Order Code IB92011
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
U.S. Space Programs:
Civilian, Military, and Commercial
Updated January 4, 2006
Marcia S. Smith
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
U.S. Government Civilian Space Programs
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
Human Spaceflight
Science Programs
Other Civilian Government Agencies, including NOAA
Interagency Coordination
Commercial Space Programs
Space Launch Services
Commercial Remote Sensing, and Landsat
Space Tourism
Military Space Programs
International Cooperation and Competition
NASA and DOD Space Budgets
Space Program Issues
NASA Issues: The “Vision for Space Exploration”
Military Space Issues
Space Radar and TSAT
FY2006 Congressional Action
Developing New Space Launch Vehicles
International Relationships
LEGISLATION
For links to other current CRS reports on space activities, go to the CRS website
[http://www.crs.gov] and click on “Science/Technology” in the list of Current Legislative
Issues. Then click on “U.S. Space Programs.”

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U.S. Space Programs:
Civilian, Military, and Commercial
SUMMARY
The 109th Congress is addressing a broad
The Department of Defense (DOD) has
range of civilian, military, and commercial
a less visible but equally substantial space
space issues.
program. Tracking the DOD space budget is
extremely difficult since space is not identi-
The National Aeronautics and Space
fied as a separate line item in the budget.
Administration (NASA) conducts the most
DOD sometimes releases only partial
visible space activities. For FY2005, NASA
information (omitting funding for classified
received a total of $16.2 billion. The FY2006
programs) or will suddenly release without
request was $16.46 billion; the FY2006 appro-
explanation new figures for prior years that
priations act that includes NASA (P.L.109-
are quite different from what was previously
108) approves approximately that amount
reported. Figures provided to CRS show a
(unadjusted for across-the-board rescissions or
total (classified and unclassified) space budget
hurricane recovery additions).
of $19.4 billion for FY2003, $20 billion for
FY2004, $19.8 billion for FY2005, and a
The future of the U.S. human space flight
request of $22.5 billion for FY2006. How to
program is dominating debate about NASA.
manage DOD space programs to avoid the
The space shuttle returned to flight in July
cost growth and schedule delays that have
2005 after a two and one-half year hiatus
characterized several recent projects is a key
following the 2003 Columbia tragedy, but the
issue facing DOD.
next launch has been indefinitely postponed
because of a foam-shedding event during that
The appropriate role of the government
launch similar to what led to the loss of Co-
in facilitating commercial space businesses is
lumbia. Pursuant to the “Vision for Space
an ongoing debate. For many years, the focus
Exploration” announced by President Bush in
has been on space launch services, but com-
January 2004, the shuttle program is to be
mercial remote sensing satellites also pose
terminated in 2010. The Vision directs NASA
complex questions. President Bush signed a
to focus its activities on returning humans to
new commercial remote sensing policy in
the Moon by 2020 and eventually sending
2003, and a new space launch policy in 2004,
them to Mars. The Vision has broad implica-
that try to strike a balance between facilitating
tions for the agency, especially since most of
commercial activities while ensuring the U.S.
the money to implement it is expected to come
government has needed data and services.
from other NASA activities. NASA’s
FY2006 budget request also assumed a reduc-
International cooperation and competi-
tion of about 2,500 jobs from NASA’s civil
tion in space are affected by the world eco-
service workforce by FY2007. Congress is
nomic situation and the post-Cold War politi-
debating the many issues raised by the Vision,
cal climate. President Clinton’s 1993 decision
including what the balance should be among
to merge NASA’s space station program with
NASA’s various space and aeronautics activi-
Russia’s is symbolic of the dramatic changes,
ties, and whether the United States should end
and the risks.
the shuttle program before a replacement is
available.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
NASA’s FY2006 funding is a combination of $16.456 billion provided in the FY2006
Science, State, Justice, Commerce Appropriations Act ( P.L. 109-108), minus a 0.28%
across-the-board rescission in that act, minus a 1% across-the-board rescission in the FY2006
Department of Defense appropriations and hurricane recovery act (P.L. 109-148), plus $350
million added for NASA for hurricane recovery in P.L. 109-148. Congress also passed a
FY2007-2008 NASA authorization act (P.L. 109-155). It authorizes $17.9 billion for
FY2007, and $18.7 billion for FY2008, and contains a wide range of policy provisions. Both
funding figures are higher than the out-year estimates accompanying NASA’s FY2006
budget request ($17 billion for FY2007 and $17.3 billion for FY2008). For more on the
NASA FY2006 budget, see CRS Report RS22063, The National Aeronautics and Space
Administration: Overview, FY2006 Budget in Brief, and Key Issues for Congress, by Marcia
S. Smith and Daniel Morgan.
DOD requested $22.5 billion for space activities in FY2006, compared with the $19.8
billion appropriated in FY2005. The total amount of space funding in the FY2006 DOD
authorization bill (H.R. 1815, presented to the President January 3, 2006), and the FY2006
DOD appropriations act (H.R. 2863, P.L. 109-148), has not been announced by DOD yet.
Both bills make significant cuts to two DOD space programs: Space Radar (formerly Space-
Based Radar — SBR), and TSAT (the transformational communications satellite program).
Space Radar’s $226 million request was cut by $126 million. TSAT’s $836 million request
was cut by $400 million. These programs are controversial because their cost estimates are
high, and Congress is skeptical of those estimates and of DOD’s ability to manage the
programs successfully.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
U.S. Government Civilian Space Programs
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
The establishment of NASA in the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (P.L.
85-568, the “NASA Act”) symbolized the entrance of the United States into the space age.
The Soviet Union had successfully orbited the first artificial satellite, Sputnik 1, on October
4, 1957, lending the U.S. space program a new urgency. The first U.S. satellite, Explorer 1
(developed and launched by the Army), was orbited on January 31, 1958 after several failures
of the Naval Research Laboratory’s Vanguard rocket. President Eisenhower’s desire to
separate military and civilian space activities led to the “NASA Act” and the creation of the
civilian NASA on October 1, 1958, with the Department of Defense (DOD) retaining control
over military space programs.
Human Spaceflight. The Soviets achieved another space “first” on April 12, 1961,
when Yuri Gagarin became the first human to orbit Earth. The United States responded by
launching Alan Shepard into space on May 5, 1961, though he made only a suborbital flight
(the first American to orbit the earth was John Glenn in February 1962), as part of the
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Mercury program. Following Shepard’s flight, on May 25, 1961, President Kennedy
announced that the United States intended to put a man on the Moon within a decade,
initiating the Apollo program. Following successful completion of the Mercury and Gemini
programs, NASA was ready to begin Apollo flights, but in January 1967, the first Apollo
crew was killed when fire erupted in their Apollo command module during a pre-launch test.
The first successful Apollo flight took place in 1968. On July 20, 1969, Neil Armstrong and
Buzz Aldrin became the first humans to walk on the Moon as the Apollo 11 spacecraft and
pilot Michael Collins orbited overhead. A total of six 2-man crews (Apollo 11, 12, 14, 15,
16 and 17) walked on the Moon through December 1972. Another crew (Apollo 13)
intended to do so, but instead made an emergency return to Earth when the craft’s Service
Module exploded enroute to the Moon. Apollo was followed by the Skylab space station (to
which three crews were sent in 1973-1974) and the 1975 Apollo-Soyuz Test Project in which
a U.S. Apollo spacecraft with three astronauts and a Soviet Soyuz spacecraft with two
cosmonauts docked for two days of joint experiments.
In 1972, President Nixon approved NASA’s proposal to develop a reusable vehicle for
taking crews and cargo into Earth orbit — the space shuttle. The first shuttle flight occurred
in 1981 and NASA declared the system operational in 1982. The Challenger tragedy in
January 1986 suspended shuttle operations for 32 months. Flights resumed in 1988. After
87 successful flights, on February 1, 2003, the space shuttle Columbia disintegrated during
its return to Earth (see CRS Report RS21408, NASA’s Space Shuttle Program: The Columbia
Tragedy, the Discovery Mission, and the Future of the Shuttle, by Marcia S. Smith). NASA
launched the space shuttle Discovery on July 26, 2005, the first flight since the Columbia
tragedy (STS-114). After discovering that a problem occurred during Discovery’s launch
that is similar to what happened to Columbia, NASA indefinitely postponed future shuttle
launches. Discovery landed safely on August 9, 2005. See CRS Report RS21408, NASA’s
Space Shuttle Program: The Columbia Tragedy, the Discovery Mission, and the Future of
the Shuttle, by Marcia S. Smith for more on the shuttle.
The shuttle is NASA’s sole means of launching humans into space. Beginning in the
early 1980s, NASA, sometimes with DOD, attempted to develop a replacement for it (see
Developing New Space Launch Vehicles, below). For many years, NASA’s plan was to
phase out the shuttle in 2012. The replacement programs were not successful, however, and
in November 2002, NASA announced that it would keep the shuttle operational at least until
2015, and perhaps until 2020 or longer. However, in January 2004, President Bush
announced a “Vision For Space Exploration” that calls for the space shuttle to be retired in
2010. He directed NASA to build a new “Crew Exploration Vehicle” (CEV) to take
astronauts to and from the Moon, and that it be available for taking people to Earth orbit by
2014. Between 2010 and 2014, the United States would not have an ability to place
astronauts in space, and would rely on Russia to provide such services instead (see below).
NASA Administrator Griffin hopes to shorten that gap and have the CEV ready for Earth
orbital flights in 2012. The first lunar trip would occur in 2018 under Dr Griffin’s plan.
NASA continues to build and operate the International Space Station (ISS) in
cooperation with Russia, Canada, Japan, and several European countries (see CRS Issue
Brief IB93017, Space Stations, by Marcia S. Smith). The space station program began in
1984 (FY1985) and has been very controversial because of cost growth and schedule delays.
Twenty-two attempts in Congress between 1991 and 2000 to terminate the program in NASA
funding bills failed. The ISS is being assembled in orbit, with segments taken into space by
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the U.S. space shuttle or Russian launch vehicles. The first assembly flight was in 1998, and
construction is now approximately 50% complete. Most of the remaining segments are
designed to be launched on the shuttle, so assembly is suspended while NASA fixes the
shuttle. Crews rotating on six-month schedules continue to live and work aboard the station
using Russian Soyuz spacecraft for crew transport and “crew return” (essentially a lifeboat
to return the crew to Earth in an emergency), and Russian Progress spacecraft for cargo
delivery. NASA was facing a deadline whereby U.S. astronauts could not have remained on
the ISS for long-duration missions because NASA could not pay Russia for use of its Soyuz
vehicles because of restrictions in the Iran Nonproliferation Act (INA, P.L. 106-178).
Congress passed a law amending the INA (P.L. 109-112) to allow NASA to buy ISS-related
goods and services through January 1, 2012 (they also must be delivered by that date).
Science Programs. NASA has launched many spacecraft for space science and earth
science research. Robotic probes served as pathfinders to the Moon for astronauts, and have
visited all the planets in the solar system except Pluto, and a probe is scheduled to be
launched to that planet in 2006. Many of the probes have been quite successful, but there
were failures, too. In 1999, for example, two NASA Mars missions failed, at a combined cost
of $328.5 million. They reflected NASA’s “faster, better, cheaper” (FBC) approach to
scientific spacecraft, replacing large, complex spacecraft that can acquire more information,
but take longer and cost more to build. The FBC approach was subsequently scrutinized and
NASA restructured its Mars exploration program significantly. Two NASA probes, Mars
Odyssey and Mars Global Surveyor, are now orbiting Mars, and twin rovers, Spirit and
Opportunity, are investigating the planet’s surface (a European probe, Mars Express, also is
orbiting Mars). NASA also has sent, or plans to send, spacecraft to other planets, comets,
and asteroids. These include Cassini, which arrived at Saturn on July 1, 2004 (GMT) after
a seven-year journey; and the Stardust probe that is on its way back to Earth after collecting
samples of a comet (it is scheduled to return on January 15, 2006).
Space-based observatories in Earth orbit have studied the universe since the 1960s,
creating new fields of astronomy since space-borne telescopes can intercept wavelengths
(such as x-rays and gamma rays) that cannot penetrate Earth’s atmosphere. In the 1980s,
NASA embarked upon building four “Great Observatories” for studies in different parts of
the electromagnetic spectrum: Hubble Space Telescope, launched April 1990 (primarily for
the visible wavelengths); Compton Gamma Ray Observatory, launched April 1991, deorbited
June 2000; Chandra X-Ray Observatory, launched July 1999; and the Spitzer Space
Telescope (formerly the Space Infrared Telescope Facility), launched August 2003. NASA
is planning the James Webb Space Telescope for further infrared observations. Hubble was
designed to be serviced and eventually returned to Earth by the space shuttle, but NASA
announced in January 2004 it would not send any more shuttles to Hubble because of safety
concerns. A new NASA administrator, Dr. Michael Griffin, took office in April 2005, and
agreed to reassess that decision once the shuttle completes its two Return to Flight missions
(see CRS Report RS21767, Hubble Space Telescope: Should NASA Proceed with a Servicing
Mission?, by Daniel Morgan).
NASA has solar-terrestrial physics programs that study the interaction between the Sun
and the Earth. In FY2001, NASA began the Living with a Star program that envisions the
launch of many spacecraft over the next decade to obtain more accurate information on how
the Earth and society are affected by what has come to be known as “space weather” —
including, for example, negative effects of solar activity on telecommunications.
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During the 1960s and 1970s, NASA developed communications, meteorological, and
land and ocean remote sensing satellites. NASA’s role in this aspect of space utilization
traditionally is R&D. Once the technology is proven, operational responsibility is transferred
to other agencies or the private sector. NASA continues to perform research in many of these
areas, however, particularly earth sciences (including global climate change). NASA,
sometimes in partnership with other countries, has a variety of earth science probes in orbit
today, including three large satellites in the Earth Observing System (EOS). The United
States also is leading the international Global Environmental Observing System and Systems
(GEOSS) program [http://iwgeo.ssc.nasa.gov/]. The future of NASA’s earth sciences
program was explored at an April 28, 2005 House Science Committee hearing.
Other Civilian Government Agencies, including NOAA
Beginning in the 1960s, other civilian agencies became involved in space. Operation
of weather satellites was transferred to what is now the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) in the Department of Commerce. NOAA is currently working with
DOD to build a joint weather satellite system that merges the capabilities of its Polar
Orbiting Environmental Satellite (POES) system with those of DOD’s Defense
Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP). Called the National Polar-orbiting Operational
Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS), it is managed by an Integrated Program Office
(see [http://www.ipo.noaa.gov/]). NASA is developing new technology for NPOESS, and
plans to launch the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) satellite to demonstrate new sensors
that could be used for NPOESS. The NPOESS program is experiencing significant cost
overruns and schedule delays, which were highlighted at a November 16, 2005 House
Science Committee hearing. The first NPOESS launch has slipped to 2012 (from 2010), and
the program’s cost has grown by $2-3 billion, to a new estimate of $9-10 billion. Committee
members expressed deep concern about a potential gap that could develop between when the
last of NOAA’s POES satellites is operating and the first NPOESS is launched. Such a data
gap could affect weather forecasting. Other parts of the Department of Commerce are
involved in space issues as well due to the Department’s role in trade policy and export of
items on the Commerce Control List. It also has an Office of Space Commercialization (part
of the Technology Administration) to facilitate commercial space businesses.
In 1983, the Department of Transportation (DOT) was given responsibility for
facilitating and regulating commercial launch services companies. This function is
performed through the Federal Aviation Administration. DOT and DOD co-chair a group
that oversees use of DOD’s Global Positioning System of navigation satellites
[http://www.igeb.gov/]. DOT represents civilian users and has programs to augment the
system’s utility to the civilian community. Other government agencies involved in space
include the Department of Energy, which develops nuclear power sources for spacecraft; the
U.S. Geological Survey in the Department of Interior, which operates the government’s
Landsat land remote sensing satellites; the Departments of Agriculture and other departments
that use satellite data for crop forecasting and map making, for example; and the Department
of State, which develops international space policy and determines whether to grant export
licenses for items on the Munitions List. The White House’s National Security Council,
Office of Management and Budget, and Office of Science and Technology Policy are
involved in developing policy.
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Interagency Coordination
Several mechanisms have been tried since 1958 to coordinate interagency space policy.
Congress created a National Aeronautics and Space Council in the NASA Act. That Space
Council was abolished in 1973 by President Nixon. President Carter established a Policy
Review Committee on Space under the aegis of the National Security Council (NSC), but
it was chaired by the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy. President
Reagan established a Senior Interagency Group on Space (SIG/Space) under the NSC,
chaired by the National Security Adviser. Congress was dissatisfied with SIG/Space,
however, particularly in terms of slow decision making after the 1986 space shuttle
Challenger tragedy. Congress created a National Space Council in the FY1989 NASA
authorization act (P.L. 100-685), chaired by the Vice President. Under President George H.
W. Bush, the Space Council was headed by Vice President Quayle.
President Clinton decided not to use the Space Council mechanism. It still exists in law,
but is not staffed or funded. Instead, Space Council functions were merged into a National
Science and Technology Council, administered through the Office of Science and
Technology Policy. NSTC oversaw civil and commercial space policy; while military space
activities were overseen by the National Security Council. Some space advocates hoped
President George W. Bush would reactivate the Space Council, but instead his administration
uses a Policy Coordinating Committee under the NSC (similar to SIG/Space). NASA and
DOD also have a “Partnership Council” to facilitate communication between their
organizations and identify areas for collaboration and cooperation.
On July 28, 2002, in NSPD-15, President Bush directed the NSC to chair a review of
national space policies. The first new policy, on commercial remote sensing, was signed
April 25, 2003. On January 6, 2005, the White House released a new U.S. Space
Transportation Policy, which had been authorized by President Bush on December 21, 2004.
Also, President Bush announced a new Vision for Space Exploration for NASA on January
14, 2004. An overall national space policy reportedly is still being developed.
Commercial Space Programs
Commercial communications satellites have been chiefly a private sector activity since
passage of the 1962 Communications Satellite Act (P.L. 87-624). Attempts to
commercialize other aspects of space activities have yielded mixed success.
Space Launch Services
Congress has passed several laws to facilitate the commercialization of space launch
services for putting satellites into orbit (the 1984 Commercial Space Launch Act, the 1988
Commercial Space Launch Act Amendments, the 1998 Commercial Space Act, and the 2004
Commercial Space Launch Act Amendments). The development of a U.S. commercial
launch services industry has been largely successful. DOD and NASA continue to play a role
in developing new launch vehicles, though some private companies are developing their
own. The most controversial issues are the relative roles of the government versus the
private sector in developing new systems, ensuring that U.S. companies can compete with
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foreign launch services companies (primarily in Europe and Russia), and trade and missile
proliferation issues involved in exporting satellites to other countries for launch. In terms
of competition, it must be mentioned that the two major U.S. space launch service companies
operate in partnership with companies in other countries. Lockheed Martin and two Russian
companies comprise International Launch Services, which offers launches on the U.S. Atlas
and Russian Proton vehicles. Boeing offers launches on its Delta 2 launch vehicle, and also
is a partner in the Sea Launch venture, where a Ukrainian Zenit launch vehicle with a
Russian third stage is launched from a mobile oil rig built by Norway. See CRS Issue Brief
IB93062, Space Launch Vehicles: Government Activities, Commercial Competition, and
Satellite Exports, by Marcia S. Smith for more information.
Commercial Remote Sensing, and Landsat
Congress also sought to facilitate commercialization of land remote sensing satellites
by privatizing the government’s Landsat program through the 1984 Land Remote Sensing
Commercialization Act (P.L. 98-365). Such satellites provide imagery of the Earth that can
be used for land-use planning, environmental studies, mineral exploration, and many other
purposes. The first Landsat satellite was launched in 1972. After a tumultuous eight years
that saw the effort to privatize Landsat fail, Congress repealed that act and replaced it with
the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-555), bringing Landsat back under
government sponsorship. Landsat 5 and 7, built and operated by the government, are now
in orbit; the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) operates the satellites. Landsat 5, launched in
1984, is well past its design lifetime and only partially functioning. One of the sensors on
Landsat 7, launched in 1999, also is not functioning properly. Whether and how the U.S.
government should ensure the continuity of Landsat-type data has been controversial. NASA
hoped the private sector, rather than the government, would build the next satellite. NASA
solicited bids, but only one was received and NASA rejected it. The decision was then made
to place Landsat-type sensors (called OLIs, for Operational Land Imagers) on the NPOESS
satellites, but concerns about delays and cost overruns on NPOESS (discussed earlier) led
to a reassessment of that plan. On December 23, 2005, the White House Office of Science
and Technology Policy (OSTP) issued a new policy. For the near-term, the plan to put OLI’s
on NPOESS was terminated. Instead, OSTP directed NASA to acquire a new satellite to
provide Landsat-type data, which will be operated by USGS. For the long-term, OSTP will
lead an effort to develop a strategy for providing this type of data.
The Land Remote Sensing Policy Act also promoted development of new systems by
the private sector. Coupled with a 1994 Clinton Administration policy, these actions led
several U.S. companies to initiate programs to build remote sensing satellites and offer
imagery on a commercial basis. Those companies must obtain an operating license from
NOAA for these systems, and certain conditions apply. For example, the government may
exercise “shutter control” for national security reasons, requiring a satellite operator to cease
obtaining or distributing imagery. Three U.S. companies — Space Imaging, DigitalGlobe,
and Orbimage — have commercial remote sensing satellites in orbit. The market for their
products is limited, however, and they reportedly are struggling financially. Partially in
response to that concern, President Bush signed a new commercial remote sensing policy on
April 25, 2003 that is intended to sustain and enhance the U.S. remote sensing industry.
Orbimage and Space Imaging announced plans to merge in September 2005.
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Controversy over the fact that the imagery has military as well as civilian uses
complicates this commercial space effort, however. Though not as precise as military
reconnaissance satellites, the three operating U.S. private sector satellites, Ikonos 2 (Space
Imaging), QuickBird (DigitalGlobe), and Orbview 3 (Orbimage) produce imagery with
resolution (the ability to “see” an object or feature of a certain size) of 1 meter or less.
Competitors include French, Russian, Indian, and Israeli companies that offer imagery with
2.5-meter, 1-meter, 1-meter, and 1.8-meter resolution respectively. One major issue is when
the U.S. government can exercise shutter control (discussed above). When the United States
initiated attacks in Afghanistan, instead of requiring the one company (Space Imaging) that
had a commercial satellite in orbit at the time (Ikonos) to stop taking images, DOD took a
different approach. For two months, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA,
now the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency or NGA) bought exclusive rights to Ikonos
imagery of that area so that no one else could use the data without NIMA’s approval. The
practice was dubbed “checkbook shutter control” in the media. The government apparently
did not limit access to commercial satellite imagery during the 2003 Iraqi war. Another issue
is the government’s role in controlling to whom the imagery is sold and which countries may
invest in the U.S.-owned systems. U.S. companies want time limits on how long the
government can take to decide whether particular sales or investments will be permitted so
they can make wise business decisions. The 2003 Bush policy states that the government
will provide a timely and responsive regulatory environment.
Special issues have arisen regarding Israel. On October 7, 1994, Senator Bingaman and
63 other Senators sent a letter to the Secretary of Commerce expressing concern that data
from Eyeglass (subsequently renamed Orbview) that could be used against Israel would be
made available to Saudi Arabia, which was providing partial financing for the system and
would be the location of a ground station. The FY1997 DOD authorization bill (P.L.
104-201) prohibits collection and release, or U.S. government declassification, of satellite
imagery of Israel unless such imagery is no more detailed or precise than what is available
from commercial sources.
Potential availability of commercial imagery also has a positive side for the military,
since the U.S. military and intelligence communities could reduce costs by acquiring imagery
commercially instead of building their own systems for some purposes. Congress has
strongly encouraged NIMA (now NGA) to purchase commercial imagery to augment
classified imagery. The 2003 Bush policy directs the U.S. government to utilize U.S.
commercial remote sensing space capabilities, for both civil and national security purposes,
to the maximum extent practicable. Foreign commercial remote sensing space capabilities
may be used consistent with national security and foreign policy objectives. (See below for
more on the use of commercial imagery by NGA/NIMA.)
Space Tourism
A nascent commercial space area is “space tourism.” On June 21, 2004, Mike Melvill
became the first person to reach space (on a suborbital flight) aboard a privately funded
launch vehicle, SpaceShipOne, designed by Scaled Composites. Mr. Melvill is sometimes
referred as the first “commercial astronaut,” but several representatives of commercial
companies, and other private individuals, have flown in space. Mr. Melvill’s flight is notable
because SpaceShipOne was developed without government funding, and some hope it will
usher in an era of “affordable” space tourism. In 2004, Congress passed the Commercial
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Space Launch Act Amendments (P.L. 108-492) that, inter alia, create a regulatory structure
for space tourism. See CRS Issue Brief IB93062, Space Launch Vehicles: Government
Activities, Commercial Competition, and Satellite Exports, by Marcia S. Smith.
Military Space Programs
The 1958 National Aeronautics and Space Act specified that military space activities
be conducted by the Department of Defense (DOD). The Undersecretary of the Air Force
is DOD’s executive agent for space, and the Air Force acquisition executive for space. The
intelligence community makes significant use of space-based intelligence collection
capabilities. The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), an agency within DOD, builds and
operates intelligence collection satellites, and collects and processes the resulting data, which
are provided to users such as the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) and the
National Security Agency (NSA). NRO, NGA, and NSA also are under the oversight of the
new Director of National Intelligence (DNI). See CRS Report RL32515, Intelligence
Community Reorganization: Potential Effects on DOD Intelligence Agencies, by Richard A.
Best, Jr., for more on the DNI and potential effects for DOD intelligence agencies, including
NRO, NGA, and NSA.
DOD and the intelligence community manage a broad array of space activities,
including launch vehicle development, communications satellites, navigation satellites (the
Global Positioning System — GPS), early warning satellites to alert the United States to
foreign missile launches, weather satellites, reconnaissance satellites, and developing
capabilities to protect U.S. satellite systems and to deny the use of space to adversaries
(called “space control” or “counterspace systems”). The 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War is
dubbed by some as the first “space war” because support from space displayed great
improvement over what was available during the previous major conflict, Vietnam. These
systems continue to play significant roles in U.S. military operations.
How to organize DOD and the intelligence community to work effectively on space
programs has been an issue for many years. Congress established commissions to review the
NRO in the FY2000 intelligence authorization act, P.L. 106-120; NGA (then called NIMA,
the National Imagery and Mapping Agency) in the classified annex to the FY2000 DOD
appropriations act, P.L. 106-79; and overall U.S. national security space management and
organization in the FY2000 DOD authorization act, P.L. 106-65. The NRO, NGA/NIMA,
and “Rumsfeld Space Commission” reports are discussed below.
Although U.S. military and civilian space programs are separated organizationally, the
functions performed by satellites and the vehicles that launch them are not easily divided.
Both sectors use communications, navigation, weather, and remote sensing/reconnaissance
satellites, which may operate at different frequencies or have different capabilities, but have
similar technology. The same launch vehicles can be used to launch any type of military,
civilian, or commercial satellite. DOD uses some civilian satellites and vice versa.
After the Cold War, interest in space weapons to attack satellites (antisatellite, or
ASAT, weapons) or ballistic missiles declined initially, but was rekindled beginning with the
104th Congress. Using satellites to attack ballistic missiles has been controversial since
President Reagan’s 1983 announcement of a Strategic Defense Initiative to study the viability
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of building a ballistic missile defense system to protect the United States and its allies. The
Clinton Administration changed the name of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization
to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization to reflect a new focus on theater missile
defense in the wake of the Persian Gulf War, rather than national missile defense. The
George W. Bush Administration changed the name to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA)
to reflect its interest in broad missile defense goals (see CRS Report RL31111, Missile
Defense: The Current Debate, coordinated by Steven A. Hildreth).
The concept of placing weapons in space, as part of a missile defense system or
otherwise, remains controversial. A May 18, 2005 New York Times article reported that the
new national space policy being developed by the Bush Administration (discussed earlier)
would “move the United States closer to fielding offensive and defensive space weapons.”
White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan, responding to questions at that day’s White
House press briefing, stressed that the new policy, still being developed, does not represent
a substantial shift in U.S. policy . The same day, Representative Kucinich introduced a bill
(H.R. 2420) to ban weapons in space, and the use of weapons to damage or destroy objects
in orbit. The House rejected (124-302) a Kucinich amendment to the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act (H.R. 2601) on July 20, 2005 that was similar to his bill.
International Cooperation and Competition
Virtually every country in the world uses satellites for communications and obtaining
weather data, but the usual measure of whether a country is a member of the “space-faring”
club is its ability to launch satellites. By that criterion, Russia, the United States, China,
Japan, India, Israel, Ukraine, and the European Space Agency (ESA) are members. ESA
developed the Ariane launch vehicle; Ariane launches are conducted by the French company
Arianespace. These countries, including many of the individual members of ESA, present
opportunities for cooperation, as well as competition. The 17 members of ESA are Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
The NASA Act specifically states that NASA may conduct international space
activities. Many NASA programs today have an international component. One of the major
cooperative projects today is the International Space Station (see CRS Issue Brief IB93017,
Space Stations, by Marcia S. Smith). European countries, both individually and through
ESA, Canada, and Japan, in particular, have participated in many cooperative space programs
with NASA. They also compete with U.S. companies in some space areas. Europe, India,
Ukraine, and Russia compete in launch services. France, Russia, India and Israel compete
in satellite remote sensing, and Europe competes in communications satellite manufacturing.
Cooperation and competition between the United States and the former Soviet Union
attracted much attention. Competition with the Soviet Union was measured less in economic
terms than in prestige and national defense. The main area of competition today seems to
be on the economic front, although Russian and Ukrainian companies have joint ventures
with U.S. firms to provide launch services, so economic cooperation also exists. China has
launched two human spaceflight missions, and some suggest that this may usher in a new era
of national prestige competition, with China attempting to send “taikonauts” to the Moon
before U.S. astronauts return there. Some Chinese commentators suggest that China may
adopt the goal of a human lunar landing mission by 2020, but many other Chinese experts
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suggest that China’s focus is on robotic exploration of the Moon (see CRS Report RS21641,
China’s Space Program: An Overview, by Marcia S. Smith).
NASA and DOD Space Budgets
The majority of U.S. government space funding goes to NASA and DOD. This table
shows NASA and DOD space funding from FY1959 to FY2005, with projections (for
NASA) through FY2010. The DOD funding figures must be used cautiously, however.
Space is not a line item in the DOD budget, and DOD’s annual budget justifications do not
include a figure for “space activities.” DOD sometimes releases only partial information or
will release without explanation new figures for prior years that are quite different from what
was previously reported. Space spending by all federal government agencies, by year since
FY1959, is provided in
Appendix E of the
NASA & DOD Budgets
annual Aeronautics and
(in Billions of Unadjusted Dollars by Fiscal Year)
Space Report of the 25
President, submitted to
Congress by NASA. 20
The most recent edition
[http://history.nasa.gov/ 15
presrep2003.pdf] covers
through FY2003. This 10
table uses data from that
report for NASA and 5
DOD through FY2003.
NASA figures for
FY2004 and beyond, 0 59 61 63 65 67 69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 '01 '03 '05 '07 '09
including projections
through FY2010, are
NASA
DOD
from NASA’s annual
Does not include transition quarter. See text for other notes.
budget justifications.
The DOD figures for FY2004-FY2006 were supplied to CRS by DOD’s Office of the
Comptroller; out-year projections were not provided. According to the DOD data provided
in March 2004 and March 2005, DOD requested $21.7 billion for space programs in
FY2005, while Congress provided $19.8 billion; the FY2006 request was $22.5 billion. The
total amount appropriated has not been released by DOD yet. According to NASA budget
documents, NASA requested $16.2 billion for FY2005 and received $16.07 billion in the
FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act (adjusted for an across-the-board rescission), plus
$126 million in a FY2005 supplemental for hurricane relief, for a total FY2005 budget of
$16.2 billion. For FY2006, NASA requested $16,456.3 million, and received 16,456.8
million, subject to a 0.28% rescission, in the FY2006 Science, State, Justice, Commerce
appropriations act (P.L. 109-108), and a 1% across-the-board rescission in the FY2006 DOD
appropriations and hurricane recovery act (P.L. 109-148). That law also has a $350 million
addition for NASA to cover costs associated with hurricane recovery. NASA’s Stennis
Space Center near Slidell, LA, and the Michoud Assembly Facility in New Orleans, LA,
were damaged by the hurricane. All NASA figures include aeronautics funding ($400
million-$1 billion annually in recent years).
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Space Program Issues
NASA Issues: The “Vision for Space Exploration”
President Bush’s January 14, 2004 announcement of a new “Vision for Space
Exploration” (see CRS Report RS21720, Space Exploration: Issues Concerning the ‘Vision
for Space Exploration’, by Marcia S. Smith) is capturing the spotlight of NASA issues. The
President’s directive called for redirecting NASA’s human exploration program from low
Earth orbit to the Moon, Mars, and “worlds beyond.” Achieving that goal involves both
robotic and human missions. According to the President’s speech, humans would return to
the Moon in 2015-2020, and eventually go to Mars (no date given). The space shuttle
program would be terminated when construction of the International Space Station (ISS) is
completed, currently expected in 2010. The President also asserted that the United States
would meet its obligations to the other partners in the program (see CRS Issue Brief
IB93017, Space Stations, by Marcia S. Smith). How it will do so without the shuttle is
uncertain; NASA is assessing what other government or commercial launch vehicles and
spacecraft might be able to accomplish those tasks. The President invited other countries to
join the United States in the Vision.
U.S. research aboard the ISS would focus only on that which is needed to support the
Vision instead of the broadly-based program that was planned. NASA officials indicate that
the agency will complete its research program aboard the ISS by 2016. The President
directed NASA to build a Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) to take crews to and from the
Moon, with an Earth-orbital capability by 2014. U.S. astronauts would have to rely on
Russia to take them to and from ISS during the gap between the end of the shuttle program
in 2010 and the availability of the CEV. In September 2005, NASA announced its
implementation plan for the Vision, with 2012 as the goal for availability of the CEV for
earth orbital flights. That would shorten the gap, but still require NASA to purchase services
from Russia.
In September 2005, based on the implementation plan he announced at that time, NASA
Administrator Griffin estimated the cost of returning humans to the Moon by 2018 (the
current goal) at $104 billion. (That figure excludes another $20 billion estimated for the costs
of servicing the ISS with the CEV.) A September 2004 Congressional Budget Office
[http://www.cbo.gov] report, Budgetary Analysis of NASA’s New Vision for Space
Exploration, concluded that, based on historical NASA experience, the cost could be much
higher than NASA estimates. NASA has not provided an estimate for sending astronauts to
Mars. Most of the required funding would come from redirecting funds from other NASA
activities, but Dr. Griffin repeatedly states that he will not take money from NASA’s space
science, earth science, or aeronautics programs to pay for the Vision. He also told a Senate
Appropriations subcommittee in May 2005 that increased costs for space shuttle Return to
Flight activities, costs associated with preserving the option to conduct a Hubble shuttle
servicing mission, costs for other congressionally directed items, and cost increases in several
other programs, means that NASA does not have enough funding to pursue all the programs
now on its plate. How NASA will afford to pay for the Vision and its other activities within
a budget that is projected to increase only at the rate of inflation is unclear. That issue was
explored at a November 3, 2005 House Science Committee hearing.
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Congress funded NASA close to its requested level for FY2005 and FY2006, which
many supporters of the Vision viewed as an endorsement of the plan. However, the
committee reports accompanying NASA’s FY2006 funding bills and the FY2007-2008
NASA authorization act (P.L. 109-155) qualify their support for the Vision on the condition
that NASA continue to have a balanced program that includes science and aeronautics.
Military Space Issues
For many years, questions have arisen about whether DOD effectively manages its space
activities, and several commissions and task forces have studied the issue. Congress created
a commission in the FY2000 DOD authorization bill to make recommendations on the
overall management of national security space programs. Chaired by Donald Rumsfeld, the
Commission released its report on January 11, 2001, shortly after Mr. Rumsfeld became
Secretary of Defense. The “Rumsfeld Space Commission” made sweeping recommendations
for management of DOD and intelligence community space programs. According to two
GAO reports (GAO-02-772, June 2002; GAO-03-379, April 2003), DOD plans to implement
10 of the 13 organizational recommendations.
Several DOD space programs have experienced significant cost overruns and schedule
delays, raising concerns about DOD’s acquisition process for space systems. The Defense
Science Board (DSB) and Air Force Scientific Advisory Board (AFSAB) commissioned a
task force to review DOD space program acquisition because of significant cost increases in
several programs. Chaired by retired Lockheed Martin executive Tom Young, its May 2003
report was publicly released in September 2003 [http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/
space.pdf]. Four key points are that cost has replaced mission success as the primary driver
in managing acquisition processes, creating excessive technical and schedule risk; the space
acquisition system is strongly biased to produce unrealistically low cost estimates;
government capabilities to lead and manage the acquisition process have seriously eroded;
and there are long term concerns about the space industrial base. According to press reports
(e.g., Wall Street Journal, August 25, 2004, B7), the task force produced an update in August
2004 that concluded that some of the space programs it criticized were making progress but
still required close review, and that better coordination in needed between the military and
intelligence agencies in setting requirements.
Meanwhile, figures from the DOD Comptroller’s Office over several years showed that
the Bush Administration planned to increase DOD’s space budget significantly — from
$15.7 billion in FY2002, to $20 billion in FY2004, to a request of $21.7 billion for FY2005,
and continued increases to a projected $28.7 billion in FY2008. However, in its 2004 report
on the FY2005 DOD appropriations bill (S. 2559, S.Rept. 108-284), the Senate
Appropriations Committee cautioned that funding for DOD’s space activities may not be
sustainable. Figures provided to CRS by the DOD Comptroller’s Office in March 2005
showed that DOD received $19.8 billion for FY2005 (compared to the $21.7 billion
requested). The FY2006 request was $22.5 billion. Projected future year funding was not
provided. DOD has not yet released its estimate of how much was appropriated for space
programs in the FY2006 DOD appropriations act (P.L. 109-148).
Space Radar and TSAT. A number of DOD space programs are encountering cost
growth and schedule delays, including the Air Force’s Space Based Infrared System-High
(SBIRS-High) for early warning of missile launches (see CRS Report RS21148, Military
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Space Programs: Issues Concerning DOD’s SBIRS and STSS Programs, by Marcia S.
Smith), the Air Force’s Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) communications
satellite system, and the National Reconnaissance Office’s (NRO’s) Future Imagery
Architecture reconnaissance satellite system. DOD’s requests to initiate new programs,
including a Space Radar program (previously called Space-Based Radar), and the
Transformational Satellite (TSAT) communications satellite program, are controversial
because of the potentially large costs involved, whether the technologies they require are
sufficiently mature, and how to avoid the cost growth and schedule delays experienced in
other DOD space programs.
Space Radar would be a system of many satellites (the exact number has not been
determined) that would track mobile targets (as opposed to fixed targets) on the ground. The
House Appropriations Committee has sharply criticized the program for the past several
years. In its 2004 report on the FY2005 DOD appropriations bill (H.Rept. 108-557), the
committee noted that the estimated cost for a nine-satellite constellation was $34 billion, and
the Air Force considers nine satellite to be less than half the number required. The
committee expressed skepticism about the $34 billion estimate, as well.
The TSAT program would be a follow-on to the AEHF program, which, in turn, is a
follow-on to the current series of Milstar satellites. AEHF itself is controversial because of
cost overruns, and, in 2002, DOD decided to procure only three instead of five AEHF
satellites. The first AEHF launch is scheduled for 2008. TSAT is expected to “transform”
DOD communications by providing vastly greater capacity than is available today by
operating at much higher (optical) frequencies. If TSAT is delayed, additional AEHF
satellites may be needed.
FY2006 Congressional Action. The FY2006 DOD authorization bill (H.R. 1815,
conference report H.Rept. 109-360) was presented to the President on January 3, 2006. The
FY2006 DOD appropriations act (H.R. 2863, conference report H.Rept. 109-359) was signed
into law on December 30, 2005 (P.L. 109-148).
The request for Space Radar was $226 million. Congress cut $126 million in both the
FY2006 DOD authorization and appropriations acts. The Senate Armed Services Committee
(SASC) and the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) commented extensively on the
program (pp. 200-201 of S.Rept. 109-69; pp. 214-216 of H.Rept. 109-89). Both discussed
the need to integrate the Space Radar into a broader architecture of radar capabilities,
including airborne radars. SASC also emphasized the need for a single space radar system
to meet military and intelligence needs, and expressed concern about the lack of certainty
about cost and other issues. HASC noted a number of concerns, including that the Air Force
has not sufficiently emphasized affordability as a key objective or fully considered the
requirements for a demonstration program. HASC provided specific direction as to what is
needed for such a program, utilizing ground, airborne, and existing space assets.
The request for TSAT was $836 million. Congress cut $400 million in the FY2006
DOD authorization and appropriations acts. In its report on the bill (S.Rept. 109-69), SASC
expressed support for TSAT, but noted that GAO found that only one of its seven critical
technologies is mature (p. 200). Thus, SASC recommended that a fourth AEHF satellite be
procured (adding $100 million for that satellite) while the TSAT technologies are developed,
and that some of those technologies could be incorporated into the fourth AEHF satellite if
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feasible. The Senate Appropriations Committee did not add funding for a fourth EHF
satellite, but restricted the use of $150 million of the funds it provided for TSAT in order to
fund a fourth EHF satellite if needed (S.Rept. 109-141, p. 218). HASC also supported the
concept of TSAT, and commended the Air Force on its vision for revolutionary solutions
(pp. 216-217). However, it cited the recent history of cost overruns and schedule growth
associated with other Air Force space programs as cause for skepticism about the ability of
the current acquisition system to accommodate the risks associated with revolutionary
technologies. The HASC directed that the focus of the TSAT program shift to technology
development rather than acquisition. It added that it did not believe additional funding for
AEHF would be needed until FY2007.
In addition to discussing problems with DOD’s space acquisition system in connection
with specific programs, SASC and HASC included a number of recommendations about
DOD’s acquisition system (SASC, Title VIII; HASC, pp. 13-14, 202). HASC also expressed
concern about the need to develop closer relationships between “black” (classified) and
“white” (unclassified) space activities (pp. 208-209). The Senate Appropriations Committee
expressed concern about defense space acquisition (S.Rept. 109-141, p. 217) as well.
Developing New Space Launch Vehicles
Government and private sector launch vehicles are discussed in CRS Issue Brief
IB93062, Space Launch Vehicles: Government Activities, Commercial Competition, and
Satellite Exports, by Marcia S. Smith. There are two types of launch vehicles: Expendable
Launch Vehicles (ELVs, which can only be used once) and Reusable Launch Vehicles
(RLVs). The space shuttle is the only RLV in the world.
NASA began its attempts to develop a new RLV to replace the space shuttle in the
1980s that would cost less and improve safety. Several programs were started and later
abandoned: the National Aero-Space Plane (NASP), jointly with DOD; X-33; X-34; and the
Space Launch Initiative (SLI). SLI was terminated following President Bush’s January 2004
announcement of the Vision for Space Exploration, The Vision involves sending astronauts
back to the Moon, but NASA officials have not yet determined what launch vehicles are
needed to take crews there, or cargo. NASA has concluded that it is preferable to separate
the functions of crew transport and cargo (the shuttle does both).

Under a 1994 Clinton policy, NASA was the lead agency for developing new RLVs,
while DOD was the lead agency for ELVs. DOD initiated the Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicle (EELV) program to upgrade U.S. expendable launch vehicles to reduce launch costs
by at least 25%. Lockheed Martin and Boeing each built EELVs: the Atlas V and the Delta
IV respectively, which are now in operation. The companies and DOD shared the
development costs, with the expectation that the companies would recoup their costs through
selling launches to commercial customers. Market demand did not materialize as expected,
however, and the companies now are seeking additional funds from DOD. DOD has been
supportive of industry’s position, asserting that by ensuring the health of both companies, it
will have “assured access to space” should technical problems arise with one of the vehicles.
DOD notified Congress in 2004 that the EELV program breached a “Nunn-McCurdy” limit
of 25% cost growth, which required DOD to cancel or restructure the program, or certify that
it is essential to national security. In April 2004, DOD certified that the program is essential
for national security. Questions began to arise, however, about whether the government
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could afford both EELV service providers. In May 2005, Boeing and Lockheed Martin
announced they would merge their EELV launch services for U.S. government customers;
the proposal is being reviewed for antitrust compliance by the Federal Trade Commission.
In January 2005, the Bush White House released a new U.S. space launch policy
[http://www.ostp.gov/html/SpaceTransFactSheetJan2005.pdf]. Under the new policy, DOD
is the lead agency for the national security space sector, and NASA is the lead agency for the
civil sector. DOD is directed to maintain the capability to develop, evolve, operate and
purchase services for the space transportation systems, infrastructure, and support activities
necessary to meet national security requirements. NASA is directed to do the same for the
civil sector, but is permitted to engage in development activities only for requirements that
cannot be met by capabilities being used by the national security or commercial sectors.
Regarding the EELV program, DOD is directed to fund the annual fixed costs for both
launch service providers unless or until the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) certifies to the
President that a capability to reliably assure access to space can be maintained without two
EELV providers. No later than 2010, the SecDef, Director of Central Intelligence, and the
Administrator of NASA are to evaluate the long term requirements for the EELV, including
a recommended “proportionate shift” of funding responsibility to reflect any change in the
balance between national security and civil missions requiring an EELV. Any department
or agency seeking to modify or develop new launch systems derived from the EELV,
including human rating (such as may be needed for NASA to accomplish the Vision for
Space Exploration), is responsible for related funding.
In September 2005, NASA announced its implementation plan for the President’s
Vision for Space Exploration. Under the plan, NASA will develop two “shuttle derived
launch vehicles” (SDLVs). One, the Crew Launch Vehicle, would use a single Solid Rocket
Booster (the shuttle uses two, one on either side of the External Tank) augmented by a new
“upper stage,” with the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) on top (the CEV is designed to take
astronauts to and from space). The second, often referred to as the “heavy lift” launcher,
would use a modified External Tank (the large cylindrical tank that carried fuel for the
orbiter’s main engines) in conjunction with SRBs, with a cargo-carrying spacecraft on top.
NASA and DOD agreed that NASA would develop these new vehicles for the Vision, but
use the EELVs for its other spacecraft in the 5-20 metric ton range to the maximum extent
possible (although commercial companies may offer other launch vehicles in competition
with the EELVs if they become available.)
Several private companies are attempting to develop their own launch vehicles. One
focus today is building suborbital launch vehicles that would take passengers into space
(though not to orbit). The first successful launch of a person into space on a craft
(SpaceShipOne) that was developed with private capital was conducted on June 21, 2004
(discussed earlier). The 2005 Bush policy calls both for continued government support for
space transportation capabilities, and for capitalizing on the U.S. private sector’s
“entrepreneurial spirit.” NASA is hoping that the private sector can field systems to take
cargo to and from the ISS after the space shuttle is retired in 2010.
International Relationships
The shifting world political situation has allowed new relationships to evolve in
international space cooperation. Increased cooperation is the result not only of changed
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political circumstances, but also of constrained budgets throughout the world. All the major
space-faring countries are questioning how much they should invest in space. Other
countries are responding cautiously to President Bush’s invitation to join in the new Vision
for Space Exploration. Some of the partners in the ISS program say they want that program
completed before agreeing to further cooperation. NASA Administrator Griffin has stated
that he does not want the new Crew Exploration Vehicle or Crew Launch Vehicle to be
dependent on foreign suppliers, but is open to discussions with potential partners about other
aspects of the Vision. Many of NASA’s current partners, as well as potentially new partners
such as China, are participating in NASA-led discussions.
LEGISLATION
P.L. 109-108, H.R. 2862. FY2006 Science, State, Justice, Commerce appropriations
(includes NASA). Reported from House Appropriations Committee June 10, 2005 (H.Rept.
109-118); passed House June 16. Reported from Senate Appropriations Committee June 23
(S.Rept. 109-88); passed Senate September 15. Conference report (H.Rept. 109-272) passed
House November 9, Senate November 16. Signed into law November 22.
P.L. 109-148, H.R. 2863. FY2006 DOD appropriations bill. Reported from House
Appropriations Committee June 10, 2005 (H.Rept. 109-119); passed House June 20.
Reported from Senate Appropriations Committee September 29 (S.Rept. 109-141); passed
Senate October 7. Conference report (H.Rept. 109-359) passed House December 19. Signed
into law December 30, 2005.
P.L. 109-155, S. 1281. NASA FY207-2008 authorization bill. H.R. 3070 would have
authorized NASA funding for FY2006-FY2007; reported by the House Science Committee
July 18 (H.Rept. 109-173), passed House July 22, 2005. S. 1281 would have authorized
NASA funding for FY2006-FY2010; reported by Senate Commerce Committee July 26
(S.Rept. 109-108), passed Senate September 28, 2005. Conference report (H.Rept. 109-354),
authorizing funds for FY2007-FY2008, passed House December 17. Signed into law
December 30, 2005.
H.R. 1815 (Hunter). FY2006 DOD authorization bill. Reported from House Armed
Services Committee May 20, 2005, H.Rept. 109-89; passed House May 25. S. 1042 reported
from Senate Armed Services Committee May 17 (S.Rept. 109-69); passed Senate November
15. Conference report (H.Rept. 109-360) passed House December 19, Senate December 21.
Presented to the President January 3, 2006.
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