Order Code RS22097
Updated June 9, 2005
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Balkan Cooperation on War Crimes Issues:
2005 Update
Julie Kim
Specialist in International Relations
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
A combination of intensified international pressure and deadlines associated with
Euro-Atlantic integration processes has prompted a spate of transfers of persons indicted
for war crimes to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
in The Hague from late 2004 through early 2005. Full cooperation with The Hague
tribunal has been established as a key prerequisite to further progress toward a shared
long-term goal for the western Balkan countries: closer association with and eventual
membership in the European Union (EU) and NATO. The Euro-integration efforts of
Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia and Montenegro have stalled (to varying
degrees) over ICTY cooperation, although recent substantial progress in turning over
indicted persons has been achieved. Three top-ranking war crimes suspects remain at
large: wartime Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and Gen. Ratko Mladic, and
former Croatian Gen. Ante Gotovina. This report will be updated as events warrant. See
also CRS Report RS21686, Conditions on U.S. Aid to Serbia.
Introduction and U.S. Concerns
Since late 2004, a steady stream of individuals charged with Balkan war crimes has
turned up at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The
Hague. Factors contributing to this recent inflow include intensified international
pressure and deadlines associated with the European integration process. The European
Union (EU) and NATO have explicitly conditioned closer association with the western
Balkan states (mainly Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and also Croatia)
on their respective levels of cooperation with ICTY. To varying degrees, conditionality
policy has held up Euro-integration processes in the western Balkans that would otherwise
likely have gone forward.
Most of the recent transfers of indicted persons have come from Serbia or the
Republika Srpska (RS) entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina, both parties with the
greatest number of suspects and the weakest cumulative record of cooperation with ICTY.
Other prominent surrenders include the former Prime Minister of Kosovo’s governing
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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institutions and the former Bosnian Muslim (or Bosniak) Army chief. However, the fate
of top-ranking remaining war crimes suspects, some of whom have eluded capture for a
decade, remains uncertain.
Meanwhile, ICTY operations are beginning to wind down after a dozen years in
operation. ICTY Chief Prosecutor Carla del Ponte prepared the Tribunal’s final
indictments in late 2004 and the last war crimes indictments were unsealed and made
public in March 2005. More than 60 accused are currently in ICTY’s custody. ICTY
planned to conclude all initial trials by 2008 and all court proceedings by 2010. However,
due to a variety of factors, the President of ICTY recently extended his estimate for a
completion date by at least one year.1
U.S. Administration and congressional interest in levels of Balkan cooperation with
the Tribunal stems from longstanding U.S. support for ICTY and insistence that the top-
ranking indicted persons be turned over to The Hague. The United States supports the
region’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations, including closer ties to and possible membership in
NATO. In legislation, Congress has annually conditioned U.S. assistance to Serbia on
ICTY cooperation, including the extradition of Gen. Mladic, and a presidential waiver.
The Bush Administration has also supported the Tribunal’s original “completion strategy”
to conclude activities by 2010.
Chronology of Recent Transfers2
04/25/2005 — Despite earlier statements that he would not voluntarily surrender, Gen. Nebojsa
Pavkovic, former Serbian Army chief of staff, arrived at The Hague. He is the third Serbian
general under the October 2003 indictment against four generals to come into custody. He is
charged with alleged crimes relating to Serbian military and police operations in Kosovo in 1998-
1999.
04/14/2005 — Former Bosnian Serb officer Vujadin Popovic surrendered to The Hague. He is
charged with genocide and war crimes related to the 1995 Bosnian Serb attacks on Srebrenica.
04/08/2005 — Former Bosnian Serb commander Milorad Trbic arrived at The Hague and is
charged in the same indictment as Vinko Pandurevic (see 03/23).
04/04/2005 — Former Serbian special police Gen. Sreten Lukic was transferred to The Hague
from a Belgrade hospital where he had undergone vascular surgery. Lukic is charged with crimes
allegedly committed by forces under his command in Kosovo in 1999. The Serbian government
denied reports that it had forced Lukic’s extradition.
04/01/2005 — Former Bosnian Serb special police commander Ljubomir Borovcanin arrived at
The Hague from Belgrade. His indictment from 2002 charges him with individual and command
responsibility for crimes relating to the 1995 Bosnian Serb offensive in eastern Bosnia.
03/24/2005 — Former Macedonian Interior Minister Ljube Boskovski was transferred to The
Hague from Croatia, where he had been incarcerated on charges unrelated to the ICTY
1 Assessment of the ICTY President and Prosecutor to the U.N. Security Council, May 25, 2005,
S/2005/343.
2 Details of the indictments can be found at the ICTY home page, [http://www.un.org/icty].

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indictment. His ICTY indictment cites charges relating to the unlawful killing of ethnic Albanian
civilians in northern Macedonia during the 2001 conflict.
03/23/2005 — Former Bosnian Serb Gen. Vinko Pandurevic was transferred to The Hague. Gen.
Pandurevic served as a brigade commander of the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) and is charged with
genocide and crimes against humanity relates to the 1995 massacre in Srebrenica.
03/17/2005 — Former Bosnian Serb Chief of Security Drago Nikolic arrived at The Hague.
Nikolic is charged with genocide and crimes against humanity for his alleged individual criminal
role in the 1995 Srebrenica assault.
03/16/2005 — Former Macedonian police officer Johan Tarculovski arrived at The Hague. Along
with former Macedonian Interior Minister Ljube Boskovski, Tarculovski is charged with
unlawful attacks on civilians during the 2001 conflict.
03/14/2005 — Former Bosnian Serb Chief of Police Gojko Jankovic was transferred to The
Hague from Banja Luka.3 He is charged with war crimes allegedly committed in the 1992 attack
on the Bosnian town of Foca.
03/11/2005 — Former Bosnian Serb Interior Minister (MUP) Mico Stanisic was transferred to
The Hague. He is charged with war crimes and crimes against humanity relating to his role in
commanding and directing Bosnian Serb police actions against non-Serb populations in Bosnia
during 1992.
03/09/2005 — Ramush Haradinaj arrived at The Hague after resigning from his position as
Kosovo Prime Minister the previous day. The indictment against former Kosovo Liberation Army
commander Haradinaj and two of his subordinates (Lahi Brahimaj and Idriz Balaj, who turned
themselves in with Haradinaj) cites charges of war crimes perpetrated against Serbs and others
in Kosovo in 1998. Haradinaj was granted provisional release, with conditions, on June 6.
03/07/2005 — Gen. Momcilo Perisic, former Chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army,
surrendered to The Hague. He is charged with 13 counts of crimes allegedly committed in
Sarajevo, Zagreb, and Srebrenica.
02/28/2005 — Gen. Radivoj Miletic, former Bosnian Serb army chief of operations, arrived at
The Hague after surrendering to Serbian government authorities. His indictment, shared with
Milan Gvero (below), relates to war crimes allegedly committed in Srebrenica in 1995.
02/28/2005 — Gen. Rasim Delic, former Chief of the General Staff of the Bosnian Army,
departed Sarajevo for The Hague, and is charged on the basis of his command authority with four
counts of violating customs of war in 1993 and 1995. Delic was granted provisional release on
May 6.
02/24/2005 — Milan Gvero, a former VRS commander, arrived at The Hague from Belgrade.
He is charged with individual criminal responsibility for crimes allegedly committed in the
Srebrenica region in 1995.
02/03/2005 — Gen. Vladimir Lazarevic, former commander of the Yugoslav Army Pristina
Corps, arrived at The Hague. Lazarevic is one of the four Yugoslav Army generals indicted by
3 Jankovic was reportedly one of several Serbian indictees who had sought and received refuge
in Russia for years. See Ed Vulliamy, “Russians Accused of Sheltering War Crimes Suspects,”
The Guardian (U.K.), Mar. 15, 2005.

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ICTY in October 2003 for alleged crimes committed in Kosovo. (ICTY provisionally released
Lazarevic and three other suspects on April 15.)
Remaining Suspects at Large
By June 2005, ten known indicted suspects remained at large. For most concerned
parties, the short-list comprises the top three suspects: former Bosnian Serb leaders
Radovan Karadzic and Gen. Ratko Mladic; and former Croatian Gen. Ante Gotovina.
The indictments against Karadzic and Mladic charge the former Bosnian Serb leaders
with genocide, crimes against humanity, and violations of the laws or customs of war as
part of the Bosnian Serb campaign in 1991 to 1995 to control territory and drive out non-
Serb populations. Gotovina is charged with crimes against humanity and violations of the
laws or customs of war in relation to the 1995 Croatian “Storm” offensive against
Croatian Serb-held territory in the Krajina region.
Authorities in Belgrade, Sarajevo, and Zagreb insist they do not know the
whereabouts of these suspects; ICTY and other international officials believe that local
governments can do more than they have to bring about their arrest and capture, especially
by going after their support networks. According to ICTY Chief Prosecutor del Ponte,
Gotovina, Mladic, and Karadzic remain “within reach” of authorities in Croatia, Serbia,
and the RS. She also recently asserted that Belgrade’s policy of voluntary surrenders may
have reached its limits. In April, Serbia and Montenegro Foreign Minister Draskovic
stated that the security services knew where Mladic was. A subsequent Serbian news
report quoted a former security source claiming that Mladic had been sheltered by the
Serbian military in 2004.4
Most of the remaining seven Serb or Bosnian Serb fugitives are thought to be in
Serbia and Montenegro or in the RS.
Policy Implications
By early 2005, the implications of the established international conditionality policy
had become more pronounced, as international actors such as the European Union, United
States, and Office of the High Representative in Bosnia wielded “carrot and stick”
instruments more explicitly. Securing the region in a stable and prosperous Euro-Atlantic
zone, as opposed to an area of incomplete postwar transition susceptible to destabilizing
trends or criminal elements, remains a shared goal. On the incentive side, officials have
expressed continued support for the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of the western Balkan states
and a strong interest in moving forward in these integration processes, some of which
have lagged primarily over ICTY cooperation. At the same time, recent actions have
made clear that these processes cannot be completed until the Balkan states adhere to
standards on international commitments and the rule of law, especially with regard to
meeting obligations on ICTY cooperation and overcoming the legacy of the wartime
years. Still lagging behind other nations in the integration process, the western Balkan
states have made closer ties to NATO and especially the EU a key strategic priority.
4 “Serbian Authorities Know Where Mladic Is Hiding,” Financial Times, Apr. 5, 2005;
Associated Press, Apr. 11, 2005.

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Examples of the carrot and stick approach include the EU’s recent decisions to
approve opening association talks with Serbia, on the one hand, while postponing actual
membership talks with Croatia, on the other hand. In 2004, NATO twice decided not to
invite Bosnia and Serbia-Montenegro to join Partnership for Peace, and High
Representative Paddy Ashdown subsequently took measures to remove obstructionist
Bosnian Serb leaders from office. Another related example was the U.S. decision in
January to withhold a portion of FY2005 bilateral assistance to Serbia because of
Belgrade’s poor cooperation with ICTY, and to restore it in June in recognition of recent
progress.
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Like Serbia and Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina
currently seeks membership in NATO’s Partnership for Peace program and a Stabilization
and Association Agreement (SAA) with the European Union. The EU concluded an SAA
Feasibility Study for Bosnia in November 2003 and identified 16 priority reform areas
that have become a blueprint for Bosnia’s ongoing reform process. At the same time,
limited cooperation with ICTY, especially by the Republika Srpska (RS), has caused a
slowdown in the association process, and the SAA process has stalled. Until January
2005, RS authorities had not turned over a single indicted suspect. The ICTY issue has
also provided High Representative Paddy Ashdown justification for exercising his
authority to remove obstructionist officials, freeze assets, and even re-shape governing
institutions especially in the defense and security sectors, segments of which were thought
to support war crimes fugitives.5 The status of Radovan Karadzic will remain a key
challenge for Bosnia’s authorities as well as for the EU military force and residual NATO
presence in Bosnia, whose mandates include apprehending persons indicted for war
crimes.
Croatia. With the exception of one major issue, Croatia’s largely positive record
of cooperation with ICTY — as well as considerable advancement in economic and
institutional reforms — have enabled it to progress steadily in the EU integration process.
Croatia signed an EU Stabilization and Association Agreement in October 2001. Croatia
formally applied for EU membership in February 2003, and in June 2004, the EU named
Croatia a candidate country for membership. In December 2004, the EU agreed to open
accession negotiations with Croatia in March 2005 provided that Croatia continued to
cooperate with ICTY. However, the unresolved status of Gen. Ante Gotovina, who
disappeared in June 2001 and represents the final obstacle to full cooperation with ICTY,
has had a negative impact on this timetable.
On March 16, 2005, European Union members decided to postpone indefinitely the
opening of accession negotiations with Croatia. The EU created a special task force to
continue to assess Croatia’s ICTY cooperation and possibly re-examine the EU position
on Croatia in coming months, although some further resolution of the Gotovina situation
will likely be required before membership talks can begin.6 Meanwhile, the EU’s
5 Beyond the issue of extradition, a recent achievement in Bosnia was the inauguration in March
2005 of the War Crimes Chamber of the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is
expected eventually to take over for ICTY prosecution of war crimes in Bosnia.
6 In May 2005, ICTY Prosecutor del Ponte reported no further progress in Croatia’s efforts to
locate, arrest, and transfer Gen. Gotovina, and questioned Zagreb’s willingness to do so.
(continued...)

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decision to postpone accession talks sparked a swift popular Croatian backlash against
the EU and a renewed wave of support for Gotovina. Polls show that a majority of Croats
oppose Gotovina’s extradition, and a move by the Sanader government to capture
Gotovina could imperil political stability. Some analysts are concerned that popular
resentment over the Gotovina case could erode support for reforms essential for eventual
EU integration. Others note that Croatia is otherwise well positioned to join the EU
relatively soon.
Serbia and Montenegro. Despite Serbia’s notable achievement of extraditing
wartime Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic to The Hague in 2001, assessments of
Serbia’s level of cooperation with ICTY remained largely negative until recently.
Beginning in late 2004, the Kostunica government increased its efforts to encourage the
voluntary surrender of indicted persons, with evident results, even while it has not
abandoned its reluctance to make arrests. Politically, the Kostunica government is
constrained to some extent because it is supported in parliament by Milosevic’s Socialist
Party (SPS) and because the SPS and the nationalist Radical Party (SRS) vehemently
oppose forced indictee transfers to The Hague. However, the extent of Kostunica’s
political vulnerability over ICTY cooperation is open to debate.7
Serbia’s cooperation with ICTY has been a sore spot in its foreign relations for the
past few years. In accordance with annual foreign aid appropriations legislation, the
United States suspended portions of bilateral assistance to Serbia over war crimes issues
in FY2004 and FY2005. In 2004, Serbia and Montenegro was twice denied entry into
Partnership for Peace despite some significant progress in defense reforms. Serbia and
Montenegro lagged behind other western Balkan states in the EU’s Stabilization and
Association process, the precursor to closer EU association and targeted EU assistance.
Most observers believe that a projected EU timetable of March-April 2005 to finalize a
Feasibility Study for a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with Serbia and
Montenegro spurred Belgrade to demonstrate substantially improved ICTY cooperation
beginning in late 2004.8
In April 2005, in recognition of Serbia’s substantial progress in cooperating with
ICTY, the European Commission approved its Feasibility Study on the SAA, and the EU
Council called for stalled SAA negotiations to begin later in the year. However, the
Council reiterated that it expected ICTY cooperation to continue and all remaining
persons indicted for war crimes to be brought before the Tribunal. Similarly, in June,
visiting U.S. Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns announced in Belgrade that about
$10 million in previously suspended U.S. assistance to Serbia would be released, while
noting the expectation that Belgrade would “take the final step” and send Mladic to The
Hague.
6 (...continued)
S/2005/343, May 25, 2005.
7 The recent release of a video depicting Serbian atrocities during the 1995 Srebrenica massacre
has raised Serbian public awareness and questioning of Serbia’s role in the Bosnian war.
8 Complications arising from the state of the Serbia and Montenegro union had also presented
some obstacles to EU integration.

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