Order Code IB10123
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Trade Negotiations During the 109th Congress
Updated August 3, 2005
Ian F. Fergusson
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Lenore M. Sek
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
U.S. Negotiating Strategy
Notification and Consultation Requirements
Before the Start of Negotiations
During Negotiations
Before Signing the Agreement
Entering Into the Agreement
Agreements Signed
U.S.-Dominican Republic-Central American FTA (DR-CAFTA)
U.S.-Bahrain FTA
Agreements Under Negotiation
Multilateral Trade Negotiations
Regional Negotiations
Free Trade Area of the Americas
U.S.-Southern African Customs Union FTA
U.S.-Andean FTA
U.S.-United Arab Emirates-Oman FTA
Bilateral Negotiations
U.S.-Panama FTA
U.S.-Thailand FTA
Other Potential Trade Agreements
Middle East - North African Free Trade Agreement
Enterprise for ASEAN
New Zealand
Taiwan
Egypt
FOR ADDITIONAL READING

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Trade Negotiations During the 109th Congress
SUMMARY
The Bush Administration has made
Ecuador), the United Arab Emirates, and
bilateral and regional free-trade agreements
Oman. Several other trade initiatives are
(FTAs) more important elements of U.S. trade
under discussion, including a U.S.-Middle
policy, a strategy known as “competitive liber-
East FTA and an FTA with countries in south-
alization.” This strategy, it argues, will push
east Asia.
forward trade liberalization simultaneously on
bilateral, regional and multilateral fronts. It is
An ongoing regional initiative is the Free
meant to spur trade negotiations by liberaliz-
Trade Area of the Americas. In April 1998,
ing trade with countries willing to join FTAs,
34 Western Hemisphere nations formally
and to pressure other countries to negotiate
initiated negotiations on tariffs and nontariff
multilaterally. Critics contend, however, that
trade barriers in the hemisphere, but the talks
the accent on regional and bilateral negotia-
have now stalled.
tions undermines the multilateral forum and
increases the risk of trade diversion away from
The broadest trade initiative being nego-
competitive countries not in the trade bloc.
tiated is the multilateral trade negotiations in
the World Trade Organization (WTO). In
The controversial CAFTA (Central
November 2001, trade ministers from 142
American Free Trade Agreement) — an agree-
WTO member countries agreed to launch a
ment signed with the five countries of the
new round of trade talks covering market
Central American Common Market (CACM)
access, WTO institutional rules, and
and the Dominican Republic — was passed by
developing-country issues. Negotiators are
the House on July 28, 2005, by a vote of 217-
trying to prepare an agreement on modalities
215. Later in the day, the Senate approved the
in time for the WTO Ministerial in Hong
House version of the legislation to implement
Kong in December 2005, but progress has
CAFTA, and President Bush signed it on
been slow.
August 2 (P.L. 109-53). The Administration
also has concluded an FTA with Bahrain but
Potential agreements resulting from
has not presented draft legislation to Con-
current trade negotiations may be considered
gress.
by Congress under trade promotion authority
(fast-track authority) legislation enacted in
The United States is participating in
2002. That legislation covers agreements
several other regional and bilateral trade
signed before June 30, 2007. Under the legis-
negotiations. Agreements were concluded and
lation, if the President meets notification
became effective during the 108th Congress
requirements and other conditions, Congress
with Australia, Chile, and Singapore. Also
will consider a bill to implement a trade agree-
during the 108th Congress, an agreement with
ment under an expedited procedure (no
Morocco was concluded and approved by
amendment, deadlines for votes). The notifi-
Congress, but it is not yet in effect. Negotia-
cation requirements include minimum 90-day
tions are underway with the Southern African
notices before starting negotiations and before
Customs Union (SACU), Panama, Thailand,
signing a trade agreement.
three Andean nations (Colombia, Peru, and
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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On August 2, 2005, President Bush signed the Dominican Republic-Central American
Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA)(P.L. 109-53); the House passed H.R. 3045 on July 28
by a vote of 217-215. The Senate passed H.R. 3045 that day by a vote of 55-45.
The 11th round of negotiations for a U.S.-Andean FTA took place in Miami from July
18-22.
The fourth round of negotiations for a U.S. Thailand FTA took place from July 11-15
in Montana.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
For over 50 years, U.S. trade officials have negotiated multilateral trade agreements to
achieve lower trade barriers and rules to cover international trade. During the 108th
Congress, U.S. officials negotiated and Congress approved four bilateral free-trade
agreements with Australia, Chile, Morocco, and Singapore.1 Currently, the Bush
Administration is making bilateral and regional free-trade agreements more important
elements of its trade policy. The multilateral arena is no longer the only means, or perhaps
even the principal means, by which the United States is pursuing liberalized trade.2
Trade agreements are negotiated by the executive branch, although Congress has the
ultimate Constitutional authority to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. Trade
promotion authority (TPA) requires that the President consult with and advise Congress
throughout the negotiating process. After the executive branch signs an agreement, Congress
may consider implementing legislation if any statutory changes are required under the
agreement. There is no deadline for submission of the legislation, but once a bill is
submitted, TPA requires a final vote within 90 legislative days.
U.S. Negotiating Strategy
U.S. negotiating strategy is based on a concept known as “competitive liberalization.”
As explained by the Administration, this strategy is designed to push forward trade
liberalization on multiple fronts: bilateral, regional and multilateral. It is meant to further
trade negotiations by liberalizing trade with countries willing to join free trade agreements,
and to put pressure on other countries to negotiate in the WTO. According to former United
States Trade Representative (USTR) Robert B. Zoellick,
1 The United States also is a party to four previous negotiated agreements: the U.S.-Israel Free Trade
Agreement (effective 1985), the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (effective 1989), the North
American Free Trade Agreement (effective 1994) and the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement
(effective 2001).
2 For further information, see CRS Report RL31356, Free Trade Agreements: Impact on U.S. Trade
and Implications for U.S. Trade Policy, by William H. Cooper.
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we want to strengthen the hand of the coalition pressing for freer trade. It would be fatal
to give the initiative to naysayers abroad and protectionists at home. As we have seen in
the League of Nations, the UN, the IMF and the World Bank, international organizations
need leaders to prod them into action.3
Critics argue that the accent on regional and bilateral negotiations will undermine the
World Trade Organization (WTO) and increase the risk of trade diversion. Trade diversion
occurs when the lower tariffs under a trade agreement cause trade to be diverted away from
a more efficient producer outside the trading bloc to a producer inside the bloc. What results
from the plethora of negotiated FTAs, according to one article, “is a ‘spaghetti bowl’ of rules,
arbitrary definitions of which products come from where, and a multiplicity of tariffs
depending on source.”4 Nonetheless, in the aftermath of the failure of the WTO Ministerial
meeting in Cancún, Mexico in 2003, then-USTR Zoellick indicated that the United States
would more aggressively pursue bilateral and regional free trade agreements. “We are going
to keep trying to open markets one way or the other,” he reportedly said.5
The manner in which the Administration chooses potential partners has been the subject
of scrutiny by some Members of Congress. Traditionally, regional and bilateral trade
agreements have been negotiated for a mixture of economic, political, and development
reasons. The U.S.-Canada Free-Trade Agreement (FTA) was primarily economic in nature:
recognizing the largest bilateral trade relationship in the world between two countries at a
similar stage of development. The partnership with Mexico to create NAFTA brought in a
country at a different stage of development and gave attention to trade as a lever to encourage
economic advancement. It also had a geopolitical rationale of encouraging stability in the
U.S. neighbor to the south. The FTA with Israel was seen by supporters as an affirmation
of U.S. support for the Jewish state, while the FTA with Jordan can be seen as a reward for
Jordan’s cooperation in the Middle East peace process.
In May 2003, then-USTR Zoellick enumerated several factors used to evaluate
countries seeking to negotiate trade agreements with the United States, but he said there were
no formal rules or procedures to make the determination.6 A GAO study released in January
2004 reported that an interagency process had been established to assess FTA partners using
6 factors. These factors include a country’s readiness in terms of trade capabilities, the
3 Robert B. Zoellick, “Unleashing the Trade Winds,” The Economist, December 7, 2002, p.29.
4 Jagdish Bhagwati and Arvind Panagariya, “Bilateral Trade Treaties Are a Sham,” Financial Times,
July 14, 2003.
5 “U.S. Plans to Accelerate Own Trade Agreements Talks,” Congress Daily, September 14, 2003.
6 These considerations included cooperation with the United States in its foreign and security
policies; country support for U.S. positions in the Free-Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and the
WTO; the ability of a trade agreement to spur internal economic or political reform in the target
country or region; the ability to counteract FTAs among other countries or trading blocs that
disadvantage American firms; the presence of congressional interest or opposition to an FTA;
support among U.S. business and agricultural interests; the ability of a country to anchor broader
trade agreements to spur regional integration; the willingness of a partner to negotiate a
comprehensive agreement covering all economic sectors; and the capacity constraints of the Office
of the USTR. “Following the Bilateral Route?, Washington Trade Daily, May 9, 2003; “Zoellick
Says FTA Candidates Must Support U.S. Foreign Policy,” Inside U.S. Trade, May 16, 2003.
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maturity of its political and legal system, and the will to implement reforms; the economic
benefit to the United States; the country’s support of U.S. trade liberalization goals; a
partner’s compatibility with U.S. foreign and economic policy interests; congressional or
private sector support, and U.S. government resource constraints.7
Some Members of Congress have questioned the manner in which potential FTA
partners are chosen. Senator Max Baucus criticized the Administration for overlooking high
volume trading partners in Asia and has been quoted saying that “this Administration’s trade
policy is dictated largely by its foreign policy, not by economics.”8 In addition, some business
groups have expressed a desire to concentrate more on the multilateral negotiations of the
WTO, which potentially could yield greater commercial gains.9 In January 2005, the National
Association of Manufacturers advocated the commencement of FTA negotiations with
Egypt, India, Malaysia, New Zealand, and South Korea.10
The Administration cites the negotiation of free trade agreements in multilateral,
regional, and bilateral settings as an integral part of its strategy to enhance prosperity and
freedom for the rest of the world. In its September 2002 National Security Strategy, the
Administration seemed to equate the concept of ‘free trade’ to a basic freedom or moral
principle, “the freedom for a person or a nation to make a living.” According to this
document, free-market economic and trade policies, more than development assistance, will
provide nations with the ability to lift themselves out of poverty and to insure stability.11
While the Administration is pursuing trade agreements on multiple fronts, critics
question whether the United States should be negotiating trade agreements at all. They state
that American jobs are lost because of cheaper imports, and that relocation of U.S.
production to other countries has been facilitated by trade agreements. Some argue that trade
agreements do not adequately address the problem of countries with lower labor and
environmental standards that are able to produce at lower cost. Some critics believe that the
U.S. economy will be harmed by the Administration’s pursuit of free-trade agreements.
The result of the competitive liberalization strategy is that the United States is involved
in an unprecedented number of trade negotiations. Multilaterally, the United States and over
140 countries are participating in the Doha Development Agenda under the auspices of the
World Trade Organization. Regionally, the United States is meeting with 33 other western
hemisphere countries in an effort to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas, and has started
FTA negotiations with countries in South America (Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador), Southern
7 GAO Report 04-233, International Trade: Intensifying Free Trade Negotiating Agenda Calls for
Better Allocation of Staff and Resources, January 2004, pp 9-10, 12.
8 “Baucus Proposes FTAs in Asia to Offset Chinese Influence ,” Inside U.S. Trade, December 10,
2004.
9 “Filling Up with Appetizers,” Congress Daily AM, June 11, 2003.
10 NAM, “Recommended Candidates for Additional Free Trade Agreement Negotiations,” available
at [http://www.nam.org/s_nam/bin.asp?CID=46&DID=233031&DOC=FILE.PDF]
11 National Security Council, National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002,
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf], pp. 17-21.
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Africa (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, and Swaziland), Panama, Thailand,
Andean countries (Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru), Oman, and the United Arab Emirates. The
United States has concluded FTAs with Bahrain and with the Dominican Republic and the
countries of the Central American Common Market (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, and Nicaragua); congressional approval is necessary for these agreements.
Agreements with Singapore and Chile entered into force on January 1, 2004 and an
agreement with Australia entered into force on January 1, 2005. The United States has also
concluded an agreement with Morocco, but its implementation has been held up by Morocco,
which is still in the process of drafting legislation consistent with the obligations of the
agreement.
Notification and Consultation Requirements
Later sections of this Issue Brief refer to formal notifications by the Administration to
Congress. Under trade promotion authority (TPA) legislation passed in 2002 (Title XXI,
P.L. 107-210), the President must notify Congress before starting negotiation of a trade
agreement and before signing a completed agreement. TPA legislation applies to trade
agreements entered into before June 1, 2007. If the Administration meets the notification
requirements, consults as required, and satisfies other conditions in the TPA legislation, the
2002 legislation calls on Congress to consider implementing legislation for a trade
agreement under expedited (“trade promotion” or “fast-track”) procedures.12 The following
briefly reviews the notification and consultation requirements.
Before the Start of Negotiations. Before starting negotiations, the Administration
must notify Congress at least 90 calendar days in advance. (This requirement was waived
for certain negotiations that were underway before enactment of the TPA legislation.) Before
and after submitting this notice, the Administration must consult with the relevant
congressional committees and the Congressional Oversight Group (COG).13 The
Administration must comply with certain additional consultation and assessment
requirements for agricultural, textile and apparel, and fish and shellfish negotiations.
During Negotiations. In the course of negotiations, the USTR must consult closely
and on a timely basis with the COG and all committees of jurisdiction. Guidelines developed
by the USTR, in consultation with the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate
Finance Committee (the revenue committees), cover briefings of the COG, access by COG
12 For further information, see CRS Report RL31974, Trade Agreements: Requirements for
Presidential Consultation, Notices, and Reports to Congress Regarding Negotiations, by Vladimir
N. Pregelj, and CRS Report RL32011, Trade Agreements: Procedure for Congressional Approval
and Implementation, by Vladimir N. Pregelj.
13 Members of the COG are the chairman and ranking member of the House Ways and Means
Committee and the Senate Finance Committee, three other members from each of those committees
(no more than two from the same party), and the chairman and ranking member from any other
committees with jurisdiction. COG members are official advisers to the U.S. delegation in trade
negotiations. They consult with and provide advice to the USTR on the formulation of objectives,
negotiating strategies, and other trade matters.
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members and staff to documents, and coordination between the USTR and the COG at
critical periods of the negotiations.
Before Signing the Agreement. At least 180 calendar days before signing a trade
agreement (at least 90 calendar days for an agreement with Chile or with Singapore), the
President must report to the revenue committees on proposals that might require amendments
to U.S. trade remedy laws. At least 90 calendar days before entering into a trade agreement,
the President must notify Congress of the intention to enter into the agreement. No later than
30 days after this notification, private sector advisory committees must submit reports on the
trade agreement to Congress, the President, and the USTR. Also at least 90 calendar days
before entering into a trade agreement, the President must provide the International Trade
Commission (ITC) with the details of the trade agreement and request an assessment.
The USTR must consult closely and on a timely basis (including immediately before
initialing an agreement) with the revenue committees, the COG, and other congressional
advisers, and with the agriculture committees when an agreement relates to agricultural trade.
Entering Into the Agreement. Within 60 days of entering into the agreement, the
President must submit a list of required changes to U.S. law that likely would be necessary
to bring the United States into compliance with the agreement. Not later than 90 calendar
days after the President enters into an agreement, the ITC must report to the President and
to Congress on the likely impact of the agreement on the U.S. economy and on specific
industrial sectors. There is no deadline for submission of an implementing bill.
Agreements Signed
U.S.-Dominican Republic-Central American FTA (DR-CAFTA). On January
8, 2003, negotiations formally began on an FTA between the United States and the five
nations composing the Central American Common Market (CACM) — Costa Rica, El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua.14 U.S. trade with the region totaled $24.0
billion in 2004. The United States imported $13.1 billion (primarily apparel items, bananas,
coffee, and integrated circuits) and exported $10.9 billion (led by apparel, textiles, electrical
generating equipment, and electrical components for assembly).
On December 17, 2003, the United States concluded negotiations on a U.S.-Central
America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) with four of the five CACM countries
(Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua). Costa Rica later agreed to CAFTA on
January 25, 2004, after resolving market access issues with the United States in the areas of
telecommunications, insurance, and agriculture. President Bush notified his intent to enter
into the agreement on February 20, 2004. The parties signed CAFTA on May 28, 2004, at
a ceremony at the Organization of American States in Washington, D.C.
Just as negotiations on CAFTA were completed, the United States began negotiating
an FTA with the Dominican Republic that would integrate the Dominican Republic into the
14 For further information, see CRS Report RL31870, The Dominican Republic-Central America-
United States FTA (DR-CAFTA), by J.F. Hornbeck.
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FTA with the Central American countries. The Dominican Republic is the largest economy
in the Caribbean. Two-way trade between the United States and the Dominican Republic
was valued at $8.6 billion in 2004, with $4.5 billion in U.S. imports and $4.1 billion in U.S.
exports.15 Leading exports include electrical circuitry, ignition and generating parts,
computers, heavy construction equipment, cotton, and apparel. Leading imports are apparel,
medical instruments, circuit breakers, electrical equipment, and jewelry.
Negotiations between the United States and the Dominican Republic began on January
12, 2004, and concluded on March 15, 2004. As negotiated between the United States and
the Dominican Republic, the Dominican Republic would have its own market access
provisions, but would accept the CAFTA framework already negotiated. On March 25,
2004, the President notified Congress of his intent to sign the FTA with the Dominican
Republic. A new agreement was signed by all seven countries in Washington, D.C., on
August 5, 2004, and was referred to as the DR-CAFTA. The House Ways and Means
Committee held its first hearing into CAFTA on April 21, 2005. The agreement has been
ratified with three of the signatories: El Salvador on December 7, 2004; Honduras on March
3, 2005; and Guatemala on March 10, 2005.
Under the DR-CAFTA, more than 80% of U.S. consumer and industrial exports would
become duty-free immediately, with all tariffs removed within 10 years. Tariffs would go
to zero on information technology products, agricultural and construction equipment, paper
products, chemicals, and medical/scientific equipment, among others. Over half of current
U.S. farm exports to Central America would become duty-free immediately, including “high
quality” cuts of beef, cotton, wheat, soybeans, certain fruits, and vegetables, processed food
products, and wine. At the same time, the U.S. conceded to slight increases in sugar quotas
for the Central American countries. Advances were also made in other areas important to
the United States, including services trade, intellectual property rights, investment, and
government procurement. For Central American parties, benefits received under the
Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) would become permanent.
In the United States, there is opposition to liberalizing trade rules for Central America’s
major exports, apparel and agricultural goods, especially from the U.S. sugar industry and
some textile sectors. There is also considerable resistence to the agreement from labor
groups, although many industry groups have come out in favor of the agreement. On
December 16, 2004, U.S. labor groups petitioned USTR to investigate the continued
eligibility of four of the CAFTA countries (Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador, and
Honduras) for generalized system of preferences (GSP) benefits, citing attempts to diminish
statutory labor protections.16
Trade promotion authority procedures apply to legislation to implement the CAFTA
agreement. On June 23, 2005, President Bush sent draft implementing legislation to
Congress. On the same day, the legislation was introduced in the House (H.R. 3045) and in
15 U.S. import and export data throughout the Issue Brief are from the United States International
Trade Commission, Interactive Trade and Tariff Dataweb, available at [http://dataweb.usitc.gov].
Data are imports for consumption (Customs value) and domestic exports (Fas value).
16 “Labor Groups Petition USTR to Review FTA Partners’ GSP Eligibility,” Inside U.S. Trade,
December 24, 2004.
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the Senate (S. 1307). The bills were referred to the Ways and Means Committee and to the
Finance Committee respectively. The Senate Finance Committee approved S. 1307 by voice
vote on June 29, 2005, and the full Senate approved the bill by a 54-45 vote on June 30,
2005. The House Ways and Means Committee ordered H.R. 3045 favorably reported by a
25-16 vote on June 30, 2005. The House approved the legislation on July 28, 2005, by a vote
of 217-215, and later in the day this bill passed the Senate by a vote of 55-45.17 The
President signed the legislation on August 2 (P.L. 109-53).
U.S.-Bahrain FTA. On January 26, 2004, formal negotiations began on a U.S.-
Bahrain FTA. Talks concluded after three rounds on May 27, 2004.18 On September 14,
2004, the two countries signed an agreement. Implementing legislation has not yet been
submitted. The Administration has praised the economic and commercial environment of
the sheikhdom. The proposed FTA is touted by the Administration as a first step in the
creation of the Middle East Free Trade Area by 2013, and it foresees the possibility that other
nations in the gulf region could link to this agreement as they reform their economies and
develop their trade potential. Bahrain is a kingdom of 690,000 persons (mid-year 2003) with
a GDP of $9.1 billion (2003).19 Bahrain was a founding member of the WTO in 1995 and
signed a Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) with the United States in 2001 and a Trade and
Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) in 2002. The nation has diversified its economy
away from dependence on petroleum and has created a services hub for information
technology, telecommunications and health care. U.S. merchandise trade with Bahrain
totaled $684 million in 2004: imports of $406 million included apparel, textiles, fertilizers,
chemicals, and aluminum and exports of $278 million were led by aircraft and aircraft parts,
military equipment, passenger vehicles, machinery, and, not surprisingly, air conditioning
equipment.
Agreements Under Negotiation
Multilateral Trade Negotiations
At the 4th Ministerial meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Doha, Qatar
on November 9-14, 2001, trade ministers from over 140 member countries of the World
Trade Organization agreed to launch a new round of multilateral trade negotiations.20 The
negotiations became known as the Doha Development Agenda, because of the possibility of
increased participation of developing-country members, which now account for about four-
fifths of the WTO members.
17 Although the Senate had acted previously, the final legislation must originate in the House (as a
revenue measure), and the bills must be identical (under TPA procedures), hence the revote.
18 For further information, see CRS Report RS21846, Proposed U.S.-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement,
by Martin A. Weiss.
19 The World Bank. “Country at a Glance Tables” available on the World Bank web page at
[http://www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/countrydata.html].
20 For further information, see CRS Report RL32060, World Trade Organization Negotiations: The
Doha Development Agenda, by Lenore Sek.
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The work program combined on-going negotiations on agriculture and services
liberalization with new negotiations on trade barriers for industrial products, WTO rules on
dumping and subsidies, several topics that developing countries had sought such as easier
access to medicines under the existing WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), and so-called “Singapore issues” (investment,
competition, transparency in government procurement, and trade facilitation).
On August 1, 2004, negotiators in Geneva reached agreement on a framework for the
conduct of future negotiations.21 This framework had been the goal of the unsuccessful 5th
Ministerial, held in Cancún, Mexico, in September 2003. The framework provides a
blueprint for future negotiations on agriculture, non-agricultural market access (NAMA), and
services. Ministers also agreed to begin negotiations on trade facilitation, but the other
so-called Singapore issues of government procurement, investment, and trade and
competition policy were dropped from the Doha round negotiations. Members
acknowledged that the December 31, 2004 deadline for completion of the round would not
be met, and the framework set no new deadline. Negotiators also announced that the 6th
Ministerial would occur in December 2005 in Hong Kong. WTO negotiators began their
August recess with disagreements persisting on the tariff formula for the agriculture
negotiations, disciplines on agricultural subsidies and export competition, and modalities for
the NAMA negotiations.
Regional Negotiations
Free Trade Area of the Americas. In 1994, 34 Western Hemisphere nations met
at the first Summit of the Americas, envisioning a plan for a Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA) by January 2005. The FTAA is a regional trade proposal among 34 nations of the
Western Hemisphere that would promote economic integration by creating, as originally
conceived, a comprehensive (presumably WTO-plus) framework for reducing tariff and
nontariff barriers to trade and investment.22 The United States traded $816.6 billion worth
of goods with the FTAA countries in 2004: $309.9 billion in exports and $506.6 billion in
imports.
Formal negotiations commenced in 1998, and five years later, the third draft text of the
agreement was presented at the Miami trade ministerial held November 20-21, 2003. The
FTAA negotiations, however, are at a crossroads, with Brazil and the United States, the co-
chairs of the Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) that oversees the process, at odds over
how to proceed. Deep differences remain unresolved as reflected in the Ministerial
Declaration, which has taken the FTAA in a new direction. It calls for a two-tier framework
comprising a set of “common rights and obligations” for all countries, augmented by
voluntary plurilateral arrangements with country benefits related to commitments. A follow-
up meeting in Puebla, Mexico in February 2004, was unable to clarify the details of this
21 For more information, see CRS Report RL32645. The Doha Development Agenda: The WTO
Framework Agreement, coordinated by Ian F. Fergusson, and CRS Report RS21905, The
Agricultural Framework Agreement in the Doha Round Negotiations, by Charles Hanrahan.
22 For more information, see CRS Report RS20864, A Free Trade Area of the Americas: Status of
Negotiations and Major Policy Issues, by J. F. Hornbeck.
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arrangement and subsequent efforts have been inconclusive, leaving the future of the FTAA
unclear.
Progress on the FTAA still depends on Brazil and the United States agreeing on the
common set of obligations and defining parameters for plurilateral arrangements. This goal
remains elusive, despite ongoing communications between their trade representatives. In the
meantime, the trade dynamics of the region are changing, with many in the region heading
toward bilateral agreements with the United States, the EU, and each other. Brazil and other
Mercosur countries may have to evaluate the welfare tradeoffs of entering a deeper versus
a shallower two-tier FTAA, or no FTAA at all given the agreements forming around them.
This picture is still unclear and how it develops may depend on whether or not the U.S.
Congress passes implementing legislation for the DR-CAFTA, Panama, and Andean
agreements, as well as whether progress on agriculture issues outlined in the Doha Work
Programme (framework agreement) adopted by the WTO on August 1, 2004, changes
Brazil’s negotiating position in the FTAA. The Government Accountability Office (GAO)
recently issued a report criticizing the handling of the FTAA negotiations by its two co-
chairs, the United States and Brazil. It faulted two mechanisms intended to facilitate progress
as having failed to revitalize the talks, the two-tiered negotiating structure and the co-
chairmanship of the U.S. and Brazil. It also faulted the two nations for placing a higher
priority on other trade negotiations, such as the Doha Round and other regional FTAs.23
U.S.-Southern African Customs Union FTA. On November 4, 2002, the USTR
notified Congress of the intent to negotiate an FTA with the Southern African Customs
Union (SACU).24 The first round of talks began in Johannesburg, South Africa on June 3,
2003. SACU is a customs union composed of South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia,
and Swaziland. A large degree of economic integration exists among the SACU states led
by South Africa, the dominant economic power. U.S. imports from SACU totaled $6.9
billion in 2004, composed of minerals such as platinum, diamonds, and titanium, textiles
and apparel, vehicles, and automotive parts. U.S. exports to SACU totaled $3.1 billion, led
by aircraft, vehicles, construction and agricultural equipment, and computers. Potential
problems include competition issues concerning the South African telecommunications
industry and government procurement, especially South Africa’s Black Economic
Empowerment Program, U.S. textile tariffs and quotas, and intellectual property rights with
regard to access to HIV/AIDS medicines. While all the SACU states are eligible for the tariff
preferences under the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act (Title I, P.L. 106-200), the
negotiation of an FTA would “lock-in” and potentially expand such tariff advantages. SACU
trade ministers met with then-USTR Zoellick on December 10, 2004, and acknowledged the
talks were stalled. They announced that the parties would create a new framework to re-
invigorate the negotiations.25 There is no date set for the next round of talks.
23 GAO Report 05-168, FTAA: Missed Deadline Prompts Efforts to Restart Stalled Hemispheric
Trade Negotiations, March 2005.
24 For further information, see CRS Report RS21387, United States-Southern African Customs
Union (SACU) Free Trade Agreement Negotiations: Background and Potential Issues, by Ian F.
Fergusson.
25 “U.S.-SACU Free Trade Negotiations Put on Hold; New Mechanism Being Created,”
International Trade Reporter, December 16, 2004.
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U.S.-Andean FTA. On November 18, 2003, the Administration formally notified
Congress of the intent to initiate negotiations for an FTA with Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and
Bolivia. The negotiations began on May 18-19, 2004, with Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador in
Cartagena, Colombia, and 11 rounds have been held so far,26 the latest taking place in Miami
on July 18-22, 2005. U.S. preferential treatment for imports from Colombia, Peru, Ecuador,
and Bolivia terminate at year-end 2006. In 2004, the United States imported $15.5 billion
from the four Andean countries and exported $7.7 billion, for a total of $23.2 billion in trade.
Colombia accounted for half of that total. Leading U.S. imports in 2004 from the four
countries were crude and refined petroleum oils, which were primarily from Colombia and
Ecuador; bananas; copper; coffee; and cut flowers. About half of U.S. imports from the
region came in under existing Andean trade preferences. Leading U.S. exports were
machinery parts, data processing machines, corn, wheat, and telecommunications
transmission apparatus such as cell phones. Negotiators have had difficulty resolving issues
concerning agricultural market access, data exclusivity for pharmaceutical patents, “second-
use” patent provisions, and attempts to protect IPR rights of Andean-origin biodiversity.
Negotiators are also attempting to resolve several investment disputes between U.S.
companies and Peru and Ecuador.
U.S.-United Arab Emirates-Oman FTA. On November 15, 2004, the USTR sent
formal notification to Congress that the Administration intended to pursue FTA negotiations
with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman. Talks began in March 2005 with each
nation. The USTR said that an FTA would be a move toward the President’s plan for a
Middle East Free Trade Area. (See “Other Potential Trade Agreements” below.) The USTR
also said that an FTA with the UAE and Oman would build on FTAs already in effect with
Israel, Jordan, and Morocco and an FTA signed with Bahrain, and that an FTA would
encourage the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council to take measures to promote trade
and investment. The USTR stated that FTAs with Middle Eastern countries were consistent
with the 9/11 Commission recommendation that the United States encourage development
in the Middle East by expanding trade. Worker protections in the UAE and Oman are
proving to be a controversial issue in the negotiations. Both nations rely heavily on guest
workers, and reportedly place heavy restrictions on the right to strike or to organize.27
Further, the Administration has identified the UAE as one of four countries that might be the
subject of U.S. sanctions for human trafficking.28 In 2004, the United States imported $1.5
billion from both the UAE and Oman ($1.1 billion - UAE; $0.4 billion - Oman) and exported
$4.0 billion to both countries ($3.6 billion - UAE; $0.3 billion - Oman; numbers do not add
to total due to rounding). The leading U.S. import by far was crude petroleum. Leading U.S.
exports were aircraft, cars, and machinery.
26 For further information, see CRS Report RL32770. Andean-U.S. Free-Trade Agreement
Negotiations, by Lenore Sek.
27 U.S. to Conclude Oman FTA as Early As Next Month After Two Rounds, Inside U.S. Trade, April
29, 2005.
28 Yerkey, Gary G. “U.S. Threatens FTA Partners in Gulf With Sanctions Over Human Trafficking.”
Bureau of National Affairs, Inc. Daily Report for Executives. June 6, 2005.
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Bilateral Negotiations
U.S.-Panama FTA. During the FTAA summit in Miami on November 18, 2003,
then-USTR Zoellick announced that the Administration had formally notified Congress of
its intent to begin negotiations for an FTA with Panama. 29 Those bilateral negotiations
began formally on April 25, 2004, in Panama City, Panama. The negotiations have
progressed quickly in part because they have relied on the text of the DR-CAFTA agreement
as an overall framework for discussion. In announcing the proposed FTA, the USTR cited
Panama’s return to democracy, its position as a regional financial and commercial center, and
its assistance with counternarcotics, anti-terrorism, and anti-money laundering efforts.
Panama was the 66th largest trading partner of the United States in 2004 with total trade of
$1.9 billion. U.S. imports of $0.3 billion were led by shrimp, fresh fish, precious or semi-
precious metals, refined petroleum, and sugar. U.S. exports in 2004 totaled $1.6 billion and
were comprised of refined petroleum, aircraft, medicaments, corn, computer parts and
accessories and telecommunications equipment. In the negotiations, the United States is
seeking to address high tariff levels on some agricultural products, restrictive service
licensing practices, and the lack of regulatory transparency. Panama will seek greater access
to its largest market, the United States, which purchased 13% of its exports in 2003 and is
also seeking maritime concessions. On December 16, 2004, U.S. labor groups petitioned
USTR to investigate the continued eligibility of Panama for GSP benefits, citing lack of
progress in enforcing existing rights and attempts to diminish statutory labor protections.30
The eighth round of talks was held January 31-February 6, 2005. Negotiations have not
concluded on sensitive agricultural products, on investment and government procurement
related to the Panama Canal Area.

U.S.-Thailand FTA. On February 12, 2004, the Administration officially notified
Congress of its intent to negotiate an FTA with Thailand. Negotiations began formally on
June 28, 2004 in Hawaii.31 The White House sees potential benefits as: (1) promotion of
U.S. exports, notably benefitting U.S. farmers and the auto and auto parts industries; (2)
protection of U.S. investment; and (3) advancement of the Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative
(mentioned later in this issue brief) and the U.S.-Singapore FTA.32 It also emphasized
Thailand’s importance on military, security and political issues. Thailand is the 19th largest
U.S. trading partner. Two-way trade in 2004 was $23.3 billion — $17.5 billion in U.S.
imports, $5.8 billion in U.S. exports. Leading U.S. imports were computers and parts,
television receivers, and jewelry, and leading exports were integrated circuits,
semiconductors, computers and computer parts. The continuation of a 25% U.S. tariff on
light trucks, intellectual property rights protections, and sugar are issues in the negotiations.
29 For further information, see CRS Report RL32540, The Proposed U.S.-Panama Free Trade
Agreement, by J. F. Hornbeck.
30 “Labor Groups Petition USTR to Review FTA Partners’ GSP Eligibility,” Inside U.S. Trade,
December 24, 2004.
31 For further information, see CRS Report RL32314. U.S.-Thailand Free Trade Agreement
Negotiations, by Raymond J. Ahearn and Wayne M. Morrison.
32 The White House. Fact Sheet on Free Trade and Thailand. October 19, 2003.
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Other Potential Trade Agreements
Middle East - North African Free Trade Agreement. On May 9, 2003, President
Bush announced an initiative to create a U.S.- Middle East Free Trade Agreement by 2013.
This initiative would create a multi-stage process to prepare countries in the region for an
FTA with the United States. Countries would begin the process by negotiating accession to
the World Trade Organization33 and subsequently by concluding Bilateral Investment
Treaties (BIT) and Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFA) with the United
States.34 As domestic reforms progress, countries would then negotiate FTAs with the
United States, possibly linking to other existing or planned FTAs, such as with Jordan,
Morocco or Bahrain. As mentioned above, on November 15, 2004, the Administration
notified Congress of its intent to negotiate an FTA with the UAE and Oman. Qatar and
Kuwait have also been mentioned as a near-term FTA candidates.
The Administration’s rationale for this potential FTA is to provide the incentive for the
transformation of the economies of the Middle East and their integration into the world
economy. One study reports that, since 1980, the share of world exports emanating from
middle eastern countries has dropped from 13.5% to 4%, and that per capita income has
fallen by 25% in the Arab world.35
Enterprise for ASEAN. This initiative, announced by President Bush on October 26,
2002, provides the impetus for the negotiation of bilateral FTAs with individual countries
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia,
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam). The first stage
of this process is expected to be the negotiation of a region-wide trade and investment
framework agreement (TIFA), which is seen as the first step in the process of negotiating
individual FTAs with ASEAN member states. Thailand is the first candidate for an FTA
under this initiative (see earlier section on Thailand). As seen by the Administration, the
principal benefits to the United States of FTAs with ASEAN member states are the potential
to reduce high tariffs on agricultural products and to eliminate restrictive tariff-rate quotas
on other U.S. exports, while the major benefit to ASEAN countries would be improved
access to the U.S. market. The initiative is also seen as a way of countering growing Chinese
influence in the region. Two-way trade with ASEAN reached $131.7 billion in 2004, with
imports of $87.3 billion and exports of $44.3 billion.
New Zealand. In the 109th Congress, there is some congressional interest in launching
FTA negotiations with New Zealand. In February 2005, 54 House Members launched the
“Friends of New Zealand Congressional Caucus” to demonstrate support for FTA
negotiations. Proponents claim an FTA with New Zealand would be a natural complement
to then ongoing U.S. FTA negotiations with Australia due to the high degree of integration
33 In the Middle East region, Afghanistan, Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria,
and Yemen are not members of the WTO.
34 “President Bush Lays Out Broad Plan for Regional FTA with Middle East by 2013,” International
Trade Reporter, May 15, 2003.
35 Edward Gresser, “Blank Spot on the Map: How Trade Policy Is Working Against the War on
Terror,” Progressive Policy Institute Policy Report, February 2003.
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of the Australian and New Zealand economies. However, Administration officials have
enumerated several political and security impediments to a potential FTA, including New
Zealand’s longstanding refusal to allow nuclear powered ships into its harbors and its refusal
to support the United States in the Iraq war.36 An FTA with New Zealand may also entail
tough negotiations on sensitive U.S. agriculture sectors such as beef, lamb, and sugar,
although many of these issues were also under negotiation with Australia. For its part, New
Zealand fears that a solo U.S.-Australian FTA would reorient U.S. trade and investment
away from New Zealand towards Australia. New Zealand was the 51st largest trading partner
of the United States in 2004 with two-way trade of $4.9 billion. U.S. imports of $2.9 billion
were led by meat, dairy products, wood products, and machinery. U.S. exports of $2.0
billion were led by machinery, aircraft and parts, electronic equipment and vehicles.
Taiwan. An FTA with Taiwan has been advanced by proponents in the last several
years.37 In the 108th Congress, House Majority Leader Tom DeLay lent support to an FTA
with Taiwan in a speech to the American Enterprise Institute on June 2, 2003.38 Taiwan is
the 8th largest U.S. trading partner with total two-way trade in 2004 of $54.8. The United
States is now Taiwan’s second largest trading partner after mainland China. In 2004, the
U.S. imported $34.5 billion in merchandise from Taiwan with computers, circuitry, vehicle
parts, television transmission, and telecommunications equipment leading. U.S. exports to
Taiwan, which totaled $20.3 billion, included integrated electronic circuits, electrical
machinery, aircraft parts, corn, and soybeans. While the Bush Administration has indicated
support for the concept of a U.S.-Taiwan FTA, it cites several outstanding trade disputes,
including Taiwan’s enforcement of intellectual property rights, the imposition of excessive
standards, testing, certification and labeling requirements, and Taiwanese rice import
quotas.39 In addition, the negotiation of an FTA with Taiwan likely would encounter the ire
of the mainland Chinese government, which considers Taiwan to be a province of China.
Taiwan acceded to the WTO on January 1, 2002 and signed a Trade and Investment
Framework Agreement with the United States in 1994.
Egypt. Egypt is the 55th largest trading partner of the United States with U.S. imports
in 2004 of $1.3 billion, exports of $3.0 billion, and two-way trade totaling $4.3 billion.
Major export to Egypt include cereals, aircraft and parts, machinery, vehicles and parts,
telecommunications equipment, and arms; imports include textiles, apparel, carpets,
petroleum, and iron and steel. With a population of 65.3 million, Egypt is the largest country
in the Middle East. Egypt has been a member of the World Trade Organization since 1995,
and it has concluded a TIFA with the United States.
Egypt’s central position in the Arab world has recently led to speculation that the United
States would seek to launch FTA negotiations. In November 2004, a House Ways and
36 “Zoellick Says Relationship with New Zealand Makes FTA a Challenge,” Inside U.S. Trade, May
23, 2003.
37 For further information, see CRS Report RS20683. Taiwan’s Accession to the WTO and Its
Economic Relations with the United States and China, by Wayne M. Morrison.
38 Available at [http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.17544,filter.all/pub_detail.asp].
39 U.S. Trade Representative, 2005 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, p.
pp. 591-608.
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Means Committee delegation led by Chairman Thomas found reforms in customs
administration, tariff reduction, and tax reform encouraging, but they cited continuing
intellectual property rights violations and Egyptian restrictions on U.S. agricultural imports
as impediments to an agreement.40 In addition, discriminatory taxes on imports and poor
labor rights standards have also been mentioned as impediments to an agreement.41 At a
Cairo news conference on December 14, 2004, then-USTR Zoellick announced that the two
sides would conduct “in-depth discussions on all aspects of the agreement” in January 2005
and that he was “pleased with the follow-through” on U.S. concerns.42 In January 2005, the
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) indicated that it opposed
launching FTA negotiations with Egypt after the Egyptian Ministry of Health granted
marketing approval to generic drugs without, PhRMA alleges, providing legally required data
exclusivity periods.43 In addition, the two sides reportedly have established a number of
exploratory “subcommittees” to prepare for the negotiations.44
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
The WTO
CRS Report RL32053. Agriculture in WTO Negotiations, by Charles E. Hanrahan.
CRS Report RL32060. The World Trade Organization: The Doha Development Agenda, by
Lenore M. Sek.
CRS Report RL32645. The Doha Development Agenda: The WTO Framework Agreement,
coordinated by Ian F. Fergusson.
CRS Report RS21569. Geographical Indications and WTO Negotiations, by Charles E.
Hanrahan.
CRS Report RS21609. The WTO, Intellectual Property Rights, and the Access to Medicines
Controversy, by Ian F. Fergusson.
CRS Report RS21905. The Agricultural Framework Agreement in the WTO Doha Round,
by Charles Hanrahan
40 House Ways and Means Committee, “Congressional Delegation to Tunisia, Jordan, Oman, and
Egypt: Finding by the Delegation,” November 17, 2004. [http://waysandmeans.house.gov/media/pdf/trade/
111704codelfindings.pdf]
41 “U.S. to Consider Egypt FTA After Next TIFA, Wants Further Reforms,” Inside U.S. Trade,
January 14, 2005.
42 “Zoellick Says U.S. Moving More Quickly Toward Free Trade Agreement with Egypt,” Daily
Report for Executives, December 16, 2004.
43 “PHRMA Calls for U.S. to Oppose Egypt FTA Over IPR Violations,” Inside U.S. Trade, February
4, 2005.
44 U.S., Egypt Set Up ‘Subcommittees’ To Lay Groundwork for Free Trade Talks, International
Trade Reporter, July 21, 2005.
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IB10123
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Free Trade Area of the Americas
CRS Report RL30935. Agricultural Trade in the Free Trade Area of the Americas, by Remy
Jurenas.
CRS Report RS20864. A Free Trade Area of the Americas: Major Policy Issues and Status
of Negotiations, by J. F. Hornbeck.
Regional and Bilateral FTAs
CRS Report RL32770. Andean-U.S. Free-Trade Agreement Negotiations, by Lenore Sek.
CRS Report RL32322. Central America and the Dominican Republic in the Context of the
Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) with the United States, coordinated by K. Larry
Storrs.
CRS Report RS21464. Morocco - U.S. Free Trade Agreement, by Raymond J. Ahearn.
CRS Report RL32375. The U.S.-Australia Free Trade Agreement: Provisions and
Implications, by William H. Cooper.
CRS Report RS21846. Proposed U.S.-Bahrain Free Trade Agreement, by Martin A. Weiss.
CRS Report RL32540. The Proposed U.S.-Panama Free Trade Agreement, by J. F.
Hornbeck.
CRS Report RS20683. Taiwan’s Accession to the WTO and Its Economic Relations with the
United States and China, by Wayne M. Morrison.
CRS Report RS21387. United States - Southern African Customs Union (SACU) Free Trade
Agreements Negotiations: Background and Potential Issues, by Ian F. Fergusson.
CRS Report RL31870. The Dominican Republic-Central America-United States FTA (DR-
CAFTA), by J. F. Hornbeck.
CRS Report RL31144. The U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement: Economic and Trade Policy
Issues, by J. F. Hornbeck.
CRS Report RL30652. U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, by Mary Jane Bolle.
CRS Report RL31789. The U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, by Dick K. Nanto.
CRS Report RL32314. U.S.-Thailand Free Trade Agreement Negotiations, by Raymond J.
Ahearn and Wayne M. Morrison.
General
CRS Report RS21554. Free Trade Agreements and WTO Exceptions, by Jeanne J. Grimmett
and Todd Tatelman.
CRS Report RL31356. Free Trade Agreements: Impact on U.S. Trade and Implications for
U.S. Trade Policy, by William H. Cooper.
CRS Report RL31974. Trade Agreements: Requirements for Presidential Consultations,
Notices, and Reports to Congress Regarding Negotiations, by Vladimir N. Pregelj.
CRS Report RL31932. Trade Agreements: Impact on the U.S. Economy, by James K.
Jackson.
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Trade Negotiations During the 109th Congress
(* - Agreements Signed)
U.S. Total
Agreement
Trade+
Status
Sensitive Areas
($ bill.)
Doha
$ 2,111.1
A work program was produced at the trade ministerial
Agriculture,
Development
meeting in Doha in Nov. 2001. On August 1, 2004,
industrial market
Agenda of the
negotiators reached a framework agreement on the conduct
access, services
WTO
of future negotiations. The next Ministerial meeting is
trade facilitation,
scheduled for Hong Kong in December 2005.
development issues
Free Trade Area
$ 816.6
Negotiations began in 1998. Trade ministers met in Miami
Agriculture,
of the Americas
on Nov. 20-21, 2003, where the third draft text of the
antidumping,
agreement was presented. Talks have stalled, with no date
textiles and apparel,
for the next ministerial meeting.
worker rights, IPR
* U.S.-
$32.6
Talks were formally launched with five Central American
Textiles and
Dominican
countries on Jan. 8, 2003. An agreement was reached
apparel, rules of
Republic-
with four countries on Dec. 17, 2003. The fifth country
origin, worker
Central America
joined the agreement, and the text was released, on Jan. 25,
rights, agriculture,
FTA (DR-
2004. The agreement (CAFTA) was signed on May 28,
environment, IPR.
CAFTA)
2004. Talks formally began between the United States and
the Dominican Republic (DR) on Jan. 12, 2004. An
agreement was reached on Mar. 15, 2004. The United
States, the five Central American countries, and the DR
signed the DR-CAFTA agreement on Aug. 5, 2004.
The House approved implementing legislation (H.R. 3045)
on July 28, 2005 by a vote of 217-215, and later in the day,
this bill passed the Senate by a vote of 55-45. The
President signed the legislation on August 2 (P.L. 109-53)
U.S.-Thailand
$23.3
The Administration officially notified Congress of its
Sugar, trucks,
FTA
intent to negotiate an FTA on Feb. 12, 2004. Negotiations
telecomm., IPR
formally began on June 28, 2004.
U.S.-Andean
$23.2
On Nov. 18, 2003, the Administration notified Congress of
IPR, agriculture,
FTA
(includes
its intent to begin negotiations with Colombia, Peru,
investment
$0.4 for
Ecuador, and Bolivia. On May 18-19, 2004 the United
Bolivia)
States began FTA talks with Colombia, Peru, and
Ecuador; Bolivia is observing the talks.
U.S.-SACU FTA
$10.0
Talks began on June 3, 2003, and have been extended
procurement,
beyond the end-2004 deadline.
textiles,
pharmaceuticals
U.S.-United
$5.5
On Nov. 15, 2004, the Administration formally notified
Worker rights,
Arab Emirates
Congress of the intent to begin negotiations on an FTA.
investment,
(UAE)-Oman
Talks began the week of March 8 with the UAE and a
services
FTA
week later with Oman.
U.S.- Panama
$1.9
On Nov. 18, 2003, the Administration formally notified
Agriculture,
Congress of its intent to begin negotiations with Panama.
services, maritime
Talks began formally on Apr. 25, 2004.
services
* U.S.-Bahrain
$0.7
Talks began on Jan. 26, 2004. An agreement was reached
Serve as hub for
FTA
on May 27, 2004 and signed on Sept. 14, 2004. So far, the
Middle East FTA
Administration has not proposed a draft implementing bill.
+Domestic exports (Fas value) plus imports for consumption (Customs value) with countries of the proposed agreement in 2004.
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