Order Code IB93017
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Space Stations
Updated August 9, 2005
Marcia S. Smith
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Introduction
The Space Station Program: 1984-1993
Space Station Freedom
1993 Redesign — the Clinton Administration Restructuring
The International Space Station (ISS): 1993-Present
ISS Design, Cost, Schedule, and Lifetime
September 1993-January 2001: The Clinton Administration
2001-Present: The George W. Bush Administration
Reviews of NASA’s Cost Estimates and Adding Funds for ISS
Congressional Action
FY2005
FY2006
International Partners
The Original Partners: Europe, Canada, and Japan
Russia
Risks and Benefits of Russian Participation
ISS and U.S. Nonproliferation Objectives, Including the Iran Nonproliferation Act
(INA)
Key Issues For Congress
Maintaining ISS Operations While the Shuttle Is Grounded
Ensuring U.S. Astronaut Participation in Long-Duration Missions
Impact of President Bush’s Vision for Space Exploration, Including a Potential Gap in
U.S. Human Access to Space
LEGISLATION


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Space Stations
SUMMARY
Congress continues to debate NASA’s
Canada, Japan, and several European
International Space Station (ISS), a perma-
countries became partners with NASA in
nently occupied facility in Earth orbit where
building the space station in 1988; Russia
astronauts live and conduct research.
joined in 1993. Except for money paid to
Congress appropriated approximately $35
Russia, there is no exchange of funds among
billion for the program from FY1985-2005.
the partners. Europe, Canada, and Japan
The initial FY2006 ISS request was $2.180
collectively expect to spend about $11 billion
billion: $1.857 billion for construction and
of their own money. A reliable figure for
operations and $324 million for research.
Russian expenditures is not available.
NASA submitted a budget amendment on July
15, transferring ISS Crew/Cargo Services and
In 1993, when the current space station
the funding for it ($168 million) to the Explo-
design was adopted, NASA said it would cost
ration Systems Mission Directorate.
$17.4 billion for construction (not including
launch or other costs). That estimate grew to
The space station is being assembled in
$24.1-$26.4 billion, leading Congress to
Earth orbit. ISS segments, crews, and cargo
legislate spending caps on part of the program
are taken into orbit by Russian or U.S. space-
in 2000. The estimate then grew by almost
craft. ISS has been permanently occupied by
another $5 billion, leading NASA (at White
successive “Expedition” crews rotating on 4-6
House direction) to cancel or indefinitely defer
month shifts since November 2000. “Expedi-
some hardware to stay within the cap. NASA
tion 11” is now aboard. Cost growth and
alerted Congress in its FY2006 budget request
schedule delays have characterized the pro-
that it may exceed the cap, however.
gram since its inception. The grounding of the
space shuttle fleet for 30 months after the
Controversial since the program began in
February 2003 Columbia tragedy further
1984, the space station has been repeatedly
affected schedule, operations, and cost. The
redesigned and rescheduled, often for cost-
shuttle’s schedule remains uncertain because
growth reasons. Congress has been concerned
NASA grounded the system again due to
about the space station for that and other
problems during the launch of Discovery in
reasons. Twenty-two attempts to terminate the
July 2005. Most of the remaining ISS seg-
program in NASA funding bills were de-
ments are designed to be launched by the
feated, however (3 in the 106th Congress, 4 in
shuttle and construction therefore is sus-
the 105th Congress, 5 in the 104th, 5 in the
pended. A new exploration initiative an-
103rd, and 5 in the 102nd). Three other at-
nounced by President Bush in January 2004
tempts in broader legislation in the 103rd
also is affecting the ISS program. He called
Congress also failed.
for curtailing the shuttle program in 2010, and
changing the focus of U.S. research aboard
Current congressional debate focuses on
ISS to only that which supports his
the impact of space shuttle-related delays, how
“Moon/Mars” human space exploration goals
and whether to ensure that U.S. astronauts can
instead of the broadly-based scientific
be part of long duration ISS crews, and the
experiments that were planned.
future of ISS in light of President Bush’s new
exploration initiative.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The “Expedition 11” crew (Russian Sergei Krikalev and American John Phillips)
continues its work aboard the International Space Station (ISS). NASA launched STS-114
on July 26; the first shuttle launch since the 2003 Columbia tragedy. STS-114 successfully
returned to Earth on August 9, after spending several days docked with the ISS, delivering
supplies and making certain repairs. NASA had hoped that STS-114 and another mission
in September would be completely successful, allowing future shuttle flights to resume ISS
construction (it is about 50% complete). However, NASA has again suspended shuttle
launches because of a problem during STS-114’s launch (see CRS Report RS21408).
Since the Columbia tragedy, Russia has been launching U.S. astronauts to ISS on its
Soyuz spacecraft at no cost to NASA under a 1996 agreement. Russia’s obligations under
that agreement will be fulfilled with a Soyuz scheduled for launch in October 2005 and
return to Earth in April 2006. Thereafter, NASA would have to pay to use the Soyuz
spacecraft either for ferrying crews to and from ISS, or for using Soyuz as a “lifeboat” in case
of an emergency on ISS. NASA is prohibited from paying Russia for ISS-related activities,
however, unless Russia complies with the Iran Nonproliferation Act (INA, see CRS Report
RS22072). The Bush Administration has proposed an amendment to the INA that would
allow NASA to pay for such service; there has been no legislative action to date.
The original FY2006 request for the ISS was $2.180 billion: $1.857 billion for
construction and operations (including $160 million for ISS Crew/Cargo Services) and $324
million for research. In the FY2006 Science, State, Justice and Commerce (SSJC)
appropriations bill (H.R. 2862), which includes NASA, the House cut $10 million from ISS
construction and operations, $10 million from ISS Crew/Cargo Services, and $25 million
from the account that funds research on ISS, though it did not specify that the cuts be made
to the ISS-related portion of that account. The Senate Appropriations Committee (S.Rept.
109-88) cut all $160 million from ISS Crew/Cargo Services. The Senate Commerce
Committee reported a FY2006-2010 NASA authorization bill (S. 1281, S.Rept. 109-108),
which adds $100 million for FY2006 and makes other changes to enhance the use of ISS for
research. The House passed a FY2006-2007 NASA authorization bill (H.R. 3070, H.Rept.
109-173) on July 22; it does not specify an amount for the ISS program. On July 15, NASA
amended its FY2006 request, shifting the funds for ISS Crew/Cargo services (which it now
identifies as $168 million) into a different budget account, and commensurately reducing the
ISS request. See CRS Report RL32988.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Introduction
NASA launched its first space station, Skylab, in 1973. Three crews were sent to live
and work there in 1973-74. It remained in orbit, unoccupied, until it reentered Earth’s
atmosphere in July 1979, disintegrating over Australia and the Indian Ocean. Skylab was
never intended to be permanently occupied. The goal of a permanently occupied space
station with crews rotating on a regular basis was high on NASA’s list for the post-Apollo
years. In 1969, Vice President Agnew’s Space Task Group recommended a permanent space
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station and a reusable space transportation system (the space shuttle) to service it as the core
of NASA’s program in the 1970s and 1980s. Budget constraints forced NASA to choose to
build the space shuttle first. When NASA declared the shuttle “operational” in 1982, it was
ready to initiate the space station program.
In his January 25, 1984 State of the Union address, President Reagan directed NASA
to develop a permanently occupied space station within a decade, and to invite other
countries to join. On July 20, 1989, the 20th anniversary of the first Apollo landing on the
Moon, President George H. W. Bush gave a major space policy address in which he voiced
his support for the space station as the cornerstone of a long-range civilian space program
eventually leading to bases on the Moon and Mars. That “Moon/Mars” program, the Space
Exploration Initiative, was not greeted with enthusiasm in Congress, primarily due to budget
concerns, and ended in FY1993, although the space station program continued.
President Clinton dramatically changed the character of the space station program in
1993 by adding Russia as a partner to this already international endeavor. That decision
made the space station part of the U.S. foreign policy agenda to encourage Russia to abide
by agreements to stop the proliferation of ballistic missile technology, and to support Russia
economically and politically as it transitioned from the Soviet era. The Clinton
Administration strongly supported the space station within certain budget limits.
President George W. Bush, prompted in part by the February 2003 space shuttle
Columbia tragedy, made a major space policy address on January 14, 2004, directing NASA
to focus its activities on returning humans to the Moon and someday sending them to Mars.
Included in this “Vision for Space Exploration” is a plan to retire the space shuttle in 2010.
The President said the United States would fulfill its commitments to its space station
partners, but the details of how to accomplish that without the shuttle were not announced.
The Space Station Program: 1984-1993
NASA began the current program to build a space station in 1984 (FY1985). In 1988,
the space station was named Freedom. Following a major redesign in 1993, NASA
announced that the Freedom program had ended and a new program begun, though NASA
asserts that 75% of the design of the “new” station is from Freedom. The new program is
simply referred to as the International Space Station (ISS). Individual ISS modules have
various names. (Some refer to the facility as “Space Station Alpha,” but that is not its formal
name). ISS is a laboratory in space for conducting experiments in near-zero gravity
(“microgravity”). A broadly based research program was planned, but President Bush’s
Vision for Space Exploration would limit U.S. research on ISS to that which is needed to
support the goal of sending humans back to the Moon and to Mars. From FY1985- FY2005,
Congress appropriated approximately $35 billion for the space station program.
Space Station Freedom
When NASA began the space station program in 1984, it said the program would cost
$8 billion (FY1984 dollars) for research and development (R&D — essentially the cost for
building the station without launch costs) through completion of assembly. From FY1985-
1993, Congress appropriated $11.4 billion to NASA for the Freedom program. Most of the
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funding went for designing and redesigning the station over those years. Little hardware was
built and none was launched. Several major redesigns were made. A 1991 redesign evoked
concerns about the amount of science that could be conducted on the scaled-down space
station. Both the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) and the
Space Studies Board (SSB) of the National Research Council concluded that materials
science research could not justify building the space station, and questioned how much life
sciences research could be supported. They criticized the lack of firm plans for flying a
centrifuge, considered essential to this research. NASA subsequently agreed to launch a
centrifuge (although it reportedly is reconsidering that now, see below).
Cost estimates for Freedom varied widely depending on when they were made and what
was included. Freedom was designed to be operated for 30 years. As the program ended
in 1993, NASA’s estimate was $90 billion (current dollars): $30 billion through the end of
construction, plus $60 billion to operate it for 30 years. The General Accounting Office
(GAO) estimated the total cost at $118 billion, including 30 years of operations.
In 1988, after three years of negotiations, Japan, Canada and nine European countries
under the aegis of the European Space Agency (ESA) agreed to be partners in the space
station program. A government-to-government Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) was
signed in September, and Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) between NASA and its
counterpart agencies were signed then or in 1989. The partners agreed to provide hardware
for the space station at their own expense, a total of $8 billion at the time.
1993 Redesign — the Clinton Administration Restructuring
In early 1993, as President Clinton took office, NASA revealed $1 billion in cost growth
on the Freedom program. The President gave NASA 90 days to develop a new, less costly,
design with a reduced operational period of 10 years. A new design, Alpha, emerged on
September 7, 1993, which NASA estimated would cost $19.4 billion. It would have used
some hardware bought from Russia, but Russia was not envisioned as a partner. Five days
earlier, however, the White House announced it had reached preliminary agreement with
Russia to build a joint space station. Now called the International Space Station (ISS), it
superseded the September 7 Alpha design. NASA asserted it would be a more capable space
station and be ready sooner at less cost to the United States. Compared with the September
7 Alpha design, ISS was to be completed one year earlier, have 25% more usable volume,
42.5 kilowatts more electrical power, and accommodate six instead of four crew members.
In 1993, President Clinton pledged to request $10.5 billion ($2.1 billion a year) for
FY1994-1998. NASA said the new station would cost $17.4 billion to build, not including
money already expended on the Freedom program. That estimate was derived from the
$19.4 billion estimate for the September 7 Alpha design minus $2 billion that NASA said
would be saved by having Russia in the program. The $2.1 billion and $17.4 billion figures
became known as “caps,” though they were not set in law. (See Cost Caps below).
The International Space Station (ISS): 1993-Present
The International Space Station program thus began in 1993, with Russia joining the
United States, Europe, Japan, and Canada. The 1993 and subsequent agreements with Russia
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established three phases of space station cooperation and the payment to Russia of $400
million, which grew to $473 million. (NASA transferred about $800 million to Russia for
space station cooperation through this and other contracts.)
During Phase I (1995-1998), seven U.S. astronauts remained on Russia’s space station
Mir for long duration (several month) missions with Russian cosmonauts, Russian
cosmonauts flew on the U.S. space shuttle seven times, and nine space shuttle missions
docked with Mir to exchange crews and deliver supplies. Repeated system failures and two
life-threatening emergencies on Mir in 1997 raised questions about whether NASA should
leave more astronauts on Mir, but NASA decided Mir was sufficiently safe to continue the
program. (As discussed below, Mir was deorbited in 2001.) Phases II and III involve
construction of the International Space Station itself, and blend into each other. Phase II
began in 1998 and was completed in July 2001; Phase III is underway.
ISS Design, Cost, Schedule, and Lifetime
ISS is being built by a partnership among the United States, Russia, Europe, Japan, and
Canada. The 1988 Intergovernmental Agreement was renegotiated after Russia joined the
program. The new version was signed in 1998. The IGA is a treaty in all the countries
except the United States, where it is an Executive Agreement. The IGA is implemented
through Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) between NASA and its counterpart agencies.
Brazil is not a partner in ISS, but agreed to participate through a bilateral agreement with
NASA. Boeing is the U.S. prime contractor.
NASA originally stated that ISS would be operated for 10 years after assembly was
completed, with a possibility for 5 additional years if the research was considered
worthwhile. Using the original schedule, assembly would have been completed in 2002,
with operations at least through 2012. The completion of assembly slipped to 2006, but
President Bush restructured the space station program in 2001, and it was not clear when
assembly would be “completed.” NASA briefing charts in March 2003 showed space station
operations possibly continuing until 2022. Under President Bush’s January 2004 “Vision
for Space Exploration,” NASA plans to complete its utilization of ISS in 2016 (though the
other partners may continue to use it after that time).
ISS segments are launched into space on U.S. or Russian launch vehicles and assembled
in orbit. The space station is composed of a multitude of modules, solar arrays to generate
electricity, remote manipulator systems, and other elements that are too numerous to describe
here. Details can be found at [http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/home/index.html]. Six major
modules are now in orbit. The first two were launched in 1998: Zarya (“Sunrise,” a Russian-
built, U.S.-owned, module with guidance, navigation, and control systems) and Unity (a U.S.
“node” connecting other modules). Next was Zvezda (“Star,” a Russian module that serves
as the crew’s living quarters) in 2000. Destiny (a U.S. laboratory), Quest (a U.S. airlock),
and Pirs (“Pier,” a Russian docking compartment) arrived in 2001. Among the other
modules awaiting launch are laboratory modules built by Russia, Europe, and Japan, and two
more “nodes” built by Europe. (Zarya counts as a U.S. module because NASA paid Russia
to build it. Some of the European- and Japanese-built hardware counts as U.S. because they
are built under barter agreements where Europe and Japan produce hardware NASA needs
instead of paying cash to NASA for launch and other ISS-related services.) Ordinarily, the
U.S. space shuttle takes crews and cargo back and forth to ISS. The shuttle system is
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currently grounded because of problems that occurred during the July 2005 launch of STS-
114 (see CRS Report RS21408). Russian Soyuz spacecraft are also used to take crews to and
from ISS, and Russian Progress spacecraft deliver cargo, but cannot return anything to Earth
(Progress is not designed to survive reentry into the Earth’s atmosphere). A Soyuz is always
attached to the station as a lifeboat in case of an emergency.
The schedule for launching segments and crews is called the “assembly sequence” and
has been revised many times. At the end of the Clinton Administration, the assembly
sequence showed completion of assembly (“assembly complete”) in April 2006. The most
recent assembly sequence was released after a January 2005 “Heads of Agency” meeting in
Montreal, but it does not include launch dates, only the order in which the launches will go.
It does list “Establishment of a Permanent Crew of Six (January 2009),” followed by nine
shuttle launches to assembly complete. Under the Vision, ISS construction is to be
completed by 2010, but NASA Administrator Griffin has indicated that a sufficient number
of shuttle flights may not be able to be launched in that time period. He intends to terminate
the shuttle in 2010 nonetheless, however, and reportedly is assessing other methods for
launching ISS segments. Thus, what segments of the ISS will be launched, and on what
schedule, remain undetermined.
“Expedition” crews have occupied ISS on a 4-6 month rotating basis since November
2000. Originally the crews had three members (two Russians and one American, or two
Americans and one Russian), with an expectation that crew size would grow to six or seven
once assembly was completed. Crew size is temporarily reduced to two (one American, one
Russian) while the U.S. shuttle is grounded in order to reduce resupply requirements. The
number of astronauts who can live on the space station is limited in part by how many can
be returned to Earth in an emergency by lifeboats docked to the station. Only Russian Soyuz
spacecraft are available as lifeboats. Each Soyuz can hold three people, limiting crew size
to three if only one Soyuz is attached. NASA planned to build a U.S. Crew Return Vehicle
(CRV) to provide lifeboat capabilities for at least four more crew, but the Bush
Administration canceled those plans due to cost growth in the ISS program.
Each Soyuz must be replaced every six months. The replacement missions are called
“taxi” flights since the crews bring a new Soyuz up to ISS and bring the old one back to
Earth. Therefore, under normal conditions, the long duration Expedition crews are regularly
visited by taxi crews, and by the space shuttle bringing up additional ISS segments or
exchanging Expedition crews. When the shuttle is unavailable, Expedition crews are taken
back and forth on the “taxi” flights.
September 1993-January 2001: The Clinton Administration.
Cost Growth. From FY1994-FY2001, the cost estimate for building ISS grew from
$17.4 billion to $24.1-26.4 billion. The $17.4 billion estimate (called its “development cost,”
“construction cost,” or “R&D cost”) covered FY1994 through completion of assembly, then
scheduled for June 2002. It did not include launch costs, operational costs after completion
of assembly, civil service costs, or other costs. NASA estimated the program’s life-cycle
cost (all costs, including funding spent prior to 1993) from FY1985 through FY2012 at $72.3
billion. In 1998, GAO estimated the life-cycle cost at $95.6 billion (GAO/NSIAD-98-147).
More recent, comparable, life-cycle estimates are not available from NASA or GAO.
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Cost growth first emerged publicly in March 1996 when then-NASA Administrator
Daniel Goldin gave the space station program manager control of money allocated for (and
previously overseen by) the science offices at NASA for research intended to be conducted
aboard the space station. Congress gave NASA approval to transfer $177 million from those
science accounts to space station construction in the FY1997 VA-HUD-IA appropriations
act (P.L. 104-204). A similar transfer was approved for FY1996 ($50 million). NASA
changed its accounting methods so future transfers would not require congressional action,
and transferred $235 million from space station science into construction in FY1998. (“Space
station science” funding is for scientific activities aboard the space station. It is separate
from NASA’s other “space science” funding, such as Mars exploration.)
One factor in the cost growth was schedule slippage related to Russia’s Zvezda module.
As insurance against further Zvezda delays, or a launch or docking failure, NASA decided
to build an “Interim Control Module” (ICM). To cover cost growth associated with the
schedule delay and ICM, NASA requested permission to move $200 million in FY1997 from
the space shuttle and payload utilization and operations accounts to the space station
program, and to transfer $100 million in FY1998 from unidentified NASA programs to the
space station program. The appropriations committees approved transferring the $200
million in FY1997, but not the FY1998 funding.

In March 1998, NASA announced that the estimate for building the space station had
grown from $17.4 billion to $21.3 billion. In April 1998, an independent task force
concluded that the space station’s cost through assembly complete could be $24.7 billion.
Mr. Goldin initially refused to endorse the $24.7 billion estimate, but by 2000, NASA’s own
estimate had grown to $24.1-$26.4 billion.
Cost Caps. The $2.1 billion per year figure the Clinton White House and Congress
agreed to spend on the space station, and NASA’s $17.4 billion estimate to build the station,
became known as “caps,” although they were not set in law. Both were exceeded in 1997-
1998. As costs continued to rise, Congress voted to legislate caps on certain parts of the ISS
program in the FY2000-2002 NASA authorization act (P.L. 106-391). The caps are $25
billion for development, plus $17.7 billion for associated shuttle launches. The act also
authorizes an additional $5 billion for development and $3.5 billion for associated shuttle
launches in case of specified contingencies. The caps do not apply to operations, research,
or crew return activities after the space station is “substantially” complete, defined as when
development costs consume 5% or less of the annual space station budget. In its FY2006
budget justification (p. EC 2-4), NASA alerted Congress that it may exceed the $25 billion
cap for ISS development during FY2005, attributing the increased costs to delays resulting
from the Columbia tragedy. The House version of the pending NASA authorization bill,
H.R. 3070, would repeal the cap. The Senate version, S. 1281, would require NASA to
submit a report on how certain factors affected ISS development costs, and to identify
statutory changes needed to address those impacts.
2001-Present: The George W. Bush Administration.
Cost Growth. As President Bush took office, NASA revealed substantial additional
cost growth. In 2000, NASA’s estimate of the remaining cost to build ISS was $8 billion
(FY2002 to FY2006). In January 2001, however, it announced that an additional $4.02
billion was needed. That figure grew to $4.8 billion by June, and the IMCE task force
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(discussed below) said another $366 million in growth was discovered between August and
October. Those increases would have raised the cost to over $30 billion, 72% above the
1993 estimate, and $5 billion above the legislated cap. NASA explained that program
managers had underestimated the complexity of building and operating the station. The Bush
Administration signaled it supported the legislated cap, would not provide additional funds,
and NASA would have to find what it needed from within its Human Space Flight account.
“Core Complete” Configuration. In February 2001, the Bush Administration
announced it would cancel or defer some ISS hardware to stay within the cap and control
space station costs. It canceled the Propulsion Module, and “indefinitely deferred” the
Habitation Module, Node 3, and the Crew Return Vehicle (CRV). The decision truncated
construction of the space station at a stage the Administration called “core complete.” The
Administration said that “enhancements” to the station might be possible if NASA
demonstrated improved cost estimating and program management. In 2001, the space
station program office at Johnson Space Center (JSC) estimated that it would cost $8.3
billion from FY2002-2006 to build the core complete configuration, described at that time
as all the U.S. hardware planned for launch through “Node 2,” plus the launch of laboratories
being built by Europe and Japan. NASA subsequently began distinguishing between “U.S.
Core Complete” (the launches through Node 2, which, prior to the Columbia tragedy, was
scheduled for February 2004) and “International Partner (IP) Core Complete” which included
the addition of European and Japanese laboratory modules (then anticipated in 2008).
The non-U.S. partners, and U.S. scientists who planned to conduct research on ISS,
expressed deep concern with the core complete configuration (see CRS Report RL31216).
Concerns focused on the decision to indefinitely defer the CRV (which subsequently was
canceled), which limits the space station to three permanent crew members, not seven as
planned, reducing the number of crew available to conduct scientific research. For U.S.
researchers, another issue was that NASA also reduced the space station research budget by
37.5% over the FY2002-2006 period, necessitating a reassessment of U.S. research priorities
on ISS. A July 2002 report of the “Research Maximization and Prioritization” (ReMaP) task
force, and a September 2002 National Research Council report, made recommendations on
research priorities. (Both were superseded by the January 2004 “Vision for Space
Exploration,” which directs that U.S. research on ISS be restricted only to that which
supports the Vision, discussed elsewhere in this report.) For Europe, Canada, and Japan, the
lack of a U.S. crew return capability also poses problems because the additional crew
member slots were to be allocated, in part, to their astronauts. Without those positions, their
astronauts might be limited to working aboard ISS only for short durations as part of crews
on the U.S. space shuttle or Russian Soyuz “taxi” missions.
Reviews of NASA’s Cost Estimates and Adding Funds for ISS. NASA
created the ISS Management and Cost Evaluation (IMCE) Task Force in July 2001 to review
the space station program office’s $8.3 billion cost estimate for finishing the core complete
configuration. Chaired by former Lockheed Martin executive Tom Young, IMCE
determined that the cost estimate was not credible, and NASA should make significant
management and cost estimating changes (see CRS Report RL31216). NASA Headquarters
directed the space station program office to reassess its estimate, and had two independent
groups conduct their own estimates. A July 2002 GAO report (GAO-02-735) concluded that
NASA’s focus on managing annual budgets resulted in NASA’s failure to heed indicators
of future program cost growth.
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In November 2002, the Bush Administration submitted an amended FY2003 budget
request that shifted $706 million into the ISS program for FY2004-2007: $660 million to
boost program reserves, and $46 million in FY2004 for “long-lead” items to preserve the
option of increasing crew size beyond three. (Congress cut $200 million from ISS in
FY2004, however.) The latter included a proposal to build an Orbital Space Plane (OSP) to
takes crews back and forth to ISS as a complement to the space shuttle.
At a December 2002 “Heads of Agency” meeting, the ISS partners agreed on a process
for selecting a final ISS configuration by December 2003. The 2003 space shuttle Columbia
tragedy delayed the process, and President Bush’s January 2004 announcement of the Vision
for Space Exploration, changed NASA’s own plans, including cancellation of the Orbital
Space Plane, and termination of the space shuttle program after ISS construction is
completed. At a January 2005 Heads of Agency meeting, the partners endorsed a final
configuration of ISS, but NASA is continuing to assess what modules it needs. For example,
NASA officials indicate that the centrifuge and its accommodation module may not be
needed. NASA also is assessing how many shuttle flights can be accomplished before 2010.
Congressional Action
FY2005
The FY2005 request for the ISS program was $2.412 billion: $1.863 billion for
construction and operations, including $140 million in a new “ISS Crew/Cargo Services” line
to pay for alternatives to the shuttle for taking crew and cargo to and from ISS; and $549
million for research. Congress did not specify a funding level for the ISS in the final version
of the FY2005 VA-HUD-IA appropriations act, which was incorporated in the FY2005
Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 4818, P.L. 108-447). Instead, it gave NASA
“unrestrained transfer authority” to shift money between budget accounts. In a May 10, 2005
update to its FY2005 operating plan, NASA indicated that it is shifting $160 million from
the space station into the space shuttle program for costs associated with returning the shuttle
to flight status. The operating plan shows $1.676 billion for ISS construction and operations,
including $98 million for ISS Crew/Cargo Services. However, management of the ISS
Crew/Cargo Services activity, and the $98 million, have been moved to the Exploration
Systems Mission Directorate. The operating plan retains the $98 million in the ISS
subaccount, however. The FY2005 total shown in the table in this issue brief — $2.058
billion — is the sum of $1.676 billion as shown in NASA’s May 2005 operating plan, plus
$382 million allocated for space station research as shown in a FY2006 NASA budget chart.
FY2006
For FY2006, NASA originally requested $2.180 billion for the ISS program: $1.857
billion for construction and operations (including $160 million for ISS Crew/Cargo
Services), and $324 million for ISS research. In a May 10, 2005 FY2005 operating plan
update, NASA announced that it was moving the ISS Crew/Cargo Services activity to the
Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD). A July 15 amended budget request also
moved the FY2006 funding for that activity (which it said was $168 million) into ESMD and
commensurately reduced the ISS construction and operations request. The figure used in the
accompanying table is the amended request ($2.013 billion).
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The FY2006 Science, State, Justice and
Table 1. U.S. Space Station
Commerce (SSJC) appropriations bill (H.R.
Funding
2862), includes NASA. The House cut $10
(in $ millions)
million from ISS construction and
operations, $10 million from ISS
Fiscal Year
Request
Appropriated
Crew/Cargo Services, and $25 million from
1985
150
150
the account that funds research on ISS,
though it did not specify that the cuts come
1986
230
205
from the ISS portion of that account. The
1987
410
410
Senate Appropriations Committee (S.Rept.
109-88) cut all $160 million from ISS
1988
767
425
Crew/Cargo Services. S. 1281, a FY2006-
1989
967
900
2010 NASA authorization bill, adds $100
million in FY2006 and makes other changes
1990
2,050
1,750
to enhance ISS research. H.R. 3070
1991
2,430
1,900
(H.Rept. 109-173) is a FY2006-2007 NASA
authorization bill, that does not specify an
1992
2,029
2,029
amount for ISS.
1993
2,250
2,100
1994
2,106
2,106
International Partners
1995
2,113
2,113
The Original Partners: Europe,
1996
2,115
2,144
Canada, and Japan
1997
2,149
2,149
Canada, Japan, and most of the 16
1998
2,121
2,441A
members of the European Space Agency
1999
2,270
2,270
(ESA) have been participating in the space
2000
2,483
2,323
station program since it began. Formal
agreements were signed in 1988, but had to
2001
2,115
2, 115
be revised following Russia’s entry into the
2002
2,114 2,093
program, and two more European countries
joined in the interim. The revised
2003
1,839
1,810 B
agreements were signed on January 29,
2004 C
2,285
2,085
1998, among the partners in the ISS
program: United States, Russia, Japan,
2005
2,412
2,058 D
Canada, and 11 European countries —
2006
2,013
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy,
The numbers here reflect NASA’s figures for “the
the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden,
space station program.” Over the years, what is
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
included in that definition has changed. The
Representatives of the various governments
appropriated amount may differ from actual
spending.
signed the government-to-government level
A NASA’s FY1999 budget documents showed
Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) that
$2.501 billion in the expectation Congress would
governs the program. (The United Kingdom
approve additional transfer requests, but it did not.
B Adjusted for 0.65% rescission.
signed the IGA, but is not financially
C Reflects shift to full cost accounting.
D
participating in the program so the number
Congress did not specify an appropriations level.
of European countries participating in the
This figure is from NASA’s May 10, 2005 operating
plan, plus the amount to be spent on ISS research.
program is variously listed as 10 or 11.)
NASA also signed Memoranda of
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Understanding for implementing the program with its counterpart agencies: the European
Space Agency (ESA), the Canadian Space Agency (CSA), the Russian space agency
(Rosaviakosmos at that time, now Roskosmos), and the Japanese Science and Technology
Agency. The IGA is a treaty in all the countries except the United States (where it is an
Executive Agreement).
Canada is contributing the Mobile Servicing System (MSS) for assembling and
maintaining the space station. In February 1994, the new prime minister of Canada had
decided to terminate Canada’s role in the program, but later agreed to reformulate Canada’s
participation instead. The first part of the MSS (the “arm” or Canadarm 2) was launched in
April 2001; another part, the Special Purpose Dextrous Manipulator, is awaiting launch.
ESA is building a laboratory module called Columbus, and an Automated Transfer
Vehicle (ATV) to take cargo to ISS. The ATV will be launched on Europe’s Ariane launch
vehicle. The first ATV launch is expected in 2006. The major contributors to Columbus are
Germany, France, and Italy. Budgetary difficulties over the years led ESA to cancel other
hardware it was planning. ESA also is building a cupola (a windowed dome) and two of the
three “nodes” (Node 2 and Node 3) for NASA in exchange for NASA launches of Europe’s
module and other services. Node 2, Columbus, and the cupola are awaiting launch. NASA
had canceled plans for Node 3, but now has revived them. NASA also has a bilateral
agreement with Italy under which Italy built three “mini-pressurized logistics modules”
(MPLMs). Already in use, they are launched via the shuttle, attached to ISS while cargo is
transferred to the station, filled with refuse or other unwanted material, placed back into the
shuttle’s cargo bay, and returned to Earth.
Japan is building the Japanese Experiment Module, named Kibo (Hope). One part is
pressurized and the other is not (called the “back porch,” it will be exposed to space for
experiments requiring those conditions). The pressurized section is awaiting launch; the
unpressurized section is in development. Japan also is building a centrifuge and a Centrifuge
Accommodation Module (“CAM”) for NASA in exchange for shuttle flights to launch Kibo.
NASA now is reconsidering whether it needs the centrifuge.
CSA reported in February 2004 that Canada’s total ISS spending is expected to be $1.4
billion (Canadian), of which $1.3 billion (Canadian) was spent by that time. ESA reported
in March 2004 that its estimated funding for ISS is 5.1 billion Euros, of which 4.1 billion
Euros were spent as of the end of 2003. (In March 2004, 1 Canadian dollar = 0.75 U.S.
dollar and 1 Euro = 1.2 U.S. dollars.) In February 2004, the Japanese space agency reported
that Japan expects to spend $4.8 billion on ISS, of which $4 billion was spent by the end of
March 2003. (A bilateral agreement was signed with Brazil in October 1997 for Brazil to
provide payload and logistics hardware. Brazil is restructuring its agreement in light of
financial constraints, however. The level of its funding contribution is unclear.)
Russia
Issues associated with Russia’s participation in ISS are discussed elsewhere. This
section explains Russian space station activities from 1971 to the present. The Soviet Union
launched the world’s first space station, Salyut 1, in 1971 followed by five more Salyuts and
then Mir. At least two other Salyuts failed before they could be occupied. The Soviets
accumulated a great deal of data from the many missions flown to these stations on human
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adaptation to weightlessness. The data were often shared with NASA. They also performed
microgravity materials processing research, and astronomical and Earth remote sensing
observations. Importantly, they gained considerable experience in operating space stations.
Russia’s most recent space station, Mir, was a modular space station built and operated
between 1986 and 2001. Crews were ferried back and forth to Mir using Soyuz spacecraft.

Crews occupied Mir from 1986-2000. For almost ten of those years (1989-1999), Mir
was continuously occupied by crews on a rotating basis. Although occasionally crews
stayed for very long periods of time to study human reaction to long duration spaceflight,
typically they remained for 5-6 months and then were replaced by a new crew. From 1995-
1998, seven Americans participated in long duration (up to six month) missions aboard Mir,
and nine space shuttle missions docked with the space station. Individuals from Japan,
Britain, Austria, Germany, France, and the Slovak Republic also paid for visits to Mir.
Russia deorbited Mir into the Pacific Ocean on March 23, 2001.
Risks and Benefits of Russian Participation
For many years, controversy over the ISS program focused on Russia’s participation in
the program. Among the issues were the extent to which successful completion of ISS is
dependent on Russia, Russia’s financial ability to meet its commitments, and whether the
United States should provide funding to Russia if it proliferates missile technology to certain
countries. While there is no exchange of funds among the other ISS partners, the United
States (and other partners) have provided funding to Russia. By 1998, the United States had
paid approximately $800 million to Russia for space station cooperation.
Following the Clinton Administration’s decision to bring Russia into the program,
Congress stated that Russian participation “should enhance and not enable” the space station
(H.Rept. 103-273, to accompany H.R. 2491, the FY1994 VA-HUD-IA appropriations act,
P.L. 103-124). The current design, however, can only be viewed as being “enabled” by
Russian participation. It is dependent on Russian Progress vehicles for reboost (to keep the
station from reentering Earth’s atmosphere), on Russian Soyuz spacecraft for emergency
crew return, and on Russia’s Zvezda module for crew quarters (which allows ISS to be
permanently occupied). Since the Columbia accident, access to ISS has been completely
dependent on Russia, which ferries crews back and forth on the Soyuz spacecraft and takes
cargo to ISS on Progress spacecraft. President Bush’s exploration initiative would increase
U.S. dependence on Russia vis a vis the space station (see Key Issues for Congress below).
Russia’s financial ability to meet its commitments is an ongoing issue. The launch of
Zvezda, the first module Russia had to pay for itself, was more than two years late. (Zarya
was built by Russia, but NASA paid for it.) Since Zvezda’s launch in 2000, Russia has met
its commitments to launch Soyuz and Progress spacecraft, but is reassessing what other
modules and hardware it will build at its own expense. Russian space agency officials have
repeatedly expressed concern about whether they can provide the needed number of Soyuz
and Progress spacecraft because of budget constraints.
Clinton Administration and NASA officials asserted repeatedly that Russian
participation in the space station program would accelerate the schedule by two years and
reduce U.S. costs by $4 billion. That was later modified to one year and $2 billion, and an
April 1, 1994 letter to Congress from NASA said 15 months and $1.5 billion. NASA
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officials continued to use the $2 billion figure thereafter, however. GAO concluded
(GAO/NSIAD 94-248) that Russian participation would cost NASA $1.8 billion, essentially
negating the $2 billion in expected savings. In 1998, a NASA official conceded that having
Russia as a partner added $1 billion to the cost. Other benefits cited by the Clinton
Administration were providing U.S. financial assistance to Russia as it moves to a market
economy, keeping Russian aerospace workers employed in non-threatening activities, and
the emotional impact, historic symbolism, and potential long term significance of the two
former Cold War adversaries working together in space.
One benefit is that the space station can be serviced with Russian as well as American
spacecraft, providing redundancy if either side must ground its fleet due to an accident, for
example. This is an important advantage while the U.S. space shuttle is grounded. Russia
is providing both crew and cargo flights to the space station, enabling it to continue operation
without the shuttle.
ISS and U.S. Nonproliferation Objectives, Including the Iran
Nonproliferation Act (INA)

The overall relationship between the United States and Russia is another factor in the
ISS equation, including Russian adherence to U.S. nonproliferation objectives. Getting
Russia to adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), designed to stem
proliferation of ballistic missile technology, appears to have been a primary motivation
behind the Clinton Administration’s decision to add Russia as a partner. The United States
wanted Russia to restructure a contract with India that would have given India advanced
rocket engines and associated technology and know-how. The United States did not object
to giving India the engines, but to the technology and know-how. Russia claimed that
restructuring the contract would cost $400 million. The 1993 agreement to bring Russia into
the space station program included the United States paying Russia $400 million for space
station cooperation. At the same time, Russia agreed to adhere to the MTCR. The question
is what the United States will do if Russia violates the MTCR. Some Members of Congress
believe Russia already has done so. The Clinton Administration sanctioned 10 Russian
entities for providing technology to Iran. Neither the Russian space agency nor any major
Russian ISS contractors or subcontractors were among those sanctioned.
On March 14, 2000, President Clinton signed into law the Iran Nonproliferation Act
(INA), P.L. 106-178. The law, inter alia, prohibits NASA from making “extraordinary
payments” related to ISS after January 1, 1999, in cash or in kind, to Russia unless Russia
takes the necessary steps to prevent the transfer of weapons of mass destruction and missile
systems to Iran, and the President makes a determination that neither the Russian space
agency nor any entity reporting to it has made such transfers for at least one year prior to such
determination. Exceptions are made for payments needed to prevent imminent loss of life by
or grievous injury to individuals aboard ISS (the “crew safety” exception); for payments to
construct, test, prepare, deliver, launch, or maintain Zvezda as long as the funds do not go
to an entity that may have proliferated to Iran and the United States receives goods or
services of commensurate value; and hardware needed to dock the U.S. Interim Control
Module (ICM, discussed earlier). Certain notifications are required if the exceptions are
utilized. NASA was seeking permission to spend $35 million on Russia goods and services,
of which $14 million was for the ICM docking hardware. President Clinton provided
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Congress with a required notification with regard to that $14 million on June 29, 2000.
Ultimately, only $11 million was needed for the ICM hardware, leaving $24 million that
NASA wanted to spend. No determination as required by the act was forthcoming from the
President. NASA considered using the crew safety exception, but at a House International
Relations Committee hearing on October 12, 2000, some committee Members sharply
criticized NASA’s legal interpretation of that exception, particularly NASA’s broad
interpretation of the word “imminent.”
Thus, the INA has important ramifications for whether NASA can keep its astronauts
on ISS for long duration missions after April 2006, or at all after 2010 if the shuttle is
terminated as planned (see Key Issues for Congress, below). The Bush Administration
submitted a proposed amendment to Congress on July 12, 2005, to modify the INA. The
amendment would change the definition of “extraordinary payments.” If adopted, the
revised law would prohibit payments only for goods or services that Russia had previously
agreed to provide at no cost. There has been no legislative action on that proposal to date.
Before the Administration submitted the proposal, the House passed the FY2006 Department
of Defense (DOD) authorization bill (H.R. 1815, Sec. 1211) including a sense of Congress
that the INA has been a “critical tool in preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction
and their associated delivery systems to Iran” and the INA “should not be weakened by
creating exceptions to requirements of such Act to serve lesser policy priorities.” However,
Representative Dana Rohrabacher, who helped draft the INA, stated at a June 28, 2005,
House Science Committee hearing on the future of NASA that the strategy embodied in the
INA “has not worked.” He asserted that neither the Clinton nor the Bush Administrations
provided sufficient follow-up to make the law effective.
Key Issues For Congress
Maintaining ISS Operations While the Shuttle Is Grounded
The grounding of the space shuttle system following the Columbia accident suspended
assembly of ISS, temporarily reduced the size of Expedition crews from three to two, and
complicated efforts to keep the crews supplied with consumables, scientific experiments, and
spare parts for equipment that needs repair. NASA launched the shuttle on its first Return to
Flight mission, STS-114, on July 26, 2005 (see CRS Report RS21408). STS-114 landed
successfully on August 9, after spending much of its mission docked with ISS. Another
shuttle launch was scheduled for September, but a problem occurred during STS-114’s
launch and NASA has again grounded the fleet, so it is not known when the next shuttle
mission will be launched.
In the absence of the shuttle, ISS crews are taken to and from ISS using Russian Soyuz
spacecraft on the same six-month schedule already planned, and Russian Progress spacecraft
resupply the crew. Russia is obligated to provide crew return for three people throughout the
lifetime of ISS. Currently, they accomplish that with two Soyuzes per year (each lasts only
six months once docked to ISS). Russia also is obligated to provide a certain number of
Progress spacecraft, but has cautioned that funding for Soyuz and Progress is not assured.
As discussed above, the INA prohibits NASA from paying Russia for ISS-related activities
unless the President certifies that Russia is not proliferating certain technologies to Iran. The
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other ISS partners to date have not volunteered to pay for additional Soyuz or Progress
spacecraft, although ESA is paying Russia to launch its astronauts to ISS on Soyuz.
The Russians operated seven of their own space stations (see above) using only Soyuz
and Progress spacecraft, so it is possible to keep ISS operating without the shuttle as long as
Russia is willing to provide them. However, operation of ISS was premised on the
availability of the cargo-carrying capacity of the space shuttle. Keeping ISS operating
without the shuttle is challenging. For example, the Expedition 10 crew was required to
reduce its food intake because of shortages aboard the station in late 2004. Stocks were
resupplied by a Progress that reached ISS late that December, but U.S. and Russian space
station personnel made clear that if the Progress had failed to dock, the crew would have had
to return home prematurely because of the food situation. ISS crews also need to repair
faulty equipment, but replacement parts may not fit aboard Progress or Soyuz. NASA’s
decision to again ground the shuttle fleet because of a problem during STS-114’s launch may
lead to questions about whether to keep a crew aboard ISS. In addition to questions about
keeping the crews well supplied, with a two-person crew, less time may be available for
scientific research, and without the shuttle, fewer experiments can be taken to ISS. If little
scientific research can be accomplished, some may question the wisdom of asking astronauts
and cosmonauts to accept the risks inherent in human spaceflight simply to maintain ISS
systems. Conversely, how long ISS could continue to function with no one aboard is
unknown. Progress spacecraft could dock with ISS automatically to reboost it and keep it
at the proper altitude, but a major system malfunction that could not be remedied by ground-
based controllers could imperil the station.
Ensuring U.S. Astronaut Participation in Long-Duration Missions
As noted, ISS crew size is limited in part by the number of occupants that can be
accommodated in a lifeboat, or “crew return vehicle” (CRV), in an emergency. Without its
own CRV, NASA faces two deadlines in terms of assuring access to ISS for long duration
missions by U.S. astronauts. First is spring 2006, when Russia will have fulfilled its
commitment to provide lifeboat services for U.S. astronauts. Second is 2010, when the
shuttle is expected to be retired in accordance with President Bush’s Vision for Space
Exploration. The 2010 deadline is discussed separately (see next issue).
Regarding the spring 2006 deadline, the international agreements that govern the ISS
program obligate Russia to provide crew return services for three crew members throughout
the lifetime of the ISS, and the United States to provide such services for at least four people
beginning when assembly of ISS is completed. Prior to the Columbia tragedy, that milestone
was expected to occur in 2006. By that time, a U.S. CRV, accommodating at least four
people, was expected to be available. It would not only provide lifeboat capabilities for U.S.
crew members, but allow the ISS crew size to grow to seven (three could return on a Soyuz,
and four on the CRV), including representatives from the other partners. However, the Bush
Administration terminated the CRV, and its successor, the Orbital Space Plane. Therefore,
only Russian Soyuz spacecraft are currently available for lifeboat services.
Under a 1996 “balance agreement” between NASA and the Russian space agency,
Russia is obligated to use 11 Soyuz spacecraft to provide crew return for U.S. crews. The
last is scheduled for launch in October 2005, returning to Earth in April 2006. After that,
Russia no longer must allocate any of the seats on its Soyuzes for U.S. astronauts. It can sell
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those flight opportunities to whomever it wishes. Russia is interested in selling flight
opportunities to help finance its space program, so might choose to limit those opportunities
to paying customers. As noted, the INA prevents NASA from paying Russia for ISS-related
activities unless Russia does not proliferate certain technologies to Iran.
The impending situation where Russia’s obligation will be fulfilled, and there is no U.S.
CRV to ensure that American astronauts can be part of Expedition missions, has been
recognized for several years. As that deadline approaches, attention to the issue is increasing,
resulting in the Administration’s proposed amendment to the INA discussed above.
Impact of President Bush’s Vision for Space Exploration, Including
a Potential Gap in U.S. Human Access to Space

President Bush’s January 2004 Vision for Space Exploration directs NASA to focus its
activities on returning humans to the Moon by 2020, and someday sending them to Mars and
“world beyond.” If adopted, it would affect the ISS program in several ways. First, the
President directed that the shuttle be retired in 2010. A NASA budget chart that accompanied
announcement of the Vision shows NASA completing its utilization of ISS by FY2017. By
terminating the shuttle and NASA utilization of the ISS, that funding (approximately $6
billion per year) could be reallocated to achieving other aspects of the Vision. The President
also directed that the U.S. research on ISS be restricted to research needed to support the
Vision, instead of the broadly-based research program that was planned.
The extent to which ISS can be utilized without the space shuttle is not clear. Soyuz
spacecraft can take crews back and forth, but the shuttle’s cargo capacity — both for taking
cargo to ISS, and back to Earth (e.g. the results of scientific experiments, or hardware that
needs repair) — could be expensive to replicate. No other partner has a spacecraft able to
bring material back to Earth today. Europe reportedly is considering adding a return capsule
to its Automated Transfer Vehicle (a robotic cargo spacecraft now expected to make its first
flight in 2006). NASA is exploring the possibility of U.S. commercial companies providing
launch and/or return services for either crews or cargo through the ISS Crew/Cargo activity.
Another issue is how U.S. crews would be able to access ISS once the shuttle is retired
in 2010. As already discussed, NASA is facing an April 2006 deadline regarding Russian
support for U.S. astronauts. If those arrangements cannot be negotiated, U.S. astronauts will
still be able to visit ISS using the shuttle, which typically docks for 1-2 weeks. That option
obviously would not be available once the shuttle is retired. NASA would be dependent on
Russia for access to ISS until NASA’s new Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), being
developed as part of the Vision, is available. CEV’s primary purposes is taking astronauts
to and from the Moon, and the President directed that it be available for Earth orbital
missions by 2014. That would leave a multi-year gap when NASA could not launch its own
astronauts into space, and, initially, NASA would not commit to using it to service the ISS
at all. NASA Administrator Griffin has made ISS servicing part of the CEV’s goals, and
wants to accelerate the availability of the CEV.
When the shuttle is grounded, NASA is dependent on Russia for taking astronauts to
and from the space station, and delivering cargo. While some view the 2010-2014 gap as
similar to the situation today, it would, in fact, be quite different. Today, there is an
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agreement in place where Russia is launching U.S. crews and cargo to ISS at no cost to
NASA. That obligation will be fulfilled in April 2006. No other agreement has been
negotiated. If the INA is amended, Russia could charge whatever price it wanted for those
services. If the INA is not amended, NASA could not pay in any case.
There also is a difference between the emergency situation necessitated by the Columbia
tragedy and the problems with the Discovery launch, and an intentional decision to terminate
NASA’s ability to launch astronauts into space and hope that the political relationship with
Russia remains stable and a mutually beneficial agreement can be negotiated. Congress is
assessing the implications of the extent to which such a decision could create a situation
where U.S. astronauts might not be able to work aboard ISS, a facility being built largely at
U.S. taxpayer expense. If U.S. astronauts cannot be part of Expedition missions, ground-
based alternatives may be available for some of the research. If ground-based alternatives
are available, though, some may question why the United States is continuing to spend such
a large amount of money to complete ISS construction. Others may argue that fulfilling
commitments to the other ISS partners is a sufficient justification.
LEGISLATION
H.R. 1815 (Hunter)/S. 1042 (Warner). FY2006 DOD authorization bill. Reported
from House Armed Services Committee May 20, 2005, H.Rept. 109-89; passed House May
25. Reported from Senate Armed Services Committee May 17 (S.Rept. 109-69); Senate
floor debate began July 20, 2005. House version includes statement about importance of
Iran Nonproliferation Act and that it should not be weakened by creating exceptions intended
to serve “lesser policy priorities.”
H.R. 2862 (Wolf). FY2006 Science, State, Justice, Commerce Appropriations Act
(includes NASA). Reported from House Appropriations Committee June 10, 2005 (H.Rept.
109-118); passed House June 16. Reported from Senate Appropriations Committee June 23
(S.Rept. 109-88).
H.R. 3070 (Calvert)/S. 1281 (Hutchison). NASA authorization bill. H.R. 3070, as
reported from the House Science Committee (H.Rept. 109-173) and passed by the House
July 22 authorizes NASA funding for FY2006-2007. S. 1281 authorizes NASA funding for
FY2006-2010; reported by Senate Commerce Committee July 26 (S.Rept. 109-108).
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