Order Code RL32988
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
The National Aeronautics and Space
Administration’s FY2006 Budget Request:
Description, Analysis, and Issues for Congress
Updated August 1, 2005
Marcia S. Smith and Daniel Morgan
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Congressional Research Service { The Library of Congress

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s
FY2006 Budget Request: Description, Analysis, and
Issues for Congress
Summary
For FY2006, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is
requesting $16.456 billion. That amount is a 2.4% increase over the $16.070 billion
(adjusted for the rescission) appropriated in the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations
Act (P.L. 108-447). NASA also received a supplemental of $126 million for
hurricane relief, for a total FY2005 appropriated level of $16.196 billion. The
FY2006 request is 1.6% above that total amount. By comparison, last year the White
House projected that NASA’s budget would increase by 4.7%. NASA submitted a
FY2006 budget amendment on July 15; total funding for the agency did not change.
Congress is debating both appropriations and authorization bills for NASA.
NASA’s appropriations are in the FY2006 Science, State, Justice, Commerce (SSJC)
appropriations bill (H.R. 2862). The House-passed version approves $15 million
above the request. The Senate version, as reported from committee (S.Rept. 109-
88), cuts the request by $60 million. The House-passed NASA authorization bill
(H.R. 3070), following adoption of a manager’s amendment, includes $510 million
more than the request. The Senate version, as reported from the Senate Commerce
Committee (S. 1281, S.Rept. 109-108), recommends $100 million above the request.
Debate over NASA’s FY2006 request centers on plans to implement the Vision
for Space Exploration, announced by President Bush in January 2004. The Vision
calls for NASA to return humans to the Moon by 2020, and someday send them to
Mars. President Bush did not propose adding significant funding to NASA’s
five-year budget plan to implement the Vision. Instead, the agency must redirect
funds from its other activities. NASA’s resources are being strained by that decision,
increased funding demands for returning the space shuttle to flight status, cost growth
in existing programs, and the need to fund congressionally-directed items.
NASA Administrator Dr. Michael Griffin testified to Congress in May 2005 that
NASA cannot afford all the programs currently on its plate, and priorities must be
set. He also is changing the emphasis on some of the Vision-related activities. For
example, he is accelerating development of a Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) to
reduce an expected multi-year gap between when the space shuttle is to be terminated
(2010) and the availability of the CEV. During that gap, the United States would not
have its own ability to launch astronauts, and thus would be dependent on Russia for
crew transportation to the International Space Station (ISS). To pay for accelerating
the CEV, Dr. Griffin plans to reduce funding for other Vision-related activities such
as developing nuclear power and propulsion systems (Project Prometheus) or
performing research on ISS.
NASA’s FY2006 budget request also assumes a reduction of about 2,500 NASA
civil servants by the beginning of FY2007. As it considers the FY2006 request,
Congress is debating whether to adopt the Vision, and if it does, the resulting impact
on NASA’s other activities and the agency itself. This report will be updated. An
abbreviated version is available as CRS Report RS22063.

Contents
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Introduction to NASA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
NASA’s Historical Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Congressional Committee Reorganizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Overview of NASA’s FY2006 Budget Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Appropriations Action on the FY2006 Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
House (H.R. 2862) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Senate (H.R. 2862) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Authorization Action on the FY2006 Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
House (H.R. 3070) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Senate (S. 1281) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Major NASA Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Should NASA Be a “Single Mission” Agency Implementing the
Vision for Space Exploration? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Key Features of the Vision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Personnel Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Congressional Reaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
FY2005 Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
FY2006 Budget Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Dr. Griffin’s Proposed Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
What is the Space Shuttle’s Future? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Terminating the Shuttle in 2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Proposal for a “Shuttle-Derived” Launch Vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
FY2005 Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
FY2006 Budget Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
What Should Be the U.S. Strategy for the International Space Station
Program? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
FY2005 Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
FY2006 Budget Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Should the Hubble Space Telescope be Serviced? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
FY2005 Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
FY2006 Budget Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
What is the Future of NASA’s Aeronautics Program? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
“Transforming” NASA’s Aeronautics Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
A National Aeronautics Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
FY2005 Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
FY2006 Budget Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
NASA’s FY2006 Request By Budget Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Science, Aeronautics, and Exploration (SA&E) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Exploration Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Aeronautics Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Education Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Exploration Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Inspector General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Out-Year Budget Projections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Appendix A: Related CRS Reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
Appendix B: Highlights of NASA’s Activities: 1958-2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
List of Figures
Figure 1. NASA Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Figure 2. NASA’s Organization Chart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Figure 3. NASA Budget Authority FY1959-2004 — Current and Constant
Dollars (in $millions) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Figure 4. NASA’s “Sand Chart” of Projected Budget Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
List of Tables
Table 1. NASA Budget Authority, Past Ten Years (1996-2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Table 2. NASA’s FY2006 Budget Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Table 3: Recommended Funding Levels and Budget Structure in H.R. 3070 . . . 14
Table 4. Breakdown of NASA’s FY2004-2010 Budget As Exploration-Specific,
Shuttle & Station, and Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Table 5. Space Shuttle Projected Funding: FY2005-2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Table 6. FY2006 Request for the Science Mission Directorate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Table 7. Changes to Earth Science Budget Run-Out . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Table 8. FY2006 Request for Exploration Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Table 9. FY2006 Request for Space Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Table 10. FY2006-2010 NASA Funding Projection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Table 11. Five-Year Funding Recommendations in S. 1281 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

The National Aeronautics and Space
Administration’s FY2006 Budget Request:
Description, Analysis, and Issues for
Congress
Preface
This report discusses the major issues being debated in the context of NASA’s
FY2006 request for $16.456 billion, a 2.4% increase over the $16.070 billion
appropriated in the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act (adjusted for the
rescission). NASA also received $126 million in a FY2005 supplemental for
hurricane relief, giving it a total of $16.196 billion for FY2005. The FY2006 request
is a 1.6% increase above that total. By comparison, last year’s budget submission
projected that the agency would receive a 4.7% increase for FY2006. NASA
submitted a FY2006 budget amendment on July 15, 2005; total funding requested did
not change, only how it is allocated within the agency.
NASA substantially changed its budget structure in the FY2006 budget request,
as it has done repeatedly over the past several years. The agency also shifted to “full
cost accounting” in FY2004. These changes make comparisons across fiscal years
at the program level virtually impossible. Comparing the FY2005 appropriation and
the FY2006 request alone is difficult. In its FY2006 request, NASA provided
estimated FY2005 funding figures, taken from its Initial Operating Plan (December
23, 2004), using the same structure as the FY2006 budget to enable comparisons
between those years. However, NASA’s FY2005 spending plans have changed
significantly since then, as explained in a May 10, 2005 update to the operating plan.1
The operating plan update was presented in the budget structure NASA used for
FY2005, not FY2006, with no”crosswalk” between the old and new structures. Thus,
those numbers cannot be incorporated into the tables in this report. Major changes
are discussed in the text, however.
The most prominent issues in the FY2006 budget are carry-overs from the
FY2005 debate: whether to approve President Bush’s “Vision for Space Exploration”
to return astronauts to the Moon by 2020 and then go on to Mars and “worlds
beyond”; returning the space shuttle to flight status following the February 2003
space shuttle Columbia tragedy; the future of U.S. use of the International Space
Station; and whether to use the shuttle to service the Hubble Space Telescope.
1 NASA’s operating plans are discussed below under Overview of NASA’s FY2006
Budget Request
.

CRS-2
Another major issue this year is the future of NASA’s aeronautics research programs,
which are slated for significant reductions.
Several other CRS reports are available on NASA-related topics, and are
referenced herein. For convenience, a list is provided in Appendix A. An
abbreviated version of this report is available as CRS Report RS22063, The National
Aeronautics and Space Administration: Overview, FY2006 Budget in Brief, and Key
Issues for Congress.

FY2005 estimated, and FY2006 requested, budget figures are from NASA’s
budget justification documents [http://www.nasa.gov/about/budget/index.html], and,
where indicated, from a budget amendment submitted by the White House
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/amendments/amendment_7_15_05.pdf]
on July 15, 2005. Program descriptions are condensed from material provided by
NASA in that or previous budget justifications, and previous CRS reports in this
series.
Introduction to NASA
NASA was created by the 1958 National Aeronautics and Space Act (P.L. 85-
568), and opened its doors on October 1, 1958.2 NASA’s charter is to conduct
civilian space and aeronautics activities. Military space and aeronautics activities are
conducted by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the intelligence community.
The organizations cooperate in some areas of technology development and
occasionally have joint programs.
NASA began operations almost exactly one year after the Soviet Union ushered
in the Space Age with the launch of the world’s first satellite, Sputnik, on October
4, 1957. In the 47 years that have elapsed, NASA has conducted far reaching
programs in human and robotic spaceflight, technology development, and scientific
research. The agency is managed from NASA Headquarters in Washington, D.C.
It has nine major field centers around the country (see Figure 1):
! Ames Research Center, Moffett Field, CA, which also manages
Moffett Federal Airfield, Mountain View, CA.;
! Dryden Flight Research Center, Edwards, CA;
! Glenn Research Center, Cleveland, OH;
2 The National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), chartered in 1915, served as
the nucleus for NASA. The day that NASA began operations, five NACA research facilities
were transferred to NASA, and all continue to operate today: Ames Research Center,
Dryden Flight Research Center, Glenn Research Center (formerly Lewis Research Center),
Langley Research Center, and Wallops Flight Facility. Two Army organizations also were
transferred to NASA within a year of the agency’s creation: the Development Operations
Division of the Army Ballistic Missile Agency — the “von Braun team” — which
developed the Jupiter C launch vehicle that placed the first U.S. satellite into orbit on
January 31, 1958 (prior to NASA’s creation), now called Marshall Space Flight Center; and
the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, which developed that satellite (Explorer 1).

CRS-3
! Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, MD, which also
manages the Goddard Institute of Space Studies (New York, NY),
the Independent Validation and Verification Facility (Fairmont,
WV), and the Wallops Flight Facility (Wallops, VA);
! Johnson Space Center, near Houston, TX, which also manages
NASA activities at the White Sands Test Facility, White Sands, NM;
! Kennedy Space Center, near Cape Canaveral, FL;
! Langley Research Center, Hampton, VA;
! Marshall Space Flight Center, Huntsville, AL; and
! Stennis Space Center, in Mississippi, near Slidell, LA.
The Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Pasadena, CA, often counted as a 10th NASA
center, is a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) operated for
NASA by the California Institute of Technology.3 Figure 1 shows the locations of
these facilities. See [http://www.nasa.gov/about/highlights/OrganizationIndex.html]
for links to all of NASA’s facilities.
According to information supplied to CRS by NASA in March 2005, and
NASA’s workforce website [http://nasapeople.nasa.gov/workforce/default.htm],
NASA employs approximately 19,000 full time equivalent (FTE) civil servants.4 The
website also estimates that NASA has 40,000 on-site and near-site support
contractors and grantees. Significant workforce cutbacks are planned by the
beginning of FY2007 as NASA “transforms” itself to implement President Bush’s
Vision for Space Exploration. That issue is discussed below.
NASA is headed by an Administrator. Dr. Michael Griffin was sworn in as
NASA’s 11th Administrator on April 14, 2005. Dr. Griffin has extensive experience
in military and civilian space programs, and has served in a number of private sector
and government capacities (including previous service at NASA). Immediately prior
to his appointment as Administrator, he was Space Department Head at Johns
Hopkins University’s Applied Physics Laboratory. His predecessor as Administrator
was Mr. Sean O’Keefe.
NASA Headquarters is currently organized into four Mission Directorates:
Aeronautics Research, Exploration Systems, Science, and Space Operations. NASA
Headquarters’ current organization chart is provided in Figure 2.
3 Despite its name, JPL’s primary role for NASA is developing earth-orbiting and planetary
exploration spacecraft, and managing the Deep Space Network, which tracks and
communicates with planetary spacecraft.
4 A NASA official told the House Science Committee on February 17, 2005 that NASA had
18,000 employees, an apparent reference to full-time permanent (FTP) employees, not the
more commonly used “full time equivalents” (FTEs), which are budget-related estimates of
the number of work years required to achieve agency missions and objectives. According
to data provided to CRS by NASA in March 2005, the FY2005 NASA budget funds 19,227
FTEs, and the FY2006 budget would fund 18,798 FTEs; the actual number of employees
was 18,932, of which 17,475 were FTPs. Those data also show that NASA plans to reduce
its FTE level to 16,738 by FY2007, a reduction of 2,489 from its current level. Other NASA
information indicates that as many as 2,673 positions may be eliminated.


4
Facilities
SA

CRS-
Figure 1. NA


5
CRS-
’s Organization Chart
SA

Figure 2. NA

CRS-6
NASA’s Historical Budget
Since its creation in 1958, NASA has experienced periods of budget growth and
decline, some of which were dramatic. Figure 3 displays the agency’s budget
history, both in current year dollars (i.e., unadjusted for inflation) and in constant
2005 dollars (i.e., adjusted for inflation). In the early 1960s, as the nation strived to
put an American on the Moon by 1969, NASA’s budget increased rapidly, peaking
at $5.25 billion (current dollars) in FY1965. Then, as other national priorities gained
precedence, NASA’s budget declined sharply to about $3 billion (current dollars) by
FY1974. Subsequently, it increased steadily for almost two decades (the one-year
spike in 1987 was to build a replacement space shuttle orbiter), but declined in the
mid-1990s as efforts to restrain federal funding took hold. It rose gradually (in
current dollars) thereafter. President Bush’s Vision for Space Exploration called for
NASA’s budget to increase by about 5% in FY2005-2007. That occurred for
FY2005, but the FY2006 budget request is less than what had been projected last
year (see below).
Figure 3. NASA Budget Authority FY1959-2004 —
Current and Constant Dollars (in $millions)
30000
25000
20000
15000
10000
5000
0
'59
'64
'69
'74
'79
'84
'89
'94
'99
'04
Current Year Dollars
Constant 2005 Dollars
Does not include Transition Quarter.
Source: Current dollars for 1959-2003 are from the Aeronautics and Space Report of the President:
FY2003; for 2004-2005, from the Historical Tables of the Budget of the U.S. Government, FY2006.
Constant dollars (adjusted for inflation to reflect 2005 dollars) were calculated by CRS using the GDP
(chained) price index. The spike in NASA funding in 1987 was to cover the costs of building a
replacement orbiter after the 1986 Space Shuttle Challenger tragedy.

CRS-7
Table 1. NASA Budget Authority, Past Ten Years (1996-2005)
(in millions of dollars)
Current Dollars
Constant 2005 Dollars
Fiscal Year
(unadjusted for inflation)
(adjusted for inflation)
1996
13,884
16,332
1997
13,709
15,840
1998
13,648
15,581
1999
13,653
15,384
2000
13,601
15,022
2001
14,230
15,355
2002
14,868
15,751
2003
15,364
15,998
2004
15,379
15,692
2005
16,197
16,197
Source: Current dollars for 1959-2003 are from the Aeronautics and Space Report of the President:
FY2003; for 2004-2005, from the Historical Tables of the Budget of the U.S. Government, FY2006.
Constant dollars (adjusted for inflation to reflect 2005 dollars) were calculated by CRS using the GDP
(chained) price index.
Congressional Committee Reorganizations
Historically, NASA has been part of the appropriations bill covering the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Department of Veterans
Affairs (VA), and Independent Agencies, including the National Science Foundation
and the Environmental Protection Agency. The House and Senate appropriations
subcommittees with oversight over that bill were dubbed the “VA-HUD-IA”
subcommittees. In the 109th Congress, the House decided to reorganize its
Appropriations Committee, reducing the number of subcommittees from 13 to 10.
The VA-HUD-IA subcommittee was one of those abolished. NASA now is part of
the newly established Science, State, Justice, Commerce (SSJC) subcommittee.
Press accounts5 trace the origin of the reorganization to House Majority Leader Tom
DeLay’s dissatisfaction with deep cuts for NASA recommended by the VA-HUD-IA
subcommittee in the FY2005 deliberations (see CRS Report RL32676), and a desire
to eliminate the funding competition between NASA and other popular programs
such as housing and veterans medical care.
The Senate also eliminated its VA-HUD-IA subcommittee, but retained a total
of 12 subcommittees (down from 13). NASA was moved into the newly established
5 For example, see U.S. House Republican Pushes for Spending Change, Reuters, February
9, 2005 (via Factiva); and Hulse, Carl, There’s No Talk of Dollars in This Battle Over the
Budget, New York Times, February 16, 2005 (via Factiva)

CRS-8
Commerce, Justice, and Science (CJS) subcommittee. The Senate CJS
subcommittee’s jurisdiction is different from its House counterpart in that the House
subcommittee includes the State Department.
NASA’s Senate authorizing committee, the Senate Commerce, Science, and
Transportation Committee, also reorganized its subcommittee structure. Previously,
NASA was part of the Science, Technology and Space Subcommittee. In this case,
the committee added several new subcommittees, and technology issues were moved
to a different one. The subcommittee that oversees NASA is now named the Science
and Space Subcommittee. The House Science Committee, which authorizes NASA
activities in the House, maintained the same structure as in the 108th Congress, with
NASA issues under the purview of the Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee.
Overview of NASA’s FY2006 Budget Request
NASA is requesting $16.456 billion for FY2006, a 2.4% increase over the
$16.070 billion (adjusted for the rescission) appropriated in the FY2005 Consolidated
Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-447). NASA also received $126 million in a FY2005
supplemental for hurricane relief (P.L. 108-324), giving it a total of $16.196 billion
for FY2005. The FY2006 request is a 1.6% increase above that total. Last year,
NASA was projected to receive a 4.7% increase for FY2006. NASA has
substantially changed its budget structure again, as it has each year for the past
several years, making comparisons across fiscal years difficult. Footnotes to Table
2
explain budget structure changes from FY2005.
NASA submitted a FY2006 budget amendment on July 15, 2005, available at
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/amendments/amendment_7_15_05.pdf].
It reflects, in part, the shifting of two programs into the Exploration Systems Mission
Directorate (ESMD): ISS Crew/Cargo services ($168 million) from the International
Space Station theme in the Space Operations Mission Directorate, and the Lunar
Robotic Exploration Program ($135 million) from the Solar System Exploration
theme in the Science Mission Directorate. These changes are consistent with the
statement in NASA’s May 10, 2005 operating plan update that these moves had been
made for FY2005. Thus, the FY2006 funding request for the ESMD increases by
$303 million in the budget amendment. The budget amendment makes a number of
other changes, which are discussed elsewhere in this report as appropriate.
Some of the fields in Table 2 are necessarily blank because of how the various
congressional committees have acted on the bills. Although increases and decreases
for specific programs are noted in the text of the House and Senate committee reports
accompanying the appropriations bill (H.R. 2862), overall funding levels are
identified only at the account level. The Senate version of the authorization bill (S.
1281) also identifies funding only at the account level. The House-passed
authorization bill creates a different account structure than that used in NASA’s
request, and it cannot be adapted for use in Table 2. Therefore, Table 2 shows only
the total for the agency recommended in H.R. 3070. See Table 3 for the structure
and funding levels recommended in H.R. 3070.

CRS-9
Table 2. NASA’s FY2006 Budget Request
(Budget Authority, in millions of dollars)
FY2005 FY2006
Appropriations
Authorization
Category
Estimate
Request
(Initial Op.
(Amended)
House
Senate
House
Senate
Plan)
passed
cmte
passed
cmte
Science, Aeronautics, and
**7,619
**9,829
9,726
9,761
9,661
Exploration
Science A
5,527
5,342
Aeronautics
906
852
Biol. and Phys. Research
1,004
— B
Exploration Systems
25
3,469
Education
217
167
Exploration Capabilities
**8,358
**6,595
6,713
6,603
6,863
Space Operations
6,704
6,595
- Space Shuttle
4,543
4,531
- International Space Station
1,676
1,689
- Space and Flight Support
485
376
Exploration Systems
1,654
— C
Inspector General
31
32
32
32
32
Total Regular
16,070
16,456
16,471
16,396
16,966
16,556
Appropriations
FY2005 Hurricane Suppl.
126
Grand Total
16,196
16,456
16,471
16,396
16,966
16,556
Source: FY2005 Estimate and FY2006 Request from the Office of Management and Budget
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2006/nasa.html], except for space shuttle, space station, and space and flight
support, which are from NASA’s FY2006 budget justification. Grand Total was added by CRS. The FY2006 request
figures are adjusted for the July 15, 2005 budget amendment. Appropriations and authorization figures are from NASA
FY2006 funding bills (H.R. 2862, H.R. 3070, and S. 1281) and associated committee reports. The budget amendment
was submitted after the committees had acted on the original request. Totals may not add due to rounding.
* Figures in this column are from the December 23, 2004 version of NASA’s operating plan, as provided in NASA’s
FY2006 budget justification documents. An updated version of the operating plan, dated May 10, 2005, is
available on NASA’s budget website [http://www1.nasa.gov/pdf/115071main_FY05_op_plan_may.pdf]. The May
update is presented in the budget structure used for the FY2005 budget, however, and cannot be used to update
this table (which is in the FY2006 budget structure).
** The FY2005 totals for the SA&E and Exploration Capabilities accounts are different from those in the table included
in NASA’s FY2006 budget justification documents because OMB shows the shift of “Exploration Systems” from
one account to the other. The NASA table uses the FY2006 budget structure without showing a “trace” between
last year’s budget presentation and this year’s. Since the OMB data show that trace, and include FY2004, they
are used in this report.
A In the FY2006 request, “ Science” incorporates the former Space Science and Earth Science line items.
B In the FY2006 request, Biological and Physical Research became part of Exploration Systems.
C In the FY2006 request, funding for Exploration Systems was moved into the SA&E account.

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Congress gave NASA significant latitude in how it could spend its FY2005
funding. The conference report refers to it as “unrestrained transfer authority”
between NASA’s two major budget accounts. NASA must notify Congress of how
it plans to spend the money, and is doing so through the traditional process of
submitting periodic “operating plans.” An Initial Operating Plan was sent to
Congress on December 23, 2004,6 but it stated that further changes would be
forthcoming. The most recent revision was submitted to Congress on May 10, 2005.7
Despite the fact that NASA received approximately the same amount that it
requested in FY2005, the agency is under significant funding constraints. As noted,
$126 million of the total is a supplemental to help NASA recover from the hurricanes
that damaged NASA facilities at Kennedy Space Center, FL in 2004. The NASA
budget was subject to an across-the-board rescission, reducing the appropriated level
from $16.200 billion to $16.070 billion. More than $1 billion in other funding must
be spent on activities that were not included in the FY2005 request: increased costs
for returning the shuttle to flight status ($762 million); congressionally directed items
(approximately $400 million, including $291 million to service the Hubble Space
Telescope); and cost increases in other NASA programs. NASA Administrator
Griffin testified to the Senate Appropriations CJS subcommittee on May 12, 2005,
about one month after he took office. His statement covered both the FY2006
request, and the May 10 update to the FY2005 operating plan. He emphasized that
NASA does not have sufficient money to fund all the programs it has on its plate for
FY2005, and priorities must be set. His priorities are discussed below.
As noted by the House and Senate Appropriations Committees, and the House
Science Committee, in their reports on NASA’s funding bills (see below), NASA’s
FY2006 budget justification documents contained significantly less detail than in
previous years. The committees directed NASA to provide more detail in the future.
However, because of that lack of detail in publicly available documents, it is not
always possible in the lists below of committee actions to indicate the amount that
was requested for a particular activity.
Appropriations Action on the FY2006 Request
House (H.R. 2862). The House SSJC appropriations subcommittee marked
up its version of the FY2006 appropriations bill on May 24, 2005. It was reported
from the full committee on June 10 (H.R. 2862, H.Rept. 109-118), and passed the
House on June 16. The committee recommended, and the House approved, $16.471
billion for NASA, a net increase of $15 million above the request. In total, the House
added $64.76 million for the Science, Aeronautics, and Exploration account, and cut
$50 million from the Exploration Capabilities account as follows:
6 The December 23, 2004 plan was publicly released by NASA in February 2005 and is used
in NASA’s FY2006 budget justification, available at [http://www1.nasa.gov/about/budget/].
7 The May 10, 2005, update to the operating plan is available on NASA’s website at
[http://www1.nasa.gov/pdf/115071main_FY05_op_plan_may.pdf].

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Science, Aeronautics, and Exploration
! An increase of $30 million for the Glory earth sciences mission ($5
million was requested);
! An increase of $10 million for the Space Interferometry Mission;
! An increase of $54 million for aeronautics research, restoring it to
its FY2005 level ($906 million);
! An increase of $2 million for education programs ($167 million was
requested);
! An increase of $50 million for continuation of unspecified
congressionally-directed programs that were terminated in the
budget request;
! A decrease of $25 million from exploration systems research and
technology ($919 million was requested);
! A decrease of $25 million from human systems research and
technology ($807 million was requested);
! A decrease of $31 million from corporate administrative costs, of
which $10 million is from the Office of Advanced Planning and
Integration, which the committee said was being eliminated; and
! A direction that $10 million of the funds provided for non-
programmatic construction of facilities be allocated for the Institute
for Scientific Research, Inc. for construction of research facilities.
Exploration Capabilities
! A decrease of $10 million from the International Space Station
($1.86 billion was requested);
! A decrease of $10 million from ISS Crew/Cargo Services (included
in the ISS request above);
! A decrease of $10 million from Rocket Propulsion Testing ($69
million was requested);
! A decrease of $10 million from Space Communications ($173
million was requested); and
! A decrease of $10 million from Launch Services ($124 million was
requested), but none can be taken from the Small Payload Launch
program.
Senate (H.R. 2862). The Senate CJS appropriations subcommittee marked
up its version of H.R. 2862 on June 21, and the bill was reported from the full
committee on June 23 (S.Rept. 109-88). The bill recommended a net cut of $60
million, adding $100 million for the Science, Aeronautics, and Exploration account,
and cutting $160 million from the Exploration Capabilities account. The report lists
several specific increases, but only two specific decreases, which do not total the $60
million net reduction. The report makes a number of recommendations about funding
levels, and in some cases directs NASA to spend funding in a certain manner. In
many cases, these do not involve increases above a requested funding level, but
instead are instructions on how to spend the funds. In other cases, it is not clear if it
is an increase, or a specified allocation.

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Science, Aeronautics and Exploration
! An increase of $250 million for a Hubble servicing mission (none
was requested for a servicing mission, although $191 million is
requested for the Hubble program);
! An increase of $30 million for the National Center for Advanced
Manufacturing;
! An increase of $15 million for Earth Science Applications ($52
million was requested) was included in a recommendation of
“$102,837,000 million within this account to supplement the areas
of earth science and exploration”;
! A direction that $50 million be allocated for unspecified
congressionally-directed initiatives terminated in the budget request;
! A direction that $20 million of Exploration Systems funding be used
for the evaluation of alternative small spacecraft technologies with
the potential for dramatically lowering planetary exploration costs;
! A recommendation that $25 million be used to continue hypersonic
engine technology research (none was requested);
! A direction that the Research Partnership Centers and the University
Research Engineering and Technology Institutes be funded at the
same level as in FY2005 (precise figures were not provided either in
NASA’s budget documentation or in the committee’s report);
! A recommendation that within the funds for education, $12 million
be for EPSCoR, $29.55 million for the Space Grant program, and
$54.233 million for other education-related activities (EPSCoR and
Space Grant are discussed later in this report, the total requested for
education is $167 million);
! A recommendation that $10 million be allocated to research and
development for integrated radiation shielding protection,
regenerative environmental control and life support systems,
advanced life support air revitalization, and integrated vehicle health
management through the ECLSS Life Test program office;
! A recommendation that, within the funds provided, $20 million be
allocated for the Propulsion Research Laboratory to perform nuclear
thermal propulsion systems development, and research on other
advanced nuclear power propulsion; and
! A decrease of $34 million (the entire request) for the Centennial
Challenges program.
Exploration Capabilities
! A decrease of $160 million (the entire request) from ISS
Crew/Cargo Services.
Authorization Action on the FY2006 Request
Congress also is debating an authorization bill for NASA. The House-passed
version (H.R. 3070, H.Rept. 109-173) is a two-year bill providing funding for
FY2006 and FY2007. The Senate version, as reported from the Senate Commerce,
Science, and Transportation Committee (S. 1281, S.Rept. 109-108), is a five-year

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bill, for FY2006-2010. The most recent NASA authorization act was enacted in
2000 and covered FY2000-2002 (P.L. 106-391). The pending authorization bills
contain extensive policy provisions that are too numerous to include in this report.
This report summarizes only the provisions that affect the major issues identified
herein. The following paragraphs pertain to funding recommendations in the bills.
Policy recommendations are addressed in later sections of this report as appropriate.
House (H.R. 3070). H.R. 3070, as passed by the House on July 22, 2005,
authorizes funding for FY2006 and FY2007.
Committee Action. As reported from the House Science Committee (H.Rept
109-173), the total for FY2006 was the same as approved in the House version of the
appropriations bill (see above) — $16.471 billion, a $15 million increase over the
request. The level for FY2007 was the same as the projected request in NASA’s
budget documents — $16.962 billion. As discussed below, these figures changed
significantly in the House-passed version of the bill.
During committee markup, an amendment in the nature of a substitute was
adopted that reflected a compromise between H.R. 3070 as approved by the Space
and Aeronautics Subcommittee on June 29, and H.R. 3250 (Gordon), a Democratic
substitute that was introduced after subcommittee markup. Most Democratic
members of the subcommittee abstained from voting on H.R. 3070 during
subcommittee markup because they said they had insufficient time to review it. The
amended version of H.R. 3070 that cleared the full committee is quite different from
the earlier version of H.R. 3070, and from H.R. 3250.
The amended bill adopts the budget structure proposed in H.R. 3250, which is
different from the one used in NASA’s FY2006 budget request. Instead of three
accounts (Science, Aeronautics, and Exploration; Exploration Capabilities; and
Inspector General), the bill creates four accounts: Science, Aeronautics and
Education; Exploration Systems; Space Operations; and Inspector General. Thus,
funding for “exploration” would be in its own account, instead of with science,
aeronautics and education. According to comments at the markup, the intent is to
create budgetary “firewalls” that would require closer congressional scrutiny if
funding is shifted from one set of activities (e.g., science, aeronautics and education)
into another (e.g., exploration). The goal is to maintain balance among NASA’s
activities. The recommended budget structure is shown in Table 3.
The committee shifted some programs from one account to another. As
explained in the report (H.Rept. 109-173), the new Science, Aeronautics and
Education account would include all the programs in the current Science,
Aeronautics and Education lines proposed in the request, except that the Robotic
Lunar Exploration program would be transferred from Science to Exploration
Systems. The Exploration Systems account would include all programs currently in
the Exploration Systems line in the FY2006 request, as well as the Robotic Lunar
Exploration Program, and two activities transferred from the Space Operations
account — Space and Flight Support, and ISS Crew/Cargo Services. The new Space
Operations account would include only the space shuttle and the International Space
Station (minus the ISS Crew/Cargo Services activity).

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H.R. 3070, as reported, further specified that, for FY2006, of the amount in the
Science, Aeronautics and Education account, $962 million was for aeronautics, $150
million was for a Hubble servicing mission (see below), and $24 million was for the
National Space Grant College and Fellowship program. For FY2007, the bill as
reported from committee specified that, of the amounts in the Science, Aeronautics
and Education account, $990 million was for aeronautics, and $24 million was for
the National Space Grant College and Fellowship program.
Floor Action. The House adopted a manager’s amendment during floor
debate on H.R. 3070 that significantly increased the authorization level for both
FY2006 and FY2007. The new amounts are shown in Table 3. In total, $510 was
added for FY2006, and $765 million for FY2007. The amounts for Science,
Aeronautics and Education are unchanged from the committee-reported bill. The
total for Exploration Systems increases by $663 million in FY2006 and by $925
million in FY2007. The total for Space Operations (i.e., the space shuttle and the
International Space Station) was reduced by $168 million in FY2006, and by $160
million in FY2007. The specific amounts identified in the committee-reported bill
remained unchanged, and, for FY2006, $8.9 million was specified for the Science
and Technology Scholarship Program.
Table 3: Recommended Funding Levels and Budget Structure in
H.R. 3070
(in $ millions)
As reported
As passed
Category
FY2006
FY2007
FY2006
FY2007
Science, Aeronautics and
Education
6,870
7,332
6,870
7,332
Exploration Systems
3,181
3,589
3,844
4,514
Space Operations
6,387
6,008
6,219
5,848
Inspector General
33
34
33
34
Total
16,471
16,962
16,966
17,727
Source: H.R. 3070 as reported from the House Science Committee July 18, 2005 (H.Rept.
109-173) and as passed by the House July 22. Column totals may not add due to rounding.
Senate (S. 1281). S. 1281 (S.Rept. 109-108), as reported from the Senate
Commerce Committee on July 26, 2005, would provide a five-year (FY2006-2010)
authorization for NASA. The authorization for FY2006 and FY2007 is broken down
into the three accounts used in NASA’s request, but not further allocated to specific
programs. For FY2008-2010, only a total for the agency is provided. (See Table 11
at the end of this report for those figures.)
For FY2006, $16.556 billion is recommended, a $100 million increase above
the request. That additional funding, in the Exploration Capabilities account, is for

CRS-15
implementing a section of the bill that pertains to increasing the scientific research
conducted aboard the ISS. For FY2007, a $91 million increase is recommended:
$17.053 billion. The additional funding similarly is in the Exploration Capabilities
account, but there is no language specifying how it should be spent. The bill contains
a number of policy provisions, and requires NASA to submit certain reports. These
are discussed in subsequent sections of this report as appropriate.
Major NASA Issues
Should NASA Be a “Single Mission” Agency Implementing
the Vision for Space Exploration?

On January 14, 2004, President Bush made a major space policy address in
which he directed NASA to focus its activities on returning astronauts to the Moon
by 2020, and someday sending them to Mars and “worlds beyond.” Officially this
policy is called the “Vision for Space Exploration,” VSE, or simply “the Vision.”
CRS Report RS21720 discusses the Vision in more detail.
A key question is whether the Vision should be NASA’s single focus, which
could be a de facto result of the President’s decision to fund the Vision by redirecting
funds from NASA’s other activities, instead of adding substantial new money.
Programs throughout the agency are being affected. The space shuttle and U.S. use
of the International Space Station (ISS)8 would end earlier than anticipated. NASA
has split its activities into those that are “Vision-related” and those that are not.
Those that are not — aeronautics, earth science, and certain space science disciplines
— apparently would bear the brunt of cutbacks as NASA “transforms” itself into an
agency focused on achieving the goals set forth by President Bush. Related
personnel cutbacks are anticipated. However, funding for individual Vision-related
projects is not secure either, as NASA Administrator Griffin shifts money from some
programs (such as Project Prometheus) into accelerating development of others
(notably the Crew Exploration Vehicle).9
Congress is debating whether to adopt the President’s Vision as announced, or
to modify it. At an April 28, 2005 hearing on NASA’s earth science program, House
Science Committee Chairman Sherwood Boehlert cautioned that he was “somewhat
concerned that NASA is being viewed by some as almost a single-mission agency,
and it’s much more than a single-mission agency, and I’m proud to identify with the
8 The International Space Station is being built as a partnership with Canada, Russia, Japan,
and 10 European countries. Although NASA now plans to complete its use of the ISS by
FY2017, the other partners could continue to use it. The future of the ISS is discussed later
in this report.
9 It should be noted that some of the funding changes in NASA’s FY2005 budget that are
negatively impacting certain science programs are not due to the Vision, as sometimes
suggested in press accounts, but to funding requirements for returning the shuttle to flight
status, for congressionally-related items (including $291 million for a mission to service the
Hubble Space Telescope), and for coping with cost growth in existing science programs.

CRS-16
various missions of NASA, including the President’s Vision for Space
Exploration.”10 (See below for more on Congress’ deliberations.)
Dr. Griffin testified at his April 2005 confirmation hearing that NASA pursued
a broad range of activities during the Apollo program in the 1960s and early 1970s,
and sees no reason the agency cannot do so while implementing the Vision.11
(Appendix B provides a summary comparison of NASA’s human space flight,
robotic space flight, and aeronautics activities by decade.) He concluded that the
total amount of NASA funding is not the problem, pointing out that NASA received
approximately the same amount of money in its first 16 years as it has in the past 16
years (adjusted for inflation). Instead, he said, it is a matter of setting priorities.
Key Features of the Vision. Under the Vision as delineated in January
2004, NASA would terminate the shuttle program in 2010 when construction of the
International Space Station (ISS) is completed, instead of operating the shuttle until
2015 or beyond as planned prior to the Columbia tragedy. The scientific research
program aboard the ISS would be restructured to support only research associated
with achieving the Vision instead of the broadly-based program that was planned.
NASA would end its use of ISS by FY2017 instead of using it for at least 10 years
after assembly is completed, as previously planned. President Bush directed NASA
to build a Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), with a demonstration flight by 2008, and
an operational capability to low Earth orbit no later than 2014. Its primary purpose
is transporting astronauts to and from the Moon. NASA also would build robotic
probes as “trailblazers” for the astronauts, and launch other robotic missions to
explore the solar system and the universe, including new space telescopes. The
President invited other countries to join in the initiative.
One of the first questions raised by the Vision is whether or not the United
States can afford it. Initially, the President and NASA did not provide cost estimates
for achieving the goals, only budget estimates for FY2005-FY2009, and a “sand
chart” of budget projections through FY2020 (see Figure 4). The sand chart showed
a NASA budget that would increase approximately 5% each year for FY2005-2007,
less than 1% in FY2008 and 2009, and remain roughly level with inflation
(approximately 2%) beyond FY2009. NASA officials said the intent of the chart
was to demonstrate there was no “balloon” in funding past FY2009. The total
amount of funding for the Vision represented in the chart appears to be $150-170
billion. Taking most of the requisite funds from other NASA programs instead of
adding new money for the agency may mitigate concerns that the Vision could
increase the deficit or detract from other national priorities. But it raises issues about
the impact on those other NASA programs, and whether the level of funding is
adequate to achieve the goals.
10 House Science Committee hearing on NASA’s Earth science program, April 28, 2005.
Transcript provided by Federal Document Clearing House (via Factiva).
11 Dr. Michael Griffin, testimony before the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation
Committee, April 12, 2005. Transcript by Federal Document Clearing House (via Factiva).


thority
u

ected Budget A
17
CRS-
’s “Sand Chart” of Proj
SA

Figure 4. NA

CRS-18
In late February 2004, NASA released a cost estimate for landing a crew on the
Moon in 2020 — $64 billion (in FY2003 dollars). It consisted of $24 billion
(FY2004-2020) to build and operate the Crew Exploration Vehicle; and $40 billion
(FY2011-2020) to build the lunar lander portion of that vehicle, a new launch
vehicle, and operations. The estimate does not include the cost of robotic missions.
NASA did not provide an estimate for sending astronauts to Mars.
Whatever the total cost, the question remains as to whether NASA’s annual
budget is sufficient to support implementation of the Vision. As noted, NASA’s
request for FY2006 is less than what the White House projected last year, so the
Vision did not survive even its first year of priority setting within the total national
budget. Some critics assert that the Vision is more about ending NASA programs
than setting the nation on a bold path towards the future. Veteran space commentator
John Pike, who operates the globalsecurity.org website, called the Vision “a roadmap
for the quiet and orderly phase-out of manned space flight.”12
Personnel Impacts. Another aspect of the Vision is its effect on NASA’s
workforce. NASA’s FY2006 budget justification, which includes projections for the
following four years (i.e., though 2010), assumes that the agency will cut about 2,500
civil service jobs by the end of FY2006. The agency is offering buy-outs and other
incentives to encourage staff in certain disciplines to leave, but to date these efforts
have not achieved their targets. NASA officials explain that everyone who currently
is employed by NASA is funded through the end of FY2006.
As discussed below in the section on the future of the aeronautics program,
many of the personnel cuts are expected in the aeronautics field, where significant
funding cutbacks are being proposed because aeronautics is not considered to be a
Vision-related activity. Four of NASA’s field centers focus primarily on aeronautics
research — Langley, Glenn, Ames, and Dryden — and are expected to bear the brunt
of the personnel cuts. Dr. Griffin has been visiting each NASA center, reassuring
workers that the centers themselves will not be closed, but cautioning that workforce
changes are inevitable as NASA shifts its focus to implementing the Vision.
Congressional Reaction. As noted, House Science Committee Chairman
Boehlert has expressed concern that NASA not become a single mission agency.
Science Committee Ranking Democrat Bart Gordon similarly has said that he
strongly supports exploration, but “NASA is headed for a potential train wreck as it
puts all its eggs in the exploration basket at a time when deficit concerns are going
to keep squeezing discretionary spending.”13 He added that “cannibalizing NASA’s
science and aeronautics programs to fund the exploration initiative will further erode
the base of support for NASA in Congress.”
As discussed below (see the FY2005 Budget subsection), although Congress
appropriated funds for the Vision in FY2005, conferees on the appropriations bill
12 Quoted in: Jeffrey F. Bell. The Bush Space Initiative: Fiscal Nightmare or... Fiscal
Nightmare? SpaceDaily, March 17, 2004.
1 3 Representative Bart Gordon, February 17, 2005 press release
[http://www.house.gov/science_democrats/releases/05feb17.htm]

CRS-19
emphasized that it was not an endorsement of the plan. At the February 17, 2005
hearing, Chairman Boehlert made the point that “Congress has never endorsed — in
fact, has never discussed — the Vision. What we did do ... is provide the money to
enable NASA to continue planning..., but the truly critical spending commitments
start is fiscal year ‘06, so this year is when we must have the debate.”14
All of the pending NASA funding bills express support for the goals enunciated
in the Vision specifically or generally, but they also call for NASA to continue to
have a balanced set of programs in science, aeronautics, and exploration.
The House Appropriations Committee report said that it was concerned about
maintaining the nation’s leadership in science and technology, including in
aeronautics. “However, given the serious nature of the budget deficit facing the
nation the Committee was forced to make a number of difficult choices in allocating
the scarce resources available to NASA and has proposed what it believes is a more
balanced budget that both supports the new vision but does not abandon NASA’s
other core functions.” (H.Rept. 109-118, p. 102).
The Senate Appropriations Committee called on NASA to lay the groundwork
for implementing the Vision, but added that it is “concerned that NASA will neglect
areas that will only tangentially benefit from, or that do not fit within, the proposed
vision.” The report added that the committee “is concerned that the strong, balanced
science program that has served the Nation so successfully for many years could be
left behind instead of being nurtured and sustained...” (S.Rept. 109-88, p. 89)
The House Science Committee’s report said that the committee “expects NASA
to continue to support productive programs in human space flight, aeronautics and
science, including space science, earth science, and microgravity. ...[E]ach must be
evaluated on its own merits. For that reason, this Act directs NASA to move ahead
with the President’s Vision for Human Space Exploration, while coming up with
separate “visions” to guide the other NASA programs. The Committee is pleased
with Administrator Griffin’s commitment to operate NASA as a multi-mission
agency.” (H.Rept. 109-173, pp. 45-46.)
The Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee’s report notes
that the bill provides authority and policy guidance for implementing the Vision “in
a manner that maximizes the use of the Nation’s previous investments in civil space
programs and the resulting wealth of expertise and proven technologies. ... The bill
would also ensure that an appropriate balance is maintained among NASA’s
important missions of exploration, space operations, aeronautics research, and
science. (S.Rept. 109-108, p. 2.) The Senate authorization bill has a strong focus
on utilizing the International Space Station for the broadly based research agenda
originally planned, rather than the narrower objectives it would serve under the
Vision, and on retaining the space shuttle until a replacement vehicle is available,
rather than terminating the shuttle in 2010.
14 Representative Sherwood Boehlert. Opening statement, hearing on NASA’s FY2006
budget request [http://www.house.gov/science/hearings/full05/feb17/February172005.htm],
February 17, 2005.

CRS-20
FY2005 Budget. For FY2005, Congress appropriated a total for NASA that
was quite close to its requested amount: $16.196 billion (including the hurricane
supplemental and adjusted for the across-the-board rescission) versus the $16.244
billion requested.15 House Majority Leader DeLay is widely credited with winning
that funding level for NASA.16 Many commentators concluded the funding level was
a sign of congressional support for the Vision. However, conferees on the
Consolidated Appropriations Act explicitly stated that although they were
appropriating substantial funds for the Vision, “to date there has been no substantive
Congressional action endorsing this initiative.” (H.Rept. 108-792, p. 1599). They
called on the House and Senate authorizing committees to provide guidance and
authorization for the effort. Thus, the FY2005 funding level is not necessarily a sign
of congressional support. The conferees made the following comments vis a vis the
Vision:
! They directed NASA to include in all future budget justifications the
phase-out schedules for programs that will be terminated in order to
fund the Vision.
! They directed NASA to forward a comprehensive package of
authorization legislation for consideration by the 109th Congress.
! They were concerned that NASA was not giving adequate attention
to the heavy lift launch requirements of the Vision and directed
NASA to report to the appropriations committees within six months
of the bill’s enactment regarding those needs and how to meet them.
! They were concerned that initial planning for the CEV is
insufficient, and directed NASA to provide the appropriations
committees with a report detailing the criteria and developmental
goals the CEV must meet, and other information. They cautioned
NASA not to repeat the mistakes of the space station program,
“where poor management and lack of independent oversight resulted
in major cost overruns.” They directed NASA to identify “an
independent oversight committee capable of examining the design,
technology readiness, and most importantly the cost estimates for the
CEV.” That committee is to report to the NASA Administrator and
the appropriations committees on its findings and recommendations.
FY2006 Budget Request. As noted, the requested increase in NASA’s
FY2006 budget is substantially less than was forecast by the White House last year.
It is either 2.4% more, or 1.6% more, than the FY2005 appropriated level depending
on whether the emergency supplemental for hurricane relief is included, instead of
4.7% more as had been projected. Some therefore view the FY2006 request as an
indication of soft support from the White House for implementing the Vision.
15 For action on NASA’s FY2005 budget request, see CRS Report RL32676.
16 For example, see Tax Record Spat Slows Omnibus Spending Vote in Senate, Congress
Daily PM, November 20, 2004, (Special Edition).

CRS-21
Within NASA’s total budget request, what constitutes funding for the “Vision”
is open to interpretation. The entire NASA budget is labeled “Exploration Vision,”
but a FY2006 NASA budget chart (reproduced as Table 4) divides the request into
three categories: “exploration-specific,” “shuttle & space station,” and “earth science,
aero, & other.” Some may consider the Vision funding as that contained in the
“exploration-specific” category. Others may add funding for the space shuttle and
space station, since those are often described as the first steps in the Vision.
Alternatively, funding specifically for the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate
(ESMD, see Table 2) could be defined as funding for the Vision
The House Appropriations Committee cut $50 million from research and
technology accounts associated with the Vision, but approved the rest of the funding.
The Senate Appropriations Committee reduced NASA’s overall funding (described
earlier) but did not specify where all of the cuts would be made. Funding for specific
programs is not identified in the pending Senate authorization bill.
As discussed earlier, H.R. 3070, the House version of the authorization bill, as
reported from committee (H.Rept. 109-173), creates a separate budget account for
Exploration Systems within NASA’s budget structure. The amount recommended
for FY2006 is $3.181 billion, $16 million more than NASA requested for
Exploration Systems. For FY2007, the committee recommended $3.589 billion,
$118 million more than projected in the FY2006 NASA budget documents for
Exploration Systems. As discussed earlier, the programs that comprise “Exploration
Systems” in the House bill are different than the NASA request, so direct
comparisons cannot be made.
The House-passed version of H.R. 3070 also prohibits NASA from
implementing any Reductions in Force (RIFs) or other involuntary separations (other
than for cause) before February 16, 2007. It further prohibits buyouts until 60 days
after NASA transmits to Congress a human capital strategy specified in the bill.
What impact these restrictions would have on NASA’s budget is unclear. (The
House substantially increased the authorized funding level for NASA both for
FY2006 and FY2007 as shown in Table 3.)

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CRS-24
Dr. Griffin’s Proposed Changes. As noted above, Dr. Griffin testified to
the Senate Appropriations CJS Subcommittee in May 2005 that NASA does not have
sufficient money to fund all the programs it has on its plate for FY2005, and
priorities must be set. Dr. Griffin’s chief priorities are returning the shuttle to flight
and making each flight as safe as possible, complete construction of the space station
by 2010, terminate the shuttle in 2010, and accelerate the development of the Crew
Exploration Vehicle (CEV) to minimize the gap between when the shuttle ends and
the CEV is available. These priorities are affecting spending plans for FY2005 and
FY2006.
! The Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) and a launch vehicle for it
— the Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) — have become the major focus
of the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD). They are
both funded under “Constellation Systems” within ESMD. Dr.
Griffin has stated repeatedly that he wants to close the gap between
when the space shuttle will be terminated (2010) and when the CEV
becomes available. He also has added servicing the International
Space Station to the CEV’s requirements. Previously, NASA
officials insisted that the CEV’s mission was to take astronauts to
and from the Moon. They would not commit to its use as a ferry to
the ISS, in order to keep the CEV design focused on the lunar
transportation requirement. Instead of looking for new concepts for
the CEV — which might be expensive and take time to develop —
Dr. Griffin emphasizes that it should be simple and straightforward,
and therefore not require significant development time. He has
decided that instead of funding two contractors with competing
designs through 2008, as originally planned, the agency will choose
a single contractor in 2006. Dr. Griffin estimates that
“downselecting” to one contractor that early could save $1 billion.
In the near term, however, additional funds are needed. The FY2006
budget amendment submitted on July 15, 2005 shifts $292 million
into CEV/CLV from other ESMD activities. The following
reductions are specified: $122 million from the $919 million
requested for Exploration Systems Research and Technology; $140
million from the $320 million requested for Project Prometheus (see
below); and $30 million from the $807 million requested for Human
Systems Research and Technology (see Biological and Physical
Research, below).
! Project Prometheus is a program to develop new nuclear power and
propulsion systems, and was initiated by NASA prior to the Vision
speech. NASA initially requested $320 million for FY2006, but the
July 15 budget amendment reduced that request by $140 million,
with that amount instead shifted into the CEV/CLV effort. The
goals of Project Prometheus also are changing. Its original goal was
developing Nuclear Electric Propulsion (NEP) and advanced
Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs). A robotic probe,
the Jupiter Icy Moons Orbiter (JIMO), which was designed to study
three of Jupiter’s moons, was to be the first mission to use these new
systems. RTGs have been used by NASA since the 1960s to supply

CRS-25
power for spacecraft systems and experiments on probes that travel
so far from the Sun that solar energy-based systems are impractical.
RTGs also can be used for spacecraft that land on surfaces where
they will experience “night” for long periods. NASA has not used
nuclear propulsion, either NEP or a different type, Nuclear Thermal
Propulsion (NTP), in the past, although NASA worked on
developing NTP in the 1960s and early 1970s. Dr. Griffin has
changed the focus of Project Prometheus to nuclear “surface power”
systems (for use on the lunar surface, e.g.), and NTP. Development
of NEP is now third on the priority list. JIMO has been indefinitely
deferred.
! Funding for biological and physical research, including that to be
conducted aboard the International Space Station, will be cut further
to enable acceleration of the CEV. Previously this research was
funded by the Office of Biological and Physical Research (OBPR),
which was merged with the Office of Exploration Systems to form
the ESMD in August 2004. Activities that were conducted under
OBPR are now funded in the “Human Systems Research and
Technology” line in ESMD’s budget. NASA is developing a revised
research plan for the ISS and for supporting the Vision, including
identification of what must be done on the ISS versus using ground-
based facilities. The details have not been released. Dr. Griffin’s
announcement that he will tap these research funds to help pay for
accelerating the CEV is likely to further affect that research plan.
The initial FY2006 request for Human Systems R&D was $807
million. The July 15 budget amendment shifts $30 million of that
into the CEV/CLV effort.
! Management responsibility for the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter
(LRO) has been shifted from the Science Mission Directorate to the
ESMD. The LRO’s purpose is to support the Vision by providing
detailed maps of the lunar surface, but since the former Office of
Space Science was experienced in developing such probes, it was
given management responsibility for LRO originally. Conferees on
the FY2005 appropriations bill directed that, because it was being
funded by the Office of Space Science, at least 25% of its
experiments should focus on science objectives, rather than those
associated with the Vision. NASA’s decision to move the program
into ESMD presumably will makes its purpose and focus clearer.
The FY2005 funding level will not change from the $53 million in
the December operating plan. (Congress cut funding for the LRO
from $70 million to $10 million in FY2005, but NASA nevertheless
plans to spend $70 million on it — $17 million that was
reprogrammed in FY2004, and $53 million in FY2005). The July
15 budget amendment similarly moves the $135 million requested
for the Lunar Robotic Exploration Program in FY2006 from the
Science Mission Directorate into ESMD.

CRS-26
What is the Space Shuttle’s Future?
The congressional committees that oversee NASA are closely following the
agency’s efforts to return the space shuttle to flight status following the February 1,
2003 Columbia tragedy. Although NASA launched the first of two “Return to
Flight” missions — STS-114 — on July 26, 2005, the agency re-grounded the shuttle
fleet the next day after discovering problems during that launch that are similar to
what led to the loss of Columbia. The Columbia tragedy, STS-114, and the Return
to Flight effort are discussed in CRS Report RS21408. The impact of the STS-114
problems on the future of the shuttle is unclear.
At the same time, there is considerable debate about the shuttle’s future in light
of President Bush’s directive that the shuttle — at least in its current form — be
terminated in 2010. Some want the shuttle terminated as soon as possible, either
because they consider it unsafe or because they want to use the money now devoted
to the shuttle program for other aspects of the Vision instead. Others want to keep
the shuttle until the CEV is operational so that the United States is not dependent on
Russia for human access to space. A third option is to define precisely how many
more shuttle missions are needed, and operate the system until they are completed,
whenever that occurs.
Terminating the Shuttle in 2010. All of the remaining shuttle launches
currently on the schedule (or “manifest”) are for ISS construction and servicing.
NASA may restore one other mission contemplated prior to the Columbia tragedy —
to service the Hubble Space Telescope (addressed elsewhere in this report) — but
will not make that decision until after the shuttle successfully returns to flight. Most
of the remaining segments of the ISS awaiting launch were designed to be launched
only on the shuttle. The shuttle also is used to take crews back and forth.
Construction of ISS has been suspended since the Columbia accident. NASA and its
ISS partners have been keeping two-man crews aboard ISS using Russian spacecraft
in the interim.
NASA continues to assess how many shuttle flights are needed to complete the
ISS. In early 2005, the estimate was 28, but Dr. Griffin considers only 18 of those
28 to be needed for ISS assembly. The other 10 comprise five for logistics (taking
food, water, equipment, etc. to the ISS) and five for utilization (conducting research).
He proposes shifting the logistics flights to other launch vehicles, that perhaps could
be provided by commercial launch service providers, and to delay NASA’s utilization
of the ISS. NASA is conducting an assessment of exactly how many more shuttle
flights are needed.
NASA’s FY2006 request includes budget projections that show the shuttle
budget decreasing significantly beginning in FY2008 (see Table 5). Whether NASA
can succeed in reducing shuttle budgets while maintaining whatever flight rate is
needed is uncertain. The board that investigated the Columbia tragedy cited budget
constraints as a factor.

CRS-27
Table 5. Space Shuttle Projected Funding: FY2005-2010
(in $ millions)
FY2005
FY2006
FY2007
FY2008
FY2009
FY2010
4,543.0
4,530.6
4,172.4
3,865.7
2,815.1
2,319.2
Source: NASA FY2006 budget justification. The FY2005 estimate is from NASA’s December 23,
2004 Initial Operating Plan. See the FY2005 Budget subsection below for additional changes since
then.
Another factor cited by the Columbia investigation board was schedule pressure
resulting from the ISS assembly schedule. At the time, then-NASA Administrator
Sean O’Keefe had set completing a particular phase of ISS construction (called “U.S.
Core Complete”) by February 2004 as a priority. Today, some worry that setting a
firm date of 2010 for completing all shuttle launches is creating an environment
similar to that prior to Columbia. Dr. Griffin has stated that the shuttle program will
end in 2010 even if ISS construction is not completed. NASA is assessing what new
launch vehicles may be needed to accomplish the Vision and therefore might be
available to service the ISS. (A shuttle derived launch vehicle is one option, as
discussed below).
The Senate authorization bill, S. 1281, would direct NASA not to retire the
shuttle until a replacement human-rated spacecraft has been demonstrated. By
contrast, the House version, H.R. 3070, as introduced and approved at the
subcommittee level, directed that the shuttle not be launched after December 31,
2010. However, the Democratic alternative, H.R. 3250, contained language similar
to that in the Senate bill. The compromise version of H.R. 3070, as reported from
the House Science Committee (H.Rept. 109-173) and passed by the House, is silent
on this issue.
Proposal for a “Shuttle-Derived” Launch Vehicle. President Bush’s
directive that “the shuttle” be terminated in 2010 apparently refers to the shuttle in
its current form — a vehicle that takes both crews and cargo into space. The concept
of developing a “shuttle-derived” launch vehicle (SDLV, or SDV) has been
discussed for many years. The need for a launch vehicle for the new CEV, and a
“heavy lift” launch vehicle to support other aspects of the Vision, has reenergized
debate about the SDLV. Dr. Griffin is a strong advocate of such a vehicle.
There are several versions of an SDLV under consideration. In one concept, the
shuttle’s orbiter — the airplane-like section that carries the crew and cargo — would
be replaced with a cargo pod, which would be mounted to the side as is the orbiter.
Another version would use a single Solid Rocket Booster (the shuttle uses two, one
on each side of the orbiter), augmented by a new “upper stage,” with a spacecraft on
top. One potential use of this vehicle is to launch the new CEV. Still another
concept would modify the External Tank (the large cylindrical tank that carries fuel
for the orbiter’s main engines) and use it alone or in conjunction with SRBs, with a
spacecraft on top. These latter two options are called “in line” designs. Advocates
argue that the version based on the External Tank could lift approximately 100 tons

CRS-28
of cargo to low Earth orbit (LEO), five times what could be launched with existing
versions of the other two major U.S. launch vehicles — Atlas V and Delta IV.17
Choosing to build a SDLV might mitigate some of the workforce displacements
that would result from terminating the shuttle program in its current form. It also
could bring a new launch vehicle into the U.S. fleet at lower cost than developing a
new vehicle from scratch. But it is not clear how cost-effective an SDLV would be.
How many of the “standing army” of civil servants and contractors, how much of the
infrastructure at NASA’s Kennedy Space Center, and how much redesign would be
needed are under study. Proponents of the Atlas and Delta argue that if NASA used
them for the Vision, the cost per launch would go down, making space launches more
affordable for DOD and NASA overall. The Atlas and Delta also might be able to
be modified to launch heavier payloads.
Boeing manufactures the Delta IV. Lockheed Martin manufactures the Atlas V,
as well as the External Tanks for the space shuttle system. The SRBs are
manufactured by ATK Thiokol. The United Space Alliance, a 50-50 joint venture
between Boeing and Lockheed Martin, is the “single prime contractor” in charge of
most ground operations for the existing space shuttle system. The two companies
have announced plans to create a similar joint venture, called United Launch
Alliance, to market Atlas V and Delta IV to government customers.
Under a national space transportation policy released by the White House in
January 2005, NASA, in cooperation with DOD, is to evaluate the relative costs and
benefits of EELVs, an SDLV, or a new system.
FY2005 Budget. For FY2005, NASA requested $4.3 billion for the space
shuttle program, compared with $4 billion in FY2004. NASA informed Congress
in November 2004 that it needed $762 million more in FY2005 for the shuttle
program, but a budget amendment was not submitted. Congress appropriated the
requested amount, and said that NASA could reprogram funds, or submit a
supplemental request if needed. According to NASA briefing charts accompanying
its May 10, 2005 operating plan update, funding was reprogrammed as follows: $55
million from the Science Mission Directorate ($20 million from space science, $35
million from earth science); $375.8 million from the Exploration Systems Mission
Directorate ($73 million from biological and physical research, $204 million from
human and robotic technology, and $98 million from transportation systems); and
$331.2 million from the Space Operations Mission Directorate ($160 million from
the space station, $170 million from space shuttle upgrades, and $1.2 million from
space flight support).
FY2006 Budget Request. NASA’s FY2006 request for the shuttle program
is $4.5 billion. The House-passed and Senate committee-reported versions of the
FY2006 Science, State, Justice, and Commerce appropriations bill (H.R. 2862) fully
fund the shuttle for FY2006. The pending authorization bills do not specify how
much funding is provided for the shuttle. As noted above, the Senate bill (S. 1281)
17 These two launch vehicles were developed under the Department of Defense’s Evolved
Expendable Launch Vehicle program and thus are sometimes referred to as “the EELVs.”

CRS-29
would direct that the shuttle not be terminated until a replacement is available. The
House bill, as passed, is silent on that issue. S. 1281 also would direct NASA to
develop an implementation plan for transitioning to a new system for launching
crews that uses the shuttle personnel, capabilities, assets, and infrastructure to the
fullest extent possible.
What Should Be the U.S. Strategy for the International Space
Station Program?

NASA began what is now known as the International Space Station (ISS)
program in 1984. Canada, Japan, 10 European countries, and Russia are partners
with the United States in building the space station. For more information, see CRS
Issue Brief IB93017.
Assembly of the space station was originally intended to be completed by 1994,
followed by 30 years of operation during which a wide variety of scientific research
would be conducted. The results of that research were expected to have applications
on Earth such as new and better pharmaceuticals, metal alloys, and manufacturing
processes. The original cost estimate was $8 billion (in FY1984 dollars).
Twenty-one years and approximately $35 billion later, whether those promises
will be met is uncertain. Under the Vision, NASA is directed to meet its
commitments to the other partners, finish construction in 2010, and complete its
utilization of the ISS by FY2017. (The other partners could continue to use it beyond
that time.) The President directed that the only research conducted by NASA is that
needed to implement the Vision, not the broadly-based program that was planned.
At the same time, it is not clear how NASA astronauts will be able to access the
ISS after April 2006. While the shuttle is grounded, two-person crews (one Russian,
one American) are being maintained aboard the ISS by using Russian Soyuz
spacecraft. A 1996 agreement between NASA and the Russian space agency requires
Russia to provide crew transportation and “lifeboat” services18 to NASA on 11 Soyuz
spacecraft at no cost. That agreement would be fulfilled with a Soyuz scheduled for
launch in October 2005 and return to Earth in April 2006. Russian officials have
made clear that they expect to be paid for any crew transportation or lifeboat services
after that point. However, NASA is not permitted to pay Russia for ISS-related
services under the Iran Nonproliferation Act (INA, P.L. 106-178). The linkage
between the ISS and the INA, and its implications for the future of U.S. access to
ISS, are explained in CRS Report RS22072.
The Bush Administration sent a proposed amendment to the INA to the House
and Senate on July 12 that would narrow the definition of what payments are
prohibited. If adopted, the revised INA would allow NASA to pay Russia for
18 A spacecraft must be docked with the space station at all times so that crews have an
emergency escape route in the event of an emergency. The spacecraft that serves that
function is called a “lifeboat” or “crew return vehicle” (CRV). NASA terminated its plan
to build a CRV in 2002, so Russia’s Soyuz spacecraft is the only one available for that duty.
For more information, see CRS Issue Brief IB93017.

CRS-30
additional Soyuz missions, for example. An amendment regarding the INA was
offered and withdrawn by Representative Rohrabacher at the July 14 markup of H.R.
3070. A committee press release following the markup said that the Science
Committee was working with the House International Relations Committee on the
INA issue, and quoted Chairman Boehlert as saying that the final bill that is sent to
the President for signature must address it, “but I have no idea at this point what that
resolution will be.”19
If the INA is not amended, NASA could have its astronauts on ISS only when
the shuttle is docked there. If the shuttle is discontinued in 2010 as currently
planned, NASA astronauts would have no access to ISS until the CEV is operational.
Even if the INA is amended, some want to continue the shuttle until the CEV is
operational to ensure there is no gap in the ability of the United States to place its
own astronauts in space. As discussed above, S. 1281 would direct NASA not to
terminate the shuttle until a replacement is available.
NASA spends about $2 billion a year on ISS, in addition to the costs of the
shuttle program. Some question whether ISS is worth that level of investment
considering the modest research opportunities that remain. Others consider fulfilling
U.S. commitments to the other ISS partners to be a sufficient rationale for continued
U.S. involvement. President Bush pledged to fulfill U.S. commitment to the ISS
partners in his Vision speech. Dr. Griffin has reiterated that pledge. How NASA
will do that is unclear, since the partners anticipated that the space shuttle, with its
large crew and cargo capacity, would be available during the operational phase of the
ISS. NASA also was committed to building a Crew Return Vehicle (CRV) that
would enable the crew size to increase to at least six. NASA canceled the CRV,
then replaced it with another program (called an Orbital Space Plane), which then
also was canceled. Dr. Griffin apparently plans to develop a CEV that can be used
not only to take crews to and from the Moon, but as a vehicle to transport crews to
and from ISS, and remain docked to the ISS for long periods of time, enabling it to
serve in a CRV-mode. If that plan proceeds, it may be that the United States once
again is building a vehicle to fulfill the CRV function.
Another question is what will happen to the ISS once NASA discontinues its use
of the facility. Would it be turned over to the other partners? Would it be
privatized? Would it be deorbited? If it remains in orbit under someone else’s
control, would the United States have any continuing liability if, for example, it made
an uncontrolled reentry and impacted people or property on the ground? Or if it
collided with another object in space?
FY2005 Budget. Congress did not specify a funding level for the ISS in the
FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act. The request was $2.412 billion: $1.863
billion for construction and operations, including $140 million in a new “ISS
Crew/Cargo Services” line to pay for alternatives to the shuttle for taking crew and
cargo to and from ISS; and $549 million for research (included in the request for the
19 Science Committee Unanimously Approves NASA Authorization Bill. House Science
Committee press release [http://www.house.gov/science/press/109/109-110.htm], July 14,
2005.

CRS-31
Office of Biological and Physical Research). NASA’s December 23, 2004 Initial
Operating Plan cut $160 million from ISS construction and operations to help pay for
additional costs for returning the space shuttle to flight status. Funding for research
also was cut, from the planned $549 million to $382 million (per the December
operating plan). Dr. Griffin plans to make additional cuts to the ISS research budget
to help pay for accelerating the CEV, but details have not been released.
FY2006 Budget Request. The original FY2006 ISS request was $1.857
billion for construction and operations, including $160 million for ISS Crew/Cargo
Services; and $324 million for ISS research. Dr. Griffin indicated in the May 10,
2005 update to the FY2005 operating plan that he is moving the ISS Crew/Cargo
Services activity, and associated funding, to the Exploration Systems Mission
Directorate (ESMD). The July 15 budget amendment similarly moves the FY2006
ISS Crew/Cargo funding into ESMD, reducing the request for ISS construction and
operations commensurately. The budget amendment identifies the FY2006 request
for ISS Crew/Cargo Services as $168 million, rather than $160 million as shown in
earlier NASA FY2006 budget briefing charts. Thus the revised FY2006 request for
ISS construction and operations is $1.689 billion.
The House cut $10 million from ISS construction and operations, and $10
million from ISS Crew/Cargo services program, in the FY2006 SSJC appropriations
bill (H.R. 2862). The Senate Appropriations Committee cut all $160 million from
ISS Crew/Cargo services because NASA has not spent any of the $98 million
provided for FY2005. The Senate Commerce Committee added $100 million for
FY2006 for ISS research in its authorization bill (S. 1281, S.Rept. 109-108). That bill
also includes extensive language about enhancing the utilization of the ISS, including
direction that the U.S. segment of the ISS be established as a “national laboratory.”
The House-passed version (H.R. 3070, H.Rept. 109-173) would require NASA to
allocate 15% of the funds budgeted for ISS research to research that is not directly
related to supporting the Vision. It would also direct the Administration to ensure that
ISS can be used for a diverse range of microgravity research, be able to support a crew
size of at least six persons, support CEV docking and automated docking of other
vehicles, and be operated at an appropriate risk level. It also requires a report from
NASA on issues such as the ISS research agenda and how the ISS will be completed
and serviced.
The FY2000-2002 NASA authorization act (P.L. 106-391) imposed a cost cap
on the ISS program (see CRS Issue Brief IB93017 for details). H.R. 3070, as passed
by the House, would repeal the cap. S. 1281, as reported, would require NASA to
submit a report within six months of enactment that explains the impacts of the space
shuttle Columbia accident, and NASA’s shift to full cost accounting,20 on the
development costs of the ISS, and identifies any statutory changes needed to address
those impacts.
20 In full cost accounting, all program costs, including civil service salaries and construction
of facilities (CoF), are included in program costs, instead of being identified separately.
NASA shifted to full cost accounting in FY2004. For its previous 44 years, NASA had
separate account(s) for agency-wide civil service and CoF costs.

CRS-32
Should the Hubble Space Telescope be Serviced?
NASA launched the Hubble Space Telescope in 1990. From the beginning,
Hubble was designed to be serviced regularly by astronauts. That design proved
fortuitous when it was discovered that Hubble had a defective mirror that produced
blurry images. Astronauts on the first servicing mission in 1993 were able to install
corrective optics, allowing years of scientific accomplishments and generating
widespread scientific and public support. Additional servicing missions were
conducted in 1997, 1999, and 2002 to replace aging hardware and install advanced
scientific instruments. Two more shuttle missions to Hubble were scheduled: another
servicing mission in 2004 (known as SM-4) and a retrieval mission to bring the
telescope back to Earth in 2010. In the wake of the Columbia tragedy, however, then-
NASA Administrator Sean O’Keefe decided in January 2004 not to proceed with
either flight. His stated reason was the safety of the shuttle astronauts, but many
critics perceived a connection with the new priorities of the Vision for Space
Exploration, announced just days before.
The decision to cancel SM-4 brought praise from some, but also considerable
congressional and public opposition. The opposition initially focused on efforts to
reverse Mr. O’Keefe’s decision and proceed with a shuttle mission. Attention soon
shifted to robotic options, which dominated the public discussion of Hubble’s future
throughout most of 2004. In March 2004, Mr. O’Keefe agreed to ask the National
Research Council (NRC) to study options for extending Hubble’s life, including both
shuttle and robotic missions. In December 2004, the final NRC report surprised many
by finding it “unlikely that NASA will be able to extend the science life of [Hubble]
through robotic servicing.” The report recommended a servicing mission by
astronauts in the space shuttle, and a robotic mission only for deorbiting the telescope
at the end of its useful lifetime.21 (If left unattended, NASA has estimated that Hubble
would make an uncontrolled reentry in about 2012.) Mr. O’Keefe stood by his
decision not to proceed with a shuttle servicing mission, and by early 2005, NASA’s
work on a robotic mission to Hubble was focused on deorbiting it, rather than
servicing it.
The confirmation of Michael Griffin as NASA Administrator in April 2005
breathed new life into efforts to service Hubble. At his Senate confirmation hearing
on April 12, 2005, Dr. Griffin stated that while he considered robotic servicing
infeasible and “would like to take the robotic mission off the plate,” he planned to
revisit the shuttle servicing option after the shuttle returns to flight. After there have
been two successful shuttle flights, NASA would be able to reassess the risks
associated with what Dr. Griffin considers “essentially a new vehicle.” H.R. 3070 and
S. 1281 both call for a shuttle servicing mission after the shuttle returns to flight
successfully “unless such a mission would compromise astronaut safety”; they would
also require a status report on servicing plans within 60 days of the landing of the
second successful RTF flight. Prospects for servicing Hubble became more uncertain
21 National Research Council, Assessment of Options for Extending the Life of the Hubble
S p a c e T e l e s c o p e
, N a t i o n a l A c a d e m i e s P r e s s , 2 0 0 5 . O n l i n e a t
[http://books.nap.edu/catalog/11169.html].

CRS-33
when NASA grounded the shuttle fleet again after problems with the first RTF launch
on July 26, 2005.
Congress is debating how to balance the scientific value and public popularity
of Hubble with the cost of servicing it, the likely impact of that cost on other NASA
astronomy programs, and the remaining safety risks. The NRC report described
Hubble as “an enormous scientific success ... the most powerful space astronomical
facility ever built ... garnering sustained public attention over its entire lifetime.”
Without a servicing mission, Hubble would cease scientific operations in about 2008.
On the other hand, many expect the cost of a Hubble servicing mission, followed by
the cost of operating Hubble for an unknown number of additional years, to be offset
by reductions in other NASA astronomy programs. The July 15 budget amendment
stated that most of the funding needed to preserve a Hubble servicing option would
come from the Terrestrial Planet Finder, a planned future astronomy spacecraft.
Considering that Hubble was originally intended to operate only until 2005, and SM-4
was originally intended to extend operations only until 2010, some question whether
it makes scientific sense to cut funding for future missions in order to extend the life
of Hubble past 2008. And no matter how successfully the shuttle returns to flight, a
shuttle mission will always entail some safety risks.
Cost estimates for a Hubble servicing mission vary widely, depending partly on
what the mission would include, and partly on how one treats the costs of the shuttle
launch. Before the Columbia tragedy, Hubble servicing missions were estimated to
cost about $100 million each, not including the marginal cost of a shuttle launch.
According to a GAO report in November 2004, NASA then estimated the full cost,
including all shuttle costs, at between $1.7 billion and $2.4 billion; GAO considered
this estimate “not yet definitive.”22
FY2005 Budget. The FY2005 budget was released shortly after Mr. O’Keefe’s
first announcement that the shuttle would not fly to Hubble. At that time, NASA
intended to cancel the 2004 servicing mission entirely, and was only in the earliest
stages of studying the possibility of robotic deorbiting. For this reason, the potential
costs of servicing and deorbiting were not included in the FY2005 request. Most of
the $130.1 million requested for Hubble was for data analysis. The FY2005
appropriations conference agreement was written before the release of the NRC report,
at a time when the debate was focused on the robotic option. It designated $291
million for development of a Hubble servicing mission, but it did not specify where
NASA should make the offsetting reductions.
NASA’s initial operating plan for FY2005, released after the NRC report but
before the appointment of Administrator Griffin, reflected $175 million for
development of Hubble servicing and deorbiting missions, with the remainder of the
$291 million to be determined after a design review in March 2005. The May 2005
update to the operating plan, released after Dr. Griffin’s announcement that a shuttle
servicing mission will be reassessed after the shuttle completes its Return to Flight
22 Government Accountability Office, Space Shuttle: Costs of Hubble Servicing Mission and
Implementation of Safety Recommendations Not Yet Definitive
, GAO-05-34, November
2004.

CRS-34
missions, reflected the full $291 million. To fund the difference, NASA has
postponed two other astronomy missions — the Terrestrial Planet Finder and the
Space Interferometry Mission — and reduced funding for Mars exploration.
FY2006 Budget Request. In the original FY2006 budget, NASA requested
$190.7 million for Hubble, including funds for development of a deorbit mission, but
no funds for a servicing mission. The July 15 budget amendment requested $30
million to preserve the option of a Hubble servicing mission. If a decision is made to
proceed with a servicing mission, and additional funds are needed for it during
FY2006, there are three ways to incorporate them into the budget process: (a) NASA
could submit an additional amendment to its FY2006 budget; (b) Congress could
appropriate funds without an explicit request; or (c) NASA could reallocate funding
from other activities via the operating plan process.
The House-passed appropriations bill, H.R. 2862, did not specify a funding level
for Hubble, although report language applauded Dr. Griffin’s commitment to reassess
SM-4. The version reported by the Senate Appropriations Committee recommended
a $250 million increase, pending the Administrator’s reassessment and final decision.
The House-passed authorization bill, H.R. 3070, would authorize $150 million in
FY2006 for a Hubble servicing mission. The Senate-reported authorization bill, S.
1281, would not specify a funding level for Hubble.
What is the Future of NASA’s Aeronautics Program?
Aeronautics R&D has a long history of government involvement, starting in 1915
with the creation of the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA).
NASA was established in 1958 using NACA as its nucleus, and NACA’s research
centers were transferred to the new agency. Although NASA is better known for its
space programs, supporters note that aeronautics is “the first A in NASA.”
For several years, however, aeronautics advocates have failed to halt a multi-year
slide in funding. NASA’s budget for aeronautics was cut by about one-third in the
late 1990s, with the termination of programs in high-speed research and advanced
subsonic technology. In 2003, NASA’s move to full-cost accounting heightened
funding concerns, because research facilities such as wind tunnels play an especially
large role in the aeronautics program.23 In 2004, when the President announced the
Vision for Space Exploration, many foresaw that new spending priorities would
increase the pressure on aeronautics further. The FY2006 budget request confirmed
that expectation: according to Administrator Griffin, “the nation makes available to
us within NASA a certain amount of money ... The fact is that in the President’s
program going forward, aeronautics is not as high a priority as ... space exploration.”24
23 Under full-cost accounting, programs must pay for the cost of the facilities they use.
Previously, facility costs were budgeted separately. The change therefore meant that the
same program activity now appears to require a larger program budget. H.R. 3070 as passed
by the House would direct NASA not to seek full cost recovery for its test facilities.
24 NASA Headquarters, Office of Public Affairs, Press Conference with Administrator
M i c h a e l G r i f f i n , A p r i l 1 8 , 2 0 0 5 . O n l i n e a t
(continued...)

CRS-35
“Transforming” NASA’s Aeronautics Program. As the Vision reduces
the priority NASA gives to aeronautics and as total NASA funding for aeronautics
declines, the largest element of the aeronautics program, Vehicle Systems, is being
“transformed.” The FY2006 budget proposes to reduce Vehicle Systems funding by
27% relative to FY2005, place more emphasis on barrier-breaking demonstrations,
and focus resources on a smaller number of research areas. NASA describes this new
approach as a pilot for transforming the entire Aeronautics Research Mission
Directorate. The restructured program consists of four projects: two on noise
reduction, one on emissions reduction, and one on unpiloted research aircraft. The
topics eliminated include hypersonics, rotorcraft, and ultraefficient engine technology
— all of which have received congressional funding increases in past appropriations
cycles — as well as most evolutionary, incremental improvements to subsonic
aeronautics. The 2003 National Research Council assessment recommended that
NASA “pursue more high-risk, high-payoff technologies” and “reduce the number of
tasks in its aeronautics technology portfolio,” so the transformation is not entirely a
result of the Vision, but the elimination of several entire research areas is
controversial, especially in the context of substantial, continuing reductions in total
funding for the program. The House Appropriations Committee report on H.R. 2862
called for NASA to continue work on hypersonics and rotorcraft and expressed the
view that transforming the aeronautics program is premature in light of a May 2005
report by the National Institute of Aerospace and a forthcoming study by the National
Research Council (both discussed further below). The Senate committee report on
H.R. 2862 referred to the proposed changes in Vehicle Systems as “dismantlement”
and directed NASA to “maintain the existing program structure ... along with its
people and facilities.” The House Science Committee report on H.R. 3070 (H.Rept.
109-173) identified civil supersonic transport, rotorcraft, and hypersonics as initiatives
that NASA “may establish.”
An especially controversial consequence of the proposed funding reductions is
a reduction in staffing levels at NASA centers. According to NASA briefing charts,
the reduction in aeronautics funding would mean the elimination of 1,100 civil service
jobs at the centers by FY2007. A smaller number of on-site contractor positions
would also be eliminated. Most of the affected positions would be at Langley
Research Center (in Hampton, VA) and Glenn Research Center (in Cleveland, OH),
but Dryden Flight Research Center (in Edwards, CA) and Ames Research Center (in
Mountain View, CA) would also be affected. Some aeronautics research facilities at
these centers would likely be closed as well, but the affected facilities have not yet
been identified. Aeronautics supporters and leaders in the affected communities have
expressed alarm at the consequences of these changes, both for aeronautics itself and
for the local economies surrounding the centers. Since taking over as NASA
Administrator in April 2005, Dr. Griffin has sought to downplay the cuts at the
centers. He and other NASA officials insist that the goal is to transform centers, not
to close them, and to ensure that the NASA workforce has the mix of skills that is
necessary to implement the Vision. On visits to Glenn and Langley in May 2005, Dr.
Griffin stated that job losses there will not be as severe as was earlier projected. H.R.
3070 as passed by the House prohibits NASA from implementing reductions in force
24 (...continued)
[http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/113096main_mg_presscon_041805.pdf].

CRS-36
(RIFs) or other involuntary separations (except for cause) until February 16, 2007; this
date was October 1, 2006, in the committee-reported bill.
If research areas such as subsonic aeronautics and hypersonics are indeed
eliminated from NASA’s aeronautics program, the question arises of whether other
federal agencies, or the U.S. private sector, will conduct the research that is needed
in these areas. A leading justification for federal aeronautics funding has been the
economic importance of the U.S. aircraft industry. Supporters often cite increases in
European funding for aeronautics R&D as a threat to U.S. competitiveness. NASA’s
new high-risk, high-payoff approach shifts the program’s value to industry towards
longer-term needs. Some believe that this is appropriate, and that industry should be
responsible for its own short-term R&D, but others argue that aeronautics “requires
unique national facilities and world-class researchers that are not resident in any one
company” and that “the fruits of this research add to the nation’s wealth, not just to
that of any individual company.”25 In the past NASA has also stated that it plays “a
key role in ... increasing the performance of military aircraft.”26 The FY2006 budget
documents no longer mention this goal, and the projects on emissions reduction, noise
reduction, and research aircraft that remain in the Vehicle Systems program seem to
have little direct application to military needs. The Air Force, Navy, and Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency have aeronautics R&D programs, particularly
in the area of hypersonics. These Defense Department programs tend to focus on
specific military missions, such as rapid long-range strike, so they may not address all
aspects of the field. On the other hand, much of their work has a long enough time
horizon that it can be applied quite generally. A concern that has not yet been
resolved is how Defense Department and industrial users of NASA aeronautics
facilities, such as high-speed wind tunnels, will be affected by possible facility
closures. H.R. 3070 as passed by the House would call for an independent review of
NASA test facilities and would prohibit closures until completion of that review.
A National Aeronautics Policy. Supporters and critics alike have long
argued that NASA’s aeronautics program needs a clearer vision of its goals and
direction. In February 2001, NASA sought to answer this criticism in The NASA
Aeronautics Blueprint: Toward a Bold New Era in Aviation
.27 November 2002
brought recommendations on aeronautics from the congressionally established
Commission on the Future of the United States Aerospace Industry.28 In November
2003, the National Research Council published An Assessment of NASA’s Aeronautics
Technology Programs
.29 In May 2005, the National Institute of Aerospace released
a congressionally requested five-year plan for U.S. aeronautics research, Responding
25 National Institute of Aerospace, Responding to the Call: Aviation Plan for American
Leadership.
26 FY2005 NASA budget request.
27 [http://www.aerospace.nasa.gov/aboutus/tf/aero_blueprint/cover.html]
28 [http://www.ita.doc.gov/td/aerospace/aerospacecommission/aerospacecommission.htm]
29 [http://books.nap.edu/html/atp/0309091195.pdf]

CRS-37
to the Call: Aviation Plan for American Leadership.30 The National Research Council
is undertaking another study, to be completed in late 2006, that will “assess and
develop options for a national policy in aeronautics,” “develop a course of action to
guide the federal government’s investment and role in aeronautics,” and “provide
specific guidance on how to disseminate whatever federal resources may be allocated
for aeronautics research.”31 Despite all these efforts, there is still no consensus view
of NASA’s role in aeronautics.
Three of the pending NASA funding bills — H.R. 2862 and H.R. 3070 as passed
by the House, and S. 1281 as reported from the Senate Commerce Committee —
would direct the President to develop “a national aeronautics policy ... through 2020.”
Both House bills focus on NASA: the President would be directed to act “through
the [NASA] Administrator ... in consultation with other agencies,” and the policy
would address how NASA should “coordinate its aeronautics program with other
Federal agencies.” The Senate bill addresses all federal aeronautics activities equally:
the President would be directed to act “through the Director of the Office of Science
and Technology Policy, in consultation with NASA and other relevant Federal
agencies,” and the policy would address the “respective roles and responsibilities of
various Federal agencies.” H.R. 3070 provides more detail than the other two bills on
the issues to be considered, including military and commercial needs and the impact
on U.S. industry. It also states that “it shall be the policy of the United States to
reaffirm the ... identification of aeronautical research and development as a core
mission of NASA.” The Senate Appropriations Committee-reported version of H.R.
2862 does not address a new national aeronautics policy in bill language, but the
accompanying report supports the concept, and states that any such policy should be
based on the May 2005 National Institute of Aerospace report, not on “some new
collection effort or study.”
FY2005 Budget. Under NASA’s May 2005 operating plan, FY2005 funding
for aeronautics is $962 million. This total consists of $630 million for the Vehicle
Systems program, $183 million for Aviation Safety and Security, and $149 million for
Airspace Systems. The original FY2005 appropriation was $919 million, reduced to
$906 million by a general rescission. NASA transferred $56 million into the program
in its May 2005 operating plan, making the total $962 million, to support the cost of
congressionally directed items that were not in the FY2005 budget request.
FY2006 Budget Request. The FY2006 request for aeronautics is $852
million, with a further reduction to $728 million projected for FY2007. The FY2006
total consists of $459 million for Vehicle Systems, $193 million for Aviation Safety
and Security, and $200 million for Airspace Systems. The House-passed H.R. 2862
provided $906 million, the same as the FY2005 appropriation before the changes
made by the May 2005 operating plan. The Senate report on H.R. 2862 recommended
$25 million for hypersonics but did not specify a funding level for aeronautics as a
whole. H.R. 3070 as passed by the House would authorize $962 million for FY2006
and $990 million for FY2007. S. 1281 does not specify a funding amount for
30 [http://www.nianet.org/nianews/AviationPlan.php]
31 [http://www7.nationalacademies.org/aseb/AeroDecadal_Main_Page.html]

CRS-38
aeronautics. The July 15 budget amendment made no changes to the FY2006 request
for aeronautics.
NASA’s FY2006 Request By Budget Account
NASA’s FY2006 budget request has three accounts: Science, Aeronautics, and
Exploration (SA&E); Exploration Capabilities; and Inspector General. This section
follows the format of the NASA budget as shown in the agency’s FY2006 budget
estimate. As noted, NASA has changed its budget structure repeatedly over the past
several years. For FY2006, the names of the budget accounts remain the same as last
year. However, the programs under the two major accounts (SA&E, and Exploration
Capabilities) have changed to reflect a new NASA headquarters organization adopted
in August 2004. In summary, the Office of Space Science and the Office of Earth
Science merged, and are now the Science Mission Directorate (SMD). The Office of
Biological and Physical Research and the Office of Exploration merged, and are now
the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD). The Office of Education was
abolished. Its activities are now under a Chief Education Officer. The Office of
Space Flight was renamed the Space Operations Mission Directorate (SOMD). The
Office of Aeronautics was renamed the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate
(ARMD).
The SA&E account funds the Science Mission Directorate (SMD), the
Exploration Systems Mission Director (ESMD), the Aeronautics Research Mission
Directorate (ARMD), and Education Programs. The Exploration Capabilities account
funds the Space Operations Mission Directorate (SOMD), which includes the
International Space Station (ISS), the space shuttle, and space flight operations.
Science, Aeronautics, and Exploration (SA&E)
In the FY2006 budget request, the SA&E account includes the Science Mission
Directorate, Exploration Systems Mission Directorate, Aeronautics Research Mission
Directorate, and Education Programs. The Science Mission Directorate focuses on
increasing human understanding of space and Earth, and makes use of satellites, space
probes, and robotic spacecraft to gather and transmit data. The Exploration Systems
Mission Directorate is focused on implementing the Vision for Space Exploration,
including development of a new Crew Exploration Vehicle to take astronauts to and
from the Moon, development of nuclear power and propulsion systems, and biological
and physical research, including that to be conducted on the ISS. The Aeronautics
Research Mission Directorate contributes to increasing air traffic capacity, reducing
the impact of aircraft noise and emissions, and improving aviation safety and security.
NASA’s education funding is for programs aimed at educating children in elementary
and secondary school, as well as university students, in science, mathematics,
engineering, and technology.
For FY2006, NASA initially requested $9.661 billion for SA&E, compared with
$9.336 billion appropriated for FY2005 (per the December 23, 2004 Initial Operating
Plan). That request was increased to $9.829 billion in the July 15 budget amendment,
reflecting the shift of $168 million from the Exploration Capabilities account into this

CRS-39
account. The $168 million is for ISS Crew/Cargo Services that had been part of the
International Space Station program. That activity now will be part of the Exploration
Systems Mission Directorate.
Science. The Science Mission Directorate (SMD) is the merger of the former
Office of Space Science (OSS) and Office of Earth Science (OES). Each of those
offices was organized by “themes.” OSS had six themes (Solar System Exploration,
Mars Exploration, Lunar Exploration, Astronomical Search for Origins, Structure and
Evolution of the Universe, and Sun-Earth Connections), and OES had two (Earth
System Science, and Earth Science Applications). All of those now have been
merged into three themes under the new SMD: Solar System Exploration, the
Universe, and Earth-Sun System.
Solar System Exploration programs involve sending spacecraft to other planets,
the Moon, and other solar system destinations (such as asteroids). They combine the
previous themes of Solar System Exploration, Mars Exploration, and Lunar
Exploration. Programs in the Universe theme include space-based astronomical
observatories such as the Hubble Space Telescope, the Spitzer Space Telescope, the
Chandra X-Ray Observatory, and plans for future observatories, as well as planning
for studies of dark energy and dark matter, for example. They combine the previous
themes of Astronomical Search for Origins, and Structure and Evolution of the
Universe. Earth-Sun Systems studies the Earth as a system (such as global climate
change) and interactions between the Sun and the Earth (solar terrestrial physics). This
theme combines activities previously under the two OES themes, and the Sun-Earth
Connections theme that was part of OSS.
Table 6. FY2006 Request for the Science Mission Directorate
(In $ millions)
FY2005
FY2006 Initial
FY2006 Amended
Theme
Estimate*
Request
Request
Solar System Exploration
1,858.1
1,900.5
1,667.5
The Universe
1,513.2
1,512.2
1,522.2
Earth-Sun System
2,155.2
2,063.6
2,151.9
Total
5,527.2
5,476.3
5,341.6
Source: NASA FY2006 Budget Justification and July 15, 2005 budget amendment.
* NASA’s budget justification uses the figures from its Initial Operating Plan, submitted to Congress
on Dec. 23, 2004. Updates to that operating plan have been submitted, but are in the format of
the FY2005 budget, not FY2006, so cannot be used to update this table.
Budget Amendment Changes. The July 15 FY2006 budget amendment
made the following changes to the Science Mission Directorate (SMD). First, are
several changes to the Solar System Exploration theme. As announced in the May 10
operating plan update for FY2005, NASA decided to move the Lunar Robotic
Exploration Program into the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate (ESMD) since

CRS-40
its primary purpose is to support the Vision for Space Exploration. The FY2006
budget amendment therefore shifts the $135 million requested for the Lunar
Reconnaissance Orbiter to ESMD, with a consequent reduction in the Solar System
Exploration theme. Next, the budget amendment reduces funding for this theme by
$98 million, shifting $88.3 million into the Earth-Sun Systems theme, and $10 million
into the Universe theme. According to the budget amendment, the $98 million was
“made available” by cancellation or deferral of several robotic Mars exploration
programs, while funding also will be added to fund extended operation of the Mars
rovers currently on the Martian surface, and to maintain a 2009 launch date for the
Mars Science Laboratory [http://marsprogram.jpl.nasa.gov/missions/future/msl.html].
The budget amendment states that the Universe theme would be increased by $10
million, with $30 million provided to preserve the option of a Hubble servicing
mission. Most of the funds for the Hubble option would come from funding for a
future astronomical observatory called the Terrestrial Planet Finder
[http://planetquest.jpl.nasa.gov/TPF/tpf_index.html].
The $88.3 million added for Earth-Sun systems would be allocated to funding the
Glory mission (see below), provide additional funding for extending the mission of
currently operating satellites, and maintain the launch schedule for the Solar Dynamics
Observatory [http://sdo.gsfc.nasa.gov/].
Concerns About NASA’s Earth Science Program. The merger of space
science and earth science, and cuts to funding for earth science programs as NASA
redirects money into implementing the Vision, have raised concerns in the earth
science community and Congress. The House Science Committee held a hearing on
NASA’s earth science program on April 28, 2005. Among the witnesses was Dr.
Berrien Moore, the chairman of a National Research Council study that is reviewing
NASA’s earth sciences program.32 Dr. Moore warned that the process of building an
understanding of the earth system is “at risk of collapse”33 because of decisions to
terminate certain NASA earth science missions. Science Committee Chairman
Boehlert said in his opening statement that “The planet that has to matter most to us
is the one we live on. You’d think that would go without saying. ... It’s great if earth
science can contribute to exploration, and greater still if exploration of other planets
could teach us more about Earth.”34
NASA’s FY2006 budget justification documents did not allow a comparison of
funding for earth science programs between the FY2006 request and prior years
because funding for earth science was merged with funding for programs that had
been part of the Sun-Earth Connections theme, which was in the former Office of
32 National Academies. National Research Council. Earth Science and Applications from
Space: Urgent Needs and Opportunities to Serve the Nation. April 2005. Prepublication
Copy. Available at [http://www.nas.edu ].
33 Prepared statement of Dr. Berrien Moore before the House Science Committee, April 28,
2005, p. 2. Available at [http://www.house.gov/science].
34 Opening statement of Chairman Sherwood Boehlert at House Science Committee hearing
on NASA’s earth science program, April 28, 2005, p. 1. Available at
[http://www.house.gov/science].

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Space Science. NASA provides five-year funding projections — called the “budget
run-out” — in its annual budget justifications that show the request for the current
year plus projections for the next four years. In preparation for the hearing, the
Science Committee insisted that NASA provide such a comparison for earth sciences.
The funding data were published in the hearing charter (available on the committee’s
website), and are reproduced in the following table. The data show the budget run-out
as it was projected in the FY2004 budget (for FY2004-2008), FY2005 budget (for
FY2005-2009), and the current budget (FY2006-2010). The table shows that the
earth sciences budget was $1.55 billion in FY2004, $1.49 billion for the current fiscal
year (FY2005), and the request for FY2006 is $1.37 billion. Thus, the program
experienced a significant cut in FY2005 — a $1 billion cut through the five-year run-
out compared with what had been projected in F2004. The cut in the FY2006 request
is slightly less. In summary, the cut from FY2004 to FY2005 is 8%; the cut from
FY2004-FY2006 is 12%.
Table 7. Changes to Earth Science Budget Run-Out
(in $ billions)
FY2004
FY2005
FY2006
FY2007
FY2008
FY2009
FY2010
2004
1.55
1.53
1.6
1.7
1.73
Request
2005
1.49
1.39
1.37
1.34
1.47
Request
2006
1.37
1.35
1.33
1.47
1.44
Request
Source: House Science Committee. Hearing Charter for April 28, 2005 Hearing on NASA Earth
Sciences. Available on the committee’s website [http://www.house.gov/science].
Among the earth science programs of particular concern to the earth science
community are the Global Precipitation Mission (GPM), Glory, and continuation of
data acquired by Landsat satellites. GPM is a follow-on to an existing program (the
Tropical Rainfall Mapping Mission) to measure global rainfall. The launch of GPM
has been delayed from 2007 to 2010. Glory is intended to study aerosols in the
atmosphere and how they affect global climate change. In the original FY2006 budget
submission, NASA had decided to cancel development of the Glory spacecraft, but
continue development of the sensor, with the hope that it someday would be able to
fly on some other spacecraft. The July 15 budget amendment, however, shifts
funding into the Glory program to “fully fund a standalone...mission.” The portion
of the $88.3 million added to Sun-Earth Systems in the budget amendment that will
be allocated to Glory was not specified.
NASA launched its first Landsat satellite in 1972. Landsat 5 and Landsat 7 are
currently in orbit though both are only partially operational.35 The earth science
community wants to ensure “data continuity” — obtaining similar data over decades
35 The Landsat satellites are now operated by the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) in the
Department of the Interior.

CRS-42
— for Landsat, but NASA’s plans for a follow-on to Landsat 7 have been in flux.
NASA hoped that the private sector would build the next satellite and NASA could
purchase data on a commercial basis. It received only one bid for that contract,
however, and NASA considered it inadequate. NASA’s current plan is to build
Landsat-type sensors (called Operational Land Imagers, or OLIs) and install them on
a different satellite, called NPOESS.36 Earth scientists are concerned that the
NPOESS satellite with the first OLI will not be launched before Landsat 5 and 7 cease
operating and data continuity will be lost. They want a “bridge mission” to be
launched carrying a Landsat-type sensor to ensure there is no break in data acquisition.
H.R. 3070, as reported from the House Science Committee (H.Rept. 109-173),
requires the Administrator to seek an independent assessment of the costs and risks
associated with placing the OLI on the first NPOESS, versus building a bridge
mission and waiting for the second NPOESS to host an OLI.
S. 1281, as reported, directs NASA, in consultation with NOAA and USGS, to
submit a plan that ensures the “long-term vitality” of NASA’s earth observing system
(EOS). EOS is a set of three spacecraft (Terra, Aura, and Aqua) in Earth orbit that are
conducting long term global observations of the Earth’s surface and atmosphere to
better under Earth as a system.
Potential Cuts in Space Science Programs. The Vision incorporates a
number of space science disciplines. As described in NASA’s FY2005 request,
programs to explore other planets and to build and operate space-based observatories
such as the Hubble Space Telescope, are Vision-related. However, these programs
are feeling the strain of NASA’s constrained budget environment as the agency shifts
funds to pay for the increasing costs of returning the space shuttle to flight status, to
preserve the option of sending a shuttle mission to service the Hubble Space
Telescope, to pay for cost growth in other science programs, and to pay for
congressionally-directed items. For example, Congress directed in the FY2005
appropriations conference report that NASA spend $291 million on a Hubble
servicing mission. NASA must find those funds from within its current budget.
The FY2006 budget run-out for Science Mission Directorate overall is $1 billion
less than what had been projected in FY2005. In addition, in the May 10, 2005
operating plan update, Dr. Griffin indicated that he would take funds from future Mars
probes (those that were being planned for 2011 and beyond), and from two future
space-based observatories — the Terrestrial Planet Finder and the Space
Interferometry Mission — to pay for the Hubble Servicing Mission and cost growth
in other science programs, such as a Mars probe scheduled for launch in 2005.
NASA also is considering terminating some of its older space science probes
even though they are still returning useful data. Considerable concern has been
expressed in the space science community at the prospect of turning off the Voyager
36 The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) is a
joint effort of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the
Department of Defense (DOD), and NASA. NOAA and DOD each operate their own
weather satellite systems; NPOESS is the merger of those systems. NASA develops new
technology for NPOESS. The first NPOESS is currently scheduled for launch by 2010.
Further discussion of NPOESS is outside the scope of this report.

CRS-43
1 and Voyager 2 probes. Launched in 1977, Voyager 1 has just reached the outer edge
of the solar system, and Voyager 2 is to do so in a few years. NASA expects to be
able to continue to receive data from the probes through 2020, when their power
sources are expected to become too weak to send signals back to Earth. NASA
explains that there are a total of 13 probes in the Earth-Sun Systems theme that have
far exceeded their design lifetimes and are being considered for termination in order
to save the $49.6 million requested in the FY2006 budget to continue operating them.
The portion of that total for the two Voyager probes is $4.2 million. As Dr. Griffin
told the Senate Appropriations CJS subcommittee, NASA cannot afford all of the
programs it currently has on its plate, and priorities must be set. The space science
community is waiting to see if these probes make the list. Dr. Griffin said at a June
28, 2005 House Science Committee hearing that he thought turning off the Voyager
spacecraft was “rather dumb,” but that he was awaiting a report from a group that is
reviewing the future of all 13 spacecraft before announcing a final decision.37 The
July 15 budget amendment states that some of the $88.3 million added to Earth-Sun
systems would be used for extended missions.
H.R. 3070, as reported from the House Science Committee (H.Rept. 109-173),
directs NASA to develop a policy to guide earth and space science programs through
2016; requires the National Academy of Sciences to evaluate the performance of each
scientific discipline on a certain time schedule; and requires NASA to carry out annual
termination reviews for extended missions, and that such a review be made for certain
extended missions (including Voyager) within 60 days of enactment, with a report to
Congress required 30 days later.
S. 1281 as reported directs NASA to conduct a “rich and vigorous set of science
activities.” It also directs NASA to assess the cost and benefits of extending the
missions of the Voyager spacecraft, and another spacecraft called Ulysses that is
studying the Sun.
Exploration Systems. This budget category funds the part of NASA
primarily responsible for implementing the “Moon/Mars” portion of the Vision. The
Constellation Systems line item funds development of the CEV and a vehicle to
launch it — called the Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV). Exploration Systems Research
and Technology funds a variety of technology development efforts, including funding
for Centennial Challenges, a program through which NASA offers prizes for
developing specific technologies. Project Prometheus, which is developing nuclear
power and propulsion, is discussed in an earlier section of this report. Human
Systems Research and Technology comprises the programs that remain from the
previous Office of Biological and Physical Research. It is the budgetary location of
funds for research to be performed by NASA aboard the International Space Station,
though it also funds ground-based research.
37 Hearing transcript from Federal Document Clearing House, via Factiva.

CRS-44
Table 8. FY2006 Request for Exploration Systems
(in $ millions)
FY2006
FY2006
FY2005
Theme
Initial
Amended
Est.*
Request
Request
Constellation Systems
526.0
1,120.1
1,412.1
Exploration Systems Research & Technology
722.8
919.2
797.2
Project Prometheus
431.7
319.6
179.6
Human Systems Research & Technology
1,003.9
806.5
776.5
ISS Crew/Cargo Services**
NA
NA
168.4
Lunar Robotic Exploration Program**
NA
NA
135.0
Total
2,684.5
3,165.4
3,468.8
Source: NASA FY2006 Budget Justification and July 15, 2005 budget amendment.
* NASA’s budget justification uses the figures from its Initial Operating Plan, submitted to Congress
on Dec. 23, 2004. Updates to that operating plan have been submitted, but are in the format of
the FY2005 budget, not FY2006, so cannot be used to update this table.
** The July 15 budget amendment moves funding for these two programs into the Exploration Systems
Mission Directorate (as discussed earlier in this report), but does not specify if they are now
included in one of the four themes identified in the original FY2006 request, or if new themes are
created for them. They are shown here as separate line items due to lack of other information to
the contrary. NA means Not Applicable.
Congressional action on funding for the Vision is discussed earlier in this report.
Aeronautics Research. NASA’s aeronautics research program and its
FY2006 budget request are discussed earlier in this report.
Education Programs. Prior to FY2004, NASA’s education activities
appeared under the budget heading “Academic Programs.” NASA reorganized its
education activities in 2003, consolidating programs that had been in its Office of
Human Resources & Education, and the Office of Equal Opportunity Programs, into
a new Office of Education. That office was abolished in the August 2004
reorganization, however. Now, a “Chief Education Officer” oversees these activities.
According to NASA current organizational structure, the Chief Education Officer
reports to the Chief of Strategic Communications. In addition to the funding
identified in the budget under Education Programs, other NASA programs in the
various Mission Directorates also fund educational activities. These are not separately
identified in NASA’s budget justification documents, and therefore are not addressed
in this section.
NASA’s education programs include a broad array of activities designed to
improve science education at all levels — kindergarten through 12th grade (K-12) and
higher education. They include programs that directly support student involvement
in NASA research, train educators and faculty, develop new educational technologies,

CRS-45
provide NASA resources and materials in support of educational curriculum
development, and involve higher education resources and personnel in NASA research
efforts. The National Space Grant and Fellowship Program, which funds research,
education, and public service projects through university-based Space Grant consortia,
is administered through this office. The Space Grant program
[http://calspace.ucsd.edu/spacegrant/] was established by Congress in NASA’s
FY1988 authorization bill (P.L. 100-147). It funds Space Grant Consortia in all 50
states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, to broaden the base of universities
and individuals contributing to and benefitting from aerospace science and
technology.
Programs devoted to minority education (the Minority University Research and
Education Program — MUREP) focus on expanding participation of historically
minority-dominant universities in NASA research efforts. These programs develop
opportunities for participation by researchers and students from those institutions in
NASA activities. The objective is to expand NASA’s research base through
continued investment in minority institutions’ research and academic infrastructure
to contribute to the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics pipeline.
This office also administers NASA’s participation in the Experimental Program
to Stimulate Competitive Research (EPSCoR). According to its website
[http://calspace.ucsd.edu/epscor/], NASA’s EPSCoR program targets states of modest
research infrastructure with funds to develop a more competitive research base within
their member academic institutions. NASA is one of several federal agencies that
participate in the EPSCoR program. Among the others are the National Science
Foundation,38 the National Institutes of Health, the Department of Defense, and the
Department of Energy.
For FY2006, NASA is requesting $166.9 million for education programs,
compared to a FY2005 appropriation of $216.7 million (per the Initial Operating
Plan). The difference between the request and last year’s appropriation is primarily
due to congressionally directed funding for which NASA is not requesting funds in
FY2006. The specific amounts for EPSCoR and the Space Grant program are not
provided in NASA’s budget justification document. The Senate Appropriations
Committee specified that within the funds for education, $12 million be for EPSCoR,
$29.55 million for the Space Grant program, and $54.233 million for other education-
related activities. S. 1281 directs that NASA use appropriated funds to ensure the
continuation of the EPSCoR, Space Grant, and NASA Explorer School programs, but
does not specify amounts. The bill includes other language supportive of certain
education programs. H.R. 3070, as passed, specifies that $24 million in both FY2006
and FY2007 be allocated for the Space Grant program, and in FY2006, $8.9 million
be allocated for the Science and Technology Scholarship Program. It also contains a
section (Title VI, Subtitle B) regarding other education programs at NASA.
38 NSF’s EPSCoR program is described in: CRS Report RL30930, U.S. National Science
Foundation: Experimental Program to Stimulate Competitive Research (EPSCoR),
by
Christine Matthews.

CRS-46
Exploration Capabilities
Last year, this budget account included most of the funding related to
implementing the Vision, labeled “Exploration Technologies.” Those activities now
have been moved in the SA&E account under the “Exploration Systems” line. What
remains in this budget account is funding for the Space Operations Mission
Directorate and its three themes: International Space Station, Space Shuttle, and
Space and Flight Support.
The ISS and space shuttle programs are discussed earlier in this report. Space
and Flight Support is a budget category that includes funding for space
communications, rocket propulsion systems testing, launch services (i.e., acquisition
of commercial launch services for NASA payloads that are not launched on NASA’s
shuttle), and crew health and safety.
Table 9. FY2006 Request for Space Operations
(in $ millions)
FY2005
FY2006 Initial
FY2006 Amended
Theme
Estimate*
Request
Request
International Space Station**
1,676.3
1,856.7
1,688.3
Space Shuttle†
4,543.0
4,530.6
4,530.6
Space and Flight Support
485.1
375.6
375.6
Total
6,704.4
6,763.0
6,594.5
Source: NASA FY2006 Budget Justification and July 15, 2005 budget amendment.
* NASA’s budget justification uses the figures from its Initial Operating Plan, submitted to Congress
on Dec. 23, 2004. Updates to that operating plan have been submitted, but are in the format of
the FY2005 budget, not FY2006, so cannot be used to update this table.
** Does not include funding for space station research activities, which are included in the Exploration
Systems Mission Directorate. At the time of its budget submission, a NASA briefing chart
indicated that $382 million in FY2005, and $324 million in FY2006 was for space station
research, although those numbers are expected to decrease as the result of later funding decisions.
† The FY2005 estimate in the Initial Operating Plan did not fully fund the $762 million shortfall that
NASA identified in November 2004. Additional money subsequently was moved into the
FY2005 shuttle account.
The original request for the ISS program included $160 million for ISS
Crew/Cargo Services according to NASA briefing charts. This subaccount was
created in the FY2005 budget to cover costs associated with obtaining alternative
means to the space shuttle for servicing the ISS. Dr. Griffin announced in the May
10, 2005 operating plan that he was shifting responsibility for this program from the
Space Operations Mission Directorate to the Exploration Systems Mission
Directorate, which is developing a launch vehicle strategy for the future. The July 15
budget amendment similarly shifted the FY2006 requested funding into ESMD,
reducing the ISS request (the budget amendment stated that the FY2006 requested
level was $168.4 million, not $160 million).

CRS-47
The Senate Appropriations Committee disapproved all $160 million, explaining
that NASA had not spent the $98 million provided for FY2005. That amount will be
carried over into FY2006, and should be sufficient for any activity initiated in
FY2006, according to the committee’s report.
Inspector General
In NASA’s FY2006 budget documentation, the Office of Inspector General
describes its responsibilities as preventing and detecting crime, fraud, waste, abuse
and mismanagement, while promoting economy, effectiveness, and efficiency within
NASA. The FY2006 request is $32.4 million, an increase of $1.1 million over
FY2005. All the pending NASA funding bills recommend the requested amount.
Out-Year Budget Projections
NASA’s FY2006 budget estimate contains the out-year budget projections shown
in Table 10. Such projections are always subject to change, but can be indicative of
the direction in which the Bush Administration wants NASA to head. Compared to
the projections in the FY2005 budget (see last row), the projected increases in
NASA’s budget for implementing the Vision for Space Exploration are less in
FY2006-2007, and slightly more in FY2008 and FY2009, but still less than the
projected rate of inflation (approximately 2%). Also, NASA lists the $126 million
in emergency hurricane relief for FY2005 separately from the $16.070 billion
provided in the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act. If those figures are added,
the increase from FY2005 to FY2006 actually is 1.6%, not 2.4% as shown in this
table.

CRS-48
Table 10. FY2006-2010 NASA Funding Projection
(in $ millions)
Budget Account
FY2005
FY2006
FY2007
FY2008
FY2009
FY2010
Science, Aeronautics, and
9,334.7
9,661.0
10,549.8
11,214.6
12,209.6
12,796.1
Exploration
Science
5,527.2
5,476.3
5,960.3
6,503.4
6,853.0
6,797.6
Exploration Systems
2,684.5
3,165.4
3,707.0
3,825.9
4,473.7
5,125.5
Aeronautics Research
906.2
852.3
727.6
730.6
727.5
717.6
Education Programs
216.7
166.9
154.9
154.7
155.4
155.4
Exploration Capabilities
6,704.4
6,763.0
6,378.6
6,056.7
5,367.1
5,193.8
Space Operations
6,704.4
6,763.0
6,378.6
6,056.7
5,367.1
5,193.8
International Space
1,676.3
1,856.7
1,835.3
1,790.9
2,152.3
2,375.5
Station
Space Shuttle
4,543.0
4,530.6
4,172.4
3,865.7
2,815.1
2,419.2
Space and Flight Support
485.1
375.6
370.9
400.0
399.7
399.1
Inspector General
31.3
32.4
33.5
34.6
35.2
37.3
TOTAL
16,070.4
16,456.3
16,962.0
17,305.9
17,611.9
18,027.1
Year to Year Increase (%)
2.4*
3.1
2.0
1.8
2.4
Projected in FY2006 Budget
Emergency Hurricane
126.0
Supplemental
GRAND TOTAL
16,196.4
16,456.3
16,962.0
17,305.9
17,611.0
18,027.1
Year to Year Increase (%)
5.6
4.7
4.8
1.0
0.2
**
Projected in FY2005 Budget
Source: NASA FY2006 Budget Justification, p. 1, except that CRS added the last two rows. The Grand Total was
calculated by CRS; the Year to Year Increase Projected in the FY2005 Budget is from NASA’s FY2005 Budget
Justification, p. 1. As noted in NASA’s FY2006 Budget Justification, the FY2005 figures in this table are from
NASA’s Initial Operating Plan, submitted to Congress on December 23, 2004, and are not final.
* As noted in the text of this report, the actual increase from FY2005 to FY2006 is only 1.6% when the $126
million in emergency hurricane relief funds are added to the $16.070 billion provided in the FY2005
Consolidated Appropriations Act.
** The projected budgets are for five years only, so the FY2005 budget did not include a figure for FY2010.
The Senate authorization bill, S. 1281, recommends annual funding for NASA
for FY2006-2010. The totals for FY2006 and FY2007 are broken down by account.
Table 11 shows the figures recommended in that bill as reported from committee.
The House authorization bill, H.R. 3070, as passed by the House, authorizes funding
for FY2006 and FY2007 in a budget structure different from that used in the NASA
request (see Table 3).

CRS-49
Table 11. Five-Year Funding Recommendations in S. 1281
(In $ millions)
Budget Account
FY2006
FY2007
FY2008*
FY2009*
FY2010*
Science, Aeronautics &
9,661
10,550
Exploration
Exploration Capabilities
6,863
6,470
Inspector General
32
34
TOTAL
16,556
17,053
17,470
17,995
18,535
Source: S. 1281. Totals may not add due to rounding.
*Funding for FY2008-2010 was not broken down by account.

CRS-50
Appendix A: Related CRS Reports
General
CRS Issue Brief IB92011, U.S. Space Programs: Civilian, Military, and Commercial
CRS Issue Brief IB93017, Space Stations
CRS Issue Brief IB93062, Space Launch Vehicles: Government Requirements,
Commercial Competition, and Satellite Exports
The Vision for Space Exploration
CRS Report RS21720, Space Exploration: Issues Concerning the “Vision for Space
Exploration”
CRS Report RS21866, Space Exploration: Report of the Aldridge Commission on
Implementation of President Bush’s Exploration Initiative
The Columbia Accident and the Space Shuttle Program
CRS Report RS21408, NASA’s Space Shuttle Program: Issues for Congress Related
to the Columbia Tragedy and “Return to Flight”
CRS Report RS21606, NASA’s Space Shuttle Columbia: Synopsis of the Report of the
Columbia Accident Investigation Board
Hubble Space Telescope
CRS Report RS21767, Hubble Space Telescope: Should NASA Proceed with a Shuttle
Servicing Mission?

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