Order Code RL33079
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
U.S. Citizenship of Persons Born in the United
States to Alien Parents
Updated November 4, 2005
Margaret Mikyung Lee
Legislative Attorney
American Law Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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U.S. Citizenship of Persons Born in the United States to
Alien Parents
Summary
Over the last decade or so, concern about the level of immigration, focused
particularly on illegal immigration, has sporadically led to a re-examination of a
long-established tenet of U.S. citizenship, codified in the Fourteenth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution and §301(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) (8
U.S.C. §1401(a)), that a person who is born in the United States, subject to its
jurisdiction, is a citizen of the United States regardless of the race, ethnicity, or
alienage of the parents. The war on terror and the case of Yaser Esam Hamdi, a
U.S.-Saudi dual national captured in Afghanistan fighting with Taliban forces, further
heightened attention and interest in restricting automatic birthright citizenship, after
the revelation that Hamdi was a U.S. citizen by birth in Louisiana to parents who
were Saudi nationals in the United States on non-immigrant work visas and arguably
entitled to rights not available to foreign enemy combatants. This report traces the
history of this principle under U.S. law and discusses some of the legislation in recent
Congresses intended to alter it.
The traditional English common-law followed the doctrine of jus soli, under
which persons born within the dominions of and with allegiance to the English
sovereign were subjects of the sovereign regardless of the alienage status of their
parents. The exceptions to this rule are persons born to diplomats, who are born
subjects of the sovereign whom the parents represent abroad, and persons born to
citizens of a hostile occupying force, who are born subjects of the invading
sovereign. Although the states and courts in the United States apparently adopted the
jus soli doctrine, there still was confusion about whether persons born in the United
States to alien parents were U.S. citizens. This arose because citizenship by birth in
the United States was not defined in the Constitution nor in the federal statutes.
Legal scholars and law makers were torn between a “consensualist” doctrine of
citizenship, by which a person and a government consent to be mutually obligated,
and an “ascriptive” doctrine by which a person is ascribed citizenship by virtue of
circumstances beyond his control, such as birth within a particular territory or birth
to parents with a particular citizenship. Additionally, African-Americans were not
considered citizens of the United States, even if they were free. Native Americans
also were not considered U.S. citizens because they were members of dependent
sovereign Indian nations. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth
Amendment, ratified in 1868, extended birthright citizenship to African-Americans,
but the United States Supreme Court made clear that although U.S.-born children of
aliens were U.S. citizens regardless of the alienage and national origin of their
parents, Native Americans still were not U.S. citizens under the terms of those laws.
Native Americans were made U.S. citizens by statute.
In recent Congresses there have been several legislative proposals to amend the
Constitution and the INA to limit automatic citizenship upon birth in the United
States so that persons born in the United States to parents who are unlawfully present
in the United States or are non-immigrant aliens would not become U.S. citizens,
e.g., H.J.Res. 41, H.J.Res. 46, H.R. 698, § 201 of H.R. 3700 and § 701 of H.R. 3938
in the 109th Congress. This report will be updated as necessary.

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Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Historical Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Jus Soli Doctrine before the Fourteenth Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 . . . . . . . . . . . 6
United States v. Wong Kim Ark and Elk v. Wilkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Legislative Proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Constitutional and Statutory Amendments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Congressional Act without Constitutional Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

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U.S. Citizenship of Persons Born in the
United States to Alien Parents
Introduction
Over the last decade or so, concern about the level of immigration, focused
particularly on illegal immigration, has sporadically led to a re-examination of a
long-established tenet of U.S. citizenship, codified in the Fourteenth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution and §301(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act [INA] (8
U.S.C. §1401(a)), that a person who is born in the United States, subject to its
jurisdiction, is a citizen of the United States regardless of the race, ethnicity, or
alienage of the parents. The war on terror and the case of Yaser Esam Hamdi, a U.S.-
Saudi dual national captured in Afghanistan fighting with Taliban forces, further
heightened attention and interest in restricting automatic birthright citizenship, after
the revelation that Hamdi was a U.S. citizen by birth in Louisiana to parents who
were Saudi nationals in the United States on nonimmigrant work visas1 and arguably
entitled to rights not available to foreign enemy combatants.
Some proponents of immigration reform have advocated either constitutional
or statutory amendments to limit automatic citizenship upon birth in the United
States so that persons born in the United States to parents who are unlawfully present
in the United States or are non-immigrant aliens would not become U.S. citizens.
This report traces the history of “automatic citizenship” under U.S. law and discusses
the legislation in recent Congresses intended to alter it.
Historical Development
Jus Soli Doctrine before the Fourteenth Amendment
There are two basic doctrines for determining birthright citizenship. Jus soli is
the principle that a person acquires citizenship in a nation by virtue of his birth in that
nation or its territorial possessions.2 Jus sanguinis is the principle that a person
1 Hamdi apparently returned to Saudi Arabia with his parents while he was still a toddler and
did not return to the United States until he was brought here as an enemy combatant. Brief
of Amicus Curiae Claremont Institute Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence at 2-3 and
Brief of Amici Curiae the Center for American Unity et al. at 3 for Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 59
L. Ed. 2d 578, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 03-6696).
2 Black’s Law Dictionary 775 (5th Ed. 1979); entry for “jus soli.”

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acquires the citizenship of his parents, “citizenship of the blood.”3 The English
common law tradition prior to the Declaration of Independence, which was the basis
of the common law in the original thirteen colonies and which was adopted by most
of the states as the precedent for state common law,4 followed the jus soli doctrine.5
Persons born within the dominion of the sovereign and under the protection and
ligeance of the sovereign were subjects of the sovereign and citizens of England; this
included persons born to “aliens in amity” who owed temporary allegiance to the
sovereign while in his territory.6 The exceptions were persons born to members of
a hostile occupying force or to diplomats representing another sovereign.7 The
reason was that the children of a hostile occupying force did not owe allegiance to
nor were born under the protection of the proper sovereign of the occupied territory.
The children of diplomats, although enjoying the temporary protection of the
sovereign while in his/her dominions, actually owed allegiance to and had a claim to
the protection of the sovereign whom their parents represented at the court of the
sovereign in whose dominions they were born. All civilized nations recognize and
assent to the immunity of foreign diplomats from their jurisdiction, without which
a foreign ambassador might not be able to effectively represent the sending
sovereign, but it would be “inconvenient and dangerous to society . . . if [private
individual aliens] did not owe temporary and local allegiance, and were not amenable
to the jurisdiction of the country.”8
The original framers of the U.S. Constitution did not define citizenship of the
United States, although the Constitution required that a person have been a citizen
of the United States for seven years to be a Representative and for nine years to be
a Senator,9 and that a person be a natural-born citizen or a citizen at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution in order to be eligible to be President (and therefore,
Vice-President).10 The Naturalization Act of 1790 and subsequent Acts until the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment did not
3 Id.; entry at “jus sanguinis.”
4 Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sandford Ch. 583, 646 (N.Y. 1844); 4 CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY
MAILMAN & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 92.03[1][b]
(2005); Isidor Blum, Is Gov. George Romney Eligible to be President? [part two], New
York Law Journal, p. 1, col. 5 (Oct. 17, 1967).
5 4 GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR, supra note 4, at § 92.03[1][a & b]; Jill A. Pryor,
The Natural-Born Citizen Clause and Presidential Eligibility: An Approach for Resolving
Two Hundred Years of Uncertainty, 97 Yale L.J. 881, 886 & n. 24 (1988).
6 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 655-668 (1898); Lynch v. Clarke, 1
Sandford Ch. at 670; Calvin’s Case, 7 Coke’s Reports 1, 8-21 (1607)(as reprinted in vol. 4
of the 1826 edition edited by John H. Thomas & John F. Fraser).
7 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 675, 682-688; Calvin’s Case, 7 Coke’s Reports
at 10-11.
8 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 683-688, citing the case of The Exchange, 7
Cranch. 116 (1812).
9 U.S. Const. art. I, §2, cl. 2 (Representatives), U.S. Const. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (Senators).
10 U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 5.

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define citizenship by birth within the United States.11 These naturalization acts
specified that only free white persons could be naturalized. As a result of the absence
of any definition in the Constitution or federal statutes of U.S. citizenship by birth in
the United States, citizenship by birth in the United States generally was construed
in the context of the English common law.12 This provided the frame of reference
and definition of “citizenship” that the framers of the Constitution would have
understood and also provided the pre-independence precedent for state common laws.
The acquisition of citizenship by birth and by naturalization in the United States
depended on state laws, both statutory and common law, until the enactment of the
naturalization law in 1790.13 The Naturalization Act of 1790, enacted pursuant to the
Congress’ powers under the Constitution,14 clearly established the definition of
citizenship by naturalization, but Congress’ silence on the issue of citizenship by
birth in the United States caused some confusion and disagreement as to what the
appropriate definition was. For example, some persons rejected the idea that English
common law provided the proper rule for citizenship by birth in the United States.15
And until the Civil War, some eminent jurists and legal scholars believed that there
was no real citizenship of the United States separate from citizenship in a state; that
is, a person was a citizen of a state which was part of the Union, therefore a person
was a citizen of the United States by virtue of his citizenship in a state.16
11 Act of March 26, 1790, 1 Stat. 103; Act of Jan. 29, 1795, 1 Stat. 414; Act of April 14,
1802, 2 Stat. 153; Act of Feb. 10, 1855, 10 Stat. 604.
12 Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sandford Ch. at 646, 658; Isidor Blum, supra note 4, at p. 1, col. 5.
13 One should note that the determination of U.S. citizenship by naturalization also depended
on state laws prior to the enactment of the first federal naturalization act. The election of
Albert Gallatin to the U.S. Senate in 1793 was successfully challenged on the grounds that
he had not been a U.S. citizen for nine years as required by the Constitution. 4 ANNALS OF
CONGRESS, 3rd Cong. 47-55, 57-62 (Gales & Seaton 1849 — there may be some difference
in the pagination between different printings of the same congressional debates) (covering
period of Feb. 20-28, 1794). He claimed that he had become a citizen of either Virginia or
Massachusetts at least nine years before his election. But a majority of the Senate, upon an
examination of the Virginia and Massachusetts citizenship laws, decided that Gallatin had
not satisfied the residency of either state prior to moving to Pennsylvania, where he
ultimately settled and was elected to Congress. He had not been resident in Pennsylvania
for nine years prior to election. This example also illustrates the pre-Constitution position
that U.S. citizenship could not exist without state citizenship, which some legal scholars
continued to espouse until the Civil War. Although Gallatin had resided in the United States
for thirteen years, he had not satisfied all the requirements for citizenship in the states where
he had resided nine years before election. Gallatin tried to argue, inter alia, that U.S.
citizenship was not dependent on state citizenship laws which had existed before
independence because U.S. citizenship depended on allegiance to the new nation and even
persons who had been natural-born citizens of the states were not considered citizens of the
United States if they had not shown allegiance to the new government and nation.
14 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cls. 4 & 18.
15 See, e.g., Lynch v. Clarke, 1 Sandford Ch. at 657; 4 GORDON, MAILMAN & YALE-LOEHR,
supra note 4, at § 92.03[1][b]. n. 9; PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP
WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY, 50-54 (1985).
16 Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wallace 36, 72 (1873); Leonard W. Levy, Kenneth L. Karst
(continued...)

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Although the English common law at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution considered a person born in the English dominions to alien parents to
be an English citizen unless those alien parents fit into the exceptions described
above, and although American law apparently generally accepted this position, there
nevertheless appeared to be some uncertainty as to whether persons born in the
United States to alien parents were, in fact, citizens of the United States. Some
scholars ascribe this uncertainty to the desire of Americans to embrace both a
“consensualist” doctrine of citizenship,17 by which a person and a government
consent to be mutually obligated, and an “ascriptive” doctrine by which a person is
ascribed citizenship by virtue of circumstances beyond his control, such as birth
within a particular territory or birth to parents with a particular citizenship.18
Apparently, Lynch v. Clarke, an 1844 New York case,19 was the first case to
decide the issue of whether the U.S.-born child of an alien was a U.S. citizen.20 It
held that the U.S.-born child of an Irish resident of the United States who returned
to Ireland after the child’s birth and died without ever declaring even an intent to be
16 (...continued)
& Dennis J. Mahoney, Citizenship (Historical Development), Encyclopedia of the American
Constitution 258 (1986).
17 Cases arose in the United States through the early nineteenth century concerning the issue
of citizenship of natural-born state citizens whose allegiance to the United States was in
question. Generally, such citizens had left the United States for England or English
dominions before or during the Revolutionary War and no act by them or their home state
had affirmed their allegiance to the independent state or the United States. Factors relevant
to this consensual citizenship included whether the person was born before or after July 4,
1776; whether the person left for England before or after July 4, 1776; whether the person
was a minor at the time of departure for England; whether the person elected to affirm U.S.
allegiance upon attaining majority; and whether the person was born or residing in territory
during its occupation by the British on or after July 4, 1776. For example, if a person was
born a British subject, i.e., before July 4, 1776, and as an adult did not adhere to the
independent states after July 4, 1776, he remained a British subject. Generally, if he was
born after July 4, 1776, he was a U.S. citizen, unless he was born in British-occupied
territory, left for England as a minor, and did not elect to affirm his U.S. citizenship within
a reasonable time after attaining his majority. See Inglis v. Sailor’s Snug Harbor, 28 U.S.
(3 Peters) 99 (1830). But see McIlvaine v. Cox, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 208 (1808), where the
Court held that a person who joined the British Army and left for England still had
inheritance rights because initially he had remained in New Jersey after July 4, 1776, and
after New Jersey had passed legislation declaring itself an independent and sovereign state
and its residents to be citizens of the independent state, and thus he had become a citizen of
independent New Jersey. See also Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Peters) 242 (1830), holding
that a woman born in South Carolina before July 4, 1776, and remaining there afterward,
was a citizen of independent South Carolina and her subsequent marriage to a British soldier
during the occupation of her hometown did not change this status. However, her subsequent
removal to England with her husband in 1782 rendered her a British subject within the
meaning of the treaty of 1794 which recognized inheritance rights for British subjects with
property in the United States.
18 SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 15, at 42-62.
19 1 Sandford Ch. 583
20 SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 15, at 57.

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naturalized was a U.S. citizen. It held that the right of citizenship was a national
right not pertaining to the individual states;21 that state laws could no longer define
U.S. citizenship;22 and that national laws instead determined citizenship.23 In
determining the appropriate national law, the court rejected the consensualist doctrine
in favor of the traditional English common-law doctrine of jus soli.24 It rejected the
argument that the application of the common-law doctrine was based on feudal
principles inappropriate to the United States, which had been founded on the
principles of consent between the government and the people to be governed, and
found instead that the silence of the Constitution and the federal statutes indicated
that Congress approved the adoption of the traditional common-law position.25 The
court also believed that even if federal laws did not indicate acquiescence in
common-law doctrine, the common-law rule provided a well-defined, unambiguous,
reliable rule without confusing recourse to the status of the parents.26 It held that the
national law defined any person born within the dominions and allegiance of the
United States as a citizen, regardless of the status of the parents.27 Notwithstanding
the general acceptance of jus soli, in the minds of many persons, the issue of
automatic citizenship upon birth in the United States to alien parents was still not to
be decided definitively for many years, particularly where the parents were of a
minority race or ethnicity.
Until the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment, African-
Americans were not considered citizens of the United States. In the case of Dred
Scott v. Sandford,28 the United States Supreme Court held that African-Americans
could not be citizens of the United States, even if they were free, because they were
descended from persons brought to the United States as slaves; the terms of the
Constitution demonstrated that slaves were not considered a class of persons included
in the political community as citizens;29 and the various state laws indicated that
African-Americans had not been considered to be state citizens and that it was widely
permitted to treat them as property at the time of the adoption of the federal
Constitution.30 The descendants of slaves could not have a citizenship right which
their ancestors had not had upon the formation of the Union and which no law had
subsequently granted them at the time of the Dred Scott decision.
21 1 Sanford Ch. at 641.
22 1 Sanford Ch. at 643-5.
23 Id.
24 1 Sandford Ch. at 656-663.
25 Id.
26 1 Sandford Ch. at 658.
27 1 Sandford Ch. at 663.
28 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
29 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 411.
30 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 407-416.

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The Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866
Although the primary aim was to secure citizenship for African-Americans, the
debates on the citizenship provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the
Fourteenth Amendment indicate that they were intended to extend U.S. citizenship
to all persons born in the United States and subject to its jurisdiction regardless of
race, ethnicity or alienage of the parents. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 declared that
“all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding
Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States.”31 The
Fourteenth Amendment declared that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United
States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside.”32 The Civil Rights Act of 1866 differs from the
Fourteenth Amendment by using the terms “not subject to any foreign power” and
“excluding Indians not taxed.”
During the debates on the act, Senator Trumbull of Illinois, chairman of the
committee that reported the civil rights bill, moved to amend the bill so that the first
sentence read, “All persons born in the United States, and not subject to any foreign
power, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States without distinction of
color.”33 Senator Cowan of Pennsylvania, who opposed both the Civil Rights Act of
1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment, asked “whether it will not have the effect of
naturalizing the children of Chinese and Gypsies born in this country?” Senator
Trumbull replied, “Undoubtedly.” The two disagreed as to whether, under the law
in existence prior to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, Chinese-
Americans were citizens of the United States. Cowan raised the specter of unfettered
Chinese immigration to California, resulting effectively in something tantamount to
a takeover of California by the Chinese empire, if the proposed language were
adopted. Trumbull asked Cowan whether the children born in Pennsylvania to
German parents were not U.S. citizens, to which Cowan replied that Germans were
not Chinese, Australians or Hottentots or the like. Trumbull replied that the law
made no distinction between the children of Germans and Asiatics “and the child of
an Asiatic is just as much a citizen as the child of a European.” Later in the debates,
Senator Johnson of Maryland urged Senator Trumbull to delete the phrase “without
distinction of color” because it was unnecessary since even without the phrase he
understood that Trumbull’s proposed amendment “comprehends all persons, without
any reference to race or color, who may be so born.” Trumbull felt that it was better
to retain the phrase to eliminate any doubt or dispute as to the meaning of his
amendment.34
31 C. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
32 Ratified July 9, 1868.
33 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 498 (1866).
34 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 573-574 (1866).

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There was also a debate over whether Indians should be included or excluded
from the citizenship provision.35 Trumbull believed that if the Indians were separated
from their tribes and incorporated into the mainstream community then they already
were U.S. citizens under the law. Senator Lane of Kansas disagreed and felt that a
more explicit bill was needed to extend citizenship to Indians, which he favored.
Other Senators wished to exclude Indians not taxed, which apparently was intended
to exclude unassimilated Indians, who were deemed to be mostly living in an
uncivilized condition in their tribes.36 When the exclusion was adopted, Senator
Henderson of Missouri objected that the citizenship of white persons did not depend
on whether or not they were taxed and that it was unfair to make such a distinction
for Indians, particularly since the issue of taxation was irrelevant to the issue of
assimilation.37
During the debates on the Fourteenth Amendment, Senator Howard of Michigan
moved to amend it by adding the first sentence in its present form, minus the phrase
“or naturalized.”38 Senator Cowan again objected to language that he felt would
include races such as the Chinese and prevent California from dealing with the
massive Chinese immigrant population as it saw fit.39 He again invoked the fear that
California would be overrun by Chinese, Pennsylvania by Gypsies. He believed that
the people of different races and cultures could not mingle. Senator Conness of
California replied that he had supported the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and had no
problem with constitutionally guaranteeing the U.S.-born children of Mongolian
parents civil rights and equal protection, his support apparently influenced by his
belief that the population of non-European immigrants and their descendants would
not increase significantly.40
There was also debate as to whether Indians should be excluded from the scope
of the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and whether they were
excluded by the phrase “subject to the jurisdiction thereof.”41 Apparently most of the
Senators supported the idea of excluding Indians but disagreed as to whether the
phrase “excluding Indians not taxed” should be inserted as it had been in the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. Several Senators argued that “subject to the jurisdiction” meant
the full and complete jurisdiction of the United States, and the Indians had always
been considered subject to the jurisdiction of their tribes which were quasi foreign
nations;42 some also felt that the taxation requirement was problematic. Some
Senators argued that “excluding Indians not taxed” was good enough for the Civil
35 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 498-499 (1866).
36 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 571-573 (1866).
37 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 571 (1866).
38 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2890 (1866).
39 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2890-2891 (1866).
40 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2891-2892 (1866).
41 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2890-2897 (1866).
42 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2890, 2893, 2895, 2897 (1866) (remarks of Senator
Howard of Michigan, Senator Trumbull of Illinois, Senator Williams of Oregon).

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Rights Act so it was appropriate for the Fourteenth Amendment; they also argued that
Indians were subject to U.S. jurisdiction for a variety of purposes so the “subject to
the jurisdiction” language was insufficiently clear.43 Ultimately, the Senate rejected
the insertion of “excluding Indians not taxed,” although at least one Senator said he
voted against this insertion because he favored extending citizenship to Indians and
not because he believed that the “subject to the jurisdiction language” excluded
Indians already.44
United States v. Wong Kim Ark and Elk v. Wilkins
Despite the clarification in the debates that race, ethnicity and alienage of
parents would not affect the right to citizenship by birth in the United States, the
issue concerning the meaning of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth
Amendment was not settled until the 1898 case of United States v. Wong Kim Ark.45
As the debates about those laws indicate, an underlying problem appears to have been
the attitude that certain alien races and Native Americans, like the African-Americans
in Dred Scott, could not be members of the American political community because
they had not been members of the community that yielded the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution. The United States Supreme Court discussed the
congressional debates described above, noting that although they were not admissible
as evidence to control the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, they were
important as an indication of the contemporaneous legal opinion of jurists and
legislators and showed that Congress had explicitly considered the application of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Chinese (and other U.S.-born children of aliens).46
The Court traced the history of the statutory and common law regarding jus soli
in England and America47 and distinguished another case in which an alleged
Chinese-American had been found not to be a U.S. citizen, noting that the issue had
been the insufficiency of proof that the claimant had been born in the United States.48
But where birth in the United States was clear, a child of Chinese parents was, in the
Court’s opinion, definitely a citizen under the Fourteenth Amendment, even though
Chinese aliens were ineligible to naturalize under then-existing law.49 The Court
rejected the argument that the child was born subject to the jurisdiction of the
Chinese emperor and outside the jurisdiction of the United States because his
allegiance and citizenship derived from his parents’ remaining subjects to the
Chinese emperor under treaties between the United States and China and the
43 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2892, 2893, 2895 (1866) (remarks of Senator Doolittle
of Wisconsin, Senator Johnson of Maryland, Senator Hendricks of Indiana).
44 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2897 (1866) (remarks of Senator Saulsbury of
Delaware).
45 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
46 169 U.S. at 697-699.
47 169 U.S. at 655-675.
48 169 U.S. at 696-697.
49 169 U.S. at 705.

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naturalization laws.50 It noted and rejected the Slaughter-House Court’s inaccurate
statement that the exceptions to jus soli included the children of consuls and other
aliens generally in addition to the children of ambassadorial-level diplomats and the
children of hostile, occupying forces.51 The decision alludes to a contemporaneous
New Jersey case that held that a U.S.-born child of Scottish parents domiciled but not
naturalized in the United States was born subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and not subject to the
jurisdiction of a foreign country within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.52
The Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment affirmed the traditional jus soli rule,
including the exceptions of children born to foreign diplomats, to hostile occupying
forces or on foreign public ships, and added a new exception of children of Indians
owing direct allegiance to their tribes.53 It further held that the “Fourteenth
Amendment . . . has conferred no authority upon Congress to restrict the effect of
birth, declared by the Constitution to constitute a sufficient and complete right to
citizenship”54 and that it is “throughout affirmative and declaratory, intended to allay
doubts and settle controversies which had arisen, and not to impose any new
restrictions upon citizenship.”55
Even after the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Wong Kim Ark decision secured automatic birthright citizenship for all persons born
in the U.S. and subject to its jurisdiction, Native Americans were not considered to
be Fourteenth Amendment citizens because the U.S. Supreme Court determined that
they were not born “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States. Following
earlier cases that had held that Indian tribes and their members were not subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States, and language in the Constitution and the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 that included only “Indians not taxed,” the Court in Elk v.
Wilkins56 held that Indians were not citizens of the United States unless they had been
naturalized by treaty or by a federal collective naturalization statute, or taxed or
recognized as a citizen by the United States or a state. At the time of the decision,
Native Americans were not eligible to be naturalized on an individual basis according
to the usual naturalization procedures and were only naturalized by treaty or statute.57
The Court found that Native Americans who had not been taxed or naturalized still
owed immediate allegiance to the tribe and were members of an independent political
community, and thus were not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and
50 169 U.S. at 694-705.
51 169 U.S. at 675, 682-688.
52 169 U.S. at 692.
53 169 U.S. at 693.
54 169 U.S. at 703; see also Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 266-267 (1967), which noted at
footnote 22 that some have referred to this statement as a holding and others have referred
to it as obiter dictum, but which deemed it entitled to great weight regardless of whether it
was dictum or a holding.
55 169 U.S. at 688.
56 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
57 Anna Williams Shavers, A Century of Developing Citizenship Law and the Nebraska
Influence: A Centennial Essay, 70 Nebraska L. Rev. 462, 487-489 (1991).

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were not citizens of the United States.58 The argument echoes those in the debates
about the Fourteenth Amendment. John Elk had separated from his tribe and lived
“under the jurisdiction of Nebraska” and had assimilated into mainstream society.
Despite these facts, the Court held that he was not a U.S. citizen nor could he become
one in the absence of treaty or federal statutory action regarding his tribe. Native
Americans are still not Fourteenth Amendment citizens;59 they are citizens by virtue
of one of the various statutes and treaties naturalizing specific tribes, the Citizenship
Act of 1924 (which was ambiguous regarding those born after the act),60 the
Nationality Act of 1940 (which finally and unambiguously declared all Native
Americans born in the United States to be U.S. citizens),61 or the Immigration and
Nationality Act.62
Legislative Proposals
Constitutional and Statutory Amendments
In recent Congresses there have been various proposals aimed at excluding the
children of illegal aliens and even nonimmigrant aliens from automatic birthright
citizenship, in part in order to remove an incentive for aliens to enter the United
States illegally or to enter legally on a nonimmigrant visa, then illegally stay beyond
the visa period.63 These proposals take the form of amendments to the Citizenship
58 112 U.S. at 102, 109.
59 Under Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971), the United States Supreme Court’s current
position appears to be that there are three types of citizenship: the two defined in the
Fourteenth Amendment, birth and naturalization in the United States when subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, and non-Fourteenth Amendment statutory citizenship, e.g., the
citizenship of Native Americans, persons born abroad to U.S. citizens, and persons born in
Puerto Rico, Guam and the Virgin Islands. See J. Michael Medina, The Presidential
Qualification Clause in this Bicentennial Year: The Need to Eliminate the Natural Born
Citizen Requirement, 12 Oklahoma City Univ. L. Rev. 253, 265 (1987).
60 Act of June 2, 1924, c. 233, 43 Stat. 253.
61 C. 876, § 201(b), 54 Stat. 1137, 1158.
62 C. 477, § 301(a)(2), 66 Stat. 163, 235 (1952); codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.A. §
1401(b) (Supp. 1994).
63 Aliens are seen as willing to enter the United States illegally in order to have a child here,
because they realize that when the U.S.-citizen child reaches his/her majority, he/she may
bring immediate relatives over to the United States, even if the Immigration and
Naturalization Service decides to deport the parents, or they choose to leave, in the interim.
So the automatic birthright gives illegal aliens a foot in the door to the United States and its
benefits. 151 Cong Rec. E816 (daily ed. Apr. 28, 2005) (Rep. Paul); 149 Cong. Rec. E547
(daily ed. Mar. 21, 2003) (statement of Rep. Paul); 143 Cong. Rec. H7354-8 (daily ed. Sept.
16, 1997) (statements of Rep. Smith of Texas and Rep. Bilbray); 142 Cong. Rec. H2487
(daily ed. Mar. 20, 1996) (statement of Rep. Deal); 141 Cong. Rec. E127-8 (daily ed. Jan.
19, 1995) (statement of Rep. Beilenson); 140 Cong. Rec. E456 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 1994)
(statement of Rep. Taylor); 139 Cong. Rec. S11997 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1993) (statement of
(continued...)

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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or to the Immigration and Nationality Act
provisions on birthright citizenship and comprise different approaches.
The proposals for constitutional amendments differ in defining what status a
parent must have to enable automatic birthright citizenship for a child born in the
United States.64 Proposals would variously limit jus soli citizenship under the
Constitution to persons born to:
! parents both of whom are either citizens or lawful permanent
residents (doesn’t expressly repeal the current Citizenship Clause);65
! mothers who are legal residents (expressly repeals the current
Citizenship Clause);66
! mothers who are citizens or legal residents (expressly repeals the
current Citizenship Clause);67
! mothers or fathers who are citizens (doesn’t expressly repeal the
current Citizenship Clause);68
! mothers or fathers who are citizens or persons who owe permanent
allegiance to the United States (doesn’t expressly repeal the current
Citizenship Clause);69
63 (...continued)
Sen. Reid), E 2168-2169 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1993) (statement of Rep. Gallegly), S10378
(daily ed. Aug. 4, 1993) (statement of Sen. Reid), H4437 (daily ed. Jul. 1, 1993) (statement
of Rep. Gallegly), H1005 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1993) (statement of Rep. Gallegly), E409 (daily
ed. Feb. 23, 1993) (statement of Rep. Beilenson); 138 Cong. Rec. E2572-3 (daily ed. Sept.
10, 1992) (statement of Rep. Gallegly), E1847 (daily ed. Jun. 16, 1992) (statement of Rep.
Gallegly), E441 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 1992) (statement of Rep. Gallegly); 137 Cong. Rec.
H8180 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1991) (statement of Rep. Gallegly), H7788 (daily ed. Oct. 10,
1991) (statement of Rep. Dornan).
The legislative proposals discussed in this report were suggested in Schuck & Smith,
supra note 15, at 116-140, as a more appropriate law of citizenship. Their proposal is to
exclude children of illegal and nonimmigrant aliens, because the nation has not consented
to the permanent residence of the parents. The children of legal residents, i.e., permanent
resident aliens, would be provisional citizens at birth and until their majority. They note that
the United Kingdom, which shares common origins with our common law of citizenship,
has adopted laws which do not extend birthright citizenship to children of illegal or
nonimmigrant aliens.
64 One should note that the constitutional Citizenship Clause provides the baseline for
birthright citizenship — Congress can provide for broader bases by statute.
65 H.J.Res. 4, 105th Cong. (1997); H.J.Res. 190, 104th Cong. (1996).
66 H.J.Res. 357, 102nd Cong. (1992).
67 H.J.Res. 64, 104th Cong. (1995); H.J.Res. 129, 103rd Cong. (1993).
68 H.J.Res. 60, 105th Cong. (1997); H.J.Res. 88, 104th Cong. (1995); H.J.Res. 396, 103rd
Cong. (1994).
69 H.J.Res. 46, 109th Cong. (2005); H.J.Res. 42, 108th Cong. (2003).

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! mothers or fathers who are legal residents (expressly repeals the
current Citizenship Clause);70
! mothers or fathers who are citizens or lawful permanent residents
(doesn’t expressly repeal the current Citizenship Clause);71 or
! mothers or fathers who are citizens, or are lawfully in the United
States or have lawful status under the immigration laws of the
United States (doesn’t expressly repeal the current Citizenship
Clause).72
Even as a baseline for defining citizenship, some of the distinctions drawn are
unclear. The term “legal resident” used in some of the proposals would appear to
implicitly include citizens, nationals, and lawful permanent residents, but it may also
be interpreted to include certain categories of nonimmigrants who typically reside in
the United States for several years and other aliens permanently residing under the
color of law. Other proposals refer to citizens, but not to nationals who are not
citizens (e.g., American Samoans). One type of proposal refers to persons who owe
permanent allegiance to the United States, which is how the INA defines nationals.
Therefore, for the sake of clarity, proposed language that includes an explicit
enumeration of the applicable categories of parents — citizens, nationals, lawful
permanent residents, nonimmigrants (if any) may be preferable to language that only
explicitly refers to parents who are legal residents or to citizens without mentioning
nationals. Some proposals focus on the mother as the conduit for birthright
citizenship, excluding a father who is a U.S. citizen or legal resident from being the
conduit for such citizenship. All of these proposals would only apply prospectively
to those born after the date of the ratification of an amendment by the legislatures of
three-fourths of the states within seven years of its submission for ratification and all
provide that Congress shall have the power to enforce the article by appropriate
legislation.
Some of the above proposals to amend the Constitution have parallel proposals
to amend the INA to conform to the new baseline of the Citizenship Clause once it
is amended, including legislation to limit citizenship by birth in the United States to
persons born to:
! mothers who are legal residents73 or
! mothers who are citizens or legal residents.74
By their own terms, these types of statutory amendments would not take effect until
a related constitutional amendment had been ratified and would only apply to those
born after the date of ratification. These statutory proposals have the same problems
as the parallel constitutional amendments.
70 H.J.Res. 56, 104th Cong. (1995); H.J.Res. 117, 103rd Cong., 1st. Sess. (1993).
71 H.J.Res. 41, 109th Cong. (2005); H.J.Res. 44, 108th Cong. (2003).
72 H.J.Res. 59, 107th Cong. (2001); H.J.Res. 10, 106th Cong. (1999); H.J.Res. 26, 105th Cong.
(1997); H.J.Res. 93, 104th Cong. (1995); H.J.Res. 340, 103rd Cong. (1994).
73 H.R. 3605, 102nd Cong. (1991).
74 H.R. 705, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 1191, 103rd Cong. (1993).

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One set of proposals would limit birthright citizenship in a way that its
proponents believe would not necessitate a constitutional amendment (see discussion
in the following section). It essentially would statutorily define who is born “subject
to the jurisdiction” of the United States under the Citizenship Clause notwithstanding
the U.S. Supreme Court holdings in United States v. Wong Kim Ark. These proposals
variously define:
! persons, whose birth mothers are not citizens, nationals, or lawful
permanent residents of the United States and who are
citizens/nationals of another country of which a natural parent is a
citizen/national, as not being born subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, but
rather as being born subject to the jurisdiction of the other country;75
! persons, whose birth mothers are not citizens or lawful permanent
residents of the United States and who are citizens/nationals of
another country of which a natural parent is a citizen/national, as not
being born subject to the jurisdiction of the United States within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, but rather as being born
subject to the jurisdiction of the other country;76
! persons born subject to the jurisdiction of the United States as
including persons born in wedlock to a mother or father who is a
U.S. citizen, a U.S. national, or a lawful permanent resident who
maintains primary residence in the United States, or persons born
out of wedlock to a mother who is a U.S. citizen, a U.S. national, or
a lawful permanent resident who maintains primary residence in the
United States;77
The first two of these proposals would avoid the problem of rendering a person
stateless by permitting persons born to illegal alien or nonimmigrant mothers to be
citizens at birth if they have no viable claim to citizenship in another country. These
two proposals could result in a scenario in which a person may be born in the United
States to a mother who is a nonimmigrant or illegal alien and a father who is a U.S.
citizen, national or lawful permanent resident (in or out of wedlock) and not be born
a U.S. citizen because that person has a claim to citizenship in the mother’s country.
75 H.R. 190, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 319, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 346, 105th Cong. (1997);
H.R. 375, § 301, 104th Cong. (1995). These bills specify that the persons in question are
either born citizens/nationals of another country of which either of his/her natural parents
is a citizen/national or entitled upon application to become a citizen/national of that other
country.
76 H.R. 2162, § 701, 104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 4934, § 701, 103rd Cong. (1994); H.R. 3862,
§ 401, 103rd Cong. (1994); S. 1351, § 1001, 103rd Cong. (1993). These bills specify that
the persons in question are either born citizens/nationals of another country of which either
of his/her natural parents is a citizen/national or entitled upon application to become a
citizen/national of that other country.
77 H.R. 3938, § 701, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 698, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 1567, 108th
Cong. (2003); H.R. 73, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 7, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 1363, 104th
Cong. (1995). All but the last of these defines “wedlock” as not including common-law
marriage.

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The third proposal does not permit a person born out of wedlock to a father who is
a U.S. citizen, national or lawful permanent resident to be considered born subject
to the jurisdiction of the United States and does not provide for the acquisition of
U.S. citizenship by such a person through a U.S. citizen father. Without conforming
amendments to § 309 of the INA, this proposal would mean that persons born abroad
out of wedlock to a U.S. citizen father and an alien mother would have a process by
which that they could be deemed U.S. citizens at birth and, paradoxically, persons
born in the U.S. of similar parentage would not. These proposals are all therefore
arguably unconstitutional on due process/equal protection grounds as well as
Citizenship Clause grounds.78
One proposal in the 109th Congress, without statutorily defining “born subject
to the jurisdiction” of the United States, would provide that, with respect to a person
born after the date of the enactment of the proposal, the person shall not be a national
or citizen at birth under section 301 of INA (8 U.S.C. § 1401) unless at least one of
the parents is, at the time of birth, a citizen or national of the United States or an alien
lawfully admitted for permanent residence.79
A final legislative proposal is sui generis; it does not purport to be a
congressional interpretation of the Citizenship Clause but is a limitation on H-visa
holders and would be unconstitutional under the Citizenship Clause. Under this
proposal, children born to a parent who is an nonimmigrant employee under §
101(1)(15)(H) of the INA would not be U.S. citizens by birth in the United States
unless the other parent is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident.
The legislation discussed above is intended to discourage unlawful entry and
presence of aliens in the United States and the anomaly of automatically granting
citizenship to persons who, despite birth in the United States, are not raised and do
not act in accordance with allegiance to the United States. It may accomplish this but
may also throw into question the ultimate status of many born here, e.g., persons
whose parents are in the United States initially on temporary visas but ultimately
obtain lawful permanent status. Also, the additional record-keeping necessary to
document who becomes a citizen automatically upon birth in the United States may
present bureaucratic challenges, particularly since birth records are a matter for State
laws.
78 The U.S. Supreme Court has upheld the provisions for transmission of citizenship by a
U.S. citizen father to a child born out of wedlock outside the United States as consistent
with constitutional equal protection despite the fact that their requirements are more
stringent than those for transmission by a U.S. citizen mother to a child born in the same
circumstances. Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 533 U.S. 53 (2001).
However, in that case, there was a possibility for transmission; the more stringent
requirements were substantially related to the congressional purpose of requiring a
demonstrable bond between the U.S. citizen father and child. The absence of any possibility
of basing citizenship on the father’s citizenship, nationality, or resident status may be
unconstitutional.
79 H.R. 3700, § 201, 109th Cong. (2005).

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Congressional Act without Constitutional Amendment
As noted above, proponents of certain proposals to amend the INA argue that
congressional interpretation of the Citizenship Clause to limit automatic birthright
citizenship may be permissible without an accompanying constitutional amendment
because, under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has the power to
“enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.” In a still evolving
area of law, the United States Supreme Court has held that Congress has some power
to define the substance of the rights that are protected under the amendment and may
even, under some circumstances, legislate contrary to judicial decisions by going
beyond judicial decisions defining such rights in order to enforce the amendment.
In Katzenbach v. Morgan,80 the Court found that Congress could define the
substantive scope of equal protection for the purpose of determining whether state
laws violate equal protection. The Court rejected the dissent’s concern that Congress
could legislate to dilute the equal protection and due process decisions of the Court,
saying that Congress may adopt measures only to enforce Fourteenth Amendment
rights, not to restrict, abrogate or dilute them.81 However, Congress has passed
legislation that purported to overrule the Court’s expansion of the right against self-
incrimination and the right-to-counsel and expressly relied on Katzenbach v. Morgan,
although the Court, contemporaneously with the legislation, changed course to adopt
a view in alignment with that of Congress.82 Congressional abortion opponents have
tried to initiate legislation restricting the right that the Court has derived from the
Constitution.83 Other recent cases show that the Court will not always defer to
Congress’ determination as to what legislation is appropriate to enforce the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.84
Thus, there may be an issue as to whether Congress could define “subject to the
jurisdiction thereof” in a manner that would curtail a long-assumed right of persons
born to aliens in the United States to be U.S. citizens regardless of the immigration
status of their parents. One could argue that Congress has no power to define
“subject to the jurisdiction” and the terms of citizenship in a manner contrary to the
Court’s understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment as expressed in Wong Kim Ark
and Elk, particularly since that understanding includes a holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not confer on Congress a right to restrict the effect of birth on
citizenship as declared by the Constitution. In other words, there may be a distinction
80 384 U.S. 641, 654-656 (1966). See also, City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S.Ct.
706, 717-20, 726-727 (1989); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 476-8, 482-4 (1980); City
of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970);
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION,
S. Doc. No. 108-17, 2041-2047 (2002 & 2004 Supp.) (Johnny H. Killian, George A.
Costello & Kenneth R. Thomas eds.) [hereinafter CONSTITUTION ANNOTATED].
81 384 U.S. at 651, n. 10. See also Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718,
731-733 (1982).
82 CONSTITUTION ANNOTATED, supra note 79, at 2042-3, n. 1990.
83 Id. at 2044, n. 1999.
84 Id. at 2044-7.

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CRS-16
between the existence of a right under the Fourteenth Amendment (e.g., citizenship),
which depends on the text and judicial interpretation, and the implications or scope
of the right, which is subject to some degree of congressional regulation. However,
since Congress has broad power to pass necessary and proper legislation to regulate
immigration and naturalization under the Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cls. 4 & 18,85
arguably Congress has the power to define “subject to the jurisdiction thereof” for the
purpose of regulating immigration.
The federal courts arguably support an interpretation of the Constitution that
would foil those who attempt to gain an immigration advantage by breaking U.S.
laws, although Wong Kim Ark made no distinction between lawfully and unlawfully
present alien parents, nor between legal resident and nonimmigrant aliens. However,
the Wong Kim Ark Court did not have to make such distinctions, because Wong’s
parents were legal resident aliens. Federal appellate courts have upheld the refusal
by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (I.N.S.) to stay the deportation of
illegal aliens merely on the grounds that they have U.S.-citizen, minor children,
because to do so would be unfairly to grant an advantage to aliens who successfully
flouted U.S. immigration laws long enough to have a child born in the United States
over those aliens who followed the law, and would turn the immigration statute on
its head.86 Although the mere fact of the existence of U.S.-citizen, minor children
would not be sufficient to prevent the deportation of illegal alien parents, extreme
hardship to the children caused by the deportation of the parents is a factor to be
considered in the discretionary suspension of deportation.87 The United States
Supreme Court has upheld the discretion of the Attorney General and the I.N.S. to
define “extreme hardship” under proceedings for the suspension of deportation88 and
to deny suspension of deportation and refuse to reopen proceedings for the
85 Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1976); Mathew v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1975).
86 See, e.g., Hernandez-Rivera v. I.N.S., 630 F.2d 1352, 1356 (9th Cir. 1980); Gonzalez-
Cuevas v. I.N.S., 515 F.2d 1222, 1224 (5th Cir. 1975). See generally Annotation, Infant
Citizen as Entitled to Stay of Alien Parents’ Deportation Order, 42 A.L.R. Fed. 924 (1979
& Supp. 2001), and Annotation, What Constitutes “Extreme Hardship” or “Exceptional and
Extremely Unusual Hardship,” Under § 244(a) of Immigration and Nationality Act (8
U.S.C.S. § 1254(a)), Allowing Attorney General to Suspend Deportation of Alien and Allow
Admission for Permanent Residence, 72 A.L.R. Fed. 133 §§ 7-12 (1985 & Supp. 2001).
87 Urbano de Malaluan v. I.N.S., 577 F.2d 589, 594 (9th Cir. 1978). This particular case
actually held that suspension of deportation proceedings should be reopened, and it
distinguished consideration of the children’s existence from a consideration of extreme
hardship under proceedings for the suspension of deportation, because the latter proceedings
required a seven-year continuous presence in the United States. However, later cases, while
acknowledging extreme hardship as a statutory factor, limited review of the I.N.S. discretion
to grant suspension of determination and did not seem to consider seven-years continuous
presence to be a significant reduction of any loophole based on U.S.-citizen children. See
infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text. See also Annotation, supra note 85, 72 A.L.R.
Fed. at 133, §§ 7-12. The annotation lists and summarizes a number of cases which do and
do not find extreme hardship, including cases involving U.S.-citizen minor children. The
specific facts in some cases resulted in a finding of extreme hardship.
88 I.N.S. v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 145 (1981).

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CRS-17
suspension of deportation even if a prima facie case for suspension is demonstrated.89
The Court held that a court could not substitute a liberal definition of “extreme
hardship” for a narrow one preferred by the Attorney General and the I.N.S., noting
that otherwise “any foreign visitor who has fertility, money, and the ability to stay out
of trouble with the police for seven years can change his status from that of tourist
or student to that of permanent resident without the inconvenience of immigration
quotas. This strategy is not fair to those waiting for a quota.”90 A U.S.-citizen child
must be twenty-one years old to bring alien parents into the United States as
immigrants.91 Federal courts have found that this requirement is meant “to prevent
wholesale circumvention of the immigration laws by persons who enter the country
illegally and promptly have children to avoid deportation,”92 and does not violate
equal protection by distinguishing between U.S.-citizen children who are minors and
those who have attained majority.93
The courts apparently have never ruled on the specific issues of whether the
native-born child of illegal aliens as opposed to the child of lawfully present aliens
may be a U.S. citizen or whether the native-born child of nonimmigrant aliens as
opposed to legal resident aliens may be a U.S. citizen.94 However, Wong Kim Ark
specifically held that under the Fourteenth Amendment a child born in the United
States to parents who, at the time of his birth, were subjects of the Chinese emperor,
but had a “permanent domicil [sic] and residence in the United States”95 and were not
diplomats of the emperor, was born a U.S. citizen. The holding does not make a
distinction between illegal and legal presence in the United States, but one could
argue that the holding is limited to construing the Fourteenth Amendment in the
context of parents who are legal permanent residents. However, the Court’s own
discussion of the common law doctrine of jus soli and the Fourteenth Amendment
as an affirmation of it indicates that the holding, at the least, would not be limited to
permanent legal residents as opposed to nonimmigrant, transient, legal aliens96 and
89 I.N.S. v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444, 446, 451 (1985).
90 450 U.S. at 145.
91 Section 201(b)(2)(A)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, codified as amended at
8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(I).
92 Hernandez-Rivera v. I.N.S., 630 F.2d at 1356, citing Urbano de Malaluan v. I.N.S., 577
F.2d at 594.
93 Hernandez-Rivera v. I.N.S., 630 F.2d at 1356.
94 SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 15, at 117.
95 169 U.S. at 705.
96 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 693-694. The Court also states: “The real
object of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution, in qualifying the words, ‘All
persons born in the United States,’ by the addition, ‘and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,’
would appear to have been to exclude, by the fewest and fittest words, (besides children of
members of the Indian tribes, standing in a peculiar relation to the National Government,
unknown to the common law,) the two classes of cases — children born of alien enemies
in hostile occupation, and children of diplomatic representatives of a foreign State — both
of which, as has already been shown, by the law of England, and by our own law, from the
(continued...)

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CRS-18
currently accepted law would also weigh against this argument.97 Also, the cases
involving the deportation of illegal aliens simply take for granted that their U.S.-born
children are U.S. citizens in considering whether the existence of or extreme hardship
to U.S.-citizen, minor children should stay the deportation of the parents.98 This is
true regardless of whether the children were born during the period of any lawful stay
by the parents, during the period of any unlawful stay or after an I.N.S. finding of
deportability of the parents. However, some scholars argue that the Citizenship
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment should not apply to the children of illegal
aliens because the problem of illegal aliens did not exist at the time the Fourteenth
Amendment was considered in Congress and ratified by the states.99 Although the
Elk decision construed the phrase, “subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” the situation
of Native Americans is unique, so any interpretation that the U.S.-born children of
illegal aliens are not born “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States arguably
could not rely on the Elk decision.
Because of the Supreme Court interpretations of U.S. citizenship laws and
constitutional provisions, one could argue that a constitutional amendment is
necessary to clarify the meaning of “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
On the other hand, amicus curiae (friend of the court) briefs submitted by several
interested organizations to the U.S. Supreme Court for consideration during the case
of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld100 argued, among other things, that the Supreme Court
interpretations never contemplated or intended to include the granting of automatic
citizenship by birth in the United States to persons whose parents were aliens who
entered or stayed in the United States unlawfully or who were transiently present.
Most other jus soli countries have limited citizenship by birth in their territories.
96 (...continued)
time of the first settlement of the English colonies in America, had been recognized
exceptions to the fundamental rule of citizenship by birth within the country.” 169 U.S. at
683.
97 Shavers, supra note 57, at 489.
98 See, e.g., I.N.S. v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. at 446; Braun v. I.N.S., 992 F.2d 1016, 1020 (9th
Cir. 1993); Hernandez-Rivera v. I.N.S., 630 F.2d at 1356; Wang v. I.N.S., 622 F.2d 1341,
1348 (9th Cir. 1980);Urbano de Malaluan v. I.N.S., 577 F.2d at 594; Gonzalez-Cuevas v.
I.N.S., 515 F.2d at 1224.
99 SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 15, at 95-98.
100 59 L. Ed. 2d 578, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004). The Court itself made its decision based on
the assumption that Hamdi is a U.S. citizen. Amicus Curiae briefs addressing the
interpretation of the Citizenship Clause were submitted by (1) the Eagle Forum Education
and Legal Defense Fund; (2) the Claremont Institute Center for Constitutional
Jurisprudence; and (3) the Center for American Unity, Friends of Immigration Law
Enforcement, National Center on Citizenship and Immigration, and Representatives Steve
King, Dana Rohrabacher, Lamar S. Smith, Thomas G. Tancredo, Roscoe Bartlett, Mac
Collins, Joe Barton, and John J. Duncan, Jr.

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