Order Code RL32488
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Venezuela: Political Conditions
and U.S. Policy
Updated August 24, 2005
Mark P. Sullivan
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

---

Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S. Policy
Summary
Under populist President Hugo Chávez, first elected in 1998, Venezuela has
undergone enormous political changes, with a new constitution, a new unicameral
legislature, and even a new name for the country, the Bolivarian Republic of
Venezuela. Chávez was re-elected President with a new six-year term in July 2000
under the new constitution. Although Chávez remained widely popular until mid-
2001, his popularity eroded considerably after that, amid concerns that he was
imposing a leftist agenda on the country and that his government was ineffective in
improving living conditions. In April 2002, massive opposition protests and pressure
by the military led to the ouster of Chávez from power for a brief period. The
military restored him to power, but political opposition to his rule continued. From
December 2002 until February 2003, the opposition orchestrated a general strike that
curtailed Venezuela’s oil exports, but was unsuccessful in getting President Chávez
to agree to new elections. After months of negotiations facilitated by the OAS and
the Carter Center, the Chávez government and the opposition signed an agreement
in May 2003 to resolve the crisis. This led to an August 15, 2004, presidential recall
referendum that Chávez won convincingly by a margin of 59% to 41%.
Chávez’s rule was further strengthened when his allies won a majority of
gubernatorial and municipal posts in elections held in October 2004. The country’s
next presidential elections are set for late 2006, and there is a strong chance that
Chávez could win another six-year term. The Chávez government has benefitted
from the rise in world oil prices, which has increased government revenues, and
sparked an economic growth rate of 18% for 2004. Some observers are concerned
that Chávez is using his political strength to push toward authoritarian rule.
The United States traditionally has had close relations with Venezuela, but there
has been friction in relations with the Chávez government, and in 2005,
Administration officials have used increasingly strong language to express concerns
about President Chávez’s actions in Venezuela and in Latin America. A dilemma for
U.S. policymakers has been how to press the Chávez government to adhere to
democratic principles without taking sides in Venezuela’s polarized political conflict.
Some observers have expressed concerns that a more aggressive approach could
create further estrangement in the bilateral relationship. Since Venezuela is the fourth
major supplier of foreign oil to the United States, a key U.S. interest has been
ensuring the continued flow of oil exports. Despite friction in U.S.-Venezuelan
relations and despite past threats by President Chávez to stop selling oil to the United
States, Venezuela has remained a steady supplier of oil to the United States.
In the 109th Congress, there has been legislative action on several initiatives on
Venezuela. The Senate-passed version of H.R. 3057 would provide up to $2 million
in FY2006 for democracy programs in Venezuela. The House-passed version of H.R.
2601 would authorize $9 million for each of FY2006 and FY2007 for democracy
programs in Venezuela. H.R. 2601 would also authorize funds for U.S.-government
broadcasting to Venezuela. Finally, with regard to the human rights situation in
Venezuela, H.Con.Res. 224 (Fortuno) calls on the Venezuelan government to uphold
the human rights and civil liberties of the people of Venezuela.

---

Contents
Political Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Chávez’s Brief Ouster in April 2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Continued Opposition and Strike in 2002 and 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
August 2004 Presidential Recall Referendum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Background Leading to the Referendum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Referendum Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Political Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Human Rights Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Economic Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
U.S. Policy
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Tensions Increase in 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Policy Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
U.S. Funding for Democracy Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Oil Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Counternarcotics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Concerns About Venezuela’s Involvement in Latin America . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Venezuela’s Extradition Requests
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Legislative Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
108th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
109th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
List of Figures
Figure 1. Map of Venezuela . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

---

Venezuela:
Political Conditions and U.S. Policy
Political Situation
Background
With his election as President in December 1998, Hugo Chávez began to
transform Venezuela’s political system. The watershed election, in which former
coup leader Chávez received 56% of the vote (16% more than his closest rival),
illustrated Venezuelans’ rejection of the country’s two traditional parties, Democratic
Action (AD) and the Social Christian party (COPEI), that had dominated Venezuelan
politics for much of the past 40 years. Elected to a five-year term, Chávez was the
candidate of the Patriotic Pole, a left-leaning coalition of 15 parties, with Chávez’s
own Fifth Republic Movement (MVR) the main party in the coalition.
Most observers attribute
Chávez Biography
Chávez’s rise to power to
Venezuelans’ disillusionment
Hugo Chávez Frias was born on July 28, 1954, in
a small farming town in the western Venezuelan state of
with politicians whom they
Barinas. The son of school teachers, Chávez was a 1975
judge to have squandered the
graduate of Venezuela’s Military Academy. He reached
country’s oil wealth through
the rank of lieutenant colonel by 1990. In February
poor management and endemic
1992, Chávez led an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow
corruption. A central theme of
the elected government of President Carlos Andres
Perez. He was imprisoned for two years for the coup
his campaign was constitutional
attempt before being pardoned. While in the military,
reform; Chávez asserted that the
Chávez founded the nationalistic and left-leaning
system in place allowed a small
Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement, which was later
elite class to dominate Congress
transformed into the Fifth Republic Movement in the
and that revenues from the
1998 elections when Chávez was first elected president.
state-run oil company, Petroleos
Source: Current Leaders of Nations, Gale Group. May
de Venezuela (PdVSA), had
20, 2004.
been wasted.
Although Venezuela had one of the most stable political systems in Latin
America from 1958 until 1989, after that period numerous economic and political
challenges plagued the country and the power of the two traditional parties began to
erode. Former President Carlos Andres Perez, inaugurated to a five-year term in
February 1989, initiated an austerity program that fueled riots and street violence in
which several hundred people were killed. In 1992, two attempted military coups
threatened the Perez presidency, one led by Chávez himself, who at the time was a
lieutenant colonel railing against corruption and poverty. Ultimately the legislature
dismissed President Perez from office in May 1993 on charges of misusing public
funds, although some observers assert that the President’s unpopular economic

---

CRS-2
reform program was the real reason for his ouster.1 The election of elder statesman
and former President Rafael Caldera as President in December 1993 brought a
measure of political stability to the country, but the Caldera government soon faced
a severe banking crisis that cost the government more than $10 billion. While the
macro-economy began to improve in 1997, a rapid decline in the price of oil brought
about a deep recession beginning in 1998.
Under President Chávez, Venezuela has undergone enormous political changes,
with a new constitution in place and even a new name for the country, the Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela, named after the 19th century South American liberator Simon
Bolivar, whom Chávez often invokes. In 1999, Venezuelans went to the polls on
three occasions — to establish a constituent assembly that would draft a new
constitution, to elect the membership of the 165-member constituent assembly, and
to approve the new constitution — and each time delivered victory to President
Chávez. The new document revamped political institutions, eliminating the Senate
and establishing a unicameral National Assembly, and expanded the presidential term
of office from five to six years, with the possibility of immediate re-election for a
second term. Under the new constitution, voters once again went to the polls in July
2000 for a so-called mega-election, in which the President, national legislators, and
state and municipal officials were selected. President Chávez easily won election to
a new six-year term, capturing about 60% of the vote while his opponent, fellow
former coup leader Francisco Arias, received 38%; Chávez’s term will expire in
January 2007. Chávez’s Patriotic Pole coalition also captured 14 of 23 governorships
and a majority of seats in the National Assembly.
From the outset, critics raised concerns about Chávez and his government. They
fear that he is moving toward authoritarian rule and point to his domination of most
government institutions. Some argue that Chávez has replaced the country’s
multiparty democracy with a political system that revolves around himself, in essence
a cult of personality; others point to Chávez’s open admiration of Fidel Castro and
close relations with Cuba as a disturbing sign. Other observers express concern
about the increased role of the military in the government, with Chávez appointing
dozens of retired and active duty officers to key positions, as well as the mobilization
of thousands of army reservists for social projects. Still other critics of Chávez
believe that he is trying to politicize the educational system by making changes to
school curriculums. They fear Chávez’s call for his followers to form political cells
in schools, hospitals, and businesses in order to support his revolution and believe
that such groups, known as Bolivarian circles, could mirror Cuba’s controversial
neighborhood committees.2
1 For example, see M. Delal Baer, “Revenge of the Venezuelan Dinosaurs,” Wall Street
Journal, June 18, 1993.
2 For example, see William S. Prillman, “The Castro in Caracas: Venezuelan Strongman
Hugo Chávez, in Fidel’s Image,” National Review, April 3, 2003; Stephen Johnson,
“Venezuela Erupting,” National Review, March 5, 2004.

---

CRS-3
Chávez’s Brief Ouster in April 2002
Although President Chávez remained widely popular until mid-2001, his
standing eroded considerably after that, amid concerns that he was imposing a leftist
agenda on the country and that his government was ineffective in improving living
conditions in Venezuela. In late 2001 and early 2002, opposition to Chávez’s rule
grew into a broad coalition of political parties, unions, and business leaders. Trade
union opposition became stronger amid the President’s attempt to replace the
Venezuelan Workers Confederation (CTV) with a pro-government union. President
Chávez’s own Fifth Republic Movement also became plagued with internal dissent.
In April 2002, massive opposition protests and pressure by the military led to
the ouster of Chávez from power for a brief period. However, he ultimately was
restored to power by the military. Chávez was ousted from office on April 11, 2002,
after protests by hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans and the death of at least18
people. Venezuelan military leaders expressed outrage at the massacre of unarmed
civilians and blamed President Chávez and his supporters. On April 12, Pedro
Carmona of the country’s largest business association — the Federation of
Associations and Chambers of Commerce and Industry (Fedecamaras) — proclaimed
himself interim president, but Carmona quickly lost the support of the military when
he took such hardline measures as dismantling the National Assembly, firing the
Supreme Court, and suspending the Constitution. Carmona stepped down just a day
after he took office, paving the way for Chávez’s return to power early in the
morning of April 14. The interim government’s hardline polices as well as strong
support in the streets from Chávez supporters convinced military commanders to
back Chávez’s return. Moreover, some military factions had continued to support
Chávez during his ouster.
Continued Opposition and Strike in 2002 and 2003
After Chávez’s return to power, some 40 disparate opposition groups united in
a coalition known as the Democratic Coordinator (CD) in an effort to remove Chávez
from office, focusing on efforts to hold him accountable for the death of civilian
protestors in April 2002 and to push for a national referendum on his presidency.
The CD demanded a non-binding referendum on Chávez’s rule in early February
2003, which they believed would force the President to resign, but Venezuela’s
Supreme Court ruled against holding such a referendum. President Chávez
maintained that, according to the constitution (Article 72), a binding referendum on
his rule could take place after the halfway point of his term, which would occur in
August 2003.
From early December 2002 until early February 2003, the CD orchestrated a
general strike that severely curtailed Venezuela’s oil exports and disrupted the
economy but was unsuccessful in getting President Chávez to agree to an early non-
binding referendum on his rule or new elections. At various junctures, there were
violent clashes between Chávez supporters and the opposition, resulting in several
deaths. The Chávez government responded to the oil sector strike by firing 13,000-
16,000 PdVSA employees.

---

CRS-4
August 2004 Presidential Recall Referendum
After months of negotiations facilitated by the OAS and the Carter Center, the
government of Hugo Chávez and the opposition signed an agreement on May 29,
2003, that set forth mechanisms to help resolve the political crisis. Implementation
of the accord was difficult at times and hampered by political polarization between
supporters and opponents of President Chávez. Nevertheless, Venezuela’s National
Electoral Council (CNE) announced on June 8, 2004, that a presidential recall
referendum would be held on August 15, 2004. Chávez won the referendum
convincingly by a margin of 59.3% to 40.7%, according to the CNE’s final official
results.3
Background Leading to the Referendum. For a recall referendum to take
place, the constitution required a petition signed by 20% of registered voters (which
means 2.4 million signatures out of a registry of 12.3 million). Petition signatures
were collected during a four-day period beginning in late November 2003, but on
March 2, 2004, the CNE ruled that there were only 1.83 million valid signatures
supporting a presidential recall referendum. The CNE subsequently updated this to
1.91 million valid signatures, with almost 1.2 million signatures that could be valid
if individuals confirmed their signatures in a reparo or “repair” period. This meant
that about 525,000 signatures of those under review would need to be validated for
a referendum to be required. The CNE’s announcement that there were not yet
enough valid signatures for a referendum prompted strong opposition protests, but
the opposition ultimately agreed to participate in a repair period that was held May
27-31, 2004, in more than 2,600 centers around the country. About 100 observers
from the OAS and the Carter Center monitored the repair period; President Carter
reported that the overall process was peaceful and orderly, although he did note some
initial concern about the temporary suspension of the CNE’s tabulation process.4
On June 3, 2004, the CNE announced that enough signatures had been secured
for a recall referendum, and subsequently scheduled the referendum for August 15.
The date of the referendum was significant because under the constitution, if it were
held after August 19 (one year after the half-way point of Chávez’s term) and Chávez
lost the referendum, then Vice President Jose Vicente Rangel (a Chávez ally) would
serve the remainder of the President’s term until January 2007.
In order for President Chávez to be recalled, the majority of voters needed to
vote “yes” and the number of votes to recall him needed to exceed the number that
he received when last elected in July 2000 (3.75 million). If Chávez had been
recalled, new presidential elections would have been held within 30 days. It was
unclear whether President Chávez would have been allowed to run for re-election,
but most observers believed that the Supreme Court would have ruled that he was
eligible to run. One of the problems that plagued the opposition was that it did not
have a well-organized or coherent political coalition. As a result, it could have been
3 “CNE Emitió Resultados Oficiales Del Referendo Revocatorio Presidencial,” Consejo
Nacional Electoral, August 26, 2004.
4 “President Carter’s Trip Report on Venezuela, May 29-June 1, 2004,” The Carter Center,
June 4, 2004.

---

CRS-5
difficult for the opposition to present a single candidate who could have defeated
Chávez in new elections, assuming that he was permitted to run.
Public opinion polls conducted in June and July 2004 by various survey firms
yielded significantly different results, with some favoring the opposition and some
favoring Chávez, but by early August 2004 a number of polls showed Chávez with
an advantage. A June 2004 poll by Datanálisis, a Venezuelan research firm, showed
that 57% of Venezuelans would vote to recall President Chávez, while another poll
in June by the U.S.-based Greenberg, Quinlan, Rosner Research firm found that only
44% would vote to recall the president.5 Another poll by North American Opinion
Research Inc. published in early July 2004 showed that 41% would vote to recall
Chávez, compared to 57% favoring the president.6 A poll in late July by the U.S.
firm of Evans/McDonough and Varianzas Opinión of Venezuela showed that 43%
would vote against Chávez and 51% would vote for him.7 In early August, a
newspaper that has been a strong opposition supporter, Ultimas Noticias, published
four polls showing that Chávez would win by at least 10%.8 Some observers,
however, maintained that many people were not being truthful in these opinion polls
because of fear of retribution for answering truthfully; they maintained that these so-
called “hidden voters” could determine the outcome of the referendum.9
Referendum Results. With a turnout of about 70% of registered voters,
President Chávez won the recall referendum convincingly with 5.80 million people
voting “no” to reject his recall, or 59.25% of the vote, and 3.989 million people, or
40.74%, voting “yes” in favor of his recall.10 Observers from the OAS and the Carter
Center maintained that these results were compatible with their own quick count
results. The opposition claimed that massive fraud had taken place and cited their
exit polls showing that 59% had voted to recall President Chávez.11 The Carter
Center and the OAS conducted a second audit of the vote on August 19-21 and
concluded that the vote results announced by the CNE reflect the will of the
Venezuelan people.12
On August 26, 2004, the OAS approved a resolution expressing “satisfaction
with the holding of the presidential recall referendum” and calling “upon all players
to respect the results.” In the resolution, the OAS also welcomed the offer made by
5 “Battle of the Polls is Engaged,” Latin American Weekly Report, July 6, 2004.
6 “Venezuela’s Recall Referendum,” BBC Worldwide Monitoring, July 8, 2004.
7 “A Poll of Polls,” Miami Herald, August 11, 2004.
8 “Chávez on Course for Victory,” Latinnews Daily, August 9, 2004.
9 Steven Dudley, “Chávez Recall Vote Confounds Pollsters,” Miami Herald, August 11,
2004.
10 “CNE Emitió Resultados Oficiales Del Referendo Revocatorio Presidencial,” Consejo
Nacional Electoral, August 26, 2004.
11 Andy Webb-Vidal, “Auditing of Chávez Vote Begins as Fraud Allegations Multiply,”
Financial Times, August 20, 2004.
12 Last Phase of the Venezuelan Recall Referendum: Carter Center Report (English and
Spanish), Carter Center, August 21, 2004.

---

CRS-6
President Chávez “to foster national dialogue” and called “for a process of
reconciliation ... in which differences are settled in the framework of the democratic
systems and in a spirit of transparency, pluralism, and tolerance.”13
There are various factors that explain President Chávez’s victory in the recall
referendum. The economy, fueled by proceeds from high oil prices, turned around
in 2004. The president was able to use oil proceeds to boost social spending for the
poor. He made anti-poverty programs an important focus of his administration.
Another factor has been the strength of the opposition. As noted above, the
opposition in Venezuela has been fragmented and did not wage an effective
campaign during the recall referendum. Even if it had won the referendum, it was
unclear whether it would have been able to present a single candidate to challenge
Chávez in a subsequent election.
Political Conditions
Even before the recall referendum, some analysts maintained that the vote
would not necessarily resolve Venezuela’s political conflict, which has been fueled
by high levels of political polarization between supporters and opponents of
President Chávez. According to this view, dialogue, inclusion, and the advancement
of national reconciliation will be the keys needed to alleviate political conflict in the
country, regardless of the referendum’s outcome.14 In the aftermath of Chávez’s
victory in the recall referendum, many observers maintain that efforts toward political
reconciliation — by both the government and the opposition — will be the key to
returning political stability to the country.
Chávez’s rule was further strengthened when his allies won a majority of
gubernatorial and municipal posts in elections held in late October 2004. Legislative
elections will take place in December 2005, and it is expected that pro-Chávez parties
will gain more seats in the 165-member National Assembly. The country’s next
presidential elections are set for December 2006, and there is a strong chance that
Chávez could win another six-year term. Chávez’s current popularity rating is 70%,
among the highest of any leader in Latin America.15 The government has benefitted
from the rise in world oil prices, which has increased government revenues, and
sparked an economic boom. As a result, Chávez has been able to increase
government expenditures on anti-poverty and other social programs associated with
the populist agenda of President Chávez’s Bolivarian revolution.
Human Rights Concerns. U.S. officials and international human rights
organizations have expressed concerns about the deterioration of democratic
13 Organization of American States, Permanent Council. “Results of the Presidential Recall
Referendum Held in Venezuela on August 15, 2004,” CP/RES. 869 (1436/04), Adopted
August 26, 2004.
14 For example, see Marifeli Pérez-Stable, “Venezuela: Only Dialogue Can Restore
Shattered Trust,” Miami Herald, June 10, 2004.
15 Juan Forero, “Venezuela: Chávez Popularity at 70 Percent,” New York Times, May 3,
2005.

---

CRS-7
institutions and threats to freedom of speech and press in Venezuela under the
Chávez government.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) issued a report in
March 2004 expressing concerns about the growing concentration of power in the
executive branch of government, the tendency to militarize public administration,
attacks and intimidation against human rights activists and organizations, and the
government’s tendency to confront and disparage the political opposition and its
constant attacks on journalists and the media. While Venezuela has vigorous print
and electronic media, the IACHR report maintained that draft legislation (ultimately
enacted in December 2004) on what the Chávez government called “social
responsibility” in radio and television could severely constrain the full exercise of
freedom of expression.
Other groups such as the Committee for the Protection of Journalists and
Reporters Without Borders have expressed concerns about President Chávez’s
condemnation of Venezuela’s private press and attacks against journalists during
street protests. Human Rights Watch issued a public letter to President Chávez
documenting the use of torture and excessive force against protestors that occurred
in late February and early March. Amnesty International issued a report in May 2004
criticizing the Venezuelan security forces’ excessive use of force and the ill-treatment
and torture of detainees.
In the aftermath of Chávez’s victory in the August 2004 recall referendum, some
observers are concerned that Chávez will use his political strength to push toward
authoritarian rule. Human Rights Watch asserted in mid-December 2004 that the
Chávez government has dealt a severe blow to judicial independence by packing the
Supreme court under a new law that expands the court from 20 to 32 justices. It
maintains that President Chávez and his supporters are rigging the judicial system in
order to assert political control over the court.16 Critics of Chávez also fear that a
new media law enacted in early December will permit the government to censor news
reports of protests or government crackdowns.17 Some maintain that the new laws
already have led to self-censorship by private television channels.18 Human rights
groups also expressed concern in March 2005 when the Chávez government amended
Venezuela’s criminal code by broadening laws that punish “disrespect for
government authorities.” The groups fear that the change could thwart the ability of
the press to criticize the government and to monitor government actions.19 Some
other observers assert that freedom of the press and assembly thrive in Venezuela,
and they doubt that the Chávez government would censor the press. They also
16 “Venezuela: Chávez Allies Pack Supreme Court,” Human Rights Watch, December 14,
2004.
17 Juan Forero, ‘Venezuela Chief Signs Pres Law Some See as Aimed at His Critics,” New
York Times, December 9, 2004.
18 Danna Harman, “Latin Strongman Rebels Against U.S.-Centric News,” Christian Science
Monitor, May 13, 2005.
19 “Venezuela: Curbs on Free Expression Tightened,”Human Rights Watch, March 24, 2005.

---

CRS-8
maintain that allegations of threats to Venezuelan judicial independence are grossly
exaggerated.20
Economic Conditions
Venezuela’s major economic sector is petroleum, which accounts for one-third
of its gross domestic product and 80% of exports. While the country is classified by
the World Bank as an upper middle income developing country because of its
relatively high per capita income of $3,490 (2003), economic conditions in the
country have deteriorated over the past decade. The percentage of Venezuelans
living in poverty (income of less than $2 a day) increased from 32.2% to 48.5% of
the population between 1991 and 2000, while the percentage of the population in
extreme poverty (income of less than $1 a day) increased from 11.8% in 1990 to
23.5% in 2000.21
In 2002-2003, the country’s political instability and polarization between the
government and the opposition contributed to a poor investment climate, capital
flight, and declines in GDP. The national strike orchestrated by the opposition from
late 2002 to early 2003 contributed to a contraction of the national economy by
almost 9% in 2002 and 7.7% in 2003.
The economy rebounded in 2004, however, with a growth rate over 17.3%
fueled by the windfall in international oil prices. The forecast for 2005 is for a
growth rate of 6.9%. Given this positive outlook, the Chávez government is
expected to move ahead with economic goals that fit into his “Bolivarian revolution.”
These include land reform, renegotiation of contracts with large foreign investors
(especially in the petroleum sector), the restructuring of operations at the state oil
company, and diversification of trade and investment partners.22 As noted above, the
government is using the windfall in oil profits to boost social spending and programs
to fight poverty.
U.S. Policy
Although the United States has traditionally had close relations with Venezuela,
characterized by an important trade and investment relationship and cooperation in
combating the production and transit of illegal narcotics, there has been friction and
tension in relations with the Chávez government. In the aftermath of the September
11 terrorist attacks, U.S. officials became far less tolerant of President Chávez’s anti-
American rhetoric.
After Chávez’s brief ouster in April 2002, the United States expressed solidarity
with the Venezuelan people, commended the Venezuelan military for refusing to fire
20 Mark Weisbrot, “U.S. Criticism of Chávez Unfounded,” Miami Herald, December 20,
2004.
21 World Bank, “Venezuela Country Brief,” August 2004.
22 Economist Intelligence Unit, “Venezuela Country Report,” August 2005.

---

CRS-9
on peaceful demonstrators, and maintained that undemocratic actions committed or
encouraged by the Chávez administration provoked the political crisis.23 With
Chávez’s return to power, the United States called on President Chávez to heed the
message sent by the Venezuelan people by correcting the course of his administration
and “governing in a fully democratic manner.”24 In contrast, many Latin American
nations condemned the overthrow of Chávez, labeling it a coup. Venezuelan
allegations of U.S. involvement in the attempted overthrow of President Chávez have
contributed to strained relations. U.S. officials have repeatedly rejected the charges
that the United States was involved.25 In the aftermath of Chávez’s temporary ouster,
the Department of State’s Office of the Inspector General undertook a review of U.S.
policy toward Venezuela and concluded that the Department of State had not played
any role in President Chávez’s overthrow.26
The Bush Administration expressed strong support for the work of the OAS to
bring about a resolution to the crisis. With U.S. support, the OAS approved a
resolution on December 16, 2002, that rejected any attempt at a coup or interruption
of the constitutional democratic order in Venezuela, fully supported the work of the
Secretary General in facilitating dialogue, and urged the Venezuelan government and
the Democratic Coordinator “to use good faith negotiations to bring about a
constitutional, democratic, peaceful, and electoral solution...” Beginning in January
2003, the United States joined with five other nations — Brazil, Chile, Mexico,
Spain, and Portugal, in establishing a group known as the “Friends of Venezuela” —
to lend support to the OAS Secretary General’s efforts. U.S. officials welcomed the
May 2003 accord ultimately signed, and maintained that the United States would
continue to work to facilitate a peaceful, constitutional, democratic, and electoral
solution to Venezuela’s political impasse.
Comments by Venezuelan and some U.S. officials at times exacerbated tensions
in the bilateral relationship. In the lead-up to the “repair” period held in late May
2004, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roger Noriega
maintained that it was already clear that “the requisite number of people supported
the [recall] petition.”27 Venezuelan Vice President Jose Vicente Rangel strongly
criticized Noriega’s statement as prejudging the outcome of the “repair” period.
President Chávez, who has often used anti-American rhetoric to shore up his
domestic support, maintains that President Bush will be his greatest rival in the recall
23 U.S. Dept. of State, “Venezuela: Change of Government,” Press Statement, Apr. 12, 2002.
24 U.S. Dept. of State, International Information Programs, “White House Calls on
Venezuela’s Chávez to Preserve Peace, Democracy,” Washington File, Apr. 14, 2002.
25 U.S. Dept. of State, International Information Programs, Washington File, “U.S. Again
Rejects Charges of Meddling in Venezuelan Affairs,” April 19, 2004.
26 U.S. Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Office of Inspector
General, “A Review of U.S. Policy Toward Venezuela November 2001 — April 2002,”
Report Number 02-OIG-003, July 2002.
27 David R. Sands, “U.S. Casts Wary Eye on Venezuela Vote; Action Promised if Vote is
Rigged,” Washington Times, May 26, 2004.

---

CRS-10
referendum, and that the United States would “govern” in Venezuela if the
opposition wins the recall referendum and subsequent election.28
After the August 2004 recall referendum, the Administration congratulated the
Venezuelan people for their commitment to democracy and commended the work of
the OAS and Carter Center. At the same time, U.S. officials stressed the importance
of reconciliation on the part of the government and the opposition in order to resolve
their political differences peacefully.
Tensions Increase in 2005
In 2005, however, Administration officials have voiced increasing concern
about President Chávez, and tensions have increased in U.S.-Venezuelan relations,
with elevated rhetoric on both sides. Assistant Secretary of State for Western
Hemisphere Affairs Roger Noriega testified to Congress on March 9 that President
Chávez’s “efforts to concentrate power at home, his suspect relationship with
destabilizing forces in the region, and his plans for arms purchases are causes of
major concern.” Noriega asserted that the United States “will support democratic
elements in Venezuela so they can fill the political space to which they are
entitled.”29 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld expressed concerns on March 23
about Venezuela’s plan to buy 10 military helicopters and 100,000 AK-47 rifles from
Russia and questioned why Venezuela needs the weapons.30 U.S. officials have also
expressed concerns about Venezuela’s plans to buy patrol boats and military
transport aircraft from Spain as well as a decision by Venezuela in April 2005 to
cancel a U.S.-Venezuelan bilateral military exchange program.
On May 31, 2005, President Bush met with Maria Corina Machado, the founder
of Súmate, a Venezuelan civic group that was involved in the signature drive for the
August 2004 recall referendum. The meeting exacerbated the already tense U.S.-
Venezuelan bilateral relations. Machado is facing charges in Venezuela for
conspiring against the government by accepting U.S. funding from the National
Endowment for Democracy for Súmate’s activities leading up to the recall
referendum. U.S. officials and some Members of Congress have strongly defended
the NED’s activities in Venezuela and have criticized the Venezuelan government’s
efforts to intimidate the leaders of Súmate. (See U.S. Funding for Democracy
Projects, below.)
In early August 2005, Venezuela suspended its cooperation with the U.S. Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) because it alleged that DEA agents were spying
on Venezuela. U.S. officials asserted that the accusations were “baseless and
28 Alice M. Chacon, “Venezuelan President Says His Greatest Rival is George W. Bush,”
Associated Press, June 12, 2004.
29 House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere,
Hearing on “The State of Democracy in Latin America,” Testimony of Roger F. Noriega,
Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, March 9, 2005.
30 Todd Benson, “Rumsfeld in Brazil, Criticizes Venezuela on Assault Rifles,” New York
Times, March 24, 2005.

---

CRS-11
outrageous” but also indicated that the United States would like to improve U.S.
relations with Venezuela and reverse the negative trend in relations over the past
couple of months.31
While traveling in South America in August 2005, Secretary of State Donald
Rumsfeld asserted that “there certainly is evidence that both Cuba and Venezuela
have been involved in the situation in Bolivia in unhelpful ways.”32 Some Members
of Congress, such as Senator Arlen Specter, reportedly called for the Secretary to
tone down his rhetoric.33 Specter met with President Chávez and Venezuelan
ministers in mid-August 2005 to discuss cooperation on drug interdiction.
On August, 22, 2005, the comments of TV evangelist Pat Robertson that the
United States should “assassinate” Chávez evoked a strong response from
Venezuelan officials and from many U.S. policymakers. The State Department
responded by labeling Robertson’s comments as “inappropriate.”34 (For further
information on the U.S. prohibition against assassination, see CRS Report RS21037,
Assassination Ban and E.O. 12333: A Brief Summary.)
Policy Approaches
A dilemma for U.S. policymakers has been how to press the Chávez government
to adhere to democratic principles without appearing to interfere in Venezuelan
domestic affairs or taking sides in the country’s polarized political conflict. The
appearance of U.S. interference in Venezuela could result in increased popular
support for the Chávez government. In the lead up to the recall referendum, the
Chávez government portrayed the opposition as supported by the U.S. government
and the United States as Venezuela’s main adversary. As noted above, for the most
part, the Bush Administration worked through the OAS and the Carter Center from
2002-2004 to help resolve the country’s political crisis. At the same time, U.S.
officials have not refrained from criticizing the Chávez government on various
occasions for its anti-democratic actions.
According to press reports in March 2005, the Administration was involved in
a major reassessment of policy toward Venezuela that could lead to a tougher U.S.
policy toward Venezuela, including more assistance to foundations and business and
political groups in Venezuela. Some observers have expressed concerns that a more
aggressive approach could create further estrangement and tension in the bilateral
relationship.35
31 Lauren Monsen, “United States Hopes for Improved Cooperation,” Washington File, U.S.
Department of State, August 19, 2005.
32 Josh White, “Rumsfeld in Latin America, Voices Democracy Concerns,” Washington
Post, August 17, 2005.
33 Holly Yeager, “Senator Takes Rumsfeld to Task Over Chavez Criticism,” Financial
Times, August 20, 2005.
34 U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, August 23, 2005.
35 Pablo Bachelet, “U.S. Exploring Taming Chávez,” Miami Herald, March 18, 2005; Juan
(continued...)

---

CRS-12
There are other schools of thought about the appropriate U.S. policy toward
Venezuela. Some maintain that the United States should work to normalize relations
with the Chávez government and attempt to work cooperatively on issues of mutual
concern, such as drug trafficking. Some also maintain that United States should
ensure that no U.S. funding goes to any groups headed by individuals who
participated in the April 2002 ouster of President Chávez or to any partisan groups.36
Another longer-term policy approach advocated by some is that the United
States should work to address the circumstances that led to the rise to power of
Chávez. This policy approach pertains not just to Venezuela, but to other countries
in Latin America struggling with high levels of unemployment, crime, and political
corruption.37
U.S. Funding for Democracy Projects
The United States provides funding for democracy projects in Venezuela
through the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) (funded by the Commerce,
Justice, and State appropriations measure) and through Economic Support Funds for
democracy-related projects (funded through the Foreign Operations appropriations
measure). The NED has been funding democracy projects for Venezuela since 1992,
but has increased its funding over the past several years under the Chávez
government. In FY2004, NED funded 13 democracy projects for Venezuela with
about $874,000, and in FY2003, it funded 15 democracy projects with $1.05 million.
In previous years, the NED’s funding for Venezuela projects amounted to $1.1
million in FY2002, $877,000 in FY2001, $258,000 in FY2000, and $1.1 million in
FY1999.
ESF assistance for democracy-related projects in Venezuela amounted to
$470,000 in FY2003, an estimated $1.497 million in FY2004 (including $1 million
in reprogrammed funds to support political reconciliation), and $496,000 in FY2005.
For FY2006, the Administration requested $500,000 in ESF assistance.
The Venezuelan government and some other critics have criticized NED’s
funding of opposition groups.38 They maintain that the NED has funded groups
headed by people involved in the overthrow of Chávez in April 2002 as well as a
35 (...continued)
Forero “U.S. Considers Toughening Stance Toward Venezuela,” New York Times, April 26,
2005..
36 Testimony of Mark Weisbrot, Center for Economic and Policy Research, at a hearing of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on “The State of Democracy in Venezuela,” June
24, 2004.
37 Testimony of Miguel Diaz, Center for Strategic and International Studies, at a hearing of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the “The State of Democracy in Venezuela,”
June 24, 2004.
38 Testimony of Mark Weisbrot, Center for Economic and Policy Research, at a hearing of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on “The State of Democracy in Venezuela,” June
24, 2004.

---

CRS-13
group, Súmate, involved in the signature collecting process for the recall referendum
campaign. Critics argue that Súmate led the signature drive for the recall referendum,
and question whether the NED should have funded such a group.
U.S. officials and some Members of Congress strongly defended the NED’s
activities in Venezuela and have criticized the Venezuelan government’s efforts to
intimidate the leaders of Súmate by charging them with conspiring against the
government. Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roger
Noriega maintained that “the Venezuelan government’s efforts against Súmate are
intended to intimidate and dissuade participation in the referendum process.”39
According to the NED, its program in Venezuela “focuses on promoting citizen
participation in the political process, civil and political rights, freedom of expression
and professional journalism, and conflict mediation.” The NED asserts that all of the
Venezuelan programs that it funds operate on a non-partisan basis. It maintains that
Súmate, which received a grant of $53,400 in September 2003, mobilized a citizen
campaign to monitor the signature collection process and that the money was used
“in developing materials to educate citizens about the constitutional referendum
process and to encourage citizens to participate.”40 NED officials also assert that they
did not fund the Democratic Coordinator for the development of its July 2004
consensus platform. The NED points out that it did fund a consensus building
project in 2002 for one of the NED’s core institutions, the Center for International
Private Enterprise (CIPE). For the project, CIPE partnered with a Venezuelan group,
the Center for the Dissemination of Economic Information (CEDICE) to work with
several Venezuelan nongovernmental organizations and the business sector for the
development of a broad-based consensus.41
As a result of the controversy, the conference report to the FY2005 Consolidated
Appropriations Act (Division B of P.L. 108-447, H.Rept. 108-792) requires a
comprehensive report on NED’s activities in Venezuela since FY2001, and
reaffirmed NED’s duty to ensure that all sponsored activities adhere to core NED
principles. The reporting requirement had first been included in the report to the
House version of the FY2005 Commerce, Justice, and State Appropriations bill (H.R.
4754, H.Rept. 108-576).
Oil Issues
Since Venezuela is a major supplier of foreign oil to the United States (the
fourth major foreign supplier in 2004, after Canada, Mexico, and Saudi Arabia), a
key U.S. interest has been ensuring the continued flow of oil exports at a reasonable
and stable price. The December 2002 strike orchestrated by the opposition reduced
39 U.S. Department of State, International Information Programs, “U.S. Official Outlines
Challenges Facing Venezuela,” Washington File, June 24, 2004.
40 National Endowment for Democracy, “NED Venezuela Programs FAQ,” available at
[http://www.ned.org/grants/venezuelaFacts.html].
41 Telephone conversation with NED official July 15, 2004; also see Andres Oppenheimer,
U.S. Group’s Funds Aid Democracy, Miami Herald, July 15, 2004.

---

CRS-14
Venezuela’s oil exports, but by May 2003, Venezuelan officials maintained that
overall oil production returned to the pre-strike level. Venezuelan officials maintain
that national production currently amounts to about 3.2 billion barrels per day but
critics and independent analysts assert that the figure is about 2.6 billion barrels per
day.42 PdVSA announced in December 2004 that outside auditors would be
appointed to verify the country’s oil production.43
Despite the friction in U.S.-Venezuelan relations and Venezuela’s opposition
to the U.S. war in Iraq, the Chávez government announced before the military
conflict that it would be a reliable wartime supplier of oil to the United States. At
various junctures, however, Chávez has threatened to stop selling oil to the United
States; in April 2004, he threatened to do so if the United States did not stop
“intervening in Venezuela’s domestic affairs.”44 Many observers believe that
Chávez’s threats have been merely part of his rhetoric that is designed to divert
attention from the country’s political crisis.
Some observers, however, have raised questions about the security of Venezuela
as a major supplier of foreign oil for the United States. There are also concerns that
Venezuela is looking to supplant China as a replacement market, although
Venezuelan officials maintain that they are only attempting to diversify Venezuela’s
oil markets. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Richard Lugar has asked
the Government Accountability Office (GAO) to study the issue of potential
Venezuelan oil supply disruption.45
Counternarcotics
Because of Venezuela’s extensive 1,370-mile border with Colombia, it is a
major transit route for cocaine and heroin destined for the United States. Cocaine
seizures by the Venezuelan government increased significantly from 15 metric tons
in 2002 to over 32 metric ton in 2003.
Despite the friction in U.S.-Venezuelan relations, cooperation between the two
countries at the law enforcement agency level led to significant cocaine seizures in
2004, according to the State Department’s March 2005 International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report. In the report, the Department of State maintained that
Venezuela needs to make substantial efforts in five areas: passing an Organized
Crime Law; making effective efforts to combat corruption; cracking down on
document fraud; enforcing court-ordered wiretaps; and conducting opium poppy and
coca eradication operations at least annually. Venezuela has received small amounts
of U.S. assistance under the Administration’s Andean Counterdrug Initiative: $5
million in FY2002; $2.075 million in FY2003; $5 million in FY2004; almost $3
42 “Venezuela’s state-run oil company changes eight of its eleven board members,”
Associated Press, January 13, 2005.
43 “Venezuela Industry: Oil and Gas Update,” EIU ViewsWire, December 16, 2004.
44 “Chávez Threatens to Halt Oil to U.S.,” Miami Herald, April 19, 2004.
45 Andy Webb-Vidal, “U.S. to look into Venezuela oil supply reliance,” Financial Times,
January 14, 2005.

---

CRS-15
million for FY2005; and a request of $3 million for FY2006. ACI programs in
Venezuela focus on counternarcotics cooperation and judicial reform support. (For
further information, see CRS Report RL32337, Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI)
and Related Funding Programs: FY2005 Assistance, by Connie Veillette.)
As noted above, Venezuela suspended its cooperation with the U.S. Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) in early August 2005 because it alleged that
DEA agents were spying on Venezuela. U.S. officials maintained that the charges
were baseless. Senator Specter met with President Chávez and Venezuelan ministers
in mid-August 2005 to discuss cooperation on drug interdiction.
Concerns About Venezuela’s Involvement in Latin America
There have been long-held suspicions that Chávez has supported leftist
Colombian guerrillas, although Chávez denies such support. The State Department’s
April 2005 Country Reports on Terrorism maintains that Colombia’s three terrorist
groups — the leftist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the
National Liberation Army (ELN), and the rightist United Self-Defense Forces of
Colombia (AUC) — often cross into sparsely populated Venezuelan border areas,
regarding it as a safe area to rest, secure logistical supplies, and transship arms and
drugs. They also commit kidnapping and extortion for profit in Venezuelan territory.
The report maintained, however, that “it is unclear to what extent and at what level
the Venezuelan Government approves of or condones material support to Colombian
terrorists.” Nevertheless, the State Department asserted in the report that President
Chávez’s ideological affinity with the FARC and ELN limited antiterrorism
cooperation with Colombia.
In addition to Colombia, U.S. officials have expressed concerns about President
Chávez’s close relationship with Cuba’s Fidel Castro, as well as allegations that he
has financed leftist groups in Ecuador and Bolivia. Chávez has denied such
allegations about financing leftist groups46 and defends his relationship with Cuba.
Venezuela supplies oil to Cuba on a concessionary basis, which in 2005 reportedly
increased from 53,000 to 90,000 barrels per day. In return, Venezuela has received
support from thousands of Cuban health care workers and sports instructors in the
country. During an April 2005 trip to Cuba, Presidents Chávez and Castro
announced commercial deals worth over $400 million, including a joint shipyard to
build small navy ships and a joint housing construction company.
President Chávez’s popularity has grown throughout Latin America, in part
because of his strong stance toward the United States. He has launched a Bolivarian
Alternative for the Americas (ALBA) as an alternative to the Free Trade Area of the
Americas. ALBA advocates a socially oriented trade block that would include
mechanisms for poverty reduction. Chávez is also funding a new 24-hour
hemispheric television network, TV of the South (Televisora del Sur or Telesur) that
began test broadcasts in May 2005, and began official broadcasts in July. Some
observers fear that the network will spread Chávez’s populist and anti-U.S. rhetoric
46 Phil Gunson, “Chávez’s ‘Revolution’ Seen as Different From Castro’s,” Miami Herald,
June 13, 2004.

---

CRS-16
throughout the hemisphere. At the recent OAS meeting held in Florida, Latin
American governments refrained from supporting a U.S. proposal that would have
established a permanent committee to monitor democracy in the region. They
viewed it as an attempt to monitor Venezuela through the OAS.
In the 108th Congress, the conference report (H.Rept. 108-401) on the FY2004
Consolidated Appropriations Act, H.R. 2673 (P.L. 108-199), requested the Secretary
of State to provide (within 90 days of enactment and in a classified form if necessary)
“a description of the extent to which, if any, the Government of Venezuela has
supported or assisted groups designated as terrorist organizations in Colombia.”47 In
addition, the FY2005 Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act (P.L.
108-375), enacted into law October 28, 2004, requires a report within 60 days from
the Secretary of State regarding any relationships between foreign governments or
organizations and terrorist groups in Colombia (Section 1021).
Venezuela’s Extradition Requests
Venezuela has requested the extradition of three of its citizens from the United
States in two controversial terrorism cases. In early 2004, the Chávez government
requested the extradition of two former Venezuelan National Guard lieutenants, José
Antonio Colina and German Rodolfo Varela, charged with the February 2003
bombings of the Spanish Embassy and the Colombian Consulate in Caracas. Both
applied for political asylum because they claimed that they would be executed or
tortured if returned to Venezuela. They have been held since December 2003 at the
Krome Detention Center in Florida run by U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE). In February 2005, a U.S. immigration judge denied them asylum
because of “serious reasons for believing” that they were involved in the bombings
but prohibited the United States from deporting them to Venezuela.48 The
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has asked an immigration appeals court to
deport the two Venezuelans, arguing that they would not be tortured if returned
home. As evidence, they cite the treatment of a former general arrested in Venezuela
for the same case.49
In another controversial case, Venezuela has requested the extradition of anti-
Castro activist Luis Posada Carriles for his alleged role in the 1976 bombing of a
Cuban airliner that killed 73 people.50 In April 2005, Posada’s lawyer announced that
Posada had entered the United States illegally from Mexico and would apply for
asylum because he has a “well-founded fear of persecution” for his opposition to
Fidel Castro.51 Posada had been imprisoned in Venezuela for the bombing of the
47 No such report has been submitted, according to the Department of State.
48 Gerardo Reyes and Alfonso Chardy, “Wanted Chavez Foes Flee to South Florida,” Miami
Herald, April 5, 2005.
49 Alfonso Chardy, “Deport Venezuelan Bombing Suspects, U.S. Urges Court,” Miami
Herald, March 25, 2005.
50 Also see CRS Report RL32730, Cuba: Issues for the 109th Congress, by Mark P. Sullivan.
51 Alfonso Chardy and Nancy San Martin, “Lawyer Expects Posada to Show Soon,” Miami
(continued...)

---

CRS-17
Cuban airliner but reportedly was allowed to “escape” from prison in 1985 after his
supporters paid a bribe to the prison warden.52 He had been acquitted for the
bombing but remained in prison pending a prosecutorial appeal. Posada also
reportedly admitted, but later denied, involvement in a string of bombings in Havana
in 1997, one of which killed an Italian tourist.53 More recently, Posada was
imprisoned for several years in Panama for his involvement in an alleged plot in
November 2000 to kill Fidel Castro. He was convicted on weapons charges in the
case and sentenced to eight years in prison, but ultimately was pardoned by outgoing
President Mireya Moscoso in August 2004. ICE arrested Posada on May 17, 2005,
and subsequently charged him with illegally entering the United States. A DHS press
release indicated that ICE does not generally deport people to Cuba or countries
believed to be acting on Cuba’s behalf.54 Venezuela has pledged that it would not
hand Posada over to Cuba.
Legislative Initiatives
108th Congress. In the 108th Congress, Members of Congress had expressed
concerns about the political situation in Venezuela. The Senate Foreign Relations
Committee held hearing in June 2004 on the status of democracy in Venezuela and
the August recall referendum.55 As noted above (U.S. Funding for Democracy
Projects), the conference report to the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act
(Division B of P.L. 108-447, H.Rept. 108-792) required a comprehensive report on
NED’s activities in Venezuela since FY2001 and reaffirmed NED’s duty to ensure
that all sponsored activities adhere to core NED principles.
Also in the 108th Congress, two resolutions were introduced in the House, but
no action was taken on these measures. H.Res. 716, introduced by Representative
Elton Gallegly on July 14, 2004, would, among other provisions, have encouraged
Venezuelans to participate in a constitutional, peaceful, democratic, and electoral
solution to the political crisis in Venezuela, and appealed to the Venezuelan
government and the opposition to support a free, fair, and transparent recall
referendum in accordance with the Venezuelan Constitution. H.Res. 867, introduced
by Representative Tom Lantos on November 20, 2004, would have expressed support
for the National Endowment for Democracy in Venezuela. The resolution would
have expressed the view that charges against Súmate were politically motivated. As
noted above, Súmate is a Venezuelan civic organization involved in voter education
and electoral observation that received funding from the National Endowment of
51 (...continued)
Herald, April 14, 2005.
52 Ann Louise Bardach, “Our Man’s in Miami. Patriot or Terrorist?,” Washington Post,
April 17, 2005.
53 Oscar Corral and Alfonso Chardy, “Victim’s Kin Oppose Posada Bid for Asylum,” Miami
Herald, May 7, 2005.
54 Department of Homeland Security, Office of Public Affairs, Statement, May 17, 2005.
55 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace
Corps, and Narcotics Affairs, “The State of Democracy in Venezuela,” Hearing, June 24,
2004.

---

CRS-18
Democracy. The resolution also would have welcomed the dropping of charges by
the Venezuelan government against Súmate. Earlier in the year, in a July 12, 2004,
letter to President Chávez, the House International Relations Committee expressed
serious concern about the treatment of the leaders of Súmate.
109th Congress. In the 109th Congress, there has been legislative action on
several initiatives on Venezuela. The Senate-passed version of H.R. 3057 (S.Rept.
109-96), the FY2006 Foreign Operations appropriations bill, has a provision (Section
6121) that would provide up to $2 million in Economic Support Funds for democracy
programs in Venezuela through grants provided by the National Endowment for
Democracy. The House-passed version of H.R. 2601 (H.Rept. 109-168), the FY2006
and FY2007 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, has a provision (Section 1025),
authorizing $9 million in Economic Support Funds for each of FY2006 and FY2007
“to fund activities which support political parties, the rule of law, civil society, an
independent media, and otherwise promote democratic, accountable governance in
Venezuela.”
H.R. 2601 also has a provision, in Section 106(5), authorizing funds for the
“Broadcasting Board of Governors to carry out broadcasting to Venezuela for at least
30 minutes per day of balanced, objective, and comprehensive television news
programming, radio news programming, or both.”
Finally, with regard to the human rights situation in Venezuela, H.Con.Res. 224
(Fortuno) calls on the Venezuelan government to uphold the human rights and civil
liberties of the people of Venezuela.

---

CRS-19
Figure 1. Map of Venezuela
Martinique
Fort-de-
(FR.)
France
C a r i b b e a n S e a
Castries
Saint Lucia
Saint Vincent and
Barbados
The Grenadines
Kingstown
Aruba
Netherlands
Bridgetown
(Neth.)
Antilles
Oranjestad
(Neth.)
Saint
Curacao
Aruba
Bonaire
George's Grenada
Willemstad
Punto
Golfo
Fijo
de
Tobago
Venezuela
Coro
Isla la
La Asuncion
Port-of-
Tortuga
Trinidad
Isla de
Riecito
Spain
Margarita
and
Guiria
Maracaibo
La Guaira
Tobago
Gulf
Cabimas
Cumana
San Felipe
Maracay
Caracas
of
Barcelona
Paria
Trinidad
Los
Baraquisimeto
Valencia
Teques
Maturin
Atlantic
San Juan
Valera
San
Ocean
de los
Guanare
Carlos
Tucupita
Morros
Barinas
Curiapo
Merida
Ciudad
Ciudad Guayana
Bolivar
Cabruta
San Fernando
Bochinche
San Cristobal
Guasipati
Caicara
Ciudad Piar
El Amparo
Tumeremo
El Dorado
El Jobal
La Paragua
Canaima
Guyana
V e n e z u e l a
Puerto
Ayacucho
San Juan
Santa Elena
de Manapiare
de Uairen
San Fernando
de Atabapo
C o l o m b i a
Esmeralda
Venezuela
International Boundary
State Capital
B r a z i l
National Capital
0
50
100
150 Kilometers
0
50
100
150 Miles
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS. (K.Yancey 7/15/04)

---