Order Code IB89118
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Lebanon
Updated November 1, 2005
Alfred B. Prados
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
United States and Lebanon
Overview
Lebanon: Demography and Politics
Political Profile
Sectarianism
Political Structure and Power Sharing
The Civil War and Taif Reforms
Political Upheaval of 2005
Assassination of Former Prime Minister
Resolution 1595
The Mehlis Report
Elections of 2005 and Aftermath
Recent or Current Foreign Presence in Lebanon
Syria
Israel
U.S.-.Lebanese Relations
U.S. Policy Toward Lebanon
Role of Congress
Recent and Current U.S. Assistance to Lebanon

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Lebanon
SUMMARY
The United States and Lebanon continue
Lebanon’s government is based in part
to enjoy good relations. Prominent current
on a 1943 agreement that called for a
issues between the United States and Lebanon
Maronite Christian President, a Sunni Muslim
include progress toward a Lebanon-Israel
Prime Minister, and a Shi’ite Muslim Speaker
peace treaty, U.S. aid to Lebanon, and Leba-
of the National Assembly, and stipulated that
non’s capacity to stop Hizballah militia at-
the National Assembly seats and civil service
tacks on Israel. The United States supports
jobs be distributed according to a ratio of 6
Lebanon’s independence and favored the end
Christians to 5 Muslims. On August 21, 1990,
of Israeli and Syrian occupation of parts of
the Lebanon National Assembly adopted the
Lebanon. Israel withdrew from southern
“Taif” reforms (named after the Saudi Arabian
Lebanon on May 23, 2000, and Syria com-
city where they were negotiated). The parlia-
pleted withdrawing its forces on April 26,
ment was increased to 128 to be divided
2005.
evenly between Christians and Muslim-Druze,
presidential authority was decreased, and the
A large Lebanese-American community
Speaker’s and the Prime Minister’s authority
follows U.S.-Lebanon relations closely. Presi-
was increased. President Ilyas Hirawi signed
dents Eisenhower and Reagan said the United
the constitutional amendment implementing
States had “vital” interests in Lebanon, but
the reforms on September 21, 1990.
others might describe U.S. interests in Leba-
non as less than vital. At the invitation of the
Since the civil war, Lebanon has held
Lebanese government, the United States
elections for the National Assembly in 1992,
intervened in Lebanon to defend Lebanese
1996, 2000, and, most recently, 2005. The
sovereignty in 1958 and 1982. In a Beirut
National Assembly elected Emile Lahoud
terror bombing in October 1983, 241 U.S.
President on October 15, 1998, and extended
armed forces personnel died. From 1987 until
his term for three years by a constitutional
July 1997, the United States banned travel to
amendment in September 2004. The assassi-
Lebanon because of the threat of kidnaping
nation of former Lebanese Prime Minister
and dangers from the ongoing civil war.
Rafiq Hariri, who opposed Lahoud’s exten-
sion, sparked a political crisis, realignments in
Lebanon is rebuilding after the
Lebanon’s domestic politics, and withdrawal
1975-1990 civil war. Syrian armed forces,
of Syrian troops from Lebanon.
invited into Lebanon in 1976 to prevent a
Muslim attack on the Christians, continued to
Other CRS reports on Lebanon include
occupy the northern and eastern parts of the
CRS Issue Brief IB92075, Syria: U.S. Rela-
country until April 2005. Israeli forces in-
tions and Bilateral Issues, by Alfred B.
vaded southern Lebanon in 1982 and occupied
Prados.
a 9-mile-wide strip along the Israel-Lebanon
border until May 2000.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On October 31, 2005, the U.N. Security Council voted unanimously to compel Syria to
cooperate “fully and unconditionally” with the U.N. investigation into the assassination of
the late Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri or face unspecified “further action.” The
Syrian foreign minister criticized the report of the U.N. commission as based on
“preconceived conclusions,” but promised to cooperate with the investigation.
In his second semi-annual report on implementation of U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1559 (which called for withdrawal of foreign forces from Lebanon), the U.N.
Secretary General forwarded the findings of a verification team that there was “no remaining
visible or significant Syrian intelligence presence or activity in Lebanon,” while
acknowledging some credible reports that Syrian intelligence continued to influence events
in Lebanon, but said most of these reports were exaggerated.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
United States and Lebanon
Overview
The United States and Lebanon have traditionally enjoyed good relations, rooted in
long-standing contacts and interaction beginning well before Lebanon’s emergence as a
modern state. Factors contributing to this relationship include a large Lebanese-American
community (a majority of Arab-Americans are of Lebanese origin); the pro-Western
orientation of many Lebanese, particularly during the Cold War; cultural ties exemplified by
the presence of U.S. universities in Lebanon; Lebanon’s position as a partial buffer between
Israel and its principal Arab adversary, namely Syria; Lebanon’s democratic and partially
Christian antecedents; and Lebanon’s historic role as an interlocutor for the United States
within the Arab world.
Two U.S. presidents have described Lebanon as of vital interest to the United States,
President Eisenhower in 1958 and President Reagan in 1983. (Public Papers of the
Presidents, 1958, p. 550-551; Public Papers of the Presidents, 1983, vol. II, p. 1501.) Both
statements were made in the context of brief U.S. military deployments to Lebanon to help
Lebanese authorities counter rebellions supported by radical Arab states with ties to the
former Soviet Union. Some would agree that a friendly and independent Lebanon in a
strategic but unstable region is vital to U.S. interests. But others might disagree, pointing
to the absence of such tangible interests as military bases, oil fields, international waterways,
military or industrial strength, or major trading ties. In a broader sense, a ruinous 15-year
civil war that created turmoil in Lebanon between 1975 and 1990 and that periodically
threatened to spill over into adjacent areas of the Middle East illustrated the dangers to U.S.
interests posed by instability in this small country.
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Lebanon: Demography and Politics
Political Profile
Sectarianism. Lebanon, with a population of 3.8 million, has the most religiously
diverse society in the Middle East, comprising 17 recognized religious sects.
“Confessionalism,” or the distribution of governmental posts by religious sect, is a long-
standing feature of Lebanese political life, despite frequent calls to abolish it. Because of
political sensitivities related to power sharing among the various communities, no census has
been taken in Lebanon since 1932, when Lebanon was under a French mandate. According
to current estimates by the Central Intelligence Agency as of 2005, Muslim groups comprise
59.7% of the population while Christian groups comprise 39.0%, with another 1.3%of
assorted religious affiliations. A more detailed but less recent estimate by an expert on the
geography and demography of the Middle East gives the following breakdown:1
Sect
Number
Percent
Shi’ite Muslim
1,192,000
34%
Sunni Muslim
701,000
20%
Maronite Christian*
666,000
19%
Druze**
280,000
8%
Greek Orthodox (Christian)
210,000
6%
Armenian (Christian)***
210,000
6%
Greek Catholic (Christian)*
175,000
5%
Other
70,000
2%
Total (not exact, due to rounding)
3,506,000
100%
*
Affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church but retain their own rituals
**
Grouped with Muslims; regarded by some as derived from Shi’ite Islam
*** Armenians are the only sizeable ethnic minority in Lebanon; other Lebanese groups
are all ethnic Arab
Lebanese groups have developed political parties along religious, geographical, ethnic,
and ideological lines and are often associated with prestigious families. Christian groups,
especially Maronites, tend to be strong advocates of Lebanese independence and opposed to
Syrian and other external influences. Christian parties include the Phalange led by the
Gemayel family, and smaller parties led by the Chamoun, Frangieh, and Iddi families. Sunni
Muslim parties, historically more Arab nationalist in orientation, include the Independent
Nasirite group and a new group, the Futures Party, that has coalesced around anti-Syrian
1 Colbert C. Held, Middle East Patterns, Westview Press, 2000, p. 262. Reflecting 1999 figures,
Held uses an estimated total Lebanese population of 3.506 million, to which he applies the above
percentages.
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supporters of the recently assassinated Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. Shi’ite parties include
the more moderate Amal under Nabih Berri and the more radical Hizballah (see below),
former rivals but now at least temporarily allied; Druze are largely associated with the
Progressive Socialist Party led by the leftist yet feudally based Jumblatt family, now
somewhat tenuously aligned with the Futures Party. A religiously mixed group, the Syrian
National Social Party (SNSP), favors a union of Syria, Lebanon, and possibly other nearby
states. Several of these parties and groupings formerly maintained militias, notably the
Lebanese Forces, which were affiliated with the Christian Phalange Party, and Hizballah,
which has both a political and a military wing. Most of the militias were disbanded after the
civil war and Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea was jailed (he has just been amnestied),
but Hizballah’s militia continues to function.
Political Structure and Power Sharing. Post-civil war Lebanon retains the
country’s unique political system, based on power sharing among the diverse religious
sectarian communities and political factions that comprise the modern Lebanese state. Under
the constitution of 1926, Lebanon is a republic with a president elected by parliament for a
non-renewable six-year term, a prime minister and cabinet appointed by the president, and
a parliament, elected by universal adult suffrage for a four-year term. Composition of
parliament varies in accordance with electoral laws that are promulgated before each
election; current membership is 128. Unlike the President, the prime minister and cabinet
must receive a vote of confidence from parliament.
In 1943, when Lebanon became fully independent from France, leaders of the principal
religious communities adopted an unwritten agreement known as the National Covenant,
which provided that the President be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni
Muslim, and the Speaker of Parliament a Shi’ite Muslim; parliamentary seats were divided
on the basis of six Christians to five Muslims. Cabinet posts are generally distributed among
the principal sectarian communities, notably Maronites, Greek Orthodox, smaller Christian
sects, Druze (a small sect associated with Islam), Sunni Muslims, and Shi’ite Muslims. As
time passed, the 1943 ratios, which had been based on the country’s sole census conducted
in 1932, became less reflective of Lebanese society as Muslims gradually came to outnumber
Christians, while within the Muslim community, Shi’ite Muslims came to outnumber Sunni
Muslims. Discontent over power sharing imbalances was a major factor in inter-communal
tensions and civil strife culminating in the 1975-1990 civil war.
The Civil War and Taif Reforms. At stake in the civil war was control over the
political process in Lebanon, the status of Palestinian refugees and militia, and the respective
goals of Syria and Israel (see the section below on Foreign Presence in Lebanon). From 1975
to 1990, the civil war killed, wounded, or disabled hundreds of thousands and rendered
comparable numbers homeless at one time or another during the fighting. At one point, a
terror bombing in October 1983 killed 241 U.S. armed forces personnel, who were part of
a short-lived multinational force attempting to keep peace among Palestinian refugees and
Lebanese factions. From 1987 until July 1997, the United States banned travel to Lebanon
because of the threat of kidnaping and dangers from the ongoing civil war. Lebanon
continues to rebuild in the aftermath of the civil war.
The Lebanese parliament elected in 1972 remained in office for 20 years, since it was
impossible to elect a new parliament during the civil war. After a prolonged political crisis
near the end of the war, Lebanese parliamentary deputies met in 1989 in Taif, Saudi Arabia,
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under the auspices of the Arab League and adopted a revised power sharing agreement. The
so-called Taif Agreement raised the number of seats in parliament from 99 to 108 (later
changed to 128), replaced the former 6:5 ratio of Christians to Muslims in parliament with
an even ratio, provided for a proportional distribution of seats among the various Christian
and Muslim sub-sects, and left appointment of the prime minister to parliament, subject to
the president’s approval. It also addressed the status of Syrian forces in Lebanon, as
explained in a section below. Parliamentary elections held in 1992, 1996, and 2000 resulted
in pro-Syrian majorities, given the presence and influence of Syrian forces in Lebanon
ostensibly as part of a peacekeeping force. Though supported by some Lebanese, including
many Shi’ite Muslims, the Syrian presence was increasingly resented by other elements of
the Lebanese population.
Political Upheaval of 2005
Assassination of Former Prime Minister. By 2004, tensions had increased
between the pro-Syrian Lebanese President Emile Lahoud and the independent Prime
Minister Rafiq Hariri, a self-made billionaire who had spearheaded the reconstruction of
Lebanon after the civil war. Matters came to a head when the Lebanese parliament,
apparently under Syrian pressure, adopted a Syrian-backed constitutional amendment
extending President Lahoud’s tenure by an additional three years. Hariri, who disagreed with
the move, resigned in October 2004, and subsequently aligned himself with an anti-Syrian
opposition coalition. Hariri’s assassination in a car bombing on February 14, 2005, blamed
by many on Syrian agents, led to widespread protests by an anti-Syrian coalition comprising
many members of the Christian, Druze, and Sunni Muslim communities and counter-
demonstrations by pro-Syrian groups including Shi’ites who rallied behind the Hizballah and
Amal parties. Outside Lebanon, the United States and France were particularly vocal in their
denunciation of the assassination and a possible Syrian role in it.
Resolution 1595. A statement by the President of the U.N. Security Council on
February 25, although it did not mention Syria by name, condemned the assassination and
requested the Secretary General “to report urgently on the circumstances, causes and
consequences of this terrorist act.” In accordance with this request, a U.N. fact-finding team
visited Lebanon and concluded that “the Lebanese investigation process suffers from serious
flaws and has neither the capacity nor the commitment to reach a satisfactory and credible
conclusion.”
On April 7, as domestic and international outrage mounted, the U.N. Security Council
adopted Resolution 1595, under which the council decided to “establish an international
independent investigation Commission (‘the Commission’ or UNIIIC) based in Lebanon to
assist the Lebanese authorities in their investigation of all aspects of this terrorist act,
including to help identify its perpetrators, sponsors, organizers and accomplices.” Heading
the Commission is Detlev Mehlis, described as “a 25-year veteran of the Berlin prosecutor’s
office with a record of solving high profile terror cases.”2 The resolution requested the
Commission to complete its work within three months from the date it commences
operations, authorizes the Secretary General to extend the Commission’s mandate for another
2 Warren Hoge, “Bush Pushes U.N. to Move Swiftly on Syria Report,” New York Times, Oct. 22,
2005.
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period of up to three months, and requests an oral update every two months while the
Commission is functioning. The U.N. Secretary General informed members of the Security
Council that the Commission was fully operational as of June 16, 2005. On September 8,
2005, the Commission requested a 40-day extension to complete its work. Upon submission
of the Commission’s initial report on October 19, the Secretary General extended its mandate
until December 15 to enable the Commission to pursue further gaps it had identified (see
“The Mehlis Commission,” below).3 On August 30, a U.N. spokeswoman announced that
three former heads of Lebanese intelligence agencies and a former Lebanese member of
parliament had been identified as suspects in the assassination of Hariri. A subsequent press
report describes the suspects as Syrian proxies with close ties to President Lahoud.4
The Mehlis Report. Tensions mounted as reports circulated that Syrian and Lebanese
officials would be implicated in the findings of the Mehlis Commission. After encountering
initial resistance from Syria, from September 20-23, members of the commission visited
Damascus, where they interviewed senior Syrian military and security officials including the
last two Syrian chiefs of intelligence in Lebanon, who were widely regarded as the effective
viceroys of Lebanon during their respective tenures: Generals Rustom Ghazali and Ghazi
Kanaan. Kanaan, who was reassigned to Syria in 2002 and appointed minister of the interior
apparently committed suicide in October 2005. Some observers speculate that Kanaan was
killed or forced to commit suicide by Syrian authorities because of what he might reveal —
or might have revealed — about Syrian involvement in the Hariri assassination or that he
chose to take his own life because he feared that he would become the scapegoat for Syrian
actions in Lebanon. In actuality, however, Kanaan is not mentioned in the Commission’s
report of October 19 (see below).
The 54-page report submitted by the Mehlis Commission represented four months of
research in which Commission members interviewed more than 400 persons and reviewed
60,000 documents, identified several suspects, and established various leads. Two central
conclusions reached by the Commission deal with the question of culpability, although they
do not constitute a conclusive finding:
It is the Commission’s view that the assassination on 14 February 2005 was carried out
by a group with an extensive organization and considerable resources and capabilities.
...there is converging evidence pointing at both Lebanese and Syrian involvement in this
terrorist act.... Given the infiltration of Lebanese institutions and society by the Syrian
and Lebanese intelligence services working in tandem, it would be difficult to envisage
a scenario whereby such a complex assassination plot could have been carried out
without their knowledge.
3 In its operative paragraph 1, Resolution 1595 “Decides ... to establish an international independent
investigation Commission (“the Commission”) based in Lebanon to assist the Lebanese authorities
in their investigation of all aspects of this terrorist act ...” The resolution requests that the
commission complete its work within three months from commencement of operations. The U.N.
subsequently announced that the Commission began its operations on June 16, 2005.
4 Hassan M. Fatah, “Lebanon’s President Facing Growing Pressure to Resign,” New York Times,
Sept. 6, 2005. The press report lists the four as the current head of security, the former head of
security, a former military intelligence chief, and a former chief of police.
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The Commission report adds that the investigation is not complete and calls for further
investigation; states that Syrian authorities, including the foreign minister, while extending
limited cooperation, have provided some false or inaccurate information; and calls on Syria
to help clarify unresolved questions. Syrian officials, including President Bashar al-Asad,
have denied complicity in the Hariri assassination and said the Mehlis report was biased. On
October 29, President Asad said Syria has set up a commission to investigate the
assassination.5
Questions have been raised regarding the apparent exclusions in the report of the names
of suspects who had been identified in earlier drafts of the report. The principal example
appears in Paragraph 96 (page 29) of the report, in which a witness told the Commission that
in September 2004 “senior Lebanese and Syrian officials decided to assassinate Rafik Hariri”
and held several follow-up meetings in Syria to plan the crime. An earlier version reportedly
listed the names of five of the senior officers, including President Asad’s brother Maher al-
Asad and the President’s brother-in-law Asif Shawkat, chief of military intelligence and
widely considered the second most powerful official in the regime. Some reporters
questioned whether or not the Commission chief Detlev Mehlis had come under pressure to
make the report less accusatory. At a news conference on October 21, both Mehlis and
Secretary-General Kofi Annan denied this; Mehlis went on to explain that he suppressed the
names of the officers when he found out that the Commission’s report was to be made
public, because he had only one anonymous source for the specific accusation.6 Maher al-
Asad does not appear at all in the official copy of the report and Asif Shawkat appears only
once (paragraph 178) when Shawkat allegedly forced an individual 45 days before the
assassination to make a tape claiming responsibility for the crime, purportedly in an effort
to hide Syrian or Lebanese complicity.
On October 31, 2005, the U.N. Security Council voted unanimously to compel Syria to
cooperate “fully and unconditionally” with the Mehlis investigation into the assassination of
the late Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri or face unspecified “further action.” By
dropping a threat appearing in earlier drafts of specific economic sanctions, the sponsors of
the resolution were able to attract support from Russia and China while leaving the door
open to the imposition of sanctions at a later date. U.S. officials noted that the resolution
was adopted under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which gives the Council power to
impose penalties, including use of military force.7
Elections of 2005 and Aftermath. As Syrian troops departed from Lebanon under
U.S. and international pressure (see below), the Lebanese prepared to hold parliamentary
elections without Syrian interference for the first time since 1972. Three principal groupings
emerged to contest the multi-phased elections: a mixed coalition of supporters of the late
Prime Minister Hariri (the “Bristol Gathering”), who rallied around his son Saad Hariri; a
combined electoral list led by Hizballah and Amal; and the “Change and Reform Alliance”
5 Warren Hoge and Steven R. Weisman, “U.N. Is Expected to Pass Measure Pressuring Syria,” New
York Times, Oct. 31, 2005.
6 Warren Hoge, “Bush Pushes U.N. to Move Swiftly on Syria Report,” New York Times, Oct. 22,
2005.
7 Warren Hoge, “U.N. Tells Syria to Stop Impeding Slaying Inquiry,” New York Times, Nov. 1, 2005.
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consisting of largely Christian supporters of the long exiled former armed forces commander-
in-chief General Michel Awn, who returned to Lebanon in May.8 As a result of
parliamentary elections held in four phases between May 29 and June 5, Hariri’s candidates
(the Bristol Gathering) gained a majority of 72 seats in Lebanon’s 128-member parliament.
The other two blocs, the Hizballah-Amal Movement and the Change and Reform Alliance,
won 33 and 21 seats, respectively. On June 22, in a statement by the President of the
Security Council, the Council welcomed the Lebanese parliamentary elections and
commended “the fair and credible character of the vote.”
Despite Hariri’s success, the strong showing by the Amal-Hizballah list among Shi’ite
voters resulted in the reelection of veteran parliamentary speaker Nabih Berri, generally
regarded as pro-Syrian. But an anti-Syrian Hariri supporter, former Finance Minister Fouad
Siniora, gained parliament’s endorsement for the post of prime minister and was appointed
to this post by President Lahoud on June 30. On July 19, Siniora gained approval for a 24-
member cabinet composed of 15 supporters of Saad Hariri’s Futures Movement, five
supporters of the pro-Syrian Shi’ite coalition, and others. Particularly noteworthy was the
appointment for the first time in Lebanese history of a Hizballah official, Muhammad Fneish,
to a cabinet position as Minister of Energy and Water Resources. The new cabinet received
a vote of confidence on July 30, gaining 92 affirmative votes from the 128-member
parliament, with 14 opposed, 2 abstaining, and 20 not attending the session.
Siniora will continue to face difficulties in working with this mixed government. First,
pressure is reportedly mounting for the resignation of President Lahoud with the recent
identification of several of his close associates in the Hariri assassination. Second, the role
of the formerly exiled General Awn is uncertain: though long an opponent of the Syrian role
in Lebanon, Awn formed tactical alliances with several pro-Syrian Lebanese politicians
during the recent elections in an effort to defeat pro-Hariri candidates. On the other hand,
Awn’s grouping is not represented in the newly formed cabinet and Awn has said he will
form the backbone of an opposition to Siniora’s government. Some observers believe Awn
has his eye on the presidency. Third, the inclusion of a Hizballah official in the cabinet
raises further potential problems; for example, the U.S. State Department, while welcoming
the new cabinet, has said it will not deal with an official of Hizballah, which the U.S.
Government has listed as a foreign terrorist organization. In this connection, a major
stumbling block for the new government will be a U.N. demand contained in Security
Council Resolution 1559 that all militias be disbanded, which in effect refers primarily to
Hizballah. This will be difficult to implement in view of Hizballah’s strong block of
supporters in parliament and inclusion of a Hizballah official in the new cabinet.
8 General Awn, a controversial former armed forces commander and prime minister, rejected the Taif
Agreement and fled to the French Embassy in Beirut after being besieged by Syrian forces. He was
subsequently granted political asylum in France.
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Recent or Current Foreign Presence in Lebanon
Syria
Thirty-five thousand Syrian troops entered Lebanon in March 1976, in response to then
President Suleiman Frangieh’s appeal to protect the Christians from Muslim and Palestinian
militias; later, Syria switched its support away from the main Christian factions. Between
May 1988 and June 2001, Syrian forces occupied most of west Beirut and much of eastern
and northern Lebanon. Syrian forces did not venture south of a “red line” running east and
west across Lebanon near Rashayah, inasmuch as territory south of the line was considered
to fall within the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) operating area.
In October 1989, as part of the Taif agreements, Syria agreed to begin discussions on
possible Syrian troop redeployment from Beirut to the eastern Beqaa Valley two years after
political reforms were implemented and discuss further withdrawals at that time. Then
President Elias Hirawi signed the reforms in September 1990. However, the withdrawal
discussions, which according to most interpretations of the Taif Agreement were to have
started in September 1992, did not take place, in part because the Lebanese government said
it needed more time to establish its authority over the country. Syrian officials maintained
that they were waiting for the Lebanese government to complete rebuilding the army and
police forces and assume security responsibilities in Lebanon before beginning the
withdrawal discussions. In the meantime, Syria and Lebanon signed a treaty of brotherhood,
cooperation, and coordination in May 1991, which called for creating several joint
committees to coordinate policies. Although Syrian troop strength in Lebanon reportedly
declined from 35,000-40,000 in the 1980s to approximately 14,000 by early 2005, Syria
continued to exercise controlling influence over Lebanon’s domestic politics and regional
policies; moreover, its intelligence agents were active in Lebanon. U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1559 adopted on September 2, 2004, called among other things upon “all
remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon.”
The Hariri assassination in February 2005 prompted strong international pressure on the
Syrian regime, particularly from the United States and France, to withdraw its forces and
intelligence apparatus from Lebanon in accordance with Resolution 1559. On April 26, the
Syrian foreign minister informed U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan and the President of
the U.N. Security Council that Syrian forces had completed their withdrawal from Lebanon.
In his first semi-annual report on the implementation of Resolution 1559,9 the U.N. Secretary
General stated that as of April 26, however, he had not been able to verify full Syrian
withdrawal; consequently, he dispatched a U.N. team to verify whether there had been a full
Syrian withdrawal. On May 23, the U.N. Secretary General forwarded a report by a team he
had sent to Lebanon to verify Syrian withdrawal. The team “found no Syrian military forces,
assets or intelligence apparatus in Lebanese territory, with the exception of one Syrian
battalion” deployed near the disputed village of Deir Al-Ashayr on the Lebanese-Syrian
border. The team also concluded that “no Syrian military intelligence personnel remain in
9 U.N. Security Council document S/2005/272, Paragraph 17.
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Lebanon in known locations or in military uniform” but added that it was “unable to
conclude with certainty that all the intelligence apparatus has been withdrawn.”10
On June 10, 2005, following reports of Syrian involvement in attacks on anti-Syrian
Lebanese officials and journalists, Secretary General Annan sent the verification team back
to Lebanon to see if Syrian intelligence agents were still in the country. The team returned
on July 11 and subsequently submitted a report to Annan. In his second semi-annual report
on implementation of Resolution 1559, submitted on October 26, 2005, Annan reported that
“[o]verall, the team corroborated its earlier conclusion that there was no remaining visible
or significant Syrian intelligence presence or activity in Lebanon, though the distinctly close
historical and other ties between the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon also had to be taken
into account when assessing a possibly ongoing influence of Syrian intelligence in Lebanon.”
He acknowledged that there were some credible reports that Syrian intelligence continued
to influence events in Lebanon but said most of these reports were exaggerated. On the other
hand, the Secretary General noted that other requirements of Resolution 1559 remained to
be implemented, particularly disbanding and disarming Lebanese and non-Lebanese militia
(notably Hizballah and several Palestinian groups) and extension of Lebanese government
control throughout all of the country.11
Syria has long regarded Lebanon as part of its sphere of influence. Some international
observers have expressed concern that Syrian leaders might try to circumvent the effect of
the withdrawal by maintaining their influence through contacts they have acquired over the
years in the Lebanese bureaucracy and security services.12 Attacks on and assassinations of
several prominent Lebanese critics of Syria in June and July 2005 have accentuated these
fears. Another remaining question concerns the ability of the Lebanese security forces to
assume responsibility for maintaining order in areas vacated by Syrian forces. Lebanon’s
ground forces number approximately 70,000 organized into 11 brigades and a few separate
units and armed largely with obsolescent equipment, plus minuscule air and naval forces,
each consisting of about 1,000 personnel.13
A related issue concerns the Lebanese-Syrian border. Since Syria’s withdrawal from
Lebanon, some Lebanese have complained that Syria is obstructing commercial traffic across
the Lebanese border, while Syrian officials say they have had to tighten border controls on
security grounds. Also, members of Syria’s large expatriate work force in Lebanon complain
that they have been victims of a backlash against Syria, and some have returned to Syria as
a result, depriving Syria of worker remittances that have benefitted the Syrian economy. A
joint Lebanese-Syrian commission started meeting in August 2005 to adopt procedures to
handle movement of workers between the two countries.
10 Annex to U.N. Security Council document S/2005/331, Letter dated 23 May 2005 from the
Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council.
11 Text of report is attached to U.N. Security Council document S/2005/673, Oct. 26, 2005.
12 Robin Wright, “Syria Moves to Keep Control of Lebanon,” Washington Post, March 31, 2005.
Syria also has potential built-in assets through the continued presence of President Lahoud and
parliamentary speaker Berri.
13 Recent estimates appear in International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance,
2004-2005, London, pp. 129-130.
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Israel
In March 1978, Israel invaded and occupied Lebanese territory south of the Litani River,
to destroy Palestinian bases that Israel believed were the source of attacks against Israelis.
Israeli forces withdrew in June 1978, after the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
(UNIFIL) was placed south of the Litani to serve as a buffer between Israel and the
Palestinians (U.N.S.C. Resolution 425, March 19, 1978). In June 1982, Israel mounted a
more extensive invasion designed to root out armed Palestinian guerrillas from southern
Lebanon, defeated Syrian forces in central Lebanon, and advanced as far north as Beirut. As
many as 20,000 Palestinians and Lebanese may have perished in the fighting. Israeli forces
completed a phased withdrawal in 1985, but maintained a 9-mile wide security zone in
southern Lebanon from 1985 to 2000. About 1,000 members of the Israeli Defense Forces
(IDF) patrolled the zone, backed by a 2,000-3,000 Lebanese militia called the South Lebanon
Army (SLA), which was trained and equipped by Israel. On its part, Israel continued its air
and artillery retaliation against Palestinian and Lebanese Shi’ite militia and Lebanese armed
forces units that attacked IDF and SLA positions.
In May 2000, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak fulfilled a 1999 campaign promise to
withdraw Israeli forces from the security zone in southern Lebanon. Barak had hoped to do
this in conjunction with a Syrian withdrawal, but the continued stalemate in Syrian-Israeli
talks led Barak to decide to move unilaterally. Some 500 Hizballah militia moved into
portions of the southern security zone vacated by the IDF and SLA. Israel gave asylum to
approximately 6,700 SLA fighters and their families, while another 1,500 SLA were captured
by Hizballah and turned over to the Lebanese Government to stand trial. Of the 6,700 exiles,
many emigrated to Australia, Canada, and Latin America; approximately 2,000 remained in
Israel as of mid-2005, where they were recently granted the right to Israeli citizenship but
few applied.
Syria and the pro-Syrian Lebanese government asserted that the Israeli withdrawal was
incomplete because it did not include a 10-square-mile enclave known as the Shib’a Farms
near the Israeli-Lebanese-Syrian tri-border area. Most third parties maintain that the Shib’a
Farms is part of the Israeli-occupied Syrian Golan Heights and is not part of the Lebanese
territory from which Israeli was required to withdraw under a 1978 U.N. Security Council
resolution (425). On June 16, 2000, the U.N. Secretary General informed the Security
Council that Israel had withdrawn from Lebanon in compliance with Resolution 425.
Hizballah, on its part, claimed credit for forcing Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon,
thereby boosting its credentials within the Arab world. Since May 2000, Israeli forces in the
Shib’a Farms area have been the main focus of Hizballah attacks. Some analysts believe that
Syria, the Lebanese Government, and Hizballah raised the issue of this obscure enclave as
a justification for continuing to put military pressure on Israel to withdraw from the Golan
Heights in the aftermath of its withdrawal from Lebanon.14 Syria denies this. It is not clear
whether the new Lebanese government, which contains both pro- and anti-Syrian elements,
will maintain Lebanon’s former position regarding the Shib’a Farms.
14 Michael Slackman, “Shabaa [variant spelling] Farms at Center of Tension for Lebanon, Syria and
Israel,” Los Angeles Times, Apr. 28, 2001.
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U.S.-Lebanese Relations
U.S. Policy Toward Lebanon. The United States has enjoyed good diplomatic
relations with Lebanon and has supported its political independence. During the 1975-1990
civil war, the United States expressed concern over the violence and destruction taking place
there; provided emergency economic aid, military training, and limited amounts of military
equipment; and briefly deployed military forces to Lebanon in the early 1980s, as noted
earlier. The United States supported and participated in various efforts to bring about a
cease-fire during the civil war and subsequent efforts to quiet unrest in southern Lebanon
along the Lebanese-Israeli border. In 1996 the United States helped negotiate an agreement
between Hizballah and Israel to avoid targeting civilians and is a member of a five-party
force monitoring this agreement. The United States endorsed the U.N. Secretary General’s
findings in May 2000 that Israel had completed its withdrawal from southern Lebanon. The
U.S. Administration reacted strongly to the assassination of the late Prime Minister Hariri
in February 2005, criticized the Syrian presence in Lebanon, and demanded withdrawal of
Syrian forces; following the assassination, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice recalled U.S.
Ambassador to Syria Margaret Scobey to Washington for consultations.
The United States has welcomed the formation of a new Lebanese government
following the withdrawal of Syrian forces. On July 22, 2005, Secretary of State Rice met
with President Lahoud, Prime Minister Siniora, and other officials during a brief surprise
visit to Lebanon. After a meeting with Siniora, Dr. Rice said, “I think that you cannot find
a partner more supportive of Lebanon than the United States. This is a tremendous
achievement for the Lebanese people; namely, to be able to control their future by
themselves.” She reiterated U.S. demands that Hizballah be disarmed, however, and
criticized Syria for obstructing commercial traffic across the Lebanese border. (Syrian
officials say they have had to tighten border controls on security grounds.).15
Congress has also shown considerable interest in Lebanon and Members have spoken
frequently against Syrian domination of the Lebanese scene. Both houses have passed
measures condemning the Hariri assassination, calling for a full investigation, and calling on
Syria to withdraw from Lebanon (for example, H.Res. 91, H.Res. 273, S.Res. 63, S.Res. 77).
Previously, in 2003, Congress passed the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty
Restoration Act (P.L. 108-175), which prescribes additional sanctions against Syria unless
the President certifies that Syria is strictly respecting the sovereignty of Lebanon and meets
other specified requirements.
Role of Congress
On July 1, 1993, the U.S. Senate passed by voice vote S.Con.Res. 28, which stated that
Syria had violated the Taif Agreements (see below) by not withdrawing from Lebanon in
September 1992, urged an immediate Syrian withdrawal, and called upon the President to
continue withholding aid and support for Syria.
15 Saudi Hudson, “Rice pledges support to Lebanon on surprise visit,” Reuters, July 22, 2005. Also,
“Lebanese premier, Rice hold news conference in Beirut 22 Jul,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, July
22, 2005.
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The House of Representatives added an amendment to the State Department
Authorization bill, Section 863 of H.R. 1646, in mid-May 2001, which would have cut
$600,000 in International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds to Lebanon unless
Lebanon deployed its armed forces to the border with Israel. Section 863 also called upon
the President to present a plan to Congress to cut ESF funds if Lebanon did not deploy within
six months.
Section 1224 of P.L. 107-228, the Security Assistance Act of 2002, stated that $10
million of the funds available for FY2003 and subsequent years could not be obligated until
the President certified to Congress that Lebanese Armed Forces had deployed to the
internationally recognized Lebanon-Israel border and that Lebanon was asserting its authority
over the border area. The amendment (popularly called the “Lantos Amendment” after its
initial sponsor) was added to compel Lebanon to exercise control over the border area,
displacing Hizballah forces. Lebanon refused to move to the border until Israel evacuated
the Shib’a Farms disputed area. As of March 2004, Lebanese forces had not moved into the
border area. According to unconfirmed sources, the $10 million was held in an escrow
account pending negotiations among the United States, Israel, Lebanon, and Members of
Congress.
On December 12, 2003, President Bush signed H.R. 1828 (P.L. 108-175), which directs
the President to apply economic and diplomatic sanctions to Syria if Syria does not meet
several demands, including withdrawal from Lebanon and deployment of Lebanon’s armed
forces in all parts of Lebanon. According to the U.N. Secretary General, Lebanon has not
fully extended its control over all Lebanese territory (see above).
Recent and Current U.S. Assistance to Lebanon
In December 1996, the United States organized a Friends of Lebanon conference, which
resulted in a U.S. commitment of $60 million in U.S. aid to Lebanon over a five-year period
beginning in FY1997 and ending in FY2001, i.e., $12 million per year mainly in Economic
Support Funds (ESF). Congress increased this amount to $15 million in FY2000 and $35
million in FY2001, reportedly to help Lebanon adjust to new conditions following Israel’s
withdrawal and cope with continuing economic strains. U.S. economic aid to Lebanon has
hovered around $35 million in subsequent years.
The Bush Administration requested $35 million in ESF and $700,000 in International
Military Education and Training (IMET) for FY2006. H.R 3057 (the foreign operations
appropriations bill for FY2006), which was passed by the House on June 28, 2005, raises the
requested ESF amount from $35 million to $40 million, of which $6 million is to be devoted
to scholarships and U.S. educational institutions in Lebanon. The Senate version of H.R.
3057, reported on June 30, contained $35 million in ESF, of which $4 million is for
educational institutions. During floor debate on July 19, however, the Senate adopted
Amendment 1298, which increased ESF to Lebanon by $5 million and provided that an
additional $2 million of these funds would be available for scholarships and educational
institutions, thereby aligning the Senate figures with those of the House bill. The Senate
passed its version of the bill on July 20. (See Table 2, below, for annual U.S. aid to
Lebanon.)
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According to the Administration’s original planning (based on $35 million in ESF), ESF
for Lebanon in FY2006 is targeted toward three main objectives: economic growth,
agriculture, and trade ($22 million); promoting democracy and good governance ($7
million); and protection of the environment ($6 million). IMET programs are designed to
increase military professionalism among Lebanese Armed Forces personnel, reduce
sectarianism in a major national institution, foster personal working relationships with U.S.
military personnel, and offer an alternative to training conducted by Syria and other countries
less amenable to U.S. democratic ideals. IMET-funded maritime training will emphasize
port security and search and rescue operations.
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Table 2. U.S. Assistance to Lebanon
(millions of dollars)
Economic Aid
Food Aid
Military Aid
I.M.E.T.
Year
Total
(Grants)
(Grants)
(Loans)
(Grants)
1946 - 1980
332.7
120.2a
86.2b
123.3c
3.0
1981
24.3
4.0
0
20.0
0.3
1982
21.8
9.0
2.2
10.0
0.6
1983
153.9
52.2
0
100.0
1.7
1984
44.0
28.1
0.3
15.0
0.6
1985
21.1
19.9
0.5
0
0.7
1986
17.6
16.0
1.1
0
0.5
1987
23.0
12.8
9.7
0
0.5
1988
12.3
5.1
6.8
0
0.4
1989
15.5
2.8
12.3
0
0.4
1990
19.4
8.3
10.7
0
0.4
1991
19.2
9.3
9.9
0
0
1992
16.4
9.2
7.2
0
0
1993
14.4
10.3
3.5
0
0.6
1994
2.0
1.7
0
0
0.3
1995
16.0
15.6d
0
0
0.4
1996
2.5
2.0
0
0
0.5
1997
12.8
12.3
0
0
0.5
1998
12.6
12.0
0
0
0.6
1999
12.6
12.0
0
0
0.6
2000
15.6
15.0
0
0
0.6
2001
35.4
34.9
0
0
0.5
2002 35.6
35.0
0
0
0.6
2003
35.5
34.8
0
0
0.7
2004
35.9
35.2
0
0
0.7
2005
35.9
35.2
0
0
0.7
2006e
35.7
35.0e
0
0
0.7
Totals
1,023.7
587.9
150.4
268.3
17.1
I.M.E.T. = International Military Education and Training
Source: U.S. Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants
a. Of the $120.2 million total, $19 million was loans.
b. Of the $86.2 million total, $28.5 million was loans.
c. Of the $123.3 million total, $109.5 was loans and $13.8 million was grants.
d. Includes about $6 million from 1994.

e. Administration request; H.R. 3057 would raise economic aid to $40 million.
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