Order Code RL30588 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Updated June 15, 2005 Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Summary Afghanistan’s stabilization appears to be gathering strength, about three years after the U.S.-led war that brought the current government to power, but major challenges persist. Successful presidential elections held on October 9, 2004, and economic reconstruction is proceeding. However, the insurgency led by remnants of the former Taliban regime is still active, narcotics trafficking is rampant, and local militias, largely independent of government authority, remain throughout the country. The report of the 9/11 Commission recommended a long-term commitment to stabilize Afghanistan. Legislation passed in December 2004 to implement those recommendations (P.L. 108-458) contains several provisions on Afghanistan. Since the defeat of the Taliban, Afghanistan no longer serves as a safe base of operations for Al Qaeda. Afghan citizens are enjoying new personal freedoms that were forbidden under the Taliban, and women are participating in economic and political life, a point highlighted during First Lady Laura Bush’s visit to Afghanistan on March 29, 2005. Political reconstruction is slowly following the route laid out by major Afghan factions and the international community in late 2001. A loya jirga (traditional Afghan assembly) adopted a new constitution on January 4, 2004. Presidential and parliamentary elections were to be held by June 2004, but security concerns and factional infighting caused the presidential elections to be postponed until October 9, 2004. Parliamentary and provincial elections are now set for September 18, 2005, with district elections put off until 2006. The presidential elections were held amid high turnout and minimal violence; interim president Karzai was declared first-round winner on November 3, 2004. A new cabinet was sworn in December 27, 2004. U.S. stabilization measures focus on strengthening the central government and its security forces. The United States and other countries are building an Afghan National Army; deploying a multinational International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to patrol Kabul and other cities; running regional enclaves to secure reconstruction (Provincial Reconstruction Teams, PRTs); and disarming militia fighters. Approximately 18,000 U.S. troops remain in Afghanistan to combat the Taliban-led insurgency. To build security institutions and assist reconstruction, the United States gave Afghanistan a total of almost $1.8 billion for FY2004, mostly through a supplemental appropriations (P.L. 108-106). An FY2005 supplemental appropriates about $3.35 billion, including funds for Afghan security forces, and another $920 million is requested for the regular FY2006 foreign aid appropriations. This paper will be updated as warranted by major developments. See also CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Presidential and Parliamentary Elections; CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy; and CRS Report RL32783, FY2005 Supplemental Appropriations for Iraq and Afghanistan, Tsunami Relief, and Other Activities. Contents Background to Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 The Mujahedin Government and Rise of the Taliban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Clinton Administration Relations With the Taliban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 The “Northern Alliance” Coalition Against the Taliban: Rabbani, Masud, Dostam, and Sayyaf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Bush Administration Policy Pre-September 11, 2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Major Combat Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Post-War Stabilization Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 The Bonn Conference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Permanent Constitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 National Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Key Challenges to the Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Constraining Regional Leaders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Strengthening Central Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Combating Narcotics Trafficking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 Reconstructing Infrastructure and the Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Implementing Rule of Law/Improving Human Rights Practices . . . . . 20 Advancement of Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Post-War Security Operations and Force Capacity Building . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Counter-Insurgency Combat/Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) . . . 23 International Security Force (ISAF)/NATO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 Afghan National Army (ANA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) . . . . . . . . . 31 Regional Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 Central Asian States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 Residual Issues from Past Conflicts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Stinger Retrieval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Mine Eradication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 U.S. and International Aid to Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Post-Taliban/FY2002-2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 and Amendments . . . . . . 41 FY2006 Regular Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Additional Forms of U.S. Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 World Bank/Asian Development Bank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 International Reconstruction Pledges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43 Domestically Generated Funds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Promoting Long-Term Economic Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 Trade and Investment Framework Agreement and WTO Membership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Lifting of U.S. and International Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 List of Figures Figure 1. Map of Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 List of Tables Table 1. Table 2. Table 3. Table 4. Table 5. Table 6. Table 7. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY1999-FY2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1978-FY1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 ISAF Contributing Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 Major Factions in Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy Background to Recent Developments Afghanistan’s slide into instability began in the 1970s when its Communist Party and its Islamic movement grew in strength and became increasingly bitter opponents of each other.1 The instability shattered the relative peace and progress that characterized the rule of Afghanistan’s last monarch, King Mohammad Zahir Shah, who reigned from 1933 to 1973. Prior to the founding of the monarchy in 1747 by Ahmad Shah Durrani, Afghanistan was a territory inhabited by tribes and tribal confederations often linked to neighboring nations; it was not a distinct political entity. King Amanullah Khan (1919-1929) launched attacks on British forces in Afghanistan shortly after taking power and won complete independence from Britain as recognized in the Treaty of Rawalpindi (August 8, 1919). He was considered a secular modernizer presiding over a government in which all ethnic minorities participated. He was succeeded by King Mohammad Nadir Shah (19291933), and then by Zahir Shah. Zahir Shah is remembered fondly by many Afghans for promulgating a constitution in 1964 that established a national legislature and promoting freedoms for women, including freeing them from covering their face and hair. However, possibly believing that doing so would enable him to limit Soviet support for communist factions in Afghanistan, Zahir Shah also entered into a significant political and arms purchase relationship with the Soviet Union. While undergoing medical treatment in Italy, Zahir Shah was overthrown by his cousin, Mohammad Daoud, a military leader. Daoud established a dictatorship characterized by strong state control over the economy. After taking power in 1978 by overthrowing Daoud, the communists, first under Nur Mohammad Taraki and then under Hafizullah Amin (leader of a rival communist faction who overthrew Taraki in 1979), attempted to impose radical socialist change on a traditional society, in part by redistributing land and bring more women into government. These moves spurred recruitment for Islamic parties opposed to communist ideology. The Soviet Union sent troops into Afghanistan on December 27, 1979 to prevent a seizure of power by the Islamic militias that became popularly known as “mujahedin”2 (Islamic fighters). Upon their invasion, the Soviets ousted Hafizullah Amin and installed a local ally, Babrak Karmal, as president. 1 For more information, see CRS Report RL31759, Reconstruction Assistance in Afghanistan: Goals, Priorities, and Issues for Congress. 2 The term refers to an Islamic guerrilla; literally “one who fights in the cause of Islam.” CRS-2 After the Soviets occupied Afghanistan, the U.S.-backed mujahedin fought them effectively, and Soviet occupation forces were never able to pacify the country — outlying regions remained largely under mujahedin control. The mujahedin benefited from U.S. weapons and assistance, provided through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), working closely with Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence directorate (ISI). That weaponry included portable shoulder-fired anti-aircraft systems called “Stingers,” which proved highly effective against Soviet aircraft. The Islamic guerrillas also hid and stored weaponry in a large network of natural and manmade tunnels and caves throughout Afghanistan. The Soviet Union’s losses mounted, and Soviet domestic opinion turned anti-war. In 1986, after the reformist Mikhail Gorbachev became leader — and perhaps in an effort to signal some flexibility on a possible political settlement — the Soviets replaced Babrak Karmal with the more pliable director of Afghan intelligence, “Najibullah” Ahmedzai. On April 14, 1988, Gorbachev agreed to a U.N.-brokered accord (the Geneva Accords) requiring it to withdraw. That withdrawal was completed by February 15, 1989, leaving in place a weak communist government facing a determined U.S.backed mujahedin. The United States closed its embassy in Kabul in January 1989, as the Soviet Union was completing its pullout. A warming of superpower relations moved the United States and Soviet Union to try for a political settlement to the Afghan internal conflict. The 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union reduced Moscow’s capacity for supporting communist regimes in the Third World, leading Moscow to agree with Washington on September 13, 1991, to a joint cutoff of military aid to the Afghan combatants. The State Department has said that a total of about $3 billion in economic and covert military assistance was provided by the U.S. to the Afghan mujahedin from 1980 until the end of the Soviet occupation in 1989. Press reports say the covert aid program grew from about $20 million per year in FY1980 to about $300 million per year during FY1986-FY1990. The Soviet pullout decreased the strategic value of Afghanistan and made the Administration and Congress less forthcoming with subsequent funding.3 With Soviet backing withdrawn, on March 18, 1992, President Najibullah publicly agreed to step down once an interim government was formed. His announcement set off a wave of rebellions primarily by Uzbek and Tajik militia commanders who were nominally his allies, including by Uzbek commander Abdul Rashid Dostam (see below). The defectors joined prominent mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masud of the Islamic Society, a largely Tajik party headed by Burhannudin Rabbani. Masud sent his fighters into Kabul, paving the way for the installation of a regime led by the mujahedin on April 18, 1992. Masud had earned a reputation as a brilliant strategist by successfully preventing the Soviets from occupying his power base in the Panjshir Valley of northeastern Afghanistan. (After 3 For FY1991, Congress reportedly cut covert aid appropriations to the mujahedin from $300 million the previous year to $250 million, with half the aid withheld until the second half of the fiscal year. Although the intelligence authorization bill was not signed until late 1991, Congress abided by the aid figures contained in the bill. See “Country Fact Sheet: Afghanistan,” in U.S. Department of State Dispatch, vol. 5, no. 23 (June 6, 1994), p. 377. CRS-3 failing to flee, Najibullah, his brother, and a few aides remained at a U.N. facility in Kabul until the Taliban movement seized control in 1996 and hanged them.) Afghanistan at a Glance Population: Ethnic Groups: Religions: GDP: External Debt: Major Exports: Major Imports: 28.5 million (July 2004 est.) Pashtun 42%; Tajik 27%; Uzbek 9%; Hazara 9%; Aimak 4%; Turkmen 3%; Baluch 2%; other 4% Sunni Muslim 80%; Shiite Muslim 19%; other 1% $20 billion (purchasing power parity) $8 billion bilateral, plus $500 million multilateral fruits, nuts, carpets, semi-precious gems, hides, opium food, petroleum, capital goods, textiles Source: CIA World Factbook, 2004. The Mujahedin Government and Rise of the Taliban4 The fall of Najibullah brought the mujahedin parties to power in Afghanistan but also exposed the serious differences among them. The leader of one of the smaller mujahedin parties, Islamic scholar Sibghatullah Mojadeddi (leader of the Afghan National Liberation Front), became president for an initial two months (April-May 1992). Under an agreement among the major mujahedin parties, Burhannudin Rabbani became President in June 1992, with the understanding that he would leave office in December 1994. He refused to step down at that time, maintaining that political authority would disintegrate in the absence of a clear successor, and the other parties accused him of monopolizing power. Kabul was subsequently ravaged by daily shelling from another mujahedin commander, Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, attempting to force Rabbani out. Hikmatyar, who headed a fundamentalist faction of Hizb-e-Islami (Islamic Party) and reportedly received a large proportion of the U.S. covert aid during the war against the Soviet Union, was nominally prime minister but never formally took office. Four years (1992-1996) of the civil war created popular support for the Taliban as a movement that could deliver Afghanistan from the factional infighting. (Hikmatyar was later ousted by the Taliban from his power base around Jalalabad, despite sharing the Taliban’s ideology and Pashtun ethnicity, and he fled to Iran before returning to Afghanistan in early 2002. He is now allied with Taliban and Al Qaeda insurgents, and his whereabouts are unknown.) The Taliban was formed in 1993-1994 by Afghan Islamic clerics and students, many of them former mujahedin who had become disillusioned with continued conflict among mujahedin parties and had moved into Pakistan to study in Islamic seminaries (“madrassas”). They were mostly practitioners of an orthodox form of Sunni Islam, “Wahhabism,” similar to that practiced in Saudi Arabia. The Taliban was composed overwhelmingly of ethnic Pashtuns (Pathans) from rural areas of 4 For an in-depth study of the Taliban and its rule, see Rashid, Ahmad. Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia. Yale University Press, 2000. CRS-4 Afghanistan. Pashtuns constitute a plurality in Afghanistan, accounting for about 42% of Afghanistan’s population. Taliban members viewed the Rabbani government as corrupt, anti-Pashtun, and responsible for continued civil war and the deterioration of security. With the help of defections by sympathetic mujahedin fighters, the Taliban seized control of the southeastern city of Qandahar in November 1994, and by February 1995, it had reached the gates of Kabul, after which an 18-month stalemate around the capital ensued. In September 1995, the Taliban captured Herat province, bordering Iran, and expelled its governor, Ismail Khan. In September 1996, a string of Taliban victories near Kabul led to the withdrawal of Rabbani and Masud to their Panjshir Valley redoubt north of Kabul with most of their heavy weapons; the Taliban took control of Kabul on September 27, 1996. The Taliban was led by Mullah (Sunni Muslim cleric) Muhammad Umar, who fought (and lost an eye) in the anti-Soviet war under the banner of the Hizb-e-Islam (Islamic Party) mujahedin party of Yunis Khalis. Umar held the title of Head of State and Commander of the Faithful, but he mostly remained in his power base in Qandahar, rarely appearing in public. He did not take an active role in governance, but he sometimes summoned Taliban leaders to meet with him in Qandahar to discuss pressing issues. Considered a hardliner, Umar forged a close bond with bin Laden and adamantly opposed meeting U.S. demands to hand him over. Born in Uruzgan province, Umar, who is about 60 years old, fled Qandahar when the Taliban surrendered it on December 9, 2001. He is still at large. The Taliban progressively lost international and domestic support as it imposed strict adherence to Islamic customs in areas it controlled and employed harsh punishments, including executions. The Taliban made extensive use of its Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Suppression of Vice, a force of religious police officers that often used physical punishments to enforce Islamic practices, as well as a ban on television, Western music, and dancing. It prohibited women from attending school or working outside the home, except in health care, and it conducted some public executions of women for various transgressions, such as adultery. In what many consider its most extreme action, in March 2001 the Taliban blew up two large Buddha statues carved into hills above Bamiyan city, which dated to the seventh century AD. Some experts believe the move was a reaction to U.N. sanctions imposed in December 2000 (see below), and it provoked widespread condemnation of the Taliban. Several U.N. Security Council resolutions, including 1193 (August 28, 1998) and 1214 (December 8, 1998), urged the Taliban to end discrimination against women. During a November 1997 visit to Pakistan, then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright attacked Taliban policies as “despicable.” U.S. women’s rights groups, including the Feminist Majority and the National Organization for Women (NOW), mobilized to urge the Clinton Administration not to recognize the Taliban government. In May 1999, the Senate passed a resolution (S.Res. 68) calling on the President not to recognize any Afghan government that discriminates against women. CRS-5 Clinton Administration Relations With the Taliban The Clinton Administration diplomatically engaged the Taliban movement as it was gathering strength, but U.S. relations with the Taliban deteriorated sharply during the five years that the Taliban was in power. The two sides had become defacto adversaries well before the September 11, 2001 attacks. The United States withheld recognition of Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, formally recognizing no faction as the government. Because of the lack of broad international recognition of Taliban, the United Nations seated representatives of the Rabbani government, not the Taliban. The State Department ordered the Afghan embassy in Washington, D.C., closed in August 1997 because of a power struggle that embassy. Despite the deterioration, Clinton Administration officials met periodically with Taliban officials to stress U.S. concerns. Well before the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Taliban’s hosting of Al Qaeda’s leadership had become the Clinton Administration’s overriding bilateral agenda item with Afghanistan.5 In April 1998, then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Bill Richardson visited Afghanistan and asked the Taliban to hand bin Laden over to U.S. authorities, but he was rebuffed. After the August 7, 1998, Al Qaeda bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the Clinton Administration placed progressively more pressure on the Taliban to extradite bin Laden, adding sanctions, some military and reported covert action,6 and the threat of further punishments. Clinton Administration officials say that they did not take major action to oust the Taliban from power, either through direct U.S. military action or by providing military aid to Taliban opponents, because domestic U.S. support for those steps was then lacking and because the Taliban’s opponents were considered too weak and not necessarily consistent with U.S. values. ! On July 4, 1999, because of the Taliban’s hosting of bin Laden, President Clinton issued Executive Order 13129, imposing a ban on U.S. trade with Taliban-controlled portions of Afghanistan and blocking Taliban assets in U.S. financial institutions. Afghanistan was not named a state sponsor of terrorism on the grounds that doing so would have implied recognition of the Taliban as the government. ! On October 15, 1999, with Russian support, the United States achieved adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1267, which banned flights outside Afghanistan by Ariana airlines, and directed U.N. member states to freeze Taliban assets. 5 For more information on bin Laden and his Al Qaeda organization, see CRS Report RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2001, September 10, 2001. See also CRS Report RS20411, Afghanistan: Connections to Islamic Movements in Central and South Asia and Southern Russia. 6 On August 20, 1998, the United States fired cruise missiles at alleged bin Laden-controlled terrorist training camps in retaliation for the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. CRS-6 ! On December 19, 2000, the United States and Russia achieved U.N. Security Council adoption of Resolution 1333, prohibiting the provision of arms or military advice to the Taliban (directed against Pakistan); directing a reduction of Taliban diplomatic representation abroad; and banning foreign travel by senior Taliban officials. On July 30, 2001, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1363, providing for the stationing of monitors in Pakistan to ensure that no weapons or military advice was being provided to the Taliban. (In the aftermath of the Taliban’s ouster from power, these provisions were narrowed to focus on Al Qaeda, and not the Taliban, by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1390 of January 17, 2002.) The “Northern Alliance” Coalition Against the Taliban: Rabbani, Masud, Dostam, and Sayyaf The Taliban’s policies not only alienated the Clinton Administration but caused other Afghan power centers to make common cause with the ousted President Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Masud, the Tajik core of the anti-Taliban opposition. The Tajiks of the Alliance was located not only in the north but also in western Afghanistan near the Iranian border. Those in the west were led by Ismail Khan.7 The groups discussed below joined with these Tajik leaders into a broader “Northern Alliance.” 7 ! Uzbeks/General Dostam. One non-Tajik component of the Alliance was the Uzbek militia (the Junbush-Melli, or National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan) of General Abdul Rashid Dostam. Uzbeks constitute about 9% of the population, compared with 27% that are Tajik. Dostam, best known for his 1992 break with Najibullah that led to Najibullah’s overthrow that year, subsequently fought against Rabbani during 1992-1995 in an effort to persuade him to yield power. Dostam joined the Northern Alliance after the Taliban took power. Dostam once commanded about 25,000 troops, significant amounts of armor and combat aircraft, and even some Scud missiles, but infighting within his faction left him unable to hold off Taliban forces. The Taliban captured Dostam’s region in August 1998, leaving him in control of only small areas near the border with Uzbekistan. Dostam was a candidate for president in the October 9, 2004 elections; in March 2005 Karzai appointed him as his chief of staff for military affairs. ! Hazara Shiites. Members of Hazara tribes, mostly Shiite Muslims, are prominent in central Afghanistan, particularly Bamiyan Province. The Hazaras are always wary of repression by Pashtuns and other larger ethnic factions. The main Hazara Shiite grouping is Hizb-eWahdat (Unity Party, an alliance of eight smaller groups), which joined Rabbani’s 1992-1996 government. Hizb-e-Wahdat has Khan regained the governorship of his former stronghold in and around Herat after the Taliban collapse. CRS-7 traditionally received some material support from Iran, whose population practices Shiite Islam. Hizb-e-Wahdat forces occasionally retook Bamiyan city from the Taliban, but they did not hold it until the Taliban collapsed in November 2001. The most well known Hazara political leader is Karim Khalili, leader of a large faction of Hizb-e-Wahdat; he was one of President Hamid Karzai’s vice presidential running mates in the presidential election. Mohaqiq, mentioned above, ran in the October 2004 presidential election. ! Pashtun Islamists/Sayyaf. Another former mujahedin party leader, Abd-I-Rab Rasul Sayyaf, heads a Pashtun-dominated faction called the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan. Sayyaf lived many years in and is politically close to Saudi Arabia, which shares his conservative brand of Sunni Islam (“Wahhabism”). During the U.S.-backed war against the Soviet occupation, Sayyaf’s mujahedin faction, along with that of Hikmatyar, was a principal recipient of U.S.-supplied weaponry. Both criticized the U.S.-led war against Saddam Hussein after Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait. The similarity of Sayyaf’s ideology to that of the Taliban partly explains why many of Sayyaf’s fighters defected to the Taliban movement during its ascendancy. Despite that similarity, Sayyaf joined the Northern Alliance against the Taliban. Sayyaf retains some militia fighters and he is said to want to exercise major influence over the judiciary in the post-presidential election government. Many Afghans believe his Islamic orthodoxy would slow modernization of the judiciary and hinder an expansion of Western-style freedoms. Bush Administration Policy Pre-September 11, 2001 Bush Administration policy initially differed only slightly from Clinton Administration policy: applying pressure short of military action against the Taliban, while retaining some dialogue with it. Prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Bush Administration did not provide the Northern Alliance with U.S. military assistance, although the 9/11 Commission report says that, in the months prior to the September 11 attacks, the Administration was coming to consensus on taking such a step. The Commission report says some Administration officials wanted to also assist Pashtun forces opposed to the Taliban, and not just the Northern Alliance; other covert options might have been under consideration as well.8 Before the September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration stepped up engagement with Pakistan in an effort to persuade it to end support for the Taliban. In accordance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1333, in February 2001 the State Department ordered the closing of a Taliban representative office in New York. The Taliban complied with the directive, but its representative continued to operate informally. In March 2001, Bush Administration officials received a Taliban 8 Drogin, Bob. “U.S. Had Plan for Covert Afghan Options Before 9/11.” Los Angeles Times, May 18, 2002. CRS-8 envoy, foreign ministry aide Rahmatullah Hashemi, to discuss bilateral issues. As did the executive branch, Congress became increasingly critical of the Taliban. A sense of the Senate resolution (S.Res. 275) that resolving the Afghan civil war should be a top U.S. priority passed by unanimous consent on September 24, 1996. A similar resolution, H.Con.Res. 218, passed the House on April 28, 1998. Fighting with only some Iranian and Russian support, the Northern Alliance was unable to topple the Taliban. After losing Kabul in 1996, the Alliance steadily lost additional ground, even in areas populated by friendly ethnic minorities. By the time of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Taliban controlled at least 75% of the country and almost all major provincial capitals. The Northern Alliance suffered a major setback on September 9, 2001, two days before the September 11 attacks, when Ahmad Shah Masud was assassinated by alleged Al Qaeda suicide bombers posing as journalists. He was successor by his intelligence chief, Muhammad Fahim, a veteran figure but who lacks Masud’s charisma or authority. September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom After the September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration decided to militarily overthrow the Taliban regime when it refused a U.S. demand to immediately extradite bin Laden. The Bush Administration decided that a friendly regime in Kabul was needed to create the conditions under which U.S. forces could eliminate Al Qaeda activists from Afghanistan and deny it a base of operations. In Congress, S.J.Res.23 (P.L. 107-40) authorized “all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 or harbored such organizations or persons....” This resolution received no opposition (98-0 in the Senate, no objections in the House). Another bill, H.R. 2998, P.L. 107148) established a “Radio Free Afghanistan” broadcasting service under RFE/RL, and provided $17 million in funding for it for FY2002. Major Combat Phase. The U.S.-led war in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF) began on October 7, 2001. The major combat phase of OEF consisted primarily of U.S. airstrikes on Taliban and Al Qaeda forces, coupled with targeting by relatively small numbers (about 1,000) of U.S. special operations forces, to facilitate military offensives by the Northern Alliance and Pashtun anti-Taliban forces. Some U.S. ground units (about 1,300 Marines) moved into Afghanistan to pressure the Taliban around Qandahar at the height of the fighting (OctoberDecember 2001), but there were few pitched battles between U.S. and Taliban soldiers. Most of the ground combat was between Taliban units and Afghan opposition militias. Some critics believe that U.S. dependence on local Afghan militia forces in OEF strengthened the militias’ subsequent autonomy. The Taliban regime unraveled rapidly after it lost Mazar-e-Sharif to Dostam on November 9, 2001. Northern Alliance forces commanded by Mohammad Fahim — who had initially promised U.S. officials his forces would not enter the city itself but then abrogated that pledge — captured Kabul three days later. The collapse in the north was followed by its loss of control of southern and eastern Afghanistan to proU.S. Pashtun commanders, such as Hamid Karzai. Karzai had entered Afghanistan just after the September 11 attacks to organize Pashtun resistance to the Taliban, CRS-9 supported in that effort by U.S. special forces. He became central to U.S. efforts in the south after another Pashtun leader, Abdul Haq, entered Afghanistan in October 2001 without coordination with or support from U.S. forces; he was captured and killed by the Taliban. As the Taliban collapsed, groups of other Pashtun commanders took control of cities and provinces in the east and south. Major U.S. combat operations continued after the fall of the Taliban. The United States and its Afghan allies conducted “Operation Anaconda” in the Shah-iKot Valley south of Gardez during March 2 - 19, 2002, to eliminate a pocket of as many as 800 Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters. In late March 2003, about 1,000 U.S. troops launched a raid on suspected Taliban or Al Qaeda fighters in villages around Qandahar. On May 1, 2003, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Afghan president Karzai declared major OEF combat operations ended. Smaller operations against Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants continue, as discussed below. Post-War Stabilization Efforts9 The war paved the way for the success of an eight year long U.N. effort to form a broad-based Afghan government. The United Nations was viewed as a credible mediator by all sides largely because of its role in ending the Soviet occupation, but some observers criticized U.S. policy as being insufficiently engaged to bring about a settlement. Proposals from a succession of U.N. mediators incorporated many of former King Zahir Shah’s proposals for a government to be selected by a traditional assembly, the loya jirga. U.N. mediation, at times, appeared to make progress, but ceasefires between warring factions always broke down. One U.N. mediator, Algerian diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi ended his efforts in frustration in October 1999. In coordination with direct U.N. mediation efforts, a “Six Plus Two” contact group began meeting in early 1997; the group consisted of the United States, Russia, and the six states bordering Afghanistan: Iran, China, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. The group was created following informal meetings of some of the key outside parties, in which these countries, including the United States, agreed not to arm the warring factions.10 In 2000, a “Geneva group” on Afghanistan began meeting: Italy, Germany, Iran, and the United States. Another mediation effort existed within the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). The United States also supported initiatives coming from individual Afghans, including Karzai’s clan. One initiative, the Intra Afghan Dialogue, consisted of former mujahedin commanders and clan leaders; it held meetings during 1997 and 1998 in Bonn, Frankfurt, Istanbul, and Ankara. Another group was centered around 9 Some of the information in the following sections was gathered during a visit by CRS staff to Afghanistan in January 2004. For an analysis of U.S. reconstruction initiatives in Afghanistan, with a focus primarily on economic reconstruction, see U.S. General Accounting Office, Afghanistan Reconstruction, GAO-04-403 (June 2004). 10 In June 1996, the Administration formally imposed a ban on U.S. sales of arms to all factions in Afghanistan, a policy that had been already in place less formally. Federal Register, vol. 61, no. 125 (June 27, 1996), p. 33313. CRS-10 former King Zahir Shah (“Rome Grouping”), and a third grouping, the “Cyprus Process,” consisted of other Afghan exiles. The Bonn Conference. Immediately after the September 11 attacks, Brahimi was brought back as U.N. mediator. On November 14, 2001, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1378, calling for a “central” U.N. role in establishing a transitional administration and inviting member states to send peacekeeping forces to promote stability and secure the delivery of aid. In late November 2001, after Kabul had fallen, the United Nations invited delegates of the major Afghan factions, most prominently the Northern Alliance and that of the former King, to a conference Bonn, Germany. The Taliban was not invited. On December 5, 2001, the factions signed the “Bonn Agreement,” which ! formed a 30-member interim administration to govern until the holding in June 2002 of a loya jirga, which would be opened by the former King and would choose a government to run Afghanistan until a new constitution is approved and national elections held (planned for June 2004). Hamid Karzai was selected to chair the interim administration, weighted heavily (17 out of 30 of the positions) toward the Northern Alliance. This bloc held the key posts of Defense (Fahim), Foreign Affairs (Dr. Abdullah Abdullah), and Interior (Yunus Qanooni). The three are ethnic Tajiks, with the exception of Dr. Abdullah (half Tajik and half Pashtun); all are in their late 40s, and were close aides to Ahmad Shah Masud. It was agreed that, in the interim, Afghanistan would abide by the constitution of 1964.11 ! An international peace keeping force would be formed to maintain security, at least in Kabul, and Northern Alliance forces were to withdraw from Kabul. ! The Bonn Agreement was endorsed by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1385 (December 6, 2001), and the international peacekeeping force was authorized by Security Council Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001).12 Hamid Karzai and His Governing Style. President Karzai, who is about 50 years old, is leader of the powerful Popolzai tribe of Durrani Pashtuns; he became tribal leader when his father was assassinated, allegedly by Taliban agents, in Quetta, Pakistan in 1999. Karzai, who had attended university in India, had been deputy foreign minister in Rabbani’s government during 1992-1995. In 1995, he supported the Taliban as a Pashtun alternative to Rabbani, but he broke with the Taliban as its excesses unfolded. During 1997-2001, some of his several brothers 11 The last loya jirga that was widely recognized as legitimate was held in 1964 to ratify a constitution. Najibullah convened a loya jirga in 1987 to approve pro-Moscow policies; that gathering was widely viewed by Afghans as illegitimate. 12 Text of Bonn agreement at [http://www.runiceurope.org/german/frieden/afghanistan/talks/ agreement.htm]. CRS-11 lived in the United States. As noted above, prior to the September 11 attacks, he and his clan had reached out to the Northern Alliance in a broad anti-Taliban alliance, while also seeking dialogue to persuade the Taliban to share power. He is viewed as a leader who seeks factional compromise rather than by intimidating his opponents with the use of armed force. Permanent Constitution. In preparation for the 2002 “emergency” loya jirga, the former King returned to Afghanistan on April 18, 2002. By the time of the meeting, 381 districts of Afghanistan had chosen the 1,550 delegates to it, of which about 200 were women. At the loya jirga, which began June 11, 2002, the former King and Rabbani, withdrew from leadership candidacy and the assembly selected Karzai to continue to lead until planned June 2004 national elections. On its last day (June 19, 2002), the assembly approved a new cabinet, which included three vice presidents and was very similar to the previous cabinet. The loya jirga did not establish a parliament. After the loya jirga, the process of drafting a permanent constitution began. A 35-member constitutional commission, appointed in October 2002, drafted the document, and it was publicly unveiled in November 2003. It was debated by 502 delegates, selected in U.N.-run caucuses, at a “constitutional loya jirga (CLJ)” during December 13, 2003 - January 4, 2004. The CLJ, chaired by Sibghatullah Mojadeddi (who is discussed above), ended with approval of the constitution with only minor changes from the draft. Most significantly, members of the Northern Alliance factions and their allies did not succeed in measurably limiting the power of the presidency in the drafting process or at the CLJ. The Alliance had wanted to set up a prime minister-ship as a check on presidential power, but that was not included in the draft out of broad concerns that a prime minister might emerge as a rival to the presidency.13 As an alternative, the Northern Alliance sought a strong elected parliament.14 At the CLJ, some additional powers were given to the parliament, such as veto power over senior official nominees. Some experts believe that setting up a strong presidency places undue weight on Karzai’s incumbency and self-restraint. According to the new constitution: ! Two vice presidents run on the same election ticket as the president, and one succeeds him in the event of the president’s death. They serve a five-year term, and presidents are limited to two terms. If no presidential candidate receives at least 50%, a run-off is to be held within two weeks. The constitution gives parliament the ability to impeach a president. 13 Constable, Pamela. “Afghan Constitution Seeks Balance.” Washington Post, September 28, 2003. 14 Information on the contents of the draft constitution are derived from a variety of November 3, 2003, wire service reports, including Reuters and Associated Press, which are based on an English translation of the draft provided to journalists by the Afghan government. CRS-12 ! There is to be a two-chamber parliament, provincial, and district councils. The lower house (Wolesi Jirga, House of People), to consist of 249 seats, is to be fully elected at the same time, if possible, as presidential elections. ! The 102 seat upper chamber (Meshrano Jirga, House of Elders) is to be selected as follows: one-third of the seats (34) are appointed by the President; another one third (34, one per province) are selected by provincial councils (elected, if possible, the same day as the parliamentary elections); and a final 34 are selected by the nearly 400 district councils (elected, if possible, the same day as the parliamentary elections). The constitution does not stipulate other roles for the district councils, although some believe they will ultimately acquire some power to impose local taxes and provide local services.15 ! In the elected lower house, at least 68 of those elected (an average of two per province x 34 provinces) “should” be women. That would give women about 25% of the seats in that body. The goal is to be met through election rules that would give seats to the top women vote-getters in each province. In the upper house, 50% of the president’s appointments are to be women, giving women at least 17 seats (half of the president’s 34 nominees) — about 17% of that body. ! The constitution allows political parties to be established so long as their charters “do not contradict the principles of Islam,” and they do not have affiliations with other countries. The constitution does not impose Sharia (Islamic law), but it does attempt to satisfy Afghanistan’s conservative clerics by stipulating that laws shall not contradict “the beliefs and provisions” of Islam. ! Protects minorities by giving Uzbeks and Turkmens rights for their language to be official languages in their regions, provisions not contained in the original draft. This represented an apparent victory for Afghanistan’s minorities; the Pashtun leaders had wanted the final constitution to designate Pashto as the sole official language. National Elections. A separate CRS report, CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, provides information on the presidential election, including results and funding, as well as the upcoming parliamentary and provincial elections. As noted in that report, the October 9, 2004, presidential voting was orderly and turnout heavy (about 8.2 million votes cast out of 10.5 million registered voters). On November 3, 2004, Karzai was declared winner (55.4% of the vote) over his seventeen challengers on the first round, 15 Aizenman, N.C. “Afghans Face a Rocky Road to Next Vote.” Washington Post, February 19, 2005. CRS-13 avoiding a runoff. He was inaugurated on December 7, 2004, with Vice President Cheney attending. Parliamentary elections had been intended for April-May 2005, although they have now been scheduled for September 18, 2005. The provincial councils are to be elected that same day. However, because of the difficulty in confirming voter registration rolls and determining district boundaries, elections for the district councils, each of which will have small and contentious boundaries, have been put off until some time in 2006. Voting district boundaries have been determined, and the number of lower house parliamentary seats for each province has been set. There will be a “supplemental voter registration” period during June 25-July 21 to correct voter registration errors or oversights from the October 2004 presidential election. Because the district elections will not be held at the same time as the parliamentary and provincial elections, the Afghan election commission has said that, as an interim measure, the upper house of parliament is to consist of the 34 selectees of the provincial councils, and 17 presidential appointees. The remaining 51 seats of the upper house are to be filled when district elections are held in 2006. According to the U.N. Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA), as of June 8, 2005, there are 2,885 candidates for the lower house of parliament thus far (including 338 women) and 3,186 candidates for the provincial councils (including 270 women). As of October 2004, the latest date for which official information is available, 70 political parties were registered with the Justice Ministry. Karzai has not formed his own party, and some of his allies in government say he is unlikely to do so. Yunus Qanooni, Karzai’s main presidential election challenger, was not given a cabinet seat in the new government, prompting him to announce the formation of a “New Afghanistan” opposition party, and a broader, multi-party opposition coalition called the “Afghanistan National Coordination Front.” These groupings will not only compete in the parliamentary elections but will monitor government performance until then. On May 18, 2005, former Taliban foreign minister Wakil Mutawakkil, who was released from prison as part of a reconciliation deal, said he plans to run for parliament. U.S. Election Assistance. The FY2005 supplemental appropriations (P.L. 109-13) provides $1.086 billion in Economic Support Funds (ESF), but the conference report does not specify how much of the funds is to be used for election assistance. The Administration request had asked, within a broad $265 million “democracy and governance” category, for $60 million in funds for parliamentary elections and voter education functions. Post-Presidential Election Cabinet.16 On December 27, 2004, a new 27seat cabinet was sworn in. Broadly, the cabinet appears to retain the factional balance (among Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, and others) that previously existed, but the main security ministries, Defense and Interior, are now occupied by 16 Biographic information on the new cabinet was provided to CRS by the Embassy of Afghanistan in Washington, D.C. December 2004. CRS-14 Pashtun ministers. There are eight Tajik ministers. However, the cabinet generally emphasizes technocratic qualifications (nine have Ph.D’s) over factional allegiances: ! The most prominent Northern Alliance minister, Fahim, was replaced as Defense Minister by his Pashtun deputy, Abdul Rahim Wardak. Wardak lived in the United States during Taliban rule. Fahim’s ouster has heightened tensions between Karzai and the Northern Alliance grouping. ! Prominent Northern Alliance figure, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, was retained as Foreign Minister, and Interior Minister Ali Jalali, a Pashtun, was retained. Jalali reportedly must relinquish his U.S. citizenship to retain the post. ! Finance Minister, Ashraf Ghani (a Pashtun), well liked by international donors, was dropped in favor of another Pashtun, Karzai ally (and Central Bank governor) Anwar ul-Haq Ahady. ! Three women are in the cabinet, an addition of one from the previous cabinet. Female presidential candidate Masooda Jalal was made Minister of Women’s Affairs; Sediqa Balkhi is Minister for Martyrs and the Disabled; and Amina Afzali is Minister of Youth. ! To emphasize his stated commitment to end the burgeoning narcotics trafficking problem, Karzai created a new Ministry of Counter-Narcotics, headed by Habibullah Qadari. Part of the U.S. and Afghan stabilization strategy is to build democratic traditions at the local level. The Afghan government’s “National Solidarity Program” seeks to create local governing councils and empower these councils to make decisions about local reconstruction priorities. Elections to these local councils have been held in several provinces, and almost 40% of those elected to them have been women.17 The FY2005 supplemental request included, within the $265 million broad democracy category, $155 million in ESF for programs including the National Solidarity Program. The conference report on P.L. 109-13 does not specify how much of the $1.086 billion in ESF appropriated is allocated for these programs. Key Challenges to the Transition Karzai’s government is slowly expanding its writ, although tensions remain among factions of the national government and between the central government and some regional leaders. Aside from the security concerns generated by continuing Taliban insurgency, the political transition is proceeding steadily but continues to face challenges that are discussed below. 17 Khalilzad, Zalmay (Then U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan). “Democracy Bubbles Up.” Wall Street Journal, March 25, 2004. CRS-15 Constraining Regional Leaders. The Kabul government is slowly expanding its authority and its capabilities and curbing regional leaders who sometimes act outside government control. This effort is supplemented by U.N. programs to disarm identified and illegal militias, as discussed below (DDR programs). In an indication of the scope of the problem, on July 11, 2004, Karzai cited regional and factional militias as the key threat to Afghan stability — greater than that posed by continuing Taliban attacks. In his first post-election speech on November 4, 2004, Karzai said he would continue curbing militias. On the other hand, some argue that Afghans have always sought substantial regional autonomy and that the effort to increase the authority of the central government will likely incur consistent opposition. Some critics attribute the continued strength of regional militias to U.S. policies to use these militias to combat Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants. Others believe that easily obtained arms and manpower, funded by narcotics trafficking profits, help to sustain the independence of local factions and militias. Still others maintain that local militias did not interfere to any great extent on the presidential vote and that the issue is fading as an obstacle to Afghan stability. Karzai’s 2004 cabinet selections showed his attempts to marginalize regional strongmen. He removed Pashtun regional leader Ghul Agha Sherzai as Minister of Public Works and of Urban Development but then returned him to his prior post as governor of Qandahar. Herat strongman Ismail Khan was appointed Minister of Water and Energy; he had been removed by Karzai as governor of Herat Province in September 2004. As noted above, Dostam has been appointed Karzai’s top military advisor, taking him away from his political base in northern Afghanistan. He took up his post in April 2005 after “resigning” as head of his Junbush Melli faction. In July 2004, Karzai removed a charismatic Northern Alliance commander, Atta Mohammad, from control of a militia in the Mazar-e-Sharif area and moved two other militia leaders, Hazrat Ali (Jalalabad area) and Khan Mohammad (Qandahar area) into civilian police chief posts. One commander of concern is former Defense Minister Fahim, still the Northern Alliance’s military chief, who now has no official position. Although he has mostly withdrawn Northern Alliance militia fighters from Kabul, as required in the Bonn agreement, and turned almost all of his heavy weapons over to U.N. and Afghan forces (see below), he could conceivably still pose a military threat to Karzai’s government, should he turn to armed rebellion. Another potential threat is Abd-Rab Rasul Sayyaf, discussed above. Sayyaf has refused to allow his “Division 1” militia in Kabul to be dismantled. Strengthening Central Government. Afghanistan’s central government still lacks administrative capacity. As part of the U.S. push to build government capacity in advance of the 2004 Afghan elections, the Administration assigned 14 U.S. officials (fewer than the 20 that were planned) full- or part-time to the U.S. Embassy in Kabul (Afghan Reconstruction Group, ARG) to serve as additional advisors to the Afghan government. Zalmay Khalilzad, an American of Afghan origin who was President Bush’s envoy to Afghanistan, became ambassador in December 2003, and he reportedly had significant influence on Afghan government CRS-16 decisions.18 However, he has now left Afghanistan and been nominated to become ambassador to Iraq. Ambassador Ronald Neumann has been nominated as his replacement. To assist the U.S. Embassy in Kabul and coordinate reconstruction and diplomacy, in 2004 the State Department created an Office of Afghanistan Affairs, now headed by Ambassador Maureen Quinn. In addition, U.S. intelligence is advising the National Security Directorate to help it build its capabilities to monitor threats to the new government.19 As a demonstration of high-level U.S. support for Karzai, the Administration has maintained a pattern of senior visits. As noted above. Vice President Cheney attended Karzai’s inauguration in December 2004. In March 2005, Secretary of State Rice, and then First Lady Laura Bush (March 29, 2005) visited Afghanistan. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has visited roughly every three months. Funding Issues/FY2005 Supplemental. The U.S. embassy is expanding its personnel and facilities to help accelerate the reconstruction process, and it is improving its physical security capabilities. The FY2005 supplemental appropriation request asked $240 million to help build the capacity of the Afghan central government, including salaries, and to promote democracy and rule of law. The conference report on P.L. 109-13 provided the requested $60 million for embassy Kabul operations, as well as the requested $17.1 million in nonproliferation, anti-terrorism, and de-mining (NADR) funds for Karzai protection. Additional amounts for Afghan government capacity are not specified. Part of the U.S. embassy funds are for contract security to replace U.S. marines that now guard the compound. A requested $25 million to improve the Kabul international airport was not provided.20 Combating Narcotics Trafficking. A detailed discussion of the narcotics trafficking issue, including U.S. funding to combat this problem in Afghanistan, is provided in CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy. Narcotics trafficking has been identified as a growing problem facing the Karzai government, and the State Department’s International Narcotics Strategy Report, released March 4, 2005, says that Afghanistan is “on the verge of becoming a narcotics state.” In his November 4, 2004 election victory speech, and at a Kabul conference on the issue two days after his December 7, 2004 inauguration, he called on Afghans to join a “jihad” against the opium trade. On December 12, 2004, he pledged to destroy Afghanistan’s poppy fields within two years. A U.N. preliminary report released March 27, 2005 said there has been some response to Karzai’s initiatives, and that poppy crop planting for next year’s crop is falling from the prior year’s level in 29 out of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. On the other hand, a press report published on the eve of Karzai’s May 23, 2005, visit to the United States said 18 Waldman, Amy. “In Afghanistan, U.S. Envoy Sits in Seat of Power.” New York Times, April 17, 2004. Afghanistan’s ambassador in Washington is Seyed Jalal Tawwab, formerly a Karzai aide. 19 Kaufman, Marc. “U.S. Role Shifts as Afghanistan Founders.” Washington Post, April 14, 2003. 20 The conference report on the FY2004 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 108-106) provided $44 million for improvements to the U.S. embassy in Kabul. CRS-17 that the U.S. Embassy in Kabul had assessed that Karzai was refusing or failing to overcome Afghan resistance to more assertive U.S. and Afghan efforts to reduce poppy cultivation.21 In April 2005, for example, Afghan farmers in the Qandahar area fought Afghan units who were attempting to eradicate poppy fields. During the course of the Karzai visit, however, U.S. officials praised Karzai’s cooperation on narcotics issues. U.S. official reports say that about $2.3 billion — half of Afghanistan’s GDP — is generated by narcotics trafficking. According to the 2004 Opium Survey conducted by the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Afghan Counternarcotics Directorate, published November 2004, the opium crop was close to 4,200 metric tons for 2004, a 17% increase from 2003 and keeping Afghanistan as the leading producer of opium crop.22 Cultivation took place on 131,000 hectares of land for 2004, an increase of 64% from the 80,000 hectares of land used for opium production in 2003, according to that report, although some estimates say that as much as 206,000 hectares were under poppy cultivation. Several reports and observers say that narcotics trafficking is funding Taliban insurgents and their allies in Afghanistan, and there are widespread fears that local leaders might use narcotics profits to fund their campaigns for parliament. On the other hand, the traffickers do not appear to have formed cartels, and it is not clear that those involved in the narcotics trade necessarily have independent political objectives. Britain has been formally the lead coalition partner in reducing narcotics production and trafficking; it has been raiding some drug processing labs and has sent counter-narcotics forces to the Qandahar province. In May 2004, the United States began funding a separate program to work with Afghan government officials to destroy poppy fields themselves, but the Afghan government apparently has persuaded the United States not to focus primarily on creating alternative livelihoods that will dissuade Afghans from engaging in cultivation. Some Bush Administration officials have sought to task the U.S. military to play a greater role in attacking traffickers and their installations, a mission the U.S. military reportedly had been reluctant to perform on the grounds that it would expand the U.S. military mission in Afghanistan.23 On April 6, 2005, Lt. Gen. Barno, formerly the senior U.S. commander in Afghanistan, said the U.S. military would expand its counter-narcotics role by flying Afghan forces on missions, identifying targets, and taking charge of training counter-narcotics police. In November, 2004, press reports said the Bush Administration would also take new legal steps against suspected Afghan drug traffickers by indicting them and putting the legal machinery 21 Cloud, David and Carlotta Gall. “U.S. Memo Faults Afghan Leader on Heroin Fight.” New York Times, May 22, 2005. 22 Tohid, Owais. “Bumper Year for Afghan Poppies.” Christian Science Monitor, July 24, 2003. 23 Zoroya, Greg. “Military Urged to Hit Afghan Drug Traffic.” USA Today, February 12,. 2004; Barnard, Anne, and Farah Stockman. “US Weighs Role in Heroin War in Afghanistan.” Boston Globe, October 20, 2004. CRS-18 in place to have them extradited from Afghanistan if caught.24 In mid-April 2005, a DEA operation successfully caught the alleged leading Afghan narcotics trafficker, Haji Bashir Noorzai, arresting him after a flight to New York. On November 17, 2004, the Bush Administration (Assistant Secretary of State for INL, Robert Charles) announced “Plan Afghanistan,” a $780 million (FY2005 funds) program to raise public awareness about the problem, promote alternative livelihoods, and conduct interdiction and crop eradication. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is a participant in Plan Afghanistan. There might be some controversy over a U.S. plan to buy 14 used Israeli helicopters for use by the Afghans in drug eradication; Afghanistan’s conservative Muslims will likely oppose the use of formerly Israeli equipment.25 Funding Issues/FY2005 Supplemental. narcotics funds are being provided. Substantial U.S. counter- ! For FY2004, the United States provided $220 million to assist Afghanistan’s counter-narcotics effort and to train Afghan police, both handled by INL. Of that, $170 million was appropriated in the FY2004 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 108-106), and $50 million is being provided from the post-September 11 “Emergency Response Fund.” The supplemental also provided $73 million for Defense Department counter-narcotics activities in Afghanistan, virtually all of which has been spent. ! The FY2005 regular foreign aid appropriation (P.L. 108-447) contained no hard earmark for Afghan counter-narcotics. ! The FY2005 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 109-13) provided substantial funds for “Plan Afghanistan”: $227 million for DOD counter-narcotics in Afghanistan ($30 million less than requested); the requested $260 million for INL counter-narcotics; the requested $8 million for DEA operations in Afghanistan; and $34 for counternarcotics operations of the Afghan government. The requested $248 million to promote alternative livelihoods was not specifically provided, nor was $46 million for aerial eradication. The appropriation also provides for furnishing Afghan counter-narcotics forces with some weaponry and equipment, as well as for an audit of how U.S. counter-narcotics funds are used there. ! The request for regular FY2006 foreign aid appropriations asks $260 million for counter-narcotics and police training purposes. The Bush Administration has not imposed sanctions on post-Taliban Afghanistan even though it has determined that Afghanistan is a major drug transit 24 Cameron-Moore, Simon. “U.S. to Seek Indictment of Afghan Drug Barons.” Reuters, November 2, 2004. 25 “IAF Choppers to Fight Afghan Drugs.” Jerusalem Post, February 11, 2005. CRS-19 or illicit drug producing country. To avoid sanctioning Afghanistan, the Administration has not included Afghanistan on an annual list of countries that have “failed demonstrably to make substantial efforts” during the past 12 months to adhere to international counter-narcotics agreements and take certain counter-narcotics measures set forth in U.S. law.26 Narcotics trafficking control was perhaps the one issue on which the Taliban satisfied much of the international community; the Taliban enforced a July 2000 ban on poppy cultivation, which the U.N. International Drug Control Program (UNDCP) said in February 2001 had dramatically decreased cultivation in the areas surveyed.27 The Northern Alliance did not issue a similar ban in areas it controlled. Reconstructing Infrastructure and the Economy. U.S. and Afghan officials see the growth in narcotics trafficking as a product of an Afghan economy ravaged by war and lack of investment. Since 2003, an accelerated U.S. economic reconstruction plan has showcased some evidence of success, including roads, education, and health.28 ! Roads. Paving of the Kabul-Qandahar roadway project (Phase I), completed in December 2003. According to USAID, Phase II paving was completed in November 2004, and several bridges have been completed. Work has begun on the Qandahar-Herat roadway, which will be funded by the United States, Japan, and Saudi Arabia. U.S.-funded ($2.7 million) work began on March 15, 2005 for a road out of the Panjshir Valley. ! Education and Health. Additional work is being conducted on school and health clinic rebuilding (180 schools and clinics were built during 2004), and agriculture projects, such as the setting up of 138 market centers country-wide. During her March 29, 2005 visit to Afghanistan, First Lady Laura Bush announced U.S. grants out of FY2005 funds of $17.7 million for a private “American University of Kabul,” and $3.5 million for primary school education. These grants were part of the approximately $152 million in U.S. funds programmed for Afghanistan education during FY2003-FY2005 (of which $85 million was appropriated in the FY2004 supplemental, P.L. 108-106). On the other hand, some outside experts said in June 26 This is equivalent to the listing by the United States, as Afghanistan has been listed every year since 1987, as a state that is uncooperative with U.S. efforts to eliminate drug trafficking or has failed to take sufficient steps on its own to curb trafficking. 27 Crossette, Barbara. “Taliban Seem to Be Making Good on Opium Ban, U.N. Says.” New York Times, February 7, 2001. 28 Numerous other examples of U.S. economic reconstruction initiatives are analyzed in a General Accounting Office (GAO) report: Afghanistan Reconstruction. GAO Report GAO04-403, June 2004. The report, which studied mainly economic reconstruction, was generally critical of U.S. reconstruction efforts to date, asserting that long term reconstruction efforts had achieved “limited results,” because the U.S. effort “lacked a complete operational strategy.” These findings were disputed by the State Department and USAID in their commenting letters at the end of the report. CRS-20 2005 that overall health conditions might be worsening and that Afghanistan might soon face a cholera epidemic. Funding/FY2005 Supplemental. The FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13) appropriates $1.086 billion in ESF out of the $2 billion requested for all civilian reconstruction projects. The conference report says the amount “assumes full funding” for health programs and provincial reconstruction team (PRTs, discussed below) expenses. Among projects apparently not funded are refurbishment of Kabul Airport, venture capital funding, industrial park funding, higher education including costs of a new law school in Kabul, and various long term construction projects (hydropower and a gas fired power plant, industrial parks, and courthouses). The FY2006 regular foreign aid requests asks for about $620 million for economic reconstruction-related activities. Implementing Rule of Law/Improving Human Rights Practices. Virtually all observers agree that Afghans are freer than they were under the Taliban. The press is relatively free and Afghan political groupings and parties are able to meet and organize freely, according to the State Department report on human rights practices for 2004 (released February 28, 2005). However, according to the State Department and other reports, including an April 2005 report submitted by U.N. human rights monitor on Afghanistan Cherif Bassiouni, there continue to be reports of reprisals and other abuses based on ethnicity or political factionalism in many parts of Afghanistan. Some believe the Afghan police mishandled protests in Jalalabad, Ghazni, and other cities during May 11-13, 2005, which erupted in response to a May 9 Newsweek story that U.S. interrogators in Guantanamo Bay had mishandled and dishonored the Quran. The unrest resulted in 15 Afghans killed, which some attributed to overreaction and excessive use of force by the police. The Afghan government says the protests were stoked by Taliban remnants and proHikmatyar activists. The State Department report also cites the arbitrary implementation of justice and corruption in areas controlled by regional leaders as a key source of Afghan human rights abuses. On the other hand, some ethnic minorities look to the regional leaders to defend their interests. Some observers say that the government is reimposing some Islamic restrictions that characterized Taliban rule, including the code of criminal punishments stipulated in Islamic law.29 Some have blamed the increased restrictions on chief justice Fazl Hadi Shinwari, a religious conservative who was appointed in late November 2001 by Rabbani, just after the Taliban fled Kabul but before Karzai took office. In January 2003, Shinwari called for cable television in Kabul to be shut down on the grounds it was un-Islamic, and he called for an end to co-education, although his directives apparently have not been implemented by the government. Although U.S. officials are privately critical of Shinwari, the U.S. government has generally refrained from advising the new government on these issues, lest the United States be accused of undue interference in Kabul’s affairs. U.S. programs — many of which are conducted in partnership with Italy, which is the “lead” coalition country on judicial reform — generally focus on building capacity of the judicial system, including police training and court construction. The United States has provided 29 Shea, Nina. “Sharia in Kabul?” National Review, October 28, 2002. CRS-21 numerous training programs for judges, prosecutors, and court administrators for the Ministry of Justice, the office of the Attorney General, and the Supreme Court. The conference report on the FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13) does not specifically appropriate the requested $25 million for court administration, a law school, and other rule of law programs. An Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHC) also has been formed to monitor government performance; it is headed by former Women’s Affairs minister Sima Samar. The FY2004 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 108-106), appropriated $5 million to fund the Commission in FY2004. This is the amount authorized, for each FY2003-2006, for that purpose, in the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-327). Another $2 million for the AIHC was appropriated in P.L. 108-447, the regular FY2005 appropriation. Advancement of Women.30 The government is widely considered to be promoting the advancement of women, although the treatment of women remains subject to Afghanistan’s conservative traditions. The first major development in post-Taliban Afghanistan was the establishment of a Ministry of Women’s Affairs, now headed by former presidential candidate Masooda Jalal, which is dedicated to improving women’s rights. That ministry has tried to get more Afghan women involved in business ventures and it has invited Afghan religious scholars to hear interpretations of the Quran that favor participation of women in national affairs. In another notable development, in March 2005 Karzai appointed former Minister of Women’s Affairs Habiba Sohrabi as governor of Bamiyan province, inhabited mostly by Hazaras. As noted above, the constitution reserves for women at least 25% of the seats in the upper house of parliament and 17% of the upper house, three women are in the new cabinet, and the constitution recognizes men and women as equal citizens. Women are performing some jobs, such as construction work, that were rarely held by women even before the Taliban came to power in 1996, 31 including in the new police force. Press reports say Afghan women are increasingly starting small businesses and learning how to drive. Under the new government, the wearing of the full body covering called the burqa is no longer obligatory, although many women continue to wear it by tradition. Although the treatment of Afghan women has improved since the Taliban were removed from power, the Administration and Congress have taken a continued interest in the treatment of women in Afghanistan. After the Karzai government took office, the United States and the new Afghan government set up a U.S.-Afghan Women’s Council to coordinate the allocation of resources to Afghan women. Empowerment of Afghan women was a major feature of First Lady Laura Bush’s visit to Afghanistan in March 2005. The United States was active at the constitutional loya jirga to enshrine in the new constitution protections for women and policies to advance women in government. 30 See also CRS Report RS21865, Assistance to Afghan and Iraqi Women: Issues for Congress. 31 Amanpour, Christiane. CNN special report on Afghanistan. Broadcast November 2, 2003. CRS-22 Funding to Advance Afghan Women. In recent congressional action: 32 ! On November 27, 2001, as the Taliban was collapsing, the House unanimously adopted S. 1573, the Afghan Women and Children Relief Act, which had earlier passed the Senate. The law (signed December 12, 2001) calls for the use of unspecified amounts of supplemental funding (appropriated by P.L. 107-38, which gave the Office of the President $40 billion to respond to the September 11, 2001 attacks, and which was subsequently distributed throughout the government to fund various programs)32 to fund educational and health programs for Afghan women and children. ! The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-327) authorized $15 million per year, for FY2003-2006, for the Ministry of Women’s Affairs. ! The FY2004 supplemental (P.L. 108-106) appropriated $60 million for programs to assist Afghan women and girls, and expresses the sense of Congress that the United States seek (in Afghanistan and Iraq) to promote high level participation of women in legislative bodies and ministries and ensure their rights in new institutions. The section also calls on the Administration to seek to ensure women’s access to credit, property, and other economic opportunities. In concert with a meeting with President Karzai, on June 15, 2004, President Bush announced that the United States would fund a $4 million women’s teacher training institute in Kabul and that it would provide $5 million for small business grants to Afghan women. ! The FY2005 regular foreign aid appropriation, P.L. 108-447, provides $50 million for Afghan women and girls, of which $7.5 million is to go to small grants to women’s businesses. Another $6 million is appropriated in that law for maternal and child health care in Afghanistan. On March 11, 2005, the Administration announced a $2.275 million grant (FY2005 funds) to the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, during a visit to the United States by Minister Masooda Jalal. ! The conference report on P.L. 109-13, the FY2005 supplemental, recommends $5 million be used for women’s organizations’ capacity building. The FY2005 supplemental request said that some of a $60 million request for “elections and democracy” programs (part of the broader $265 million democracy and governance request would be used for “Muslim outreach with an emphasis on women’s issues.” For more information on how the appropriated funds were distributed and used, see CRS Report RL31173, Combating Terrorism: First Emergency Supplemental AppropriationsDistribution of Funds to Departments and Agencies. CRS-23 Post-War Security Operations and Force Capacity Building Much of the U.S. program for Afghanistan is focused on securing Afghanistan. The report of the 9/11 Commission recommends that “...the United States and the international community should make a long-term commitment to a secure and stable Afghanistan ... so that Afghanistan does not again become a sanctuary for international crime and terrorism.” Despite the Taliban’s overthrow, Taliban, proHikmatyar, and some Al Qaeda militants continue to operate in Afghanistan. The pillars of the security effort are (1) combat operations by U.S. and other coalition forces in Afghanistan; (2) patrols by a NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); (3) the formation of “provincial reconstruction teams” (PRTs); (4) the establishment and training of an Afghan National Army and a police force; and (5) the demobilization of local militias. These programs are discussed below. Counter-Insurgency Combat/Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). The United States military (U.S. Central Command, CENTCOM) has about 18,000 troops in Afghanistan, and six coalition countries are contributing another 1,600 combat troops to OEF. Their primary mission is to combat Taliban remnants other insurgents, but several hundred additional OEF forces also contributed to security for the October presidential elections. The current commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan is Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry (as of May 3, 2005, replacing Lt. Gen David Barno). Eikenberry heads the “Combined Forces Command (CFC),” headquartered near the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, relocating in late 2003 from Bagram air base north of Kabul. OEF forces do not routinely conduct “peacekeeping” missions or patrol Afghan neighborhoods. Japan’s navy provides fuel for coalition warships involved in OEF, and Japan has extended that mission through November 1, 2005. (Additional foreign troops are part of ISAF, see below). U.S. forces along with Afghan troops continue on the offensive against insurgents. Earlier, the United States and Afghanistan launched “Operation Mountain Viper” on August 25, 2003, followed up by “Operation Avalanche,” (December 8-30, 2003). During March to July 2004, U.S. forces, along with Afghan National Army soldiers, conducted “Operation Mountain Storm” against Taliban remnants in and around Uruzgan province (home province of Mullah Umar). Other significant operations against militants, particularly in southeastern Afghanistan, took place in May-October 2004 as part of a “spring offensive.” A winter offensive, “Operation Lightning Freedom,” was conducted in December 2004-February 2005. Some reports suggest that the combat, coupled with overall political and economic reconstruction, appears to be succeeding against the insurgency, although insurgents attacks have escalated somewhat since April 2005. Their attacks focus on aid workers, U.S. and Afghan soldiers, and police. Although some U.S. commanders — including Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Richard Myers on a visit to Afghanistan in early March 2005 — are saying the insurgency is weakening, they caution that an early reduction in U.S. or other foreign troops in Afghanistan could allow insurgents to regroup. U.S. commanders also attribute the progress to a new military strategy, launched by Lt. Gen. Barno in February 2004, to station some U.S. forces in populated areas to cultivate relations with them and thereby better acquire combatrelevant information. According to an outgoing top U.S. commander in Afghanistan (Maj. Gen. Eric Olson) on March 7, 2005, Mullah Umar essentially has lost control CRS-24 of the insurgency, although he reportedly continues to travel around eastern and southern Afghanistan, meeting with Taliban insurgent commanders and exhorting them to continue their insurgency. Some of his top aides have been captured, but others, such as Jalaludin Haqqani and Mullah Akhtar Usmani, are still at large. In addition, in April 2005 Taliban remnants started a clandestine radio station, “Voice of Shariat,” suggesting the movement still has substantial resources. The success of the October 9 presidential elections apparently caused a rift in the Taliban, with some militants now negotiating with the government to join the political process or surrendering. President Karzai has offered “moderate” Taliban amnesty in exchange for allowing them into the political process. According to press reports, about 50-60 militants, including several key Taliban and Hikmatyar activists, have joined the reconciliation process, which is headed by Sibghatullah Mojadeddi. In January 2005, U.S. forces in Afghanistan released 81 detained Taliban fighters at Karzai’s request. Karzai has said about 100-150 of the top Taliban leadership would not be eligible for amnesty or political engagement. Mojadeddi said in May 2005 that even Mullah Umar or Hikmatyar might be eligible for amnesty, but U.S. officials quickly distanced themselves from Mojadeddi’s comments. Ending Taliban urban terrorist attacks is considered a more complicated mission. Such attacks have included a September 5, 2002, car bombing in a crowded marketplace in Kabul and a virtually simultaneous unsuccessful assassination attempt against President Karzai. One of the most significant attacks occurred on June 1, 2005, when a mosque in Qandahar was bombed, killing 40 Afghans, including Kabul’s police chief. Four Americans were killed in an August 29, 2004, bombing of a U.S. security contractor (Dyncorps) facility in Kabul. (In January 2005, Afghan authorities arrested an Afghan judge for allegedly harboring Al Qaeda or Taliban militants who conducted that attack.) A British citizen working in Afghanistan was shot by unknown assailants in Kabul in March 2005, and an Italian worker for CARE was kidnapped in mid-May 2005 but released in June 2005. A bomb blast killed three at a cyber-cafe in Kabul on May 8, 2005 The Hunt for Al Qaeda and Other Militants. U.S. Special Operations Forces continue to hunt for bin Laden and his close ally, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Bin Laden reportedly escaped the U.S.-Afghan offensive against the Al Qaeda stronghold of Tora Bora in eastern Afghanistan in December 2001. However, bin Laden is widely believed to be on the Pakistan side of the border. As noted above, another target of OEF is the Hikmatyar faction (Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, HIG) allied with Al Qaeda and Taliban insurgents. On February 19, 2003, the U.S. government formally designated Hikmatyar as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist,” under the authority of Executive Order 13224. That order subjected named terrorists and terrorist-related institutions to financial and other U.S. sanctions. The HIG is included in the section on “other terrorist groups” in the State Department’s report on international terrorism for 2003, released April 2004. The group is not formally designated as a “Foreign Terrorist Organization.” Longer Term Presence. Even if the Taliban insurgency is defeated completely, it appears that the United States will maintain a long-term presence in Afghanistan. Top U.S. commanders, including Joint Chiefs Chairman Richard CRS-25 Myers (on a visit to Afghanistan in March 2005), say that the United States might seek permanent bases in Afghanistan, but that no decision or recommendation on that had been made. President Karzai told visiting Defense Secretary Rumsfeld on April 13, 2005, that Afghanistan would ask President Bush for a long-term security pact with the United States that might include permanent bases, although Rumsfeld reportedly was non-committal. On May 8, 2005, Karzai summoned about 1,000 delegates to a national consultation in Kabul on the proposal to allow permanent U.S. bases in Afghanistan; delegates reportedly supported an indefinite presence of international forces to maintain security but urged Karzai to delay a firm decision on allowing permanent U.S. bases. On May 23, 2005, Karzai and President Bush issued a “joint declaration” providing for U.S. forces to have access to Afghan military facilities, in order to prosecute “the war against international terror and the struggle against violent extremism.” The joint statement did not spell out any permanent stationing of U.S. bases in Afghanistan, nor did the statement give Karzai his requested increased control over facilities used by the U.S. forces, over U.S. operations, or over the disposition of prisoners taken in the course of operations. Some of the bases, both in and near Afghanistan, that are used in support of U.S. operations in Afghanistan and that could form part of a longer-term U.S. presence include the following. 33 ! Bagram Air Base north of Kabul, where many of the U.S. troops in Afghanistan are based,33 as well as thirteen other airfields around Afghanistan that handle the 150 U.S. aircraft (including helicopters) in the country. The FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13) provides a total of about $52 million for various projects to upgrade facilities at Bagram, including a control tower and an operations center, but a $57 million fuel storage tank farm for Bagram was not appropriated. ! Qandahar airfield, just outside that city, which bases about 500 U.S. military personnel. The FY2005 supplemental provides $16 million for an ammunition supply facility at Qandahar. ! Karshi-Khanabad airbase in Uzbekistan houses about 1,750 U.S. military personnel (900 Air Force, 400 Army, and 450 civilian), and is mostly a supply hub for U.S. forces in Afghanistan. No combat missions are flown from there, according to U.S. officers, and U.S. use of the base has been reduced since May 2005 following a government crackdown on unrest in the city of Andijon. State Department criticism of the crackdown prompted strains in U.S.Uzbekistan relations. P.L. 109-13 appropriates $42.5 million to upgrade the airbase, including runway improvement. ! The Peter Ganci base at Manas airport in Kyrgyzstan has about 1,000 U.S. military personnel, as well as refueling and cargo aircraft. Harris, Kent. “Buildings Going Up at Bagram Air Base as U.S. Forces Dig In for the Long Haul.” Stars and Stripes, March 15, 2005. CRS-26 Leadership of Kyrgyzstan changed in April 2005 in a revolution against former President Askar Akayev, but the new leadership says the U.S. use of the base will not be affected. ! Several bases in the Persian Gulf are used to support the Afghanistan mission, including Al Dhafra in the UAE, Al Udeid in Qatar, and several airfields in Oman. P.L. 109-13 appropriates $1.4 million to upgrade Al Dhafra. ! On April 21, 2005, Turkey said it would extend for another year an agreement allowing the United States to use Incirlik air base to supply U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. OEF Costs and Casualties. As of June 14, 2005, about 195 U.S. military personnel have been killed in OEF including from enemy fire, friendly fire, and nonhostile deaths (accidents). No reliable Afghan casualty figures for the war on the Taliban and Al Qaeda have been announced, but estimates by researchers of Afghan civilian deaths generally cite figures of “several hundred” civilian deaths. On July 1, 2002, a U.S. air-strike on suspected Taliban leaders in Uruzgan Province mistakenly killed about 40 civilians. Incremental costs of U.S. operations in Afghanistan appear to be relatively stable at about $900 million to $1 billion per month. About $13 billion in incremental costs were incurred in FY2002. The FY2004 supplemental appropriation provided about $11 billion for Operation Enduring Freedom for FY2004 (P.L. 108-106). Supplemental FY2005 funds for Afghanistan combat were provided in P.L. 108-287 and P.L. 109-13.34 International Security Force (ISAF)/NATO.35 The Bonn Agreement and U.N. Security Council Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001) created an international peacekeeping force for Afghanistan, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Its mandate was initially limited to Kabul but is now broadening as NATO/ISAF assumes control over additional provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs, see below). ISAF’s baseline force was about 6,400 troops from all 26 NATO countries, plus 11 non-NATO countries but force levels increased to about 9,000 to help secure the October 9, 2004 elections. That level has now fallen back to under 8,500,36 but it will again increase by about 2,000 (a Dutch battalion in Mazar, a 34 Information on U.S. military costs and funding requests for these operations is analyzed in CRS Report RS21644, Costs of Operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Enhanced Security, by Amy Belasco. 35 As noted above, six countries (in addition to the United States) are providing forces to OEF, and twelve countries are providing forces to both OEF and ISAF. 36 Many of the additional 2,500 election-related troops were from Spain and Italy; the Italian battalion was attached to the “NATO Response Force (NRF),” but the NRF as an entity did not deploy. France had objected to deploying that force on the grounds that election security in Afghanistan was not part of the NRF’s intended mission. In addition to the extra troops for the election period, the Netherlands and Britain each provided six (continued...) CRS-27 Romanian battalion in Kabul, and Spanish troops in Herat) to help secure the September 2005 parliamentary and provincial elections. Table 5, an appendix at the end of this report, contains a table listing each contributing country to ISAF and the number of forces being contributed. NATO’s role in Afghanistan has been expanding since August 2003, when it took command of ISAF. This commitment put to rest the perpetual difficulty of identifying a lead country for ISAF each six-month period. NATO took over from Germany and the Netherlands.37 NATO’s assumption of command intensified discussions about whether ISAF should deploy to other major cities, a mission the Afghan government long favored.38 The Bush Administration initially favored reliance on alternative security efforts, but it later agreed to ISAF expansion if enough troops could be contributed. In early October 2003, NATO endorsed a plan to expand its presence to several other cities, contingent on formal U.N. approval. That decision came several weeks after Germany agreed to contribute an additional 450 military personnel to expand ISAF into the city of Konduz. On October 14, 2003, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1510, formally authorizing ISAF to deploy outside Kabul. (Additional long-term NATO involvement in Afghanistan is a key recommendation of the 9/11 Commission report.) Currently, the core of ISAF is the Kabul Multinational Brigade (4,400 personnel), which was headed by Canada until August 2004, then by the “Eurocorps,” a rapid response force composed of forces from France, Germany, Spain, Belgium, and Luxembourg. Turkey took over the lead as of February 2005, and Turkey has augmented its force to 1,800 accordingly. At the headquarters level, there are 600 personnel from 15 contributing nations. ISAF coordinates with Afghan security forces and with OEF forces as well, and it assists the Afghan Ministry of Civil Aviation and Tourism in the operation of Kabul international airport. The United States contributes a small amount of force to ISAF (194 troops), primarily to coordinate U.S. military assistance to it. ISAF - OEF Mission Merger. In concert with NATO/ISAF’s expanded role, there is a growing consensus within NATO that the ISAF peacekeeping and OEF combat missions should be combined. In February 2005, in conjunction with meetings between European leaders and Secretary of State Rice and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, NATO and the United States said they would eventually merge the two missions, possibly as early as 2006. It is unlikely, however, that even U.S. forces would withdraw from Afghanistan if such a mission merge took place. Some NATO countries, including Germany and France, are reluctant to shift their missions to combat rather than peacekeeping, and U.S. commanders are said to remain skeptical about whether NATO is able to conduct a combat mission effectively. 36 (...continued) combat aircraft that could have been used to help suppress any election-related violence. 37 Earlier ISAF leaders were Turkey (June 2002 to February 2003) and Britain (December 2001 to June 2002). 38 Driver, Anna. “U.N. Envoy Pushes for Troop Expansion in Afghanistan.” Reuters, August 13, 2003. CRS-28 Some observers also want NATO/ISAF to assume a role in counter-narcotics missions. In June 2005, it was reported that British troop levels would increase to enable Britain to step up its anti-Taliban, anti-narcotics mission in concert with U.S. forces performing similar missions in southeastern Afghanistan Personnel and equipment shortages have plagued NATO’s ability to build up in Afghanistan. In an effort to address staffing and equipment shortages, in December 2003, NATO announced new pledges for ISAF operations: 12 helicopters from Germany, the Netherlands, and Turkey; six aircraft from various nations; an infantry company from Norway’s Telemark battalion, troops from the Czech Republic, intelligence officers from Italy, Romania, and other countries, and airport traffic controllers from Belgium and Iceland. For the most part, the personnel and equipment have now arrived. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The U.S. military has increasingly focused on fostering secure conditions for reconstruction. The cornerstone of that effort, inaugurated in mid-December 2002, is the concept of the provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). PRTs are military-run enclaves that provide safe havens for international aid workers to help with reconstruction and to extend the writ of the Kabul government throughout Afghanistan by attaching to the PRTs Afghan government (Interior Ministry) personnel. PRT activities can range from resolving local disputes to coordinating local reconstruction projects. Each U.S.-run PRT is composed of U.S. forces, Defense Department civil affairs officers, representatives of U.S. aid and other agencies, and allied personnel. Most PRTs, including those run by partner forces, have personnel to train Afghan security forces. There are now 21 PRTs in operation, of which 11 are U.S.-run. Each has about 50-100 military personnel, although some coalition partners deploy larger forces than that at the PRTs they run. The U.S.-run PRTs are in Gardez, Ghazni, Parwan, Qandahar, Jalalabad, Khost, Qalat, Asadabad, Tarin Kowt, Lashkar Gah, and Sharana. Partner countries now run ten PRTs, and plans are for the remaining U.S.-run PRTs to eventually be taken over by NATO/ISAF, freeing up U.S. (and British) forces for combat in areas where there is insurgency and narcotics trafficking. As of June 2005, partner countries run ten PRTs, following the takeover by Italy and Spain of U.S. PRTs in Herat and Farah, in western Afghanistan. The two countries also established a “Forward Support Base” in Herat Province to serve those two PRTs as well as two new ones formed at Gaghcharan (capital of Ghor Province, led by Lithuania), and Qaleh-ye Now (capital of Badghis Province, led by Spain). The new PRTs require adding a total of 500 troops to NATO/ISAF’s force in Afghanistan. The other partner-run PRTs are in Konduz (led by Germany); Mazar-e-Sharif (led by Britain); Faizabad (as a satellite of Germany’s Konduz PRT); Meymaneh (led by U.K., Norway, and Finland); and Baghlan (led by Netherlands). New Zealand deploys 120 military personnel to run an OEF-run PRT in Bamiyan, not under NATO/ISAF auspices. In addition, U.K. forces have formed three satellites of the Mazar PRT: in Sari Pol, Samangan, and Shebergan. CRS-29 In future deployments, Canada is moving 1,250 troops to Afghanistan to take over the U.S.-led PRT in Qandahar, and the Netherlands reportedly might take over a U.S.-run PRT in southeastern Afghanistan. Sweden is reportedly offering to take over the British-run PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif to free up British forces to take over some U.S. PRTs in the more restive south and east and to perform combat missions in that area. U.S. plans are to eventually establish PRTs in most of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces. Some aid agencies say they have felt more secure since the PRT program began, fostering reconstruction activity in areas of PRT operations.39 However, other relief groups do not want to associate with any military force because doing so might taint their perceived neutrality. In February 2004, U.S. commanders unveiled an additional concept for “regional development zones (RDZ),” areas of operations that might group several PRTs, in an effort to promote reconstruction and Afghan governance. A pilot RDZ was established in Qandahar, composed of a strongly proKabul governor working with U.S. troops and Afghan national police and Afghan National Army forces. One intention of the concept is to devolve security decisionmaking to U.S. commanders in the regions, rather than at U.S. headquarters in Kabul. The FY2004 supplemental appropriations provided $50 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) for “PRT projects” (P.L. 108-106). The conference report on the FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13) says that ESF for PRT reconstruction-related programs are provided ($87 million was requested for this function). Afghan National Army (ANA). U.S. Special Operations Forces, in partnership with French, British, and other partner forces, are training the new ANA. U.S. officers in Afghanistan say the ANA is beginning to become a major force in stabilizing the country and a national symbol. As of June 2005, the ANA exceeds 23,000 troops, according to U.S. fact sheets. On the other hand, about 31,000 have been trained to date, suggesting that some desertion or absentee problem persists. U.S. commanders have set a goal of 33,5000 ANA soldiers for 2006, and the ultimate size of the army is to be 70,000 by 2007. The United States is also building four bases for the ANA, according to U.S. officials. The bases are in Herat, Gardez, Qandahar, and Mazar-e-Sharif. The ANA began its first deployments in December 2002. Thus far, by all accounts, it has been welcomed by local populations as a symbol of a unified future for Afghanistan. The ANA has now established a presence in most of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, working with the PRTs and assisted by embedded U.S. trainers. The ANA deployed to Herat in March 2004 to help quell factional unrest there, and to Maimana in April 2004 in response to Dostam’s militia movement into that city. Coalition officers are conducting heavy weapons training for a heavy brigade as part of a “Kabul Corps,” based in Pol-e-Charki, east of Kabul. There had been reports, at the time the United States first began establishing the ANA, that Northern Alliance figures were weighting recruitment for the national 39 Kraul, Chris. “U.S. Aid Effort Wins Over Skeptics in Afghanistan.” Los Angeles Times, April 11, 2003. CRS-30 army toward his Tajik ethnic base. Many Pashtuns, in reaction, refused recruitment or left the ANA program. U.S. officials in Afghanistan say this problem has been alleviated with better pay and more involvement by U.S. special forces, as well as the appointment of additional Pashtuns in senior Defense Ministry positions.40 The naming of a Pashtun, Abdul Rahim Wardak, as Defense Minister in December 2004 could also reduce desertions and absenteeism among Pashtuns. U.S. officers in Afghanistan add that some recruits take long trips to their home towns to remit funds to their families, and often then return to the ANA after a long absence. Fully trained recruits are paid about $70 per month. The FY2005 foreign aid appropriation for Afghanistan (P.L. 108-447) contains a provision requiring that ANA recruits be vetted for past involvement in terrorism, human rights violations, and drug trafficking. An Afghan Air Force, a carryover from the Afghan Air Force that existed prior to the Soviet invasion, remains, although it has virtually no aircraft to fly. It has about 400 pilots, as well as 28 aging helicopters and a few cargo aircraft. Russia overhauled 11 of these craft in 2004, but the equipment is difficult to maintain. In May 2005, representatives of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) said the United States is considering obtaining for Afghanistan additional transport planes and helicopters, although the equipment might not necessarily be U.S. equipment, according to DSCA. Afghan pilots are based at Bagram Airfield. Afghanistan is seeking the return of 26 aircraft, including some MiG-2s that were flown to safety in Pakistan and Uzbekistan during the more than two decades of warfare in Afghanistan. Funding and Armament. Thus far, weaponry for the ANA has come primarily from Defense Ministry weapons stocks — with the concurrence of former Defense Minister Fahim who controlled those stocks — from international donors, primarily from the former East bloc,41 and from the disarmament program discussed below. The United States has provided some trucks, M-113 armored personnel carriers, and other equipment as excess defense articles (EDA), and plans to provide additional articles and services, according to statements by U.S. officials. In December 2004, President Bush authorized (Presidential Determination 2004-15) the draw-down from U.S. stocks of $135 million worth of U.S. defense articles and services, including training. The FY2004 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 108-106) provided $287 million in foreign military financing (FMF) to accelerate ANA development, allocated as follows: $146 million for infrastructure; $78 million for equipment; $40.7 million for “sustainment” (ANA salaries); $13 million for training; and $9 million for transportation. The FY2005 foreign aid appropriation (P.L. 108-447) earmarked $400 million in FMF for the ANA. The FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13) provides the requested $1.285 billion for DOD operations to train and equip the 40 Gall, Carlotta. “In a Remote Corner, an Afghan Army Evolves From Fantasy to Slightly Ragged Reality.” New York Times, January 25, 2003. 41 Report to Congress Consistent With the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002, July 22, 2003. CRS-31 ANA. Of that amount, $290 million is to reimburse the U.S. Army for funds already obligated to train and equip the Afghan forces. National Guard. In early 2004, because of the slow pace of expanding the ANA, the Bush Administration reportedly formulated a plan to build up a “national guard” to supplement the ANA.42 The national guard apparently will consist primarily of regional militia forces; it would report to OEF. This plan might appear to conflict with the Administration’s plan to build up the Kabul government and weaken regional militias, although the Administration reportedly believes this plan could better bring militia forces under central control. National Police. Some Afghan officials believe that building up a credible and capable national police force is at least as important as building the ANA. Some do not believe the ANA should have a role in maintaining internal security, and that this should be the role of the police. The United States and Germany are training the Afghan National Police (ANP) force. About 38,000 ANP are on duty, and that number is expected to reach 62,000 by mid-2006. Germany is focusing on police commander training, and it has trained about 3,700 police commanders thus far, with another 1,500 in training. There are five training centers around Afghanistan, with two more to be established. Some national police have begun to dismantle factional checkpoints in some major cities, according to U.S. officers in Afghanistan. Part of the training consists of courses in human rights principles and democratic policing concepts. On the other hand, some U.S. commanders believe the ANP need additional training because police mishandled the riots in Jalalabad in May 2005, started over rumors of the mishandling of the Quran at the Guantanamo Bay prison facility. Moreover, the ANP work in the communities they come from, often embroiling them in local factional or ethnic disputes. The State Department (INL) has placed 30 U.S. advisors in the Interior Ministry to help it develop the national police force and counter-narcotics capabilities. According to the State Department, the United States has completed training of the first unit of National Interdiction Unit officers under the Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan. U.S. trainers are also building Border Police and Highway Patrol forces. The FY2005 supplemental (P.L. 109-13) provides $360 million (of $400 million requested) in State Department INL funds to train Afghan police. Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR). Japan, the United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA), the United Kingdom, and Canada, with participation of the United States are leading (funding and implementing) an effort to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate (DDR) into society fighters from individual militias. The DDR program is intended to undercut the strength of regional strongmen relative to the central government. The program got off to a slow start because the Afghan Defense Ministry did not enact mandated reforms (primarily reduction of the number of Tajiks in senior positions) by the 42 Dempsey, Judy. “US Planning for Stopgap Afghan National Guard.” Financial Times (London), February 12, 2004. CRS-32 targeted July 1, 2003, date. In September 2003, Karzai took action on the issue, replacing 22 senior Tajik officials in the Defense Ministry with officials of Pashtuns, Uzbek, and Hazara ethnicity. The DDR program had initially been expected to demobilize 100,000 fighters. However, lists of fighters submitted by regional leaders in June 2004 identified about 60,000 total to be demobilized. According to the UNAMA on June 13, 2005, virtually all of the 60,000 militia fighters identified have been disarmed. Of that total, 49,000 have begun exercising their reintegration options: training, starting small businesses, and other options. The program got a boost from the ousting of Ismail Khan as Herat governor in August 2004; he permitted many of his militiamen to enter the DDR program after he was removed. In addition, there is now a pool of perhaps 100,000 members of “illegal armed groups,” to be disarmed; these are unofficial militiamen that were not part of recognized local forces. The program to disarm them is called the Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG). Some studies have criticized the DDR program for failing to prevent a certain amount of rearmament of militiamen or stockpiling of weapons and for the rehiring of some militiamen in security programs run by the United States and its partners.43 A related program is the surrender and cantonment of heavy weapons possessed by major factions. According to UNAMA, at least 33,500 medium and light weapons have been collected as of June 8, 2005. Of these, 13,400 pieces have been transferred to the ANA. About 9,054 heavy weapons (tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery pieces) have been collected; this is nearly all of the heavy weapons believed controlled by militia forces, although there are still believed to be about 220 heavy weapons pieces uncollected in Shindand, Farah, and Konduz. Heavy weapons cantonment was completed in Kabul in January 2005 because Fahim submitted the heavy weapons under his control — including the weapons kept in the Northern Alliance stronghold of the Panjshir Valley. The final weapons submitted by him included the last four Scud missiles that were under his control, along with 70 tanks and 20 artillery pieces. As noted above, the U.K.-led PRT in Mazar-eSharif has collected and (along with the ANA) is guarding some heavy weapons (tanks, artillery) from Dostam and rival factions in northern Afghanistan. The FY2004 supplemental requested $60 million for DDR operations. However, $30 million was provided in that law (P.L. 108-106) because it is expected that Japan might contribute additional funds. 43 For an analysis of the DDR program, see Christian Dennys. Disarmament, Demobilization and Rearmament? June 6, 2005, [http://www.jca.apc.org/~jann/Documents/Disarmament %20demobilization%20rearmament.pdf]. CRS-33 Regional Context Even before September 11, several of Afghanistan’s neighbors were becoming alarmed about security threats emanating from Afghanistan. Some experts believe that the neighboring governments are now attempting to manipulate Afghanistan’s factions to their advantage, despite the signing on December 23, 2002 of a noninterference pledge (Kabul Declaration) by six of Afghanistan’s neighbors. Pakistan44 Pakistan publicly ended its support for the Taliban in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, although questions persist about Pakistan’s commitment to preventing Taliban remnants from operating there. Pakistan initially saw the Taliban movement as an instrument with which to build an Afghan central government strong enough to prevent fragmentation of Afghanistan while at the same time sufficiently friendly and pliable to provide Pakistan strategic depth against rival India. It had been the most public defender of the Taliban movement and was one of only three countries (Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are the others) to formally recognize it as the legitimate government. Pakistan saw Afghanistan as essential to opening up trade relations and energy routes with the Muslim states of the former Soviet Union. Prior to the September 11 attacks, General Pervez Musharraf, who took power in an October 1999 coup, resisted U.S. pressure to forcefully intercede with the Taliban leadership to achieve bin Laden’s extradition. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1333, of December 19, 2000, was partly an effort by the United States and Russia to compel Pakistan to cease military advice and aid to the Taliban. Pakistan, for the most part, abided by the resolution, including ordering the Taliban to cut the staff at its embassy in Pakistan.45 Pakistan’s pre-September 11 steps against the Taliban reflected increasing wariness that the Taliban movement was radicalizing existing Islamic movements inside Pakistan and that its support for the Taliban was propelling the United States into a closer relationship with India. These considerations, coupled with U.S. offers of economic benefit, prompted Pakistan to cooperate with the U.S. response to the September 11 attacks. Pakistan provided the United States with requested access to Pakistani airspace, ports, airfields. Pakistan also has arrested over 550 Al Qaeda fighters, some of them senior operatives, and turned them over to the United States. Among those captured by Pakistan are top bin Laden aide Abu Zubaydah (captured April 2002); alleged September 11 plotter Ramzi bin Al Shibh September 11, 2002); top Al Qaeda planner Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (March 2003); and most recently a top planner, Abu Faraj al-Libbi (May 2005). 44 For further discussion, see Rashid, Ahmed. “The Taliban: Exporting Extremism.” Foreign Affairs, November-December 1999. 45 Constable, Pamela. “New Sanctions Strain Taliban-Pakistan Ties.” Washington Post, January 19, 2001. CRS-34 Following failed assassination attempts in December 2003 against Musharraf, Pakistani forces accelerated efforts to find Al Qaeda forces along the PakistanAfghanistan border, in some cases threatening tribal elements in these areas who are suspected of harboring the militants. In March 2004, about 70,000 Pakistani forces began a major battle with about 300-400 suspected Al Qaeda fighters in the Waziristan area, reportedly with some support from U.S. intelligence and other indirect support. Pakistan said it was winding down the combat in December 2004 and it publicly denied that it had allowed the United States to set up intelligence bases in the Waziristan area as part of the search for bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders.46 Pakistan’s forces are now poised near the north Waziristan area of Pakistan, and the U.S. military acknowledged in April 2005 that it is training Pakistani commandos to fight Al Qaeda fighters in Pakistan.47 At the same time, Pakistan has sought to protect its interests by fashioning a strong Pashtun-based component for a post-Taliban government. Pakistan is wary that a government dominated by the Northern Alliance would be backed by India, which Pakistan says is using its diplomatic facilities in Afghanistan to train and recruit anti-Pakistan insurgents. Some U.S. and Afghan officials continue to accuse Pakistan of allowing Taliban fighters and activists to meet and group in Pakistani cities, and they call on Pakistan to track down and arrest Taliban members as vigorously as it tracks members of Al Qaeda. Pakistan says it is too difficult to distinguish Afghan Taliban from Pakistani nationals, but President Musharraf promised, at a meeting with Karzai on August 23, 2004, to prevent militants in Pakistan from disrupting Afghanistan’s October 9 presidential elections. There are some indications Pakistan implemented that pledge, and Pakistan has sought to improve relations further now that Karzai has won a free election. Despite the improving climate between these neighbors, there are occasional border clashes, apparently caused by the lack of clear border delineation, and the presence of independent armed factions on the Afghan side of the border or aggressive commanders on the Pakistani side. The most recent border clash was on January 4, 2005. Pakistan wants the government of Afghanistan to pledge to abide by the “Durand Line,” a border agreement reached between Britain (signed by Sir Henry Mortimer Durand) and then Afghan leader Amir Abdul Rahman Khan in 1893, separating Afghanistan from what was then British-controlled India (later Pakistan after the 1947 partition). As of October 2002, about 1.75 million Afghan refugees have returned from Pakistan since the Taliban fell. About 300,000 Afghan refugees remain in Pakistan. Iran Iran perceives its key national interests in Afghanistan as exerting its traditional influence over western Afghanistan, which Iran borders and was once part of the 46 Risen, James, and David Rohde. “A Hostile Land Foils the Quest for Bin Laden.” New York Times, December 13, 2004. For more information, see CRS Report RL32259, Terrorism in South Asia. 47 Gall, Carlotta. “U.S. Training Pakistani Units Fighting Qaeda.” New York Times, April 27, 2005. CRS-35 Persian empire, and to protect Afghanistan’s Shiite minority. Iranian firms are also profiting from reconstruction work in western Afghanistan. Iran has long been politically close to the Northern Alliance, and remains so. Iran has confirmed that it offered search and rescue assistance in Afghanistan during the U.S.-led war, and it also allowed U.S. humanitarian aid to the Afghan people to transit Iran. However, some Iranian leaders were harshly critical of U.S. military action, referring to the action as a U.S. war on Islam. Iran saw the Taliban as a threat to its interests in Afghanistan, especially after Taliban forces captured Herat (the western province that borders Iran) in September 1995. Iran subsequently drew even closer to the Northern Alliance than previously, providing its groups with fuel, funds, and ammunition,48 and hosting fighters loyal to Ismail Khan, who was captured by the Taliban in 1998 but escaped and fled to Iran in March 2000. In September 1998, Iranian and Taliban forces nearly came into direct conflict when Iran discovered that nine of its diplomats were killed in the course of Taliban’s offensive in northern Afghanistan. Iran massed forces at the border and threatened military action, but the crisis cooled without a major clash, possibly because Iran lacked confidence in its military capabilities or out of fear that Pakistan would intervene on behalf of the Taliban. Amid reports Iran seeks to exert influence over the new government by arming pro-Iranian Afghan factions, in early January 2002 President Bush warned Iran against meddling in Afghanistan. Since then, the Bush Administration has continued to accuse Iran of trying to build influence over the interim government and of failing to send Al Qaeda leaders in Iran back to their countries of origin for trial. Partly in response to the U.S. criticism, in February 2002 Iran expelled Karzai-opponent Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, although it did not arrest him and allowed him to return to Afghanistan. For his part, Karzai has said that Iran is an important neighbor of Afghanistan and visited Iran in late February 2002, pledging to build ties with the Islamic republic. Iran did not strongly oppose Karzai’s firing of Iran ally Ismail Khan in September 2004, although Iran has opposed the subsequent U.S. use of the western Afghan air base of Shindand, 20 miles from the Iranian border.49 Iran is said to be helping Afghan law enforcement with anti-narcotics along their border. About 300,000 Afghan refugees have returned from Iran since the Taliban fell, but about 1.2 million remain, mostly integrated into Iranian society. Russia A number of considerations might explain why Russia mostly supported the U.S. effort against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Russia’s main objective in Afghanistan has been to prevent the further strengthening of Islamic or nationalist movements in the Central Asian states or Islamic enclaves in Russia itself, including Chechnya. Russia’s fear became acute following an August 1999 incursion into Russia’s Dagestan region by Islamic guerrillas from neighboring Chechnya. Some reports link 48 Steele, Jonathon, “America Includes Iran in Talks on Ending War in Afghanistan.” Washington Times, December 15, 1997. 49 Rashid, Ahmed. “Afghan Neighbors Show Signs of Aiding in Nation’s Stability.” Wall Street Journal, October 18, 2004. CRS-36 at least one faction of the guerrillas to Al Qaeda.50 This faction was led by a Chechen of Arab origin who is referred to by the name “Hattab” (full name is Ibn al-Khattab), although there are some reports Russia may have killed him in Chechnya in 2002. In January 2000, the Taliban government became the only government in the world to recognize Chechnya’s independence, and some Chechen fighters fighting alongside Taliban/Al Qaeda forces have been captured or killed. The U.S. and Russian positions on the Taliban coincided well before the September 11 attacks.51 Russia supported the Northern Alliance with some military equipment and technical assistance.52 U.S.-Russian cooperation led to the passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1267 and 1233 (see section on “Harboring of Al Qaeda, below). On the other hand, the United States has not blindly supported Russia’s apparent attempts to place a large share of the blame for the rebellion in Chechnya on the Taliban or Al Qaeda. India The interests and activities of India in Afghanistan are almost the exact reverse of those of Pakistan. India’s goal has been to deny Afghanistan from becoming a provider of “strategic depth” to Pakistan. In India’s view, Pakistan is attempting to keep some Taliban elements active because Pakistan believes the United States might some day depart the region, and Pakistan might want to have the option of installing another pro-Pakistan government in Afghanistan.53 India strongly supported the Northern Alliance in its civil war against the Pakistan-backed Taliban in the mid 1990s. India saw the Taliban’s hosting of Al Qaeda as a major threat to India itself because of Al Qaeda’s association with radical Islamic organizations in Pakistan dedicated to ending Indian control of parts of Jammu and Kashmir. Some of these organizations have committed major acts of terrorism in India. India denies Pakistan’s allegations that it is recruiting anti-Pakistan insurgents in Afghanistan through its diplomatic facilities or other means. India is currently considering co-financing, along with the Asian Development Bank, several power projects in northern Afghanistan. In other signs of cooperation, in January 2005 India, among other joint projects announced, promised to help Afghanistan’s struggling Ariana national airline and to begin India Air flights from Delhi to Kabul. 50 Whittell, Giles. “Bin Laden Link to Dagestan Rebel Fightback.” Times of London, September 6, 1999. 51 Constable, Pamela. “Russia, U.S. Converge on Warnings to Taliban.” Washington Post, June 4, 2000. 52 Risen, James. “Russians Are Back in Afghanistan, Aiding Rebels.” New York Times, July 27, 1998. 53 These views were expressed by Indian officials during a visit to India in December 2004. CRS-37 Central Asian States During Taliban rule, leaders in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan grew increasingly alarmed that Central Asian radical Islamic movements were receiving safe haven in Afghanistan. In 1996, several of these states banded together with Russia and China into a regional grouping called the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to discuss the threat emanating from Afghanistan’s Taliban regime. The organization groups China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan; Karzai attended its meeting in April 2004 signaling the possible eventual entry of Afghanistan into the grouping. Of the Central Asian states that border Afghanistan, two of them — Uzbekistan and Tajikistan — had seen themselves as particularly vulnerable to militants harbored by the Taliban. Uzbekistan saw its ally, Abdul Rashid Dostam, the Uzbek commander in northern Afghanistan, lose most of his influence in 1998.54 Uzbekistan has long asserted that the group Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), allegedly responsible for four simultaneous February 1999 bombings in Tashkent that nearly killed President Islam Karimov, is linked to Al Qaeda.55 One of its leaders, Juma Namangani, reportedly was killed while commanding Taliban/Al Qaeda forces in the battle for Mazar-e-Sharif in November 2001. Uzbekistan was highly supportive of the United States in the wake of the September 11 attacks and placed military facilities — mostly notably Karshi Khanabad air base, discussed above — at U.S. disposal for use in the combat against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Uzbek officials in Tashkent told CRS in May 2002 that the defeat of the Taliban has made them less anxious about the domestic threat from the IMU, and press reports say the IMU has been severely weakened by its war defeats and Namangani’s death. Tajikistan feared that its buffer with Afghanistan would disappear if the Taliban defeated the Northern Alliance, whose territorial base borders Tajikistan. Some of the IMU members based in Afghanistan, including Namangani, fought alongside the Islamic opposition United Tajik Opposition (UTO) during the 1994-1997 civil war in that country. Tajikistan, heavily influenced by Russia, was initially reluctant to allow the United States the use of military facilities in Tajikistan. However, on September 26, 2001, Moscow officially endorsed the use by the United States of three air bases in Tajikistan, paving the way for Tajikistan to open facilities for U.S. use, which it did formally offer in early November 2001. In July 2003, Afghanistan and Tajikistan agreed that some Russian officers would train some Afghan military officers in Tajikistan. There are concerns that much of the opium grown in Afghanistan might be flowing through Tajikistan; Lt. Gen. Barno visited Tajikistan in April 2005 to discuss this issue, in concert with the increased U.S. military role in Afghan counter-narcotics efforts. 54 55 CRS conversations with Uzbek government officials in Tashkent. April 1999. The IMU was named a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department in September 2000. CRS-38 Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan do not directly border Afghanistan. However, IMU guerrillas have transited Kyrgyzstan during past incursions into Uzbekistan.56 As noted above, since December 2001 Kyrgyzstan has hosted U.S. air operations at Manas airport. Kazakhstan had begun to diplomatically engage the Taliban over the year prior to the September 11 attacks, but it publicly supported the U.S. war effort against the Taliban. Kazakhstan signed an agreement with the United States in July 2002 to allow coalition aircraft to use Kazakhstan’s airports in case of an emergency or short term need related to the ongoing war in Afghanistan. Of the Central Asian states that border Afghanistan, only Turkmenistan chose to seek close relations with the Taliban leadership when it was in power, possibly viewing engagement as a more effective means of preventing spillover of radical Islamic activity from Afghanistan. Turkmenistan’s leader, Saparmurad Niyazov, saw Taliban control as facilitating construction of a natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan. However, the September 11 events stoked Turkmenistan’s fears of the Taliban and its Al Qaeda guests and the country publicly supported the U.S.-led war. No OEF forces have been based in Turkmenistan. China China has a small border with a sliver of Afghanistan known as the “Wakhan corridor” (see map) and had become increasingly concerned about the potential for Al Qaeda to promote Islamic fundamentalism among Muslims (Uighurs) in northwestern China. A number of Uighurs fought in Taliban and Al Qaeda ranks in the U.S.-led war, according to U.S. military officials. China expressed its concern through active membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, as noted above. In December 2000, sensing China’s increasing concern about Taliban policies, a Chinese official delegation met with Mullah Umar. Although it has long been concerned about the threat from the Taliban and bin Laden, China did not, at first, enthusiastically support U.S. military action against the Taliban. Many experts believe this is because China, as a result of strategic considerations, was wary of a U.S. military buildup nearby. In addition, China has been an ally of Pakistan, in part to balance out India, a rival of China. Pakistan’s cooperation with OEF appeared to allay China’s opposition to U.S. military action. Saudi Arabia During the Soviet occupation, Saudi Arabia channeled hundreds of millions of dollars to the Afghan resistance, primarily the Hikmatyar and Sayyaf factions. Saudi Arabia, which itself practices the strict Wahhabi brand of Islam practiced by the Taliban, was one of three countries to formally recognize the Taliban government. The Taliban initially served Saudi Arabia as a potential counter to Iran, with which Saudi Arabia has been at odds since Iran’s 1979 revolution, but Iranian-Saudi relations improved dramatically beginning in 1997 and balancing Iranian power ebbed as a factor in Saudi policy toward Afghanistan. 56 Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1999, pp. 14, 92. CRS-39 Drawing on its intelligence ties to Afghanistan during the anti-Soviet war, Saudi Arabia worked with Taliban leaders to persuade them to suppress anti-Saudi activities by Al Qaeda. Saudi Arabia apparently believed that Al Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan drew Saudi Islamic radicals away from Saudi Arabia itself and thereby reduced their opportunity to destabilize the Saudi regime. Some press reports indicate that, in late 1998, Saudi and Taliban leaders discussed, but did not agree on, a plan for a panel of Saudi and Afghan Islamic scholars to decide bin Laden’s fate. Other reports, however, say that Saudi Arabia refused an offer from Sudan in 1996 to extradite bin Laden to his homeland on the grounds that he could become a rallying point for opposition to the regime. In March 2000 and again in May 2000, the Saudi-based Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) sponsored indirect peace talks in Saudi Arabia between the warring factions. According to U.S. officials, Saudi Arabia generally cooperated with the U.S. war effort. It broke diplomatic relations with the Taliban in late September 2001 and quietly permitted the United States to use a Saudi base for command of U.S. air operations over Afghanistan, but it did not permit U.S. aircraft to launch strikes in Afghanistan from Saudi bases. The Saudi position has generally been to allow the United States the use of its facilities as long as doing so is not publicized. Residual Issues from Past Conflicts A few issues remain unresolved from Afghanistan’s many years of conflict. Among them are the “Stinger” anti-aircraft missiles provided to the mujahedin during the Soviet occupation, and the elimination of land mines. Stinger Retrieval. Beginning in late 1985 and following an internal debate, the Reagan Administration provided “hundreds” of man-portable “Stinger” antiaircraft missiles to the mujahedin for use against Soviet combat helicopters and aircraft. Prior to the U.S.-led war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, common estimates suggested that 200-300 Stingers remained at large in Afghanistan out of about 2,000 provided during the war against the Soviet Union, although more recent estimates put the number below 100.57 The Stinger issue resurfaced in conjunction with 2001 U.S. war effort, when U.S. pilots reported that the Taliban fired some Stingers at U.S. aircraft during the war. No hits were reported. Any Stingers that survived the anti-Taliban war were controlled by Afghans now allied to the United States and presumably posed less of a threat. However, there are continued concerns that remaining Stingers could be sold to terrorists for use against civilian airliners. In February 2002, the Afghan government found and returned to the United States “dozens” of Stingers.58 In late January 2005, the Afghan intelligence service began a new push to buy remaining Stingers back, at a reported cost of $150,000 each.59 57 Saleem, Farrukh. “Where Are the Missing Stinger Missiles? Pakistan,” Friday Times. August 17-23, 2001. 58 Fullerton, John. “Afghan Authorities Hand in Stinger Missiles to U.S.” Reuters, February 4, 2002. 59 “Afghanistan Report,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. February 4, 2005. CRS-40 The practical difficulties of retrieving the weapons had caused this issue to fade from the U.S. agenda for Afghanistan during the 1990s. In 1992, after the fall of the Russian-backed government of Najibullah, the United States reportedly spent about $10 million to buy the Stingers back, at a premium, from individual mujahedin commanders. The New York Times reported on July 24, 1993, that the buy back effort failed because the United States was competing with other buyers, including Iran and North Korea, and that the CIA would spend about $55 million in FY1994 in a renewed Stinger buy-back effort. On March 7, 1994, the Washington Post reported that the CIA had recovered only a fraction of the at-large Stingers. Many observers speculate that the CIA program retrieved perhaps 50 or 100 of them. The lingering danger of these weapons has become apparent on several occasions. Iran bought 16 of the missiles in 1987 and fired one against U.S. helicopters; some reportedly were transferred to Lebanese Hizballah, according to press reports in January 2002. India claimed that it was a Stinger, supplied to Islamic rebels in Kashmir probably by sympathizers in Afghanistan, that shot down an Indian helicopter over Kashmir in May 1999.60 It was not the Stinger but Soviet-made SA-7 “Strella” man-portable launchers that were fired, allegedly by Al Qaeda, against a U.S. military aircraft in Saudi Arabia in June 2002 and against an Israeli passenger aircraft in Kenya on November 30, 2002. Both missed their targets. SA-7s have been discovered in Afghanistan by U.S.-led forces, most recently in December 2002. Mine Eradication. Land mines laid during the Soviet occupation constitute one of the principal dangers to the Afghan people. The United Nations estimates that 5 -7 million mines remain scattered throughout the country, although some estimates by outside organizations are significantly lower. An estimated 400,000 Afghans have been killed or wounded by land mines. U.N. teams have succeeded in destroying one million mines and are now focusing on de-mining priority-use, residential and commercial property, including land surrounding Kabul. As shown in the U.S. aid table for FY1999-FY2002, the U.S. de-mining program was providing about $3 million per year for Afghanistan, and the amount escalated to about $7 million in the post-Taliban period. Most of the funds went to HALO Trust, a British organization, and the U.N. Mine Action Program for Afghanistan. U.S. and International Aid to Afghanistan The war-ravaged Afghan economy and society deteriorated further under Taliban rule. In addition to 3.6 million Afghan refugees at the start of the U.S.-led war,61 another 500,000 Afghans were displaced internally even before U.S. military action began, according to Secretary General Annan’s April 19, 2001, report on Afghanistan. Many of the displaced persons had fled the effects of a major drought that affected the 85% of the population that directly depends on agriculture. The conflicts in Afghanistan, including the war against the Soviet Union, left about 2 60 61 “U.S.-Made Stinger Missiles — Mobile and Lethal.” Reuters, May 28, 1999. About 1.5 million Afghan refugees were in Iran; 2 million in Pakistan; 20,000 in Russia; 17,000 in India, and 9,000 in the Central Asian states. CRS-41 million dead, 700,000 widows and orphans and about one million Afghan children who were born and raised in refugee camps outside Afghanistan. However, over 3 million Afghan refugees have returned since January 2002. A variety of U.N. agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) serve as the vehicles for international assistance to Afghanistan. The U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) supervises Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan and Afghan repatriation. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan During the 1990s, the United States became the largest single provider of assistance to the Afghan people, even during Taliban rule. No U.S. aid went directly to the Taliban government; monies were provided through recognized NGOs and relief organizations. During 1985-1994, the United States did have a cross-border aid program for Afghanistan, through which aid was distributed in Afghanistan via U.S. aid workers in Pakistan. However, citing the difficulty of administering a cross-border program, there was no USAID mission for Afghanistan from the end of FY1994 until the reopening of the U.S. Embassy in late 2001. Table 1 breaks down FY1999-FY2002 aid by program. For a history of U.S. aid to Afghanistan prior to 1999 (FY1978-FY1998), see Table 3.62 Post-Taliban/FY2002-2004. On October 4, 2001, in an effort to demonstrate that the United States had an interest in the welfare of the Afghan people and not just the defeat of the Taliban, President Bush announced that humanitarian aid to the Afghan people would total about $320 million for FY2002. After the fall of the Taliban, at a donors’ conference in Tokyo during January 20-21, 2002, the United States pledged $296 million in reconstruction aid for Afghanistan for FY2002. The amounts provided for FY2002, FY2003, and FY2004 are shown in the tables below. Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 and Amendments. An authorization bill, S. 2712, the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (P.L. 107327, December 4, 2002), as amended, authorized the following: ! ! ! ! ! 62 $60 million in total counter-narcotics assistance ($15 million per year for FY2003-FY2006); $30 million in assistance for political development, including national, regional, and local elections ($10 million per year for FY2003-FY2005); $80 million total to benefit women and for Afghan human rights oversight ($15 million per year for FY2003-FY2006 for the Afghan Ministry of Women’s Affairs, and $5 million per year for FY20032006 to the National Human Rights Commission of Afghanistan); $1.7 billion in humanitarian and development aid ($425 million per year for FY2003-FY2006); $300 million for an Enterprise Fund; In some cases, aid figures are subject to variation depending on how that aid is measured. The figures cited might not exactly match figures in appropriated legislation; in some, funds were added to specified accounts from monies in the September 11-related Emergency Response Fund. CRS-42 ! ! $550 million in draw-downs of defense articles and services for Afghanistan and regional militaries. (The original law provided for $300 million in drawdowns. That was increased to $450 million by P.L. 108-106, an FY2004 supplemental appropriations); and $1 billion ($500 million per year for FY2003-FY2004) to expand ISAF if such an expansion takes place. The total authorization, for all categories for all years, is over $3.7 billion. For the most part, the humanitarian, counter-narcotics, and governance assistance targets authorized by the act have been met or exceeded by successive appropriations. However, no Enterprise Funds have been appropriated, and ISAF expansion has been funded by contributing nations, not U.S. appropriations. A bill, S. 2845 (P.L. 108-458, signed December 17, 2004), the version of legislation to implement the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission, contains a subtitle called “The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act Amendments of 2004.” The subtitle mandates the appointment of a U.S. coordinator of policy on Afghanistan and contains provisions requiring additional Administration reports to Congress on progress in reconstruction: (1) a report on long-term U.S. strategy and progress of reconstruction, an amendment to the report required in the original version of this law; (2) a report on how U.S. assistance is being used; (3) a report on U.S. efforts to persuade other countries to participate in Afghan peacekeeping; and (4) a joint State and Defense Department report on U.S. counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan. The law also contains several “sense of Congress” provisions recommending more rapid DDR activities; expansion of ISAF; and new initiatives to combat narcotics trafficking. The law does not specify dollar amounts for U.S. aid for FY2005 and FY2006, authorizing “such sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal years 2005 and 2006.” FY2006 Regular Request. As noted in the sections above, on February 14, 2005, the Administration requested additional funds for Afghanistan for FY2005. Aside from the appropriation for U.S. military operations, the total appropriated in P.L. 109-13 is $3.352 billion, earmarked as follows: ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! $1.285 billion for DOD to equip and train Afghan security forces; $242 million for DOD counter-narcotics operations in Afghanistan; $1.086 billion in ESF for reconstruction and democracy and governance; $260 million for INL counter-narcotics operations in Afghanistan; $360 million for INL police training; $17.1 million for Karzai protection (NADR funds); $34 million in Commanders Emergency Response (CERP) funds, mostly for counter-narcotics activity; $7.7 million for DEA operations in Afghanistan; and $60 million for operations of U.S. Embassy Kabul. The regular request for FY2006 requests a total of $920 million, as follows: $43 million for child survival and health; $430 million to train and equip the ANA; $260 million for State Department police training and counter-narcotics; $18 million for CRS-43 Karzai protection; $18 million for peacekeeping operations; and $150 million for “other.” Additional Forms of U.S. Assistance. In addition to providing U.S. foreign assistance, since 2002 the U.S. Treasury Department (Office of Foreign Assets Control, OFAC) unblocked over $145 million in assets of Afghan government-owned banking entities that were frozen under U.S. sanctions imposed on the Taliban in 1999 (see below). These funds have been used by the new government for currency stabilization, not for recurring costs of the interim government. Most of the funds consisted of gold that is held in Afghanistan’s name in the United States to back up Afghanistan’s currency. Together with its allies, over $350 million in frozen funds have been released to the new government. In January 2002, the United States agreed to provide $50 million in credit for U.S. investment in Afghanistan, provided by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). On March 7, 2003, OPIC pledged an additional $50 million, bringing the total line of credit to $100 million. The United States also has successfully pressed the International Air Transport Association to pay Afghanistan $20 million in overflight fees that were withheld because of U.N. sanctions on the Taliban. In April 2002, OFAC unblocked $17 million in privately-owned Afghan assets. World Bank/Asian Development Bank. In May 2002, the World Bank reopened its office in Afghanistan after twenty years. On March 12, 2003, it announced a $108 million loan to Afghanistan, the first since 1979. In August 2003, the World Bank agreed to lend Afghanistan an additional $30 million to rehabilitate the telecommunications system, and $30 million for road and drainage rehabilitation in Kabul. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has been playing a major role in Afghanistan and has pledged $800 million in loans and grants and $200 million in project insurance for Afghanistan. Since December 2002, the bank has loaned Afghanistan $372 million of road reconstruction, fiscal management and governance, and agricultural development. The Bank has also granted Afghanistan about $90 million for power projects, agriculture reform, roads, and rehabilitation of the energy sector. One of its projects in Afghanistan was funding the paving of a road from Qandahar to the border with Pakistan. In December 2004, the Bank approved an additional loan of $80 million to restore and improve key sections of the road system. International Reconstruction Pledges. Afghan leaders say that Afghanistan needs $27.5 billion for reconstruction for 2002-2010. At a 2002 Tokyo donors’ conference, total pledges for reconstruction amounted to $2 billion for 2002 and $4.5 billion over five years, as follows: European Union, $495 million in 2002; Japan, $500 million over 30 months; Germany, $362 million over four years; Saudi Arabia, $220 million over three years; Iran, $560 million over five years; Pakistan, $100 million over five years; India, a $100 million line of credit; South Korea, $45 million over 30 months; and United Kingdom, $86 million in 2002. In March 2003, the EU announced an additional $410 million donation for 2003-2004. This is in addition to its contribution, noted above, for 2002. In April 2004 international donors meeting in Berlin pledged $8.2 billion for Afghanistan for 2004-2006, of which about $4.5 billion was to be provided in 2004. CRS-44 The United States committed about $2.9 for the whole period.63 Other pledges for 2004-2006 included European Union ($2.2 billion); Canada (200 million); Japan ($400 million); World Bank loans ($900 million); Asia Development Bank loans ($560 million); India ($225 million); and Iran ($155 million). Another donors’ meeting was held in Kabul on April 4, 2005, primarily to reaffirm and structure previous pledges rather than attract new promises of aid. At the meeting, Afghan leaders insisted that international aid be channeled through the Afghan government, curbing the prerogatives of NGOs in assisting the Afghan people. This call reflected the view of many Afghan ministers, including Finance Minister Anwar al-Ahady, that the NGOs have become a virtual “parallel government” of Afghanistan and are not accountable to the Afghan government. No firm commitments were made, although the United States and Britain expressed receptivity to the request. Domestically Generated Funds. Obtaining control over revenues has been a key U.S. and Kabul goal. In May 2003, Karzai insisted that regional governors remit some of their privately collected customs revenue to the central government. Twelve regional leaders did so, subsequently giving $100 million to Kabul. Kabul raised internally about $210 million of its $600 million budget for the fiscal year ended March 2004, and funds are increasingly being collected and handled by the central government. Karzai has sought to reassure international donors by establishing a transparent budget and planning process. Promoting Long-Term Economic Development. In an effort to find a long-term solution to Afghanistan’s acute humanitarian problems, the United States has tried to promote major development projects as a means of improving Afghan living standards and political stability over the long term. During 1996-98, the Clinton Administration supported proposed natural gas and oil pipelines through western Afghanistan as an incentive for the warring factions to cooperate. One proposal by a consortium led by Los Angeles-based Unocal Corporation64 was for a Central Asia Oil Pipeline (CAOP) that would originate at the TurkmenistanUzbekistan border and extend through the western region of Afghanistan to Pakistan. A $2.5 billion Central Asia Gas Pipeline (CentGas) would originate in southern Turkmenistan and pass through Afghanistan to Pakistan, with possible extensions into India. The deterioration in U.S.-Taliban relations after 1998 largely ended hopes for the pipeline projects while the Taliban was in power. Immediately after the August 20,1998 U.S. strikes on bin Laden’s bases in Afghanistan, Unocal suspended all its Afghan pipeline-related activities, including a U.S.-based training program for Afghans who were expected to work on the project. With few prospects of improved 63 “Afghanistan’s Top Donors to Pledge Nine Billion Dollars — Report.” Agence France Presse, March 11, 2004. 64 Other participants in the Unocal consortium include Delta of Saudi Arabia, Hyundai of South Korea, Crescent Steel of Pakistan, Itochu Corporation and INPEX of Japan, and the government of Turkmenistan. Some accounts say Russia’s Gazprom would probably receive a stake in the project. Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Moscow), October 30, 1997, p. 3. CRS-45 U.S. relations with Taliban, Unocal withdrew from its consortium in December 1998. Saudi Delta Oil was made interim project leader, although Delta lacked the financing and technology to make the consortium viable. The rival consortium led by Bridas of Argentina continued to try to win the project. Prospects for the project have improved in the post-Taliban period. In a summit meeting in late May 2002 between the leaders of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, the three countries agreed to revive the gas pipeline project. Sponsors of the project held an inaugural meeting on July 9, 2002 in Turkmenistan, signing a series of preliminary agreements. They recommitted to it on March 1, 2005, although financing for the project is unclear. Some U.S. officials view this project as a superior alternative to a proposed gas pipeline from Iran to India, transiting Pakistan. Trade and Investment Framework Agreement and WTO Membership. The United States is trying to build on Afghanistan’s post-war economic rebound. The Afghan economy grew 30% in 2002, 25% in 2003, and it is expected to grow 20% in 2004, according to Karzai. Following a meeting with Karzai on June 15, 2004, President Bush announced the United States and Afghanistan would negotiate a bilateral trade and investment framework agreement (TIFA). These agreements are generally seen as a prelude to a broader but more complex bilateral free trade agreement. On December 13, 2004, the 148 countries of the World Trade Organization voted to start membership talks with Afghanistan. Lifting of U.S. and International Sanctions. Shoring up a post-Taliban government of Afghanistan with financial and other assistance required waivers of restrictions or the permanent modification of U.S. and U.N. sanctions previously imposed on Afghanistan. Virtually all U.S. and international sanctions on Afghanistan have now been lifted. ! On May 2, 1980, Afghanistan was deleted from the list of designated beneficiary countries under the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), denying Afghanistan’s exports duty free treatment, by Executive Order 12204 (45 F.R. 20740). This was done under the authority of Section 504 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended [P.L. 93-618; 19 U.S.C. § 2464]. On January 10, 2003, the President signed a proclamation making Afghanistan a beneficiary of GSP, eliminating U.S. tariffs on 5,700 Afghan products. ! On June 3, 1980, as part of the sanctions against the Soviet Union for the invasion of Afghanistan, the United States imposed controls on exports to Afghanistan of agricultural products, oil and gas exploration and production equipment, and phosphates. This was implemented at 15 C.F.R. Part 373 et seq (45 F.R. 37415) under the authority of Sections 5 and 6 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 [P.L. 96-72; 50 U.S.C. app. 2404, app. 2405]. On April 24, 1981, these sanctions were modified to terminate controls on U.S. exports to Afghanistan of agricultural products and phosphates. ! In mid-1992, the George H.W. Bush Administration determined that Afghanistan no longer had a “Soviet-controlled government.” This CRS-46 opened Afghanistan to the use of U.S. funds made available for the U.S. share of U.N. organizations that provide assistance to Afghanistan. ! On October 7, 1992, President George H.W. Bush issued Presidential Determination 93-3 that Afghanistan is no longer a Marxist-Leninist country. That designation had prohibited Afghanistan from receiving Export-Import Bank guarantees, insurance, or credits for purchases under Sec. 8 of the 1986 ExportImport Bank Act, which amended Section 2(b)(2) of the ExportImport Bank Act of 1945 (P.L. 79-173, 12 U.S.C. § 635). However, President George H.W. Bush’s determination was not implemented before he left office. ! President George H.W. Bush’s October 7, 1992 determination (933) also found that assistance to Afghanistan under Section 620D of the Foreign Assistance Act is in the national interest of the United States because of the change of regime in Afghanistan. The presidential determination, had it been implemented in regulations, would have waived restrictions on assistance to Afghanistan provided for in the act, as amended [P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. § 2374]; as added by Section 505 of the International Development Cooperation Act of 1979 [P.L. 96-53]. These provisions prohibit foreign assistance to Afghanistan until it apologizes for the death of U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Adolph Dubs, who was kidnapped in Kabul in 1979 and killed when Afghan police stormed the hideout where he was held, unless the President determines that such assistance is in the national interest because of changed circumstances in Afghanistan. This restriction has consistently been waived since the fall of the Taliban. P.L. 108-458 (9/11 Commission recommendations) repeals this restriction outright. ! Section 552 of the Foreign Assistance Appropriations for FY1986 [P.L. 99-190] authorized the President to deny any U.S. credits or most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff status for Afghanistan. Under that law, on February 18, 1986, the height of the Soviet occupation, President Reagan had issued Presidential Proclamation 5437, suspending (MFN) tariff status for Afghanistan (51 F.R. 4287). On May 3, 2002, President Bush restored normal trade treatment to the products of Afghanistan. ! On March 31, 1993, President Clinton, on national interest grounds, waived restrictions provided for in Section 481 (h) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended [P.L. 87-195]; as amended and restated by Section 2005(a) of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 [P.L. 99-570]. The waiver was renewed in 1994. Mandatory sanctions include bilateral aid cuts and suspensions, including denial of Ex-Im Bank credits; the casting of negative U.S. votes for multilateral development bank loans; and a non-allocation of a U.S. sugar quota. Discretionary sanctions included denial of GSP; CRS-47 additional duties on country exports to the United States; and curtailment of air transportation with the United States. On February 25, 2002, President Bush waived restrictions on FY2002 aid to Afghanistan under this act. ! On June 14, 1996, Afghanistan was formally added to the list of countries prohibited from receiving exports or licenses for exports of U.S. defense articles and services. This amended the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (22 CFR Part 121 et seq.) under the authority of Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended (P.L. 90-629; 22 U.S.C. § 2778) by adding Afghanistan at Section 126.1 of 22 C.F.R. Part 126. On July 2, 2002, the State Department amended U.S. regulations (22 C.F.R. Part 126) to allow arms sales to the new Afghan government. ! In a ruling largely redundant with the one above, on May 15, 1997, the State Department designated Afghanistan under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104132), as a state that is not cooperating with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts. The designation, made primarily because of the Taliban’s harboring of bin Laden, makes Afghanistan ineligible to receive U.S. exports of items on the U.S. Munitions List. The designation was repeated every year since 1997. Afghanistan was deleted from the list of non-cooperative states when the list was reissued on May 15, 2002, thereby eliminating this sanction on Afghanistan. ! On July 4, 1999, the President declared a national emergency with respect to Taliban because of its hosting of bin Laden, and issued Executive Order 13129 that imposed sanctions. The sanctions include the blocking of Taliban assets and property in the United States, and a ban on U.S. trade with Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan. On August 10, 1999, the Administration determined that Ariana Afghan Airlines was a Taliban entity. That determination triggered a blocking of Ariana assets (about $500,000) in the United States and a ban on U.S. citizens’ flying on the airline. On January 29, 2002, the State Department issued a determination that the Taliban controls no territory within Afghanistan, thus essentially ending this trade ban. On July 2, 2002, President Bush formally revoked this executive order. ! On October 15, 1999, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1267; on December 19, 2000, it adopted U.N. Security Council Resolution 1333, imposed a number of new sanctions against the Taliban. For the provisions of these sanctions, see the section on the harboring of bin Laden. As noted, these sanctions were narrowed to penalize only Al Qaeda by virtue of the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1390 of January 17, 2002. CRS-48 Table 1. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY1999-FY2002 ($ in millions) U.S. Department of Agriculture (DOA) and USAID Food For Peace (FFP), via World Food Program(WFP) State/Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (PRM) via UNHCR and ICRC State Department/ Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) State Department/HDP (Humanitarian Demining Program) Aid to Afghan Refugees in Pakistan (through various NGOs) FY2000 FY2001 $42.0 worth of wheat (100,000 metric tons under “416(b)” program. $16.95 for Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran, and to assist their repatriation $7.0 to various NGOs to aid Afghans inside Afghanistan $68.875 for 165,000 metric tons. (60,000 tons for May 2000 drought relief) $131.0 (300,000 metric tons under P.L.480, Title II, and 416(b)) $198.12 (for food commodities) $14.03 for the same purposes $22.03 for similar purposes $136.54 (to U.N. agencies) $6.68 for drought relief and health, water, and sanitation programs $3.0 $18.934 for similar programs $113.36 (to various U.N. agencies and NGOs) $2.8 $7.0 to Halo Trust/other demining $2.615 $5.44 (2.789 for health, training Afghan females in Pakistan $6.169, of which $3.82 went to similar purposes Counter-Narcotics USAID/ Office of Transition Initiatives Dept. of Defense $5.31 for similar purposes $1.50 $0.45 (Afghan women in Pakistan) Foreign Military Financing Anti-Terrorism Economic Support Funds (E.S.F) Peacekeeping Totals FY2002 (Final) FY1999 $76.6 $113.2 $182.6 $63.0 $24.35 for broadcasting/ media $50.9 ( 2.4 million rations) $57.0 (for Afghan national army) $36.4 $105.2 $24.0 $815.9 CRS-49 Table 2. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY2003 (in millions, same acronyms as above table) From the FY2003 Foreign Aid Appropriations (P.L. 108-7) Development/Health $90 Food Aid $47 Peacekeeping $10 Disaster Relief $94 ESF $50 Non-Proliferation, Demining, AntiTerrorism (NADR) $5 Refugee Relief $55 Military aid $21 Total from this law: $372 From the FY2003 Supplemental (P.L. 108-11) ESF $167 ($100 million for Kabul-Qandahar road; $plus 10 million for provincial reconstruction teams; and $57 million for operational support to Afghan government) Military Aid $170 (to train Afghan national army) Anti-terrorism/de-mining $28 Total from this law: $365 Total for FY2003: $737 CRS-50 Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2004 (in millions, same acronyms as previous tables) From the FY2004 Supplemental (P.L. 108-106) Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR program) $30 Support to Afghan government $70 Elections/governance $69 Roads $181 Schools/Education $95 Health Services/Clinics $49 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) $58 Private Sector/Power Generation $95 Water Projects $23 Counter-narcotics/police training (INCLE) $220 Afghan National Army (FMF) $364 Anti-Terrorism/Afghan Leadership Protection $64 Total from this law: $1,320 From the FY2004 Regular Appropriations (P.L. 108-199) Development/Health $171 Disaster Relief $35 Refugee Relief $72 Economic Aid/ESF $75 (earmarks: $2 million for reforestation; $2 million for the Afghan Judicial Reform Commission; $5 million for Afghan women; and $2 million for aid to communities and victims of U.S. military operations) Military Assistance $50 Total from this law: Total for FY2004 $403 $1,723 CRS-51 Table 4. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY2005 (In millions) From the FY2005 Regular Appropriations (P.L. 108-447 ESF to assist Afghan governing institutions $225 FMF to train and equip the ANA $400 Assistance to benefit women and girls $50 Agriculture, private sector investment, environment, primary education, reproductive health, and democracybuilding $300 Reforestation $2 Child and maternal health $6 Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission $2 Total from this law $985 From First FY2005 Supplemental (P.L. 108-287) FMF for training and equipping the ANA (and the Iraqi security forces) $500 From Second FY2005 Supplemental (P.L. 109-13) DoD funds to train and equip Afghan security forces $1,285 DoD counter-narcotics operations $242 ESF for reconstruction and democracy and governance (including alternative livelihoods) $1,086 INL counter-narcotics $260 INL Afghan police training $360 Karzi protection (NADR funds) $17.1 Commanders’ Emergency Response Program (CERP), mostly for counternarcotics $34 DEA operations in Afghanistan $7.7 Operations of U.S. Embassy Kabul $60 Total from this law Total from all FY2005 laws $3,351 $4,336 (plus ANA portion of $500 million for ANA and Iraqi forces) CRS-52 Table 5. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY1978-FY1998 1978 4.989 Econ. Supp. (ESF) — 1979 3.074 — 1980 — 1981 — — — 1982 — — 1983 — 1984 Fiscal Year Devel. Assist. P.L. 480 (Title I and II) 5.742 7.195 Other Military (Incl. Regional Refugee Aid) 0.269 0.789 Total 11.789 — 0.347 10.616 (Soviet invasion - December 1979) — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — 1985 3.369 — — — — 3.369 1986 — — 8.9 — — 8.9 1987 17.8 12.1 2.6 — — 32.5 1988 22.5 22.5 29.9 — — 74.9 1989 22.5 22.5 32.6 — — 77.6 1990 35.0 35.0 18.1 — — 88.1 1991 30.0 30.0 20.1 — — 80.1 1992 25.0 25.0 31.4 — — 81.4 1993 10.0 10.0 18.0 — 30.2 68.2 1994 3.4 2.0 9.0 — 27.9 42.3 1995 1.8 — 12.4 — 31.6 45.8 1996 — — 16.1 — 26.4 42.5 1997 — — 18.0 — 31.9* 49.9 1998 — — 3.6 — 49.14** 52.74 Source: U.S. Department of State. * Includes $3 million for demining and $1.2 million for counternarcotics. ** Includes $3.3 million in projects targeted for Afghan women and girls, $7 million in earthquake relief aid, 100,000 tons of 416B wheat worth about $15 million, $2 million for demining, and $1.54 for counternarcotics. CRS-53 Table 6. ISAF Contributing Nations (As of May 2005) NATO website: [http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan/040628-factsheet.htm] NATO Countries Non-NATO Partner Nations Belgium 600 Albania 22 Bulgaria 35 Austria 3 Canada 1,250 Azerbaijan 22 Czech Republic 17 Croatia 47 Denmark 55 Finland 82 Macedonia 20 Georgia 50 Ireland 10 85 Estonia 9 France 800 Germany 1,000 Greece 151 Sweden Hungary 140 Switzerland 4 Iceland 14 New Zealand 6 Italy 500 Latvia 11 Lithuania 10 Luxemburg 10 Netherlands 400 Norway 250 Poland 20 Portugal 47 Romania 73 Slovakia 17 Slovenia 22 Spain 500 Turkey 1,800 Britain 538 United States 194 CRS-54 Table 7. Major Factions in Afghanistan Party/Commander Taliban Leader Ideology/ Ethnicity Mullah ultra-orthodox (Islamic cleric) Islamic, Muhammad Umar Pashtun Islamic Society (dominant Burhannudin moderate party in the “Northern Rabbani (political Islamic, Alliance”) leader), mostly Tajik Muhammad Fahim (military leaders) Ismail Khan (part of Islamic Society/Northern Alliance) Ismail Khan Tajik Eastern Shura (Council) No clear leader, moderate after death of Islamic, Abdul Qadir; son Pashtun succeeded him as Jalalabad governor Power Base Small opposition groups, mostly in the south and east. No official presence in government. Much of northern and western Afghanistan, including Kabul. Herat Province and environs; Khan removed as Herat governor in September 2004 Jalalabad and environs; Qadir was vice president. National Islamic Abdul Rashid Movement of Afghanistan Dostam secular, Uzbek Mazar-e-Sharif, Shebergan, and environs. Hizb-e-Wahdat Karim Khalili (Vice President) Shiite, Hazara tribes Bamiyan province. Pashtun Leaders Various leaders; government led by Karzai. Gul Agha Shirzai reappointed Qandahar governor (Dec. 04) mostly conservative Islamic, Pashtun Southern, eastern Afghanistan, including Qandahar, Gardez, Ghazni, Khost, Tarin Kowt, Spin Buldak. Hizb-e-Islam Gulbuddin (HIG) Mujahedin party leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar orthodox Islamic, Pashtun Small groups around Jalalabad and in the southeast. Allied with Taliban. Islamic Union Abd-I-Rab Rasul Sayyaf orthodox Islamic, Pashtun No clear regional base CRS-55 Figure 1. Map of Afghanistan