Order Code RS22270
Updated October 18, 2005
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
The International Space Station and the Iran
Nonproliferation Act (INA): The Bush
Administration’s Proposed INA Amendment
Marcia S. Smith and Sharon Squassoni
Congressional Research Service
Summary
The Iran Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 106-178) prohibits the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA) from purchasing Russian goods and services for the
International Space Station (ISS) unless the President certifies that Russia is not
proliferating certain technologies to Iran. On July 12, 2005, the Administration
submitted to Congress an amendment to the act to allow NASA to purchase goods and
services from Russia to support the U.S.-led ISS. This presents a classic policy
dilemma. Without access to Russian spacecraft, the U.S. use of the ISS could be
extremely limited. Yet Russian entities are continuing proliferation activities relating
to missile proliferation according to the Department of State. This report focuses on the
amendment proposed by the Bush Administration. CRS Issue Brief IB93017 discusses
the ISS program; CRS Report RS22072 discusses the origins of the Iran
Nonproliferation Act (INA) and its relationship to the ISS program. The Senate passed
S. 1713 on September 21. It is different from the Administration’s proposal, but would
allow NASA to purchase needed services from Russia until January 1, 2012. A similar
bill (H.R. 4003) was introduced in the House. This report will be updated as needed.
Background
The United States has passed laws and used sanctions to deter Russia and other
countries from providing technologies related to nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons, ballistic missiles, and advanced conventional weapons to Iran (see CRS Report
RL32048, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses.) The 2000 Iran Nonproliferation
Act (P.L. 106-178) widened some of the sanctions, and, in Section 6, contained a ban on
U.S. government payments to Russia in connection with the U.S.-led International Space
Station (ISS), unless the President determines that Russia is taking steps to prevent
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and ballistic and cruise missiles to
Iran. For more information on the origins and nonproliferation aspects of the INA, see
CRS Report RS22072, The Iran Nonproliferation Act and the International Space
Station: Issues and Options.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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The ISS is a multinational research laboratory under construction in Earth orbit.
Russia, Canada, Japan, and 11 European countries are partners with the United States in
the effort. ISS segments are taken into orbit, primarily on the U.S. space shuttle, and
assembled there. The ISS program began in 1993, replacing an earlier effort begun in
1984 (for more on the history of the space station program, see CRS Issue Brief IB93017,
Space Stations). Bush Administration decisions that led to a delay in development of a
U.S. “crew return vehicle” for the ISS, ongoing uncertainty associated with the space
shuttle launch schedule (see CRS Report RS21408, NASA’s Space Shuttle Program: The
Columbia Tragedy, the Discovery Mission, and the Future of the Shuttle), and a 2004
announcement of a new Vision for Space Exploration by President Bush that includes
retiring the space shuttle in 2010 (see CRS Report RS21720, Space Exploration: Issues
Concerning the “Vision for Space Exploration”), all would increase NASA’s reliance on
Russia if U.S. astronauts are to continue to live and work aboard the ISS. On July 12,
2005, NASA, on behalf of the Administration, submitted to Congress a proposed
amendment to the INA that would allow it to purchase goods and services from Russia
without regard to Russia’s proliferating behavior with Iran.

ISS and the INA
The United States invited Russia to join the ISS partnership in 1993 in part to
encourage its adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to stop sales
of ballistic missile technology.1 By the end of the decade, however, it appeared that
Russian entities were violating the MTCR, including some of those under the jurisdiction
of the Russian space agency. Concerns also were rising about Russia selling certain
technologies to Iran. On July 29, 1999, during markup of the Iran Nonproliferation Act
by the House Science Committee’s Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics, Science
Committee Chairman James Sensenbrenner explained that “Earlier this year, there were
publications of the fact that entities of the Russian Space Agency were violating the
MTCR. That’s why there is Section 6 in this bill.”2
Section 6 of the INA prohibits the U.S. Government from making “extraordinary
payments” in connection with ISS (and possibly other human space flight activities) to the
Russian space agency, organizations or entities under its control, or any other element of
the Russian government, after January 1, 1999, unless the President determines that it is
Russia’s policy to oppose proliferation to Iran, that Russia is demonstrating a sustained
commitment to seek out and prevent the transfer of WMD and missile systems to Iran,
and that neither the Russian space agency nor any entity reporting to it has made such
transfers for at least one year prior to such determination. The President must notify
Congress five days in advance of making such a determination, and provide a written
justification. Exceptions include payments needed to prevent imminent loss of life by or
grievous injury to individuals aboard ISS (the “crew safety” exception); payments to
construct, test, prepare, deliver, launch, or maintain Russia’s Zvezda Service Module; and
$14 million for certain Russian docking hardware already under consideration before the
INA was enacted. The President must provide reports or notifications to Congress within
1 House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. Subcommittee on Space. U.S.-Russian
Cooperation in the Space Station Program: Parts I and II. Hearing. October 6, 14, 1993. p. 45.
2 House Committee on Science. Markups of H.R. 356, H.R. 1883, H.R. 2607, and H.R. 2767.
July 29, September 9, and November 3, 1999. p. 44

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specified time limits if the exceptions are used. The term “extraordinary payments” is
defined in Section 7(1) of the act, and is discussed later in this report. President Clinton
provided the required notification for the $14 million for Russian docking hardware on
June 29, 2000, but there have been no subsequent determinations or notifications. NASA
wanted to purchase other Russian goods and services in 2000, and considered them
permissible under the agency’s interpretation of the meaning of “imminent” in the crew
safety exception, but terminated those efforts after strong criticism at an October 12, 2000
House International Relations Committee hearing.
Impact of the INA on NASA’s Use of the ISS: the 2006 and 2010
Deadlines. Prior to the 2003 space shuttle Columbia tragedy, NASA planned to
complete assembly of the ISS in 2006, followed by at least 10 years of operations. ISS
crews were to be taken to and from the ISS either using the U.S. space shuttle, or Russian
Soyuz spacecraft. Under the international agreements that govern the ISS program,
Russia is obligated to provide a “crew return” capability — essentially a lifeboat so crews
can evacuate the ISS in an emergency — for three crew members throughout the lifetime
of the ISS. The United States is obligated to provide such a capability for four additional
crew members once assembly of the ISS is completed, but terminated its program to build
such a vehicle, so Russia’s Soyuz spacecraft is the only option.

Under a 1996 U.S.-Russian “Balance Agreement,” Russia is obligated to provide 11
Soyuz spacecraft for crew rotation and crew return of U.S. crews at no cost to NASA in
exchange for services that NASA was providing to Russia. It is because of this agreement
that Russia has been providing free crew transport and crew return services to NASA
since the 2003 Columbia accident. The last was launched in October 2005, with its return
to Earth scheduled for April 2006. After that, Russia no longer must allocate any of the
seats on its Soyuzes for U.S. astronauts. Russian space officials have repeatedly said that
they will not continue to provide these services to NASA at no cost. Meanwhile,
President Bush’s 2004 Vision for Space Exploration directs NASA to terminate the space
shuttle program in 2010, and build a new spacecraft by 2014 — the Crew Exploration
Vehicle (CEV). During the gap between 2010 and 2014, NASA would rely on Russia to
take astronauts to and from the ISS. NASA’s Administrator, Michael Griffin, wants to
accelerate the CEV schedule to 2012, but it is not clear if that can be achieved.
Thus, there are two deadlines facing NASA: April 2006, after which U.S. astronauts
would have access to the ISS only when the shuttle is there; and 2010, after which U.S.
astronauts would have no access to the ISS until the new CEV is available. Under the
INA, NASA also would not be able to pay for use of Russia’s Progress spacecraft, which
take cargo to the ISS, beyond what Russia agreed to provide in the international
agreements. NASA is hoping that U.S. companies will develop capabilities to take cargo
to ISS. The INA prevents NASA from buying such services, however, if any of the funds
would go to Russia. For example, it cannot purchase commercial launch services for ISS
using Lockheed Martin’s Atlas V launch vehicle because it uses Russian rocket engines.
Proposed Amendment of the INA
The INA was enacted following reports in the mid- and late-1990s that Russia was
assisting Iran in building the Bushehr nuclear power reactor, and providing ballistic
missile assistance to Iran. There are differing views on the effectiveness of the INA in
changing Russia’s behavior (see below and CRS Report RS22072). The INA’s potential

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effect on the ISS is more clear-cut, and on July 12, 2005, the Bush Administration
formally submitted a proposal to Congress to amend the INA to allow NASA to purchase
Russian goods and services for the ISS by changing the definition of “extraordinary
payments.” Section 7(1) of the INA now defines this as:
The term “extraordinary payments in connection with the International Space
Station” means payments in cash or in kind made or to be made by the United States
Government —
(A) for work on the International Space Station which the Russian Government
pledged at any time to provide at its expense; or
(B) for work on the International Space Station, or goods or services relating to human
space flight, that are not required to be made under the terms of a contract or other
agreement that was in effect on January 1, 1999, as those terms were in effect on such
date.
The proposed amendment would delete subsection (B). Thus the prohibition would
apply only to payments for work Russia previously agreed to provide at its own expense,
which would not include the use of Soyuz (or any successor vehicle) by U.S. astronauts
beyond those covered by the Balance Agreement. (Subsection B also states “or goods and
services relating to human space flight.” There are differences of opinion as to whether
that broadens the effect of the INA to implementation of the Vision.)
The justification provided to Congress on July 12, 2005 by NASA Administrator
Griffin stated that the proposed amendment would “maintain key existing U.S.
nonproliferation tools.” It specifies that the proposed amendment leaves the first five
sections of the INA intact (those that establish reporting requirements to Congress),
particularly a ban on U.S. payments in connection with the ISS to any persons (including
entities) subject to sanctions under the INA or Executive Order 12938.
The amendment would affect future contracts with the Russian space agency, leaving
other aspects of the INA in place. In its report on the INA (H.Rept. 106-315, Pt. 1), the
House International Relations Committee recognized the impact of Section 6 on future
contracts, but believed it was “warranted by the magnitude of the threat to international
peace and security posed by continued proliferation of weapons technology to Iran from
Russia.” Further, the committee hoped that “that this section will give the Russian Space
Agency more incentive than it has had in the past to seek to prevent transfers to Iran....”
In August 2005, the State Department reported: “While some progress has been
made, Russian entities continued ... to supply sensitive missile-applicable items,
technology, and expertise to missile programs in India, Iran, and China ....”3

Congressional Action
On May 20, 2005, the House passed the FY2006 Department of Defense
authorization bill including a sense of Congress statement that the INA has been a
“critical tool in preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their associated
3 U.S. Department of State. Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation
and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments. August 30, 2005. p. 107. Available at
[http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/52113.pdf].

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delivery systems to Iran” and it “should not be weakened by creating exceptions to
requirements of such Act to serve lesser policy priorities” (H.R. 1815, Sec. 1211). Some
interpreted that latter phrase as a reference to the ISS program.
By contrast, Representative Dana Rohrabacher, who helped draft Section 6 of the
INA, stated at a June 28, 2005 House Science Committee hearing that the strategy
embodied in the INA “has not worked.” During markup of the FY2006-2007 NASA
authorization act (H.R. 3070) by the House Science Committee on July 14, 2005, Mr.
Rohrabacher offered and withdrew an amendment similar to that proposed by the
Administration. He argued that the Clinton and Bush Administrations had not properly
implemented the INA because they offered just the stick, and not “a carrot approach to
the Russians to get them to cease their cooperation with the Iranians. Unfortunately, that
cooperation on that nuclear power project is over now and the Russians have completed
their contribution” (H.Rept. 109-173, p. 182). A House Science Committee press release
following the markup said that the Science Committee was working with the House
International Relations Committee on the INA issue. It quoted House Science Committee
Chairman Boehlert as saying that the final NASA authorization bill that is sent to the
President for signature must address the INA issue, “but I have no idea at this point what
that resolution will be.” [http://www.house.gov/science/press/109/109-110.htm].
The Bush Administration proposed its amendment as a provision in NASA
authorization legislation or “another appropriate legislative vehicle.” Neither the House-
nor Senate-passed versions of the NASA authorization bill (H.R. 3070/S. 1281) contains
the amendment. On September 21, 2005, the Senate passed S. 1713 (Lugar) that would
allow NASA to make payments in cash or in kind to Russia to meet U.S. obligations
under the ISS international agreements until January 1, 2012, and add reporting
requirements. A similar bill (H.R. 4003, Paul) was introduced in the House.

Issues
Several issues may arise during consideration of the Bush Administration’s
amendment. A first order question is whether Section 6 of the INA has served its
nonproliferation purpose. While some Members such as Mr. Rohrabacher conclude that
it has not worked (see above), others support INA as a whole and do not wish to see it
weakened. Several bills in the 109th Congress that would tighten sanctions on Iran have
attracted broad support, suggesting there is little sentiment in Congress to unwind any
U.S. sanctions on Iran. H.R. 282, for example, which promotes a policy of regime change
for Iran and closes some loopholes in the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, has 318 co-sponsors.
Some may argue that if the Russians have, in fact, “completed their contributions” to
Iran’s nuclear program, as Mr. Rohrabacher states, then the President should make the
determinations required by the law, and amending the act would be unnecessary.
A second set of questions deal with the impact of the INA on future U.S. utilization
of the ISS. Debate is ongoing about what NASA should do on the ISS. Although it was
designed primarily as a research laboratory in space, and a broadly-based research agenda
was planned, President Bush directed NASA to limit its research on the ISS to only that
which is needed to implement his Vision. However, some in Congress want to restore the
broadly-based research program planned prior to the Vision. That view is illustrated in the
House- and Senate-passed versions of the NASA authorization bill (H.R. 3070/S. 1281).
The answer to what research should be conducted on the ISS is an important element of

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determining whether it is critical for NASA to have its astronauts on the ISS for long
duration missions between 2006 and 2010, or to have any astronauts there after 2010.
Another consideration is potential damage to U.S. international standing if the United
States fails to meet its commitments to ISS partners, or intentionally suspends its ability
to launch astronauts into space for several years. Senators Hutchison and Bill Nelson
have a pending amendment to the FY2006 Department of Defense authorization bill (S.
1042) expressing the sense of Congress about the importance of uninterrupted U.S.
preeminence in human space flight, noting that China and Russia can launch astronauts
(Congressional Record, pp. S.8638-40).
Some in Congress may want to modify the Bush Administration’s proposed INA
amendment. As proposed by the Bush Administration, NASA would be allowed to
purchase whatever goods and services it needs for the ISS (and other human space flight
activities). This would allow maximum flexibility in meeting NASA’s needs, including
those for transporting both crews and cargo to and from the ISS. The primary limit would
be how much funding NASA has available for purchases, and how much Russia charges.
From 1994-1998 (pre-INA), NASA paid Russia approximately $800 million through
several contracts for space station-related activities. Some may want to place limits on
what could be purchased, how much could be spent, what Russian entities could receive
the money, or the length of time the restrictions would be lifted. There is some concern,
for example, that Russia might charge exorbitant prices if it is the only source for the
needed services. Russian space officials routinely complain that the Russian space
program is underfunded, and are actively seeking funds to build a replacement for the
Soyuz (called Kliper). Others worry that NASA or its supporters may lose some of the
drive to build the new CEV expeditiously if they know Russian spacecraft can be used
instead. Another concern is that buying services from Russia could undercut U.S.
companies interested in developing commercial services to support the ISS.
Among possible options would be to limit payments only to crew-related flights, not
cargo. Another approach could be to limit it to crew-related flights associated with the
ISS program, but not for implementing the Vision. Alternatively, crew-related purchases
could be limited only to time periods when NASA is unable to launch its own crews
because the shuttle is grounded and the CEV is not available. Or the number of missions
per year, or in total, could be limited. Imposing such limits could be costly in terms of
negotiating with the Russians. For example, a block buy of a dozen flights could be less
expensive than buying one or two at a time.
Another option could be to lift restrictions only for a certain number of years.
Among the examples are to limit it to one or two years, enabling Congress to revisit the
issue in a comparatively short period of time to see whether Russia is adhering to U.S.
nonproliferation objectives, and to react to any changes in NASA’s program. Or a time
limit could be based on the lifetime of the shuttle (through 2010), assuming that the CEV
will be available soon thereafter. If it were not, the issue could be reconsidered at that
time. NASA currently hopes to have the CEV available in 2012, which is another
potential time limit (as in S. 1713). Or the restrictions could be lifted through 2016, the
most recent date NASA officials have suggested for when they expect to complete their
utilization of the ISS. Such limitations could negatively affect the price Russia may
charge for its services, however.

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