Order Code 98-379
Updated September 22, 2005
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Statutory Offices of Inspector General:
Past and Present
Frederick M. Kaiser
Specialist in American National Government
Government and Finance Division
Summary
Statutory offices of inspector general (OIGs) consolidate responsibility for audits
and investigations within a federal agency. Established by public law as permanent,
nonpartisan, independent offices, they are authorized in more than 60 establishments and
entities, including all departments and largest agencies, along with numerous boards and
commissions. Under two major enactments — the Inspector General Act of 1978 and
amendments of 1988 — inspectors general (IGs) have been granted substantial
independence and powers to carry out their mandate to combat waste, fraud, and abuse.1
Recent laws have added offices in agencies, funding for special operations, and law
enforcement powers to OIGs in establishments. Other initiatives call for a term of office
for the IGs, removal only for “cause,” reporting to Congress on their initial budget
request, and various mechanisms to oversee the recovery and reconstruction programs
in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. This report will be updated as events require.
Responsibilities. IGs have three principal responsibilities under the Inspector
General Act of 1978:
! conducting and supervising audits and investigations relating to the
programs and operations of the establishment;
1 5 U.S.C. Appendix directly covers all but six statutorily authorized OIGs, which operate under
similar but distinct guidelines: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); Office of the Director for
National Intelligence (ODNI), where the Director has full discretion in setting it up; Special
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR); along with three legislative brach entities
(i.e., Government Printing Office (GPO), Library of Congress (LOC), and U.S. Capitol Police).
See President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency, A Strategic Framework, 2005-2010 (2004)
at [http://www.ignet.gov]; Frederick M. Kaiser, “The Watchers’ Watchdog: The CIA Inspector
General,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, vol. 3, 1989, pp. 55-75;
Paul C. Light, Monitoring Government: Inspectors General and the Search for Accountability
(Washington: Brookings, 1993); Government Accountability Office, Inspectors General: Office
Consolidation and Related Issues, GAO Report GAO-02-575 (August 2002); and U.S. Congress,
House Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, 25th Anniversary of the Inspector General Act
and Improving IG Functionality and Independence, hearings (Washington: GPO, 2003 and 2004).
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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! providing leadership and coordination and recommending policies for
activities designed to promote the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness
of such programs and operations, and preventing and detecting fraud and
abuse in such programs and operations; and
! providing a means for keeping the establishment head and Congress fully
and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the
administration of such programs and operations, and the necessity for and
progress of corrective action.
Authority and Duties. To carry out these purposes, IGs have been granted broad
authority to: conduct audits and investigations; access directly all records and information
of the agency; request assistance from other federal, state, and local government agencies;
subpoena information and documents; administer oaths when taking testimony; hire staff
and manage their own resources; and receive and respond to complaints from agency
employees, whose confidentiality is to be protected. In addition, the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 gave law enforcement powers to criminal investigators in offices headed by
presidential appointees. Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, moreover,
some IG staff were redeployed to assist in airline security and in terrorist investigations.
Notwithstanding these powers and duties, IGs are not specifically authorized to take
corrective action themselves. Along with this, the Inspector General Act prohibits the
transfer of “program operating responsibilities” to an IG. The rationale here is that it
would be difficult, if not impossible, for IGs to audit or investigate programs and
operations impartially and objectively if they were directly involved in carrying them out.
Reporting Requirements. IGs also have reporting obligations with regard to
findings, conclusions, and recommendations for corrective action. These include
reporting: (1) suspected violations of federal criminal law directly and expeditiously to
the Attorney General; (2) semiannually to the agency head, who must submit the IG report
(along with his or her comments) to Congress within 30 days; and (3) “particularly serious
or flagrant problems” immediately to the agency head, who must submit the IG report
(with comments) to Congress within seven days. The CIA IG must also report to the
Intelligence Committees if the Director or Acting Director of the CIA is the focus of an
investigation or audit.
By means of these reports and “otherwise,” IGs are to keep the agency head and
Congress fully and currently informed. Other means of communication include testifying
at congressional hearings; meeting with Members and staff of Congress; and responding
to congressional requests for information and reports.
Independence. In addition to having their own powers (e.g., to hire staff and issue
subpoenas), the IGs’ independent status is reinforced in a number of other ways:
protection of their budgets, qualifications on their appointment and removal, prohibitions
on interference with their activities and operations, a proscription on operating
responsibilities, and self-determination of their audits and investigations, except when
required by law.
Appropriations. Presidentially appointed IGs in the larger federal agencies have
a separate appropriations account (a separate budget account in the case of the CIA) for

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their offices. This prevents agency administrators from limiting, transferring, or
otherwise reducing IG funding once it has been specified in law.
Appointment and Removal. Under the Inspector General Act, IGs are to be
selected without regard to political affiliation and solely on the basis of integrity and
demonstrated ability in accounting, auditing, financial and management analysis, law,
public administration, or investigations. The CIA IG, who operates under a different
statute, is to be selected under these criteria as well as prior experience in the field of
foreign intelligence and in compliance with the security standards of the agency.
Presidentially nominated and Senate-confirmed IGs can be removed only by the President.
When so doing, he must communicate the reasons to Congress. However, IGs in the
(usually) smaller, designated federal entities are appointed by can be removed by the
agency head, who must notify Congress in writing when exercising the power. In the U.S.
Postal Service, by comparison, the governors appoint the inspector general, one of only
two IGs with a set term (7 years). The other is in the Capitol Police (5 years), who is
appointed by and can be removed by the Capitol Police Board. The USPS inspector
general is also the only one with the qualification that he or she can be removed only “for
cause” and then only by the written concurrence of at least seven of the nine governors.
Supervision. IGs serve under the “general supervision” of the agency head,
reporting exclusively to the head or to the officer next in rank if such authority is
delegated. With but a few specified exceptions, neither the agency head nor the officer
next in line “shall prevent or prohibit the Inspector General from initiating, carrying out,
or completing any audit or investigation, or from issuing any subpoena during the course
of any audit or investigation.”
Under the IG Act, the heads of only five agencies — the Departments of Defense,
Homeland Security, Justice, and Treasury, plus the U.S. Postal Service — may prevent
the IG from initiating, carrying out, or completing an audit or investigation, or issuing a
subpoena and then only for specified reasons: to preserve national security interests or
to protect on-going criminal investigations, among others. When exercising this power,
the department head must transmit an explanatory statement for such action to the House
Government Reform Committee, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs Committee, and other appropriate congressional panels within 30 days. Under the
CIA IG Act, the Director may similarly prohibit the inspector general from conducting
investigations, audits, or inspections and then must notify the House and Senate
Intelligence Committees of the reasons for such action within seven days.
Coordination and Controls. Several presidential orders have been issued to
improve coordination among the IGs and provide a means for investigating charges of
wrongdoing by the IGs themselves and other top echelon officers. In 1981, President
Ronald Reagan established the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE) to
coordinate and enhance efforts at promoting integrity and efficiency in government
programs and to combat waste, fraud, and abuse (E.O. 12301). Chaired by the Deputy
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the PCIE is composed of the existing
statutory IGs plus other officials from relevant agencies. In 1992, the concept was
extended to IGs in designated federal entities, through of a parallel Executive Council on
Integrity and Efficiency (ECIE). Both PCIE and the ECIE now operate under E.O. 12805,
issued by President George H.W. Bush in 1992. A separate Intelligence Community
Inspectors General Forum — a coordinative body of the inspectors general from the IC

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agencies along with observers from the FBI and several Defense units — has been
instituted in the meantime.
Investigations of alleged wrongdoing by IGs themselves or other high-ranking
officials in an office of inspector general (under the IG act) are conducted by a special
Integrity Committee, composed of PCIE and ECIE members and chaired by the FBI
representative (E.O. 12993, issued by President Clinton in 1996). If deemed warranted,
the panel refers complaints to be investigated to an executive agency with appropriate
jurisdiction, usually the FBI, or a special investigative unit composed of council members.
Establishment. Statutory offices of inspector general been authorized in 62
current federal establishments and entities, including all 15 cabinet departments; major
executive branch agencies; independent regulatory commissions; various government
corporations and boards; and three legislative branch agencies. All but six of the OIGs
— in GPO, LOC, Capitol Police, CIA, ODNI, and the Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction (SIGIR) — are directly and explicitly under the 1978 Inspector General
Act. Each office is headed by an inspector general, who is appointed in one of two ways:
(1) 30 are nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate in the federal
establishments, including all departments and the larger agencies (Table 1).
(2) 32 are appointed by the head of the entity in the 27 designated federal entities
— usually smaller boards and commissions — and in five other units, where
the IGs operate under separate but parallel authority: SIGIR, ONDI, and three
legislative agencies (i.e., GPO, LOC, and Capitol Police) (Table 2).
Table 1. Statutes Authorizing Inspectors General Nominated by the
President and Confirmed by the Senate, 1976-Present
(current offices are in bold)a
Year
Statute
Establishment
1976
P.L. 94-505
Health, Education, and Welfare (now Health and Human Services)
1977
P.L. 95-91
Energy
1978
P.L. 95-452
Agriculture, Commerce, Community Services Administration,b
Housing and Urban Development, Interior, Labor,
Transportation, Environmental Protection Agency, General
Services Administration, National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, Small Business Administration, Veterans
Administration (now the Veterans Affairs Department)
1979
P.L. 96-88
Education
1980
P.L. 96-294
U.S. Synthetic Fuels Corporationb
1980
P.L. 96-465
Statec
1981
P.L. 97-113
Agency for International Developmentd
1982
P.L. 97-252
Defense
1983
P.L. 98-76
Railroad Retirement Board
1986
P.L. 99-399
U.S. Information Agencyb,c
1987
P.L. 100-213
Arms Control and Disarmament Agencyb,c
1988
P.L. 100-504
Justice,e Treasury, Federal Emergency Management Administration,b,f
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Personnel Management
1989
P.L. 101-73
Resolution Trust Corporationb
1989
P.L. 101-193
Central Intelligence Agencya

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Year
Statute
Establishment
1993
P.L. 103-82
Corporation for National and Community Service
1993
P.L. 103-204
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
1994
P.L. 103-296
Social Security Administration
1994
P.L. 103-325
Community Development Financial Institutions Fundb
1998
P.L. 105-206
Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administrationg
2000
P.L. 106-422
Tennessee Valley Authorityh
2002
P.L. 107-189
Export-Import Bank
2002
P.L. 107-296
Homeland Securityf
a. All except the CIA IG are directly under the 1978 Inspector General Act, as amended.
b. CSA, Synfuels Corporation, USIA, ACDA, RTC, CDFIF, and FEMA have been abolished or transferred.
c. The State Department IG had also served as the IG for ACDA. In 1998, P.L. 105-277 transferred the
functions of ACDA and USIA to the State Department and placed the Broadcasting Board of
Governors and the International Broadcasting Bureau under the jurisdiction of the State IG.
d. The Inspector General in AID may also conduct reviews, investigations, and inspections of the Overseas
Private Investment Corporation (22 U.S.C. 2199(e)).
e. In 2002, P.L. 107-273 expanded the jurisdiction of the Justice OIG to cover all department components,
including DEA and the FBI.
f. P.L. 107-296, which established the Department of Homeland Security, transferred FEMA’s functions
to it and also granted law enforcement powers to OIG criminal investigators in establishments.
g. The OIG for Tax Administration in Treasury now is the only case where a separate statutory OIG exists
within an establishment or entity that is otherwise covered by its own statutory office.
h. P.L. 106-422, which re-designated TVA as an establishment, also created, in the Treasury Department,
a Criminal Investigator Academy to train IG staff and an Inspector General Forensic Laboratory.
Table 2. Designated Federal Entities and Other Agencies with
Statutory IGs Appointed by the Head of the Entity or Agency
(current offices are in bold)a
ACTIONb
Interstate Commerce Commissionf
Amtrak
Legal Services Corporation
Appalachian Regional Commission
Library of Congressaj
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System National Archives and Records Administration
Board for International Broadcastingc
National Credit Union Administration
Coalition Provisional Authority (in Iraq)a
National Endowment for the Arts
Commodity Futures Trading Commission
National Endowment for the Humanities
Consumer Product Safety Commission
National Labor Relations Board
Corporation for Public Broadcasting
National Science Foundation
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Office of the Director of National Intelligenceak
Farm Credit Administration
Panama Canal Commissiong
Federal Communications Commission Peace
Corps
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporationd
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
Federal Election Commission
Securities and Exchange Commission
Federal Home Loan Bank Boarde
Smithsonian Institution
Federal Housing Finance Boarde
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstructiona
Federal Labor Relations Authority
Tennessee Valley Authorityh
Federal Maritime Commission
United States Capitol Policeaj
Federal Trade Commission
United States International Trade Commission
Government Printing Officea
United States Postal Servicei

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a. All these agencies — except SIGIR , CIA, ODNI, GPO, LOC, and Capitol Police — are considered “designated
federal entities” and placed directly under the 1978 IG Act by the 1988 Amendments and subsequent acts. The
CPA was dissolved in mid-2004 and its IG was converted to SIGIR.
b. In 1993, P.L. 103-82 merged ACTION into the new Corporation for National and Community Service.
c. The BIB was abolished by P.L. 103-236 and its functions transferred to the International Broadcasting Bureau within
USIA, which was later abolished and its functions transferred to the State Department.
d. In 1993, P.L. 103-204 made the IG in FDIC a presidential appointee, subject to Senate confirmation.
e. In 1989, P.L. 101-73 abolished the FHLBB and placed the new FHFB under the 1988 IG Act Amendments.
f. The ICC was abolished in 1995 by P.L. 104-88.
g. The Panama Canal Commission, replaced by the Panama Canal Commission Transition Authority, was phased out,
when United States responsibility for the Canal was transferred to the Republic of Panama (22 U.S.C. 3611).
h. P.L. 106-422 re-designated TVA as a federal establishment.
i. In 1996, the U.S. Postal Service Inspector General was separated from the Chief Postal Inspector and now exists as
an independent position. The IG is appointed by, and can be removed by, the governors.
j. In 2005, the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 2006 (P.L. 109-55) added IGs to LOC, following closely the
IG Act of 1978 as amended, and the Capitol Police, whose IG has specialized requirements.
k. P.L. 108-458 grants the Director of National Intelligence full discretion in creating an OIG in his Office.
Table 3. Tabulation of Existing Federal Establishments,
Entities, or Agencies with IGs Authorized in Law
IGs nominated by President
IGs appointed by head
Controlling statute
Total
and confirmed by Senate
of entity or agency
1978 IG Act,
as amended
29
27
56
Other statutes
1a
5b
6
Total
30
32
62
a. CIA Inspector General.
b. SIGIR, GPO, LOC, U.S. Capitol Police, and ODNI inspectors general.
Recent Initiatives
Response to Hurricane Katrina. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, various
initiatives have arisen to increase OIG capabilities in overseeing the unprecedented funding for
recovery and rebuilding efforts. Several in effect are: the President’s call, echoed by legislators,
for a “team” of IGs or deputies from affected agencies to coordinate their efforts, an additional $15
million for the OIG in Homeland Security (P.L. 109-62), and an official in the DHS office
designated to direct its work. Other proposals, in addition to increasing funds for existing OIGs,
are: setting up a long-term task force or coordinative mechanism of IGs from relevant agencies;
extending the jurisdiction of SIGIR; and creating a similar office of inspector general with
jurisdiction for gulf recovery (H.R. 3737 and H.R. 3810, 109th Congress).
General Proposals. Separate ideas for change include consolidating small OIGs in DFEs
and making the Postal Service IG a presidential appointment (H.R. 22, 109th Congress). Other
plans, advanced to increase the independence and powers of the IGs across the board, recommend:
initial OIG budget submissions to Congress and OMB; removal of an IG only “for cause;” a set
term of office for IGs; the statutory establishment of a Council of Inspectors General for Integrity
and Efficiency, combining and replacing the PCIE and ECIE; and personnel flexibilities for IGs
(H.R. 2489, 109th Congress).

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