Order Code IB93113
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Saudi Arabia:
Current Issues and
U.S. Relations
Updated August 1, 2005
Alfred B. Prados
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Current Issues
September 11 Terrorist Attacks and Aftermath
Allegations
Saudi Responses
Joint Congressional Report
Joint Task Force
9/11 Commission Report
Major Terrorist Attacks
Incidents
Evolution of Saudi Efforts
Saudi Stance on Iraq
Operation Iraqi Freedom
Post-War Iraq: Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from Saudi Arabia
Infiltrators?
Iraqi Debt
Arab-Israeli Conflict
Saudi-Palestinian Relations
Hamas
Arms Transfers to Saudi Arabia
U.S. Arms Sales
Saudi-China Contacts
Nuclear Concerns
Trade Relationships
Oil Production
Foreign Investment
Human Rights, Democracy, and Other Issues
Background to U.S.-Saudi Relations
Political Development
Saudi Leadership
Royal Succession
U.S. Aid, Defense, and Security
Congressional Interest in Saudi Arabia
108th Congress
109th Congress

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Saudi Arabia: Current Issues and U.S. Relations
SUMMARY
Saudi Arabia, a monarchy ruled by the
ing anti-Americanism in some segments of the
Saud dynasty, enjoys special importance in
Saudi population. Since the attacks on the
much of the international community because
United States September 11, 2001, some
of its unique association with the Islamic
commentators have maintained that Saudi
religion and its oil wealth. Since the estab-
domestic and foreign policies have created a
lishment of the modern Saudi kingdom in
climate that may have contributed to terrorist
1932, it has benefitted from a stable political
acts by Islamic radicals. U.S. officials have
system based on a smooth process of succes-
generally cited Saudi support in the aftermath
sion to the throne and a prosperous economy
of the attacks, including increased intelligence
dominated by the oil sector. Some commenta-
sharing, law enforcement activities, and track-
tors have suggested that growing internal
ing of terrorist financing.
pressures and regional tensions may have
weakened the Saudi regime in recent years;
In its final report, released on July 23,
others point to an apparent consensus behind
2004, the U.S. National Commission on
Saudi institutions over much of the last cen-
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (the
tury as evidence of long-term stability.
9/11 Commission) described Saudi Arabia as
having been “a problematic ally in combating
The United States and Saudi Arabia have
Islamic extremism,” while noting that Saudi
long-standing economic and defense ties. A
cooperation has improved, especially since
series of informal agreements, statements by
further terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia begin-
successive U.S. administrations, and military
ning in May 2003. The National Intelligence
deployments have demonstrated a strong U.S.
Reform Act (P.L. 108-458, December 17,
security commitment to Saudi Arabia. Saudi
2004) contains a requirement (Section
Arabia was a key member of the allied coali-
7120(b)) that the President submit to desig-
tion that expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait in
nated congressional committees a strategy for
1991. Saudi Arabia subsequently hosted U.S.
collaboration with Saudi Arabia, as part of a
aircraft enforcing the no-fly zone over south-
larger report on U.S. government activities to
ern Iraq. Saudi officials expressed opposition
implement the provisions of this act.
to the U.S.-led military campaign launched
against Iraq in March 2003 (Operation Iraqi
Other principal issues of bilateral interest
Freedom), although Saudi Arabia reportedly
include security in the post-war Gulf region,
permitted certain support operations by U.S.
the Saudi position on the Arab-Israeli conflict,
and British military forces, in addition to
arms transfers to Saudi Arabia, Saudi external
making some facilities available to them. By
aid programs, bilateral trade relationships and
mutual agreement, the United States withdrew
oil production, and Saudi policies involving
virtually all its forces from Saudi Arabia at the
human rights and democracy. The Consoli-
end of August 2003.
dated Appropriations Act for FY2005 (P.L.
108-447, December 8, 2004) contains a ban
Bombing attacks against several U.S. and
on U.S. assistance to Saudi Arabia but pro-
foreign operated installations in Saudi Arabia
vides for a presidential waiver (Section 575) if
have raised some concerns about security of
the President certifies that Saudi Arabia is
U.S. personnel and what appears to be grow-
cooperating in the war against terrorism.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On August 1, 2005, Saudi Arabia’s minister of information announced the death of the
82-year-old King Fahd (some estimates of the late monarch’s age are as high as 85). The
minister went on to announce that the royal family had acknowledged the late king’s half-
brother Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abd al-Aziz as the new sovereign and had accepted
Abdullah’s choice of Defense Minister Sultan (a full brother of the late king) as the new
Crown Prince and heir apparent. According to news reports, senior Saudis will pledge
allegiance to the new King and Crown Prince on August 3, in accordance with Saudi
tradition and Article 5(b) of Saudi Arabia’s Basic Law, which was promulgated by the late
King Fahd in 1992. Crown Prince Abdullah, 80 to 82 years old according to various
estimates, has governed the country on a day-to-day basis since the late King Fahd suffered
a debilitating stroke in late 1995. The King and Crown Prince hold the additional positions,
respectively, of Prime Minister and First Deputy Prime Minister; King Abdullah is expected
to name a Second Deputy Prime Minister (a de facto Deputy Crown Prince) as his recent
predecessors have done. According to the press, possible candidates for this position include
Prince Nayif, Minister of the Interior, and Prince Salman, Governor of Riyadh; both are full
brothers of the late King Fahd. King Abdullah’s decision to retain all current cabinet
ministers has been interpreted by some observers as evidence of likely continuity in Saudi
domestic and foreign policies.
Earlier, on July 20, Saudi officials announced the retirement of Saudi Arabia’s long-
time ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, for what were described as
private reasons. A son of Minister of Defense (and now Crown Prince) Sultan and a former
Saudi Air Force fighter pilot, Bandar had widespread contacts in the U.S. State and Defense
Departments and was close to several U.S. presidents. His successor, Prince Turki bin
Faysal, has been serving as ambassador to Britain; in an earlier position as Director of
Intelligence Prince Turki had reportedly tried to persuade the Taliban regime in Afghanistan
to return Osama bin Laden to Saudi Arabia where he (bin Laden) was wanted on charges of
seeking to overthrow the government.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Current Issues
September 11 Terrorist Attacks and Aftermath
Allegations. The September 11, 2001 attacks kindled criticisms within the United
States of alleged Saudi involvement in terrorism or of Saudi laxity in acting against terrorist
groups. Commentators have pointed to the high percentage of Saudi nationals among the
hijackers (15 out of 19). Some critics go so far as to accuse Saudi government officials of
responsibility for the September 11, 2001, attacks through design or negligence and for the
continuing threat posed by the perpetrators or by like-minded terrorist groups. Others
maintain that Saudi domestic and foreign policies have created a climate that may have
contributed to terrorist acts by Islamic radicals. For example, some believe that the Saudi
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regime has fostered international terrorism by funding religious schools (madrasas) that
propagate extreme forms of Islam and advocate violence. (For more information on these
schools, see CRS Report RS21654, Islamic Religious Schools, Madrasas: Background)
Critics of Saudi policies have also cited a multiplicity of reports that the Saudi government
has permitted or encouraged fund raising in Saudi Arabia by charitable Islamic groups and
foundations linked to Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda organization, which the U.S. government
has identified as clearly responsible for the hijacks. The exiled bin Laden was formerly a
Saudi national, but Saudi authorities revoked his citizenship in 1994. (For more information
on the question of Saudi fundraising, see CRS Report RL32499, Saudi Arabia: Terrorist
Financing Issues, July 28, 2004.)
Saudi Responses. Saudi officials maintain that they are working closely with the
United States to combat terrorism, which they say is aimed as much at the Saudi regime as
it is at the United States. In October 2001, the Saudi government announced that it would
implement U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373, which called among other things for
freezing terrorist related funds. The Saudi government later invited the G-7 Financial Action
Task Force (FATF) on Money Laundering into the kingdom to conduct a “mutual
evaluation,” established a Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) to collect intelligence on
financial activity, and passed new banking regulations.1 On February 24, 2004, Saudi Arabia
and 12 other Middle East or Asian countries attended a conference organized by the 29-
member FATF, where attendees focused on terrorist use of charitable organizations to
finance terrorist operations. In February 2005, Saudi Arabia hosted a counterterrorism
conference at which attendees adopted a resolution (the “Riyadh Declaration”) condemning
violence and terrorism.
Saudi Arabia in Brief

Population (2005):
26,417,599 (includes 5,576,076 foreign residents)
Growth rate: 2.31%
Area:
1,960,582 sq.km. (756,985 sq.mi.); just over one fifth the size of the
United States
Ethnic Groups:
(native Saudis only) Arab 90%; Afro-Asian 10%
Religion:
(native Saudis only) Muslim 100% (Sunni 85-95%, Shi’ite 5-15%)
Literacy (2003):
78.8% (male 84.7%, female 70.8%)
GDP (2004):
$236.8 billion; growth rate: 5.3%*
External Public Debt (2004): $35.8 billion
Inflation (2004):
0.4%
Unemployment (2004):
25%
*Unusually high figure, largely owing to surge in oil production.
Sources: IMF; U.S. Dept. of Commerce; CIA World Factbook; Economist Intelligence Unit (London)
1 Matthew Levitt, “Saudi Financial Counterterrorism Measures (Part II): Smokescreen or
Substance?” Policywatch No. 687, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Dec. 10, 2002, p. 1.
According to the U.S. State Department, the FATF concluded after the mutual evaluation that the
financial control regime adopted by Saudi Arabia met the general FATF obligations recommended
by the FATF for combating money laundering and terrorist financing.
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Saudi officials say they have sought to dampen religious extremism in the Kingdom.
Press reports indicate that Saudi security forces had arrested 600 suspects as of November
10, 2003. On several occasions, most recently in September 2003, the Saudi Embassy issued
a comprehensive white paper detailing initiatives undertaken by Saudi Arabia in the war
against terrorism since the September 11, 2001 attacks, with particular emphasis on
apprehension of suspected terrorists, establishment of joint task forces with the United States
(see below), intelligence cooperation, and various steps against terrorism financing. In a
speech to an Islamic conference on August 30, 2003, then Saudi King Fahd bin Abd al-Aziz
condemned terrorism and exhorted Muslim clerics to emphasize peace, security, cooperation,
justice, and tolerance in their sermons.
U.S. government statements have generally complimented Saudi cooperation with the
U.S. campaign against terrorism, while sometimes suggesting that the Saudi government
could do more. In its most recent annual report entitled Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2004
(published April 27, 2005), the State Department mentioned that the Saudi government
captured or killed all but seven of the Kingdom’s most wanted terrorists and most of the
known terrorist leadership in Saudi Arabia. According to the U.S. Treasury Department, the
United States and Saudi Arabia have worked together in jointly designating several entities
as supporters of terrorism. For example, on June 2, 2004, a spokesman of the Saudi Embassy
in Washington, D.C. announced that a large Saudi-based charitable organization (the al-
Haramayn Islamic Foundation), which has been linked to terrorist activity, would be
dissolved and that its assets, along with the assets of other Saudi charitable organizations,
would be merged into a new organization to be called the Saudi National Commission for
Relief and Charity Work Abroad, in an effort “to ensure that the charity of our citizens goes
to those who need it.” During the same period, the United States and Saudi Arabia
reportedly asked the U.N. Sanctions Committee to add five other overseas branches of al-
Haramayn to its list of foreign terrorist organizations. In his State of the Union address of
February 2, 2005, President Bush mentioned Saudi Arabia among 11 countries that have
captured or detained Al-Qaeda terrorists.
Joint Congressional Report. On July 24, 2003, the House and Senate Intelligence
Committees released part of a 900-page report entitled Joint Inquiry into Intelligence
Community Actions before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 (S.Rept.
107-351; H.Rept. 107-792). The Bush Administration refused to allow the release of an
approximately 28-page section of the report. According to press articles, persons who claim
to have read the still-classified section of the report say it covers Saudi links with individuals
involved in the September 11 attacks; specifically, the classified section reportedly states that
senior Saudi officials channeled hundreds of millions of dollars to charitable groups that may
have helped fund the attacks.2 Saudi officials, including the Saudi Ambassador to the United
States, have denounced the report, maintaining that “Al Qaeda is a cult seeking to destroy
Saudi Arabia as well as the United States. By what logic would we support a cult that is
trying to kill us?”3 On July 29, in response to an urgent request from Saudi Arabia, President
Bush met with Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faysal, who called for the release of the still-
classified section of the report to enable Saudi Arabia to rebut the allegations contained
2 “Classified Section of Sept. 11 Report Faults Saudi Rulers,” New York Times, July 26, 2003.
3 “Saudis Slam Congressional Report Accusing Kingdom of Poor Cooperation in Terror War,”
Associated Press News Wire, July 26, 2003.
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therein. President Bush refused to do so on the grounds that disclosure could reveal
intelligence sources and methods to enemies of the United States and might compromise the
on-going investigation of the September 11, 2001, attacks.4
Joint Task Force. In August 2003, the United States and Saudi Arabia reached an
agreement for the establishment in Saudi Arabia of a joint U.S.-Saudi task force to monitor
terrorist financing. The task force, composed of representatives from the U.S. Treasury
Department, the FBI, and other U.S. agencies, will screen bank accounts, computer records,
and other financial data in an effort to track the flow of money to terrorist organizations and
shut it off. U.S. officials left for the Saudi capital of Riyadh on August 26, to work out
details regarding the task force. News articles have noted that this is the first time Saudi
authorities have allowed U.S. government agencies to maintain an extended presence in
Saudi Arabia or provided them with access to Saudi documents and investigations. Some
speculate that the May 2003 bombings of three residential compounds in Riyadh (see below)
in which 34 people died, including eight Americans and seven Saudis, may have impelled
Saudi authorities to expand cooperation with the United States in fighting terrorism (“U.S.-
Saudi Anti-Terror Operation Planned,” Washington Post, August 26, 2003).
9/11 Commission Report. In its final report, released on July 23, 2004, the U.S.
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission)
described Saudi Arabia as having been “a problematic ally in combating Islamic extremism.”
The report takes note of long-standing cooperative relations between the U.S. and Saudi
governments, growing misunderstandings at the popular level in recent years, and U.S.
criticisms in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks that Saudi officials could do more to fight
terrorism. The report acknowledges increased efforts in that regard since mid-2003 when
terrorists began hitting targets in Saudi Arabia itself with more frequency; today, according
to the report, “The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is now locked in mortal combat with al Qaeda.”
One of the key recommendations in the 9/11 report addresses the U.S.-Saudi relationship:
The problems in the U.S.-Saudi relationship must be confronted, openly. The United
States and Saudi Arabia must determine if they can build a relationship that political
leaders on both sides are prepared to publicly defend — a relationship about more than
oil. It should include a shared commitment to political and economic reform, as Saudis
make common cause with the outside world. It should include a shared interest in greater
tolerance and cultural respect, translating into a commitment to fight the violent
extremists who foment hatred.
Major Terrorist Attacks
Incidents. The mid-1990s saw two forerunners of more recent attacks by terrorists
against U.S. and other targets in Saudi Arabia starting in 2003. The initial attacks seemed
mainly directed against U.S. personnel, but later attacks seemed to target Saudi interests as
well. A listing of principal incidents follows.
! Riyadh, November 13, 1995. An explosion occurred at the headquarters of
a U.S. training program for the Saudi National Guard in the capital of
Riyadh, killing seven persons (including five U.S. citizens). Several months
4 “Bush Refuses to Declassify Saudi Section of Report,” New York Times, July 30, 2003.
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later, Saudi authorities executed four Saudis, who reportedly confessed to
the crime after having been influenced by Islamic fundamentalist exiles.
! Khobar Towers, June 25, 1996. The second and more lethal explosion
occurred at Khobar Towers, a housing facility for U.S. Air Force personnel
near Dhahran Air Base, killing 19 U.S. Air Force personnel and wounding
many others. Saudi Interior Minister Prince Nayif told reporters on May 22,
1998, that the bombings “were carried out by Saudis with the support of
others.” On June 21, 2001, then U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft
announced that a federal grand jury had indicted 14 individuals in
connection with the explosion, which killed 19 U.S. servicemen and
wounded 372 others. According to the U.S. Justice Department, the
suspects belonged to the Saudi and Lebanese branches of the militant Shi’ite
Muslim organization Hizballah, which is supported by Iran. The 1996
Khobar bombing remains unresolved.
! Riyadh, May 12, 2003. Three near-simultaneous suicide truck bombings
destroyed three housing compounds in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, inhabited by
U.S. military personnel and other foreign residents in Riyadh. According to
reports, as many as 34 people were killed, including eight Americans, seven
Saudis, and 15 others. U.S. and Saudi officials said the attacks had many
earmarks of previous Al Qaeda operations.
! Riyadh, November 9, 2003. A car bomb exploded in the Saudi capital of
Riyadh at a residential compound inhabited mainly by foreign residents from
other Arab countries, killing at least 17 and wounding over 120, including
four Americans. U.S. and Saudi officials blamed Al Qaeda for the attack;
visiting U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage said “this attack
bears their hallmark.”
! Riyadh, April 21, 2004. A suicide bomber detonated a Chevrolet Blazer
packed with explosives in front of the Saudi General Security building in
Riyadh, killing at least four persons (two Saudi police officers, one civilian,
and one Syrian girl) and wounding 148. Al-Haramayn Brigades, a group
allegedly connected to Al Qaeda, claimed responsibility for the attack,
which was the first suicide bombing of a major Saudi government building.
! Yanbu, May 2, 2004. During a shooting spree on May 2, 2004, four gunmen
killed two U.S., one Australian, and two British citizens employed by the
Swiss-Swedish based engineering company ABB Lummus, which was
engaged in upgrading operations at a petrochemical plant in the Saudi Red
Sea port city of Yanbu. The plant is jointly owned by U.S. Exxon Mobil
and a Saudi industrial firm.
! Khobar, May 29, 2004. At least four gunmen attacked a residential
compound housing oil company employees and dependents in Khobar,
Saudi Arabia, seizing approximately 50 hostages. Twenty-two of the
hostages, including one U.S. citizen, were killed and approximately 25
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wounded before the hostage-takers fled during a rescue operation mounted
by Saudi commandos on May 30.
! Assassinations Since mid-May 2004. Since mid-2004, terrorist groups in
Saudi Arabia have targeted several western expatriates, including three U.S.
contractors working on military-related projects: two were shot and killed
near their residences on June 8 and 12, and a third, Lockheed Martin
employee Paul M. Johnson, was kidnaped on June 12 and reportedly
beheaded a few days later.5 This shift by terrorists from bombs to targeted
assassinations has been described by some observers as an attempt by the
perpetrators to deflect mounting criticism of Saudi militants for previous
indiscriminate bombings that caused increasing injury and death to fellow
Saudis and other Muslims.
! Jeddah, December 6, 2004. Militants using small arms and grenades
stormed the heavily fortified U.S. Consulate in the Red Sea port city of
Jeddah, killing five foreign employees of the consulate before Saudi security
personnel killed four of the militants and captured the other one. The Saudi
cabinet condemned the attack, which Saudi officials blamed on “deviants,”
a term used by Saudi officials to describe operatives or supporters of Al
Qaeda. Some commentators speculate that Al Qaeda may have shifted its
strategy again to target U.S. and western interests while refraining from
attacks on domestic targets, in an effort to recoup Saudi domestic support
for their operations.6
Evolution of Saudi Efforts. In the past, U.S. officials have criticized Saudi
counterparts for insufficient sharing of information that Saudi officials have gained from
their investigations of terrorist acts that have killed or injured U.S. citizens. Press reports
indicate that U.S.-Saudi cooperation in the investigation of terrorist incidents has improved
since mid-2003. Both U.S. and Saudi officials said the impetus for closer cooperation came
from the May 2003 attacks, which one knowledgeable observer described as “the inevitable
wake up call” for Saudi leaders increasingly concerned over apparent attempts by terrorists
to target the Saudi regime. The November bombing, which occurred after virtually all U.S.
forces had left the country, may have reinforced Saudi concerns over their vulnerability to
such attacks by Al Qaeda and like-minded groups,7 and Saudi willingness to share
information with U.S. officials. According to the 9/11 Commission’s report, “[a]s in
Pakistan, Yemen, and other countries, [Saudi] attitudes changed when the terrorism came
home.” In the course of a shoot-out in June 2004, Saudi officials said they had killed Abd
al-Aziz al-Muqrin, the leader of an apparent Al Qaeda affiliate known as “Al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula,” who had claimed responsibility or support for several terrorist acts
5 See Craig Whitlock and Renae Merle, “Saudi Victims Had Military Link,” Washington Post, June
14, 2004.
6 “Ql Qaeda Shifts Its Strategy In Saudi Arabia,” Washington Post, Dec. 19, 2004.
7 “U.S.-Saudi Anti-Terror Operation Planned,” Washington Post, Aug. 26, 2003; “A Campaign to
Rattle a Long-Ruling Dynasty,” New York Times, Nov. 10, 2003. According to the 9/11
Commission’s report, “[a]s in Pakistan, Yemen, and other countries, [Saudi] attitudes changed when
the terrorism came home.”
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including the May 2004 Khobar attack. Subsequent conflicting press reports indicated that
Muqrin’s replacement, Saleh Al-Oufi, was killed by Saudi security forces and replaced by
Saud Al-Otaibi, but a Saudi Ministry of Interior official denied this report.
Saudi Stance on Iraq
Operation Iraqi Freedom. Between the Gulf War of 1991 and Operation Iraqi
Freedom in 2003, Saudi Arabia hosted U.S. Air Force units that conducted overflights to
enforce a no-fly zone over southern Iraq (Operation Southern Watch). Although they did not
usually object to small scale U.S. responses to Iraqi aircraft or air defense units challenging
allied aircraft conducting these overflights, Saudi authorities were opposed to large-scale
allied military action against Iraqi targets. Saudi Arabia opposed the U.S.-led Operation Iraqi
Freedom, and on March 19, 2003 (the day President Bush initiated the campaign), a
communique by then King Fahd stated that Saudi Arabia “will not participate in any way”
in the war. A number of news reports, however, indicated that Saudi Arabia informally
agreed to provide logistical support to U.S.-led forces: permission to conduct refueling,
reconnaissance, surveillance, and transport missions from bases in Saudi Arabia; landing and
overflight clearances; and use of a U.S.-built facility in Saudi Arabia known as the Combat
Air Operations Center (CAOC) to coordinate military operations in the region.8 Also, on
March 8, 2003, Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan bin Abd al-Aziz said his government
was allowing U.S. troops to use two airports in northern Saudi Arabia for “help in a technical
matter.” A later report in the Philadelphia Inquirer on April 26, 2004, quoting unnamed
U.S. and Saudi officials, alleged that Saudi Arabia had a wider role in the war than had been
publicized at the time. In addition to support noted above, the officials said the Saudi royal
family permitted the staging of special forces operations from inside Saudi Arabia, allowed
some 250-300 mainly transport and surveillance planes to fly missions from Saudi Arabia,
and provided tens of millions of dollars in discounted oil, gas, and fuel for U.S. forces.
Like several Sunni Muslim-led regimes in the Gulf region, Saudi leaders are reportedly
worried in the aftermath of the war about the possible spread of Shi’ite Muslim influence in
the region, especially Iraq, whose Shi’ite majority may be vulnerable to Iranian overtures.
(“As Saudi Visits, Bush Seeks Help on Lowering Oil Prices,” New York Times, April 25,
2005.) A joint statement by President Bush and then Crown Prince Abdullah on April 25,
2005 called on the international community to support Iraq and urged neighboring states to
avoid interfering in Iraq’s internal political affairs.
Post-War Iraq: Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from Saudi Arabia. Following the
collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime, the New York Times reported on April 30, 2003, that
the United States planned to withdraw almost all of its 5,000 troops in Saudi Arabia and
move its Combat Air Operations Center to neighboring Qatar. The U.S. Air Force unit to
which most U.S. military personnel in Saudi Arabia had been assigned was formally de-
activated on August 27, 2003. On September 22, 2003, the New York Times reported that
the last American combat troops had left Saudi Arabia earlier in the month. According to
U.S. officials, approximately 220 U.S. military and contract advisors remained in country;
8 See for example “U.S. And Saudis Agree On Cooperation,” Washington Post, Feb. 26, 2003.
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as of September 2004; many of these were working with the Saudi National Guard.9 Both
U.S. and Saudi officials hoped the departure of U.S. troops would remove some of the
pressure on the Saudi government from militant anti-U.S. groups; but some terrorist attacks
against residential compounds have continued, as noted above.
Infiltrators? In late August 2003, a senior State Department official commented that
pro-Saddam Arab volunteer fighters have been infiltrating into Iraq through Iran, Syria, and
Saudi Arabia to mount attacks against U.S.-led coalition forces in Iraq. In remarks published
on August 26, a senior Saudi foreign policy advisor responded that “we have no evidence of
Saudis crossing into Iraq and we have received no evidence from the U.S. government.”10
A press article on November 19, 2003, quoted local U.S. military commanders as saying that
their soldiers had encountered relatively few foreign fighters crossing into Iraq from
neighboring countries, including Saudi Arabia.11 According to a New York Times report of
April 23, 2004, quoting Saudi officials, the Saudi government has installed heat sensors to
detect movement on the Saudi-Iraqi border in an effort to seal it. In late December 2004,
unidentified western diplomats in Saudi Arabia reportedly said that several hundred Saudi
nationals are fighting in Iraq from a total of 1,000-1,500 foreign insurgents, but went on to
say that most Saudi infiltrators had come via Syria or other countries rather than directly
from Saudi Arabia, which has tighter border controls. (London Financial Times, December
20, 2004). A more recent press report (“Islamic Activities Sweep Saudi Council Elections,”
Washington Post, April 24, 2005) also mentions “hundreds” of Saudis fighting U.S. forces
in Iraq.
Iraqi Debt. As of January 2004, Iraq reportedly owed the Saudi government $9 billion
in debts incurred during the Saddam Hussein regime, while private Saudi firms and banks
hold about $19 billion in Iraqi debt.12
Arab-Israeli Conflict
Saudi Arabia supports Palestinian national aspirations, strongly endorses Muslim claims
in the old city of Jerusalem, and has been increasingly critical of Israel since the outbreak of
the Palestinian uprising in the occupied West Bank and Gaza in September 2000. Unlike
several other Gulf countries, Saudi Arabia has not established trade or liaison channels for
communication with Israel. At the same time, Saudi Arabia has supported U.S. policy by
endorsing Israeli-Palestinian peace agreements, joined with neighboring Gulf states in 1994
in terminating enforcement of the so-called secondary and tertiary (indirect) boycotts of Israel
while retaining the primary (direct) boycott, and adopted a more pro-active approach to
peacemaking. In March 2002, then Crown Prince Abdullah proposed a peace initiative
calling for full Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories in return for full normalization
9 The London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies in its annual publication, The
Military Balance, 2004-2005, p. 136, estimates 300 U.S. Army and Air Force personnel.
10 “Saudis Challenge U.S. Over Iraq Fighters,” Washington Post, Aug. 26, 2003.
11 “U.S. Officers in Iraq Find Few Signs of Infiltration by Foreign Fighters,” New York Times, Nov.
19, 2003.
12 Tom Everett-Heath, “Opposing Views of the Kingdom to Come,” Middle East Economic Digest,
Jan. 23-29, 2004, p. 1.
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of relations between Arab states and Israel. The plan was endorsed by the Arab League at
a summit conference on March 27-28, 2004 and used as a basis of discussion between then
Crown Prince Abdullah and President Bush at a bilateral meeting in April 2002.
Over a year later, on June 3, 2003, President Bush, then Crown Prince Abdullah, and
four other Arab leaders met at Sharm al-Shaykh, Egypt, where the attendees endorsed the
Road Map — a phased plan for Palestinian-Israeli peace promulgated by the United States,
the United Nations, Russia, and the European Union (the “Quartet”). At a second bilateral
meeting between President Bush and then Crown Prince Abdullah in Texas on April 25,
2005, a joint statement by the two leaders contained the following: “With regard to the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia desire a just,
negotiated settlement wherein two democratic states, Israel and Palestine, live side by side
in peace and security.”13
Saudi-Palestinian Relations. Saudi Arabia, like other Arab states, recognizes the
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian
people. Saudi officials say that their support to Palestinians (estimated at $80 million to
$100 million per year) is provided exclusively to the Palestinian Authority (PA), which was
established under the Israeli-Palestinian agreement of September 13, 1993, known as the first
Oslo Accord.14 Saudi Arabia has provided aid (variously estimated at $33 million and $59
million) to families of Palestinians killed or injured in the three-year-old Palestinian
uprising; in addition, Saudis raised additional funds (over $100 million according to one
report) for this purpose at a telethon sponsored by then King Fahd on April 11, 2002. Saudi
officials told U.S. counterparts in late April 2002 that proceeds of the telethon are funneled
through non-governmental organizations to provide some humanitarian support to needy
Palestinian families; the Saudis drew a distinction between their fund raising activities and
those of Iraq under Saddam Hussein, which paid families who would sacrifice their children
as suicide bombers. (For more information on Saudi payments to families of Palestinians
killed in the Palestinian uprising or imprisoned by Israeli authorities, see CRS Report
RL32499, Saudi Arabia: Terrorist Financing Issues.) During then Crown Prince Abdullah’s
visit with President Bush in Crawford, Texas on April 25, 2005, Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice told reporters she had discussed with the Crown Prince “the need for
everyone to support, including financially, the Palestinians as they move forward.”
Hamas. There have been unsubstantiated reports of Saudi assistance to the PLO’s
principal rival organization, the fundamentalist Hamas organization, which the U.S.
government has designated as a foreign terrorist organization. In its annual report on
terrorism for the year 2001 (Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2001, published May 21, 2002),
the State Department noted that Hamas receives funding from “private benefactors in Saudi
Arabia and other moderate Arab states.” In its most recent issue (Patterns of Global
Terrorism, 2003, published April 29, 2004), the State Department does not specifically
mention Saudi Arabia; rather, it states that Hamas “[r]eceives some funding from Iran but
primarily relies on donations from Palestinian expatriates around the world and private
benefactors, particularly in Western Europe, North America, and the Persian Gulf region.”
13 Available at the following website: [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/04/print/
20050425-8.html]
14 “Flow of Saudi Cash to Hamas Is Under Scrutiny by U.S.,” New York Times, Sept. 17, 2003.
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The State Department reports do not estimate amounts involved. According to one press
report, people in Saudi Arabia contribute approximately $5 million to Hamas per year, or
approximately half of its annual operating budget.15 Some reports indicate that Saudi
authorities tolerate fund raising for Hamas. For example, in May 2002, Israeli officials,
citing captured Palestinian documents, said the Saudi government had given money to 13
charities, seven of which provide support to Hamas. Saudi spokesman Adel al-Jubeir, an
advisor to the Crown Prince, maintained that “no Saudi government money goes to Hamas,
directly or indirectly.”16 (See also CRS Report RL32499, cited above.)
Arms Transfers to Saudi Arabia
U.S. Arms Sales. The United States has long been Saudi Arabia’s leading arms
supplier. During the eight-year period from 1996 through 2003, U.S. arms ordered by Saudi
Arabia amounted to $7.3 billion while U.S. arms delivered to Saudi Arabia amounted to
$22.9 billion, reflecting earlier orders. An upsurge in Saudi arms purchases from the United
States in the early 1990s was due in large measure to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and its
aftermath. The largest recent sale was a $9 billion contract for 72 F-15S advanced fighter
aircraft, signed in May 1993. Saudi arms purchase figures include not only lethal equipment
but also significant amounts of support services and construction. A downward trend has
marked Saudi arms procurement since the mid-1990s as Saudi Arabia completed many of
its post-Gulf War purchases and the country faced straitened finances.
Saudi-China Contacts. In 1988, shortly before the end of the cold war, Saudi
Arabia concluded a controversial purchase of approximately 30 intermediate range CSS-2
missiles from China, in its first and only major arms purchase from a communist (or formerly
communist) state. A Reuters news wire report of February 15, 2004, quoted unnamed U.S.
officials as voicing concern over continued alleged cooperation between China and Saudi
Arabia on missiles; the report did not provide details. On the following day, the Saudi Press
Agency said a responsible source at the Saudi Defense Ministry denied the report, which a
defense spokesman described as “fabricated and baseless.”
Nuclear Concerns. There have been occasional questions in the past about possible
Saudi nuclear cooperation with other states. For example, according to press reports in 1999,
U.S. officials were concerned over a visit by the Saudi Defense Minister to nuclear and
missile facilities in Pakistan, but had received assurances from Saudi officials that Saudi
Arabia was not seeking nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction. Later, a
Washington Times article of October 22, 2003, citing “a ranking Pakistani insider,” reported
that Saudi Arabia and Pakistan had concluded a secret agreement on nuclear cooperation,
under which Pakistan would provide Saudi Arabia with nuclear technology in return for oil
at reduced prices. A State Department spokesman said the Administration had seen the
reports but did not have any information to substantiate them. The spokesman went on to
note that Pakistan understands U.S. concerns over nuclear proliferation and that Saudi Arabia
15 Don Van Natta, Jr., with Timothy L. O’Brien, “Flow of Saudis’ Cash to Hamas Is Scrutinized,”
The New York Times, Sept. 17, 2003. The report cites American law enforcement officials,
American diplomats in the Middle East, and Israeli officials.
16 Don Van Natta, Jr. with Timothy L. O’Brien, “Flow of Saudis’ Cash to Hamas Is Scrutinized,” The
New York Times, Sept. 17, 2003.
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is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Saudi Ambassador to the United
States denied that Saudi Arabia and Pakistan had concluded a nuclear agreement and
repeated previous Saudi calls for a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.
Saudi Arabia has been negotiating a full-scope safeguards agreement with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). On June 16, 2005, the IAEA approved a Small
Quantities Protocol (SQP) for Saudi Arabia; this protocol exempts countries with minimal
quantities of nuclear materials and facilities from routine inspections and declarations. It is
not clear whether the IAEA will require Saudi Arabia to conclude an Additional Protocol,
which could give the IAEA more leverage for inspections. IAEA Director General
Muhammad ElBaradei has called the SQP a “weakness” in the nuclear safeguard regime, and
the United States and some western nations are concerned that it does not provide sufficient
transparency in the case of Saudi Arabia. A Saudi official reportedly told European officials
that Saudi Arabia would provide additional information to the IAEA only if all other parties
to the protocol did the same.17
Trade Relationships
Saudi Arabia was the largest U.S. trading partner in the Middle East in 2004. For that
year, Saudi exports to the United States were estimated at $20.4 billion (up from $17.7
billion in 2003) and imports from the United States at $4.7 billion (up from $4.3 billion).
Comparable figures for Israel, the second largest U.S. trading partner in the Middle East in
2004, were $14.5 billion in exports and $6.0 billion in imports . To a considerable extent,
this high volume of trade is a result of U.S. imports of hydrocarbons from Saudi Arabia and
U.S. arms exports of arms, machinery, and vehicles to that country. Saudi Arabia has applied
to join the 128-member World Trade Organization (WTO), and U.S. officials including
President Bush have expressed support for its application. During then Crown Prince
Abdullah’s April 2005 visit, his chief advisor said the United States and Saudi Arabia are
very close to reaching a bilateral trade agreement, which would open the door to Saudi
membership in the WTO.
Oil Production. With the world’s largest proven oil reserves (estimated at 261.7
billion barrels in January 2001), Saudi Arabia produced approximately 9.5 million barrels
per day (bpd) of crude oil as of April 2005. Approximately 12.1% of U.S. oil imports and
7.6% of total U.S. oil consumption came from Saudi Arabia during 2004. Formerly the
largest foreign supplier of oil to the United States, Saudi Arabia has been exceeded in this
role by Canada, Mexico, and/or Venezuela during recent years (see Table 1).
In recent years, Saudi Arabia has alternately supported cuts and increases in production
as oil prices on the international market have fluctuated. Under a “gentlemen’s agreement”
reached in June 2000, members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) established a mechanism to adjust the supply of oil by 500,000 bpd if the 20-day
average price of oil moved outside a $22 to $28 price band. This band eroded in subsequent
years as oil prices continued to rise to more than $50 per barrel, and in follow-up comments
after the April 25, 2005, meeting between President Bush and then Crown Prince Abdullah,
the Crown Prince’s foreign policy advisor said the $22-$28 price band has become
17 George Jahn, “Saudi Arabia Exempt From Nuke Inspections,” Guardian, June 16, 2005.
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unrealistic. He went on to say that Saudi Arabia has a limited spare capacity of
approximately 1.3 to 1.4 million bpd for increased production. During the April 2005 visit,
Saudi officials proposed a long-range plan to deal with fundamental issues of supply and
demand, indicating that they would aim for production levels of 12.5 million bpd by the end
of the current decade and 15.0 million bpd over time.
Table 1. Oil Consumption and Imports
(in millions of barrels per day)
Category
2001
2002
2003
2004
Total U.S. Consumption
19.649
19.761
20.034
20.517
Total U.S. Imports
11.871
11.530
12.264
12.899
Imports from Saudi Arabia
1.662
1.552
1.774
1.556
Imports from Canada
1.828
1.971
2.072
2.118
Imports from Mexico
1.440
1.547
1.623
1.642
Imports from Venezuela
1.553
1.398
1.378
1.621
Source: DOE.
Foreign Investment. Saudi leaders, notably King Abdullah, have shown increasing
interest in attracting foreign investment, especially in their country’s energy sector. Oil
exploration and production remain generally off limits to foreign investment; however, with
the world’s fourth largest natural gas reserves (219.4 trillion cubic feet), Saudi Arabia is
emphasizing foreign participation in the country’s gas sector. In 2001, Saudi Arabia signed
three preliminary agreements worth approximately $25 billion with eight international oil
companies (including six U.S.-based companies) to develop three natural gas fields.
Conclusion of final agreements met continuing delays as Saudi and company negotiators
tried to resolve several issues, including taxes, rate of return on investments, and size of gas
reserves being offered. Eventually, in mid-2003, negotiations collapsed, and Saudi officials
began pursuing a different approach involving smaller, less ambitious projects of more
limited scope. Tenders were issued on September 15, 2003 for three new contract areas.
One U.S. company, Chevron-Texaco, submitted bids for all three; however, it was
unsuccessful in obtaining any of the contracts. Saudi Oil Minister Ali al-Naimi and other
officials said the bids were assessed strictly in accordance with the terms offered by the
various companies, although some unnamed observers suggested that the bidding process
was structured in a way that favored non-U.S. competitors. Still other observers suggested
that the awards reflect Saudi desire to cement economic ties with Russia, China, and other
third countries, and one energy expert noted that “[t]he Saudis are clearly shifting around and
looking to different parts of the world.18
In the meantime, several U.S. companies are involved in new or projected Saudi
operations. ExxonMobile and ChevronTexaco are among several international oil companies
that the Saudis have approached regarding their plans to build a large export refinery at the
port of Yanbu, potentially worth $5 billion. In addition, in March 2005, the Saudis awarded
18 Karen Matusic, “Saudis Extend Geopolitical Base with Gas Deals,” The Oil Daily, Feb. 2, 2004;
Simeon Kerr, “Saudi Arabia Strikes Hard Bargain On Gas Rights,” Dow Jones, Emerging Markets
Report, Jan. 29, 2004.
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a contract to another U.S. company, Bechtel, as part of a joint venture to develop three on-
shore oil fields in eastern Saudi Arabia at a potential cost of $3 billion.19
Human Rights, Democracy, and Other Issues
Of particular concern to Westerners are pervasive restrictions on women’s activities and
an injunction against the practice of other religions throughout the Kingdom. This injunction
has been applied not only against non-Islamic faiths but also at times against the Shi’ite
Muslim community in Saudi Arabia, estimated at 500,000 or more persons mainly in the
Eastern Province. Since 1990, the Saudi government has moved quietly to ease some
restrictions on Shi’ites. A petition presented by Saudi Shi’ite representatives was followed
by an audience with then Crown Prince Abdullah on April 30, 2003, indicating that both the
government and the Shi’ite petitioners may be seeking to pursue a more cooperative
approach. Also, according to the State Department, high-level Saudi officials have said that
Saudi policy allows for private non-Muslim worship, for example, in private homes or
secluded compounds; however, the State Department notes that Saudi officials do not always
follow these guidelines in practice and have not provided specific guidelines to determine
what constitutes private worship. (Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices - 2005, published February 28, 2005.) In the State Department’s most recent
annual Report on International Religious Freedom (September 15, 2004), Saudi Arabia is
designated for the first time as a “Country of Particular Concern.” In his 2005 State of the
Union address, President Bush commented that “[t]he Government of Saudi Arabia can
demonstrate its leadership in the region by expanding the role of its people in determining
their future.”
Political reforms promulgated by the late King Fahd in the early 1990s and continued
under Crown Prince Abdullah have set in motion a limited move toward democracy and
protection of individual freedoms. The “basic law” announced by the King on March 1,
1992, bans arbitrary arrest, harassment, or entry of individual homes without legal authority
and specifies privacy in telephone calls and mail. On August 20, 1993, the King appointed
a 60-member consultative (“Shura”) council (increased to 90 in 1997 and to 120 in 2001),
with limited powers to question cabinet members and propose laws. On January 25, 2005,
the Saudi Minister of Defense and Aviation and Second Deputy Prime Minister Prince Sultan
told Saudi newspapers that the council will be expanded to 150 members and given
additional unspecified authority in the next three months; a royal decree in early April 2005
approved the expanded membership of the council.
In further steps, the Saudi government held three rounds of municipal elections on
February 10, March 3, and April 20, 2005, in a three-stage process in which male Saudi
citizens cast votes for half the members of 178 municipal councils in the country’s first
nation-wide elections. Although political parties and coalitions were banned, post-election
reports indicated that in most cases candidates endorsed by popular Sunni Islamic religious
fared best. (Shi’ite Muslim candidates also did well in the Shi’ite centers of northeastern
Saudi Arabia.) Commentators differ as to whether winners represented a moderate religious
trend or a more militant strain. In their joint press conference on April 25, 2005, President
19 “Small Steps Forward,” Middle East Economic Digest, April 22-28, 2005, pp. 42-44; “Sultans of
Swing,” Middle East Economic Digest, May 6-12, 2005, pp. 4-5.
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Bush and then Crown Prince Abdullah noted that “[t]he United States applauds the recently
held elections in the Kingdom [of Saudi Arabia] ... and looks for even wider participation
in accordance with the Kingdom’s reform program.” Earlier, in a press interview, the Saudi
Foreign Minister predicted that women will vote in the next election.20 The State
Department report notes the establishment for the first time in Saudi Arabia of a government-
approved human rights organization, the National Society for Human Rights, which began
to address some human rights violations during the past year, such as prison conditions. On
the other hand, a trial is under way for three reformists, who were arrested in March 2004
after calling for a constitutional monarchy in Saudi Arabia.
Background to U.S.-Saudi Relations
Political Development
Saudi Leadership. As the birthplace of the Islamic religion in 622 A.D. and as the
home of Islam’s two holiest shrines (the cities of Mecca and Medina), the Arabian Peninsula
has always occupied a position of special prestige within the Middle East. With the
establishment of Arab empires based in Damascus and Baghdad, the peninsula gradually lost
its political importance and sank into disunity. In the 16th century, much of the Arabian
Peninsula came under the nominal rule of the Ottoman Empire; however, tribal leaders
effectively controlled most of the region. During this period, an alliance developed between
an influential eastern tribe, the House of Saud, and the leaders of a puritanical and reformist
Islamic group known as the Wahhabi movement. During the first quarter of the 20th century,
a chieftain of the Saud family, Abd al-Aziz ibn Abd al-Rahman (later known as Ibn Saud)
overcame numerous rivals with the support of his Wahhabi allies and succeeded in unifying
most of the Arabian Peninsula under his rule. Four sons have succeeded him.
Royal Succession. The late King Fahd, who ruled Saudi Arabia from 1982 until
2005, was a dynamic leader but suffered increasingly from medical problems including
diabetes and arthritis. In early 1996, the King Fahd temporarily turned over affairs of state
to his half-brother, Crown Prince Abdullah, for a six-week period while the King recuperated
from a stroke. Amid conflicting reports about the King’s condition, Crown Prince Abdullah
increasingly carried out many governmental functions after 1996, together with other senior
princes of the royal family. Upon the death of King Fahd on August 1, 2005, Abdullah
succeeded to the throne. Another key figure is Defense Minister Prince Sultan, a full brother
of the late King Fahd, who replaced King Abdullah as Crown Prince upon the death of King
Fahd.

As predicted by many commentators, the royal family backed Crown Prince Abdullah
in a smooth transfer of power when King Fahd passed away. Various sources describe King
Abdullah as more traditional and less western in outlook than the late King Fahd and more
oriented toward the Arab world. On balance, the new King seems likely to maintain Saudi
Arabia’s long-standing strategic and economic ties with the United States. His retention of
all current cabinet ministers is interpreted in the pres as evidence of likely continuity in Saudi
20 “Changes in the Kingdom — on ‘Our Timetable’” (interview by Lally Weymouth with Prince
Saud al-Faysal), The Washington Post, Feb. 27, 2005.
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domestic and foreign policies. U.S. officials commented that President Bush and then Crown
Prince Abdullah established a very good personal rapport during the latter’s visits in 2002
and 2005. Some speculate, however, that succession could become more intricate after
Abdullah (who is only two years younger than the late Fahd but believed to be in better
health than the late King) and fear that future intra-family rivalries could weaken the Saud
dynasty over the long term. Possible future candidates include some 25 brothers and half-
brothers of the late King and a number of sons and nephews.
U.S. Aid, Defense, and Security
As Saudi oil income expanded, U.S. economic aid ended in 1959. Small amounts of
aid continued through 1975, limited to a small international military education and training
(IMET) program after 1968. Total U.S. aid to Saudi Arabia from 1946 through its
termination in 1975 amounted to $328.4 million, of which $295.8 million was military and
$32.6 million was economic assistance. Approximately 20% of total aid was in the form of
grants and 80% in loans, all of which have been repaid. A small IMET program of $22,000
per year to help defray some expenses of sending Saudi officers to U.S. military service
schools was resumed in FY2002 and increased slightly to $25,000 in 2003 and 2004;
$25,000 was requested by the Administration for Saudi Arabia in FY2005. This amount
permits Saudi Arabia to purchase additional U.S. training at a lower cost than that which is
charged to countries not eligible for IMET. Saudi officials also cite their country’s role as
a donor of aid to less affluent countries; according to the Saudi Embassy in Washington,
Saudi Arabia gave $1.7 billion in development assistance and $14.7 million in relief
assistance to developing countries in 2002.
Congressional Interest in Saudi Arabia
108th Congress. U.S.-Saudi bilateral issues of interest to Congress in recent years
include arms sales to Saudi Arabia, Arab-Israeli issues including the now somewhat
attenuated Arab boycott of Israel, oil pricing, Saudi trade practices including disputes
between U.S. companies and Saudi clients (largely resolved), and terrorism. During the
debate on H.R. 4818, the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill for FY2005, the House
adopted Amendment 708 introduced by Representative Anthony D. Weiner, which stated
that “None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available pursuant to this act shall
be obligated or expended to finance any assistance to Saudi Arabia.” Though not included
in the Senate version of the bill, this amendment was included as Section 575 in the
conference report on H.R. 4818 (H.Rept. 108-792); it provided waiver authority if the
President certifies to the congressional appropriations committees that Saudi Arabia is
cooperating in the war against terrorism and that U.S. assistance will facilitate that effort.
The President signed the bill as P.L. 108-447 on December 8, 2004.
Relevant sections of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (P.L. 108-
458, December 17, 2004) capture many of the concerns reflected in the 9/11 Commission
report regarding Saudi Arabia. Section 7105(a) contains findings that review problems in
the bilateral relationship but note improvements in counter-terrorism cooperation between
the two countries since mid-2003. Section 7105(b) expresses the sense of Congress that
“there should be a more robust dialogue between the people and Government of the United
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States and the people and Government of Saudi Arabia.” Section 7120(b) requires the
President to submit to Congress within 180 days a strategy for collaboration with Saudi
Arabia, as part of a larger report on U.S. government activities to implement the provisions
of this act. The strategy paper is to include steps to institutionalize U.S.-Saudi relationships,
intelligence and security cooperation, ways to increase Saudi contributions to peace and
stability in the Middle East, political and economic reform, ways to promote tolerance and
diversity in Saudi Arabia, and ways to diminish support from Saudi sources to extremist
groups.
109th Congress. The 109th Congress has continued to show concern over the role of
Saudi Arabia in the war against terrorism, with particular emphasis on encouraging Saudi
leaders to heighten their efforts against terrorist financing. S. 12, the Targeting Terrorists
More Effectively Act of 2005, introduced on January 24, 2005, contains sections on Saudi
Arabia including a statement of U.S. policy to work with the Saudi government to curtail
terrorist financing through a variety of methods; findings that Saudi Arabia has an uneven
record in fighting terrorism; and a requirement that the President submit a report to
designated congressional committees containing a long-term strategy for U.S.-Saudi
engagement and for effective prevention of terrorist financing.21
H.R. 505, the Prohibit Aid to Saudi Arabia Act of 2005, would impose a ban on U.S.
aid to Saudi Arabia and contains no waiver authority; H.R. 604 would halt issuance of visas
to Saudi citizens until the President certifies that the Saudi government does not discriminate
in its visa policies on the basis of religious affiliation or cultural heritage. H.R. 2037, the
Saudi Arabia Accountability Act of 2005, is similar to two previous Saudi Arabia
Accountability Acts (H.R. 3643/S. 1888), proposed but not enacted in the 108th Congress.
Like the earlier bills, it would prohibit export or issuance of an export license to Saudi
Arabia for any U.S. defense articles or defense services on the U.S. munitions list or dual use
items and would restrict travel of Saudi diplomats in the United States.
Section 810 of S. 600, the State Department authorization bill for FY2006-2007,
expresses the sense of Congress that the municipal elections held in early 2005 constituted
a “positive initial step” and adds that it is in the interest of Saudi Arabia to permit women
to vote and run for office in future elections. On June 28, 2005, the House adopted H.Amdt.
379 to H.R. 3057 (the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill for FY2006) by 293-122 (Roll
no. 330); this amendment added a Section 588 to H.R. 3057 prohibiting U.S. assistance to
Saudi Arabia and containing no provision for a presidential waiver. H.R. 3057 passed the
House on June 28. The Senate version of H.R. 3057, passed on July 20, 2005, does not
contain this ban.
21 Present legislation — Section 7120 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (P.L.
108-458, December 17, 2004) — requires the President to submit a strategy as part of a larger
reporting requirement within 180 rather than 90 days, as explained above.
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