Order Code IB93108
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Central Asia: Regional Developments
and Implications for U.S. Interests
Updated June 20, 2005
Jim Nichol
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Historical Background
Overview of U.S. Policy Concerns
Post-September 11 and Afghanistan
Support for Operation Iraqi Freedom
Fostering Pro-Western Orientations
Russia’s Role
Obstacles to Peace and Independence
Regional Tensions and Conflicts
Democratization and Human Rights
Democracy Pledges
Security and Arms Control
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Trade and Investment
Energy Resources
Aid Overview

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Central Asia: Regional Developments and
Implications for U.S. Interests
SUMMARY
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in
weapons materials and facilities. In
1991, the United States recognized the inde-
Tajikistan, U.S. aid focuses on economic
pendence of all the former Central Asian
reconstruction. U.S. energy firms have in-
republics, supported their admission into
vested in oil and natural gas development in
Western organizations, and elicited Turkish
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
support in countering Iranian influence in the
region. Congress was at the forefront in
Some observers call for different empha-
urging the formation of coherent U.S. policies
ses or levels of U.S. involvement in Central
for aiding these and other Eurasian states of
Asia. Some have called for strengthening
the former Soviet Union.
conditions linking aid to progress in improv-
ing human rights or in making adequate prog-
Soon after the terrorist attacks on Amer-
ress in democratization and the creation of
ica on September 11, 2001, all the Central
free markets. Some have disputed the impor-
Asian states offered overflight and other
tance of energy resources to U.S. national
support to coalition anti-terrorist efforts in
security. Others point to civil and ethnic
Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and
tensions in the region as possibly endangering
Uzbekistan have hosted coalition troops and
U.S. lives and investments. Heightened con-
provided access to airbases. In 2003,
gressional interest in Central Asia was re-
Uzbekistan endorsed coalition military action
flected in passage of “Silk Road” language in
in Iraq and Kazakhstan provided about two
late 1999 (P.L. 106-113) authorizing en-
dozen troops for rebuilding.
hanced U.S. policy attention and aid to sup-
port conflict amelioration, humanitarian
After September 11, 2001, U.S. policy
needs, economic development, transport
emphasized bolstering the security of the
(including energy pipelines) and communica-
Central Asian states to help them combat
tions, border controls, democracy, and the
terrorism, proliferation, and arms trafficking.
creation of civil societies in the South Cauca-
Other strategic interests include internal re-
sian and Central Asian states.
forms (democratization, free markets, and
human rights) and energy development.
Consolidated Appropriations for
Administration policy also aims to integrate
FY2005, including Foreign Operations (P.L.
these states into the international community
108-447, signed into law on December 8,
so that they follow responsible security and
2004) provides $126 million in FREEDOM
other policies, and to discourage the growth of
Support Act assistance to the Central Asian
xenophobic, fundamentalist, and anti-Western
states (as directed by the conferees; H.
orientations that threaten peace and stability.
Rept.108-792), a reduction of $2 million to
The Administration is concerned about human
the budget request. Prior-year provisions are
rights and civil liberties problems in all the
maintained that condition aid to Uzbekistan
states. The Administration’s policy goals in
on its progress in democratization and respect-
Central Asia reflect the differing characteris-
ing human rights, and to Kazakhstan on its
tics of these states. U.S. interests in
progress in respecting human rights. For
Kazakhstan include the security and elimina-
Kazakhstan, a presidential waiver is permitted
tion of Soviet-era nuclear and biological
on national security grounds.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Demonstrators stormed Kyrgyzstan’s government offices on June 17 but were expelled
by police. The General Prosecutor in the interim government, former dissident Azimbek
Beknazarov, warned in early June that the supporters of ousted President Askar Akayev —
“wealthy people and businessmen” who embezzled from the state — “are doing everything
possible to sabotage” presidential elections planned for July 10. Seven candidates are
running, with acting president Kurmanbek Bakiyev widely expected to win.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Historical Background
Central Asia consists of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan; it borders Russia, China, the Middle East, and South Asia. The major peoples
of all but Tajikistan speak Turkic languages (the Tajiks speak an Iranian language); and most
are Sunni Muslims (some Tajiks are Shiia Muslims). Most are closely related historically
and culturally. By the late 19th century, Russian tsars had conquered the last independent
khanates and nomadic lands of Central Asia. By the early 1920s, Soviet power had been
imposed; by 1936, five “Soviet Socialist Republics” had been created. Upon the collapse of
the Soviet Union in December 1991, the five republics gained independence. (See CRS
Report 97-1058, Kazakhstan; CRS Report 97-690, Kyrgyzstan; CRS Report 98-594,
Tajikistan; CRS Report 97-1055, Turkmenistan; and CRS Report RS21238, Uzbekistan.)
Central Asia: Basic Facts
Area: 1.6 million sq. mi., larger than India; Kazakhstan: 1.1 m. sq. mi.; Kyrgyzstan: 77,000 sq. mi.;
Tajikistan: 55,800 sq. mi.; Turkmenistan: 190,000 sq. mi.; Uzbekistan: 174,500 sq. mi.
Population: 56.9 million (2004 est., Commonwealth of Independent States Statistics Committee),
somewhat less than France; Kazakhstan: 15.1 m.; Kyrgyzstan: 5.1 m.; Tajikistan: 6.8 m.; Turkmenistan:
4.8 m.; Uzbekistan: 25.1 m.
Gross Domestic Product: $76.1 billion in 2004; per capita GDP is about $1,337; poverty is rampant.
Kazakhstan: $40.7 b.; Kyrgyzstan: $2.2 b.; Tajikistan: $2.1 b.; Turkmenistan: $19.2 b.; Uzbekistan: $11.9
b. (CIS and national statistics, current prices; Turkmenistan’s reported GDP is considered by many
observers to be inflated).
Overview of U.S. Policy Concerns
After the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, Congress and others called
for the Administration to devise an aid policy for the new Eurasian states, and President
George H.W. Bush sent the “FREEDOM Support Act” to Congress, which was amended and
signed into law in October 1992 (P.L. 102-511). In 1999, congressional concerns led to
passage of the “Silk Road Strategy Act” authorizing language (contained in Consolidated
Appropriations for FY2000; P.L. 106-113) calling for enhanced policy and aid to support
conflict amelioration, humanitarian needs, economic development, transport and
communications, border controls, democracy, and the creation of civil societies in the South
Caucasus and Central Asia.
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U.S. policymakers and others hold various views on the types and levels of U.S.
involvement in the region. Some argue that Uzbekistan is the “linchpin” of the region (it
borders all the other states, shaping the range and scope of regional cooperation) and should
receive the most U.S. attention, while others argue that ties with “energy behemoth”
Kazakhstan are more crucial to U.S. interests. In general, however, they support bolstering
democratic and economic reforms and stability in the region. Such advocates of U.S.
involvement argue that political instability and the growth of terrorist groups in Central Asia
can produce spillover effects both in nearby states, including U.S. allies and friends such as
Turkey, and worldwide. They also argue that the United States has a major interest in
preventing terrorist regimes or groups from illicitly acquiring Soviet-era technology for
making weapons of mass destruction (WMD). They maintain that U.S. interests do not
perfectly coincide with those of its allies and friends, that Turkey and other actors possess
limited aid resources, and that the United States is in the strongest position as the sole
superpower to influence democratization and respect for human rights. They stress that U.S.
leadership in fostering reform will help alleviate the social distress exploited by anti-Western
Islamic extremist groups to gain adherents. Although some U.S. policymakers acknowledge
a role for a democratizing Russia in Central Asia, they stress that U.S. and other Western aid
and investment strengthen the independence of the Central Asian states and forestall Russian
attempts to re-subjugate the region.
Some views of policymakers and academics who previously objected to a more forward
U.S. policy toward Central Asia appeared less salient after September 11, 2001, but aspects
of these views could gain more credence once Afghanistan becomes more stable. These
observers argued that the United States historically had few interests in this region and that
developments there remained largely marginal to U.S. interests. They discounted fears that
anti-Western Islamic extremism would make enough headway to threaten secular regimes
or otherwise harm U.S. interests. At least until the coup in Kyrgyzstan in March 2005 (see
below, Democratization), these observers argued that the United States should not try to
foster democratization among cultures they claimed are historically attuned to
authoritarianism. Some observers reject arguments that U.S. interests in anti-terrorism,
nonproliferation, regional cooperation, trade, and investment outweigh concerns over
democratization and human rights. These observers urge reducing or cutting off most aid to
repressive states that widely violate human rights. They warn that the populations of these
states may come to view U.S. engagement as propping up authoritarian leaders and as
focused only on energy and military access. Some observers point to civil problems in the
region as a reason to eschew major U.S. involvement such as military access that might place
more U.S. personnel and citizens in danger.
Post-September 11 and Afghanistan. Since the terrorist attacks on the United
States on September 11, 2001, the Administration has stated that U.S. policy toward Central
Asia focuses on three inter-related activities: the promotion of security, domestic reforms,
and energy development. The September 11 attacks led the Administration to realize that
“it was critical to the national interests of the United States that we greatly enhance our
relations with the five Central Asian countries” to prevent them from becoming harbors for
terrorism, according to Deputy Assistant Secretary of State B. Lynn Pascoe in testimony in
June 2002. During a February 2004 visit to the area, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld announced
that “it is Caspian security ... that is important” for the United States and the world.
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After September 11, 2001, all the Central Asian states soon offered overflight and other
assistance to U.S.-led anti-terrorism efforts in Afghanistan. The states were predisposed to
welcome such operations. Tajikistan and Uzbekistan had long supported the Afghan
Northern Alliance’s combat against the Taliban, and all the Central Asian states feared
Afghanistan as a base for terrorism, crime, and drug trafficking (even Turkmenistan, which
tried to reach some accommodation with the Taliban). The State Department’s Country
Reports on Terrorism 2004 highlights Kazakhstan’s, Kyrgyzstan’s, Tajikistan’s, and
Uzbekistan’s continuing support for U.S. and international anti-terrorism efforts in
Afghanistan (see also below, Security).
Support for Operation Iraqi Freedom. Uzbekistan was the only Central Asian
state that joined the “coalition of the willing” in February-March 2003 that endorsed
prospective U.S.-led coalition military operations in Iraq. Uzbek President Islam Karimov
on March 6 stated that the Iraq operation was a continuation of “efforts to break the back of
terrorism.” In August 2003, however, Karimov stated that Uzbekistan would not send troops
to Iraq. Among other Central Asian states, Kazakh Foreign Minister Kasymzhomart
Tokayev on March 28, 2003, voiced general support for disarming Iraq. Reportedly
responding to a U.S. appeal, Kazakhstan has deployed 27 military engineers to Iraq who are
engaged in de-mining and water purification duties. Tajik appeared initially to take a neutral
stance, but this stance may have shifted somewhat during 2004, after Rakhmanov and
Russian President Vladimir Putin signed several cooperation accords. Tajik state-owned
radio in late 2004 argued that the “occupation” of Iraq was fomenting anti-Americanism and
extremism all over the Islamic world.
Fostering Pro-Western Orientations
The United States has encouraged the Central Asian states to become responsible
members of the international community, and supported their participation in the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO bodies, and other
Western organizations. The United States has supported these integrative goals through
bilateral aid and through coordination with other aid donors, including regional powers such
as Turkey. The stated policy goal is to discourage radical regimes, groups, and Islamic
fundamentalists — who use repression or violence to oppose democratization — from
attempts to gain influence. All the Central Asian leaders publicly embrace Islam, but display
hostility toward Islamic fundamentalism. At the same time, they have established some
trade and aid ties with Iran. While they have had greater success in attracting development
aid from the West than from the East, some observers argue that, in the long run, their
foreign policies will probably not be anti-Western, but may more closely reflect the concerns
of other moderate Islamic states. (See also CRS Report RL30294, Central Asia’s Security.)
Russia’s Role. Until recently, U.S. administrations generally had viewed a
democratizing Russia as serving as a role model in Central Asia. Despite growing
authoritarian tendencies in Russia, the Bush Administration emphasizes that Russia’s
counter-terrorism efforts in the region broadly support U.S. interests. At the same time, the
United States long has stressed to Russia that it not seek to dominate the region or exclude
Western and other involvement. Virtually all U.S. analysts agree that Russia’s actions should
be monitored to ensure that the independence of the Central Asian states is not threatened.
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The long-term impact of the events of September 11, 2001, on the Central Asian states
may depend upon the duration and scope of U.S. and coalition presence in the region,
Russia’s countervailing policies, and the fate of Afghanistan. Prior to the September 2001
attacks, Putin had tried to strengthen Russia’s interests in the region while opposing the
growth of U.S. and other influence. Among Russia’s reasons for acquiescing to increased
U.S. and coalition presence in the region after the September 2001 attacks were its interests
in boosting some economic and other ties to the West and its hopes of regaining influence
in Afghanistan. More recently, Russia has resumed attempts to counter U.S. influence, with
mixed results, according to some analysts.
Russian officials have emphasized interests in strategic security and economic ties with
Central Asia, and concerns over the treatment of ethnic Russians. Strategic concerns have
focused on drug trafficking and regional conflict, and the region’s role as a buffer to Islamic
extremism. During the 1990s, Russia’s economic decline and demands by Central Asia
caused it to reduce its security presence, a trend that President Putin has tried to retard or
reverse. Russian border guards were largely phased out in Kyrgyzstan in 1999. In late 1999,
the last Russian military advisors left Turkmenistan. In 1999, Uzbekistan withdrew from the
CST, citing its ineffectiveness and obtrusiveness.
Russia has appeared determined to maintain a military presence in Tajikistan. It long
retained about 12,000 Federal Border Guards in Tajikistan, most of whom were Tajik
conscripts, and 7,800 Russian troops of the 201st motorized rifle division (The Military
Balance 2004-2005). Efforts to formalize a post-Soviet basing agreement with Tajikistan
dragged on for years, however, as Tajikistan endeavored to maximize rents and assert its
sovereignty. After the expiration of a Tajik-Russia border control cooperation agreement,
Tajikistan in 2004 demanded full control over its borders. Russia announced on June 14,
2005, that it had handed over the last guard-house along the Afghan-Tajik border to Tajik
troops. In October 2004 the Tajik-Russian basing agreement was signed, which actually
provides for troops to be based at myriad facilities throughout the country, and represents
Russia’s largest military deployment abroad, besides its Black Sea Fleet. Reportedly, about
$240 million in Tajik debt to Russia is forgiven, and Tajikistan charges less than $1 in annual
rent for the facilities.
In a seeming shift toward a more activist Russian role in Central Asia, in January 2000,
then-Acting President Putin approved a “national security concept” that termed foreign
efforts to “weaken” Russia’s “position” in Central Asia a security threat. In April 2000,
Russia called for the members of the CST to approve the creation of rapid reaction forces,
including in Central Asia, to combat terrorism emanating from Afghanistan, and hinted that
such a force might launch pre-emptive strikes on Afghan terrorist bases. These hints elicited
U.S. calls for Russia to exercise restraint and consult the UN, and elicited Taliban warnings
of reprisals against Central Asian states if they permitted Russia to use their bases for strikes.
Marking mutual concern, Presidents Clinton and Putin agreed at their June 2000 summit to
set up a working group to examine Afghan-related terrorism, and the group held two
meetings prior to September 11, 2001. A May 2001 CST summit approved the creation of
a Central Asian rapid-reaction force headquartered in Kyrgyzstan, with Russia’s troops in
Tajikistan comprising most of the force, along with small Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Tajik units.
CIS members in 2001 also approved setting up an Anti-Terrorist Center in Moscow, with a
branch in Kyrgyzstan, giving Russia influence over regional intelligence gathering.
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Perhaps to counteract the increased U.S. presence in Kyrgyzstan, Russia in September
2003 signed a 15-year military basing accord with Kyrgyzstan providing access to the Kant
airfield, near Kyrgyzstan’s capital of Bishkek. The nearly two dozen Russian aircraft and
300-700 troops at the base also serve as part of the Central Asian rapid reaction force. Putin
stressed that the base “enshrines our military presence in Kyrgyzstan.” The base is a few
miles from the U.S.-led coalition’s Manas airbase, which some observers view as a clear sign
of Putin’s drive to constrain U.S. regional influence. (However, the commander of the rapid
reaction forces in June 2004 called for cooperation with NATO forces based in the region.)
These observers argue that the initial gratitude of the Central Asian states toward the United
States — for their added security accomplished through U.S.-led actions in Afghanistan —
has slowly declined over time. Reasons may include regional perceptions that the United
States has not adequately addressed economic distress and burgeoning drug trafficking.
Also, Russia is pledging robust security support to the states to get them to forget their pre-
September 11, 2001, dissatisfaction with its support.
Russia’s economic interests in Central Asia are being reasserted as its economy
improves and may constitute its most effective lever of influence. Russia seeks to counter
Western business and gain substantial influence over oil and gas resources in the region
through participation in joint ventures and by insisting that pipelines cross Russian territory.
At the same time, Russia has avoided large economic subsidies to the region. Russia’s
attitude regarding a Western energy role in the Caspian remains complex. Particularly after
the signing of a Statement on Energy Cooperation at the May 2002 U.S.-Russia summit, it
appeared that Russia would accept a Western role in the Caspian region, including
construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline. In January 2004, however,
Putin stressed Russia’s strategic interest in being the main export route for Kazakh energy.
Russian officials have tried to discourage Kazakhstan from plans to use the BTC pipeline or
possibly connect with the gas pipeline being built from Azerbaijan to Turkey’s Erzurum.
The safety of Russians in Central Asia is a populist concern in Russia, but has in
practice mainly served as a political stalking horse for those in Russia advocating the
“reintegration” of former “Russian lands.” Ethnic Russians residing in the new Central
Asian states had concerns about employment, language, and other policies or practices they
deemed discriminatory and many emigrated, contributing to their decline from 20 million in
1989 to 6.6 million in 2001. They now constitute 12% of the population of Central Asia,
according to the CIS Statistics Agency. Remaining Russians tend to be elderly or
low-skilled. In Kazakhstan, ethnic Kazakhs have again become the majority.
Obstacles to Peace and Independence
Regional Tensions and Conflicts. The legacies of co-mingled ethnic groups,
convoluted borders, and emerging national identities pose challenges to stability in all the
Central Asian states. With the Soviet collapse, national identities often compete with those
of the clan, family, region, and Islam. Central Asia’s convoluted borders fail to accurately
reflect ethnic distributions and are hard to police, hence contributing to regional tensions.
Ethnic Uzbeks make up sizeable minorities in the other Central Asian countries and
Afghanistan. In Tajikistan, they make up almost a quarter of the population. More ethnic
Turkmen reside in Iran and Afghanistan — over three million — than in Turkmenistan.
Sizeable numbers of ethnic Tajiks reside in Uzbekistan, and seven million in Afghanistan.
Many Kyrgyz and Tajiks live in China’s Xinjiang province. The fertile Ferghana Valley is
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shared by Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, leaving large numbers of people outside
their “national” borders. Criss-crossing mountains thwart Tajikistan’s territorial integrity by
making internal travel difficult. After gaining independence, the governments of the states
also struggled to gain control over administrative subunits. Looking at the region as a whole,
most observers agree that the term Central Asia denotes a geographic area more than a region
of shared identities and aspirations, although it can be argued that the land-locked, poverty-
stricken, and sparsely-populated region will need more integration in order to develop.
Regional cooperation remains stymied by tensions among the states, and such tensions
are potentially magnified by the formation of extra-regional cooperation groups such as the
CST Organization (a military secretariat was set up in April 2003 in Moscow), NATO’s
Partnership for Peace (PFP), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Each group
reflects the diverging interests of Russia, the United States, and China, although the fact that
each group stresses anti-terrorism would seem to provide motivation for cooperation.
In 1996, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, signed the “Shanghai treaty”
with China pledging the sanctity and substantial demilitarization of mutual borders, and in
1997 they signed a follow-on treaty demilitarizing the 4,300 mile former Soviet-Chinese
border. China has used the treaty to pressure the Central Asian states to deter their ethnic
Uighur minorities from supporting separatism in China’s Xinjiang province, and to get them
to extradite Uighurs fleeing China. In 2001, Uzbekistan joined the group, re-named the
SCO. Although Karimov had criticized the SCO as ineffective, in August 2003 he insisted
that Uzbekistan host the SCO Anti-Terrorism Center. Following some U.S. criticism of the
Uzbek government’s crackdown on protesters in Andijon in May 2005, Karimov has
pointedly increased contacts with Russia and China, both of which supported the crackdown.
The 1992-1997 Civil War in Tajikistan. Tajikistan was among the Central Asian
republics least prepared and inclined toward independence when the Soviet Union broke up.
In September 1992, a loose coalition of nationalist, Islamic, and democratic parties and
groups tried to take power. Kulyabi and Khojenti regional elites, assisted by Uzbekistan and
Russia, launched a successful counteroffensive that by the end of 1992 had resulted in
20,000-40,000 casualties and up to 800,000 refugees or displaced persons, about 80,000 of
whom fled to Afghanistan. In 1993, the CIS authorized “peacekeeping” in Tajikistan, mostly
involving Russian forces in place. After the two sides agreed to a cease-fire, the U.N.
Security Council established a small U.N. Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) in
December 1994. In June 1997, Tajik President Emomali Rakhmanov and rebel leader Seyed
Abdullo Nuri signed a comprehensive peace agreement. Benchmarks of the peace process
were largely met, and UNMOT pulled out in May 2000, but Russian troops have remained.
The United States has pledged to help Tajikistan rebuild.
The 1999 and 2000 Incursions into Kyrgyzstan. Several hundred Islamic
extremists and others first invaded Kyrgyzstan in July-August 1999. Namanganiy headed
the largest guerrilla group. They seized hostages and several villages, allegedly seeking to
create an Islamic state in south Kyrgyzstan as a springboard for a jihad in Uzbekistan. With
Uzbek and Kazakh air and other support, Kyrgyz forces finally forced the guerrillas out in
October 1999. According to some observers, the incursion indicated both links among
terrorism in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Russia (Chechnya), and elsewhere and the weakness
of Kyrgyzstan’s security forces. Dozens of IMU and other insurgents again invaded
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in August 2000. Uzbekistan provided air and other support, but
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Kyrgyz forces were largely responsible for defeating the insurgents by late October 2000.
According to the State Department, the IMU did not invade the region in the summer before
September 11, 2001, in part because bin Laden had secured its aid for a Taliban offensive
against the Afghan Northern Alliance.
The 1999 and 2004 Attacks in Uzbekistan. A series of explosions in Tashkent
in February 1999 were among early signs that the government was vulnerable to terrorism.
By various reports, the explosions killed 16 to 28 and wounded 100 to 351 people. The
aftermath involved wide-scale arrests of political dissidents and others deemed by some
observers as unlikely conspirators. Karimov in April 1999 accused Mohammad Solikh
(former Uzbek presidential candidate and head of the banned Erk Party) of masterminding
what he termed an assassination plot, along with Tohir Yuldashev (former leader of the
banned Adolat social movement) and the Taliban. The first trial of 22 suspects in June
resulted in six receiving death sentences. The suspects were described in court proceedings
as Islamic terrorists who received training in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, and Russia
and were led by Solikh, Yuldashev and Jama Namanganiy (the latter two were leaders of the
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU; see below). In 2000, Yuldashev and Namanganiy
received death sentences in absentia, and Solikh received a 15.5 year prison sentence. Solikh
denied that he was an IMU member, and he and Yuldashev denied involvement in the
bombings.
On March 28 through April 1, 2004, a series of bombings and armed attacks were
launched in Uzbekistan, reportedly killing 47. President Karimov asserted on March 29 that
the violence was aimed against his government, in order to “cause panic among our people,
to make them lose their trust in the policies being carried out.” An obscure Islamic Jihad
Group of Uzbekistan (IJG; Jama’at al-Jihad al-Islami, a breakaway part of the IMU) claimed
responsibility for the violence. After the attacks, media censorship intensified. While some
observers alleged that there were wide-scale detentions, the human rights organization
Freedom House reported in July 2004 that detentions like those of 1999 “did not
materialize,” and that local trials of suspects appeared to respect the rights of defendants.
(Human Rights Watch, however, alleged that virtually all defendants were tortured.) The
defendants in several of these trials were accused of being members of IJG or of Hizb ut-
Tahrir (HT; an Islamic fundamentalist movement ostensibly pledged to peace but banned in
Uzbekistan) and of attempting to overthrow the government. The first national trial of fifteen
suspects (all of whom confessed their guilt) ended in late August 2004, with sentences of 11-
16 years in prison. Some of the defendants testified that they belonged to IJG and were
trained by Arabs and others at camps in Kazakhstan and Pakistan. They testified that IMU
member Najmiddin Jalolov (convicted in absentia in 2000) was the leader of IJG, and linked
him to Taliban head Mohammad Omar, Uighur extremist Abu Mohammad, and Osama bin
Laden. Over 100 individuals reportedly were convicted in various trials.
Explosions occurred in Tashkent, Uzbekistan on July 30, 2004, at the U.S. and Israeli
embassies and the Uzbek Prosecutor-General’s Office. Three Uzbek guards reportedly were
killed. Diplomatic personnel were unharmed. The next day, then-Secretary of State Colin
Powell condemned the “terrorist attacks.” The IMU and IJG claimed responsibility and
stated that the bombings were aimed against the Uzbek and other “apostate” governments.
A Kazakh security official announced in November 2004 that the government had
apprehended several IJG members. He alleged that the group had ties to Al Qaeda; had cells
in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Russia; and was planning assassinations in Uzbekistan. Two
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closed trials of alleged Al Qaeda and IJG members began in Kazakhstan in March 2005.
U.S. concerns about the ongoing attacks include increased instability that could affect the
security and future of K2, reduce coalition access to Afghanistan by air or ground, and
heighten the danger of trafficking in WMD technology and know-how (see also CRS Report
RS21818, The 2004 Violence in Uzbekistan).
In September 2000, the State Department designated the IMU as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization, stating that the IMU, aided by Afghanistan’s Taliban and by Osama bin Laden,
resorts to terrorism, actively threatens U.S. interests, and attacks American citizens. The
“main goal of the IMU is to topple the current government in Uzbekistan,” the State
Department warned, and it linked the IMU to bombings and attacks on Uzbekistan in 1999-
2000. According to Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, IMU forces assisting the Taliban and
Al Qaeda against coalition actions in Afghanistan suffered major losses, and Namanganiy
was probably killed. CIA Director Porter Goss testified to the Senate Armed Services
Committee on March 17, 2005, that IJG “has become a more virulent threat to U.S. interests
and local governments.” On May 25, 2005, the State Department designated IJG as a global
terrorist group, and on June 1, 2005, the U.N. Security Council added IJG to its terrorism list.
The 2005 Andijon Protest in Uzbekistan. Dozens or perhaps hundreds of
civilians were killed or wounded on May 13, 2005, after Uzbek troops fired on thousands of
demonstrators in the eastern town of Andijon, according to international reporters on the
scene. The protestors had gathered to demand the end of a trial of 23 prominent local
businessmen charged with belonging to the Akramiya Islamic terrorist group. (The group
was named after local teacher Akram Yuldashev, who was sentenced for involvement in the
1999 bombing. His followers claim that the group is a pacifistic fraternal organization.
According to one plausible account, the businessmen fell into disfavor when the political
leadership in Andijon they were allied with was replaced.) The night before, a group stormed
a prison where those on trial were held and released hundreds of inmates. Many of these
inmates then joined others in storming government buildings during the night. Uzbek
President Islam Karimov reportedly flew to the city to direct security operations, and the
government announced that order had been restored by the evening of May 13 after fierce
fighting. The government claimed on June 17 that six teams that included foreign terrorists
had elaborately planned the unrest. Dozens of alleged “terrorists” have been arrested. The
U.S. and others in the international community have called for an international inquiry into
events in Andijon, but the Uzbek government has rejected these calls (for details, see CRS
Report RS22161, Unrest in Uzbekistan).
Democratization and Human Rights
A major goal of U.S. policy in Central Asia has been to foster the long-term
development of democratic institutions and policies upholding human rights. However, U.S.
democratization support has faced many setbacks in the region. The United States has
worked with the ex-Communist Party officials who have led in the five states (even in
Tajikistan, the current president was once a low-level party official) since before
independence. Only in March 2005 did the first presidential succession occur, with Akayev’s
ouster (see below). Particularly since September 11, 2001, the United States has attempted
to harmonize its concerns about democratization and human rights in the region with its
interests in regional support for the Global War on Terrorism. On May 1, 2005, the New
York Times alleged that the Administration was sending suspected terrorists in its custody
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to Uzbekistan for questioning, a process termed “rendition.” The Administration states that
it requests that suspects not be tortured.
Possible scenarios of political development in Central Asia have ranged from continued
rule in most of the states by former Soviet elites to violent transitions to Islamic
fundamentalist or xenophobic rule. Relatively peaceful transitions to more or less
democratic and Western-oriented political systems have been considered less likely by many
observers. Some have suggested that such a scenario might be conceivable in Kyrgyzstan,
because of the slightly wider scope of civil liberties in that country compared to the rest of
Central Asia. All the Central Asian leaders have given assurances to the United States that
they support democratization, but have continued to rule largely as they did during the
communist period, with some adaptations (primarily, by relying on their family members to
help them aggrandize political and economic power). They have remained in power by
orchestrating extensions of their terms and by eliminating possible contenders. Besides the
recent coup in Kyrgyzstan (see below), alleged coup attempts — all violent — have occurred
in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan, and the leaders in Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan face rising popular protests.

Popular protests in Kyrgyzstan against a tainted legislative election and economic
distress resulted in President Akayev’s relatively peaceful overthrow on March 24, 2005.
This coup may be a third instance of a so-called “democratic revolution” in Eurasia, after
those in Georgia and Ukraine, and the first in Central Asia. (See also CRS Report RL32864,
Coup in Kyrgyzstan: Developments and Implications.) A presidential election is scheduled
for July 10, 2005. Popular candidate Feliks Kulov withdrew from the race on May 13,
announcing that he had come to agreement with acting president Kurmanbek Bakiyev that
he would support Bakiyev’s candidacy in return for being named the prime minister if
Bakiyev won. Some observers raised concerns that such “deals” could limit electoral choice.
Democracy Pledges. During Nazarbayev’s 1994 U.S. visit, he and then-President
Clinton signed a Charter on Democratic Partnership recognizing Kazakhstan’s commitments
to the rule of law, respect for human rights, and economic reform. During his December
2001 visit, Nazarbayev repeated these pledges in a joint statement with President Bush. In
March 2002, a U.S.-Uzbek Strategic Partnership Declaration was signed pledging Uzbekistan
to “intensify the democratic transformation” and improve freedom of the press. During
previous visits in 1997 and 1999 to Washington, D.C., Tajikistan’s President Rakhmanov
was not received at the presidential level as a protest against failures in democratization.
However, he met with President Bush and other top officials during his December 2002 U.S.
visit. The Administration highlighted Tajikistan’s “significant progress” in democratization,
and Rakhmanov pledged to “expand fundamental freedoms and human rights.” Some
observers argue that the Administration faces a dilemma in urging regional governments to
embrace pluralism, including toleration for Islamic groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and
Tajikistan’s Islamic Revival Party (IRP), when the governments assert that some or all
members of these groups are terrorists.
Despite such democracy pledges, the states have made little progress in democratization
and respect for human rights, according to the State Department’s Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices for 2004. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are generally viewed as
the most repressive, while Kazakhstan (and Kyrgyzstan under Akayev) increasingly limited
what free expression and other rights they permitted during the 1990s. Tajikistan
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experienced many human rights abuses during its civil war, and the government appears to
be backtracking on respect for human rights. Non-favored faiths, missionaries, and pious
Muslims face religious rights abuses in all the states. Unfair elections increase political
alienation and violence aimed against the regimes. In its June 2005 Trafficking in Persons
Report, the State Department placed Uzbekistan on a “Tier 2 Watch List,” for having
problems as a source country for human trafficking that they are making some progress in
addressing. Kazakhstan and Tajikistan were taken off the watch list but were listed (as was
Kyrgyzstan) as “Tier 2” countries that have human trafficking problems they are addressing.
The U.N. Rapporteur on Torture in March 2003 completed a draft report that concluded
that police and prison officials in Uzbekistan systematically employed torture and other
coercive means to obtain confessions and as punishment. In a speech the next month,
however, former Assistant Secretary of State Elizabeth Jones reported that the
Administration’s “persistent and consistent diplomatic engagement” with Uzbekistan had
resulted in “real achievements” in improving human rights (this also was reported to
Congress in May 2003). Several subsequent high-profile arrests and beatings led her to
testify in October 2003 that the country had regressed. In Turkmenistan, an alleged
November 2002 failed coup resulted in dozens of arrests. The U.S. State Department
strongly protested violations of legal due process and “credible reports” of forced
confessions. In December 2003, the United States, Russia, and other countries approved an
unusual U.N. General Assembly resolution urging Turkmenistan to implement human rights
reforms as suggested by the OSCE, and to permit prison visits.
In Congress, Omnibus Appropriations for FY2003 (P.L. 108-7; signed into law on
February 20, 2003) forbade FREEDOM Support Act assistance to the government of
Uzbekistan unless the Secretary of State determined and reported that Uzbekistan was
making substantial progress in meeting its commitments to democratize and respect human
rights. P.L. 108-7 also forbade assistance to the government of Kazakhstan unless the
Secretary of State determined and reported that it significantly had improved its human rights
record during the preceding six months. Unlike the case with Uzbekistan, the legislation
permitted the Secretary to waive the requirement on national security grounds. The Secretary
reported in May 2003, that Uzbekistan was making such progress, and in July 2003, that
Kazakhstan was making progress, eliciting some criticism of these findings from Congress.
These conditions have been retained in Consolidated Appropriations for FY2004, including
foreign operations (P.L. 108-199), while clarifying that the prohibition covers assistance to
the central government of Uzbekistan and specifying that conditions include respecting
human rights, establishing a “genuine” multi-party system, and ensuring free and fair
elections and freedom of expression and media. Consolidated Appropriations for FY2005,
including Foreign Operations (P.L. 108-447, signed into law on December 8, 2004) retains
the conditions on assistance to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.
On July 13, 2004, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher announced that,
despite some “encouraging progress” in respecting human rights, up to $18 million in
military and economic aid to Uzbekistan would be withheld because of “lack of progress on
democratic reform and restrictions put on U.S. assistance partners on the ground” (in
contrast, progress was reported regarding Kazakhstan). International Military Education and
Training (IMET) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programs, which are conditioned
on respect for human rights, were among those affected. The State Department
reprogrammed $2.4 million of the affected $18 million for non-governmental programs in
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Uzbekistan and used notwithstanding authority (after consultation with Congress) to expend
$7 million on health reforms, anti-torture and anti-terrorism programs, scientist retraining,
and WTO accession advice (so that about $8.5 million was ultimately withheld). The
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Richard Myers, during a visit to Uzbekistan on
August 12, 2004, criticized the cutoff of IMET and FMF programs as “shortsighted” and not
“productive,” since it reduced U.S. military influence. Reportedly, he stated that Defense
Department nonproliferation aid would amount to $21 million in FY2004 and pointed out
that fourteen patrol boats worth $2.9 million were being transferred, perhaps to reassure the
Uzbeks of U.S. interest in their security (see also below, Weapons of Mass Destruction).
Security and Arms Control
The U.S.-led coalition’s overthrow of the Taliban and routing of Al Qaeda and IMU
terrorists in Afghanistan (termed Operation Enduring Freedom or OEF) increased the
security of Central Asia. The development of U.S. security ties with Central Asia pre-
September 11, 2001, facilitated the cooperation of the states in OEF. According to Assistant
Secretary of Defense Crouch in testimony in June 2002, “our military relationships with each
[Central Asian] nation have matured on a scale not imaginable prior to September 11th.”

! Kyrgyzstan, he related, became a “critical regional partner” in OEF,
providing basing for U.S. and coalition forces at Manas (in 2005, U.S.
troops reportedly number about 1,500).
! Uzbekistan provided a base for U.S. operations at Karshi-Khanabad (K2; in
2005, U.S. troops reportedly number less than 900), a base for German units
at Termez (in late 2004, German troops reportedly numbered over 300), and
a land corridor to Afghanistan for humanitarian aid via the Friendship
Bridge at Termez.
! Tajikistan permitted use of its international airport in Dushanbe for refueling
and hosted a small French and Swedish force (in early 2005, France reported
130 troops there; Swedish troops reportedly numbered about 30).
! Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan provided overflight and related support.
While denying that U.S. basing was permanent, Crouch averred that “for the foreseeable
future, U.S. defense and security cooperation in Central Asia must continue to support
actions to deter or defeat terrorist threats” and to build effective armed forces under civilian
control. In July 2003, Kyrgyzstan argued that the ostensible impermanence of U.S. basing
justified its agreement to host Russian troops at the Kant airbase to help protect Kyrgyzstan
from terrorism.
To obtain Uzbekistan’s approval for basing, the March 2002 U.S.-Uzbek Declaration
on the Strategic Partnership included a nonspecific security guarantee. The United States
affirmed that “it would regard with grave concern any external threat” to Uzbekistan’s
security and would consult with Uzbekistan “on an urgent basis” regarding a response. The
two states pledged to intensify military cooperation, including “re-equipping the Armed
Forces” of Uzbekistan.
A small but increasing amount of U.S. security assistance was provided to the region
pre-9/11. Such aid was boosted in the aftermath of 9/11, but has lessened somewhat in
FY2003-FY2005, although it remains about one-third of all agency aid budgeted for the
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region. Security and law enforcement aid (as reported by the State Department’s Office of
the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia) was $187.55 million in FY2002
(31%), $101.5 million (33%) in FY2003, and $69.6 million (33%) in FY2004. This support
includes FMF, IMET, and EDA programs and border security aid to combat trafficking in
drugs, humans, and WMD. To help counter burgeoning drug trafficking from Afghanistan,
the emergency supplemental for FY2005 (P.L. 109-13) provides $242 million for Central
Asia and Afghanistan. It also provides $42.5 million for runway improvements at K2.
In addition to the aid reported by the Coordinator’s Office, the Defense Department
provides coalition support payments to Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, including base rents and
landing and overflight fees (overall authority and funding have been provided in FY2002-
FY2005 emergency supplemental appropriations for military operations and maintenance).
According to various accounts, Kyrgyzstan derives about $40 million per year from rents,
fees, and services associated with the Ganci base.
U.S. Central Command in 1999 became responsible for U.S. military engagement in
Central Asia. All the Central Asian states except Tajikistan joined NATO’s PFP by
mid-1994 (Tajikistan joined in 2002). Central Asian troops have participated in periodic
PFP (or “PFP-style”) exercises in the United States since 1995, and U.S. troops have
participated in exercises in Central Asia since 1997. A June 2004 NATO summit
communique pledged enhanced Alliance attention to the countries of the South Caucasus and
Central Asia.

The Overseas Basing Commission, in its May 2005 Report, suggested that U.S. national
security might be enhanced by establishing Cooperative Security Locations (CSLs; military
facilities with few or no U.S. personnel, but which may contain pre-positioned equipment)
in Central Asia. While it acknowledged the usefulness of existing bases in Kyrgyzstan and
Uzbekistan for supporting OEF, it urged Congress to seek inter-agency answers to “what
constitutes vital U.S. interests in the area that would require long-term U.S. presence.”
Weapons of Mass Destruction. Major U.S. security interests have included
elimination of nuclear weapons remaining in Kazakhstan after the breakup of the Soviet
Union and other efforts to control nuclear proliferation in Central Asia. The United States
has tendered aid aimed at bolstering their export and physical controls over nuclear
technology and materials, including because of concerns that Iran is targeting these countries.
After the Soviet breakup, Kazakhstan was on paper a major nuclear weapons power (in
reality Russia controlled these weapons). Though some in Kazakhstan urged “retaining” the
weapons, it pledged to become a non-nuclear weapons state. In December 1993, the United
States and Kazakhstan signed a CTR umbrella agreement for the “safe and secure”
dismantling of 104 SS-18s, the destruction of silos, and related purposes. All bombers and
their air-launched cruise missiles were removed by late February 1994 (except seven
bombers destroyed with U.S. aid in 1998). On April 21, 1995, the last of about 1,040 nuclear
warheads had been removed from SS-18 missiles and transferred to Russia, and Kazakhstan
announced that it was nuclear weapons-free. The SS-18s were eliminated by late 1994. The
United States reported that 147 silos had been destroyed by September 1999. A U.S.-Kazakh
Nuclear Risk Reduction Center in Almaty has been set up to facilitate verification and
compliance with arms control agreements to prevent the proliferation of WMD.
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Besides the Kazakh nuclear weapons, there are active research reactors, uranium mines,
milling facilities, and nuclear waste dumps in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan, many of which reportedly remain inadequately protected against theft.
Kazakhstan is reported to possess one-fourth of the world’s uranium reserves, and
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are among the world’s top producers of low enriched uranium.
Kazakhstan had a fast breeder reactor at Aktau, the world’s only nuclear desalinization
facility. Shut down in 1999, it has nearly 300 metric tons of uranium and plutonium spent
fuel in storage pools (three tons of which are weapons-grade). In 1997 and 1999, U.S.-
Kazakh accords were signed on decommissioning the Aktau reactor. Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan report that their mining and milling activities have resulted in
massive and hazardous waste dumps. CTR aid was used to facilitate the transport of eleven
kilograms of uranium in fuel rods from Uzbekistan to Russia in 2004.
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan hosted major chemical and biological warfare (CBW)
facilities during the Soviet era. CTR and Energy Department funds have been used in
Kazakhstan to dismantle a former anthrax production facility in Stepnogorsk, to remove
some strains to the United States, to secure two other BW sites, and to retrain scientists.
CTR funding was used to dismantle Uzbekistan’s Nukus chemical weapons research facility.
CTR aid also was used to eliminate active anthrax spores at a former CBW test site on an
island in the Aral Sea. Both these projects were completed in 2002. Other CTR aid helps
keep Uzbek weapons scientists employed in peaceful research.
The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2003 (P.L. 107-314, Sec.1306) provides
for the president to waive prohibitions on CTR aid (as contained in Sec.1203 of P.L. 103-
160) to a state of the former Soviet Union if he certifies that the waiver is necessary for
national security and submits a report outlining why the waiver is necessary and how he
plans to promote future compliance with the restrictions on CTR aid. The waiver authority,
exercisable each fiscal year, will expire at the end of FY2005. The six restrictions in P.L.
103-160 include a call for CTR recipients to observe internationally recognized human
rights. Although Russian arms control compliance appeared to be the main reason for the
restrictions, on December 30, 2003 (for FY2004), and on December 14, 2004 (for FY2005),
the President explained that Uzbekistan’s human rights problems necessitated a waiver.
Trade and Investment
The Administration and others stress that U.S. support for free market reforms directly
serves U.S. national interests by opening new markets for U.S. goods and services and
sources of energy and minerals. U.S. private investment committed to Central Asia has
greatly exceeded that provided to Russia or most other Eurasian states except Azerbaijan.
U.S. trade agreements have been signed and entered into force with all the Central Asian
states, but bilateral investment treaties are in force only with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
Permanent normal trade relations with Kyrgyzstan were established by law in June 2000, so
that “Jackson-Vanik” trade provisions no longer apply that call for presidential reports and
waivers concerning freedom of emigration. In August 2003, President Bush reported to
Congress that Turkmenistan was no longer in full compliance with “Jackson-Vanik”
provisions. However, the President exercised his waiver authority under the act after
receiving assurances from Turkmenistan that it would move to restore freedom of
emigration. Turkmenistan announced in January 2004 that it was rescinding an objectionable
exit visa requirement. The Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) has obligated funds for short-
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term insurance, loans, or guarantees for export sales of industrial and agricultural equipment
and bulk agricultural commodities to all the states except Tajikistan. The Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC) has signed agreements with all the Central Asian states on
insuring U.S. private investments overseas, and has obligated funds for financing or
insurance in all the states except Tajikistan. In June 2004, The U.S. Trade Representative
signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement with ambassadors of the Central
Asian states to establish a U.S.-Central Asia Council on Trade and Investment. The Council
will meet at least yearly to address intellectual property, labor, environmental protection, and
other issues that impede trade and private investment flows between the United States and
Central Asia and that hamper intra-regional trade and economic development.
The emergence of Central Asia as a “new silk road” of trade and commerce is
challenged by corruption, internal trade barriers, border tensions, the challenges of
geography, and the uncertain respect for contracts. All the states of the region possess large-
scale resources that could yield export earnings, but these challenges scare off major foreign
investment (except for some investment in the energy sector) to revamp, develop, or market
the resources. The Kazakh and Turkmen economies are dependent on energy exports but
need added foreign investment for production and transport. Uzbekistan’s state-controlled
cotton and gold production rank among the highest in the world and much is exported. It
also has moderate energy reserves. Kyrgyzstan has major gold mines and strategic mineral
reserves, is a major wool producer, and could benefit from tourism. Tajikistan has one of
the world’s largest aluminum processing plants and is a major cotton grower.
Energy Resources. U.S. policy goals regarding energy resources in the Central
Asian and South Caucasian states have included supporting their sovereignty and ties to the
West, supporting U.S. private investment, promoting Western energy security through
diversified suppliers, assisting ally Turkey, and opposing the building of pipelines that
transit “energy competitor” Iran or otherwise give it undue influence over the region.
Security for Caspian region pipelines and energy resources also has been a recent interest.
President Bush’s May 2001 National Energy Policy report suggests that greater oil
production in the Caspian region could not only benefit regional economies, but also help
mitigate possible world supply disruptions. It recommends U.S. support for building the
BTC pipeline and an Azerbaijan-Turkey gas pipeline, coaxing Kazakhstan to use the oil
pipeline, and otherwise encouraging the regional states to provide a stable and inviting
business climate for energy development.
According to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), the Caspian region is emerging as
a significant source of oil and gas for world markets. Oil resources, DOE reports, are
comparable to those of the North Sea. Kazakhstan possesses the Caspian region’s largest
proven oil reserves at 9-17.6 billion barrels, according to DOE, and also possesses 65 trillion
cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas. The U.S. Energy Department in mid-2003 estimated that there
were 9-17.6 billion barrels of proven and possible oil reserves and 65 trillion cubic feet (tcf)
of proven gas reserves in Kazakhstan. The Tengiz oilfield began to be exploited by Chevron-
Texaco and Kazakhstan in a consortium during 1993 (U.S. Exxon-Mobil and Russia’s
LUKoil later joined). The Karachaganak onshore field is being developed by British
Petroleum, Italy’s Eni, U.S. Chevron-Texaco, and LUKoil, who estimate reserves of more
than 2.4 billion barrels of oil and 16 tcf of gas. In 2002, another consortium led by Eni
reported that the Kashagan offshore field had between 7-9 billion barrels of proven oil
reserves, comparable to those of Tengiz. Kazakhstan’s oil exports currently are about one
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million barrels per day (bpd). Private foreign investors have become discouraged in recent
months by harsher government terms, taxes, and fines (See also CRS Report RS21190,
Caspian Oil and Gas: Production and Prospects).
The Central Asian states have been pressured by Russia to yield portions of their energy
wealth to Russia, in part because Russia controls most existing pipelines to export markets.
Russian shareholders have a controlling interest, 44%, in the Caspian pipeline consortium
(CPC), which completed construction in 2001 of a 930-mile oil pipeline from Kazakhstan
to Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, the region’s first new pipeline capable of
carrying 560,000 bpd. President Bush hailed the opening of the pipeline as “advanc[ing] my
Administration’s National Energy Policy by developing a network of multiple Caspian
pipelines ... [that] help diversify U.S. energy supply and enhance our energy security.” This
policy of advocating a network of “multiple pipelines” includes support for building
pipelines that break Russia’s near-monopoly of existing routes. China and Kazakhstan are
building an oil pipeline from Atyrau on Kazakhstan’s Caspian seacoast to the Xinjiang
region of China, initially planned to carry 200,000 bpd and to be completed at the end of
2005. To assuage Russia that it is not in competition for Asian markets, Kazakhstan has
invited Russia to send some oil through the prospective pipeline.
Turkmenistan possesses about 101tcf of proven gas reserves, according to DOE, among
the largest in the world. In the late 1980s, Turkmenistan was the world’s fourth largest
natural gas producer. It is now largely dependent on Russian export routes. In December
1997, Turkmenistan opened the first pipeline from Central Asia to the outside world beyond
Russia, a 125-mile pipeline linkage to Iran. Turkmenistan has not yet been able to convince
investors to help it build a gas pipeline through Afghanistan. Appearing resigned to getting
less than the world market price, Niyazov signed a 25-year accord with Putin in April 2003
on supplying Russia about 200 billion cubic feet of gas in 2004 (about 12% of production),
rising to 2.8 tcf in 2009, perhaps then tying up a large part of Turkmenistan’s production.
Turkmenistan halted gas shipments to Russia at the beginning of 2005 in an attempt to get
a higher gas price but settled in the near-term for all-cash rather than partial barter payments.
Aid Overview
The Bush Administration provided added security and other assistance to the Central
Asian states in FY2002 in response to the events of September 11, 2001. Some observers
characterized this assistance as a U.S. quid pro quo for the use of military facilities and an
incentive for continued cooperation. The Administration has argued that the safer
environment in the Central Asian states fostered by security assistance and the U.S. military
presence should permit greater democratization, respect for human rights, and economic
liberalization in the region, and the development of Caspian energy resources.
For much of the 1990s and until September 11, 2001, the United States provided much
more aid each year to Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, and Georgia than to any Central Asian state
(most such aid was funded from the FREEDOM Support Act account in Foreign Operations
Appropriations, but some derived from other program and agency budgets). Cumulative
foreign aid budgeted to Central Asia for FY1992 through FY2004 amounted to $3.4 billion,
about 13% of the amount budgeted to all the Eurasian states, reflecting the lesser priority
given to these states prior to 9/11. Budgeted spending for FY2002 for Central Asia, during
OEF, was greatly boosted in absolute amounts ($584.13 million) and as a percent of total aid
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to Eurasia (25%). Although subsequent aid amounts appear less in absolute amounts, they
appear to loom larger as percentages of the total FREEDOM Support Act and other Function
150 aid to Eurasia (see Table 1). The conference report (H.Rept. 108-792) on H.R. 4818
(P.L. 108-447; Consolidated Appropriations for FY2005) directed FREEDOM Support Act
and FMF funding for Central Asia that matched, or nearly matched, that called for by the
request. Besides bilateral and regional aid, the United States contributes to international
financial institutions that aid Central Asia. Policy issues regarding U.S. aid include what it
should be used for, who should receive it, and whether it is effective.
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Central Asia
(in millions of dollars)
Cumulative Funds
Central Asian
FY2004
FY2005
FY2006
Budgeted FY1992-
Country
Budgeteda
Estimatea
Requestc
FY2004a
Kazakhstan
1,125.5
41.9
37.8
36.974
Kyrgyzstan
749.0
43.5
36.4
35.738
Tajikistan
612.6
34.1
43.6
37.124
Turkmenistan
237.34
8.4
9.3
8.086
Uzbekistan
645.96
38.4
48.7
37.393
Total
3,439.75 b
166.3
175.8
155.315
Percent
13
26
26
26
Sources: State Department, Office of the Coordinator for U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia; State
Department, U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with Eurasia: FY2003 Annual Report,
January 2004.
a. FREEDOM Support Act and Agency funds. Excludes some classified coalition support funding.
b. Central Asian Regional funds are included in the total.
Figure 1. Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan
Ast ana
MON.
Aral
Sea
Alma Ata
Bishkek
Caspian
UZBEKISTAN
KYRGYZST AN
Sea
Am
Tashkent
AZER.
u Da
Baku
ry
TURKMENISTAN
a
Dushanbe
Ashgabat
TAJIK.
0
500 Miles
Tehran
Kabul
Islamabad
0
500 KM
AFGHANISTAN
INDIA
Parallel scale at 40û
N 0û
E
PAKISTAN
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS. (08/02 M. Chin)
c. FREEDOM Support Act and other Function 150 funds, not including Defense or Energy Department funds;
in FY2004 and thereafter, funding for exchanges is excluded.
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