Order Code RL33196
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
The Earthquake in South Asia:
Humanitarian Assistance and Relief Operations
December 12, 2005
Daniel Kronenfeld
Research Associate
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Rhoda Margesson
Specialist in Foreign Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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The Earthquake in South Asia: Humanitarian
Assistance and Relief Operations
Summary
On October 8, 2005, a powerful earthquake struck northern Pakistan and India,
killing at least 74,500 people and injuring over 130,000 more. The earthquake
damaged the homes of as many as three million people, forcing many of them to
search for alternative means of shelter. The full extent of the destruction remains
unknown because government authorities and relief organizations continue to have
difficulty accessing some remote locations. As of the date of this report, the United
States government (USG) has pledged $410 million toward the relief effort, almost
all of it to assisting Pakistan, which remains a key U.S. ally in the war against terror.
So far, about 35% of this pledge has been committed. Because of the heavy USG
military and development presence in neighboring Afghanistan, the logistics of
bringing resources into Pakistan has been relatively straightforward. The USG,
Government of Pakistan, and NATO, among others, are operating daily relief flights
to ferry supplies, personnel, and victims to and from the region.
The earthquake struck a region that lies along the southern reaches of the
Himalayan Mountains. While continuing to deliver humanitarian assistance and
gaining full access is critical, one of the main humanitarian priorities in the coming
months is ensuring that the estimated three million people who lost their homes have
adequate protection from winter weather and diseases. Relief organizations are
distributing winterized tents, setting up emergency clinics, and working to vaccinate
children against measles, tetanus, whooping cough, diphtheria, and polio. The most
significant health problem identified so far has been a number of cases of Acute
Respiratory Illness (ARI) brought on by lack of hygiene and exposure to cold
weather. Cases of acute diarrhea are also emerging. The World Food Programme
(WFP), which estimates that 2.3 million Pakistanis will need food aid in the next two
to four months, is working to pre-position 95,000 tons of food in affected areas. A
final pressing concern remains the inaccessibility of some areas due to road damage
caused by the earthquake.
Although no systematic study has been conducted, anecdotal evidence suggests
that the USG’s aid effort has improved ordinary Pakistanis’ opinions of the United
States. Nevertheless, some aid agencies are saying that the country needs a great deal
more aid than it is getting, and warn that the economic impact of the disaster will
surpass $5.2 billion. This burden may contribute toward long-term instability in an
area perceived to be of critical importance to the United States in the war on terror.
This report will be updated as events warrant.
Legislative activity so far has included the introduction of several resolutions
expressing sympathy for those affected by the earthquake, pledging American
support for the victims, and lauding the relief efforts of U.S. personnel.

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Contents
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Comparisons to Past Disasters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Current Situation and Critical Needs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Winter and Shelter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Health and Disease . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Food . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
National Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Criticism of Government Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Militant Groups Provide Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
U.S. Humanitarian Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Assistance by Source . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
USAID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
DoD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
State/PRM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
USDA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
NGOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Private Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
U.S. Response to Other International Natural Disasters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
The U.S. Emergency Response Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
International Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Flash Appeal
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
NATO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
U.S. Image in Pakistan; Effects on War Against Terror . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Burdensharing and Donor Fatigue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Competing Aid and Budget Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
From Relief to Recovery: The Cost of Rebuilding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Transparency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Assessing U.N. Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Appendix A: Maps of Disaster Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Appendix B: U.N. Flash Appeal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

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List of Figures
Map 1. The Affected Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Map 2. The Epicenter and Political Boundaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
List of Tables
Table 1. Deadliest Natural Disasters Since 1900 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Table 2. Estimated Number of People Affected by the South Asia Earthquake . . 4
Table 3. USG Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Table 4. USG Aid in Past International Natural Disasters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

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The Earthquake in South Asia:
Humanitarian Assistance and Relief
Operations
Background
Introduction
A powerful earthquake of magnitude 7.6 on the Richter scale struck northern
Pakistan at 8:50 am local time on October 8, 2005. Its epicenter was near the city of
Muzaffarabad, 65 miles north northeast of Islamabad, Pakistan, and near the frontier
with India. The earthquake was felt as far away as New Delhi, India, and Kabul,
Afghanistan.1 The vast majority of the deaths — over 74,500 at the time of this
report — occurred in Pakistan, most of them in the Pakistani-controlled portions of
the disputed territory of Kashmir. The fatality count in India stands at 1,309.
Afghanistan registered four deaths.2
The former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, as it is called in India, or
Azad (“Free”) Jammu and Kashmir, as it is known in Pakistan, has been a source of
contention between India and Pakistan since the two countries gained their
independence from Great Britain in 1947.3 Although the earthquake has led to a
certain amount of rapprochement between New Delhi and Islamabad — including the
1 United States Geological Survey (USGS), National Earthquake Information Center,
[http://earthquake.usgs.gov/eqinthenews/2005/usdyae/], accessed October 20, 2005.
2 USAID South Asia Earthquake Fact Sheet #29, December 8, 2005.
3 See CRS Report IB93097, India-U.S. Relations, by Alan Kronstadt: “The problem is
rooted in claims by both India and Pakistan to the former princely state, divided since 1948
by a military Line of Control (LOC) separating India’s Jammu and Kashmir and
Pakistan-controlled Azad [Free] Kashmir (India and Pakistan fought full-scale wars over
Kashmir in 1947 and 1965). Some Kashmiris seek independence from both countries.
Spurred by a perception of rigged state elections that unfairly favored pro-New Delhi
candidates in 1989, an ongoing separatist war between Islamic militants and their supporters
and Indian security forces in Indian-held Kashmir has claimed 40,000-90,000 lives. India
blames Pakistan for fanning the rebellion, as well as supplying arms, training, and fighters.
Pakistan, for its part, claims to provide only diplomatic and moral support to what it calls
‘freedom fighters’ who resist Indian rule in the Muslim-majority region.” See also CRS
Issue Brief IB94041, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by Alan Kronstad;, and Haqqani, Husain,
Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2005. For a short summary, see BBC, “India and Pakistan: Tense
Neighbors,” December 16, 2001. Available at [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/]
world/south_asia/ 102201.stm. For recent exchanges between Pakistan and India, see CRS
Report RS21584, Pakistan: Chronology of Recent Events, by Alan Kronstadt.

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CRS-2
opening of telephone exchanges and previously closed border crossings — its long-
term political effects in the region remain to be seen. The domestic significance of
the earthquake within Pakistan and India is taken up in subsequent sections of this
report.
Comparisons to Past Disasters
The full extent of the damage caused by the earthquake in South Asia remains
unknown. Although its toll in human lives appears, so far, to be about a third of that
of the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, current reports indicate that damage to
Pakistan’s economy and infrastructure has been substantial. Table 1 presents a list
of the ten deadliest natural disasters of the past century, based principally on the
Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) maintained by the World Health
Organization’s (WHO) Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters
(CRED). Although CRED makes efforts to ensure the reliability of its data, it must
be cautioned that obtaining precise and accurate information about natural disasters,
many of which occurred decades ago and in areas where political and environmental
conditions made data collection difficult, is not possible. Thus casualty figures
stemming from, for instance, the series of deadly floods in China that took place a
half-century ago, must all be taken as very rough approximations. Even the figures
for the recent tsunami vary to some degree from source to source, and must be
considered estimates. On the whole, however, the EM-DAT, because of its explicit
definitions and uniform criteria for event inclusion, provides the best means of
comparing data across different disasters.4
Table 1. Deadliest Natural Disasters Since 1900
Estimated
Date
Location
Event
Fatalities
July 1931
China (Huang He River)
Flood
3.7 million
July 1959
China (Northern areas)
Flood
2 million
July 1939
China (Honan Province)
Flood
500,000
Nov. 12, 1970
Bangladesh (Khulna, Chittagong) Cyclone
300,000
July 27, 1976
China (Tangshan, Tientsin)
Earthquake
242,000a
(magnitude 7.6)
Dec. 26, 2004
Indian Ocean (esp. Indonesia,
Tsunami and
224,495b
Maldives, Sri Lanka, Thailand)
Earthquake (9.0)
May 22, 1927
China (Jiangxi Province)
Earthquake (7.9)
200,000
Dec. 16, 1920
China (Kansu Province)
Earthquake (7.8)
180,000
Sep. 1, 1923
Japan (Kanto plain)
Earthquake (7.9)
143,000
1935c
China (Yangtze river)
Flood
142,000
4 EM-DAT is at [http://www.em-dat.net/index.htm]. Criteria and definitions are at
[http://www.em-dat.net/criteria.htm].

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CRS-3
Sources: EM-DAT (op cit) and United States Geological Survey (USGS) at
[http://neic.usgs.gov/neis/eqlists/eqsmosde.html]. This table does not include droughts, epidemics,
and famines, the most significant of which have claimed as many as twenty million victims. The
events are excluded because of the difficulty in pinpointing their locations and timing, and, more
importantly, the extent to which they were exacerbated — or created — by humans. It would be
difficult to argue, for instance, that the recent North Korean famines, which have likely claimed several
hundred thousand lives over several years, are entirely “natural” in their origin.
a. USGS lists official death toll at 255,000; some reports indicate toll as high as 655,000.
b. The USGS lists death toll from earthquake and tsunami at 283,106.
c. Month unknown.
Although its nearly 75,000 fatalities rank it as a truly major calamity, the recent
earthquake in South Asia was not among the ten deadliest natural disasters of the last
century.5
Current Situation and Critical Needs
In addition to the 74,500 deaths recorded so far, over 128,288 injuries have been
reported in Pakistan and 6,622 in India. The International Organization for Migration
estimates that three million people lost their homes in the earthquake and now require
alternative shelter.6 All of the figures may rise, perhaps significantly, as government
authorities and humanitarian organizations continue to survey remote areas, such as
the Neelum, Jahlum, Kargan, Alai, and Naran valleys, where the earthquake
destroyed road links. The onset of winter is expected to make access to these areas
even more difficult.7 Table 2 summarizes the damage caused by the earthquake;
updates are available on the Pakistan Federal Relief Commission website, cited
below.
5 The December 2004 tsunami, however, was. The tsunami was unique in both the extent
of its damage and the number of countries it affected. Unlike other disasters, which have
been relatively more localized, the tsunami struck thousands of miles of populous coastline
in nearly a dozen countries, affecting millions of people. Also, the deaths of thousands of
tourists from the industrialized world vacationing in southern Thailand and Sri Lanka —
mostly Europeans but also many Americans and Japanese — may have given the Indian
Ocean tsunami a higher profile than the more recent South Asian earthquake. Indeed, there
has been some concern that donors who contributed to the tsunami relief effort may be less
enthusiastic about assisting victims of the second major South Asian natural disaster to
strike in less than a year.
6 USAID South Asia Earthquake Fact Sheet #27, November 29, 2005, citing the government
of India and IOM.
7 WFP Emergency Report no. 44, October 28, 2005, available at [http://www.wfp.org/
english/?n=34]; updates are provided regularly. For road clearance information, see
government of Pakistan Summary of Relief Activity, November 5, 2005, available at
[http://www.earthquakepakistan.com/images/summary%20oct-nov.pdf].

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CRS-4
Table 2. Estimated Number of People Affected by the South
Asia Earthquake
(Current as of December 8, 2005)
Pakistan
India
Afghanistan
Total
Killed
73,338
1,309
4
74,644
Injured
128,308
6,622
n/a
134,910
Displaced
2.8 million
150,000
n/a
2.95 million
Sources: Pakistani casualty figures are from government of Pakistan Federal Relief Commission
website at [http://earthquakepakistan.com/Press_Brief_latest.htm], which is updated regularly. Injury
figures include 69,392 “seriously injured,” and 58,896 “other injured.” Other data reported USAID
South Asia Earthquake Fact Sheet # 29, December 29, 2005, citing the government of India and IOM.
Government agencies and humanitarian organizations have identified a number
of critical needs to be addressed in the weeks and months ahead. These include
distributing shelter before the onset of winter to those whose homes were destroyed,
caring for orphaned or abandoned children, providing medical supplies and non-food
items to prevent the outbreak of disease, and making helicopters and other transport
available to ferry supplies and personnel to affected areas and victims to safety.
Winter and Shelter
With an estimated three million left homeless by the earthquake in the foothills
of the Himalayas, provision of emergency shelter before the onset of winter is among
the most pressing priorities facing humanitarian workers. The United Nations Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA) reports that many
residents of highland areas have preferred to stay on their land through the winter
rather than descend to emergency camps in the valleys. In response, the Pakistani
military and the humanitarian community are seeking to rebuild, at least temporarily,
as many shelters as possible in these areas.8 According to the Pakistani
Meteorological Department, the upcoming winter is expected to be particularly
fierce: “Snowfall is expected to exceed considerably above [sic] the normal range
both in terms of frequency of occurrence and amount. As such, the temperatures are
likely to range well below normal.”9 UNHCR and its partners have set up twenty
organized tent camps to shelter earthquake survivors. An additional 500 camps of
various sizes have sprung up spontaneously, however, and one of UNHCR’s pressing
concerns is to get supplies to these camps.10 The government of Pakistan and relief
8 For updated information, please refer to OCHA’s situation reports, available at
[http://ochaonline.un.org/webpage.asp?MenuID=9839&Page=1385].
9 Chaudhry, Qamar-uz-Zaman, Director General, Meteorological Service of Pakistan,
“Seasonal Weather Outlook, Pakistan-Earthquake Affected Areas,” press release, October
28, 2005. Available at [http://www.pakmet.com.pk/outlook.htm].
10 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Antonio Guterres, The NewsHour with
Jim Lehrer, December 1, 2005 (transcript # 8410).

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CRS-5
agencies estimate that 500,000 winterized tents are necessary to house victims of the
earthquake. As of November 30, IOM had verified that over 60% of this goal had
been met.11 Despite the progress, there has been some concern that tents will be
inappropriate for many highland inhabitants.12
Children
According to the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), more than 17,000
Pakistani children died when their schools collapsed in the earthquake. The trauma
for those who survived is worse, in the estimation of UNICEF’s director, than after
the Asian tsunami, because children watched their classmates die.13 Nearly 20,000
children may have physical impairments due to injuries and amputations, and the
organization has warned that a “second wave” of deaths may occur if children are not
provided with proper health care, clean drinking water, and immunizations before the
onset of winter. The concern is that a lack of adequate shelter, combined with poor
sanitary conditions, inaccessibility, and extreme cold, could provide a breeding
ground for disease. Indeed, there have been some recent reports that pneumonia is
spreading among children in earthquake-affected areas of the Himalayas. UNICEF
and other agencies are attempting to respond by immunizing as many children as
possible against measles, tetanus, whooping cough, diphtheria and polio.14
Health and Disease
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), 291 of a total 564 health
facilities were destroyed in the earthquake, and another 74 were partially damaged.
Fewer than half are currently operational. In order to respond to the shortfall, WHO
has opened six field offices to coordinate medical response, disseminate health
information, and provide disease surveillance. The organization has also been
distributing medicine to clinics and hospitals and has hired 125 health workers to
carry out health promotion and consultation activities.15 In addition to concerns
about pneumonia mentioned above, the major health problem identified so far has
been an increase in Acute Respiratory Illness (ARI) due to lack of hygiene and
11 OCHA Situation Report No. 25, op cit.
12 Khan, Aamer Achmed, “Dilemma Over New Quake Shelters,” BBC News, December 11,
2005 ([http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4514312.stm]).
13 “The trauma that these children have experienced I think has been particularly even worse
than other tragedies like the tsunami, because so many of these kids were in schools... They
were in school at that time when so many of the school buildings came down. The ones that
survived, many have injuries, many lost friends, they lost teachers, they lost important
people in their lives.” Quotation by UNICEF Executive Director Ann Veneman, in “Quake
Killed 17,000 Schoolchildren in Pakistan: UNICEF,” AFP, October 31, 2005.
14 Ibid.; “Winter Trebles Illnesses in Pakistan Quake Zone,” AFP, November 30, 2005;
“Deadly Pneumonia Hits Pakistan Quake Children, AFP, November 29, 3005; and Haider,
Zeeshan, “Immunisation Race Starts in Quake-Hit Pakistan,” Reuters, November 13, 2005.
15 “South Asia Earthquake Situation Report #20,” WHO and Pakistan Ministry of Health,
November 2-7, 2005. See also earlier reports, all available at
[http://www.who.int/hac/crises/international/pakistan_earthquake/sitrep/en/index.html].

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CRS-6
exposure to cold weather. There has also been some recent concern that several
hundred camp inhabitants in Pakistani Kashmir are suffering from acute diarrhea that
may indicate cholera. In addition to shelter, WHO has said there is an urgent need
for more field hospitals, female paramedics, and improved water and sanitary
conditions.16
Food
The World Food Programme (WFP) estimates that 2.3 million Pakistanis
affected by the earthquake will be reliant upon food aid in the next two to four
months, in part because the majority of the earthquake-affected areas in Pakistan had
difficulty securing adequate food supplies to begin with. WFP is attempting to pre-
position 95,000 tons of food in these areas, and has issued an urgent appeal to donors
to help meet its requirements. The situation is made more difficult because many of
those affected are staying close to their lands and livestock rather than descending to
camps in the lowlands.17 There are recent indications, however, that some
inhabitants of highland areas have begun descending to the valleys as weather has
become more inhospitable.18
Transportation
A common theme underlying the issues above is the continuing inaccessibility
of many of the earthquake victims. Three weeks after the earthquake, UN-OCHA
estimated that 30% of the affected areas of northern Pakistan were still inaccessible
to relief workers, leaving as many as 200,000 people unable to receive assistance.
In the days after the earthquake landslides blocked many key road links. Since then,
winter conditions have become a bigger problem, as snow has begun to accumulate
at higher elevations.19 For this reason there has been a continuing reliance on aircraft
to ferry in supplies and transport the wounded. According to the United Nations
Joint Logistics Centre (UNJLC), which is in charge of monitoring and coordinating
relief flights, a total of 106 aircraft are currently providing relief supplies in the
earthquake area. These include all known assets, including those of the USG, the
GoP, other nations, international organizations, and NGOs.20
16 “South Asia Earthquake Situation Report #24,” WHO and Pakistan Ministry of Health,
November 20-25, 2005. See also earlier reports, particularly #18, on WHO website:
[http://www.who.int/hac/crises/international/pakistan_earthquake/en/index.html]. Cholera
report is in Naqash, Zeeshan, “Possible Cholera Outbreak in Pakistan Quake Camps,” AFP,
November 6, 2005.
17 WFP Emergency Report no. 44, op cit. For progress to date on WFP’s food aid, see their
website at [http://www.wfp.org/english/?ModuleID=137&Key=1928]. See also Lancaster,
John, “For Pakistani Villagers, a Risky Decision to Stay,” Washington Post, November 1,
2005.
18 “Pakistan recruits volunteers for rebuilding quake-hit areas,” DPA, November 13, 2005;
and USAID South Asia Earthquake Fact Sheet #27, op cit.
19 OCHA Situation Report Nos. 17-25, op cit.
20 “UNJLC Pakistan Earthquake Bulletin No. 19,” November 19, 2005, available at
[http://www.unjlc.org/pakistan].

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CRS-7
National Response
The Pakistani response to the earthquake has come from many sectors of the
state and society. Relief has come not only from the government and military, but
also from nongovernmental groups — including militant organizations — as well as
individual Pakistanis acting on their own. While the GoP has received credit from
several sources for its efforts, it has also been criticized for responding too slowly to
the disaster. Several media reports, discussed below, have contrasted this delayed
reaction with the swift work of several Islamist political parties and militants, which
were on several occasions the first to provide relief to victims.
For its part, the government of India (GoI) has announced that it does not need
outside assistance in dealing with the aftermath of the earthquake. This stance has
been the subject of some criticism as domestic aid has at times been slow to reach
victims.
Pakistan
The GoP has estimated that it will cost Pakistan $5 billion to recover from the
earthquake; the World Bank places the figure at $5.2 billion21 The GoP has
responded by mobilizing both civil and military personnel to provide health care,
shelter, power, and road clearance. According to fact sheets, the GoP is operating 27
medical treatment centers and has fielded 31 treatment teams.22 The GoP has also
set up twelve medical relief camps and three hospital and convalescence centers, both
of which are reported as having free space. (This appears to be a change from earlier
reporting, which showed total occupancy in the camps of 13,128, well above the
stated capacity of 10,575 individuals. According to these earlier reports, the GoP
was operating seven hospitals and convalescence centers, with a capacity of 2,920
individuals and an occupancy of 1,874.23)
Turning to infrastructure repairs, the GoP states that, as of December 12, it had
opened all main road arteries except the Laswa Bypass and had restored 70% of lost
electrical power, 75% of the water supply, and 96% of telecommunications. An
earlier report stated that the GoP had cleared 10-15% of the earthquake debris; this
21 “Pakistan: Quake Cost about $5 billion,” Reuters, October 15, 2005. World Bank figure
f r om [ ht t p://www.worldbank.or g.pk/ WBSIT E/ EX T ERNAL/ COUNT RIES/
SOUTHASIAEXT/PAKISTANEXTN/0,,contentMDK:20723425~menuPK:293057~pag
ePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:293052,00.html].
22 Pakistan Federal Relief Commission Press Brief of November 21, 2005,
[http://www.earthquakepakistan.com/Press_Brief_latest.htm]. Earlier press briefings
divided the GoP response into civil and military components. According to these earlier
reports, the Pakistani Army was operating four forward medical treatment centers and had
fielded ten treatment teams. An additional 18 surgical teams and 21 health services teams
had been fielded from civil sources.
23 Pakistan Federal Relief Commission Press Release of November 14, 2005, op cit. The
information on health teams comes from an undated press release: “Relief Operations,
Details,” previously available at [http://www.earthquakepakistan.com/images/
foreighn_medical_rescue_support.pdf].

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CRS-8
data was not available on later reports.24 While an explanation of how the
government arrived at these percentages is not provided, an undated but earlier fact
sheet from the same source shows more detail on the progress. According to this
sheet, the GoP had restored all of the telecommunications linkages in the Northwest
Frontier Province (NWFP) and 86% of the disrupted linkages in Azad Jammu and
Kashmir (AJ&K). Twenty telephone exchanges (of a total 67 disrupted) had not yet
been restored. In the meantime, the government had established 103 free telephone
centers for victims, as well as 110 satellite phone centers. Power had been restored,
at least partially, to eight of nine affected areas. The government had restored 90%
of the water supply to Muzaffarabad and 100% to Rawalkot, and was working to
restore supply to Bagh and Balakot. Where the government has been unable to clear
roads blocked by debris, it has constructed mule tracks in order to ferry in supplies.25
Criticism of Government Response. President Pervez Musharraf and his
government have been criticized by some for their failure to respond more swiftly to
the earthquake. It has been reported that the Pakistani Army did not begin bringing
supplies into affected areas until October 12, four days after the earthquake struck,
and even then, according to some sources, the Army appeared thin on the ground.26
Ayaz Amir, a columnist for the influential — and generally perceived as pro-
government — Pakistani newspaper Dawn, observed,
From Hazara to Azad Kashmir voices arising from the deepest recesses of the
heart will tell you how grateful they are to the people of Pakistan who came
unbidden in their hour of need. I heard this in Balakot amidst the ruins and I
heard this in Muzaffarabad. But as God is my witness in all this wide arc of
disaster not one word, not a single one, did I hear in praise of the government or
the army.27
Pakistan’s opposition parties also criticized President Musharraf and the army
for their slow response and alleged mismanagement of the relief operation. They
launched a motion shortly after the earthquake calling on the government to “give a
full accounting of the relief efforts to Pakistan’s parliament. ‘The government has
failed to organize the crisis management,’ their motion stated. ‘The matter is very
serious and needs to be discussed on the floor of the house.’” So far, nothing has
reportedly come of this effort.28 Some opposition members have complained that
General Musharraf has used the crisis to aggrandize his own power: “Everything
from the relief to the foreign donations is being controlled by the Army, and it is not
24 Pakistan Federal Relief Commission Press Release of November 21, 2005, op cit. Earlier
report was accessed November 14.
25 “Relief Operations, Details,” op cit. A total of 13,902 of NWFP’s 668,136 lines were
disrupted; all have been restored. In AJ&K, 20,294 lines (of a total 105,592) were
disrupted; 2,831 remain to be restored.
26 Lancaster, John, “Pakistanis Vent Anger About Pace of Relief,” Washington Post,
October 13, 2005.
27 Amir, Ayaz, “The Best and the Worst,” Dawn, October 28, 2005. See also Roedad Khan,
“A President in Crisis,” The Nation, October 23, 2005.
28 Lancaster, John, op cit.

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CRS-9
accountable to anyone,” said Sherry Rehman, a member of Parliament from the
opposition Pakistan People’s Party.29
In response to such charges, President Musharraf has asserted that the
government and the military have “done a good, if not a very good, job.”30 He
compared the Pakistani response to that of the US government in the wake of
Hurricane Katrina: “In this type of calamity, no country can have 100 percent
success. Even the United States cannot do it.”31 Musharraf also criticized the
international community for its “double standard” by comparing the earthquake to
the Katrina response in another way: “I know that the contributions to Katrina were
much more. Did the U.S. need more aid than Pakistan?”32 (According to the State
Department’s most recent public information, international contributions to the
Katrina relief effort total approximately 20% of the funding pledged so far to
Pakistan.)33 As of the writing of this report, the government appears not to have
responded in detail to the charges by the Pakistani opposition that it is cutting
Parliament out of the relief effort. It is also worth noting that President Musharraf
has decided to postpone a planned purchase of F-16 fighters from the United States
in order to concentrate on earthquake relief efforts. Also, the opposition Pakistan
People’s Party (PPP) has demanded that the government defer a $1 billion weapons
deal with Sweden.34
Militant Groups Provide Aid. While the GoP was criticized for a slow
reaction, it was noted in many sources that some militant groups acted very quickly
to provide aid to victims. Jamaat-ul-Dawa, an “Islamic extremist” group with alleged
ties to Al-Qaida, has been playing an active role in relief operations in Muzaffarabad,
where it is reportedly operating a field hospital that performs twenty surgeries a day.
Jamaat-ul-Dawa is an affiliate of Lashkar-e-Taiba, a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist
organization.35 The Gulf Times reports that banned Pakistani militant groups have
not only played an active role in providing immediate aid after the earthquake, but
29 Hussain, Zahid, “‘We do not Need Them’; Islamist Groups Take a High Profile in the
Kashmir Relief Effort, and Decry an Influx of Western Troops,” Newsweek, November 7,
2005.
30 Bokhari, Farhan and Jo Johnson, “Musharraf Defends his Response to Earthquake,”
Financial Times, October 26, 2005.
31 “Musharraf Defends Quake Response, Pledges 500,000 Tents for Survivors,” AP,
November 1, 2005.
32 Haven, Paul, “A Month After Monster South Asian Earthquake, Fears that the Tragedy
May Just be Beginning,” AP, November 8, 2005.
33 As of September 16, 2005; does not include some in-kind contributions.
34 See CRS Report RS21584, Pakistan: Chronology of Recent Events, by Alan Kronstadt,
and “Makdoom Amin Fahim Wants Deferring of Plane Purchases, GHQ Shifting,” Pakistan
Press International, November 8, 2005.
35 Philp, Catherine, “Terror Groups Move into Quake Vacuum,” The Times (London),
October 17, 2005; Hussain, Zahid, “Still No Help for 40 Villages: Pakistan Death Toll
Jumps to 73,000,” Ottawa Citizen, November 3, 2005. See also Lancaster and Khan, op cit.

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CRS-10
are also soliciting and collecting funds for further relief efforts.36 The Islamic
militant group Hizbul Mujahideen — which has condemned recent violence against
civilians in Kashmir — is also active in the relief effort.37
The same Washington Post reporter who observed very few army vehicles on
the roads four days after the earthquake noticed that a road he was on, “was crowded
with private relief convoys, many belonging to the social service arm of Jamaat-e-
Islami, Pakistan’s largest and best-organized Islamic party,”38 which also has ties to
the Palestinian militant group Hamas.39
Although there is some evidence that the United States is receiving positive
feedback in Pakistan for its role in assisting relief efforts (see below), some have
speculated that the high visibility of Islamist groups may bode badly for both
President Musharraf and the United States: “Musharraf, already seen as a Western
stooge by Islamist groups, has been criticized for the pace of the operations... That,
many worry, is going to affect the popularity of an already unpopular United States
and public opinion about Musharraf.”40
To some extent, the efforts by Islamist groups to aid victims may be seen as part
of a larger outpouring of support by ordinary Pakistanis, who may have found a sense
of unity in the crisis that many felt has been lacking in the past. Pakistan has long
been a country divided by ethnicity, class, and even, to some extent, religion. A
recent survey conducted by the Pew Research Global Attitudes Project found that,
of six Muslim countries surveyed, Pakistanis are far more likely to see themselves
as “Muslims first” (79%), than they are as “national citizens first” (7%).41 According
to Husain Haqqani, an expert on Pakistan at the Carnegie Endowment, Pakistan’s
disparate elements have been held together for many years with a self-consciously
constructed official ideology characterized by the belief that “Pakistan’s success
depend[s] on an Islamic nationalism, confrontation with India, and external alliances”
36 Hyat, Kamila, “Banned Groups Back with a Vengeance,” Gulf News, November 4, 2005.
She writes, “The comments by President Pervez Musharraf that banned groups were free to
carry out relief work have brought them out into the open and proved that these forces are
entrenched in the country. Some groups like the Jaish-e-Mohammad are reported to have
been the first to arrive on the scene in some parts of Pakistan-controlled Kashmir and to
have swiftly initiated relief work.”
37 Huggler, Justin, “Pakistan Failures on the Road to Disaster,” The Independent, November
10, 2005.
38 Lancaster, John, op cit.
39 Lancaster, John and Kamran Khan, “Hard-line Islamists Lead in Pakistan Relief Effort,”
The Washington Post, October 16, 2005.
40 Calamur, Krishnadev, “Pace of Quake Aid May Help Militants,” UPI, October 24, 2005.
41 Pew Research Center, “Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western
Publics,” released J ul y 14, 2005, at [http://pewglobal.org/reports/
display.php?ReportID=248]. The six Muslim countries surveyed were Pakistan, Jordan,
Morocco, Turkey, Indonesia, and Lebanon.

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CRS-11
with the West.42 These bonds have worked with varying success over the years, as
Pakistani opinions about the West and its relationship to Islam have changed. It is
against this backdrop, some experts believe, that the outpouring of support from
ordinary Pakistanis may have provided something of a boost to national feeling.43
Others, however, have questioned how long this sentiment will last.44
India
As it did after the December 2004 tsunami, the GoI has declared that it does not
need foreign assistance in dealing with the October earthquake. “‘We ourselves are
taking care of our victims,’ said Navtej Sarna, the Foreign Ministry spokesman.
‘When there are offers by friendly countries and anything is needed, these offers are
considered.’” The GoI has responded to the earthquake by moving thousands of
tents, blankets, tarpaulins, and woollen garments, as well as tons of medicine, water,
and food to the affected area.45
As noted above, the earthquake caused far less damage in India than it did in
Pakistan. There is a sense, however, that the Indian official response has at least as
much to do with political posturing as it does with perceived needs on the ground.
The decision to go it alone has attracted some criticism amidst complaints that crucial
supplies, such as tents, are failing to reach victims.46
U.S. Humanitarian Assistance
Shortly after the earthquake, the United States pledged $50 million to assist
victims; at a recent donors’ conference (see below) USAID Administrator Andrew
Natsios announced that the pledge had been increased to $410 million. This includes
$300 million in assistance from USAID and $110 million in military in-kind support
for relief operations. In addition, Natsios said that at least $100 million was expected
from private donations.47 The total package includes both financial and in-kind
contributions to humanitarian agencies, logistical and transportation support, and
direct assistance to affected populations, including the provision of food and non-
food items. A breakdown of USG assistance is provided in Table 3.
42 Haqqani, Husain, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, Washington, DC: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2005, p. 50.
43 See, e.g., Ali Khan, Asif, “Quake Unites the Nation,” Business Recorder (Pakistan),
October 22, 2005.
44 Inayatullah, “Fault Lines of Another Kind,” The Nation, October 26, 2005.
45 Precise numbers are available in Government of India Ministry of Home Affairs, National
Disaster Management Division, Situation Report, October 26, 2005.
46 Sengupta, Somini, “Pride and Politics: India Rejects Aid,” The New York Times, October
20, 2005.
47 The full pledge as announced by Natsios, including anticipated private donations, was
thus $510 million. See USAID South Asia Earthquake Fact Sheet #26, November 22, 2005.

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CRS-12
Table 3. USG Assistance
(As of December 8, 2005)
Agency
Pledge
Value
USAID/OFDA
contributions to U.N. appeal
$15,917,459
contribution to ICRC
$5,000,000
contributions to NGOs outside of appeal
$29,758,589
relief supplies (including transportation)
$5,240,925
administration, support to USAID/Pakistan
$917,266
USAID/FFP
in-kind contributions to WFP
$6,700,000
USAID/GDA
partnership with Procter and Gamble to
$300,000
provide safe drinking water
State/PRM
contribution to UNHCR (part of appeal)
$4,000,000
USDA
46,000 tons of Title I wheat
$12,000,000
Department of
transport, relief supplies (tents, blankets,
$92,000,000
Defense
plastic sheeting, etc.)
TOTAL
$171,834,239
Sources: USAID South Asia Earthquake Fact Sheet #29, December 8, 2005. A more detailed
breakdown of DoD efforts is forthcoming.
Assistance by Source
USAID. USAID sent a Disaster Assessment and Response Team (DART)
to Pakistan on October 10. According to USAID, the “mission of the USAID/DART
is to assess humanitarian needs, assist with targeting and coordination of USG
assistance in conjunction with USAID/Pakistan, and provide technical assistance as
required.” The DART is headquartered in Islamabad and has field offices in
Mansehra and Muzaffarabad.48 It has issued regular field reports (many cited in this
report) and cables assessing the progress of relief operations.
DoD. The United State military also began its relief operations on October 10,
when it dispatched a transport jet from Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan with twelve
pallets of food, water, medicine, and blankets for earthquake victims. The U.S.
military has continued to fly in food and supplies, while also airlifting injured
Pakistanis to areas where they can get medical help.49 Three weeks after the
48 USAID website, [http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asia_near_east/south_asia_quake/].
49 Cunningham, James H., “First U.S. Earthquake Relief Supplies Arrive in Pakistan,”
American Forces Press Service, Oct. 10, 2005; Garamone, Jim, “U.S. Helicopters, Personnel
Helping Pakistan Recovery,” American Forces Press Service, Oct. 21, 2005.

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CRS-13
earthquake there were 993 U.S. military personnel and 24 helicopters supporting
relief operations in Pakistan, with nine additional CH-47s positioned at Bagram for
deployment to Pakistan when space became available. As of November 28, DoD had
flown nearly 2,000 helicopter missions delivering over 4,500 tons of relief supplies,
and transported nearly 15,000 evacuees and relief workers. In addition, DoD has set
up a Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) in Muzaffarabad, equipped with 96
beds and two operating rooms. The MASH has performed 276 surgeries and treated
4,937 patients.50 Although many of the supplies being sent to Pakistan come from
U.S. positions in Afghanistan, the relief effort is not reportedly having a discernable
affect on U.S. military activities in Afghanistan.
State/PRM. The Department of State’s Bureau for Population, Refugees, and
Migration has donated $4 million toward UNHCR’s earthquake appeal.
USDA. The U.S. Department of Agriculture has provided 46,000 metric tons
of Title I wheat to Pakistan.
NGOs. U.S.-based NGOs have played a very active role in the relief and
recovery effort in Pakistan, several of them with USG funding, including Catholic
Relief Services, International Rescue Committee, Mercy Corps International, and
Save the Children.51 Many more organizations than these have been active, however.
A list of U.S. NGOs that are active in the relief and recovery efforts in Pakistan is
provided as an appendix to this report.
Private Sector. According to the State Department, Americans in the private
sector have so far donated some $43 million to the South Asia relief effort.52 The
figure is expected to grow to $100 million. On October 27, President Bush
announced that a group of five CEOs from major American corporations were
joining to encourage private sector support for victims of the earthquake. The group
has inaugurated a website, organized through The Committee to Encourage
Corporate Philanthropy, and is already accepting contributions at
https://www.southasiaearthquakerelief.org/.
50 USAID South Asia Earthquake Fact sheet #27, November 29, 2005; DoD Support to
Pakistan Earthquake Executive Summary, November 1, 2005 (as of 0800).
51 The full list of supported NGOs is available in the USAID South Asia Earthquake Fact
sheets, op cit.
52 U.S. Department of State, Update on U.S. Response to Pakistan Earthquake, November
4, 2005. Available at [http://usinfo.state.gov/sa/Archive/2005/Nov/04-42651.html]. The
executives are Jeff Immelt, chairman and chief executive of General Electric; Hank
McKinnell, chairman and CEO of Pfizer; Sandy Weill, chairman of Citigroup; Anne
Mulcahy, chairman and CEO of Xerox; and Jim Kelly, former chairman and CEO of United
Parcel Service of America.

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CRS-14
U.S. Response to Other International Natural Disasters
In financial terms, the U.S. government response to the South Asian earthquake
falls somewhere in the middle when compared to the amount of aid it has provided
in past international natural disasters. Table 4 presents USG relief assistance for the
seven international natural disasters of the past ten years that caused more than
10,000 fatalities.53
Table 4. USG Aid in Past International Natural Disasters
Total
USG
Date
Country
Disaster
Casualties
damage
assistancea
Oct.,
Honduras,
Hurricane
18,799 dead
$6.04
$882.9
1998
Nicaragua
Mitch
3,240,000 affected
billion
million
Dec.,
Indian
Earthquake
224,495 dead
$7.71
$882.5
2004
Ocean (12
(9.0), tsunami
over 2 million
billion
million
countries)
affected
Oct.,
Pakistan,
Earthquake
74,644 dead
$5.2
$410
2005
India
(7.6)
130,000 injured
billion
million
3 million homeless
Aug.,
Turkey
Earthquake
15,000 dead
$10
$24.46
1999
(7.4)
24,000 injured
billion
million
250,000 homeless
Jan.,
India
Earthquake
20,005 dead
$2.62
$13.1
2001
(7.7)
166,812 injured
billion
million
4,365,000 affected
Dec.,
Venezuela
Flood
30,000 killed
$3.16
$11.05
1999
2,700 injured
billion
million
366,547 affected
Dec.,
Iran
Earthquake
26,796 dead
$1.0
$5.7 million
2003
(6.6)
22,628 injured
billion
45,000 homeless
Sources: All data, unless noted otherwise, are from EM-DAT Emergency Disasters Database,
([http://www.em-dat.net]). Due to the difficulty of obtaining reliable information, all data should be
taken as approximate, especially estimates of “affected” population. See notes for Table 1 and text
box below for more qualifications about data.
a. Data sources for USG assistance: Hurricane Mitch: CRS Report RL30083, Supplemental
Appropriations for FY1999: Central America Disaster Aid, Middle East Peace, and Other
Initiatives, by Larry Nowels. Tsunami: CRS Report RL32783, FY2005 Supplemental
Appropriations for Iraq and Afghanistan, Tsunami Relief, and Other Activities, by Amy Belasco
and Larry Nowels. A total of $656 million was approved for the Tsunami Recovery and
Reconstruction Fund, but $25 million was committed to avian flu. S. Asia earthquake: USAID
South Asia Earthquake Fact Sheet #27, November 29, 2005. Turkey earthquake: CRS Report
RS20328, Turkey: After the Earthquake, by Carol Migdolovitz. Total includes $14.46 million
in OFDA aid plus $10 million in assistance from the DoD. The DoD aid was omitted from the
53 This list does not include the European heat wave of 2003, which was responsible for as
many as 45,000 deaths, nor the repeated food shortages in North Korea, which are arguably
at least as man-made as they are natural.

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CRS-15
OFDA Annual Report, which lists the USG total as $14.39m. India Earthquake: OFDA
Annual Report FY2001, p. 49. Venezuela flood: OFDA Annual Report FY2000, p. 82. Iran
earthquake: USAID, [http://www.usaid.gov/iran/].
Difficulties in Comparing Disaster Assistance
Comparing USG aid figures across disasters is a speculative undertaking.
Authority, definitions, and categories of services are not necessarily equivalent
across events. Each agency has its own budget, with its own criteria, accounting
detail, and regional specificity. The fact that an urgent response to humanitarian
crises is often required only compounds the problem. Budgets may reflect regional
support, a certain area, specific countries, or a combination thereof over time and
with changing events.
Even if we accept that USG aid is comparable across disasters, the disasters
themselves are not equivalent: the areas in which they occur differ dramatically in
terrain, underlying economic conditions, and governmental capacity. It thus makes
little sense to compare, for example, the amount of USG aid delivered per casualty.
Even the decision to look at fatalities as the measure of a disaster’s severity can be
questioned, in part because of the difficulty of obtaining accurate figures. In
assessing the amount of aid provided to disasters, it may make more sense to look
at the economic damage each has caused. Measured in this way, the seven greatest
international natural disasters of the last ten years are: (1) the 1995 earthquake in
Kobe, Japan ($95 billion in damage); (2) the 1998 flood in China ($30 billion); (3)
the 2004 earthquake in Niigata, Japan ($24 billion); (4) the 1997 wildfires in
Indonesia ($17 billion); (5) the 1995 flood in North Korea ($15 billion); (6) the
1995 earthquake in Taiwan ($14.1 billion), and (7) the 1996 flooding in China
($12.6 billion). (The United States, if included in this list, would garner a spot for
Hurricane Katrina, which caused $25 billion in damage.)54
Once again, however, such a comparison may conceal more than it reveals:
a major factor affecting the economic severity of a natural disaster is clearly the
economic prosperity of the area in which it occurs. The Kobe earthquake was
expensive because Japan was so well off. Furthermore, obtaining reliable and
consistent figures for the cost of recovering from a natural disaster is notoriously
difficult. Estimates range tremendously depending upon the criteria used — for
instance, replacement cost vs. auction cost vs. assessed value of damaged property
— and the organization doing the estimate.
Comparing USG and international aid is even more difficult, because of the
often dramatically different forms the assistance takes (in-kind contributions vs.
cash, for instance). Finally, it is not always evident whether figures represent
pledges of support or more specific obligations.
54 Estimates are once again from EM-DAT, op cit.

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CRS-16
The U.S. Emergency Response Mechanism
The United States is generally a leader and major contributor to relief efforts in
humanitarian disasters.55 In 2004 the United States contributed more than $2.4 billion
to disaster relief worldwide.56 In the case of both the South Asian earthquake and the
Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, some say that the response will require a
major long-term effort beyond the relief and recovery operation currently underway.57
The President has broad authority to provide emergency assistance for foreign
disasters and the United States government provides disaster assistance through
several United States agencies. The very nature of humanitarian disasters — the need
to respond quickly in order to save lives and provide relief — has resulted in an
rather unrestricted definition of what this type of assistance consists of at both a
policy and an operational level. While humanitarian assistance is assumed to provide
for urgent food, shelter, and medical needs, the agencies within the U.S. government
providing this support typically expand or contract the definition in response to
circumstances. Funds may be used for U.S. agencies to deliver the services required
or to provide grants to international organizations (IOs), international governmental
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), as well as private or religious
voluntary organizations (PVOs). USAID is the U.S. agency charged with
coordinating U.S. government and private sector assistance. It also coordinates with
international organizations, the governments of countries suffering disasters, and
other governments.
The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) in USAID’s Bureau of
Humanitarian Response can respond immediately with relief materials and personnel,
many of whom are already abroad on mission.58 It is responsible for the provision
of non-food humanitarian assistance and can quickly assemble Disaster Area
Response Teams (DARTs) to conduct assessments. OFDA has wide authority to
borrow funds, equipment, and personnel from other parts of USAID and other federal
agencies. USAID has two other offices that administer U.S. humanitarian aid: Food
For Peace (FFP) and the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI). USAID administers
Title II of the FFP under P.L. 480 and provides relief and development food aid that
does not have to be repaid. OTI provides post-disaster transition assistance, which
includes mainly short-term peace and democratization projects with some attention
to humanitarian elements but not emergency relief.
The Department of Defense (DoD) Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic
Aid (OHDACA) appropriation funds three DoD humanitarian programs: the
55 For background information see CRS Report RL32714, International Disasters and
Humanitarian Assistance: U.S. Governmental Response, by Rhoda Margesson.
56 This total is based on FY2004 appropriations for International Disaster and Famine
Assistance (IDFA), the Refugee and Migration Account (MRA), and the Emergency
Refugee and Migration Account (ERMA), as well as the “emergency” program level for
food assistance (PL480 title II).
57 See text box above, “Difficulties in Comparing Disaster Assistance.”
58 Authorized in Sec. 491-493 of P.L. 87-195, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

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CRS-17
Humanitarian Assistance Program (HAP), the Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA)
Program, and Foreign Disaster Relief and Emergency Response (FDR/ER). The
office provides humanitarian support to stabilize emergency situations and deals with
a range of tasks including the provision of food, shelter and supplies, and medical
evacuations. In addition the President has the authority to draw down defense
equipment and direct military personnel to respond to disasters. The President may
also use the Denton program to provide space-available transportation on military
aircraft and ships to private donors who wish to transport humanitarian goods and
equipment in response to a disaster.59
Generally, OFDA provides emergency from thirty to ninety days after a disaster.
The same is true for Department of Defense humanitarian assistance. After the initial
emergency is over, assistance is provided through other channels, such as the regular
country development programs of USAID.
The State Department also administers programs for humanitarian relief with
a focus on refugees and the displaced. The Emergency Refugee and Migration
Account (ERMA) is a contingency fund60 that provides wide latitude to the President
in responding to refugee emergencies. Emergencies lasting more than a year come
out of the regular Migration and Refugee Account (MRA) through the Population,
Migration and Refugees (PRM) bureau.61 PRM covers refugees worldwide, conflict
victims, and populations of concern to the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR), often extended to include internally displaced people (IDPs).
Humanitarian assistance includes a range of services from basic needs to community
services.
International Assistance
In addition to the United States, a great many international actors are also
providing relief to the earthquake-affected region, either through financial
contributions to the Pakistani government or aid organizations, or by directly
providing relief supplies and emergency personnel. While obtaining an exact record
of all international contributions is not possible — in part because some assistance
is not reported to governments or coordinating agencies — UN-OCHA estimates that
the world community, had committed approximately $619 million to the relief effort
59 Section 402 of Title 10, named after former Senator Jeremiah Denton, authorizes shipment
of privately donated humanitarian goods on U.S. military aircraft provided there is space and
they are certified as appropriate for the disaster by USAID/OFDA. The goods can be
bumped from the transport if other U.S. government aid must be transported.
60 Governed by P.L. 103-326, the maximum amount is $100 million. Authorized in sections
2 and 3 or P.L. 87-510 of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962.
61 When there is functional or programmatic overlap between USAID and PRM, they
coordinate with each other and define partners. Traditionally PRM funds UNHCR and other
multilateral actors while USAID creates bilateral arrangements with NGOs. This is not a
hard and fast rule, however, and both organizations exercise a degree of latitude in their
response to crises.

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CRS-18
as of November 30. An additional $1.118 billion has been pledged but not
committed.62 (These totals include UN-OCHA’s tally of U.S. contributions.)
The vast majority of the funding is going to Pakistan. The government of India
has, for the most part, declined offers of assistance, stating that it is capable of
handling the relief operation on its territory. At a November 19 donors’ conference
in Islamabad, the international community pledged $5.4 billion to Pakistan to assist
in relief and recovery efforts, exceeding the GoP’s goal of $5.2 billion. Major
contributors include the Asian Development Bank ($1 billion), the Islamic
Development Bank ($501 million) and the European Union ($270 million).63 Total
pledges, according to the government of Pakistan, total $6.210 billion.64
Flash Appeal
On October 11, 2005, UN-OCHA released a multi-agency appeal for $312
million in urgent humanitarian assistance to earthquake-affected areas of Pakistan.
The appeal was revised to $550 million at a donors meeting on October 26. Despite
the higher-than-expected pledge totals announced at the November 19 meeting in
Islamabad, the U.N. flash appeal remains seriously underfunded. As of November
30, donors had committed $151.4 million, or approximately 27.5%, toward this
combined appeal.65 A breakdown of the appeal by receiving organization is provided
in Appendix B. The USG has so far contributed approximately $16 million toward
the appeal (see Table 3).
The disparity between overall funding of the relief effort and contributions
toward the U.N. appeal is due to several factors. Many countries, including the USG,
are providing assistance in the form of direct contributions of items such as blankets,
food, and tents, or through the operation of relief flights and logistics support. Much
of this assistance is coordinated directly with the GoP or the Pakistani military. In
addition to direct bilateral assistance, a good deal of funding has been provided to
NGOs operating outside of the U.N. appeal. Please see the final section, Issues for
Congress, for more on U.N. performance issues.
62 For the latest pledge numbers, see ReliefWeb’s site: [http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/dbc.nsf/
doc105?OpenForm&rc=3&emid=EQ-2005-000174-PAK]. Note that ReliefWeb’s tally does
not necessarily match that of any given contributing organization, including the United
States, presumably because of delays in recording pledges.
63 Ahmad, Munir, “Pakistan Says $5.4 Billion in Quake Aid Raised, Surpassing Target at
Donor Conference,” AP, November 19, 2005.
64 Pakistani Federal Relief Commission, [http://earthquakepakistan.com/
Press_Brief_latest.htm], accessed December 12, 2005.
65 UN-OCHA, Consolidated Appeal for South Asia Earthquake Flash Appeal 2005, available
at [http://ocha.unog.ch/fts/reports/daily/ocha_R1_A688___05112221.pdf]. Appeal numbers
are still being revised. UNHCR, for instance, has recently reduced its goal from $30 million
to $17 million.

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CRS-19
Coordination
With so many international and domestic actors and agencies on the ground, one
of the most important issues is coordination of relief activity. As indicated above,
several sources indicated that the GoP was slow to organize its own response to the
earthquake, let alone coordinate the host of international actors involved in the relief
effort. According to assessments of the USAID DART, the GoP’s performance has
steadily improved in recent weeks, and information is now being effectively
centralized at the macro-level by the Federal Relief Commission (FRC). The GoP’s
performance at the regional level has varied from location to location, and has
depended on local capacity and the assistance provided by international relief
agencies.66
The primary locus of international coordination remains UN-OCHA, which has
established four regional coordination centers in Muzaffarabad, Mansehra, Bagh, and
Batagram. The major humanitarian actors have divided the relief effort sectorally
into ten clusters, with a different organization taking the lead for each sector, as
follows: Emergency Shelter (lead: International Organization for Migration [IOM]),
Logistics (lead: WFP), Nutrition (lead: WFP), Health (lead: WHO), Water and
Sanitation (lead: UNICEF), Education (lead: UNICEF), Protection (lead: UNICEF),
Camp Management (lead: UNHCR), IT and Communications (lead: WFP), and Early
Recovery/Reconstruction (lead: United Nations Development Program [UNDP]).67
Each of the clusters is responsible for feeding information to the FRC, OCHA, and
each other. According to some reports, performance has varied significantly from
cluster to cluster. This is taken up in the Issues for Congress section.
NATO
NATO, in its first purely humanitarian mission, has contributed to the relief
effort by operating two “airbridges” to fly relief supplies into Pakistan. As of
December 7, NATO had flown 153 relief flights from its bases in Germany and
Turkey, supplying nearly 3,000 tons of supplies, including blankets, stoves, tents, and
food. NATO is also currently in the process of deploying “more than 1,000 specialist
troops (engineers and medical units) from the NATO Response Force to assist in the
relief effort.”68 Opinion surrounding NATO’s involvement in the relief operation,
is discussed below.
66 Author’s interview with USAID DART members, November 22, 2005.
6 7 For cluster information, see the U.N. coordination website at
[http://earthquake05.un.org.pk/] index.php.
68 NATO Relief Mission in Pakistan Fact Sheet (7 December) ([http://www.nato.int/issues/
pakistan_earthquake/051207-factsheet.htm]) and NATO Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response
Coordination Center (EADRCC) Situation Report no. 14. Precise details about each NATO
flight are provided at [http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2005/10/statistics.htm]. See also
[http://www.nato.int/issues/pakistan_earthquake/in_practice.htm].

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CRS-20
Issues for Congress
U.S. Image in Pakistan; Effects on War Against Terror
There has been some discussion in the media about the effects of the U.S. relief
effort on Pakistani perceptions of the United States and, more specifically, the U.S.
government. This issue is seen as important because President Musharraf’s
government is a key U.S. ally in the global war on terror. Many high-ranking
members of Al Qaeda and the Taliban are believed to remain in the rugged regions
of northwest Pakistan, and the ability of the United States to locate and capture them
likely depends on Pakistan’s cooperation. At the same time, Musharraf’s relationship
with the United States is not supported by a large portion of the Pakistani population.
A widely-cited survey taken by the Pew Center before the earthquake found that 23%
of the Pakistani public had a favorable view of the United States, while 51% had a
favorable impression of Osama bin Laden.69 The degree to which the United States
receives positive press for its contributions to the earthquake relief effort may make
it easier for Musharraf to support U.S. anti-terror activity in the region.
There does not yet appear to be any systematic public polling of Pakistani
opinion on this issue after the earthquake, but several reporters have presented
anecdotal evidence suggesting that the United States is reaping something of a
“public relations” dividend because of its involvement. It has been reported that U.S.
relief efforts in Pakistan have been quite visible on Pakistani television news
broadcasts and have thus reached a fairly broad cross-section of the population.70
Reporters’ encounters with Pakistanis living and working in affected areas support
this. One journalist spoke, for instance, of a local community’s disapproval of one
of their members who was critical of the United States. Several individuals made a
point of telling the journalist that they were grateful for Western aid.71 Academics
and commentators as well have reported a perceptible change in Pakistani attitudes
toward the United States.72 There have been some positive reports in Pakistani media
as well, although they are perhaps thinner than in the American press. The Nation,
for instance, printed a recent opinion piece praising the United States for its efforts
in saving Pakistani lives and excoriating critics of the United States.73 This latter
sentiment, however, appears to indicate that a sizable number of Pakistanis remain
critical of the United States. Indeed, “Pakistani officials and political analysts” have
cautioned that any change in perceptions may be limited to moderate, urban
69 Pew Research Center, “Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Wester
Publics,” released July 14, 2005, at [ http://pewglobal.org/reports/
display.php?ReportID=248]. Only Jordan had higher approval ratings of Osama bin Laden
(60%) and lower ratings of the United States (21%).
70 Lancaster, John, “Quake Aid Helps U.S. Alter Image in Pakistan,” The Washington Post,
October 22, 2005.
71 Rhode, David, “For Devout Pakistani Muslims, Aid Muddles Loyalties,” The New York
Times, October 26, 2005.
72 King, Ledyard, “U.S. Response to Pakistan Quake Could Help Image among Muslims,”
Gannett News Service, October 21, 2005.
73 Khan, A. R., “It is not Charity but a Duty,” The Nation (Pakistan), October 27, 2005.

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CRS-21
Pakistanis, and “is unlikely to sway the country’s small core of militants who support
Al Qaeda.”74
As noted earlier, some commentators have speculated that Pakistan’s slow
response could by implication affect public opinion about the United States, which
is widely seen as supporting the rule of General-cum-President Pervez Musharraf.
The greatest criticism of U.S. involvement appears to come from the Pakistani
political opposition, especially from Islamist parties, such as the Muttahida
Majlis-i-Amal (MMA), whose leader has said that Pakistan does not need any foreign
— including American and NATO — support.75 Similar complaints about NATO
were expressed by the leader of the opposition party Pakistan Muslim League-N, who
worried about the presence of foreign soldiers on Pakistani territory if “tomorrow we
have to fight a war with India or any other country.”76 In response to such concerns,
Pakistani Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz has gone on record saying that NATO poses
no security threat: “They are here to help us. Even if they are in uniform, it should not
be a cause of concern.”77
Burdensharing and Donor Fatigue
Although the United States is the world’s largest provider of foreign assistance,
it is often one of the lowest contributors when measured as a percentage of its
economic capacity. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), the United States provided 0.16% of its Gross National
Income (GNI) in 2004 for Overseas Disaster Assistance (ODA). By comparison the
average of major donors is 0.25%. The percentages for other major donors are as
follows: Japan (0.19%), the United Kingdom (0.36%), France (0.42%) and Germany
(0.28%).
In previous disasters, pledges made by governments have not always resulted
in actual contributions; the earthquake of December 2003 in Bam, Iran, is but one
example raised by the United Nations. Concerning the billions of dollars pledged to
help the victims of the tsunami disaster, there is skepticism whether all these pledges
will be honored. It also cannot be assumed that the funds committed to relief actually
represent new contributions, since the money may previously have been allocated
elsewhere. It will take time for a more complete picture to reveal how the actual
costs of the tsunami disaster will be shared among international donors.78 In the case
74 Rhode, David, op cit.
75 MMA Secretary General and Leader of Opposition in the National Assembly Maulana
Fazlur Rehman, quoted in Raja Asghar, “MMA Opposes Nato, US Forces for Quake
Relief,” Dawn, October 29, 2005. It was not clear whether Rehman was speaking on behalf
of the entire opposition or only his own coalition of six Islamic parties.
76 Acting parliamentary leader of the Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N) Chaudhry Nisar
Ali Khan, quoted in Amir Wasim, “Govt Criticized for Accepting Nato Forces,” Dawn,
October 26, 2005.
77 Khan, Iftikhar, “Nato Forces Posing no Security Threat: PM,” Dawn, November 1, 2005.
78 James Darcy, “The Indian Ocean Tsunami Crisis: Humanitarian Dimensions,” Overseas
Development Institute, January 11, 2005.

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CRS-22
of the October South Asia earthquake, Amir Abdulla, WFP Regional Director for the
Middle East, Central Asia and Eastern Europe has commented that “it is extremely
worrying that the international community — which was so generous after the Indian
Ocean tsunami — has so far failed to come up with an adequate response to this
crisis.” Thus far the United Nations has received 27.5% of its flash appeal of $550
million.
Some experts are concerned about funding priorities and resources for other
disaster areas and the very real possibility of international donor fatigue. Finding a
balance between burdensharing on the one hand and donor fatigue on the other often
results in delay and can negatively impact U.N. operations during emergencies when
immediate funds are required for a response. This question was raised at the U.N.
World Summit in September. Key donor countries pledged $150 million for an
emergency fund to allow the United Nations to respond more quickly to natural
disasters and humanitarian emergencies. The Central Emergency Response Fund
(CERF) is seen as a way to enable the United Nations to respond more efficiently,
effectively, and consistently to humanitarian crises worldwide.
Competing Aid and Budget Priorities.79 Amid efforts to tackle rising
budget deficits by, among other measures, slowing or reducing discretionary
spending, Congress is expected to struggle to find the resources to sustain U.S. aid
pledges. After the tsunami disaster, some Members of Congress publicly expressed
concern that funding for tsunami relief and reconstruction, which depleted most
worldwide disaster contingency accounts, could jeopardize resources for subsequent
international disasters or for other aid priorities from which tsunami emergency aid
had been transferred.80 These accounts were fully restored through supplemental
appropriations. At the time, others noted the substantial size of American private
donations for tsunami victims and argued that because of other budget pressures, the
United States did not need to transfer additional aid. The point remains, however,
that when disasters require immediate emergency relief, the Administration may fund
pledges by depleting most worldwide disaster accounts. In order to respond to future
humanitarian crises, however, these resources would need to be replenished or it
could curtail U.S. capacity to respond to other emergencies.
From Relief to Recovery: The Cost of Rebuilding. The earthquake’s
effect on Pakistan’s economy remains to be seen. The majority of the country’s
industry is located in the south, well away from the earthquake zone. For this reason,
some observers believe that the disaster will not have a serious impact on the
Pakistani economy’s impressive growth rate. The World Bank, for instance, has only
marginally revised its prediction for Pakistan’s FY2006 growth in Gross Domestic
Product (GDP), from 6.5% to 6.1%.81 Nevertheless, the costs of rebuilding the
79 Prepared by Larry Nowels, Foreign Affairs Specialist.
80 Elizabeth Becker, “No New Funds Needed For Relief, Bush Aides Say,” New York Times,
January 4, 2005.
81 The GoP’s initial projection of 7.0% had already been reduced to 6.5% because of lower
than anticipated crop yields. See Asian Development Bank and World Bank, Pakistan 2005
Earthquake Preliminary Damage and Needs Assessment, November 12, 2005, Islamabad,
Pakistan, p. 12.

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CRS-23
damaged infrastructure in the north as well as caring for the millions of affected
Pakistanis is expected to seriously strain the Pakistan government’s capacity. Some
observers have cautioned against overly optimistic projections.82
The United States currently provides nearly $700 million to Pakistan in foreign
aid, in addition to the $410 million being provided for disaster relief. There has been
no additional request for relief for Pakistan in the FY2006 Foreign Operations
legislation, but conferees did issue an invitation to reprogram some of the included
funding or to issue a supplemental appropriation.
Transparency. Some members of Congress have also raised concerns about
transparency of donor contributions, allocation of monies, and monitoring of projects
by the United Nations. The United Nations has said it will improve its financial
tracking and reporting system and Pricewaterhouse Coopers is reportedly assisting
in that effort. In responding to international disasters, many contributions are also
made directly to international organizations and non-governmental organizations,
which could raise the same questions about transparency requirements. Moreover,
while earmarks and time limits may ensure greater accountability, they can also add
pressure for organizations to spend contributed funds, sometimes leading to
unnecessary spending, waste and duplicated efforts. Restrictions on funds also often
do not allow flexibility to adapt projects to better meet the changing needs on the
ground.83
Assessing U.N. Performance
As noted above, the United Nations flash appeal for earthquake relief and
reconstruction remains seriously underfunded. By contrast, an international donors’
conference in Islamabad garnered more pledges than expected. To a certain extent,
this reflects some donors’ preference for providing bilateral rather than multilateral
funding. According to some reports, however, the initial response of some United
Nations agencies to the earthquake was confused and inadequate, prompting donors
to commit their resources to other agencies. More recent reporting indicates that
many U.N. agencies have improved their performance in recent weeks.
The USAID DART has been critical of some U.N. agencies for an inadequate
initial response to the earthquake. Some of the criticism has been structural: it is not
clear, DART members say, that the United Nations’ “cluster approach” (see above)
is the most effective method of disaster management. The problem stems from the
sometimes competing demands placed on the cluster leaders: liaising with the host
government and gathering and disseminating data, as well as responding to
immediate needs and coordinating relief activity. There has been some question
about the ability of individual agencies to fulfill all of these functions with limited
staffing under emergency conditions.84 The cluster system will be discussed at the
United Nations on December 12.
82 “Global Economic Prospects,” Business Recorder (Pakistan), November 23, 2005.
83 Edward Clay, “Lessons for Life,” The Guardian Review, January 12, 2005.
84 Author’s interview with members of USAID DART, November 22, 2005.

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CRS-24
Some of the DART’s criticism, however, reflected a more specific concern that
several U.N. agencies were inadequate in their response to the earthquake, prompting
USAID, in some cases, to look to NGOs instead of the U.N. system to carry out relief
activities. According to the DART, some U.N. agencies were slow to realize the
severity of the disaster and to allocate sufficient human and financial resources to the
relief effort. The DART singled out UNHCR, the WFP, UNJLC, and IOM (not part
of the U.N. system but a close collaborator) for particular criticism. The following
paragraph summarizes some of the DART’s reporting:
UNHCR has been thin on the ground and remains uncertain about its mandate
as head of the camp management cluster. DART members reported visiting camps
with no visible UNHCR presence. The WFP, which has performed adequately in its
role as head of the logistics cluster, has done a worse job in the food cluster. The
agency’s staff were slow to gather information on NGO activities, leading at times
to a duplication of aid delivery efforts. The UNJLC, charged with coordinating
transportation, was also slow to ramp up its operations, leading again to a duplication
of aid deliveries. Finally, IOM has failed to provide effective leadership of the
shelter cluster. Like UNHCR, its staff have appeared unsure of its mandate, and have
adopted a facilitative, rather than a leadership, role.85
The DART team spoke more favorably of UNICEF and the WHO, both of
which, despite rocky starts, quickly built up capacity and assumed leadership of their
respective clusters. Both agencies were singled out for effective coordination and
implementation.86
The DART itself points out that some of its concerns cannot be attributed to
U.N. underperformance. To begin with, the DART notes that the best-performing
agencies are also the better-funded ones, and states that better funding of the other
agencies might positively affect their performance. Beyond this, some concerns have
reflected the constraints of the United Nations’ particular operational mandate rather
than failure on its part. Unlike some NGOs, which may operate more informally, the
United Nations must carefully coordinate all of its activities with the Pakistani
government. Thus, to the extent that the GoP’s initial response to the earthquake was
slow and confused, this may have affected U.N. performance as well. Several
sources familiar with U.N. operations, including members of the DART, have
reported that the United Nations’ performance in recent weeks has improved
markedly. This bodes well, these sources say, for the operation of relief efforts over
the winter.87
There does not appear to have been much public criticism of the United
Nations’ response in the media. The DART’s concerns have largely aired within the
USG. Perhaps for this reason, the United Nations has not issued any public response
85 “Six Weeks after Pakistan’s Earthquake: Assessing the UN’s Performance,” Department
of State unclassified cable, Islamabad 17311, November 22, 2005.
86 Ibid.
87 Author’s interview with DART members, November 22, 2005, and with staff at
Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, November 22, 2005.

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CRS-25
to such charges. Privately, however, UNHCR officials have acknowledged some
missteps, especially in the early days of the relief effort. They were slow to mobilize
some assets and reorganize their staff in the field. They have pointed out, however,
that most organizations operating in Pakistan faced difficulties at that time. The
GoP’s initial disorganization had a ripple effect through the humanitarian
community; as noted above, the United Nations does not have the liberty to take any
significant actions without host government approval and coordination. Despite such
difficulties, UNHCR officials note that they immediately opened up their
warehouses, releasing thousands of tents and other supplies to the GoP.88 UNHCR
also reminds visitors to its website that its mandate is to care for refugees and other
victims of “man-made” disasters. Its involvement in the earthquake relief operation
is a function of its logical and operational capabilities in Pakistan, not its legal or
organizational mandate.89 UNHCR as well as many of its sister agencies have also
argued that they have been hamstrung by poor funding. As of November 30, 2005,
the U.N. appeal remains 27.5% funded.90
88 Author’s November 23, 2005, interview with officials at Department of State’s PRM
Bureau, who are in daily contact with UNHCR officials.
89 See [http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/earthquake?page=intro].
90 Details are at [http://www.reliefweb.int].

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CRS-26
Appendix A: Maps of Disaster Area
Map 1. The Affected Area
Source: OCHA Situation Report No. 13, available at
[http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/fullMaps_Sa.nsf/luFullMap/0CCCDBD73C013DD3852570A000658
E55/$File/rw_EQ_pak201005.pdf?OpenElement]

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CRS-27
Map 2. The Epicenter and Political Boundaries
Source: USAID, October 13, 2005, available at
[http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/fullMaps_Sa.nsf/luFullMap/
6571D95BC2D4E2A88525709900761C3B/$File/usaid_EQ_southasia131005.pdf?OpenElement]

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CRS-28
Appendix B: U.N. Flash Appeal
Organization
Appeal
Australian Aid International
$850,000
Action Contre la Faim/USA
$1,000,000
Aga Khan Foundation
$110,000
Catholic Relief Svcs
$800,000
Food and Agriculture Organization
$25,000,000
Greenstar Marketing
$1,000,000
Int’l Labor Organization
$3,000,000
Int’l Organization for Migration
$60,500,000
Int’l Rescue Committee
$1,500,000
ISCOS (Trade Union Institute for Development Cooperation )
$850,000
ISDR (Int’l Strategy for Disaster Reduction)
$1,000,000
Mercy Corps Int’l
$500,000
MDM (Medecins du Monde)
$500,000
Merlin (UK)
$850,000
OCHA
$4,900,000
Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)
$200,000
Save the Children Alliance
$8,030,000
Joint U.N. Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS)
$500,000
UNDP
$90,750,000
UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)
$1,180,000
UN Environment Program (UNEP)
$500,000
UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
$1,300,000
UN Population Fund (UNFPA)
$9,300,000
UN Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT)
$650,000
UNHCR
$30,000,000
UNICEF
$92,564,274
WFP
$181,901,667
WHO
$27,750,000
World Vision
$1,100,000
TOTAL
$549,585,941
Source: U.N. Consolidated Appeal (available at [http://www.reliefweb.int])

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