Order Code RL30588 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Updated January 11, 2006 Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Summary Afghanistan’s political transition is proceeding, but insurgent threats to Afghanistan’s government persist. A new constitution was adopted in January 2004, and successful presidential elections were held on October 9, 2004, followed by parliamentary elections on September 18, 2005. This completes the post-Taliban political transition roadmap established at the December 2001 international conference in Bonn, Germany. Afghan citizens are enjoying new personal freedoms that were forbidden under the Taliban, and women are participating in economic and political life. However, the insurgency led by remnants of the former Taliban regime has conducted numerous lethal attacks since mid-2005, narcotics trafficking is rampant, and independent militias remain throughout the country, although they are being progressively disarmed. The report of the 9/11 Commission recommended a long-term commitment to stabilize Afghanistan. Legislation passed in December 2004 to implement those recommendations (P.L. 108-458) contains several provisions on Afghanistan. U.S. stabilization measures focus on strengthening the central government and its security forces while combating insurgents. The United States and other countries are building an Afghan National Army; deploying a multinational International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to patrol Kabul and other cities; and running regional enclaves to secure reconstruction (Provincial Reconstruction Teams, PRTs). Approximately 18,000 U.S. troops remain in Afghanistan to combat the Taliban-led insurgency, but the United States and NATO have agreed to shift more of the security burden to NATO during 2006, and U.S. force levels are now programmed to drop to about 16,500 by mid-2006. To build security institutions and assist reconstruction, the United States gave Afghanistan about $3.35 billion in an FY2005 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-13), including funds for Afghan security forces. Another $931 million is provided for in the conference report on the regular FY2006 aid appropriation (P.L. 109-102). This paper will be updated as warranted by major developments. See also CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard; and CRS Report RL32783, FY2005 Supplemental Appropriations for Iraq and Afghanistan, Tsunami Relief, and Other Activities, by Amy Belasco and Larry Nowels. Contents Background to Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Mujahedin Government and Rise of the Taliban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Taliban Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 The “Northern Alliance” Coalition Against the Taliban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Bush Administration Policy Pre-September 11, 2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Post-War Stabilization and Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 The Bonn Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Permanent Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 National Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Addressing Key Challenges to the Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Strengthening Central Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Dismantling Independent Militias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Combating Narcotics Trafficking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Reconstructing Infrastructure and the Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 Implementing Rule of Law/Improving Human Rights Practices . . . . . 18 Advancement of Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Post-War Security Operations and Force Capacity Building . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Counter-Insurgency Combat/Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) . . . 21 International Security Force (ISAF)/NATO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Afghan National Army (ANA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Afghan National Police . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Regional Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Russia, Central Asian States, and China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 Central Asian States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 U.S. and International Aid to Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 and Amendments . . . . . . 35 FY2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Beyond FY2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Additional Forms of U.S. Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 World Bank/Asian Development Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 International Reconstruction Pledges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Promoting Long-Term Economic Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Trade and Investment Framework Agreement and WTO Membership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Residual Issues From Past Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Stinger Retrieval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Mine Eradication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Appendix 1: U.S. and International Sanctions Lifted . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 List of Figures Figure 1. Map of Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 List of Tables Table 1. Table 2. Table 3. Table 4. Table 5. Table 6. Table 7. Table 8. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY1999-FY2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1978-FY1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 ISAF Contributing Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Provincial Reconstruction Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Major Factions in Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Background to Recent Developments Afghanistan’s slide into instability began in the 1970s when its Communist Party and its Islamic movement grew in strength and became increasingly bitter opponents of each other.1 The instability shattered the relative peace and progress that characterized the rule of Afghanistan’s last monarch, King Mohammad Zahir Shah, who reigned from 1933 to 1973. Prior to the founding of the monarchy in 1747 by Ahmad Shah Durrani, Afghanistan was a territory inhabited by tribes and tribal confederations often linked to neighboring nations; it was not a distinct political entity. King Amanullah Khan (1919-1929) launched attacks on British forces in Afghanistan shortly after taking power and won complete independence from Britain as recognized in the Treaty of Rawalpindi (August 8, 1919). He was considered a secular modernizer presiding over a government in which all ethnic minorities participated. He was succeeded by King Mohammad Nadir Shah (19291933), and then by Zahir Shah. Zahir Shah is remembered fondly by many Afghans for promulgating a constitution in 1964 that established a national legislature and promoting freedoms for women, including freeing them from covering their face and hair. However, possibly believing that doing so would enable him to limit Soviet support for communist factions in Afghanistan, Zahir Shah also entered into a significant political and arms purchase relationship with the Soviet Union. While receiving medical treatment in Italy, Zahir Shah was overthrown by his cousin, Mohammad Daoud, a military leader. He established a dictatorship characterized by strong state control over the economy. After taking power in 1978 by overthrowing Daoud, Communists, first under Nur Mohammad Taraki and then under Hafizullah Amin (leader of a rival communist faction who overthrew Taraki in 1979), attempted to impose radical socialist change on a traditional society, in part by redistributing land and bring more women into government. These moves spurred recruitment for Islamic parties opposed to such moves. The Soviet Union sent troops into Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, to prevent a seizure of power by the Islamic militias, known as the “mujahedin”2 (Islamic fighters). Upon their invasion, the Soviets replaced Hafizullah Amin with an ally, Babrak Karmal. 1 For details, see CRS Report RL31759, Reconstruction Assistance in Afghanistan: Goals, Priorities, and Issues for Congress, by Rhoda Margesson and Johanna Bockman. 2 The term refers to an Islamic guerrilla; literally “one who fights in the cause of Islam.” CRS-2 After the Soviets occupied Afghanistan, the mujahedin fought them effectively, and Soviet occupation forces were never able to pacify the outlying areas of the country. The mujahedin benefited from U.S. weapons and assistance, provided through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), working closely with Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence directorate (ISI). That weaponry included portable shoulder-fired anti-aircraft systems called “Stingers,” which proved highly effective against Soviet aircraft. The mujahedin also hid and stored weaponry in a large network of natural and manmade tunnels and caves throughout Afghanistan. The Soviet Union’s losses mounted, and Soviet domestic opinion turned anti-war. In 1986, after the reformist Mikhail Gorbachev became leader, the Soviets replaced Karmal with the director of Afghan intelligence, “Najibullah” Ahmedzai. On April 14, 1988, Gorbachev agreed to a U.N.-brokered accord (the Geneva Accords) requiring it to withdraw. The withdrawal was completed by February 15, 1989, leaving in place the weak Najibullah government. The United States closed its embassy in Kabul in January 1989, as the Soviet Union was completing its pullout. A warming of relations moved the United States and Soviet Union to try for a political settlement to the Afghan conflict, a trend accelerated by the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, which reduced Moscow’s capacity for supporting communist regimes in the Third World. Moscow and Washington agreed on September 13, 1991, to a joint cutoff of military aid to the Afghan combatants. The State Department has said that a total of about $3 billion in economic and covert military assistance was provided by the U.S. to the Afghan mujahedin from 1980 until the end of the Soviet occupation in 1989. Press reports say the covert aid program grew from about $20 million per year in FY1980 to about $300 million per year during FY1986-FY1990. The Soviet pullout decreased the strategic value of Afghanistan, causing the Administration and Congress to reduce covert funding.3 With Soviet backing withdrawn, on March 18, 1992, Najibullah publicly agreed to step down once an interim government was formed. That announcement set off a wave of rebellions primarily by Uzbek and Tajik militia commanders who were nominally his allies. The defectors joined prominent mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masud of the Islamic Society, a largely Tajik party headed by Burhannudin Rabbani. Masud had earned a reputation as a brilliant strategist by preventing the Soviets from occupying his power base in the Panjshir Valley of northeastern Afghanistan. Najibullah fell, and a regime led by the mujahedin was established on April 18, 1992.4 3 For FY1991, Congress reportedly cut covert aid appropriations to the mujahedin from $300 million the previous year to $250 million, with half the aid withheld until the second half of the fiscal year. Although the intelligence authorization bill was not signed until late 1991, Congress abided by the aid figures contained in the bill. See “Country Fact Sheet: Afghanistan,” in U.S. Department of State Dispatch, vol. 5, no. 23 (June 6, 1994), p. 377. 4 After failing to flee, Najibullah, his brother, and aides remained at a U.N. facility in Kabul until the Taliban movement seized control in 1996 and hanged them. CRS-3 Afghanistan at a Glance Population: Ethnic Groups: Religions: GDP: External Debt: Major Exports: Major Imports: 28.5 million (July 2004 est.) Pashtun 42%; Tajik 27%; Uzbek 9%; Hazara 9%; Aimak 4%; Turkmen 3%; Baluch 2%; other 4% Sunni Muslim 80%; Shiite Muslim 19%; other 1% $20 billion (purchasing power parity) $8 billion bilateral, plus $500 million multilateral fruits, nuts, carpets, semi-precious gems, hides, opium food, petroleum, capital goods, textiles Source: CIA World Factbook, 2004. The Mujahedin Government and Rise of the Taliban5 The fall of Najibullah exposed the serious differences among the mujahedin parties. The leader of one of the smaller parties, Islamic scholar Sibghatullah Mojadeddi (still active, as discussed below, he led a small party called the Afghan National Liberation Front), became president for an initial two months (April-May 1992). Under an agreement among the major mujahedin parties, Rabbani became President in June 1992, with the understanding that he would leave office in December 1994. He refused to step down, maintaining that political authority would disintegrate in the absence of a clear successor. Kabul was subsequently ravaged by shelling from other mujahedin factions leader, particularly Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, who accused him of monopolizing power. Hikmatyar, who headed a fundamentalist faction of Hizb-e-Islami (Islamic Party) and reportedly received a large proportion of the U.S. covert aid during the war against the Soviet Union, was nominally prime minister but never formally took office. Four years (1992-1996) of the civil war created popular support for the Taliban as a movement that could deliver Afghanistan from the factional infighting. (Hikmatyar was later ousted by the Taliban from his power base around Jalalabad, despite sharing the Taliban’s ideology and Pashtun ethnicity, and he fled to Iran before returning to Afghanistan in early 2002. He is now allied with Taliban and Al Qaeda insurgents; his whereabouts are unknown.) The Taliban was formed in 1993-1994 by Afghan Islamic clerics and students, many of them former mujahedin who had become disillusioned with continued conflict among mujahedin parties and had moved into Pakistan to study in Islamic seminaries (“madrassas”). They were mostly practitioners of an orthodox form of Sunni Islam, “Wahhabism,” similar to that practiced in Saudi Arabia. The Taliban was composed overwhelmingly of ethnic Pashtuns (Pathans) from rural areas of Afghanistan. Pashtuns constitute a plurality in Afghanistan, accounting for about 42% of Afghanistan’s population. Taliban members viewed the Rabbani government as corrupt, anti-Pashtun, and responsible for continued civil war. With the help of defections by sympathetic mujahedin, the Taliban seized control of the southeastern city of Qandahar in November 1994, and by February 1995, it had reached the gates 5 For an in-depth study of the Taliban and its rule, see Rashid, Ahmad. Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. Yale University Press, 2000. CRS-4 of Kabul, after which an 18-month stalemate around the capital ensued. In September 1995, the Taliban captured Herat province, bordering Iran, and imprisoned its governor, Ismail Khan, a Tajik ally of Rabbani and Masud, who later escaped and took refuge in Iran. In September 1996, a string of Taliban victories near Kabul led to the withdrawal of Rabbani and Masud to their Panjshir Valley redoubt north of Kabul with most of their heavy weapons; the Taliban took control of Kabul on September 27, 1996. A sense of the Senate resolution (S.Res. 275) that resolving the Afghan civil war should be a top U.S. priority passed by unanimous consent on September 24, 1996. A similar resolution, H.Con.Res. 218, passed the House on April 28, 1998. Taliban Rule The Taliban was led by Mullah (Sunni Muslim cleric) Muhammad Umar, who fought (and lost an eye) in the anti-Soviet war fighting under the banner of the Hizbe-Islam (Islamic Party) of Yunis Khalis. Umar held the title of Head of State and Commander of the Faithful, but he mostly remained in his power base in Qandahar, rarely appearing in public. Umar forged a close bond with bin Laden and adamantly opposed meeting U.S. demands to extradite him. Born in Uruzgan province, Umar, who is about 60 years old, fled Qandahar when the Taliban surrendered it on December 9, 2001. He is still at large and, most recently in a statement on January 10, 2006, in which he rejected an overture by President Karzai to reconcile with the government, exhorts his followers to continue their insurgency. The Taliban progressively lost international and domestic support as it imposed strict adherence to Islamic customs in areas it controlled and employed harsh punishments, including executions. The Taliban authorized its “Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Suppression of Vice” to use physical punishments to enforce strict Islamic practices, including bans on television, Western music, and dancing. It prohibited women from attending school or working outside the home, except in health care, and it publicly executed some women for adultery or other transgressions. In what many consider its most extreme action, in March 2001 the Taliban blew up two large Buddha statues carved into hills above Bamiyan city, which dated to the seventh century AD, on the grounds that they represented unIslamic idolatry. (The pro-Taliban governor of Bamiyan at the time of the destruction, Mawlawi (honorific title) Mohammad Islam Mohammadi, won election to parliament in the September 18, 2005, elections. He blamed the decision to destroy the statues on Al Qaeda influence on the Taliban.) The Clinton Administration diplomatically engaged the Taliban movement before and after it took power, but U.S. relations with the Taliban had become mostly adversarial well before the September 11, 2001 attacks. The United States withheld recognition of Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, formally recognizing no faction as the government. Because of the lack of broad international recognition, the United Nations seated representatives of the ousted Rabbani government, not the Taliban. The State Department ordered the Afghan embassy in Washington, D.C., closed in August 1997 because of a power struggle in that embassy. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1193 (August 28, 1998) and 1214 (December 8, 1998) urged the Taliban to end discrimination against women. During a November 1997 visit to Pakistan, then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called CRS-5 Taliban policies “despicable.” Several U.S.-based women’s rights groups urged the Clinton Administration not to recognize the Taliban government, and in May 1999, the Senate passed a resolution (S.Res. 68) calling on the President not to recognize any Afghan government that discriminates against women. The Taliban’s hosting of Al Qaeda’s leadership had become the Clinton Administration’s overriding bilateral agenda item with Afghanistan by 1998.6 In April 1998, then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Bill Richardson visited Afghanistan and asked the Taliban to hand over bin Laden, but was rebuffed. After the August 7, 1998, Al Qaeda bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the Clinton Administration progressively pressured the Taliban to extradite bin Laden. It imposed U.S. sanctions and achieved adoption of U.N. sanctions on the Taliban regime (see appendix), and it undertook some reported covert actions against it.7 Clinton Administration officials say that they did not try to oust the Taliban from power through major U.S. military action or by militarily aiding Taliban opponents because domestic U.S. support for those steps was then lacking and the Taliban’s opponents were too weak and did not necessarily hold U.S. values. The “Northern Alliance” Coalition Against the Taliban The Taliban’s policies caused many different Afghan factions to ally with the ousted President Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Masud, the Tajik core of the anti-Taliban opposition, into a broader “Northern Alliance.” Other components of the Alliance were the following. ! Uzbeks/General Dostam. One major component was the Uzbek militia (the Junbush-Melli, or National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan) of General Abdul Rashid Dostam. Uzbeks constitute about 9% of the population, compared with 27% that are Tajik. Dostam was best known for his March 1992 break with Najibullah that precipitated Najibullah’s overthrow one month later. He subsequently fought against Rabbani during 1992-1995 to persuade him to yield power, but later joined Rabbani’s Northern Alliance against the Taliban. Dostam had commanded about 25,000 troops, armor, combat aircraft, and some Scud missiles, but he was unable to hold off Taliban forces, which, after several unsuccessful attempts, captured Dostam’s region in August 1998. During the U.S.-led war against the Taliban, Dostam led horse-mounted forces against dug-in Taliban positions at Shulgara Dam, south of Mazar-eSharif, leading to the fall of the city and the Taliban’s subsequent collapse. Dostam was a candidate for president in the October 9, 6 For more information on bin Laden and his Al Qaeda organization, see CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2002, by Kenneth Katzman. See also CRS Report RS20411, Afghanistan: Connections to Islamic Movements in Central and South Asia and Southern Russia, by Kenneth Katzman. 7 On August 20, 1998, the United States fired cruise missiles at alleged bin Laden-controlled terrorist training camps in retaliation for the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. CRS-6 2004 elections; in March 2005 Karzai appointed him as his “chief of staff” for military affairs. ! Hazara Shiites. Members of Hazara tribes, mostly Shiite Muslims, are prominent in Bamiyan Province (central Afghanistan) and are always wary of repression by Pashtuns and other large ethnic factions. The main Hazara Shiite grouping is Hizb-e-Wahdat (Unity Party, an alliance of eight smaller groups), which joined Rabbani’s 1992-1996 government. Hizb-e-Wahdat has traditionally received some material support from Iran, whose population practices Shiite Islam. Hizb-e-Wahdat forces occasionally retook Bamiyan city from the Taliban, but they did not hold it until the Taliban collapsed in November 2001. The most well known Hazara political leader is Karim Khalili, leader of a large faction of Hizb-e-Wahdat; he is now one of President Hamid Karzai’s two vice presidents. Another major Hazara figure, Mohammad Mohaqiq, ran in the October 2004 presidential election. He won a parliament seat in the September 18 election. ! Pashtun Islamists/Sayyaf. Another former mujahedin party leader, Abd-I-Rab Rasul Sayyaf, heads a Pashtun-dominated faction called the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan. Sayyaf lived many years in and is politically close to Saudi Arabia, which shares his conservative brand of Sunni Islam (“Wahhabism”). During the U.S.-backed war against the Soviet occupation, Sayyaf’s mujahedin faction, along with that of Hikmatyar, was a principal recipient of U.S.-supplied weaponry. Both criticized the U.S.-led war against Saddam Hussein after Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Even though his ideology is similar to that of the Taliban, Sayyaf joined the Northern Alliance against it. He won election to the lower house of parliament in the September 18, 2005, election but lost his bid to become its speaker, despite some support from Karzai. Bush Administration Policy Pre-September 11, 2001 Prior to the September 11 attacks, Bush Administration policy differed only slightly from Clinton Administration policy — applying pressure short of military action against the Taliban, while retaining some dialogue with it. The Bush Administration did not provide the Northern Alliance with U.S. military assistance, although the 9/11 Commission report says that, in the months prior to the September 11 attacks, the Administration was leaning toward such a step. That report adds that some Administration officials wanted to also assist anti-Taliban Pashtun forces and not just the Northern Alliance; other covert options might have been under consideration as well.8 However, in a departure from Clinton Administration policy, the Bush Administration stepped up engagement with Pakistan in an effort to persuade it to end support for the Taliban. In accordance with U.N. Security Council 8 Drogin, Bob. “U.S. Had Plan for Covert Afghan Options Before 9/11.” Los Angeles Times, May 18, 2002. CRS-7 Resolution 1333, in February 2001 the State Department ordered the closing of a Taliban representative office in New York. The Taliban closed that office, but its representative continued to operate informally. In March 2001, Bush Administration officials received a Taliban envoy, young foreign ministry aide Rahmatullah Hashemi, to discuss bilateral issues. Fighting with only some Iranian and Russian support, the Northern Alliance continued to lose ground to the Taliban after it lost Kabul in 1996. By the time of the September 11 attacks, the Taliban controlled at least 75% of the country and almost all major provincial capitals. The Northern Alliance suffered a major setback on September 9, 2001, two days before the September 11 attacks, when Ahmad Shah Masud was assassinated by alleged Al Qaeda suicide bombers posing as journalists. He was succeeded by his intelligence chief, Muhammad Fahim, a veteran figure but who lacks Masud’s charisma or authority. September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom. After the September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration decided to militarily overthrow the Taliban regime when it refused a U.S. demand to immediately extradite bin Laden. The Administration decided that a friendly regime in Kabul was needed to create the conditions under which U.S. forces could capture Al Qaeda activists there. In Congress, S.J.Res.23 (P.L. 107-40) authorized “all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 or harbored such organizations or persons....” It passed 98-0 in the Senate and with no objections in the House. Another law (P.L. 107-148) established a “Radio Free Afghanistan” under RFE/RL and provided $17 million in funding for it for FY2002. Major combat in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF) began on October 7, 2001. It consisted primarily of U.S. airstrikes on Taliban and Al Qaeda forces, coupled with targeting by relatively small numbers (about 1,000) of U.S. special operations forces, to facilitate military offensives by the Northern Alliance and Pashtun anti-Taliban forces. Some U.S. ground units (about 1,300 Marines) moved into Afghanistan to pressure the Taliban around Qandahar at the height of the fighting (October-December 2001), but there were few pitched battles between U.S. and Taliban soldiers; most of the ground combat was between Taliban and its Afghan opponents. Some critics believe that U.S. dependence on local Afghan militia forces in the war strengthened the militias’ subsequent autonomy. The Taliban regime unraveled rapidly after it lost Mazar-e-Sharif to Dostam on November 9, 2001. Northern Alliance forces commanded by Fahim — who had initially promised U.S. officials his forces would not enter the city itself — entered Kabul three days later. The collapse in the north was followed by the Taliban’s loss of the south and east to pro-U.S. Pashtun commanders, such as Hamid Karzai. Karzai had entered Afghanistan just after the September 11 attacks to organize Pashtun resistance to the Taliban, supported in that effort by U.S. special forces. He became central to U.S. efforts in the south after another Pashtun leader, Abdul Haq, entered Afghanistan in October 2001 without coordination with or support from U.S. forces and was captured and killed by the Taliban. CRS-8 Major U.S. combat operations continued after the fall of the Taliban regime. The United States and its Afghan allies conducted “Operation Anaconda” in the Shah-i-Kot Valley south of Gardez during March 2 - 19, 2002, to eliminate a pocket of as many as 800 Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters. In late March 2003, about 1,000 U.S. troops launched a raid on suspected Taliban or Al Qaeda fighters in villages around Qandahar. On May 1, 2003, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Afghan president Karzai declared major OEF combat operations ended. Post-War Stabilization and Reconstruction9 The war paved the way for the success of an eight-year-long U.N. effort to form a broad-based Afghan government. The United Nations was viewed as a credible mediator by all sides largely because of its role in ending the Soviet occupation. During the 1990s, proposals from a succession of U.N. mediators incorporated many of former King Zahir Shah’s proposals for a government to be selected by a traditional assembly, the loya jirga. However, any U.N.-mediated ceasefires between warring factions always broke down. One U.N. mediator, Algerian diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi ended his efforts in frustration in October 1999. Non-U.N. initiatives fared no better. They included the following: ! a “Six Plus Two” multilateral contact group, which began meeting in 1997 (the United States, Russia, and the six states bordering Afghanistan: Iran, China, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan); all countries in the Six Plus Two pledged not to arm the warring factions;10 ! a “Geneva group” (Italy, Germany, Iran, and the United States), formed in 2000; ! an Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) contact group; and ! individual Afghan exile efforts, including one from the Karzai clan, an “Intra Afghan Dialogue” consisting of former mujahedin commanders and clan leaders, a “Rome Grouping” centered on former King Zahir Shah, and the “Cyprus Process” consisting of proIranian Afghan exiles. The Bonn Agreement. Immediately after the September 11 attacks, Brahimi was brought back as U.N. mediator and U.N. Security Council Resolution 1378 (November 14, 2001) called for a “central” role for the United Nations in establishing 9 For an analysis of U.S. reconstruction initiatives in Afghanistan, with a focus primarily on economic reconstruction, see U.S. Government Accountability Office, Afghanistan Reconstruction, GAO-05-742 (July 2005). 10 In June 1996, the Administration formally imposed a ban on U.S. sales of arms to all factions in Afghanistan, a policy that had been already in place less formally. Federal Register, vol. 61, no. 125 (June 27, 1996), p. 33313. CRS-9 a transitional administration and inviting member states to send peacekeeping forces to promote stability and aid delivery. After the fall of Kabul in November 2001, the United Nations invited the major Afghan factions, most prominently the Northern Alliance and that of the former King — but not the Taliban — to a conference Bonn, Germany. On December 5, 2001, the factions signed the “Bonn Agreement,” which held the following provisions. ! It formed a 30-member interim administration to govern until the holding in June 2002 of an emergency loya jirga, which would choose a government to run Afghanistan until a new constitution is approved and national elections held (planned for June 2004). Hamid Karzai was selected to chair the interim administration, weighted toward the Northern Alliance (17 out of 30 of the positions). This bloc held the key posts of Defense (Fahim), Foreign Affairs (Dr. Abdullah Abdullah), and Interior (Yunus Qanooni). The three ethnic Tajiks, in their mid-40s, were close aides to Ahmad Shah Masud. It was agreed that, in the interim, Afghanistan would abide by the constitution of 1964.11 ! It authorized an international peace keeping force to maintain security, at least in Kabul. Northern Alliance forces were directed to withdraw from Kabul. The agreement also referenced the need to cooperate with the international community to counter narcotics trafficking, crime, and terrorism. The Bonn Agreement was endorsed by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1385 (December 6, 2001), and the international peacekeeping force was authorized by Security Council Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001).12 Hamid Karzai was selected to lead Afghanistan because he is a credible Pashtun leader who tends to seek factional compromise rather than by intimidating his opponents with the use of armed force. Karzai, who is about 50 years old, is leader of the powerful Popolzai tribe of Durrani Pashtuns; he became tribal leader when his father was assassinated, allegedly by Taliban agents, in Quetta, Pakistan in 1999. Karzai attended university in India. He was deputy foreign minister in Rabbani’s government during 1992-1995, but he left the government and supported the Taliban as a Pashtun alternative to Rabbani. He broke with the Taliban as its excesses unfolded and forged alliances with other anti-Taliban factions, including the Northern Alliance. Some of his several brothers have lived in the United States, including Qayyum Karzai, who won a parliament seat in the September 18, 2005, election. Permanent Constitution. An “emergency” loya jirga (June 2002) put a popular imprimatur on the new transition government. In preparation, former King 11 The last loya jirga that was widely recognized as legitimate was held in 1964 to ratify a constitution. Najibullah convened a loya jirga in 1987 to approve pro-Moscow policies; that gathering was widely viewed by Afghans as illegitimate. 12 Text of Bonn agreement at [http://www.runiceurope.org/german/frieden/afghanistan/talks/ agreement.htm]. CRS-10 Zahir Shah returned to Afghanistan on April 18, 2002. By the time of the meeting, 381 districts of Afghanistan had chosen the 1,550 delegates to it, of which about 200 were women. At the assembly, the former King and Rabbani withdrew from leadership candidacy and Karzai was selected to continue as leader until presidential elections (to be held June 2004). On its last day (June 19, 2002), the assembly approved a new cabinet similar to the previous one, but it did not form a parliament. Subsequently, a 35-member constitutional commission, appointed in October 2002, drafted the permanent constitution and unveiled in November 2003. It was debated by 502 delegates, selected in U.N.-run caucuses, at a “constitutional loya jirga (CLJ)” during December 13, 2003 - January 4, 2004. The CLJ, chaired by Sibghatullah Mojadeddi (who is discussed above), ended with approval of the constitution with only minor changes from the draft. Most significantly, members of the Northern Alliance factions and their allies did not succeed in measurably limiting the power of the presidency by setting up a prime minister-ship. There were broad concerns that a prime minister might emerge as a rival to the presidency.13 Instead, significant powers were given to an elected parliament at the CLJ, such as the power to veto senior official nominees and the ability to impeach a president. Some experts believe that the strong presidency places undue weight on Karzai’s incumbency and self-restraint. According to the permanent constitution: ! Two vice presidents run on the same election ticket as the president, and one succeeds him in the event of the president’s death. They serve a five-year term, and presidents are limited to two terms. If no presidential candidate receives at least 50%, a run-off is to be held within two weeks. ! There is to be a two-chamber parliament, provincial, and district councils. The lower house (Wolesi Jirga, House of People), to consist of 249 seats, is to be fully elected at the same time, if possible, as presidential elections. ! The 102-seat upper chamber (Meshrano Jirga, House of Elders) is to be selected as follows: one-third of the seats (34) are appointed by the President; another one third (34, one per province) are selected by provincial councils (which are elected, if possible, the same day as the parliamentary elections); and a final 34 are selected by the nearly 400 district councils (elected, if possible, the same day as the parliamentary elections). The constitution does not stipulate other roles for the district councils, although some believe they will ultimately acquire some power to impose local taxes and provide local services.14 13 Constable, Pamela. “Afghan Constitution Seeks Balance.” Washington Post, September 28, 2003. 14 Aizenman, N.C. “Afghans Face a Rocky Road to Next Vote.” Washington Post, February 19, 2005. CRS-11 ! In the elected lower house, at least 68 of those elected (an average of two per province x 34 provinces) “should” be women. That would give women about 25% of the seats in that body. The goal is to be met through election rules that would give seats to the top women vote-getters in each province. In the upper house, 50% of the president’s appointments are to be women, giving women at least 17 seats (half of the president’s 34 nominees) — about 17% of that body. ! Political parties may be established so long as their charters “do not contradict the principles of Islam,” and they do not have affiliations with other countries. ! Laws “contrary to the beliefs and provisions of the sacred religion of Islam” are prohibited, and men and women have “equal rights and duties before the law.” Islamic law is not imposed but court rulings should be “in accord with [the Hanafi school of] Islamic law, “when there is no provision in the Constitution or other laws regarding ruling on an issue.” ! Uzbek and Turkmen languages are official languages in regions inhabited by these ethnic groups. (These provisions were not in the original draft; Pashtun leaders had wanted the final constitution to designate Pashto as the sole official language.) National Elections. The October 9, 2004, presidential voting was orderly and turnout heavy (about 8.2 million votes cast out of 10.5 million registered voters). On November 3, 2004, Karzai was declared winner (55.4% of the vote) over his seventeen challengers on the first round, avoiding a runoff. He was inaugurated on December 7, 2004, with Vice President Cheney attending. Parliamentary elections had been intended for April-May 2005, although they were subsequently scheduled for September 18, 2005. The provincial councils were elected that same day. However, because of the difficulty in confirming voter registration rolls and determining district boundaries, elections for the district councils, each of which will have small and contentious boundaries, have been put off until later in 2006. (Because the district elections were not be held at the same time as the parliamentary and provincial elections, as an interim measure the provincial councils have chosen 68 of the seats of the upper house, with 34 of them to be interim seats to be replaced when the district elections are held in 2006.) According to the U.N. Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA), the number of candidates certified on July 12 (final certification) were 2,778 candidates for the lower house of parliament thus far (including about 330 women) and 3,027 candidates for the provincial councils (including 270 women). The election system was district based. The vote itself was considered mostly successful, with little violence and only minor reports of potential fraud. Turnout, however, was about 55% (about 6.5 million votes cast), possibly because each ballot contained many candidate names, and many voters are illiterate. CRS-12 Final results were delayed until November 12, 2005, because of the need to examine 2,000 fraud complaints. The 72 political parties registered with the Justice Ministry tried to elect candidates on a national or regional basis, but party organizations are weak relative to prominent personalities with relatively narrow followings. Karzai did not form his own formal party. Yunus Qanooni, Karzai’s main presidential election challenger, was the top figure in a loose coalition of proNorthern Alliance parliamentary candidates who belong to his “New Afghanistan” party set up in late 2004. Because Qanooni, Northern Alliance political leader Rabbani, and other pro-Qanooni candidates won seats in parliament, the bloc was expected to emerge as a center of opposition or criticism of Karzai in the new parliament. However, when the new body convened on December 18, the race for speaker of the lower house was between Qanooni and Karzai ally Abd-i-Rab Rasul Sayyaf (see above). Qanooni was selected even though Karzai supporters are believed to constitute a majority in the lower house. Qanooni immediately said he would step down as “opposition leader” and, as speaker, work cooperatively with Karzai. The role of opposition leader was subsequently taken up by Rabbani, who won a seat. The 102-seat upper house, selected by the provincial councils and Karzai, consists mainly of older, well known figures, as well as 17 females (half of Karzai’s 34 appointments, as provided for in the constitution). Karzai appointed former Northern Alliance Defense Minister Mohammad Fahim to that body as a gesture of reconciliation. The contest for leader of that body was won by Sibghatullah Mojadeddi (mentioned above) who is viewed as a mediator among factions. More detail on the various post-Taliban elections, some of the other winners, and the implications for Afghan politics and policy are discussed in CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, by Kenneth Katzman. Addressing Key Challenges to the Transition Karzai’s government is slowly expanding its writ, although tensions remain among factions of the national government and between the central government and some regional leaders. Aside from the security concerns, the political transition is proceeding steadily but continues to face challenges that are discussed below. Strengthening Central Government. A key part of the U.S. stabilization effort is to build the capacity of the Afghan government and keep its disparate factions working together. In December 2004, a 27-seat cabinet was sworn in, which balances ethnic factions (among Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, and others) but also tried to emphasize technocratic qualifications (nine have Ph.D’s) over factional allegiances. The main security ministries, Defense and Interior, were occupied by Pashtuns, which was widely seen as a move to marginalize the Northern Alliance faction in government. (Interior Minister Ali Jalali, a Pashtun, resigned in September 2005 purportedly because Karzai refused to remove some regional governors allegedly involved in corruption. However, Karzai appointed eight Tajik ministers, including Foreign Minister and Northern Alliance stalwart Abdullah Abdullah. Three ministers are women: presidential candidate Masooda Jalal is Minister of Women’s Affairs; Sediqa Balkhi is Minister for Martyrs and the Disabled; and Amina Afzali is Minister of Youth. To emphasize his stated commitment to end the burgeoning narcotics trafficking problem, Karzai created a CRS-13 Ministry of Counter-Narcotics, headed by Habibullah Qadari. A cabinet reshuffle might occur early in 2006 now that a parliament has been seated. The United States and Afghanistan are trying to build democratic traditions at the local level. The Afghan government’s “National Solidarity Program” seeks to create local governing councils and empower them to prioritize local reconstruction projects. Elections to these local councils have been held in several provinces, and almost 40% of those elected to them have been women.15 An FY2005 supplemental appropriations request included, within the $265 million broad democracy category, $155 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for programs including the National Solidarity Program. The conference report on P.L. 109-13 did not specify how much of the $1.086 billion in ESF appropriated is allocated for these programs. Yet, Afghanistan’s central government still lacks administrative capacity. As part of the U.S. push to build government capacity, the Bush Administration has formed the 15-person Afghan Reconstruction Group (ARG), placed within the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, to serve as additional advisors to the Afghan government. Zalmay Khalilzad, an American of Afghan origin who was President Bush’s envoy to Afghanistan, became ambassador in December 2003, and he reportedly had significant influence on Afghan government decisions.16 Ambassador Ronald Neumann replaced him in August 2005. To assist the U.S. Embassy in Kabul and coordinate reconstruction and diplomacy, in 2004 the State Department created an Office of Afghanistan Affairs, now headed by Ambassador Maureen Quinn. As a demonstration of high-level U.S. support for Karzai, the Administration has maintained a pattern of senior visits. Vice President Cheney attended Karzai’s inauguration in December 2004. In March 2005, Secretary of State Rice, and then First Lady Laura Bush (March 29) visited Afghanistan, with Secretary Rice visiting again in October 2005. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld visits every three months. Funding Issues/FY2005 Supplemental. The U.S. embassy has expanded its personnel and facilities to help accelerate the reconstruction process, and it is improving its physical security capabilities. The conference report on P.L. 109-13 provided a requested $60 million for embassy Kabul operations, as well as the requested $17.1 million in non-proliferation, anti-terrorism, and de-mining (NADR) funds for Karzai protection. Additional amounts for Afghan government capacity ($240 million was requested) are not specified. Part of the funds were for contract security to replace U.S. marines that had guarded the compound. A requested $25 million for Kabul international airport was not provided,17 although the airport has now acquired equipment for instrument landing. 15 Khalilzad, Zalmay (Then U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan). “Democracy Bubbles Up.” Wall Street Journal, March 25, 2004. 16 Waldman, Amy. “In Afghanistan, U.S. Envoy Sits in Seat of Power.” New York Times, April 17, 2004. Afghanistan’s ambassador in Washington is Seyed Jalal Tawwab, formerly a Karzai aide. 17 The conference report on the FY2004 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 108-106) provided $44 million for improvements to the U.S. embassy in Kabul. CRS-14 Dismantling Independent Militias. Karzai, as well as numerous private studies and U.S. official statements, cite regional and factional militias as a key threat to Afghan stability. In his first post-election speech on November 4, 2004, Karzai said he would continue curbing regional leaders and militias. Some of these local strongmen have been accused of past human rights abuses in a report released in July 2005 by the “Afghanistan Justice Project.18 Some argue that Afghans have always sought substantial regional autonomy. Some critics attribute the continued strength of regional militias to U.S. policies to use these militias to combat Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants. Others believe that easily obtained arms and manpower, funded by narcotics trafficking profits, help to sustain the independence of local militias. Still others maintain that local militias did not interfere to any great extent in the Afghan elections in 2004 or 2005 and are not an obstacle to Afghan stability. Karzai has moved to marginalize regional strongmen. Herat strongman Ismail Khan was appointed Minister of Water and Energy; he had been removed by Karzai as governor of Herat Province in September 2004. As noted above, Dostam was appointed Karzai’s top military advisor, and in April 2005 he “resigned” as head of his Junbush Melli faction. In July 2004, Karzai removed a charismatic Northern Alliance commander, Atta Mohammad, from control of a militia in the Mazar-eSharif area, appointing him as governor of Balkh province. Two other militia leaders, Hazrat Ali (Jalalabad area) and Khan Mohammad (Qandahar area) were placed in civilian police chief posts; (Hazrat Ali has been elected to the new parliament.) Karzai removed Pashtun regional leader Ghul Agha Sherzai as Minister of Public Works and of Urban Development but then returned him to his prior post as governor of Qandahar, subsequently shifting him to the governorship of Nangarhar Province, east of Kabul, which has many Pashtuns. Another commander of concern is former Defense Minister Fahim, although his appointment to the upper house of parliament now gives him a stake in the political process. Although he has mostly withdrawn Northern Alliance militia fighters from Kabul, as required in the Bonn agreement, and turned almost all of his heavy weapons over to U.N. and Afghan forces as of January 2005 (including four Scud missiles), he could conceivably still pose a military threat to Karzai’s government if Karzai continues to marginalize Tajiks/Northern Alliance figures. DDR and DIAG Programs. A cornerstone of the effort to curb regionalism is a program, run by the United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA) to dismantle identified and illegal militias (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration, DDR). This program is run in partnership with Japan, Britain, and Canada, with participation of the United States. The program first got off to a slow start because the Afghan Defense Ministry did not enact mandated reforms (primarily reduction of the number of Tajiks in senior positions) by the targeted July 1, 2003, date. In September 2003, Karzai acted on the issue, replacing 22 senior Tajik Defense Ministry officials with Pashtuns, Uzbeks, and Hazaras. 18 See [http://www.afghanistanjusticeproject.org]. CRS-15 The DDR program had initially been expected to demobilize 100,000 fighters, although that figure was later dropped to just over 60,000 by Afghan officials. According to UNAMA 63,000 militia fighters identified were disarmed by the time this phase of the program ended July 8, 2005, and virtually all of those have now exercised reintegration options: training, starting small businesses, and other options. The program got a boost from the ousting of Ismail Khan as Herat governor in August 2004; he permitted many of his militiamen to enter the DDR program after he was removed. Some studies have criticized the DDR program for failing to prevent a certain amount of rearmament of militiamen or stockpiling of weapons and for the rehiring of some militiamen in security programs run by the United States and its partners.19 Part of the DDR program is the collection and cantonment of militia weapons. According to UNAMA, at least 36,000 medium and light weapons have been collected; of these, 13,400 pieces have been transferred to the ANA. In addition, 10,880 heavy weapons (tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery pieces) have been collected; this is nearly all of the heavy weapons believed controlled by militia forces, according to U.S. officials. However, some accounts say that only poor quality weapons have been collected and that faction leaders maintain secret caches of weapons. Since June 11, 2005, the militia disarmament effort has centered on a pool of perhaps 80,000-100,000 members of 1,800 different “illegal armed groups” — militiamen that were not part of recognized local forces and were never on the rolls of the Defense Ministry. The program to disarm them is called the Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG). As of late 2005, over 11,000 weapons had been collected from these militia fighters. Combating Narcotics Trafficking. Narcotics trafficking has been identified as a growing problem facing the Karzai government. The State Department’s International Narcotics Strategy Report, released March 4, 2005, says that Afghanistan is “on the verge of becoming a narcotics state.” In his November 4, 2004 election victory speech, and at a subsequent conference, Karzai called on Afghans to join a “jihad” against the opium trade, later pledging to destroy Afghanistan’s poppy fields within two years. He has also urged the Bush Administration to focus primarily on funding alternative livelihoods that will dissuade Afghans from growing, rather than on eradication or interdiction. (In April 2005, for example, Afghan farmers in the Qandahar area fought Afghan units who were attempting to eradicate poppy fields.) The first evidence that some of these programs might be working was provided in a November 2005 study by the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Afghan Counternarcotics Directorate; that report said that the area devoted to opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan had dropped 21% over the past year. However, an improved yield caused the overall opium production to decline by only 2.5%. Narcotics still account for about $2.7 billion in value — still nearly half of Afghanistan’s GDP. 19 For an analysis of the DDR program, see Christian Dennys. Disarmament, Demobilization and Rearmament? June 6, 2005, [http://www.jca.apc.org/~jann/Documents/Disarmament %20demobilization%20rearmament.pdf]. CRS-16 To try to add effectiveness to the U.S. program, the U.S. military has overcome its initial reluctance to expand its mission in Afghanistan and it is now playing a greater role in attacking traffickers and their installations. The U.S. military is reportedly flying Afghan and U.S. counter-narcotics agents (Drug Enforcement Agency, DEA) on missions and identifying targets; it also evacuates casualties from any counter-drug operations. The Bush Administration also has taken some new legal steps against suspected Afghan drug traffickers by indicting them and putting the legal machinery in place to have them extradited from Afghanistan if caught.20 In mid-April 2005, a DEA operation successfully caught the alleged leading Afghan narcotics trafficker, Haji Bashir Noorzai, arresting him after a flight to New York. Another alleged Afghan trafficker, Baz Mohammad, was extradited from Afghanistan in October 2005. A detailed discussion of the narcotics trafficking issue, including U.S. funding to combat this problem in Afghanistan, is provided in CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard. Funding Issues/FY2005 Supplemental. narcotics funds are being provided: 20 Substantial U.S. counter- ! For FY2004, the United States provided $220 million to assist Afghanistan’s counter-narcotics effort and to train Afghan police, both handled by INL. Of that, $170 million was appropriated in the FY2004 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 108-106), and $50 million was provided from the post-September 11 “Emergency Response Fund.” The supplemental also provided $73 million for Defense Department counter-narcotics activities in Afghanistan. ! The FY2005 regular foreign aid appropriation (P.L. 108-447) contained no hard earmark for Afghan counter-narcotics. ! The FY2005 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-13) provided substantial funds for “Plan Afghanistan” — a $780 million (proposed FY2005 funds) program to raise public awareness about the problem, promote alternative livelihoods, and conduct interdiction and crop eradication. The appropriation included $227 million for DOD counter-narcotics in Afghanistan ($30 million less than requested); the requested $260 million for INL counternarcotics; the requested $8 million for DEA operations in Afghanistan; and $34 for counter-narcotics operations of the Afghan government. The requested $248 million to promote alternative livelihoods was not specifically provided, nor was $46 million for aerial eradication, although other funds appropriated for reconstruction are considered to support the development of alternative livelihoods. The appropriation also provides for furnishing Afghan counter-narcotics forces with some weaponry and Cameron-Moore, Simon. “U.S. to Seek Indictment of Afghan Drug Barons.” Reuters, November 2, 2004. CRS-17 equipment, as well as for an audit of how U.S. counter-narcotics funds are used there. ! The request for regular FY2006 foreign aid appropriations asks $260 million for counter-narcotics and police training purposes. The conference report on the FY2006 foreign aid appropriation (P.L. 109-102) provides $235 million for these functions. The conference report also limits Afghan ESF for FY2006 to $225 million unless the president certifies the Afghan government is fully cooperating with counter-narcotics efforts, although a waiver is provided for. The Bush Administration has not imposed sanctions on post-Taliban Afghanistan even though it has determined that Afghanistan is a major drug transit or illicit drug producing country. The Administration has not included Afghanistan on an annual list of countries that have “failed demonstrably to make substantial efforts” to adhere to international counter-narcotics agreements and take certain counter-narcotics measures set forth in U.S. law.21 Narcotics trafficking control was perhaps the one issue on which the Taliban satisfied much of the international community; the Taliban enforced a July 2000 ban on poppy cultivation, which the U.N. International Drug Control Program (UNDCP) said in February 2001 had dramatically decreased cultivation.22 The Northern Alliance did not issue a similar ban in areas it controlled. Reconstructing Infrastructure and the Economy. U.S. and Afghan officials see the growth in narcotics trafficking as a product of an Afghan economy ravaged by war and lack of investment. Since 2003, accelerated and somewhat restructured U.S. economic reconstruction efforts have showcased some evidence of success, including roads, education, and health, although the United States has not met all its reconstruction targets, according to a July 2005 report by the Government Accountability Office.23 The report noted that in 2004, in contrast to the few prior years, U.S. efforts focused on reconstruction rather than quick-impact programs. ! Roads. Paving of the Kabul-Qandahar roadway project (Phase I), completed in December 2003. According to USAID, Phase II paving was completed in November 2004, and several bridges have been completed. The Qandahar-Herat roadway, funded by the United States, Japan, and Saudi Arabia, is expected to be completed by the end of 2005. U.S.-funded ($2.7 million) work began on March 15, 2005 for a road out of the Panjshir Valley. On September 21 This is equivalent to the listing by the United States, as Afghanistan has been listed every year since 1987, as a state that is uncooperative with U.S. efforts to eliminate drug trafficking or has failed to take sufficient steps on its own to curb trafficking. 22 Crossette, Barbara. “Taliban Seem to Be Making Good on Opium Ban, U.N. Says.” New York Times, February 7, 2001. 23 Numerous other examples of U.S. economic reconstruction initiatives are analyzed in a General Accounting Office (GAO) report: Afghanistan Reconstruction: Despite Some Progress, Deteriorating Security and Other Obstacles Continue to Threaten Achievement of U.S. Goals. GAO Report GAO-05-742, July 2005. CRS-18 27, 2005, a $20 million road from Qandahar to Tarin Kowt, built by U.S. military personnel, was inaugurated. ! Education and Health. According to U.S. officials, five million Afghan children are now in school — up from only 900,000 in 2001 — and girls’ attendance is up sharply. Additional work is being conducted on school and health clinic rebuilding (278 schools and 326 clinics have been built thus far, according to Ambassador Quinn on September 22, 2005). During her March 29, 2005 visit to Afghanistan, First Lady Laura Bush announced U.S. grants out of FY2005 funds of $17.7 million for a private “American University of Kabul,” and $3.5 million for primary school education. These grants were part of the approximately $152 million in U.S. funds programmed for Afghanistan education during FY2003-FY2005 (of which $85 million was appropriated in the FY2004 supplemental, P.L. 108-106). Press reports say that some projects are going uncompleted; a Washington Post report of November 20, 2005, says that of 1,000 U.S.-funded health clinics and schools to be built by the end of 2004 at a cost of $73 million, only about 150 have been completed by November 2005, mostly refurbishments of existing buildings. ! Agriculture. According to the director of the USAID mission at U.S. Embassy Kabul in December 2005, USAID has helped Afghanistan double its agricultural output over the past four years. Funding/FY2005 Supplemental/FY2006. The FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13) appropriated $1.086 billion in ESF out of the $2 billion requested for all civilian reconstruction projects. The conference report says the amount “assumes full funding” for health programs and provincial reconstruction team (PRTs, discussed below) expenses. Among projects not funded were refurbishment of Kabul Airport, venture capital funding, industrial park funding, higher education including costs of a new law school in Kabul, and various long-term construction projects (power plants, industrial parks, and courthouses). The FY2006 regular foreign aid requests asks for about $630 million for reconstruction; approximately these amounts are in the conference report on H.R. 3057 (P.L. 109-102), including $430 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF). In a press interview, U.S. Ambassador Ron Neumann reportedly said (Washington Post, January 3, 2006) that appropriated funds “will not be enough” for FY2006, and he hopes that there will be more funds provided in supplemental appropriations. Implementing Rule of Law/Improving Human Rights Practices. Virtually all observers agree that Afghans are freer than they were under the Taliban. The press is relatively free and Afghan political groupings and parties are able to meet and organize freely, according to the State Department report on human rights practices for 2004 (released February 28, 2005). However, according to the State Department and other reports, including an April 2005 report submitted by U.N. human rights monitor on Afghanistan Cherif Bassiouni, there continue to be abuses based on ethnicity or political factionalism in many parts of Afghanistan and arbitrary implementation of justice by local leaders. The State Department International CRS-19 Religious Freedom report for 2005 (released November 8, 2005) supports accounts of progress but says there continues to be discrimination against the Shiite (Hazara) minority. Among specific incidents, some believe the Afghan police mishandled protests in Jalalabad, Ghazni, and other cities during May 11-13, 2005, which erupted in response to a May 9 Newsweek story that U.S. interrogators in Guantanamo Bay had mishandled and dishonored the Quran. The unrest resulted in 15 Afghans killed. Some observers say that the government has reimposed some Islamic restrictions that characterized Taliban rule, including the code of criminal punishments stipulated in Islamic law.24 Some have blamed the increased restrictions on chief justice Fazl Hadi Shinwari, a religious conservative who was appointed in late November 2001 by Rabbani, just after the Taliban fled Kabul but before Karzai took office. On October 23, 2005, Afghanistan’s Supreme Court convicted a male journalist Ali Nasab (editor of the monthly “Women’s Rights” magazine) of blasphemy and sentenced him to two years in prison for his articles about apostasy. The Kabul High Court reduced his sentence to time served and he was freed in December 2005, easing concerns. U.S. programs generally focus on building capacity of the judicial system, including police training and court construction; many of these programs are conducted in partnership with Italy, which is the “lead” coalition country on judicial reform. The United States has trained 579 judges as of June 2005, according to USAID, and it trains prosecutors and court administrators for the Ministry of Justice, the office of the Attorney General, and the Supreme Court. The conference report on the FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13) did not specifically appropriate the requested $25 million for court administration, a law school, and other rule of law programs. An Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHC) has been formed to monitor government performance and has been credited in State Department reports with successful interventions to curb abuses. It is headed by former Women’s Affairs minister Sima Samar. The FY2004 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 108106), appropriated $5 million to fund the Commission in FY2004. This is the amount authorized, for each FY2003-2006, for that purpose, in the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-327). Another $2 million for the AIHC was appropriated in P.L. 108-447 (regular FY2005 appropriation). The conference report on H.R. 3057 (P.L. 109-102) recommends another $2 million for this body. Advancement of Women.25 The government is widely considered to be promoting the advancement of women, although the treatment of women remains subject to Afghanistan’s conservative traditions. The first major development in post-Taliban Afghanistan was the establishment of a Ministry of Women’s Affairs, now headed by former presidential candidate Masooda Jalal, which is dedicated to 24 25 Shea, Nina. “Sharia in Kabul?” National Review, October 28, 2002. See also CRS Report RS21865, Assistance to Afghan and Iraqi Women: Issues for Congress, by Febe Armanios and Rhoda Margesson. CRS-20 improving women’s rights. That ministry has strived to involve more Afghan women in business ventures and it has invited Afghan religious scholars to hear interpretations of the Quran that favor participation of women in national affairs. In another notable development, in March 2005 Karzai appointed former Minister of Women’s Affairs Habiba Sohrabi as governor of Bamiyan province, inhabited mostly by Hazaras. As noted above, the constitution reserves for women at least 25% of the seats in the upper house of parliament, and several prominent women have won seats in the new parliament, including some who would have won even if there were no set-aside for women. Three women are in the cabinet. Women are performing some jobs, such as construction work, that were rarely held by women even before the Taliban came to power in 1996, 26 including in the new police force. Press reports say Afghan women are increasingly learning how to drive. Under the new government, the wearing of the full body covering called the burqa is no longer obligatory, although many women continue to wear it by tradition. The Administration and Congress are taking a continued interest in the treatment of women in Afghanistan, and U.S. officials have had some influence in persuading the government to codify women’s rights. After the Karzai government took office, the United States and the new Afghan government set up a U.S.-Afghan Women’s Council to coordinate the allocation of resources to Afghan women. Empowerment of Afghan women was a major feature of First Lady Laura Bush’s visit to Afghanistan in March 2005. According to the State Department, the United States has implemented over 175 projects directly in support of Afghan women, including women’s empowerment, maternal and child health and nutrition, funding the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, micro-finance projects, and like programs. Funding to Advance Afghan Women. Recent congressional action includes the following. ! On November 27, 2001, as the Taliban was collapsing, the House unanimously adopted S. 1573, the Afghan Women and Children Relief Act, which had earlier passed the Senate. The law (signed December 12, 2001) calls for the use of unspecified amounts of supplemental funding (appropriated by P.L. 107-38, which gave the Office of the President a $40 billion Emergency Response Fund to respond to the September 11, 2001 attacks)27 to fund educational and health programs for Afghan women and children. ! The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-327) authorized $15 million per year, for FY2003-2006, for the Ministry of Women’s Affairs. 26 Amanpour, Christiane. CNN special report on Afghanistan. Broadcast November 2, 2003. 27 For more information on how the appropriated funds were distributed and used, see CRS Report RL31173, Combating Terrorism: First Emergency Supplemental AppropriationsDistribution of Funds to Departments and Agencies, by James R. Riehl. CRS-21 ! The FY2004 supplemental (P.L. 108-106) appropriated $60 million for programs to assist Afghan women and girls, and expresses the sense of Congress that the United States seek (in Afghanistan and Iraq) to promote high level participation of women in legislative bodies and ministries and ensure their rights in new institutions. ! The FY2005 regular foreign aid appropriation, P.L. 108-447, provides $50 million for Afghan women and girls, of which $7.5 million is to go to small grants to women’s businesses. Another $6 million is appropriated in that law for maternal and child health care in Afghanistan. On March 11, 2005, the Administration announced a $2.275 million grant (FY2005 funds) to the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, during a visit to the United States by Minister Masooda Jalal. The conference report on P.L. 109-13, an FY2005 supplemental, recommends $5 million be used for women’s organizations’ capacity building. ! The conference report on the FY2006 foreign aid appropriation (P.L. 109-102 recommends $50 million in funding for programs benefitting women and girls, including $7.5 million to train and equip Afghan women-run NGOs. Post-War Security Operations and Force Capacity Building The top security priority of the Administration has been to prevent Al Qaeda from regrouping there and to reduce security threats to the Afghan government. The pillars of the U.S. security effort are (1) combat operations by U.S. and other coalition forces in Afghanistan; (2) peacekeeping by a NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); (3) U.S. and NATO expansion of “provincial reconstruction teams” (PRTs); and (4) the equipping and training of an Afghan National Army and a police force. Counter-Insurgency Combat/Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The United States military (U.S. Central Command, CENTCOM) has about 18,000 troops in Afghanistan, and nineteen coalition countries are contributing another approximately 2,000 combat troops to OEF. These include forces from Britain (several hundred); Australia (300); France (200, as well as French combat aircraft flying strikes from Bagram air base north of Kabul, Tajikistan, and Qatar); Romania, Canada, the Netherlands, Italy, New Zealand, and Germany. Additional assistance comes from Japanese naval refueling capabilities in the Arabian sea; several countries, reporting to the U.S. Fifth Fleet command in Bahrain, participate in a patrol mission for the Arabian Sea to prevent the movement of Al Qaeda and other militants across those waters. The commander of U.S./OEF forces in Afghanistan is Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry (as of May 3, 2005, replacing Lt. Gen David Barno), who heads the “Combined Forces Command (CFC),” headquartered near the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. The operational commander is Maj. Gen. Jason Kamiya. U.S. forces along with Afghan troops continue on the offensive against insurgents. Among major recent operations, the United States and Afghanistan conducted “Operation Mountain Viper” (August 2003); “Operation Avalanche,” CRS-22 (December 8-30, 2003); “Operation Mountain Storm” (March-July 2004) against Taliban remnants in and around Uruzgan province (home province of Mullah Umar); “Operation Lightning Freedom” (December 2004-February 2005); and “Operation Pil (Elephant)” in Kunar Province in eastern Afghanistan (mid-October 2005). U.S. commanders believe that the combat, coupled with overall political and economic reconstruction, is defeating the insurgency, although insurgents attacks have escalated somewhat since April 2005. Since then, Taliban and Hikmatyar insurgents, apparently mimicking suicide and roadside bombing tactics used in the Iraq insurgency, have stepped up their operations in Afghanistan. Recent insurgent attacks have focused on aid workers, U.S. and Afghan soldiers and police, Afghan teachers whose classes contain girls, pro-Karzai clerics, and politicians. Seven parliamentary candidates were assassinated during the campaign. Some attribute the stepped up attacks to a reinforcement of the Taliban insurgents by Al Qaeda militants who cross the border from Pakistan, but Gen. Eikenberry in December 2005 said he does not see indications that insurgents in Afghanistan are receiving active help from insurgents in Iraq. Karzai said in September 2005 that the U.S.-Afghan effort should now emphasize preventing the infiltration of insurgents from Pakistan and economic incentives to lure away potential insurgents, rather than on combat. Of the most significant recent attacks, on June 1, 2005 a mosque in Qandahar was bombed, killing 40 Afghans, including Kabul’s police chief. On September 28, 2005, a suicide bomber killed nine Afghan soldiers. Four Americans were killed in an August 29, 2004, bombing of a U.S. security contractor (DynCorp) facility in Kabul. A suicide bomber killed ten Afghans at a provincial market in Uruzgan province, not far from where Ambassador Neumann was meeting. Two Swedish international peacekeepers (ISAF, see below) were killed in the normally quiet mostly Uzbek city of Mazar-e-Sharif in November 2005. The Taliban insurgent command structure apparently is still intact. As noted above, Mullah Umar remains active. Some top aides have been captured, but others, such as Jalaludin Haqqani, Mullah Akhtar Usmani, and Mullah Dadullah are still at large. In addition, in April 2005 Taliban remnants started a clandestine radio station, “Voice of Shariat,” suggesting the movement still has substantial resources. On the other hand, in early October 2005, Pakistan arrested and subsequently extradited to Afghanistan the Taliban’s chief “spokesman,” Abdul Latif Hakimi. Several Taliban militants have renounced their past and joined the political process under Karzai’s offers of amnesty. According to press reports, about 50-60 militants, including several key Taliban and Hikmatyar activists, have joined the reconciliation process, which is headed by Sibghatullah Mojadeddi. In January 2005, U.S. forces in Afghanistan released 81 detained Taliban fighters at Karzai’s request. Another Taliban figure, its former ambassador to Pakistan, was released by U.S. forces in September 2005. As noted above, several Taliban figures, including its foreign minister Wakil Mutawwakil, ran in the parliamentary elections. Karzai has said about 100-150 of the top Taliban leadership would not be eligible for amnesty or political engagement. The Hunt for Al Qaeda and Other Militants. U.S. Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan (and in Pakistan) continue to hunt for bin Laden and his close CRS-23 ally, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Bin Laden reportedly escaped the U.S.-Afghan offensive against the Al Qaeda stronghold of Tora Bora in eastern Afghanistan in December 2001.28 The two are now widely believed to be on Pakistan’s side of the border. As noted above, another target of OEF is the Hikmatyar faction (Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, HIG) allied with Al Qaeda and Taliban insurgents. On February 19, 2003, the U.S. government formally designated Hikmatyar as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist,” under the authority of Executive Order 13224, but it is not formally designated as a “Foreign Terrorist Organization.” Executive Order 13224 subjects named terrorists and terrorist-related institutions to financial and other U.S. sanctions. The HIG is included in the section on “other terrorist groups” in the State Department’s report on international terrorism for 2004, released April 2005. Some accounts suggest that a Special Operations team ambushed in June 2005 might have searching for Hikmatyar; a U.S. helicopter sent to rescue the team was apparently shot down, killing the 16 aboard. Longer Term U.S. Military Presence. Even if the Taliban insurgency is defeated completely, it appears that the United States will maintain a long-term presence in Afghanistan. President Karzai told visiting Defense Secretary Rumsfeld on April 13, 2005, that Afghanistan would ask President Bush for a long-term security pact with the United States that might include permanent bases, although Rumsfeld reportedly was non-committal. On May 8, 2005, Karzai summoned about 1,000 delegates to a national consultation in Kabul on the proposal to allow permanent U.S. bases in Afghanistan; delegates reportedly supported an indefinite presence of international forces to maintain security but urged Karzai to delay a firm decision. On May 23, 2005, Karzai and President Bush issued a “joint declaration” providing for U.S. forces to have access to Afghan military facilities, in order to prosecute “the war against international terror and the struggle against violent extremism.” The joint statement did not give Karzai his requested increased control over facilities used by the U.S. forces, over U.S. operations, or over the disposition of prisoners taken in the course of operations. Some of the bases, both in and near Afghanistan, that are used in support of U.S. operations in Afghanistan and that could form part of a longer-term U.S. presence to ensure Afghanistan’s security include the following. ! Bagram Air Base north of Kabul, the operational hub of U.S. forces in Afghanistan.29 Bagram, along with thirteen other airfields in Afghanistan, handle the 150 U.S. aircraft (including helicopters) in the country. The FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13) provides a total of about $52 million for various projects to upgrade facilities at Bagram, including a control tower and an operations center, but a $57 million fuel storage tank farm for Bagram was not appropriated. 28 For more information on the search for the Al Qaeda leadership, see CRS Report RL33038, Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment, by Kenneth Katzman. 29 Harris, Kent. “Buildings Going Up at Bagram Air Base as U.S. Forces Dig In for the Long Haul.” Stars and Stripes, March 15, 2005. CRS-24 ! Qandahar airfield, just outside that city, which bases about 500 U.S. military personnel. The FY2005 supplemental provides $16 million for an ammunition supply facility at Qandahar. ! Shindand Air Base, 20 miles from the Iranian border, which has been used by U.S. forces since October 2004, after the dismissal of Herat governor Ismail Khan, whose forces controlled the facility. ! Karshi-Khanabad airbase in Uzbekistan housed about 1,750 U.S. military personnel (900 Air Force, 400 Army, and 450 civilian) in supply missions to Afghanistan when used. In July 2005, following U.S. criticism of the May 2005 crackdown on unrest in the city of Andijon, Uzbekistan formally demanded that the United States discontinue use of the base within six months. U.S. forces have ceased using it, and in November 2005 the Defense Department reportedly paid Uzbekistan $23 million in reimbursements owed for use of the facility. ! The Peter Ganci base at Manas airport in Kyrgyzstan, which has about 1,000 U.S. military personnel, as well as refueling and cargo aircraft. Leadership of Kyrgyzstan changed in April 2005 in a revolution against former President Askar Akayev, but Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Rice reportedly received assurances about continued U.S. use of the base during their visits to Kyrgyzstan in July 2005 and October 2005, respectively. However, Kyrgyzstan reportedly wants the United States to pay more for use of the facility to cover environmental clean-up costs associated with U.S. use of it. ! Several bases in the Persian Gulf are used to support the Afghanistan mission, including Al Dhafra in the UAE, Al Udeid in Qatar, and several airfields in Oman. P.L. 109-13 appropriates $1.4 million to upgrade Al Dhafra. ! On April 21, 2005, Turkey said it would extend for another year an agreement allowing the United States to use Incirlik air base to supply U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. OEF Costs and Casualties. As of January 11, 2006, 255 U.S. military personnel have been killed in OEF, of which 208 (plus one DOD civilian) have died in or around Afghanistan. In 2005, 90 U.S. soldiers were killed in Afghanistan, double the 2004 number — another indication of greater insurgent lethality. The others died in other theaters of the war, such as in Africa and the Middle East. No reliable Afghan casualty figures for the war on the Taliban and Al Qaeda have been announced, but estimates by researchers of Afghan civilian deaths generally cite figures of “several hundred” civilian deaths. Incremental costs of U.S. operations in Afghanistan appear to be relatively stable at about $900 million to $1 billion per month. About $13 billion in incremental costs were incurred in FY2002. The FY2004 supplemental CRS-25 appropriation provided about $11 billion for Operation Enduring Freedom for FY2004 (P.L. 108-106). Supplemental FY2005 funds for Afghanistan combat were provided in P.L. 108-287 and P.L. 109-13.30 International Security Force (ISAF)/NATO.31 In 2006, international forces will be assuming from the United States a greater share of the security burden. The Bonn Agreement and U.N. Security Council Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001) created an international peacekeeping force for Afghanistan: the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).32 ISAF was initially limited to Kabul but broadened with NATO’s takeover of command of ISAF (August 2003) and NATO/ISAF’s assumption of control over additional provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs, see below) in western and northern Afghanistan in 2004 and 2005.33 That process will continue in 2006 as NATO/ISAF takes over additional PRTs and, along with that, some of the combat mission, in southern and eastern Afghanistan (by July 2006). A British-led 6,000 person “Regional Command South” will be formed, with U.S. participation. The expansion agreement represents a quieting of the initial opposition of NATO nations France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain to mixing peacekeeping with anti-insurgent combat. The resolution of the differences came in late 2005 when NATO agreed on a formula under which a deputy commander of ISAF would be “dual-hatted” — reporting to the OEF combat mission as well as the ISAF command structure. In December 2005, NATO adopted rules of engagement that will allow NATO/ISAF forces to perform combat missions, although perhaps not as aggressively as the combat that has been conducted by U.S. forces. In conjunction with the assumption of greater NATO/ISAF responsibility, President Bush stated on January 4, 2006, that U.S. force levels in Afghanistan will drop to about 16,500 in 2006. NATO/ISAF force levels will correspondingly increase to about 15,000, from the current level of about 12,000. (During 2002-2004, ISAF’s force was about 6,400 troops from all 26 NATO countries, plus 10 non-NATO countries.) Table 6 lists each contributing country to ISAF and forces contributed. Currently, the core of NATO/ISAF is the Kabul Multinational Brigade (4,400 personnel), which was headed by Canada until August 2004, then by the “Eurocorps,” a rapid response force composed of forces from France, Germany, 30 Information on U.S. military costs and funding requests for these operations is analyzed in CRS Report RL33110, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Enhanced Base Security Since 9/11, by Amy Belasco. 31 As noted above, six countries (in addition to the United States) are providing forces to OEF, and twelve countries are providing forces to both OEF and ISAF. 32 Its mandate was extended on September 13, 2005, until October 2006 (U.N. Security Council Resolution 1623). 33 In October 2003, NATO endorsed expanding its presence to several other cities, contingent on formal U.N. approval. That NATO decision came several weeks after Germany agreed to contribute an additional 450 military personnel to expand ISAF into the city of Konduz. The U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1510 (October 14, 2003) formally authorizing ISAF to deploy outside Kabul. CRS-26 Spain, Belgium, and Luxembourg. Turkey took over the lead force role in February 2005, and Italy became lead in August 2005. Britain is slated to take over the lead in April 2006 as head of an “Allied Rapid Reaction Corps.” At the headquarters level, there are 600 personnel from 15 contributing nations. ISAF coordinates with Afghan security forces and with OEF forces as well, and it assists the Afghan Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism in the operation of Kabul international airport. The United States currently contributes a small amount of force to ISAF (89 troops), primarily to coordinate U.S. assistance to ISAF. Some U.S. officials are skeptical that NATO can assume greater security responsibilities, because of its chronic personnel and equipment shortages. Those shortages eased somewhat in December 2003 when NATO identified additional equipment for ISAF operations, including 12 helicopters from Germany, the Netherlands, and Turkey; and aircraft and infantry from various nations. Britain will be bringing additional equipment, including Apache attack helicopters, when it becomes lead force in NATO/ISAF in 2006. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). NATO/ISAF expansion in Afghanistan builds on a U.S. initiative to use its military presence to promote reconstruction. That effort, inaugurated in December 2002, is based on the establishment of provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) — military-run enclaves that provide safe havens for international aid workers to help with reconstruction and to extend the writ of the Kabul government. PRT activities can range from resolving local disputes to coordinating local reconstruction projects, although the U.S.-run PRTs focus mostly on counter-insurgency. Each U.S.-run PRT is composed of U.S. forces (50-100 U.S. military personnel); Defense Department civil affairs officers; representatives of USAID, State Department, and other agencies; and Afghan government (Interior Ministry) personnel. Most PRTs, including those run by partner forces, have personnel to train Afghan security forces. Plans are to eventually establish PRTs in most of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. Some aid agencies say they have felt more secure since the PRT program began, fostering reconstruction activity in areas of PRT operations.34 However, other relief groups do not want to associate with any military force because doing so might taint their perceived neutrality. Partner countries now run eleven PRTs. As part of the expansion of NATO/ISAF responsibility in Afghanistan, in mid 2005 Italy (with Spain) took over and began new PRTs in the west. In August 2005 Canada’s 1,250 troops, police, and foreign affairs officers took over the key U.S.-led PRT in Qandahar (outside NATO/ISAF auspices). Under current plans for transition to NATO/ISAF security leadership: Italy (with Spain), through their PRTs, will have primary control for Western Afghanistan; Germany (with Turkey and France) will take over the PRTs and the leadership role in the north from Britain; and Britain (with Canada, the Netherlands, and Australia) will control the south in partnership with the United States through the “Regional Command South” vehicle discussed above. However, the plan for the south was thrown into some disarray in late 2005 when Netherlands officials and parliamentarians balked at the potential dangers Dutch soldiers would 34 Kraul, Chris. “U.S. Aid Effort Wins Over Skeptics in Afghanistan.” Los Angeles Times, April 11, 2003. CRS-27 face in the south, especially the Uruzgan Province PRT that it is to take over. The United States and NATO have moved to reassure the Netherlands that U.S. combat capability will be available to assist the Dutch contingent, which is to number 1,400 when it deploys to the south. However, a Dutch decision is still pending. Under the current plans, the United States will continue to control the eastern sector of Afghanistan for the foreseeable future (and to be present in force in the south), where combat is substantial. The list of existing PRTs is shown in Table 7. (One U.S.-run PRT is under NATO auspices.) The FY2004 supplemental appropriations provided $50 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for “PRT projects” (P.L. 108-106). The conference report on the FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13) says that ESF for PRT reconstruction-related programs are provided ($87 million was requested for this function). Afghan National Army (ANA). U.S. forces (“Office of Security Cooperation Afghanistan,” OSC-A), in partnership with French, British, and other forces, are training the new ANA. U.S. officers in Afghanistan say the ANA is beginning to become a major force in stabilizing the country and a national symbol. The ANA deployed to Herat in March 2004 to help quell factional unrest there and to Meymaneh in April 2004 in response to Dostam’s militia movement into that city. In December 2005, Gen. Eikenberry highlighted the fact that the ANA had deployed outside Afghanistan to assist relief efforts for victims of the October 2005 Pakistan earthquake. The United States has built four regional bases for the ANA, in Herat, Gardez, Qandahar, and Mazar-e-Sharif. The ANA now has at least some presence in most of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, working with the PRTs and assisted by embedded U.S. trainers. Coalition officers are conducting heavy weapons training for a heavy brigade as part of the “Kabul Corps,” based in Pol-e-Charki, east of Kabul. As of January 2006, the ANA numbers about 27,000 troops, with another 6,000 in training. These comprise 40 battalions, of which 24 are combat battalions. On the other hand, about 31,000 have been trained to date, suggesting that some desertion or absentee problem persists. U.N. statements say that the ANA is expected to reach its “target strength” of 43,000 by the end of 2007, three years ahead of its original schedule. Earlier plans to build an ANA of 70,000 by 2007 have apparently been modified. A June 2005 report by the Government Accountability Office cites progress but also notes problems such as ANA equipment shortages.35 There have been personnel problems that likely continue as well. At the time the United States first began establishing the ANA, Northern Alliance figures reportedly weighted recruitment for the national army toward its Tajik ethnic base. Many Pashtuns, in reaction, refused recruitment or left the ANA program. U.S. officials in Afghanistan say this problem has been alleviated with better pay and more involvement by U.S. special forces, as well as the appointment of additional Pashtuns in senior Defense 35 Government Accountability Office Report GAO-05-575. “Afghanistan Security.” June 2005. Available at [http://www.gao.gov]. CRS-28 Ministry positions.36 The naming of a Pashtun, Abdul Rahim Wardak, as Defense Minister in December 2004 has also reduced desertions among Pashtuns. To provide ethnic balance, the chief of staff is Gen. Bismillah Khan, a Tajik who was a Northern Alliance commander; Khan conducted an official visit to the United States in October 2005. U.S. officers in Afghanistan add that some recruits take long trips to their home towns to remit funds to their families, and often then return to the ANA after a long absence. Fully trained recruits are paid about $70 per month. The FY2005 foreign aid appropriation (P.L. 108-447) contains a provision requiring that ANA recruits be vetted for past involvement in terrorism, human rights violations, and drug trafficking. An Afghan Air Force, a carryover from the Afghan Air Force that existed prior to the Soviet invasion, remains, although it has virtually no aircraft to fly. It has about 400 pilots, as well as 28 aging helicopters and a few cargo aircraft. Russia overhauled 11 of these craft in 2004, but the equipment is difficult to maintain. In May 2005, representatives of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) said the United States is considering obtaining for Afghanistan additional transport planes and helicopters, although the equipment might not necessarily be U.S. equipment, according to DSCA. Afghan pilots are based at Bagram air base. Afghanistan is seeking the return of 26 aircraft, including some MiG-2s that were flown to safety in Pakistan and Uzbekistan during the past conflicts in Afghanistan. ANA Funding and Armament. Equipment, maintenance, and logistical difficulties continue to plague the ANA, according to U.S. commanders and outside observers. Thus far, weaponry for the ANA has come primarily from Defense Ministry weapons stocks — with the concurrence of former Defense Minister Fahim who controlled those stocks — from international donors,37 primarily from the former East bloc38 and from the DDR program discussed above. In October 2005, Russia announced it would give the ANA four helicopters and other non-lethal military aid and equipment; it has already provided about $100 million in military aid to postTaliban Afghanistan. According to a GAO report of June 2005, the United States has drawn-down $287 million worth of defense articles (including M-113 armored personnel carriers) and services for the ANA during FY2002-FY2004, plus $11 million worth of military trucks and armored personnel vehicles. On June 16, 2005, the President authorized an additional draw-down of $161.5 million. In FY2006, Afghanistan is eligible to receive grant Excess Defense Articles (EDA) under Section 516 of the Foreign Assistance Act. According to the June 2005 GAO report, the United States provided about $4.1 billion during FY2002-FY2005 to support the ANA (and Afghan national police). U.S. funds appropriated for Peacekeeping Operations (PKO funds) are used to cover 36 Gall, Carlotta. “In a Remote Corner, an Afghan Army Evolves From Fantasy to Slightly Ragged Reality.” New York Times, January 25, 2003. 37 International donors have supplied an estimated $193 million worth of weapons and funds to help build the ANA. For example, in May 2005, Egypt delivered 16,000 weapons to the ANA. 38 Report to Congress Consistent With the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002, July 22, 2003. CRS-29 ANA salaries. ($20 million in such funds was provided in FY2004; $23.8 million will be provided for FY2005, and $18 million is requested for FY2006). In recent appropriations, ! The FY2004 supplemental (P.L. 108-106) provided $287 million in foreign military financing (FMF) to accelerate ANA development. The FY2005 regular foreign aid appropriation (P.L. 108-447) earmarked $400 million in FMF for the ANA. ! The FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13) provided the requested $1.285 billion for DOD operations to train and equip the ANA. Of that amount, $290 million is to reimburse the U.S. Army for funds already obligated to train and equip the Afghan forces. ! The FY2006 Defense Appropriation (P.L. 109-148) provides up to $500 million in DOD operations and maintenance funds for DOD to equip and train the ANA and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Afghan National Police. Some Afghan officials believe that building up a credible and capable national police force is at least as important as building the ANA. Some Afghans do not believe the ANA should have a role in maintaining internal security, and that this should be the role of the police. The United States and Germany are training the Afghan National Police (ANP) force. The U.S. effort has been led by State Department/INL, primarily through a contract with DynCorp, but the Defense Department is beginning to play a role in that effort, particularly in “police reform.” About 55,000 ANP are on duty, trained by the United States and Germany (police senior levels). The force is targeted for 62,000 by early 2006. There are seven police training centers around Afghanistan. Part of the training consists of courses in human rights principles and democratic policing concepts. However, the ANP work in the communities they come from, often embroiling them in local factional or ethnic disputes. The June 2005 GAO report, cited above, notes progress and continued problems, including the continued influence of local leaders on the national police. The State Department (INL) has placed 30 U.S. advisors in the Interior Ministry to help it develop the national police force and counter-narcotics capabilities. According to the State Department, the United States has completed training of the first unit of National Interdiction Unit officers under the Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan. U.S. trainers are also building Border Police and Highway Patrol forces (which are included in the figures cited above). Funding. In recent appropriations, the FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13) provides $360 million (of $400 million requested) in State Department INL funds to train the ANP. Another $58.5 million was requested for FY2006 out of a total INL request of $260 million for Afghanistan counter-narcotics and police training. The conference report on P.L. 109-102 funds $235 million for INL Afghanistan operations, meaning the request, including training of the ANP, is almost fully funded. International donors have furnished $120 million in cash for the ANP and provided another $126 million in equipment and training. CRS-30 Regional Context Although most of Afghanistan’s neighbors believe that the fall of the Taliban has stabilized the region, some experts believe that some neighboring governments are attempting to manipulate Afghanistan’s factions to their advantage, even though six of Afghanistan’s neighbors signed a non-interference pledge (Kabul Declaration) on December 23, 2002. Pakistan39 Afghan officials are trying to normalize relations with Pakistan even though they assert that Pakistan has failed to prevent Taliban remnants from operating there. Pakistan had been the most public defender of the Taliban movement when it was in power, viewing it as an instrument with which to build an Afghan central government strong enough to prevent fragmentation of Afghanistan while at the same time sufficiently friendly and pliable to provide Pakistan strategic depth against rival India. Pakistan was one of only three countries (Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are the others) to formally recognize it as the legitimate government. Pakistan publicly ended its support for the Taliban in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks. After the September 11 attacks, Pakistan provided the United States with requested access to Pakistani airspace, some ports, and some airfields for OEF. Pakistan also has arrested over 550 Al Qaeda fighters, some of them senior operatives, and turned them over to the United States. Among those captured by Pakistan are top bin Laden aide Abu Zubaydah (captured April 2002); alleged September 11 plotter Ramzi bin Al Shibh September 11, 2002); top Al Qaeda planner Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (March 2003); and most recently a top planner, Abu Faraj al-Libbi (May 2005). Following failed assassination attempts in December 2003 against President Musharraf, Pakistani forces accelerated efforts to find Al Qaeda forces along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, in some cases threatening tribal elements in these areas who are suspected of harboring the militants. In March 2004, about 70,000 Pakistani forces began a major battle with about 300-400 suspected Al Qaeda fighters in the Waziristan area, reportedly with some support from U.S. intelligence and other indirect support. Pakistan now has approximately 74,000 forces poised near the north Waziristan area of Pakistan, and the U.S. military acknowledged in April 2005 that it is training Pakistani commandos to fight Al Qaeda fighters in Pakistan.40 At the same time, Pakistan has been widely criticized for insufficient efforts to find and arrest Taliban figures who might be in Pakistan. Some suspect that Pakistan is seeking to protect its interests by fashioning a strong Pashtun-based component for 39 For further discussion, see Rashid, Ahmed. “The Taliban: Exporting Extremism.” Foreign Affairs, November-December 1999. 40 Gall, Carlotta. “U.S. Training Pakistani Units Fighting Qaeda.” New York Times, April 27, 2005. CRS-31 a post-Taliban government. Pakistan is wary that any Afghan government might fall under the influence of India, which Pakistan says is using its diplomatic facilities in Afghanistan to train and recruit anti-Pakistan insurgents. Pakistan says it is too difficult to distinguish Afghan Taliban from Pakistani nationals. On July 19, 2005, Pakistan arrested five suspected senior Taliban leaders, including a deputy to Mullah Umar, and, as noted above, in October 2005 it captured Taliban spokesman Hakimi. Despite the improving climate between these neighbors, there are occasional border clashes, apparently caused by the lack of clear border delineation, and the presence of independent armed factions on the Afghan side of the border or aggressive commanders on the Pakistani side. The most recent border clash was on January 4, 2005. Pakistan wants the government of Afghanistan to pledge to abide by the “Durand Line,” a border agreement reached between Britain (signed by Sir Henry Mortimer Durand) and then Afghan leader Amir Abdul Rahman Khan in 1893, separating Afghanistan from what was then British-controlled India (later Pakistan after the 1947 partition). As of October 2002, about 1.75 million Afghan refugees have returned from Pakistan since the Taliban fell. About 300,000 Afghan refugees remain in Pakistan. Iran Iran perceives its key national interests in Afghanistan as exerting its traditional influence over western Afghanistan, which Iran borders and was once part of the Persian empire, and to protect Afghanistan’s Shiite minority. Iranian firms are also profiting from reconstruction work in western Afghanistan. After the fall of the Taliban in late 2001, President Bush warned Iran against meddling in Afghanistan. Partly in response to the U.S. criticism, in February 2002 Iran expelled Karzaiopponent Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, although it did not arrest him. Since then, the Bush Administration has accused Iran of trying to build influence over the interim government, although such criticism has lessened as the pro-Iranian Northern Alliance has been marginalized in the government. For his part, Karzai has said that Iran is an important neighbor of Afghanistan. Iran did not strongly oppose Karzai’s firing of Iran ally Ismail Khan in September 2004, although Iran has opposed the subsequent U.S. use of the Shindand air base.41 Iran is said to be helping Afghan law enforcement with anti-narcotics along their border. About 300,000 Afghan refugees have returned from Iran since the Taliban fell, but about 1.2 million remain, mostly integrated into Iranian society. Iran’s position in Afghanistan was improved substantially by the fall of the Taliban, which Iran saw as a threat to its interests in Afghanistan, especially after Taliban forces captured Herat (the western province that borders Iran) in September 1995. Iran subsequently drew even closer to the Northern Alliance than previously, providing its groups with fuel, funds, and ammunition,42 and hosting fighters loyal to Ismail Khan. In September 1998, Iranian and Taliban forces nearly came into 41 Rashid, Ahmed. “Afghan Neighbors Show Signs of Aiding in Nation’s Stability.” Wall Street Journal, October 18, 2004. 42 Steele, Jonathon, “America Includes Iran in Talks on Ending War in Afghanistan.” Washington Times, December 15, 1997. CRS-32 direct conflict when Iran discovered that nine of its diplomats were killed in the course of the Taliban’s offensive in northern Afghanistan. Iran massed forces at the border and threatened military action, but the crisis cooled without a major clash, possibly out of fear that Pakistan would intervene on behalf of the Taliban. Iran has confirmed that it offered search and rescue assistance in Afghanistan during the U.S.led war to topple the Taliban, and it also allowed U.S. humanitarian aid to the Afghan people to transit Iran. India The interests and activities of India in Afghanistan are almost the reverse of those of Pakistan. India’s goal is to deny Afghanistan from providing “strategic depth” to Pakistan, and India supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban in the mid-1990s. According to Indian officials, Pakistan wants to have the option of installing another pro-Pakistan government there.43 India saw the Taliban’s hosting of Al Qaeda as a major threat to India itself because of Al Qaeda’s association with radical Islamic organizations in Pakistan dedicated to ending Indian control of parts of Jammu and Kashmir. Some of these groups have committed major acts of terrorism in India. India is currently considering co-financing, along with the Asian Development Bank, several power projects in northern Afghanistan. In other signs of cooperation, in January 2005 India, among other joint projects announced, promised to help Afghanistan’s struggling Ariana national airline and to begin India Air flights from Delhi to Kabul. Russia, Central Asian States, and China Some neighboring and nearby states take an active interest not only in Afghan stability, but in the U.S. military posture that supports OEF. Russia. During the 1990s, Russia supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban with some military equipment and technical assistance in order to blunt Islamic militancy emanating from Afghanistan.44 Russia, which is also still stung by its humiliating withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, apparently views Northern Alliance figures as instruments with which to rebuild Russian influence in Afghanistan. In October 2005, Russia announced it would supply the ANA with helicopters. Although Russia supported the U.S. effort against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan out of fear of Islamic (mainly Chechen) radicals, more recently Russia has sought to reduce the U.S. military presence in Central Asia. Russian fears of Islamic activism emanating from Afghanistan may have ebbed since 2002 when Russia killed a Chechen of Arab origin known as “Hattab” (full name is Ibn alKhattab), who led a militant pro-Al Qaeda Chechen faction. The Taliban government was the only government in the world to recognize Chechnya’s 43 44 These views were expressed by Indian officials during a visit to India in December 2004. Risen, James. “Russians Are Back in Afghanistan, Aiding Rebels.” New York Times, July 27, 1998. CRS-33 independence, and some Chechen fighters fighting alongside Taliban/Al Qaeda forces have been captured or killed. Central Asian States. During Taliban rule, Russian and Central Asian leaders grew increasingly alarmed that radical Islamic movements were receiving safe haven in Afghanistan. Uzbekistan, in particular, has long asserted that the group Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), allegedly responsible for four simultaneous February 1999 bombings in Tashkent that nearly killed President Islam Karimov, is linked to Al Qaeda.45 One of its leaders, Juma Namangani, reportedly was killed while commanding Taliban/Al Qaeda forces in Konduz in November 2001. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan do not directly border Afghanistan, but IMU guerrillas have transited Kyrgyzstan during past incursions into Uzbekistan.46 These countries generally supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban; Uzbekistan supported Uzbek leader Abdul Rashid Dostam, who was part of that Alliance, as discussed above. In 1996, several of these states banded together with Russia and China into a regional grouping called the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to discuss the Taliban threat. It includes China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Reflecting Russian and Chinese efforts to limit U.S. influence in the region, the group issued a statement in early July 2005, reiterated by a top official of the group in October 2005, that the United States should set a timetable for ending its military presence in Central Asia. Despite the Shanghai Cooperation Organization statements, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan are all, for now, holding to their pledges of facility support to OEF. Tajikistan, heavily influenced by Russia, was initially reluctant to allow the United States the use of military facilities in Tajikistan. However, on September 26, 2001, Moscow officially endorsed the use by the United States of three air bases in Tajikistan, paving the way for Tajikistan to open facilities for U.S. use, which it did formally offer in early November 2001. France has consistently based some combat aircraft there for the OEF effort. In July 2003, Afghanistan and Tajikistan agreed that some Russian officers would train some Afghan military officers in Tajikistan. As noted above, since December 2001 Kyrgyzstan has hosted U.S. air operations at Manas airport. Under a July 2002 agreement, Kazakhstan allows coalition aircraft to use Kazakhstan’s airports in case of an emergency or short-term need related to the ongoing war in Afghanistan. Of the Central Asian states that border Afghanistan, only Turkmenistan chose to seek close relations with the Taliban leadership when it was in power, possibly viewing engagement as a more effective means of preventing spillover of radical Islamic activity from Afghanistan. Turkmenistan’s leader, Saparmurad Niyazov, saw Taliban control as facilitating construction of a natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan (see below). The September 11 events stoked Turkmenistan’s fears of the Taliban and its Al Qaeda guests and the country publicly supported the U.S.-led war. No OEF forces have been based in Turkmenistan. 45 The IMU was named a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department in September 2000. 46 Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1999, pp. 14, 92. CRS-34 China. A major organizer of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, China has a small border with a sliver of Afghanistan known as the “Wakhan corridor” (see map). China had become increasingly concerned about the potential for Al Qaeda to promote Islamic fundamentalism among Muslims (Uighurs) in northwestern China. A number of Uighurs fought in Taliban and Al Qaeda ranks in the U.S.-led war, according to U.S. military officials. In December 2000, sensing China’s increasing concern about Taliban policies, a Chinese official delegation met with Mullah Umar. China did not, at first, enthusiastically support U.S. military action against the Taliban. Many experts believe this is because China, as a result of strategic considerations, was wary of a U.S. military buildup nearby. In addition, China has been an ally of Pakistan, in part to balance out India, a rival of China. Saudi Arabia During the Soviet occupation, Saudi Arabia channeled hundreds of millions of dollars to the Afghan resistance, primarily the Hikmatyar and Sayyaf factions. Saudi Arabia, which itself practices the strict Wahhabi brand of Islam practiced by the Taliban, was one of three countries to formally recognize the Taliban government. The Taliban initially served Saudi Arabia as a potential counter to Iran, but IranianSaudi relations improved after 1997 and balancing Iranian power ebbed as a factor in Saudi policy toward Afghanistan. Drawing on its intelligence ties to Afghanistan during that era, Saudi Arabia worked with Taliban leaders to persuade them to suppress anti-Saudi activities by Al Qaeda. Saudi Arabia apparently believed that Al Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan drew Saudi Islamic radicals away from Saudi Arabia itself and thereby reduced their opportunity to destabilize the Saudi regime. Some press reports indicate that, in late 1998, Saudi and Taliban leaders discussed, but did not agree on, a plan for a panel of Saudi and Afghan Islamic scholars to decide bin Laden’s fate. Other reports, however, say that Saudi Arabia refused an offer from Sudan in 1996 to extradite bin Laden to his homeland on the grounds that he could become a rallying point for opposition to the regime. According to U.S. officials, Saudi Arabia cooperated extensively, if not publicly, with OEF. It broke diplomatic relations with the Taliban in late September 2001 and quietly permitted the United States to use a Saudi base for command of U.S. air operations over Afghanistan, but it did not permit U.S. aircraft to launch strikes in Afghanistan from Saudi bases. The Saudi position has generally been to allow the United States the use of its facilities as long as doing so is not publicized. U.S. and International Aid to Afghanistan Afghanistan’s economy and society are reemerging after decades of warfare that left about 2 million dead, 700,000 widows and orphans, and about 1 million Afghan children who were born and raised in refugee camps outside Afghanistan. In addition to 3.6 million Afghan refugees at the start of the U.S.-led war,47 another 500,000 Afghans were displaced internally before U.S. military action began, according to 47 About 1.5 million Afghan refugees were in Iran; 2 million in Pakistan; 20,000 in Russia; 17,000 in India, and 9,000 in the Central Asian states. CRS-35 Secretary General Annan’s April 19, 2001, report. Since January 2002, more than 3.5 million Afghan refugees have returned. The Afghan economy grew 30% in 2002, 25% in 2003, 11% in 2004, and it is expected to grow 15% for 2005. Some international investors are returning, and a luxury hotel opened in November 2005. Still, the Afghan government lacks large revenue sources, and international donors, U.N. agencies, and NGOs are required to provide international assistance to Afghanistan. The U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) supervises Afghan repatriation and Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan During the 1990s, the United States became the largest single provider of assistance to the Afghan people. During Taliban rule, no U.S. aid went directly to that government — monies were provided through recognized NGOs and relief organizations. Between 1985-1994, the United States did have a cross-border aid program for Afghanistan, through which aid was distributed in Afghanistan via U.S. aid workers in Pakistan. Citing the difficulty of administering a cross-border program, there was no USAID mission for Afghanistan from the end of FY1994 until the reopening of the U.S. Embassy in late 2001. Table 1 breaks down FY1999FY2002 aid by program, and the other tables cover FY2003- FY2005. A history of U.S. aid to Afghanistan prior to 1999 (FY1978-FY1998) is in Table 5.48 Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 and Amendments. A key post-Taliban aid authorization bill, S. 2712, the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-327, December 4, 2002), as amended, authorized the following: ! ! ! ! ! ! ! 48 $60 million in total counter-narcotics assistance ($15 million per year for FY2003-FY2006); $30 million in assistance for political development, including national, regional, and local elections ($10 million per year for FY2003-FY2005); $80 million total to benefit women and for Afghan human rights oversight ($15 million per year for FY2003-FY2006 for the Afghan Ministry of Women’s Affairs, and $5 million per year for FY20032006 to the National Human Rights Commission of Afghanistan); $1.7 billion in humanitarian and development aid ($425 million per year for FY2003-FY2006); $300 million for an Enterprise Fund; $550 million in draw-downs of defense articles and services for Afghanistan and regional militaries. (The original law provided for $300 million in drawdowns. That was increased to $450 million by P.L. 108-106, an FY2004 supplemental appropriations); and $1 billion ($500 million per year for FY2003-FY2004) to expand ISAF if such an expansion takes place. In some cases, aid figures are subject to variation depending on how that aid is measured. The figures cited might not exactly match figures in appropriated legislation; in some, funds were added to specified accounts from monies in the September 11-related Emergency Response Fund. CRS-36 The total authorization, for all categories for all years, is over $3.7 billion. For the most part, the humanitarian, counter-narcotics, and governance assistance targets authorized by the act have been met or exceeded by successive appropriations. However, no Enterprise Funds have been appropriated, and ISAF expansion has been funded by contributing nations, not U.S. appropriations. A subsequent bill (S. 2845, P.L. 108-458, December 17, 2004), that implemented the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, contains a subtitle called “The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act Amendments of 2004.” The subtitle mandates the appointment of a U.S. coordinator of policy on Afghanistan and requires additional Administration reports to Congress, including (1) on long-term U.S. strategy and progress of reconstruction — an amendment to the report required in the original law; (2) on how U.S. assistance is being used; (3) on U.S. efforts to persuade other countries to participate in Afghan peacekeeping; and (4) a joint State and Defense Department report on U.S. counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan. The law also contains several “sense of Congress” provisions recommending more rapid DDR activities; expansion of ISAF; and new initiatives to combat narcotics trafficking. The law does not specify dollar amounts for U.S. aid for FY2005 and FY2006, authorizing “such sums as may be necessary” for FY2005 and FY2006.” FY2006. For FY2006, the Administration requested a total of $920 million for Afghanistan, as follows: $43 million for child survival and health; $430 million to train and equip the ANA; $260 million for State Department police training and counter-narcotics; $18 million for Karzai protection; $18 million for peacekeeping operations; and $150 million for “other.” The conference report on H.R. 3057 appropriates $931.4 million, more than fully funding the Administration request. This amount is lower than the $954 million of the House version but higher than the $920 million in the Senate version. As noted above, the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan said in a press interview in December 2005 that the FY2006 funds appropriated — of which about $630 million are for reconstruction — are insufficient to accomplish U.S. goals. Beyond FY2006. The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act authorizes funding through FY2006. On December 2, 2005, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Ron Neumann signed an agreement with the Afghan Finance Minister under which the United States pledges to provide Afghanistan with $5.5 billion in aid over the next five years. The agreement reportedly sets out plans for U.S. support to programs including education, health care, and economic and democratic development. It is not clear whether the purported figures include funding for the ANA, the national police, counter-narcotics, and other security-related programs. Additional Forms of U.S. Assistance. Since the fall of the Taliban, the U.S. Treasury Department (Office of Foreign Assets Control, OFAC) has unblocked over $145 million in assets of Afghan government-owned banking entities that were frozen under U.S. sanctions imposed on the Taliban in 1999, and another $17 million in privately-owned Afghan assets. These funds were used for currency stabilization; mostly gold held in Afghanistan’s name in the United States to back up Afghanistan’s currency. Together with its allies, over $350 million in frozen funds were released to the Afghan government. The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) has made available total investment credits of $100 million. The CRS-37 United States also successfully pressed the International Air Transport Association to pay Afghanistan $20 million in overflight fees that were withheld because of U.N. sanctions on the Taliban. World Bank/Asian Development Bank. In May 2002, the World Bank reopened its office in Afghanistan after 20 years. On March 12, 2003, it announced a $108 million loan to Afghanistan, the first since 1979. In August 2003, the World Bank agreed to lend Afghanistan an additional $30 million to rehabilitate the telecommunications system, and $30 million for road and drainage rehabilitation in Kabul. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has been playing a major role in Afghanistan and has pledged $800 million in loans and grants and $200 million in project insurance for Afghanistan. Since December 2002, the bank has loaned Afghanistan $372 million of road reconstruction, fiscal management and governance, and agricultural development. The Bank has also granted Afghanistan about $90 million for power projects, agriculture reform, roads, and rehabilitation of the energy sector. One of its projects in Afghanistan was funding the paving of a road from Qandahar to the border with Pakistan. In December 2004, the Bank approved an additional loan of $80 million to restore and improve key sections of the road system. International Reconstruction Pledges. Afghan leaders say that Afghanistan needs $27.5 billion for reconstruction for 2002-2010. At a 2002 Tokyo donors’ conference, total pledges for reconstruction amounted to $2 billion for 2002 and $4.5 billion over five years, as follows: European Union, $495 million in 2002; Japan, $500 million over 30 months; Germany, $362 million over four years; Saudi Arabia, $220 million over three years; Iran, $560 million over five years; Pakistan, $100 million over five years; India, a $100 million line of credit; South Korea, $45 million over 30 months; and United Kingdom, $86 million in 2002. In March 2003, the EU announced an additional $410 million donation for 2003-2004. In April 2004 international donors meeting in Berlin pledged $8.2 billion for Afghanistan for 2004-2006, of which about $4.5 billion (including U.S. funds) was to be provided in 2004. Other pledges for 2004-2006 included European Union ($2.2 billion); Canada (200 million); Japan ($400 million); World Bank loans ($900 million); Asia Development Bank loans ($560 million); India ($225 million); and Iran ($155 million). Another donors’ meeting was held in Kabul on April 4, 2005, primarily to reaffirm and structure previous pledges rather than attract new promises of aid. At the meeting, Afghan leaders insisted that international aid be channeled through the Afghan government, curbing the prerogatives of NGOs in assisting the Afghan people. Another donors’ conference is to take place later in January 2006. The government is trying to generate a growing portion of its budget domestically. In concert with efforts to weaken regional leaders and force customs revenue to be remitted to the central government, Kabul now raises domestically over one-third of its $600 million annual budget. Karzai also has sought to reassure international donors by establishing a transparent budget and planning process. Promoting Long-Term Economic Development. In an effort to find a long-term solution to Afghanistan’s acute humanitarian problems, the United States has tried to promote major development projects as a means of improving Afghan living standards and political stability over the long term. During 1996-98, the CRS-38 Clinton Administration supported proposed natural gas and oil pipelines through western Afghanistan as an incentive for the warring factions to cooperate. A consortium led by Los Angeles-based Unocal Corporation proposed a $2.5 billion Central Asia Gas Pipeline (CentGas) that would originate in southern Turkmenistan and pass through Afghanistan to Pakistan, with possible extensions into India.49 The deterioration in U.S.-Taliban relations after 1998 largely ended hopes for the pipeline projects while the Taliban was in power. Immediately after the August 20, 1998 U.S. strikes on bin Laden’s bases in Afghanistan, Unocal suspended all its Afghan pipeline-related activities, including a U.S.-based training program for Afghans for the project. It subsequently withdrew from its consortium. A rival consortium led by Bridas of Argentina continued to try to win the project. Prospects for the project have improved in the post-Taliban period. In a summit meeting in late May 2002 between the leaders of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, the three countries agreed to revive the gas pipeline project. Sponsors of the project held an inaugural meeting on July 9, 2002 in Turkmenistan, signing a series of preliminary agreements. They recommitted to it on March 1, 2005, although financing for the project is unclear. Some U.S. officials view this project as a superior alternative to a proposed gas pipeline from Iran to India, transiting Pakistan. Trade and Investment Framework Agreement and WTO Membership. The United States is trying to build on Afghanistan’s post-war economic rebound. Following a meeting with Karzai on June 15, 2004, President Bush announced the United States and Afghanistan would negotiate a bilateral trade and investment framework agreement (TIFA). These agreements are generally seen as a prelude to a broader but more complex bilateral free trade agreement. On December 13, 2004, the 148 countries of the World Trade Organization voted to start membership talks with Afghanistan. Residual Issues From Past Conflicts A few issues remain unresolved from Afghanistan’s many years of conflict. Among them are the “Stinger” anti-aircraft missiles provided to the mujahedin during the Soviet occupation, and the elimination of land mines. Stinger Retrieval. Beginning in late 1985 and following an internal debate, the Reagan Administration provided “hundreds” of man-portable “Stinger” antiaircraft missiles to the mujahedin for use against Soviet combat helicopters and aircraft. Prior to the U.S.-led war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, common estimates suggested that 200-300 Stingers remained at large in Afghanistan out of about 2,000 provided during the war against the Soviet Union, although more recent 49 Other participants in the Unocal consortium include Delta of Saudi Arabia, Hyundai of South Korea, Crescent Steel of Pakistan, Itochu Corporation and INPEX of Japan, and the government of Turkmenistan. Some accounts say Russia’s Gazprom would probably receive a stake in the project. Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Moscow), October 30, 1997, p. 3. CRS-39 estimates put the number below 100.50 The Stinger issue resurfaced in conjunction with 2001 U.S. war effort, when U.S. pilots reported that the Taliban fired some Stingers at U.S. aircraft during the war. No hits were reported. Any Stingers that survived the anti-Taliban war are likely controlled by Afghans now allied to the United States and presumably pose less of a threat. However, there are concerns that remaining Stingers could be sold to terrorists for use against civilian airliners. In February 2002, the Afghan government found and returned to the United States “dozens” of Stingers.51 In late January 2005, the Afghan intelligence service began a new push to buy remaining Stingers back, at a reported cost of $150,000 each.52 In 1992, after the fall of the Russian-backed government of Najibullah, the United States reportedly spent about $10 million to buy the Stingers back, at a premium, from individual mujahedin commanders. The New York Times reported on July 24, 1993, that the buy back effort failed because the United States was competing with other buyers, including Iran and North Korea, and that the CIA would spend about $55 million in FY1994 in a renewed Stinger buy-back effort. On March 7, 1994, the Washington Post reported that the CIA had recovered only a fraction (maybe 50 or 100) of the at-large Stingers. The danger of these weapons has become apparent on several occasions. Iran bought 16 of the missiles in 1987 and fired one against U.S. helicopters; some reportedly were transferred to Lebanese Hizballah. India claimed that it was a Stinger, supplied to Islamic rebels in Kashmir probably by sympathizers in Afghanistan, that shot down an Indian helicopter over Kashmir in May 1999.53 It was a Soviet-made SA-7 “Strella” man-portable launchers that were fired, allegedly by Al Qaeda, against a U.S. military aircraft in Saudi Arabia in June 2002 and against an Israeli passenger aircraft in Kenya on November 30, 2002. Both missed their targets. SA-7s have been discovered in Afghanistan by U.S.-led forces, most recently in December 2002. Mine Eradication. Land mines laid during the Soviet occupation constitute one of the principal dangers to the Afghan people. The United Nations estimates that 5 -7 million mines remain scattered throughout the country, although some estimates by outside organizations are significantly lower. An estimated 400,000 Afghans have been killed or wounded by land mines. U.N. teams have succeeded in destroying one million mines and are now focusing on de-mining priority-use, residential and commercial property, including land surrounding Kabul. As shown in the U.S. aid table for FY1999-FY2002 (Table 1), the U.S. de-mining program was providing about $3 million per year for Afghanistan, and the amount increased to about $7 million in the post-Taliban period. Most of the funds have gone to HALO Trust, a British organization, and the U.N. Mine Action Program for Afghanistan. 50 Saleem, Farrukh. “Where Are the Missing Stinger Missiles? Pakistan,” Friday Times. August 17-23, 2001. 51 Fullerton, John. “Afghan Authorities Hand in Stinger Missiles to U.S.” Reuters, February 4, 2002. 52 “Afghanistan Report,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. February 4, 2005. 53 “U.S.-Made Stinger Missiles — Mobile and Lethal.” Reuters, May 28, 1999. CRS-40 Table 1. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY1999-FY2002 ($ in millions) U.S. Department of Agriculture (DOA) and USAID Food For Peace (FFP), via World Food Program(WFP) State/Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) via UNHCR and ICRC State Department/ Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) State Department/HDP (Humanitarian Demining Program) Aid to Afghan Refugees in Pakistan (through various NGOs) FY2000 FY2001 $42.0 worth of wheat (100,000 metric tons under “416(b)” program. $16.95 for Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran, and to assist their repatriation $7.0 to various NGOs to aid Afghans inside Afghanistan $68.875 for 165,000 metric tons. (60,000 tons for May 2000 drought relief) $131.0 (300,000 metric tons under P.L.480, Title II, and 416(b)) $198.12 (for food commodities) $14.03 for the same purposes $22.03 for similar purposes $136.54 (to U.N. agencies) $6.68 for drought relief and health, water, and sanitation programs $3.0 $18.934 for similar programs $113.36 (to various U.N. agencies and NGOs) $2.8 $7.0 to Halo Trust/other demining $2.615 $5.44 (2.789 for health, training Afghan females in Pakistan $6.169, of which $3.82 went to similar purposes Counter-Narcotics USAID/ Office of Transition Initiatives Dept. of Defense $5.31 for similar purposes $1.50 $0.45 (Afghan women in Pakistan) Foreign Military Financing Anti-Terrorism Economic Support Funds (E.S.F) Peacekeeping Totals FY2002 (Final) FY1999 $76.6 $113.2 $182.6 $63.0 $24.35 for broadcasting/ media $50.9 ( 2.4 million rations) $57.0 (for Afghan national army) $36.4 $105.2 $24.0 $815.9 CRS-41 Table 2. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY2003 (in millions, same acronyms as Table 1) From the FY2003 Foreign Aid Appropriations (P.L. 108-7) Development/Health $90 Food Aid $47 Peacekeeping $10 Disaster Relief $94 ESF $50 Non-Proliferation, Demining, AntiTerrorism (NADR) $5 Refugee Relief $55 Military aid $21 Total from this law: $372 From the FY2003 Supplemental (P.L. 108-11) Road Construction (ESF, KabulQandahar road) $100 PRTs (ESF) $10 Afghan government support (ESF) $57 Military Aid (FMF) Anti-terrorism/de-mining $170 (to train Afghan national army) $28 Total from this law: $365 Total for FY2003 $737 CRS-42 Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2004 (in millions, same acronyms as previous tables) From the FY2004 Supplemental (P.L. 108-106) Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR program) $30 Support to Afghan government $70 Elections/governance $69 Roads $181 Schools/Education $95 Health Services/Clinics $49 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) $58 Private Sector/Power Generation $95 Water Projects $23 Counter-narcotics/police training (INCLE) $220 Afghan National Army (FMF) $364 Anti-Terrorism/Afghan Leadership Protection Total from this law: $64 $1,320 From the FY2004 Regular Appropriations (P.L. 108-199) Development/Health $171 Disaster Relief $35 Refugee Relief $72 Afghan women (ESF) $5 Judicial reform commission (ESF) $2 Reforestation (ESF) $2 Aid to communities and victims of U.S. military operations (ESF) $2 Other reconstruction ESF $64 Military Assistance $50 Total from this law: Total for FY2004 $403 $1,723 CRS-43 Table 4. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY2005 (in millions) From the FY2005 Regular Appropriations (P.L. 108-447 ESF to assist Afghan governing institutions $225 FMF to train and equip the ANA $400 Assistance to benefit women and girls $50 Agriculture, private sector investment, environment, primary education, reproductive health, and democracybuilding $300 Reforestation $2 Child and maternal health $6 Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission $2 Total from this law $985 From First FY2005 Supplemental (P.L. 108-287) FMF for training and equipping the ANA (and the Iraqi security forces) $500 From Second FY2005 Supplemental (P.L. 109-13) DoD funds to train and equip Afghan security forces DoD counter-narcotics operations ESF for reconstruction and democracy and governance (including alternative livelihoods) $1,285 $242 $1,086 INL counter-narcotics $260 INL Afghan police training $360 Karzi protection (NADR funds) $17.1 Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP), mostly for counternarcotics $34 DEA operations in Afghanistan $7.7 Operations of U.S. Embassy Kabul $60 Total from this law Total from all FY2005 laws $3,351 $4,336 (plus ANA portion of $500 million for ANA and Iraqi forces) CRS-44 Table 5. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1978-FY1998 1978 4.989 Econ. Supp. (ESF) — 1979 3.074 — 1980 — 1981 — — — 1982 — — 1983 — 1984 Fiscal Year Devel. Assist. P.L. 480 (Title I and II) 5.742 7.195 Other Military (Incl. Regional Refugee Aid) 0.269 0.789 Total 11.789 — 0.347 10.616 (Soviet invasion - December 1979) — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 1985 3.369 — — — — 3.369 1986 — — 8.9 — — 8.9 1987 17.8 12.1 2.6 — — 32.5 1988 22.5 22.5 29.9 — — 74.9 1989 22.5 22.5 32.6 — — 77.6 1990 35.0 35.0 18.1 — — 88.1 1991 30.0 30.0 20.1 — — 80.1 1992 25.0 25.0 31.4 — — 81.4 1993 10.0 10.0 18.0 — 30.2 68.2 1994 3.4 2.0 9.0 — 27.9 42.3 1995 1.8 — 12.4 — 31.6 45.8 1996 — — 16.1 — 26.4 42.5 1997 — — 18.0 — 31.9* 49.9 1998 — — 3.6 — 49.14** 52.74 Source: U.S. Department of State. * Includes $3 million for demining and $1.2 million for counternarcotics. ** Includes $3.3 million in projects targeted for Afghan women and girls, $7 million in earthquake relief aid, 100,000 tons of 416B wheat worth about $15 million, $2 million for demining, and $1.54 for counternarcotics. CRS-45 Table 6. ISAF Contributing Nations (As of December 2005) NATO Countries Non-NATO Partner Nations Belgium 616 Albania 22 Bulgaria 37 Austria 3 Canada 1,600 Azerbaijan 22 Czech Republic 17 Croatia 45 Denmark 122 Finland 61 Macedonia 20 Ireland 10 Sweden 85 Estonia 10 France 742 Germany 2,200 Greece 171 Switzerland 4 Hungary 159 New Zealand 5 Iceland 20 Italy 9 Lithuania 9 Luxemburg 10 Netherlands 600 (to increase to 1400) Poland 313 5 Portugal 21 Romania 72 Slovakia 16 Slovenia 27 Spain Turkey United Kingdom United States 11,928 2,100 Latvia Norway Total ISAF force 1,400 825 461 (to increase to about 3,000) 89 Note: See NATO’s Afghanistan page at [http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan]. CRS-46 Table 7. Provincial Reconstruction Teams PRT Location Province Lead Force/Country Gardez Paktia U.S. Ghazni Ghazni U.S. Parwan Parwan U.S./South Korea Jalalabad Nangarhar U.S. Khost Khost U.S. Qalat Zabol U.S. Asadabad Kunar U.S. Tarin Kowt Uruzgan U.S. (Netherlands to take over in early 2006) Lashkar Gah Helmand U.S. Sharana Paktika U.S. Mehtarlam Laghman U.S. Meydan Shahr Wardak U.S. NATO/ISAF and Partner-Run PRTs Qandahar Qandahar (as of 9/05) NATO/Canada Herat Herat NATO/Italy (with Spain) Farah Farah NATO/Italy (with Spain) Mazar-e-Sharif (with satellite outposts in Sari Pol, Samangan, and Shebergan) Balkh NATO/Britain (will switch to Germany in 2006) Konduz Konduz NATO/Germany Faizabad Badakhshan NATO/Germany Meymaneh Faryab NATO/Britain (with Norway and Finland) Chaghcharan Ghowr NATO/Lithuania Qalah-ye Now Badghis NATO/Spain (with Italy) Pol-e-Khomri Baghlan NATO/Netherlands Bamiyan Bamiyan New Zealand (not NATO/ISAF) CRS-47 Table 8. Major Factions in Afghanistan Party/Commander Taliban Leader Ideology/ Ethnicity Mullah ultra-orthodox (Islamic cleric) Islamic, Muhammad Umar Pashtun Islamic Society (dominant Burhannudin party in the “Northern Rabbani, Yunus Alliance”) Qanooni, and Muhammad Fahim moderate Islamic, mostly Tajik Regional Base Small insurgent groups, mostly in the south and east. No official presence in government. Much of northern and western Afghanistan, including Kabul. Ismail Khan (part of Islamic Society/Northern Alliance) Ismail Khan (now Tajik in central government) Herat Province and environs; Khan removed as Herat governor in September 2004 Eastern Shura (Council) No clear leadership. Ghul Agha Shirzai is governor of Nangarhar province (August 2005) Jalalabad and environs moderate Islamic, Pashtun National Islamic Abdul Rashid Movement of Afghanistan Dostam (now in central government) secular, Uzbek Mazar-e-Sharif, Shebergan, and environs. Hizb-e-Wahdat Karim Khalili (Vice President) Shiite, Hazara tribes Pashtun Leaders Various regional governors; central government led by Karzai. ModerateIslam Southern, eastern ic, Pashtun Afghanistan, including Qandahar, Gardez, Ghazni, Khost, Tarin Kowt, Spin Buldak. Hizb-e-Islam Gulbuddin (HIG) Mujahedin party leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar orthodox Islamic, Pashtun Small groups around Jalalabad and in the southeast. Allied with Taliban and Al Qaeda. Islamic Union Abd-I-Rab Rasul Sayyaf orthodox Islamic, Pashtun Paghman (west of Kabul) Bamiyan province. CRS-48 Appendix 1: U.S. and International Sanctions Lifted Virtually all U.S. and international sanctions on Afghanistan, some imposed during the Soviet occupation era and others on the Taliban regime, have now been lifted: ! On January 10, 2003, President Bush signed a proclamation making Afghanistan a beneficiary of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), eliminating U.S. tariffs on 5,700 Afghan products. Afghanistan was denied GSP on May 2, 1980, under Executive Order 12204 (45 F.R. 20740). This was done under the authority of Section 504 of the Trade Act of 1974 [19 U.S.C. § 2464]. ! On April 24, 1981, controls on U.S. exports to Afghanistan of agricultural products and phosphates were terminated. Such controls were imposed on June 3, 1980, as part of the sanctions against the Soviet Union for the invasion of Afghanistan, under the authority of Sections 5 and 6 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 [P.L. 9672; 50 U.S.C. app. 2404, app. 2405]. ! In mid-1992, the George H.W. Bush Administration determined that Afghanistan no longer had a “Soviet-controlled government.” This opened Afghanistan to the use of U.S. funds made available for the U.S. share of U.N. organizations that provide assistance to Afghanistan. ! On March 31, 1993, after the fall of Najibullah in 1992, President Clinton, on national interest grounds, waived restrictions provided for in Section 481 (h) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 mandating sanctions on Afghanistan including bilateral aid cuts and suspensions, including denial of Ex-Im Bank credits; the casting of negative U.S. votes for multilateral development bank loans; and a non-allocation of a U.S. sugar quota. Discretionary sanctions included denial of GSP; additional duties on country exports to the United States; and curtailment of air transportation with the United States. Waivers were also granted in 1994 and, after the fall of the Taliban, by President Bush. ! On May 3, 2002, President Bush restored normal trade treatment to the products of Afghanistan, reversing the February 18, 1986 proclamation by President Reagan (Presidential Proclamation 5437) that suspended most-favored nation (MFN) tariff status for Afghanistan (51 F.R. 4287). The Foreign Assistance Appropriations for FY1986 [Section 552, P.L. 99-190] had authorized the President to deny any U.S. credits or most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff status for Afghanistan. ! On July 2, 2002, the State Department amended U.S. regulations (22 C.F.R. Part 126) to allow arms sales to the new Afghan government, reversing the June 14, 1996 addition of Afghanistan to the list of CRS-49 countries prohibited from receiving exports or licenses for exports of U.S. defense articles and services. Arms sales to Afghanistan had also been prohibited during 1997-2002 because Afghanistan had been designated under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132) as a state that is not cooperating with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts. ! On July 2, 2002, President Bush formally revoked the July 4, 1999 declaration by President Clinton of a national emergency with respect to Taliban because of its hosting of bin Laden. The Clinton determination and related Executive Order 13129 had blocked Taliban assets and property in the United States, banned U.S. trade with Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan, and applied these sanctions to Ariana Afghan Airlines, triggering a blocking of Ariana assets (about $500,000) in the United States and a ban on U.S. citizens’ flying on the airline. (The ban on trade with Talibancontrolled territory had essentially ended on January 29, 2002 when the State Department determination that the Taliban controls no territory within Afghanistan. ! U.N. sanctions on the Taliban imposed by Resolution 1267 (October 15, 1999), Resolution 1333 (December 19, 2000),and Resolution 1363 (July 30, 2001) have now been narrowed to penalize only Al Qaeda (by Resolution 1390, January 17, 2002). Resolution 1267 banned flights outside Afghanistan by its national airline (Ariana), and directed U.N. member states to freeze Taliban assets. Resolution 1333 prohibited the provision of arms or military advice to the Taliban (directed against Pakistan); directing a reduction of Taliban diplomatic representation abroad; and banning foreign travel by senior Taliban officials. Resolution 1363 provided for monitors in Pakistan to ensure that no weapons or military advice was provided to the Taliban. ! P.L. 108-458 (December 17, 2004, 9/11 Commission recommendations) repeals bans on aid to Afghanistan outright, completing a pre-Taliban effort by President George H.W. Bush to restore aid and credits to Afghanistan. On October 7, 1002, he had issued Presidential Determination 93-3 that Afghanistan is no longer a Marxist-Leninist country, but the determination was not implemented before he left office. Had it been implemented, the prohibition on Afghanistan’s receiving Export-Import Bank guarantees, insurance, or credits for purchases under Sec. 8 of the 1986 Export-Import Bank Act, would have been lifted. In addition, Afghanistan would have been able to receive U.S. assistance because the requirement would have been waived that Afghanistan apologize for the 1979 killing in Kabul of U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Adolph “Spike” Dubs. (Dubs was kidnapped in Kabul in 1979 and killed when Afghan police stormed the hideout where he was held.) CRS-50 Figure 1. Map of Afghanistan