Order Code RL33095
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Hurricane Katrina: DOD Disaster Response
September 19, 2005
Steve Bowman
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Lawrence Kapp
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Amy Belasco
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
Hurricane Katrina: DOD Disaster Response
Summary
The issue that has received the most attention in post-Katrina discussions is the
speed of rescue and relief operations. The Department of Defense’s (DOD’s)
Northern Command began its alert and coordination procedures before Katrina’s
landfall; however, many deployments did not reach the affected area until days later.
An examination of the timeline of DOD’s response and the decision points along that
timeline could provide insight into whether the response could have been accelerated
given the intensity of the storm and the extent of the destruction. Both the National
Response Plan and DOD’s own Homeland Security Doctrine lay out extensive
procedures and specific decision points in an attempt to ensure an organized response
to catastrophic incidents. It may now be necessary to examine those procedures and
the actions of responsible authorities to determine whether procedural obstacles,
administrative failures, or both delayed the arrival of needed resources in the affected
area. The traditional assumption that the Department of Defense is the resource of
last resort may also require re-examination.
As with most natural disasters, the role of the National Guard is critical in the
maintenance of civil order, the provision of logistical support, and the coordination
of rescue and relief effort. The National Guard’s ability to respond through the
Emergency Management Assistance Compact may be proven to have been
exemplary, given the extent of regional destruction. Nevertheless, a number of issues
may attract attention. The fact that the National Guard may act under state control
or may be federalized and brought under command of active duty forces at the
President’s discretion creates a decision-point with political, cost, and
coordination/command implications. It is not yet clear the extent to which, if any,
these issues may have affected the speed and quality of response to Katrina. They do,
however, present a core concern in the balance of state and federal control in disaster
situations.
Another issue that has attracted significant attention is the question of whether
the demands of overseas operations in Iraq and Afghanistan in any way affected the
quality of response of both active duty and National Guard forces. Both DOD and
the National Guard have denied any deleterious effect; however, there is some
anecdotal evidence that equipment shortages among National Guard units and the
non-availability of some active duty units could be attributed to overseas deployment
activities. The National Guard’s equipment levels and deployment policies may be
of particular interest, given its dual responsibilities both domestically and overseas.
The Department Defense is currently preparing its Quadrennial Defense review
(QDR) for submission to Congress in early 2006. In examining its roles, missions,
and capabilities, it is likely that the controversies surrounding the federal response
to Katrina will affect DOD’s consideration of its responsibilities and its ability to
execute them. Though Katrina was a natural disaster, many of its effects could be
encountered in an intentional attack. Consequently, “lessons learned” from the
Katrina experience may carry long-term relevance for DOD’s civil support planning.
This report will be updated as events warrant.
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Organization of DOD Civil Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Procedures for Obtaining DOD Civil Support . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Role of the National Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
State Active Duty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
“Title 32” Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Federal Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Activation Statuses: Advantages and Disadvantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
DOD Katrina-Related Appropriations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Timeline of Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Structural or Administrative Failures? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Federalization of the Evacuation/Command of the National Guard . . . . . . 14
Impact of Overseas Deployments on DOD’s Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Impact of Katrina on the Quadrennial Defense Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
List of Figures
Figure 1. Assistance Request Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
List of Tables
Table 1: Activated National Guard Personnel Serving in
Louisiana and Mississippi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Hurricane Katrina: DOD Disaster Response
Introduction
The issue that has received the most attention in post-Katrina discussions is the
speed of rescue and relief operations. The Department of Defense’s Northern
Command began its alert and coordination procedures before Katrina’s landfall,
however many deployments did not reach the affected area until days after. An
examination of the timeline of DOD’s response and the decision points along that
timeline could provide insight into whether the response could have been accelerated
given the intensity of the storm and the extent of the destruction. Both the National
Response Plan and DOD’s own Homeland Security Doctrine lay out extensive
procedures and specific decision points in an attempt to ensure an organized response
to catastrophic incidents. It may now be necessary to examine those procedures and
the actions of responsible authorities to determine whether procedural obstacles,
administrative failures, or both delayed the arrival of needed resources in the affected
area. The traditional assumption that the Department of Defense is the resource of
last resort may also require re-examination. This report examines the existing
disaster response procedures for the Department of Defense and how they were
implemented, the use of the National Guard and its relationship to active duty forces,
funds appropriated to date, and then discusses issues that may receive congressional
consideration
Organization of DOD Civil Support1
Reinforcing a long-standing tradition, Homeland Security Presidential
Directive-5 states:
The Secretary of Defense shall provide military support to civil authorities for
domestic incidents as directed by the President or when consistent with military
readiness and appropriate under the circumstances and the law. The Secretary of
Defense shall retain command of military forces providing civil support. The
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary [of Homeland Security] shall establish
appropriate relationships and mechanisms for cooperation and coordination
between their two departments.
In keeping with the National Response Plan (NRP) and the DOD Joint Doctrine
on Homeland Security, DOD civil support is normally provided only when local,
state, and other federal resources are “overwhelmed”; and it is requested by the Lead
1 Prepared by Steve Bowman, Specialist in National Defense; Foreign Affairs, Defense, and
Trade Division
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Federal Agency responding to an incident or natural disaster.2 This is a fundamental
principle of DOD’s approach to civil support: it is generally a resource of last resort.
The Secretary of Defense has the principal authority for DOD’s provision of
civil support. His office retains approval authority for all requests for assistance from
civilian agencies and retains control of all DOD assets provided. In practice, the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Homeland Defense (ASD/HD) is
delegated supervisory responsibility of the civil support mission area and
coordination with the Department of Homeland Security.3 Within the DOD Joint
Staff, civil support responsibilities reside with the Joint Director of Military Support.
U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) has the operational responsibility for
civil support for most of the United States. It carries out civil support missions with
forces assigned as required from all the armed services, typically through the creation
of a joint task force.4 NORTHCOM has a permanently assigned Joint Interagency
Coordination Group comprising liaison officers from other DOD components and
other federal agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
The official DOD term for civil support is Military Assistance to Civil
Authorities, which is divided into three types of assistance:5
! Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA) generally consists of
support during natural disasters, special security events (e.g., the
Olympics), and man-made incidents (terrorism, oil spills) which
have evoked a presidential or state emergency declaration.
! Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies (MSCLEA)
consists of support provided to a Lead federal Agency (e.g., Federal
Bureau of Investigation, DHS) for activities such as counterterrorism
and counterdrug operations and may include provision of equipment,
training, or expert advice.
! Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances occurs when the President
employs the armed forces to suppress insurrections, riots, or to assist
the states in maintaining law and order. In these situations, the Lead
Federal Agency supported by DOD is the Department of Justice.
The Army Corps of Engineers, however, does not fall under the supervision of
the ASD(HD) or the Northern Command, despite providing extensive civil support
2 National Response Plan, Department of Homeland Security, December 2004. p. 42;
Homeland Security, Joint Publication 3-26. Department of Defense, August 2, 2005. p. IV-
1.
3 This is not the ASD/HD’s sole mission area. The ASD/HD is also responsible for the
Defense Critical Infrastructure Program, DOD domestic antiterrorism and force protection
programs, installation preparedness, and DOD continuity of government programs, among
others.
4 Civil support for incidents in Hawaii and the Pacific territories is provided by U.S. Pacific
Command.
5 DOD Joint Homeland Security Doctrine, pp. IV-4.
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from within DOD. It performs its emergency support activities primarily as an
adjunct to its on-going mission of water navigation maintenance and flood control.
(See also CRS Report RS22238: New Orleans Levees and Floodwalls: Hurricane
Damage Protection.
Procedures for Obtaining DOD Civil Support6
With the exception of circumstances discussed below, unless there is a specific
direction from the President, requests for military assistance must originate from a
Lead Federal Agency, typically the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA), Department of Homeland Security. Requests are submitted to the Office
of the Secretary of Defense, where they are evaluated by the ASD(HD) according to
the following criteria: legality, readiness, lethality, risk, cost, and appropriateness.7
This is to be done on an expedited basis and, once the Secretary of Defense approves
the requests, they are forwarded to the Joint Director of Military Support within the
Joint Staff, who in turn provides the appropriate orders to Northern Command. (See
Figure 1). A Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) is designated and deployed to the
area of the incident. In the case of Katrina, because of the size of the response
required, a Joint Task Force (JTF-Katrina) was established with Lieutenant General
Russel Honore, the DCO, as task force commander. The DCO then serves as the
single point of contact for DOD resources for other government agencies operating
in the incident area, but does not, however, have operational control over the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers or National Guard personnel operating in State Active
Duty or Title 32 status (See, Role of the National Guard). The Corps of Engineers
performs its emergency support under independent flood control authority (P.L. 64-
99), but can and does assist both FEMA and JTF-Katrina under the National
Response Plan.8
6 Prepared by Steve Bowman, Specialist in National Defense; Foreign Affairs, Defense, and
Trade Division
7 Ibid. p. IV-12
8 For more information on Katrina-related Corps of Engineer activities, see CRS Report
RS22238, New Orleans Levees and Floodwalls: Hurricane Damage Protection.
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Figure 1. Assistance Request Procedures
Source: Homeland Security, Joint Publication 3-26, August 2005, Department of Defense
Within the National Response Plan, there are provisions for a “proactive federal
response to catastrophic events.” These provisions are reserved for an event “that
almost immediately exceeds resources normally available to State and local
authorities.” These provisions are contained in the NRP’s Catastrophic Event Annex
and can be implemented only by the Secretary of Homeland Security or his designee.
Such events are to be designated Incidents of National Significance.9 The NRP
specifies the following guiding principles for proactive federal response:
! The primary mission is to save lives; protect critical infrastructure,
property, and the environment; contain the event; and preserve
national security.
! Standard procedures regarding requests for assistance may be
expedited or, under extreme circumstances, suspended in the
immediate aftermath of an event of catastrophic magnitude.
9 National Response Plan, December 2004. p. 43; Catastrophic Annex, p.1
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! Identified Federal response resources will deploy and begin
necessary operations as required to commence life-safety activities.
! Notification and full coordination with States will occur, but the
coordination process must not delay or impede the rapid deployment
and use of critical resources. States are urged to notify and
coordinate with local governments regarding a proactive Federal
response.
! State and local governments are encouraged to conduct collaborative
planning with the Federal Government as a part of “steady-state”
preparedness for catastrophic incidents.
Secretary of Homeland Security Chertoff did not declare Hurricane Katrina an
Incident of National Significance until August 30, the evening after the hurricane
made landfall, making a proactive federal response under the NRP moot.
In addition to the NRP’s provisions for a proactive federal response, the DOD
Joint Homeland Security Doctrine also addresses instances when an “immediate
response” is required of military commanders.
Responses to requests from civil authorities prior to receiving authority from the
President or chain of command are made when immediate support is critical to
save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage. When
such conditions exist and time does not permit prior approval from higher
headquarters, commanders or officials acting under immediate response authority
may take necessary action to respond, but must advise the NMCC [National
Military Command Center] through command channels by the most expeditious
means available and seek approval or additional authorizations.10
One press report has indicated that two weeks prior to Hurricane Katrina,
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld signed a severe weather execution order that gave
Northern Command some authority to respond to potential severe weather incidents
on its own initiative. The details of this order, including the extent of the authority
it conveyed, have not been made public.11 It appears that DOD, through
NORTHCOM, began planning and actually deploying ships and personnel prior to
receiving specific requests from the Department of Homeland Security or its
subordinate, FEMA. NORTHCOM’s first responses to Katrina’s approach began the
week prior to its August 29 landfall. On Wednesday, August 24, NORTHCOM
issued its first warning orders to Regional Emergency Preparedness Officers, State
Emergency Preparedness Officers, and the Senior Army Advisors (Guard) in the
states expected to be affected. The governors of Louisiana and Mississippi declared
states of emergency on August 26 and 27, respectively. President Bush declared a
state of emergency for Louisiana on August 27 and NORTHCOM began to deploy
the forward elements of what was to become Joint Task Force-Katrina (JTF-Katrina).
On Monday, August 29, after Katrina made landfall, President Bush issued a federal
declaration of emergency, and on Tuesday, August 30, JTF-Katrina was officially
activated. That evening, in response to levee breaches and consequent flooding in
10 DOD Joint Homeland Security Doctrine, August 2005, p. IV-3
11 “How the Pentagon Caught Katrina,” U.S. News and World Report, Sept. 26, 2005, p. 2.
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New Orleans, the DHS Secretary declared Katrina an Incident of National
Significance. By Wednesday, August 31, DOD medical airlift operations from the
affected area were underway, and the amphibious assault ship USS Bataan arrived
off New Orleans.12 On Thursday, September 1, the 82nd Airborne Division and 1st
Cavalry Division were placed on alert. The 5,200 troops from these units began
deploying on September 3 and arrived in the area on September 5. By September 6,
a second amphibious assault ship, the USS Iwo Jima and the aircraft carrier USS
Truman had also arrived. By September 7, DOD assets in the affected area included
42,990 National Guard personnel, 17,417 active duty personnel, 20 U.S. ships, 360
helicopters, and 93 fixed wing aircraft.13
Role of the National Guard14
The National Guard is descended from the colonial militias15 which existed prior
to the adoption of the Constitution. With the adoption of the Constitution, the federal
government acquired authority to organize, arm, and discipline the militia, and to call
the militia into federal service in order to execute the laws of the Union, to suppress
insurrection, and to repel invasion.16 Additionally, federal laws passed in the early
20th century designated part of the militia — now called the National Guard — as a
federal reserve of the Army17, thereby enhancing federal authority over the Guard in
certain respects.18 As a result of this history, the National Guard is neither a purely
12 A Wasp class amphibious assault ship like the USS Bataan resembles a small-aircraft
carrier in appearance and typically embarks 2,000 U.S. Marines, a variety of transport
helicopters, and has a 600 patient medical capacity.
13 U.S. Northern Command Press Release, September 7th, 2005.
14 Prepared by Lawrence Kapp, Specialist in National Defense; Foreign Affairs, Defense,
and Trade Division
15 The colonial militia concept, which was derived from a longstanding English tradition and
which required every able bodied white male to participate in the common defense of his
town or locality, was the backbone of colonial military power. Gradually, as the colonial
population grew and military threats waned, a distinction arose between the unorganized
militia (those members of the militia who were potentially liable for military service but
who did not actively participate in military training) and the organized militia (those
members of the militia who regularly trained for war and who responded first to military
threats).
16 See U.S. Constitution, Article I, Section 8, clauses 15 and 16, and Article II, Section 2,
clause 1.
17 Later, with the advent of the Air Force, the National Guard was organized into a land
force (the Army National Guard of the United States) that was a federal reserve of the Army
and an air force (the Air National Guard of the United States) that was federal reserve of the
Air Force. They are distinct from the Army Reserve and the Air Force Reserve, which are
purely federal entities, as are the Naval Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, and Coast Guard
Reserve. The Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard have no National Guard components.
18 The most significant pieces of legislation in this transformation were the Dick Act of 1903
and the National Defense Acts of 1916 and 1920.
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state nor a purely federal organization. Rather, it is both a state and federal
organization.
State Active Duty
Normally, the National Guard operates under the control of state and territorial
governors.19 In response to disasters and civil disorders, governors can order
National Guard personnel to perform full-time duty, commonly referred to as “state
active duty.”20 In this state capacity, National Guard personnel operate under the
control of their governor, are paid according to state law, can perform typical disaster
relief tasks21 and are not subject to the restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act (that
is, they can perform law enforcement functions).22 National Guard personnel called
to assist with disaster relief operations for Hurricane Katrina were originally called
to duty in a state active duty status by their respective governors. Interstate
agreements allowed National Guard personnel from states outside the hurricane
affected area to deploy to Louisiana and Mississippi and assist with disaster relief.23
19 The National Guard of the United States is made up of 54 separate National Guard
organizations: one for each state, and one each for Puerto Rico, Guam, the U.S. Virgin
Islands, and the District of Columbia. While the District of Columbia National Guard is an
exclusively federal organization and operates under federal control at all times, the other 53
National Guards operate as state or territorial organizations most of the time. In this
capacity, each of these 53 organizations is identified by its state or territorial name (e.g. ,the
California National Guard or the Puerto Rico National Guard), and is controlled by its
respective governor.
20 Historically, this authority has been used most frequently in response to natural disasters
such as hurricanes, earthquakes, forest fires, floods, etc. It has also been used to quell
domestic violence and to control or disperse crowds. Additionally, in the aftermath of the
September 11th terrorist attacks, a number of governors called up members of the National
Guard to protect critical infrastructure in their states, such as nuclear power plants, water
treatment facilities, and bridges, from potential terrorist attacks.
21 For example, search and rescue, clearing roads, delivering supplies, and providing medical
assistance.
22 The Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. 1385), along with other related laws and
administrative provisions, prohibits the use of the military to execute civilian laws unless
expressly authorized by the Constitution or an act of Congress. Congress has made a
number of exceptions to the act which permit military involvement in law enforcement. For
example, Congress has enacted a number of statutes which authorize the President to use
military forces to suppress insurrections and domestic violence (10 U.S.C. 331-335). If
these statutes were to be invoked, the President could use active or reserve components to
put down a rebellion or to control domestic violence. Another important exception relates
to the Coast Guard, which Congress has vested with broad law enforcement authority.
Under these statutory provisions, the Coast Guard and Coast Guard Reserve can participate
in the enforcement of maritime, customs, and certain other federal laws. For more
information on the Posse Comitatus Act see CRS Report RS20590, The Posse Comitatus Act
& Related Matters: A Sketch, and CRS Report RS22266, The Use of Federal Troops for
Disaster Assistance: Some Legal Issues.
23 The response from other states under such agreements has been unprecedented. As of
September 7, 2005, National Guard personnel from all fifty states, Puerto Rico, and the U.S.
(continued...)
CRS-8
By September 3, there were more out-of-state National Guard personnel serving in
Louisiana and Mississippi than there were from those states’ own National Guards.
(See Table 1 for a summary of National Guard force levels in Louisiana and
Mississippi). These out-of-state National Guard personnel remained on state active
duty in their respective home states after arriving in Louisiana and Mississippi and
received the pay and benefits provided by their home state’s laws, but were placed
under the operational control of the governors of Louisiana and Mississippi.
“Title 32” Status
Another way in which National Guard personnel can be activated and remain
under the control of their governor is under the authority of 32 U.S.C. 502(f). This
provision of federal law provides that “a member of the National Guard
may...without his consent, but with the pay and allowances provided by law...be
ordered to perform training or other duty in addition to [inactive duty for training or
annual training].” The advantage of using this authority is that the National Guard
personnel called will receive federal pay and benefits and are entitled to certain legal
protections24 as though they were in federal service, but they remain under the control
of their governor and are therefore not subject to the restrictions of the Posse
Comitatus Act. This is the provision of law which was used to provide federal pay
and benefits to the National Guard personnel who provided security at many of the
nation’s airports in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
Shortly after Katrina, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, Lieutenant
General Blum, reportedly asked the Secretary of Defense to approve the retroactive
transfer of all National Guard personnel participating in Katrina-related disaster relief
operations from state active duty to duty under Title 32. The purpose of this request
was to equalize pay and benefits for all National Guard personnel rather than having
their compensation based on disparate state and territorial laws. On September 7,
Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England signed a memorandum
approving the use of federal funds “for use of the National Guard in Title 32 U.S.
Code status to support Hurricane Katrina disaster relief efforts retroactive to August
23 (...continued)
Virgin Islands had joined in the relief effort. Some interstate agreements are negotiated
state to state; others occur under the umbrella of the Emergency Management Assistance
Compact (EMAC). For more information on EMAC, See CRS Report RS21227 Emergency
Management Assistance Compact. The EMAC website is [http://www.emacweb.org].
24 Specifically, they are entitled to protection under the Uniformed Services Employment
and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), but are not always covered by the
Servicemembers’ Civil Relief Act (SCRA). SCRA does cover members of the National
Guard for “service under a call to active service authorized by the President or the Secretary
of Defense for a period of more than 30 consecutive days under Section 502(f) of Title 32,
United States Code, for purposes of responding to a national emergency declared by the
President and supported by Federal funds” (P.L. 108-189, Sec. 101(2)(A)(ii), codified at 50
U.S.C. App. 511). Those not covered by the SCRA may, however, receive civil liability
protection from state or territorial laws.
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29, 2005.”25 It therefore appears likely that all of the National Guard personnel
participating in the Katrina relief operations will be converted from state active duty
to Title 32 status, although it is unclear how long it will take to implement this
transition.26
Federal Status
National Guard personnel can also be activated in a purely federal status. For
example, under 10 U.S.C. § 12304, the President can call up to 200,000 members of
the National Guard (and other reserve components) into federal service if he
determines it necessary “to augment active forces for any operational mission.” In
this federal status, National Guard personnel operate under the control of the
President, receive federal pay and benefits, and can perform typical disaster relief
tasks. However, in this status they generally are subject to the restrictions of the
Posse Comitatus Act: that is, they cannot perform law enforcement functions unless
expressly authorized by the Constitution or an act of Congress. However, such
express authorizations are contained in the Insurrection Act (10 U.S.C. §§ 331-335),
which allows the President to call the militia (which includes the National Guard)27
into federal service for certain purposes, including the suppression of insurrection
against a state government, at the request of that government (10 U.S.C. § 331), the
enforcement of federal laws and suppression of rebellion against the authority of the
United States (10 U.S.C. §332), and the prevention of interference with state and
federal laws, if that interference deprives a class of people of rights, privileges,
immunities, or protections named in the Constitution (10 U.S.C. § 333).28 Similar
authority is contained in 10 U.S.C. § 12406, which permits the President to call
members and units of the National Guard into federal service to repel invasion,
suppress rebellion, or execute the laws of the United States. Orders for this type of
call up must be transmitted through the appropriate governor.
25 Gordon England, Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense, “Memorandum for Secretary of
the Army, Acting Secretary of the Air Force; Subject: Hurricane Katrina Relief Efforts,”
September 7, 2005.
26 Additionally, it should be pointed out that compensation under state law may be more
beneficial to some National Guard personnel than compensation under federal law. These
individuals may object to such a change in status.
27 10 U.S.C. § 311 states “(a) the militia of the United States consists of all able-bodied
males at least 17 years of age and, except as provided in section 313 of title 32, under 45
years of age who are, or who have made a declaration of intention to become citizens of the
United States and of female citizens of the United States who are members of the National
Guard. (b) The classes of the militia are - (1) the organized militia, which consists of the
National Guard and the Naval Militia; and (2) the unorganized militia, which consists of
members of the militia who are not members of the National Guard or the Naval Militia.”
28 According to one news account, Administration officials considered invoking the
Insurrection Act and calling National Guard personnel into federal service, but decided
against it for several reasons. Eric Lipton, Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, “Political Issues
Snarled Plans for Troop Aid,” New York Times, September 9, 2005, p. 1.
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Activation Statuses: Advantages and Disadvantages
Each of these activation authorities have advantages and disadvantages when
dealing with disasters. Under state active duty and Title 32 activations, governors
retain control over their National Guard personnel, which is consistent with
principles of federalism and the traditional role of state governors in responding to
disasters. Moreover, duty in these statuses pose no obstacle to the use of National
Guard personnel in a law enforcement capacity. However, in the case of catastrophic
events involving multiple jurisdictions and levels of government, state control of the
National Guard can potentially interfere with the effective coordination and
utilization of resources. Federalizing National Guard forces, on the other hand, could
increase the efficiency of a major disaster response effort; however, it would do so
by stripping state governors of one of their most valuable emergency response assets.
Additionally, calling National Guard personnel into federal service requires that they
either refrain from acting in a law enforcement capacity, or that the President invoke
statutory exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act, which might be inflammatory.
In an effort to eliminate some of these trade-offs, Congress revised the statutes
governing National Guard officers called into federal service in the National Defense
Authorization Act for FY2004 (P.L. 108-106). Prior to this revision, all National
Guard personnel called to full-time duty in the active military service of the United
States were automatically relieved from duty in the National Guard of their state.
Section 516 provided an exception to this general rule for certain National Guard
officers called to active duty. As the conference report explained, the provision
would:
...allow officers of the Army or Air National Guard, called to active duty for the
purpose of commanding a unit composed of both active duty and reserve
component personnel, to retain and exercise their Army or Air National Guard
state commissions if authorized by the President and the governor. Such National
Guard officers would have the authority to command subordinate active duty
personnel by virtue of their own active duty status and also retain the authority
to command National Guard personnel in a nonfederal status.29
In testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Unconventional Threats and Capabilities last March, Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Homeland Security Paul McHale described how this authority had been used:
But utilizing a recent statutory provision, beginning at the G-8 summit, but then
again at the Democratic convention, the Republican convention, and Operation
Winter Freeze along the Canadian border, a single National Guard officer — one
man — was given a dual-hatted command. He was placed in Title 32 status to
command the Title 32 forces. He was placed simultaneously in Title 10 status
under the command and control of the combatant commander so that unity of
29 H.Rept. 108-354, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Conference
Report to Accompany HR 1588, November 7, 2003, p. 688.
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effort could be achieved, even though we maintained the distinction in terms of
unity of command.30
According to one report, a variation of this model — with an active duty officer
being sworn into the Louisiana Guard, rather than a Louisiana National Guard officer
being called to active duty — was advanced by the Administration in its discussions
with the governor of Louisiana but she rejected it. “In a separate discussion last
weekend,” the article stated, “the governor also rejected a more modest proposal for
a hybrid command structure in which both the Guard and active-duty troops would
be under the command of an active-duty, three-star general — but only after he had
been sworn into the Louisiana National Guard.”31 It is not yet clear whether the lack
of a unified command over both National Guard and DOD active duty personnel has
affected Katrina-related military operations.
Table 1: Activated National Guard Personnel Serving in
Louisiana and Mississippi
Date
Number Serving in Louisiana
Number Serving in Mississippi
National
National
Louisiana
Mississippi
Guard
Guard
National
National
Personnel
Total
Personnel
Total
Guard
Guard
from Other
from Other
Personnel
Personnel
States
States
August 30
5,804
178
5,982
3,822
16
3,838
August 31
5,804
663
6,467
3,822
1149
4,971
September 1
5,804
2,555
8,359
3,823
2,861
6,684
September 2
6,779
5,445
12,224
3,823
3,719
7,542
September 3
6,779
10,635
17,432
3,823
6,314
10,137
September 4
6,779
12,404
19,183
4,017
9,399
13,416
September 5
6,779
16,162
22,941
4,017
10,999
15,016
September 6
6,779
20,510
27,289
4,023
11,095
15,118
September 7
6,779
22,589
29,368
4,023
11,388
15,411
September 8
6,779
23,476
30,255
4,023
11,506
15,529
Source: Data extracted from slides to briefing entitled “Hurricane Katrina Update Brief 101000
September 2005,” National Guard Bureau. (Military date-time group cited in briefing title means
10:00 AM, September 10, 2005)
30 Paul McHale, Assistant Secretary, Homeland Defense, Department of Defense, Hearing
on Department of Defense Homeland Security Responsibilities before the House Armed
Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities, March 15,
2005.
31 Eric Lipton, Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, “Political Issues Snarled Plans for Troop
Aid,” New York Times, September 9, 2005, p. 1.
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DOD Katrina-Related Appropriations32
Between the two enacted supplementals, DOD has received $1.9 billion,
including $500 million in P.L. 109-61 and $1.4 billion in P.L. 109-62, to pay for
emergency evacuation of DOD personnel and repair at some 20 affected installations.
According to initial estimates, the monies will be used as follows:
! $960 million to make emergency repairs to DOD facilities;
! $370 million to evacuate and support 44,000 military personnel, and
32,000 DOD civilians;
! $570 million to pay to mobilize and support about 44,000 national
guard personnel for 45 days.33
FEMA reimburses DOD separately for its help in rescue and relief operations,
estimated at about $4.6 billion thus far.34
Damage at defense installations ranges from minor problems with roofs and
fences to wholesale damage to facilities in New Orleans and Mississippi. Three of
the damaged facilities — Naval Supply Activity in New Orleans, the Army
ammunition plant in Mississippi, and Naval Station, Pascagoula, Mississippi — are
on the base closure list that the President submitted to Congress on September 15,
2005.
The second Katrina supplemental, P.L. 109-62, also permits DOD to transfer up
to $6 million to cover the costs for residents who were evacuated from the U.S.
Naval Home in Mississippi, a retirement home for certain retired military personnel,
to the U.S. Soldiers’ and Airmen’s Home in Washington, D.C.
The DOD funds are appropriated to Operation and Maintenance, Defensewide,
set up as a transfer account where DOD can move monies to other accounts,
depending on the type of expense (e.g., to pay military personnel costs, operating
costs, procurement, family housing, and Defense Health). Funds that turn out not to
be needed may be returned to the account and then transferred elsewhere.
The appropriators approved the amount requested in both supplementals, but
added language that requires that the Armed Services and Appropriations
Committees in both the House and Senate be notified in writing within five days of
when and where funds are transferred. This requirement is important to clairfy which
funds in the various accounts are for hurricane-related expenses as opposed to those
for military operations and regular peacetime activities.
32 Prepared by Amy Belasco, Specialist in National Defense; Foreign Affairs, Defense, and
trade Division
33 DOD fact sheet, September 7, 2005 and Congress Daily.
34 Senate Budget Committee, Budget Bulletin, Sept. 12, 2005, [http://budget.senate.gov/
republican/analysis/2005/bblatest.pdf].
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Issues for Congress35
Timeline of Response
The issue that has attracted the most attention in post-Katrina discussions has
been the speed of rescue and relief operations. As noted, NORTHCOM began its
alert and coordination procedures significantly before Katrina’s landfall and the
subsequent levee breaches. It is not yet clear exactly when DHS/FEMA first
requested DOD assistance or what was specifically requested. From press releases
and reports to date, it appears that DOD made its own assessments of what resources
would be useful and began moving towards deployment prior to or shortly after
Katrina’s landfall. However, it was not until after the presidential declaration of a
federal emergency on August 30, and the declaration of an Incident of National
Significance on August 31, that many deployments began. This is in keeping with
the National Response Plan and DOD’s Homeland Security Doctrine, though it may
have slowed arrival of needed DOD assets in the affected region. Another factor that
affected deployments is simply that most relief assets must be kept out of the storm’s
path until it passes to avoid their own destruction. It is possible, however, that an
earlier and phased deployment could have brought assets closer to the affected region
in a more timely fashion. Relief assets’ approach was also slowed to some extent by
damage to airports/airbases, highways, and the concern about underwater
obstructions in the New Orleans Port area. Even after the activation of JTF-Katrina
on August 30, DOD’s response appears incremental, responding to an increasingly
deteriorating situation. The hospital ship USS Comfort was not dispatched from
Baltimore until August 31. Additional active duty ground forces (82nd Airborne, 1st
Cavalry) did not begin deploying until September 3, arriving on September 5. Again,
transportation challenges in the affected area may have played some role in slowing
these troops’ arrival. Until there is a better understanding of the timing and content
of any presidential directives and of the specific requests DHS/FEMA or local
authorities made to DOD, it is not possible to make a definitive assessment of DOD’s
timeliness in responding.
Structural or Administrative Failures?
Congress may wish to examine whether the shortcomings in Katrina relief
efforts are the result of structural problems with federal and agency disaster
plans/doctrines, the failure of administrative officials to execute effectively, or both.
Are the National Response Plan and DOD’s Joint Homeland Security Doctrine too
“procedure-bound,” with too many decision points and approvals required? Or were
provisions for expediting responses inadequately utilized? With regard to DOD
particularly, the fundamental principle that it is almost always a supporting agency
and the resource of last resort may serve to encourage a reactive rather than proactive
mode of operation. This principle exists because, for DOD, disaster relief is
secondary to its primary mission of national defense, and there has been a traditional
concern that any greater emphasis on essentially civilian or non-military operations
35 Prepared by Steve Bowman, Specialist in National Defense; Foreign Affairs, Defense, and
Trade Division
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would detract from its preparedness for its primary mission. Nevertheless, absent the
development of greater civilian capabilities in disaster response, the expectation will
remain that DOD will provide substantial, if not massive, assistance in instances of
catastrophic disasters. Current doctrine requires that state, local, and other federal
agencies be “overwhelmed” before DOD resources are requested. The question then
arises, whether the agencies and authorities that have been overwhelmed are indeed
capable of making the incident assessments and informed resource requests
necessary to obtain DOD assistance.
In assessing the response to Katrina, one of the more difficult tasks is
determining what are reasonable expectations in the face of a disaster of
unprecedented scale. What shortcomings in relief efforts could have been avoided
with better planning and execution, and what were simply unavoidable given, for
instance, the regional destruction of communication and transportation
infrastructure? Another consideration is the question of predictability. Though many
sources have predicted the possibility or probability of a hurricane with Katrina’s
effect on this region (and on New Orleans in particular), repeated warnings followed
by “near misses” over the years may have contributed to a less proactive response to
warnings about Katrina’s predicted effect on this occasion.
Federalization of the Evacuation/Command of the National
Guard
There has been considerable discussion of Louisiana Governor Blanco’s refusal
to permit DOD’s JTF-Katrina to assume control of the evacuation efforts and to
assume command of the National Guard personnel in Louisiana. This controversy
has highlighted the possible political element in the conduct of relief operations. If
state authorities wish to retain control of the National Guard, which may be the
largest resource at their command, at what point can or should presidential authority
be invoked to override state authority?
What is not clear to date is exactly what effect retention of state control of
National Guard personnel had upon the conduct of relief operations. Have the
National Guard and JTF-Katrina been able to coordinate their efforts? What
operations could have been executed more expeditiously with a unified command
structure? The answers to these questions may provide guidance for future
operations; however, it is noteworthy that command coordination is often highly
dependent upon the personalities and relationship of the relevant commanders.
Impact of Overseas Deployments on DOD’s Response
It has been suggested that the substantial overseas deployments in Iraq and
Afghanistan affected the ability of both the National Guard and active duty forces to
carry out relief operations. This contention has been repeatedly denied by both the
DOD and National Guard leadership.36 Though DOD has sought to focus this
question on the number of personnel that remained available for relief operations,
36 Department of Defense Press Briefings, August 31, September 6, 2005,
[http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/archive.html]
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there is anecdotal evidence that, particularly for the National Guard, the issue
centered more upon the availability of equipment rather than personnel. It has been
DOD’s practice to have many units that deploy to Iraq leave their equipment in Iraq
when they return so that it can be used by subsequent units. As a result, for example,
it has been reported that National Guard units responding to Katrina did not have
adequate numbers of tactical radios or High Mobility Multi-Wheeled Vehicles
(HMMWVs) adapted for high water operations because this equipment was in Iraq.
Another example noted is that of the 101st Air Assault Division, based in Ft.
Campbell, KY. This division, which has the largest number of transport helicopters
of any Army unit, was not deployed to Katrina operations because it is in the process
of deploying to Iraq.37
Impact of Katrina on the Quadrennial Defense Review
The Department of Defense is in the midst of the Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR), a congressionally-mandated examination of the Department’s roles, missions,
and capabilities. The controversies surrounding the adequacy of the federal response
to Katrina are expected to have an effect on DOD’s consideration of its
responsibilities and capabilities with regard to catastrophic incidents. Though
Katrina was a natural disaster, many of its effects could be encountered as a result of
an intentional attack (e.g., destruction of communication, transportation, and flood
control infrastructures; mass casualties; or civil unrest). With the QDR not due to
Congress until February, there will be ample time to apply at least initial “lessons
learned” from Katrina. With the likelihood that DOD leadership will continue to
maintain its emphasis on overseas operations as the primary mission for active duty
forces, it is the future role, structure, force-level and equipping of the National Guard
that may receive the most attention as a result of Katrina’s demand upon DOD
resources.
It has been suggested before that the National Guard be reorganized to focus on
domestic missions. In preparation of the 1997 QDR, Army leadership suggested
reducing the combat role of National Guard units and stressing support functions
(e.g,. logistics, communications, military police, and engineers). This was strongly
opposed by the National Guard Bureau, and the recommendation was not included
in the final QDR. In 2000, one of the recommendations of the United States
Commission on National Security/21st Century (Hart-Rudman Commission) was to
reduce the National Guard’s emphasis upon potential overseas combat deployments
and increase its attention to domestic incident capabilities. This was again opposed
by the National Guard leadership, which continued to defend the importance of
maintaining its combat capabilities.38 This argument by the Guard has received
substantial support from DOD’s evidenced need to use substantial numbers of
National Guard troops in Iraq.
37 “Military Lacked Critical Gear In responding to Katrina,” Newhouse.Com, Sept. 13,
2005; “Behind Poor Katrina Response, A Long Chain of Weak Links,” Wall Street Journal,
Sept. 6, 2005, p. 1.
38 “Katrina Likely to Fuel Debate Over Guard’s Combat, Homeland Defense Roles,” Inside
Defense, Sept. 9, 2005.
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Regardless of whether civil support remains a responsibility divided between
active duty and National Guard forces, it is likely that questions of personnel levels
and equipping for both elements of the armed services will be addressed. It will then
be necessary to determine what level of investment will be required to meet civil
support expectations. Though the study of Katrina relief operations may have an
effect on QDR recommendations, it will be necessary to examine to what extent the
demands of such an extraordinary catastrophic event should be used as baseline
guidance.
The extent of the resources needed to deal with the consequences of Hurricane
Katrina, on top of the requirements for combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan,
raises the question of what resources would be available in the event of another
almost simultaneous catastrophic event. Though some have suggested that a disaster
like Katrina increases potential vulnerability to opportunistic terrorist attack, the
approach of Hurricane Ophelia along the eastern seaboard shortly after Katrina’s
strike demonstrates the potential for sequential natural disasters. It could be useful
to examine what resources were marshalled in response to the threat of Hurricane
Ophelia, and how these efforts were affected by on-going operations on the Gulf
Coast.