Order Code RL33185
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Liberia’s Post-War Recovery:
Key Issues and Developments
December 13, 2005
Nicolas Cook
Specialist in African Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

---

Liberia’s Post-War Recovery:
Key Issues and Developments
Summary
This long report describes recent developments in Liberia, a small, poor West
African country that is undergoing a post-conflict transition and peace-building
process after its second civil war in a decade. The latter war began in 1999, escalated
in 2000, and ended in 2003. It pitted the forces of Charles Taylor, elected president
in 1997 after Liberia’s first civil war (1989-1997), against two armed anti-Taylor
rebel groups. It also affected neighboring states, which accepted Liberian refugees
and, in some cases, hosted anti-Taylor forces and became targets of armed aggression
by the Taylor regime. This report will be updated as events warrant.
Liberia held post-war elections in October 2005, with a presidential run-off vote
in November. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, an economist with Liberian government and
multinational organization experience, won with 59.4%. She is the first female
president of an African country. Her run-off opponent was George Weah, a former
soccer player whose star status and rags-to riches history make him a hero to Liberian
youth. Weah is contesting the election, contending fraud. Most election observers
characterized the process as orderly, generally well-administered, and free and fair.
The election fulfilled a key goal of an August 2003 peace accord, which ended
the second civil war, leading to an on-going, U.S.-aided post-war transition process.
That process is bolstered by the multi-faceted U.N. Mission in Liberia (UNMIL),
which carries out diverse peacekeeping, civilian policing, and socio-economic
assistance functions. UNMIL was preceded by the U.S.-assisted deployment in
August 2003 of an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
military intervention force, the ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL). Liberia’s
security situation is stable but subject to periodic volatility. Humanitarian conditions
are improving. Progress in governance has been mixed, and widespread corruption
within the interim government has been alleged. Liberia’s economy and state
structure remain devastated by war. A legal case against former president Charles
Taylor, an war crimes indictee of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) who
lives in exile in Nigeria, remains unresolved. The United States is providing
extensive post-war reconstruction aid and support for security sector restructuring,
which will include the training of a newly recruited and vetted 2,000-person military.
In addition to providing substantial support for Liberia’s rebuilding and peace
building processes, Congress has shown considerable interest in the status of Charles
Taylor. It passed laws (P.L. 108-199 and P.L. 108-106) urging that SCSL indictees,
like Taylor, be transferred to the court. In May 2005, the House and Senate passed
H.Con.Res. 127 (Royce) urging the same outcome. P.L. 109-102, the FY2006 foreign
operations appropriations act, provides $13 million for the SCSL. H.Amdt. 480
(Watson) to H.R. 2601, the FY2006-FY2007 foreign relations authorization act,
would require that the United States seek the expeditious transfer of Taylor to the
SCSL for trial. Other congressional interest in Liberia focuses on Liberia-related
immigration and debt issues. Bills related to these ends include H.R. 257
(Jackson-Lee), H.R. 2092 (Jackson-Lee), H.R. 3450 (Patrick Kennedy), S. 656
(Reed); S.Amdt. 452 (Reed); H.R. 1268 (Jerry Lewis); and H.R. 1130 (Waters).

---

Contents
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Transition Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2005 Post-War Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
New Government: Prospects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Security Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Security Sector Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Humanitarian Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
HIV/AIDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Concession Deals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Anti-Corruption Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Charles Taylor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Congressional Focus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Appendix 1: Acronyms Used in this Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
List of Tables
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Liberia, FY2004-2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

---

Liberia’s Post-War Recovery:
Key Issues and Developments
Background
Liberia, a small, poor West African country of 3.4 million people, is undergoing
a post-conflict transition and peace-building process after its second civil war within
a decade. The latter conflict burgeoned in 2000, after several minor border incursions
in 1999. It pitted the forces of Charles Taylor, elected president in 1997 after
Liberia’s first civil war (1989-1997), against two armed anti-Taylor rebel groups:
Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy and the Movement for
Democracy in Liberia. The war led to an extreme deterioration in political, economic,
humanitarian, and human rights conditions. It also affected neighboring states, which
accepted Liberian refugees and, in some cases, hosted anti-Taylor forces and became
targets of acts of armed aggression by the Taylor regime.1
A peace accord was signed on August 18, 2003, after months of international
mediation. It was facilitated by two events: Charles Taylor’s resignation of the
presidency and departure from Liberia on August 11, after he was granted political
asylum in Nigeria; and the early August deployment of an Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS) military intervention force, the ECOWAS Mission
in Liberia (ECOMIL). ECOMIL, with extensive U.S. and United Nations (U.N.)
assistance, deployed to Liberia to end heavy fighting and alleviate a worsening
humanitarian crisis in the wake of a failed June 2003 cease-fire. It was tasked with
monitoring and securing the cease-fire, enabling the delivery of relief aid, and
preparing the way for the U.N. Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). UNMIL, authorized by
the U.N. Security Council on September 19, 2003, deployed to Liberia on October
1, 2003, two weeks before the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL)
took office on October 14. ECOMIL was dissolved and its military forces absorbed
into UNMIL, which carries out diverse peacekeeping, civilian policing, and
socio-economic assistance functions in support of Liberia’s transition process.
UNMIL has also assumed responsibility from the U.N. Mission in Sierra Leone
(UNAMSIL) for providing a military guard force for the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, discussed below; UNAMSIL’s mandate ends on December 31, 2005.
1 This report focuses on current issues and recent events. CRS Report RL32243, Liberia:
Transition to Peace, and CRS Report RL30933, Liberia: 1989-1997 Civil War, Post-War
Developments, and U.S. Relations, provide in-depth background on events in Liberia during
recent decades.

---

CRS-2
Transition Process
The August 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement,2 signed by the three
warring factions and 18 political parties, laid out a peace process, provided for the
creation of the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL), and allocated
leadership positions within it. The NTGL was mandated to re-establish functioning
government authority and prepare for national elections that were held in mid-
October 2005. A newly-elected government is slated to replace the NTGL in late
January 2006. The NTGL consists of an executive branch, presided over by a
Chairman, Gyude Bryant, and an interim parliament, the National Transitional
Legislative Assembly. Bryant, a businessman and church layman who leads the
Liberian Action Party, oversees the functions of the central government and various
public corporations, agencies, and commissions. The transition has faced many
challenges, most related to the extremely destructive effects of many years of war in
Liberia. Others include the dominant role within the NTGL of the three former armed
factions, which have been prone to internal rivalries; political discord over the
allocation of state positions and resources; very limited state capacities; and reported
public sector corruption.
2005 Post-War Elections
Peaceful presidential, Senate, and House of Representatives elections were held
on October 11, 2005, and a presidential run-off vote was held on November 8. The
presidential race pitted George Manneh “Oppong” Weah, 39 years of age, a former
professional top soccer player whose star status and rags-to riches history make him
a hero to Liberian youth, against Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf, 67 years of age, a
Harvard-trained economist and former Liberian finance minister who had served as
a United Nations and World Bank official. On November 15, 2005 the National
Elections Commission (NEC) declared Johnson-Sirleaf the winner of the presidential
race, with 59.4% of votes against Weah’s 40.6%, making her the first-ever female
president of an African country. Despite its declaration in favor of Johnson-Sirleaf,
the NEC is continuing to probe claims by Weah, discussed below, that the election
was fraudulent.
In contrast to the presidential race, election results for seats in the bicameral
legislature were disparate; no party received more than 24% of seats in either
chamber and none dominated in both the Senate and the House. The largest party in
the 64-member House of Representatives is Weah’s Congress for Democratic
Change (CDC), which won 15 seats. The Liberty Party (LP) won nine House seats,
while Johnson-Sirleaf’s Unity Party (UP) and the Coalition for Transformation of
Liberia (COTOL) each won eight. Seven other parties each won between one and
five House seats, and seven independent candidates each won a seat. In the 30-seat
Senate, COTOL won seven seats and the UP won four; all other parties won between
one and three seats.3
2 Accord text available from U.S. Institute of Peace [http://www.usip.org/library/pa.html].
3 Full election results are available online from the NEC: [http://www.necliberia.org/results].

---

CRS-3
With some minor exceptions, the election was reportedly well-administered.
About 1.35 million citizens registered to vote in April and May 2005, in a process
that was marred by some minor acts and threats of violence and localized disruptions
but was generally peaceful. Attempts by some NTGL ministers to try to run for office
in the 2005 election, in violation of the 2003 peace accord, also sparked controversy.
About 1.012 million registered voters (74.9%) participated in the October elections,
and over 821,000 (60.7%) voted in the run-off poll. Registration results guided
decision-making about the distribution of polling places and electoral materials and
the composition of constituencies. The large number of presidential candidates (over
50 initial prospective candidates, of whom 22 were ultimately registered) and
registered political parties (30) reportedly proved confusing for some voters. Key
election issues included national reconciliation and unity, corruption, jobs, general
economic growth, and social services and physical infrastructure needs.
UNMIL elections staff and U.N. agencies supported media outreach and civic
education, technical tasks, and electoral security coordination, together with the
national police. UNMIL aid for the elections reportedly totaled about $8 million, and
the European Union pledged $1 million. Most of $10 million in U.S. elections
assistance supported the programs of the nonprofit democracy strengthening
organizations IFES (elections technical assistance); the National Democratic Institute
or NDI (civic education); and the International Republican Institute or IRI (political
party training). IRI and NDI, the latter jointly with the Carter Center, deployed teams
to monitor the elections, as did the African and European Unions, the U.S. and many
other governments, and international organizations. Over 6,000 domestic observers,
including over 3,500 from civil society groups, also monitored the vote.4
Weah, who claimed to have been cheated in the first round, has contested his
loss, claiming that the election was rigged, irregular, and “not free and fair,” and
called for a nullification and re-run of the vote. He submitted a formal complaint to
the NEC, filed a Supreme Court petition seeking to halt vote counting, and apprised
multinational organizations, foreign governments, and international elections
observers of his allegations. He publicly exhibited ballots that he claimed had been
pre-marked and validated in Johnson-Sirleaf’s favor, presumably for purposes of
ballot-box stuffing, and turned over to him by “concerned citizens.” Weah called on
his supporters to be peaceful, but many Liberian and international officials were
concerned that his claims might spur his supporters, who include a high proportion
of war-affected, often illiterate youth and many ex-combatants, to engage in violent
protests. Many of them, chanting such slogans as “No Weah! No peace!,” protested
on his behalf during the NEC counting process, and in some cases clashed violently
with U.N. peacekeepers, including near the U.S. Embassy. Some vowed to engage
in further violence if Weah were not declared election winner.
Concerns over further CDC-related violence appear warranted. On December
12, Weah returned to Liberia after meeting presidents John Kufuor of Ghana and
4 The author of this report observed the election as a member of the IRI delegation. In the
county where he monitored the voting process, the election was well-run. Poll workers
appeared well trained; voting equipment and materials were distributed on time and in
sufficient quantity; and voting was peaceful and voter turnout rates high.

---

CRS-4
Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, who reportedly urged him to concede his defeat with
grace. Upon his return, he again claimed publicly to have been cheated of an electoral
victory. He reportedly stated on his King FM radio station that “I am President of
this country, whether you like it or not... One cannot have an inauguration in January
when the case we are pursuing is not resolved. ... We are seeking justice and there
cannot be peace without justice.” He was also quoted as saying that “We must fight
to obtain” “revolution” and “justice.” In the wake of these statements, CDC
supporters reportedly rioted violently, causing damage to vehicles and buildings, and
clashed with security forces after police tried to break up a gathering at the CDC
headquarters. The unrest, which CDC partisans blamed on police provocation, was
suppressed by UNMIL civilian and Liberian national police, and 50 persons were
arrested, but the situation in Monrovia remained tense. There are unconfirmed
reports that two NTGL officials were involved in orchestrating the violence.5
Rhetorically volatile statements by some officials of Weah’s CDC party initially
may have provoked unrest among his supporters and laid the groundwork for their
continuing demonstrations. Some remarks targeted NEC chairwoman Frances
Johnson Morris, who labeled CDC assertions “reckless and irresponsible,” and whom
CDC officials called upon to step down for “smearing” Weah. CDC legislators-elect
also threatened to boycott parliament if Weah’s complaints were not addressed. Many
observers are skeptical about claims that systematic or large-scale fraud may have
marred the election, and U.S. officials view the process as having been orderly,
largely well-administered, and free and fair. Such views are shared by most other
governments and international entities that observed the vote. The United States
nevertheless called for an investigation of Weah’s claims, and for any contest of
results to be carried out peacefully and through established legal channels.
New Government: Prospects. Johnson-Sirleaf may face challenges in
meeting high voter expectations, in part due to her own election promise to provide
public electricity in Monrovia within six months of being elected, despite the
complexity and great cost of such an undertaking. Voters also are seen as unlikely
to give the new government a honeymoon period, following what many see as
disappointing performance by the transitional government. The public is likely to
demand rapid improvements in social services and the construction physical
infrastructure, particularly in support of education, healthcare, and transportation.
Johnson-Sirleaf will probably not be able to govern unilaterally, as Liberia’s
tradition of winner-take all politics dominated by a historically strong executive
branch allowed past incumbents, because the electorate gave no single party a strong
governing mandate. The keenly contested 22-candidate presidential first round vote,
in which no candidate garnered more than Weah’s 28.3% of votes — necessitating
a run-off presidential poll — and the splintering of the legislature among many
parties, suggests that no party enjoys the backing of a majority of the electorate.
Many observers believe that the legislature may take a more engaged and assertive
role in policy-making than is traditional in Liberia. Johnson-Sirleaf’s Unity Party
5 IRIN, “Liberia: Riots Erupt as Weah Claims Presidency,” Dec. 12, 2005 and Christopher
Melville, “Comment from Defeated Presidential Candidate Provokes Riots in Liberian
Capital,” Global Insight Daily Analysis, Dec. 13, 2005, inter alia.

---

CRS-5
does not enjoy a majority in the legislature, whereas several of the parties that lost in
the presidential election are comparatively well positioned to potentially wield
significant political power.
The fractionalized make-up of the legislature, however, suggests that successful
national policy decision-making will require coalition-building and that many
independents and small parties may be able to exercise substantial bargaining power
within such a process. The same features could, however, produce political gridlock
or political flux characterized by fluid, ad hoc, and possibly issue-specific alliances,
rather than a clear and unified policy-making trend. Given the Liberian polity’s
fragmented nature; the fact that Weah’s defeat has proven a bitter outcome for his
largely youthful, sometimes volatile base of support; and because of deeply felt war-
related social divisions and antagonisms, many analysts also see a need for
Johnson-Sirleaf to rapidly initiate efforts to foster national reconciliation and rebuild
national unity.
Johnson-Sirleaf has reportedly been discussing these and other issues, including
her priorities for Liberia and the status of Charles Taylor (see section below entitled
“Charles Taylor”), with interested governments in West Africa and abroad. During
a mid-December trip to the United States, Johnson-Sirleaf met with World Bank
President Paul Wolfowitz, National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley and his Africa
deputy, Cindy Courville, and was slated to meet with Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice, Treasury Secretary John Snow, and Members of the House and Senate,
including the Congressional Black Caucus and Majority Leader Bill Frist.6
Security Conditions
Liberia’s security situation has improved markedly since August 2003 but
remains subject to periodic volatility and localized instability. Over 101,000
ex-combatants were demobilized under a disarmament program administered by
UNMIL and the NTGL that ended in late 2004. Public security has periodically been
threatened by sometimes violent political faction rivalries; criminal acts, often by
ex-combatants; and civil unrest related to socio-economic grievances, predominantly
involving students, workers, civil servants, jobless youth, and former fighters. Price
increases for rice, fuel, and cement are key sources of social dissatisfaction. U.N. and
U.S. officials and many members of Congress are concerned about persistent,
credible reports that Charles Taylor has interfered in Liberian affairs from exile in
Nigeria through a network of political, military, and business associates, which
Taylor denies. These alleged actions are seen as destabilizing and threatening to the
consolidation of peace.7
6 Reed Kramer, “Showered With Enthusiasm, Liberia’s President-Elect Receives High-Level
Reception in Washington,” AllAfrica.com, Dec. 11, 2005
7 Liberia remains under U.N. sanctions, first imposed under U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1521 (2003), that prohibit trade in arms, diamonds, and timber with Liberia, and
the travel of certain designated individuals, mostly members or associates of the Taylor
regime. The current travel ban list includes two legislators-elect, Jewel Howard-Taylor, a
former wife of Charles Taylor, and Edwin Snowe, a former Taylor regime official. Many
(continued...)

---

CRS-6
Security Sector Reform. With U.S. assistance, Liberia is set to establish a
new military made up of an initial 2,000 recruits, all vetted to screen out human
rights abusers. The State Department will administer the overall military training
program through two contractors: DynCorp International and PAE, in coordination
with U.S. military trainers. DynCorp is to help vet, recruit, and provide basic training
for the new force. PAE will provide specialized advanced training, equipment,
logistics, and base services. The training package is currently projected to cost about
$95 million, according to the State Department, prospectively to be drawn from a
mix of FY2004 through FY2007 International Disaster and Famine Assistance,
Regional Peacekeeping, and Foreign Military Assistance funds, and is slated to begin
in February 2006. Military restructuring was hindered by a need to demobilize and
verify the severance pay eligibility of over13,000 irregular forces and Armed Forces
of Liberia (AFL) soldiers. Funds for this purpose have been scarce, but over 8,000
irregular forces have been demobilized, and many of over 4,000 regular AFL soldiers
have been demobilized. Top officers comprise the final category slated to be
decommissioned, a goal that is seen as needing to be accomplished prior to
inauguration of the new government to avoid any potential sources of military
disgruntlement during the succession of state power. Total demobilization cost
estimates vary between $15 million and $18 million.
The United States also is providing Liberia with UNMIL-administered civilian
police (CIVPOL) training assistance, which includes the deployment, as members of
UNMIL, of about 20 U.S. CIVPOL advisors, as well as equipment and contractor-
based logistical support. The Special Security Service (SSS), a roughly 1,252-
member presidential protection unit that under the NTGL continued to provide
executive branch and VIP close protection functions, is being restructured. About 600
SSS officers are receiving general UNMIL police training and will continue to
provide VIP protection services. The remaining SSS members are slated to be
decommissioned, but there is no current funding for this purpose. U.S. aid also
supports the rehabilitation of the judicial and penal systems.
Humanitarian Conditions
Humanitarian conditions are steadily improving, though from a base of severe
and widespread post-war need, and poverty remains endemic. Liberia continues to
receive substantial international food aid, with about 708,000 persons receiving food
assistance each month, and is highly donor-dependent. International assistance is,
however, increasingly supporting resettlement and socio-economic recovery, rather
than emergency humanitarian needs. By late August 2005, over 207,000 internally
displaced persons (IDPs) and over 87,000 refugee returnees had been resettled in
permanent places of residence. There remained about 314,000 IDPs as of mid-
September 2005. The United Nations has reported a lack of funds to resettle about
20% of this population. Most IDPs and over 37,000 refugee returnees have received
resettlement aid, usually consisting of basic non-food items, transport aid, and two
7 (...continued)
of these same individuals are also subject to financial asset freezes mandated by U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1532 (2004). For more detail, see CRS Report RL32243,
Liberia: Transition to Peace.

---

CRS-7
months of food supplies. U.N. agencies, together with non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and NTGL ministries have implemented a wide range of
reconstruction and capacity building projects relating to nutrition, water and
sanitation, primary healthcare services, and transport infrastructure. Numerous
schools have re-opened nation-wide, with extensive assistance from UNICEF.
HIV/AIDS. The threat of HIV/AIDS in Liberia is gaining increasing attention.
While no reliable national prevalence tests have been completed recently — though
such efforts are underway — Liberia is estimated to have an HIV infection rate of
between 5.9% and 8.2%, though some observers believe that the rate could be as high
as 12% in some population sub-groups.8 The UNMIL HIV/AIDS Adviser’s Office
is supporting public education-related AIDS prevention and national planning efforts
focused on care of orphans and vulnerable children, among other activities. The
World Health Organization, in coordination with other U.N. agencies and the NTGL,
is developing project proposals to fight AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis and build health
system capacity. The U.N. Population Fund supports several AIDS awareness and
prevention programs. Liberia receives Global Fund assistance, but its application for
further assistance under the Fund’s recent Round 5 funding project assessment
process was reportedly rejected.9 USAID implements several AIDS-related programs
in Liberia on behalf of the Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC).
These include the first post-war demographic health survey, in partnership with other
donors, which includes HIV surveillance; targeted behavior change efforts focusing
on youth and other groups; and support for home-based care and related assistance.
Governance
Progress in governance has been mixed. While the NTGL is functional, the
restoration of state authority and the rehabilitation of state institutions have been
hampered by central government ministry inefficiencies, widespread resource
constraints, and lack of institutional and financial system capacities and trained
manpower. Progress has been reported in recent months, however. Many revenue,
customs, immigration, and local officials have been deployed to sites outside
Monrovia, and regional Central Bank offices have opened, permitting salary
payments without recourse to time-consuming travel to Monrovia. USAID is
supporting the rehabilitation of administrative buildings in several key counties.
Among the most challenging issues facing governance capacity-building efforts
are persistent reports of corruption within the NTGL, in some cases on a large scale,
notably in the context of import-export transactions, government contracts, and the
issuance of commodity marketing or concession rights. The U.N. Secretary-General
reported in mid-March 2005 that there is a “lack of [NTGL] transparency in the
collection and use of revenues and the resistance of some government and public
corporation officials to reforms and audits aimed at fighting corruption”
(S/2005/177). The World Bank and bilateral donors have made similar observations
8 IRIN PLUSNEWS, “Youth Not Putting HIV Prevention Lessons into Practice,” Oct. 27,
2005 and USAID, Health Profile: West Africa-HIV/AIDS, n.d.
9 For background on the Global Fund, see CRS Report RL31712, The Global Fund to Fight
AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria: Background and Current Issues.

---

CRS-8
and called for transparency measures. National fiscal and budget obligation
mechanisms and voucher record-keeping systems are described as chaotic and subject
to manipulation in some cases by key officials. The agency miscellaneous expense
budget account category “Other” is reportedly extremely large in many cases, and
expenditures of such funds are said to be carried out in a highly ad hoc manner.
Recent actions by the transitional legislature either to appropriate for private use or
pay very nominal lease fees for expensive vehicles that each legislator was given
have drawn local and foreign condemnation. In November 2005, the U.S. Embassy
in Monrovia stated that the U.S. government is
shocked and disappointed by the recent incidents of transfers of Liberian
Government property and resources into private ownership. This drains vital
government resources that could otherwise be used for critical developmental
programs, and sends the wrong signal to international donors who finance such
programs. It also perpetuates the culture of abuse of public trust and impunity
that has contributed to two decades of decline in Liberia. The U.S. Embassy
considers these transfers unscrupulous, irresponsible, and contrary to the public
interest of the people of Liberia. Liberian government resources are for the
benefit of the Liberian people and should not be misappropriated for private
use.10
Citing a 2004 presidential proclamation, it stated that government officials who
engage in “violations of the public trust”and persons who abet such actions might —
along with their families — will be ineligible for U.S.-funded programs and services,
including consideration for Diversity Visa, Immigrant Visa, and other visa services.11
Liberia is not eligible for African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) benefits,
“largely for reasons related to its poor record on economic reform, rule of law,
corruption, human rights, and regional destabilization,” according to the Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative (USTR).12
Concession Deals. Natural resource and land concession contract deals have
drawn attention during the NTGL’s tenure because of their financial significance and
potential long-term effects on national development. U.N. experts and donor
governments questioned the propriety of a March 2005 monopsony diamond
concession deal with a previously unknown firm, which was later cancelled. Some
observers also question the NTGL’s award of offshore oil exploration permits to
three relatively obscure firms just prior to elections.
The NTGL signed two major long-term natural resource concession deals. One,
with the Firestone group of companies, extends and amends a previous series of
concession agreements, first signed in 1926, giving Firestone rights to large
10 See U.S. Embassy-Monrovia, “U.S. Embassy Shocked and Disappointed at Abuse Of
Public Trust,” Press Release, Nov. 18, 2005 and IRIN, “Liberia: Scramble for Goodies
Ahead of Political Handover,” Nov. 21 2005.
11 See Proclamation by the President, To Suspend Entry as Immigrants or Non-immigrants
of Persons Engaged in or Benefitting From Corruption, Jan. 12, 2004.
12 USTR, 2005 Comprehensive Report on U.S. Trade and Investment Policy Toward
Sub-Saharan Africa and Implementation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act.

---

CRS-9
plantation areas for the cultivation of rubber.13 The contract was amended, in part,
because Firestone contends that it was unable to exploit its holdings due to fighting
over the last decade and a half, and in order to boost foreign investment in Liberia.
The deal gives the Firestone group surface rental and other rights to nearly 200
square miles of active or proposed rubber plantation land for 36 years in exchange
for $.50 per acre per year and various investments, tax payments, social and
infrastructure development outputs, and various other commitments. It may be
extended for another 50 years after renegotiation. The other deal, with
Netherlands-based Mittal Steel Holdings, provides for the rehabilitation or
construction of diverse mining, administrative support, processing, and transport
infrastructure intended to support the extraction and shipment of iron ore from
northern Liberia. It gives Mittal a variety of surface rental, mineral license, iron ore
extraction, transport infrastructure construction, and other rights in exchange for
diverse capital investments, totaling about $900 million, and royalty, lump sum, tax,
and other payments to the government. The initial term of 25 years is extendable for
additional 25-year terms, if certain criteria are met.
Both deals have drawn criticism from some civil society groups that have
contended that the NTGL lacks a legal mandate to negotiate long-term concessions,
that such functions should only be carried out by a duly elected government, and that
such deals should be negotiated in a manner more favorable to Liberian economic
and other national interests.14 The contracts were also politically controversial. The
Mittal deal was the subject of rival bids by the large mining firms Global
Infrastructural Holdings Limited (GIHL), BHP Billington and Real Tito, and its
ratification was contested legally and in parliament. Some civil society critics have
alleged that the deals were not undertaken in a transparent manner. Mittal has denied
that charge, and maintains that the contract was won in a “transparent and
competitive bid process” and will bring significant foreign investment and
infrastructure development to Liberia.15 The former U.S. Ambassador to Liberia John
Blaney reportedly pushed for requirements that, regardless of what firm was awarded
13 The agreement is between the government of Liberia and Firestone Natural Rubber
Company, a U.S. limited liability firm that is an affiliate of Bridgestone-Firestone North
American Tire, and its Liberian subsidiary, Firestone Plantations Company.
14 A coalition of Liberian human rights groups unsuccessfully petitioned the Liberian
Supreme Court to halt execution of the two contracts on such grounds and contended that
the deals had been made without public input. The complainants reportedly may seek to re-
file their case after the formation of the new elected government. See Morrison O.G. Sayon,
“Supreme Court Places ‘Stay Order’, Firestone, Mittal Steel Agreements,” The Inquirer
(Monrovia), Nov. 7, 2005; John Walsh, “Supreme Court Issues Stay Order On NTGL;
Ja’neh Appears Today,” FrontPageAfrica, Nov. 7, 2005; George Bardue, “Supreme Court
Stops Budget Execution and Summons NTGL Officials,” The News (Monrovia), Nov. 7,
2005.
15 Alphonso Toweh, “Liberia Minister Wants Mittal Iron Ore Deal Revised,” Reuters, Sept.
14, 2005; D. Moses Wantu, “Mittal Steel Hearing Backfires,” The Analyst (Monrovia), Sept.
6, 2005; Economist Intelligence Unit, “Liberia: A steel?,” Country Monitor, Aug. 29, 2005;
Steve Swindells, “Mittal Steel Defends Pursuit of Liberian Iron Ore Concession,” June 14,
2005 Metal Bulletin News Alert Service; The Analyst (Monrovia), “Bryant, Mittal Steel
Flout Law,” June 13, 2005; The Analyst (Monrovia), “NTGL Sued in U.S. District Court -
Over LIMINCO Bidding,” June 13, 2005, inter alia.

---

CRS-10
mining rights, a major railroad that would be rehabilitated under such a deal be made
a multi-use railroad.16
The Firestone contract has drawn attention for other reasons. Some Firestone
plantation workers have complained about poor working conditions and high
production quotas. Some environmental advocacy groups and residents living near
Firestone rubber processing facilities have alleged that chemicals used in latex
processing are polluting wells, rivers, and water life. The Firestone group also is the
subject of a class action suit brought in California by the International Labor Rights
Fund, an advocacy organization that says its goal is to counter child, forced, and other
abusive labor practices internationally, including through litigation. The suit alleges
that Firestone employs children, practices forced labor, involuntary servitude, and
negligent employment practices. Firestone categorically denies these charges,
describing the suit as “outrageous” and “completely without merit.” It maintains that
its operations comply fully with Liberian law, and asserts that its workers are all
adults of legal working age, are union-represented, are paid well above prevailing
wages, and are provided with social services, and that Firestone is bringing much
needed investment to Liberia.17
Anti-Corruption Efforts. The NTGL has taken some steps to halt corrupt
practices. It established a Task Force on Corruption and a Cash Management
Committee. It has attempted to eliminate bribe-taking in relation to commodity
imports, notably by better managing Monrovia’s port, of which UNMIL took
temporary control in late April 2005. In addition, the National Transitional
Legislative Assembly (NTLA) created a committee to investigate allegations of
administrative and financial irregularities by its leadership, which eventually led to
the removal of key NTLA leaders. Some observers, however, see the NTGL Task
Force as lacking the capacity or political will to achieve significant results, and some
Liberian officials have periodically resisted donor and ECOWAS-backed
transparency and audit measures. An African Development Bank loan was reportedly
not disbursed in 2005 because Liberia failed to provide required fiscal data, and an
ECOWAS-sponsored auditing mission was opposed by Liberian auditors and certain
government officials, who cited concern over a violation of Liberian sovereignty,
despite the publicly-stated support of Chairman Bryant for the audit. In July 2005,
Chairman Bryant suspended two officials over their alleged diversion of funds paid
by the satellite communications firm Inmarsat to several Liberian state entities, and
the NTGL suspended three Bureau of Maritime Affairs officials, including the
16 A smaller former mine railroad between Monrovia and Bong County has been
rehabilitated by AmLib, a mineral exploration firm, and put into use as a multi-use transport
line. It has reportedly contributed to a several-fold drop in charcoal prices in Monrovia, and
is increasing the supply of other farm products to the capital. Charcoal is the main cooking
fuel in Liberia.
17 Femi Oke, “Is Bridgestone/Firestone Exploiting Liberian Workers?,” Inside Africa, CNN
International, Nov. 12, 2005; Joe Bavier, “Firestone Lease an Issue in Liberia Election
Campaign,” VOA News, Sept. 14, 2005; Gary Gentile, “Firestone Accused of Using Slave
Labor,” Associated Press, Nov. 17, 2005; and Reuters, “Labor Group Sues Bridgestone on
Liberia Plantation,” Nov. 17, 2005, inter alia.

---

CRS-11
Commissioner, and Liberia’s International Maritime Organization representative for
fraud.
Concerns over transparency produced a sometimes halting and highly
conditional provision to Liberia by donors of pledged aid as well as some reticence
to offer new funding. This has negatively affected the scale and pace of resettlement,
reintegration, and socio-economic rehabilitation. Nonetheless, a network of national,
international, U.N., and private development and relief organizations has made
considerable progress in these areas. Most of them participate in an inter-sectoral,
U.N.-coordinated initiative, the Results-Focused Transitional Framework (RFTF).
An April 2005 NTGL/U.N./World Bank assessment of the RFTF found that it has
been effective in “addressing short-term, stabilization priorities,” but that medium
to long-term post-transition institutional and reconstruction development will require
a more robust, coherent, and comprehensive strategy.
There are some indications that Liberian-donor government relations may
improve when the newly-elected government takes office. Johnson-Sirleaf has
reportedly suggested that she may seek a review of some public contracts or
concession deals granted by the NTGL. In addition, in September 2005, the NTGL
negotiated and signed an agreement with the International Contact Group on Liberia
(ICGL), an international policy coordinating group of donor and regional
governments and multinational institutions. The agreement, the Governance and
Economic Management Assistance Program (GEMAP), provides for contract-based
management of the revenue and expenditure flows of key public sector entities,
notably the main port, airport, and fuel refining firm, among others, in order to
strictly enforce central government controls over state revenues and to improve
public fiscal capacities. It also supports diverse economic governance and judicial
capacity-building measures for the government aimed at institutionalizing the good
governance and management capacity-building goals and reforms envisaged under
GEMAP. Elements of GEMAP that call for an external management role were
initially opposed by some in Liberia as an intrusion on national sovereignty, but
donor governments, including the United States, pushed for strict conditionality for
future assistance to Liberia. The United States has sent several Treasury Department
advisors to Liberia in the areas of budget and tax policy, management, and
administration; central bank operations and fiscal policy and regulation; and has
assessed Liberia’s financial enforcement (financial crime and corruption) capacity.
A resident U.S. legal advisor and a temporary duty team of prosecution experts are
slated to be deployed to Liberia soon to assist in building Liberia’s judicial capacity.
Charles Taylor
The future status of Charles Taylor, an indictee of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone (SCSL) for his alleged involvement in war crimes in Sierra Leone, remains
in question.18 The SCSL would like Nigeria, where Taylor is in exile, to transfer him
18 On Taylor’s alleged actions and his departure from Liberia and political power, see CRS
Report RL32243, Liberia: Transition to Peace. It also discusses Taylor’s alleged
involvement in illicit diamond trading and links with Al Qaeda, along with CRS Report
(continued...)

---

CRS-12
to SCSL custody. However, when Nigeria, under U.S. and other international
pressure, provided him with refuge it stated that it was doing so to aid the Liberian
peace process and would not countenance later pressure to extradite Taylor. Nigeria
also, however, required him to disengage from Liberian politics, either directly or
through proxies. Taylor has reportedly broken these conditions extensively . Many
human rights groups, therefore, assert that Nigeria has good reason to surrender him,
and that his continued asylum perpetuates a “culture of impunity” for human rights
abusers in Africa. Others argue that Taylor’s asylum in Nigeria remains the best way
to ensure continued stability in Liberia.19
U.S. relations with the SCSL have been mixed. Although the SCSL has received
$22 million in U.S. funding and may receive $13 million in FY2006,20 some State
Department officials have questioned the political advisability of actions taken by
former SCSL Prosecutor, David Crane, including his unsealing of an indictment
against Taylor during peace talks in June 2003, and the accuracy of his claim that
Taylor sponsored the January 2005 attempted assassination of President Lasana
Conté of Guinea. Such skepticism may, in part, explain the SCSL’s failure to obtain
authority under Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter, which would oblige U.N. member
states to cooperate with the SCSL. However, on November 11, 2005, the U.N.
Security Council passed Resolution 1638, which authorizes UNMIL to arrest Taylor
if he returns to Liberia.
On May 5, 2005, President Bush and Nigerian president Olesegun Obasanjo met
and discussed the status of Taylor, among other issues. Though few details of the
their exchange were reported, prior to the meeting, White House spokesman Scott
McClellan called for Taylor “to be held to account for the crimes he has committed,”
and stated that the United States and Nigeria are “engaged” in the question of how
18 (...continued)
RL30933, Liberia: 1989-1997 Civil War, Post-War Developments, and U.S. Relations, and
CRS Report RL30751, Diamonds and Conflict: Background, Policy, and Legislation. In
April 2005, the Treasury Department designated Viktor Bout, an accused international arms
trafficker, and four associates, including his alleged U.S.-based chief financial officer,
Richard Chichakli, as “Specially Designated Nationals” (SDNs) under Executive Order
13348. The action expanded the list of persons designated under the order, which prohibits
financial transactions between U.S. persons and these SDNs and freezes any assets of SDNs
within U.S. jurisdiction. Executive Order 13348 was issued in order to halt the unlawful
depletion, removal from Liberia, and “secreting” of Liberian resources, funds, and property,
actions which the order stated were undermining “Liberia’s transition to democracy and the
orderly development of its political, administrative, and economic institutions and
resources.” Treasury accused Bout of supplying arms to Taylor’s regime and the Sierra
Leone rebel group, the Revolutionary United Front, in exchange for payments from
Liberia’s international ship registry, diamonds, and other allegedly illegally acquired goods.
Treasury Dept., “Treasury Designates Viktor Bout’s International Arms Trafficking
Network,” Apr. 26, 2005.
19 For further background on issues surrounding the Taylor case, see section entitled “Status
of Charles Taylor,” CRS Report RL32243, Liberia: Transition to Peace.
20 The conference agreement accompanying H.R. 3057 (Kolbe), which became P.L. 109-102,
the FY2006 foreign operations appropriation, earmarks $13 million in Economic Support
Funds for the SCSL.

---

CRS-13
“to address the matter”(White House Press Briefing, May 5, 2005). He also expressed
appreciation to Nigeria for facilitating Taylor’s departure from Liberia in 2003,
which he said had helped bring peace in Liberia. He did not describe the engagement.
His remarks mirrored State Department statements on the issue during the past two-
plus years. State Department officials have often called for Taylor to “face justice,”
but have generally offered few specific suggestions on how this might be
accomplished.21 The U.S. position may be changing, however. During a reported
telephone call to congratulate Johnson-Sirleaf on her electoral victory, President
Bush reportedly expressed support for bringing Taylor to justice so that “he can no
longer threaten the people of Liberia and the region of West Africa.”22 His reported
remarks did not, however, specify a venue where such a goal could be achieved.
There is as yet no indication of how the newly elected Liberian government will
treat the Taylor case. Some observers believe that Johnson-Sirleaf does not generally
support prosecuting those who committed war time atrocities during the 1989-2003
civil wars.23 Johnson-Sirleaf has reportedly stated that Liberia cannot alone decide
whether Taylor should be turned over to the SCSL, and that the international
community would “have to be a part of such a decision because they were part of the
arrangement that saw Taylor leave for Nigeria.” She reportedly stated that any
solution would have to have the specific concurrence of the European Union, the
African Union, and West African leaders, with whom she has been meeting during
a regional pre-inauguration consulting tour, in part to address “certain national and
regional sensitivities.” Her statements are significant because Nigeria has stated that
it will only turn Taylor over to an elected Liberian government at the latter’s request.
In July, the Mano River Union of Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea, issued a joint
communique suggesting to Nigeria that the terms of Taylor’s asylum be reviewed or
that his status be referred to the ECOWAS Heads of State for further consideration.24
21 See, e.g., State Department, Daily Press Briefing, May 5, 2005. At least one State
Department official has publicly called on Nigeria to hand Taylor over to the SCSL directly.
See Daniel Balint-Kurti, “Wanted for War Crimes, Liberia’s Ex-president Hunkers down
in Nigerian Exile,” Associated Press, May 31, 2005. Some sources suggest that National
Security Council policy makers on Africa have been reticent to advise that Taylor be
transferred to the SCSL because such a transfer could be a potential source of instability for
both Sierra Leone and Liberia. A second factor may have been the U.S. commitment to
Nigeria to honor the latter’s conditions for accepting Taylor after President Bush stated in
2003 that “Taylor must go” (Press Conference of the President, “President Bush Discusses
Top Priorities for the U.S.,” July 30, 2003, inter alia), and deference to Nigeria’s views on
the matter, given its central role as a regional peacekeeping and political mediating power.
In testimony before the House Committee on International Relations during a hearing
entitled Confronting War Crimes in Africa on June 9, 2004, Howard F. Jeter, former U.S.
ambassador to Nigeria, testified that “President Obasanjo acted with our full knowledge and
concurrence.”
22 State Department, “Bush Congratulates Liberian President-Elect,” Washington File, Nov.
30, 2005.
23 Jeremy I. Levitt and J. Peter Pham, “Liberia must confront its past if it wants a brighter
future,” The Baltimore Sun, December 8, 2005.
24 See SAPA-DPA , “Sirleaf Addresses Taylor War Crimes Issue,” Nov. 20, 2005; BBC
(continued...)

---

CRS-14
Congressional Focus
Congress has shown considerable interest in the status of Charles Taylor and has
generally, with a few exceptions, shown strong support for the SCSL. It passed laws
(P.L. 108-199 and P.L. 108-106) urging that SCSL indictees, like Taylor, be
transferred to the court, and in May 2005, the House and Senate passed H.Con.Res.
127 (Royce), which urges the same outcome.25 P.L. 109-102, the FY2006 Foreign
Operations Appropriations bill, reaffirms congressional support for the court. It
would limit some types of assistance under certain conditions for countries in which
SCSL indictees are “credibly alleged to be living” unless such countries cooperate
with the SCSL, including by transferring such indictees to the SCSL. It also requires
U.S. support for that goal within the U.N. Security Council. It specifically would,
after a period, bar assistance to Nigeria unless the President reports to the
Committees on Appropriations on steps taken in FY2003 through FY2005 to obtain
Nigeria’s cooperation in surrendering Taylor to the SCSL and a strategy and time line
for achieving that purpose. H.Amdt. 480 (Watson) to H.R. 2601, the FY2006 -
FY2007 foreign relations authorization act, would require the Administration to seek
the expeditious transfer of Taylor to the SCSL for trial.
Congress also provided substantial support for Liberia’s rebuilding and peace
building processes.26 U.S. assistance is summarized on the table below. Other
congressional interest in Liberia focuses on Liberia-related immigration and debt
issues. H.R. 257 (Jackson-Lee), H.R. 2092 (Jackson-Lee), H.R. 3450 (Patrick
Kennedy), and S. 656 (Reed) would give permanent U.S. residence status to qualified
Liberians resident in the United States, among other measures, as would S.Amdt. 452
(Reed) to H.R. 1268 (Jerry Lewis). H.R. 1130 (Waters) would enact various
measures intended to reduce the national debts of certain poor countries, including
Liberia, and encourage their governments to fund social services.
24 (...continued)
News, “Liberian Taylor’s Fate Discussed,” Nov. 30 2005; and AFP, “Backed by neighbors,
Liberia requests Taylor handover to SLeone war court,” July 29, 2005.
25 The European Parliament passed a similar resolution in February 2005.
26 An Administration Economic Support Fund (ESF) FY2006 budget request for $75 million
for Liberia, however, was not included an earmark for Liberia in P.L. 109-102 (formerly
H.R. 3057, Kolbe, the FY2006 foreign operations appropriations bill). Any ESF funding for
Liberia is likely to be drawn from $88 million in general ESF funding designated for Africa.
P.L. 109-102 also mandates special congressional notification reporting for the expenditure
of funds used to assist Liberia.

---

CRS-15
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Liberia, FY2004-2006
($ millions; errors due to rounding)
Account
FY2004
FY2005
FY2006
Actual
Estimate
Request*
Child Survival and Health Program (CSH)
2.82
4.47
2.90
Development Assistance (DA)
-
6.85
7.86
Economic Support Fund (ESF)
-
24.80
75.00
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
-
2.98
2.00
International Disaster & Famine Assistance
200.00
-
-
(IDFA)-Supplemental
Int. Narcotics Control & Law Enforcement (INL)
-
5.00
2.00
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining & Related
0.16
-
-
Projects-Small Arms &Light Weapons (NADR-SALW)
Africa Regional Peacekeeping (PKO; estimates)
NA
25.00
20.00
P.L. 480, Title II [emerg. Food aid]a
21.53
22.50b
NAa
USAID/Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster
23.60
9.71b
NAa
Assistance (OFDA) [emerg. humanitarian aid]a
Transition Initiatives
3.1
2.53
4.6
State Dept., Bureau of Population,
22.80
28.19 (est.)c
NAa
Refugees & Migration (PRM)[refugee, IDP aid]a/c
Totals - Bilateral Aid
274.01
132.03
114.36
U.N. Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)/
290.34
129.00d
159.21
Contribs. to Int. Peacekeeping Account (CIPA)
Totals - All Funding
564.35
261.03
273.57
Sources: State Department, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, FY2006 and
other fiscal years; USAID, Congressional Budget Justification, FY2006 and other fiscal years; and
information from USAID/OFDA, State/PRM, and State/Political-Military Affairs officials.
*P.L. 109-102, the foreign operations FY2006 appropriation act, which was signed into law on
November 14, 2005, does not specify aid levels for Liberia, though it requires that the Committees on
Appropriations be notified if funds appropriated under the act are used to assist Liberia. Specific
assistance levels for Liberia will be finalized pursuant to requirements in the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961 and the FY2006 Foreign Operations appropriations regarding Administration aid allocation
decisions, and through executive-congressional consultations.
No

tes
a. These figures reflect appropriated levels, but some accounts, such as P.L. 480, Title II, OFDA, and
PRM levels, often increase during a given fiscal year because they are appropriated in a lump sum
and allocated throughout the year in response to emergent needs.
b. Levels to date.
c. The State/PRM $28.19 million FY2005 figure is an estimate. In general, State/PRM funding is
difficult to break out by Liberia-only levels because PRM funds refugee camps in third countries that
may house people of different nationalities, including Liberians. The table data are the closest
estimates PRM can provide for Liberia-specific spending.
d. UNMIL FY2005 CIPA Budget: $229.716 million; bills received as of Sept 8, 2005 were $129
million.

---

CRS-16
Appendix 1: Acronyms Used in this Report
AFL:
Armed Forces of Liberia
AGOA:
African Growth and Opportunity Act
CDC:
Congress for Democratic Change, Liberian political party
CIPA:
Contributions to International Peacekeeping Account
CIVPOL:
Civilian police
COTOL:
Coalition for Transformation of Liberia, Liberian political
party
CSH:
Child Survival and Health Program Fund
DA:
Development Assistance Account
ECOMIL:
ECOWAS Mission in Liberia
ECOWAS:
Economic Community of West African States
ESF:
Economic Support Fund
FMF:
Foreign Military Financing Account
GEMAP:
Governance and Economic Management Assistance Program
GIHL:
Global Infrastructural Holdings Limited
ICGL:
International Contact Group on Liberia
IDFA:
International Disaster & Famine Assistance Account
IDP:
Internally displaced person
IFES:
Elections technical assistance organization formerly known
as the International Foundation for Election Systems
INL:
International Narcotics Control & Law Enforcement
IRI :
International Republican Institute
LP:
Liberty Party, Liberian political party
NADR-SALW:
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related
Projects-Small Arms and Light Weapons
NDI :
National Democratic Institute
NEC:
National Elections Commission (of Liberia)
NGO:
Non-governmental organization
NTGL:
National Transitional Government of Liberia
NTLA:
National Transitional Legislative Assembly
OFDA:
USAID Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
OGAC:
U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator
P.L. :
Public law
P.L. 480, Title II : Humanitarian food aid
PKO :
Regional Peacekeeping Account
PRM:
Population, Refugees & Migration Bureau, State Department
RFTF:
Results-Focused Transitional Framework
SCSL:
Special Court for Sierra Leone
SDN:
Specially Designated National
SSS:
Special Security Service (of Liberia)
TI:
Transition Initiatives Account
U.N.:
United Nations
UNAMSIL:
U.N. Mission in Sierra Leone
UNICEF:
U.N. Children’s Fund
UNMIL:
U.N. Mission in Liberia

---

CRS-17
UP:
Unity Party, Liberian political party
USAID:
U.S. Agency for International Development
USTR:
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative

---