Order Code RS22188
July 11, 2005
CRS Report for Congress
.Received through the CRS Web
Regular Vetoes and Pocket Vetoes: An
Overview
Kevin R. Kosar
Analyst in American National Government
Government and Finance Division
Summary
The veto power vested in the President by Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution
has proven to be an effective tool for the chief executive in his dealings with Congress.
Since the founding of the federal government in 1789, 35 of 43 Presidents have
exercised their veto authority a total of 2,550 times. Congress has overridden these
vetoes on 106 occasions (4.2%). Presidents have vetoed 80 appropriations bills, and
Congress has overridden 12 (15.0%) of these vetoes. This report will be updated at the
beginning of each new Congress.
Constitutional Basis and Importance
To become law, the U.S. Constitution (Article I, Section 7) provides that all bills that
have been approved by both houses of Congress must be presented to the President for
his approval and signature.1 The President may sign a bill into law within the 10-day
period (excluding Sundays) provided in the Constitution,2 let it become law without his
signature, or veto it. The Constitution states that, when the President vetoes a bill, “he
shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated.” This
type of action is called a “regular” or “return” veto. If, on the other hand, Congress has
adjourned within the 10-day period after presentation of the bill to the President (thereby
preventing the return of the bill to Congress), the President may simply withhold his
signature, and the bill does not become law — a practice that has been dubbed a “pocket”
veto.3
1 These bills include joint resolutions, but do not include proposed amendments to the
Constitution, which require a two-thirds vote in each house, and are sent directly to the states for
approval. U.S. Constitution, Art. V.
2 U.S. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 7.
3 Beginning in 1929, several judicial decisions have attempted to clarify when an adjournment
by Congress “prevents” the President from returning a veto. For information on these cases, see
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
CRS-2
The President’s veto authority is among his most significant tools in legislative
dealings with Congress. Illustrative of this point is the fact that Presidents have vetoed
2,550 bills since 1789; of these, Congress has overridden 106 (4.2%). Moreover, the veto
also can be effective as a threat, sometimes forcing Congress to modify legislation before
it is presented to the President.
This report presents information on how regular vetoes can be overridden by
Congress, the number of vetoes by each President, and the use of vetoes in relation to
appropriations bills. The report does not address two other types of vetoes — “line-item”
vetoes (since the President has no such power at present) and “legislative” vetoes (which
are wielded by Congress, not the President).4
Overriding a Veto
If a bill is pocket vetoed while Congress is out of session, the only way for Congress
to overcome the veto is to reintroduce the legislation as a new bill, pass it through both
houses, and present it to the President again for his signature.5 On the other hand,
Congress may override a regular veto without introducing new legislation.
Upon receiving the President’s veto, his objections are to be entered into the journal
of the House in which it originated. The Constitution is silent, however, on what it means
for Congress to “reconsider” a vetoed bill, so House and Senate procedures and tradition
govern the treatment of bills returned by the President. A vetoed bill becomes a question
of “high privilege,” taking precedence over other pending business before Congress. The
measure then may be “reconsidered” by being tabled, referred back to committee,
postponed to a certain day, or brought to an immediate vote to override the veto. If a two-
thirds vote is successful in the originating house, the override vote then may be scheduled
for the other house. Passage by a two-thirds margin in both houses is required before the
end of the Congress in which the regular veto is received. Although the Constitution
states that approval requires “two thirds of that House,” congressional procedure,
tradition, and judicial rulings have interpreted this requirement to mean two-thirds of
those Members present and voting, provided there is a quorum.6 However, neither house
is under any constitutional, legal, or procedural obligation to schedule an override vote.
It is not unusual for Congress to make no effort to override the veto if congressional
leaders do not believe they have sufficient votes.
3 (...continued)
CRS Report RL30909, The Pocket Veto: Its Current Status, by Louis Fisher.
4 On these types of vetoes, see CRS Report RS21991, A Presidential Item Veto, by Louis Fisher;
and CRS Report RS22132, Legislative Vetoes After Chadha, by Louis Fisher.
5 Data are not readily available on overridden pocket vetoes.
6 A “quorum” is defined as the number of Members whose presence is necessary for the
transaction of business. In the Senate and House, it is a majority of the membership (when there
are no vacancies, this is 51 in the Senate and 218 in the House). A quorum is 100 in the
Committee of the Whole House.
CRS-3
Vetoes Exercised and Overridden
Pocket Vetoes and Returned Vetoes
Table 1 shows that, since the beginning of the federal government in 1789, 35 of 43
Presidents have exercised their veto authority on a total of 2,550 occasions. Of that
number, 1,484 (58.2%) have been regular vetoes — that is, the rejected legislation was
returned to the congressional house of origin, while it was in session, with a presidential
message of explanation — and 1,066 (41.8%) were pocket vetoed, or rejected while
Congress was adjourned. Congress has overridden 106 (7.1%) of the 1,484 regular
vetoes. This percentage, though, is skewed downward slightly by the enormous number
of vetoes in administrations prior to the 87th Congress (which began in 1961).7 If one
counts only the vetoes since 1961 (the beginning of the Kennedy Administration), one
finds 350 vetoes and 33 overridden (9.4%).
Table 1. Presidential Vetoes, 1789-2005
President Coincident
Regular Vetoes
Pocket Vetoes
Total Vetoes
Vetoes
Congresses
Overridden
Washington
1st -4th
2
—
2
—
Adams
5th -6th
—
—
—
—
Jefferson
7th -10th
—
—
—
—
Madison
11th -14th
5
2
7
—
Monroe
15th -18th
1
—
1
—
J. Q. Adams
19th -20th
—
—
—
—
Jackson
21st -24th
5
7
12
—
Van Buren
25th -26th
—
1
1
—
W. H. Harrison
27th
—
—
—
—
Tyler
27th -28th
6
4
10
1
Polk
29th -30th
2
1
3
—
Taylor
31st
—
—
—
—
Fillmore
31st -32nd
—
—
—
—
Pierce
33rd -34th
9
—
9
5
Buchanan
35th -36th
4
3
7
—
Lincoln
37th-39th
2
5
7
—
A. Johnson
39th-40th 21
8
29
15
7 Most of those vetoes prior to 1960 were of private bills, i.e., legislation that would confer
benefits upon a single person or company, which were almost never overridden. In 1971,
Congress gave administrators more discretion to handle the claims of individuals. Thus, the
need for congressionally passed private bills has dropped dramatically — from hundreds per
annum to a few dozen — and, therefore, the opportunities for vetoes. On private bills, see CRS
Report 98-628, Private Bills: Procedure in the House, by Richard S. Beth.
CRS-4
President Coincident
Regular Vetoes
Pocket Vetoes
Total Vetoes
Vetoes
Congresses
Overridden
Grant
41st-44th 45
48
93
4
Hayes
45th-46th 12
1
13
1
Garfield
47th
—
—
—
—
Arthur
47th -48th
4
8
12
1
Cleveland
49th -50th 304
110
414
2
B. Harrison
51st -52nd 19
25
44
1
Cleveland
53rd -54th 42
128
170
5
McKinley
55th -57th
6
36
42
—
T. Roosevelt
57th -60th 42
40
82
1
Taft
61st -62nd 30
9
39
1
Wilson
63rd -66th 33
11
44
6
Harding
67th
5
1
6
—
Coolidge
68th -70th 20
30
50
4
Hoover
71st -72nd 21
16
37
3
F. D. Roosevelt
73rd -79th 372
263
635
9
Truman
79th -82nd
180
70
250
12
Eisenhower
83rd -86th 73
108
181
2
Kennedy
87th -88th 12
9
21
—
L. B. Johnson
88th -90th 16
14
30
—
Nixon
91st -93rd 26
17
43
7
Ford
93rd -94th 48
18
66
12
Carter
95th -96th 13
18
31
2
Reagan
97th -100th 39
39
78
9
G. H. W. Bush
101st -102nd 29
15
44
1
Clinton
103rd -106th 36
1
37
2
G. W. Bush
107th -109th
—
—
—
—
Total
1,484
1,066
2,550
106
Sources: U.S. Congress, Senate, Secretary of the Senate, Presidential Vetoes, 1789-1988, S.Pub. 102-
12, 103rd Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington: GPO, 1992); and U.S. Congress, Senate, Secretary of the
Senate, Presidential Vetoes, 1989-1991, S.Pub.102-13, 103rd Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington: GPO,
1992).
Perhaps noteworthy is that the present President has not wielded his veto thus far — a
modern anomaly. Not since the presidency of Millard Fillmore (1850-1853) has a
President served a full term without wielding his veto; not since the presidency of
Thomas Jefferson (1801-1809) has a two-term President left office without vetoing a
bill.
CRS-5
Vetoes of Appropriation Bills
A veto of an appropriations bill can result in the closure of federal agencies, the
furlough of federal employees, and the interruption of federal programs and services.8
Despite these high stakes, Presidents have vetoed many appropriation bills.9 For
example, Presidents Carter, Reagan, George H. W. Bush, and Clinton were presented
with a total of 387 annual appropriations acts and vetoed 30 of them (7.8%).10
Congressional overrides of vetoes of appropriations are also not unusual. For
example, of the 80 vetoes of appropriations since 1789, 12 (15.0%) were overridden
(see Table 2). Interestingly, half of the vetoes of appropriations bills have occurred
since 1968.
Table 2. Appropriations Bills Vetoed, 1789-2005
President Coincident
Approp. Acts Vetoed
Vetoes of Approp. Acts Overridden
Congresses
Washington
1st -4th
—
—
Adams
5th -6th
—
—
Jefferson
7th -10th
—
—
Madison
11th -14th
—
—
Monroe
15th -18th
—
—
J. Q. Adams
19th -20th
—
—
Jackson
21st -24th
—
—
Van Buren
25th -26th
—
—
W. H. Harrison
27th
—
—
Tyler
27th -28th
2
—
Polk
29th -30th
1
—
Taylor
31st
—
—
Fillmore
31st -32nd
—
—
Pierce
33rd -34th
4
2
Buchanan
35th -36th
1
—
Lincoln
37th-39th
—
—
8 For additional information on federal government shutdowns, see CRS Report 98-844,
Shutdown of the Federal Government: Causes, Effects, and Process, by Kevin R. Kosar, and CRS
Report RL30339, Preventing Federal Government Shutdowns: Proposals for an Automatic
Continuing Resolution, by Robert Keith (archived and available on request from author).
9 The data in this section and in Table 2 include annual appropriations acts (which provide annual
funding for the routine operations of most federal agencies), supplemental appropriations acts,
and continuing appropriations acts. Excluded are measures dealing with impoundments, transfers,
line-item vetoes under the Line Item Veto Act of 1996, and bills proposing appropriations for the
relief of private claims.
10 CRS Report RS20719, Vetoed Annual Appropriation Acts: Presidents Carter Through Clinton,
by Mitchell Sollenberger, p. 2 (archived and available on request from author).
CRS-6
President Coincident
Approp. Acts Vetoed
Vetoes of Approp. Acts Overridden
Congresses
A. Johnson
39th-40th
—
—
Grant
41st-44th
—
—
Hayes
45th-46th
5
—
Garfield
47th
—
—
Arthur
47th-48th
1
1
Cleveland
49th -50th
1
—
B. Harrison
51st -52nd
—
—
Cleveland
53rd -54th
5
1
McKinley
55th -57th
—
—
T. Roosevelt
57th -60th
—
—
Taft
61st -62nd
4
—
Wilson
63rd -66th
8
—
Harding
67th
1
—
Coolidge
68th -70th
—
—
Hoover
71st -72nd
2
—
F. D. Roosevelt
73rd -79th
1
1
Truman
79th -82nd
1
1
Eisenhower
83rd -86th
3
1
Kennedy
87th -88th
—
—
L. B. Johnson
88th -90th
—
—
Nixon
91st -93rd
5
1
Ford
93rd -94th
5
3
Carter
95th -96th
2
—
Reagan
97th -100th
6
1
G. H. W. Bush
101st -102nd
8
—
Clinton
103rd -106th 14
—
G. W. Bush
107th -109th
—
—
Total
80
12
Sources: U.S. Congress, Senate, Secretary of the Senate, Presidential Vetoes, 1789-1988, S.Pub. 102-
12, 103rd Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington: GPO, 1992); and U.S. Congress, Senate, Secretary of the
Senate, Presidential Vetoes, 1989-1991, S.Pub.102-13, 103rd Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington: GPO,
1992).