Order Code RS22211
Updated January 6, 2006
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Islamist Extremism in Europe
Kristin Archick (Coordinator), John Rollins, and Steven Woehrel
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
Although the vast majority of Muslims in Europe are not involved in radical
activities, Islamist extremists and vocal fringe communities that advocate terrorism exist
and reportedly have provided cover for terrorist cells. Germany and Spain were
identified as key logistical and planning bases for the September 11, 2001, attacks on
the United States. The March 2004 terrorist bombings in Madrid have been attributed
to an Al Qaeda-inspired group of North Africans. And UK authorities are investigating
suspected Al Qaeda support to the British perpetrators of the July 7, 2005, terrorist
attacks on London. This report provides an overview of Islamist extremism in Europe,
possible terrorist links, European responses, and implications for the United States. It
will be updated as needed. See also CRS Report RL31612, European Counterterrorist
Efforts: Political Will and Diverse Responses in the First Year after September 11, and
CRS Report RL33166, Muslims in Europe: Integration in Selected Countries, by Paul
Gallis.
Background: Europe’s Muslim Communities1
Estimates of the number of Muslims in Europe vary widely, depending on the
methodology and definitions used, and the geographical limits imposed. Excluding
Turkey and the Balkans, researchers estimate that as many as 15 to 20 million Muslims
live on the European continent. Muslims are the largest religious minority in Europe, and
Islam is the continent’s fastest growing religion. Substantial Muslim populations exist
in Western European countries, including France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain,
Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium. Most Nordic and Central European countries have
smaller Muslim communities. Europe’s Muslim population is ethnically diverse, and
Muslim immigrants in Europe hail from a variety of Middle Eastern, African, and Asian
countries, as well as Turkey. Many Muslim communities have their roots in Western
European labor shortages and immigration policies of the 1950s and 1960s that attracted
1 Omer Taspinar, “Europe’s Muslim Street,” Foreign Policy, March/April 2003; “The War of the
Headscarves,” The Economist, February 7, 2004; Ian Buruma, “Letter from Amsterdam,” The
New Yorker, December 27, 2004; “Identity Crisis: Old Europe Meets New Islam,” Frontline,
January 25, 2005.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
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large numbers of North Africans, Turks, and Pakistanis especially. In recent years, there
have been influxes of Muslim migrants and political refugees from other regions and
countries, including the Balkans, Iraq, Somalia, and the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
European countries have struggled to integrate their growing Muslim populations.
A disproportionately large number of Muslims in Europe are poor, unemployed, or
imprisoned, and many feel a sense of cultural alienation and discrimination. For decades,
countries such as Germany, Austria, and Switzerland viewed Muslim immigrants as
temporary “guest workers.” As a result, little effort was made at integration, and parallel
societies developed. Britain and the Netherlands embraced the notion of multiculturalism
— integration while maintaining identity — but in practice, this concept helped entrench
discrete Muslim communities, functioning apart from the culture of the host country. Nor
has France’s integration policy prevented the segregation of its Muslim communities, as
seen most vividly in the riots that erupted throughout France in the fall of 2005 in working
class suburbs populated largely by North Africans.
Islamist Extremists in Europe and Links to Terrorist Groups
Although the vast majority of Muslims in Europe are not involved in radical
activities, Islamist extremists and fringe communities that advocate terrorism exist and
reportedly have provided cover for terrorist cells. Europe’s largely open borders and
previously non-existent or lax terrorism laws have also allowed some Islamist terrorists
to move around freely. Following the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States,
Germany and Spain were identified as key planning bases; numerous terrorist arrests were
also made in Belgium, France, Italy, and the UK. The March 11, 2004, bombings of
commuter trains in Madrid, Spain that killed 191 people were carried out by an Al Qaeda-
inspired group of North Africans, mostly Moroccans resident in Spain.
Even before terrorists struck London’s mass transport system in July 2005, many
analysts believed that the UK had become a breeding ground for Islamist extremists.
Radical mosques in London’s Finsbury Park and Brixton neighborhoods apparently
indoctrinated Richard Reid, the airplane “shoe bomber,” and Zacarias Moussaoui, the
alleged “20th” September 11 hijacker. In 2003 and 2004, UK authorities disrupted several
terrorist cells reportedly connected to Al Qaeda. UK authorities have named four young
British Muslims as the perpetrators of the July 7, 2005, London attacks that killed 52
people, plus the four bombers, and injured over 700. Three of the alleged bombers were
of Pakistani descent and had recently traveled to Pakistan and/or Afghanistan, where some
suspect they received terrorist training from remaining Al Qaeda operatives.2 On July 21,
2005, four Muslim immigrants tried but failed to set off four other explosions on
London’s metro and bus lines; no casualties resulted.
It should be noted that nationals aligning their beliefs with Al Qaeda or radical Islam
are not unique to Europe. The United States has captured or identified several U.S.
citizens with similar views in the course of the fight against terrorism. However, some
assert that the failure of European governments to fully integrate Muslim communities
into mainstream society leaves some European Muslims more vulnerable to extremist
2 Glenn Frankel and Craig Whitlock, “London Probe Extends Abroad,” Washington Post (WP),
July 16, 2005; “Two London Bombers Visited Pakistan,” CNN, July 20, 2005.
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ideologies. Many experts say that some European Muslim youth, many of whom are
second or third generation Europeans, feel disenfranchised in a society that does not fully
accept them; they appear to turn to Islam as a badge of cultural identity, and are then
radicalized by extremist Muslim clerics.3 Traditionally liberal asylum and immigration
laws in Western Europe, as well as strong free speech and privacy protections, have
attracted numerous such clerics and Middle Eastern dissidents. Many point to the UK as
a key sanctuary for Islamists claiming political persecution at home. Several have long
espoused violence in the name of Islam, including the former preacher of London’s
Finsbury Park mosque, Egyptian-born Abu Hamza Al Masri, and Syrian-born Omar Bakri
Mohammed, who once led the fundamentalist Al Muhajiroun youth movement.4 UK
officials have been inclined traditionally toward “watchful tolerance” of such extremists,
claiming that freedom of speech must be protected and that cracking down on them would
only drive them underground and deprive authorities of valuable intelligence information.
Some experts also believe that the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have
radicalized more European Muslims, and strengthened terrorist recruitment efforts.5
Many European Muslims claim common cause with suffering brethren in the Israeli-
occupied Palestinian territories, as well as in Iraq, Chechnya, and elsewhere. They tend
to view the “war on terrorism” as a war on Islam, and perceive an unjust double standard
at work in the foreign policies of many European governments, especially those that
supported the U.S.-led war in Iraq. Before being captured in September 2005, Al Qaeda
training camp manager Abu Musab al-Suri noted in a communique responding to the July
2005 London bombings that he had overseen the training of both Arab and non-Arab
Muslims, including some individuals born or raised in Britain, the United States, and
other Western countries. Al-Suri called upon the mujahideen in Europe to act quickly and
strike the UK, the Netherlands, Italy, Denmark, Germany, France, and other countries that
have a military presence in Iraq, Afghanistan, or on the Arabian peninsula. Some say that
the increase of jihadist websites and internet chatrooms has resulted in extremism
appealing to younger and younger Muslims. Media reports indicate instances of very
young French Muslim teenagers being recruited to fight in Iraq; German and Italian law
enforcement authorities also have reportedly disrupted efforts by Islamist extremists to
recruit European youths for Iraq. In November 2005, a Belgian woman and convert to
Islam blew herself up in an attempted suicide attack on U.S. forces in Iraq.6
Others note that Europe’s physical location — within a few days driving distance to
Iraq or Chechnya — makes it vulnerable to fighters returning from conflict zones who
have either European roots or are unable to return to their countries of origin. Press
3 “Al Qaeda Today: The New Face of the Global Jihad,” Frontline, January 25, 2005; Sebastian
Rotella, “Europe’s Boys of Jihad,” Los Angeles Times, April 2, 2005.
4 Elaine Sciolino and Don Van Natta, “For a Decade, London Thrived as a Busy Crossroads of
Terror,” New York Times (NYT), July 10, 2005; Steve Coll and Susan Glasser, “In London,
Islamic Radicals Found a Haven,” WP, July 10, 2005.
5 Patrick Tyler and Don Van Natta, “Militants in Europe Openly Call for Jihad,” NYT, April 26,
2004; “Moderate Muslims in Britain Worry the Iraq War Makes Recruiting Disillusioned Muslim
Youth by Extremists Easier,” Associated Press, November 27, 2004.
6 Rotella, Op. Cit.; Tyler and Van Natta, Op. Cit.; “Abu Musab al Suri’s Final Message to the
British and Europeans,” Global Terror Alert, August 2005; “Marriage Made a Radical of
Belgian,” Associated Press, December 2, 2005.
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reports suggest that Iraqis and others tied to the insurgency have been active in Europe.
In December 2004, German authorities arrested three Iraqis suspected of plotting to
assassinate the interim Iraqi prime minister during a visit to Berlin; the three Iraqis
allegedly belong to Ansar al-Islam, which has organized strikes against U.S. troops and
others in Iraq. Some German intelligence officials reportedly worry that extremists with
connections to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi — the leading Al Qaeda-linked terrorist in Iraq —
aspire to conduct a large-scale attack in Europe, possibly with chemical weapons.7
Central and Eastern Europe has not been reported to be as important a haven for Al
Qaeda and other terrorist groups; most countries in the region have not attracted
significant numbers of Muslim immigrants. However, concerns have been raised about
several countries in Southeastern Europe with large Muslim populations (e.g., Bosnia-
Herzegovina). One legacy of the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia is the presence of Islamist
fighters from other countries who stayed behind and became Bosnian citizens. Some
Islamic charities that proliferated during and after the war reportedly served as Al Qaeda
money-laundering fronts. Terrorist groups have also operated from Albania. At the same
time, opposition to terrorism among indigenous Muslims in the Balkans has been strong.
Most view themselves as part of Europe and are grateful for the U.S. role in defending
them against Serbian aggression in the 1990s. U.S. officials say that efforts by Islamist
extremists to recruit local Muslims have met with limited success, and they praise these
countries’ anti-terrorism efforts, especially after September 11. Nevertheless, some
experts assert that Central and Southeastern Europe may pose a more significant threat
than often acknowledged. The region’s weak governing institutions and problems with
organized crime and corruption may make it vulnerable to infiltration by terrorist groups.
Observers caution that the Balkans in particular may play a role as a transit point for
terrorists, a target area for recruitment, and a potential source of weapons or explosives.8
European Responses
The November 2004 murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh brought the issue
of Islamist extremism in Europe to the forefront of European political debate. Van Gogh,
an outspoken critic of the treatment of women in Islam, was killed by a 27-year-old Dutch
citizen of Moroccan descent and a follower of radical Islam. Since the murder, many
European officials and social commentators have proclaimed that multiculturalism in
Europe has failed, and called for greater integration of Muslims and other immigrants into
mainstream European society. They believe that Muslims and others must embrace the
native cultures of their new countries, including secularism.9 Some European
governments have been pursuing initiatives aimed at fostering integration and promoting
secularism for several years. The French government, for example, has banned
“conspicuous” religious symbols in public schools, including headscarves for Muslim
girls, yarmulkes, and large crucifixes. Moderate Muslim groups in France supported the
ban as a means to reduce tensions in the school system and in broader society. The UK
is introducing new citizenship classes to ensure that immigrants can speak English and
7 Craig Whitlock, “Germany Arrests 2 Al Qaeda Suspects,” WP, January 24, 2005; “Zarqawi
Planning Chemical Attack in Europe,” Agence France Presse, March 30, 2005.
8 Also see CRS Report RL33012, Islamic Terrorism and the Balkans, by Steven Woehrel.
9 Terry Sanderson, “God and Government,” Conscience, Spring 2005.
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understand British history and culture. Other analysts say that countries such as Spain,
Italy, and Germany need to do more to encourage Muslim immigrants to become citizens.
Some European governments are trying to encourage moderate Muslim political
voices and promote a greater role for them. Commentators note, for example, that there
are few Muslim representatives in European parliaments. In 2003, Paris established an
elected French Council of the Muslim Faith, an official advisory body that acts as the
Muslim community’s representative in dealings with the French government. French and
British officials are also looking at ways to foster “homegrown imams” to minister to the
needs of their Muslim communities, rather than relying on foreign imams whom they
claim are often unfamiliar with the West or beholden to foreign interests. The
Netherlands has reportedly created an “imam buddy system” that links foreign imams
with Dutch volunteers to promote a better understanding among these imams of Dutch
culture and society. Others argue that greater focus should be placed on addressing the
lack of jobs and educational opportunities for Muslims, as well as racism. They say that
racial violence against Muslims is on the rise in some European countries, such as the
Netherlands, but governments have failed to acknowledge the scale of the problem. In
the days after the July 2005 London bombings, over 180 incidents of racial violence
against Muslims were reported, and one Muslim man was killed by British youths.10
Several analysts suggest that mainstreaming Muslims into European society would
not necessarily translate into an embrace of European ideals; some even question whether
Islam itself is compatible with European political principles and values. They point out,
for example, that two British Muslim suicide bombers in Israel in April 2003 were from
comfortable middle-class, Westernized suburbs. Some Muslim groups in Europe say that
certain efforts toward integration, such as the French headscarf ban, are counterproductive
and only serve to increase the sense of discrimination among Muslims. In the wake of the
London bombings, the UK government is consulting with British Muslims on how to best
tackle extremism. Some Muslim leaders argue that Muslim communities must be more
vocal against extremism, and actively counter rather than tolerate radical preachers.11
European governments have also sought to contain Islamist extremists and counter
terrorists by tightening security measures and reforming immigration and asylum laws.
UK and French security services have reportedly increased their monitoring of mosques;
Germany has changed its laws to allow authorities to investigate religious groups; and
France and Italy have expelled some Muslim clerics for hate crimes. Following the
London attacks, the British government has sought to make it easier to exclude or deport
foreign individuals who incite hatred. UK legislation enacted in 2004 allows court-
ordered detentions without charge for up to 14 days, and permits a range of “control
orders,” including house arrest, for terrorist suspects. Also notable are European Union
(EU) efforts to boost police and judicial cooperation, enhance intelligence-sharing, and
strengthen external EU border controls. Security and border control services in new EU
members in Central and Eastern Europe, although not quite as effective as their Western
counterparts, are also improving as they seek to meet EU standards.
10 Elaine Sciolino, “Europe Struggling to Train New Breed of Clerics,” NYT, October 18, 2004;
Anna Mulrine, “Europe’s Identity Crisis,” U.S. News and World Report, January 10, 2005;
“Police Pledge Tough Action as Race Hate Attacks Rise,” The Guardian, July 12, 2005.
11 Mulrine, Op. Cit.; “Blair Pledges Dialogue with Muslims,” Associated Press, July 13, 2005.
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Law enforcement challenges remain throughout Europe, as elsewhere. Long-
standing traditions against intelligence-sharing, rivalries among the various local and
national security services, and different national laws continue to impede more robust EU
cooperation. For example, Germany’s highest court has ruled that the German law
implementing the EU-wide arrest warrant does not comply with Germany’s constitution;
consequently, the court refused to turn over a German citizen of Syrian origin wanted by
Spain for his alleged ties to Al Qaeda. European governments are also struggling with
balancing their efforts to curtail Islamist extremists and terrorists against well-established
civil liberty protections, strong privacy rights, and democratic ideals.
Implications for the United States
U.S. officials have expressed concerns since the 2001 terrorist attacks that Europe
might be a launching point for future attacks on the United States and U.S. interests
abroad. The Bush Administration and Members of Congress have welcomed European
initiatives to curtail Islamist extremism and improve U.S.-EU counterterrorism
cooperation in the hopes that such efforts will ultimately help root out terrorist cells in
Europe and beyond. The United States and the EU have been placing increasing emphasis
on cooperation in the areas of intelligence-sharing, border control, and transport security.
Among other initiatives, the two sides have concluded agreements to improve container
security and exchange airline passenger information. Some U.S. officials and Members
of Congress, however, remain concerned about the U.S. Visa Waiver Program (VWP),
despite steps taken to tighten passport requirements for participating countries. The VWP
allows for short-term visa-free travel to the United States from 27 countries, most of
which are in Europe. Critics point out that Islamist terrorists who hold European
citizenship have entered the United States on the VWP (UK-born Richard Reid and
French citizen Zacarias Moussaoui being two notable examples). Others argue that
eliminating the VWP could impede transatlantic tourism and commerce.12
Some analysts contend that the presence of large Muslim communities in Europe
may also be influencing the policy preferences of some European governments on
contentious Middle East issues and contributing to U.S.-European divisions. They argue
that Europe’s growing Muslim population has made some European officials more
cautious about supporting U.S. policies that risk inflaming their own “Muslim streets.”
They suggest that this is one reason why countries such as France and Germany opposed
the U.S.-led war in Iraq. Many Europeans also worry that the United States is losing the
battle for Muslim “hearts and minds” because of the war in Iraq, incidents of prisoner
abuse at Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo Bay, and favoritism toward Israel. Most recently,
European leaders have expressed concerns about a November 2005 Washington Post
report of alleged “secret” CIA prisons for terrorists in some Eastern European countries
and the possible use of European airports as transit points for U.S. flights transporting
abducted terrorist suspects. Meanwhile, Europe’s struggle with its own identity as it
grapples with integrating Muslims into European society has called into question Turkey’s
long-term EU prospects. Washington has long advocated EU membership for Turkey, a
country of 70 million Muslims, as a way to anchor this strategic ally firmly in the West
and debunk the notion of a clash of civilizations between Islam and the West.
12 Also see CRS Report RS22030, U.S.-EU Cooperation Against Terrorism, by Kristin Archick;
and CRS Report RL32221, Visa Waiver Program, by Alison Siskin.