Order Code RL32294
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Haiti: Developments and U.S. Policy Since 1991
and Current Congressional Concerns
Updated June 2, 2005
Maureen Taft-Morales
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Haiti: Developments and U.S. Policy Since 1991
and Current Congressional Concerns
Summary
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide first assumed office in February 1991,
following elections that were widely heralded as the first free and fair elections in
Haiti’s then-186-year history. He was overthrown by a military coup in September
1991. For over three years, the military regime resisted international demands that
Aristide be restored to office. U.S. policy under the Administrations of Presidents
George H. W. Bush and William J. Clinton consisted of pressuring the de facto
Haitian military regime to restore constitutional democracy. Measures included
cutting off aid to the government; imposing trade embargoes; supporting OAS and
U.N. diplomatic efforts, and ultimately, a military intervention to remove the regime.
On September 18, 1994, when it learned that a U.S. military intervention had
been launched, the military regime agreed to Aristide’s return, the immediate,
unopposed entry of U.S. troops, and the resignation of the military leadership.
President Aristide returned to Haiti on October 15, 1994, under the protection of
some 20,000 U.S. troops. Following his return, Aristide, with U.S. assistance,
disbanded the army and began to train a professional, civilian Haitian National Police
force. Elections held under Aristide and his successor, Rene Preval (1996-2000),
including the one in which Aristide was reelected in 2000, were marred by alleged
irregularities, low voter turnout, and opposition boycotts. Efforts to resolve the
electoral dispute frustrated the international community for years. The OAS tried to
mediate negotiations between the Aristide government and the civic opposition, and
set up a mission in Haiti. Tension and violence in Haiti continued throughout
Aristide’s second term, culminating in his departure from office on February 29,
2004, after the opposition had repeatedly refused to negotiate a political solution and
armed groups had taken control of over half the country.
Since February 2004, Haiti faced a series of crises. An interim government was
established with Gerard LaTortue as Prime Minister. Some Members have called for
investigations into Aristide’s claim that he is still the democratically elected president
and that the United States forced him from office, a charge the Bush Administration
denies. Natural disasters have contributed to Haiti’s ongoing instability. The U.N.
Stabilization Mission in Haiti has improved security conditions, but Haiti, the poorest
nation in the Western Hemisphere, remains unstable. Some observers are concerned
that conditions will not be conducive to elections, scheduled for fall 2005.
Congressional concerns relating to Haiti include support for fostering stability
and democratic development, the cost and effectiveness of U.S. assistance, protection
of human rights and improvement of security conditions, combating narcotics
trafficking, addressing Haitian migration, and alleviating poverty. Current law
related to Haiti includes P.L. 109-13, P.L. 108-25, P.L. 108-324, and P.L. 108-447.
Legislation related to Haiti includes H.R. 257, H.R. 611, H.R. 899, H.R. 945, H.R.
946, H.R. 1213/S. 704, H.R. 1409, H.R. 1737, H.R. 2592, S. 350, S. 453, S. 600.
This report will be updated periodically. See also CRS Report RL32733, Latin
America and the Caribbean: Issues for the U.S. Congress.

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Contents
Developments and U.S. Policy Since 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Most Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Aristide’s First Term in Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Restoration of Aristide to Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Completion of Aristide’s First Term, and the Preval Administration . . . . . . 4
The 2000 Haitian Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Aristide’s Second Term in Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
OAS/CARICOM Efforts to Resolve Haitian Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Aristide’s Departure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
The Interim Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
The U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Current Congressional Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Support of Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
U.S. Assistance to Haiti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Protection of Human Rights, and Security Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Narcotics Trafficking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Haitian Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Humanitarian Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Legislation in the 109th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Legislation in the 108th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
List of Tables
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Haiti, FY1990-FY2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Table 2. DOD Incremental Costs of U.S. International Peace and
Security Commitments, FY1992-FY1996 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

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Haiti: Developments and U.S. Policy Since
1991 and Current Congressional Concerns
Developments and U.S. Policy Since 19911
Most Recent Developments
To encourage the international community to make Haiti a higher priority, the
entire 15-member U.N. Security Council traveled to Haiti April 13-16, 2005. Calling
“dramatic” poverty “the prime cause of instability in Haiti,” the delegation
emphasized the need for a long-term development strategy. The delegation said it
planned to extend the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)’s mandate
when it expires in June and would consider contributing more foreign police. It also
said that holding elections was the most pressing challenge for Haiti and the
international community.2
The Bush Administration notified Congress that it supports adding another 800
military personnel and 275 civilian police to MINUSTAH, as recommended by the
U.N. Secretary General.3 The current ceiling is 6,700 troops and 1,622 police. The
State Department also supports the U.N.’s recommendation that MINUSTAH be
restructured to enhance its ability to implement a disarmament program and provide
security for the fall elections. The Administration estimated that expansion of the
U.N. mission would cost the U.S. an additional $16-18 million in FY2006.
In April 2005, the State Department notified Congress that it wanted to permit
U.S. companies to sell the interim Haitian government $1.9 million worth of arms,
including 3,000 .38-caliber pistols, for the Haitian National Police (HNP). The
United States has had an arms embargo in place against Haiti since military forces
ousted President Aristide in 1991. The policy allows exceptions to be considered on
a case-by-case basis, however. Haiti remains on the International Trafficking in
Arms Regulations list, which prohibits licenses for exports of defense articles to
certain countries. The President may remove a country from the list by issuing new
regulations and notifying Congress, though this has not been done regarding Haiti.
1 Sources for historical background include CRS Report 95-602, Haiti: Efforts to Restore
President Aristide, 1991-1994; and CRS Report 93-931, Haiti: Background to the 1991
Overthrow of President Aristide, both by Maureen Taft-Morales.
2 Ibid, and “Haiti Security Improved, but International Assistance Remains Vital for Social,
Political Progress, Security Council Told.” U.N.Security Council Press Release SC/8363,
April 20, 2005.
3 Letter from Matthew Reynolds, Acting Asst. Sec., Legislative Affairs, Dept. Of State, to
Richard Lugar, Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, May 31, 2005.

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CRS-2
The Administration and Congress are currently concluding negotiations to address
congressional concerns in the letter of notification that will allow the current arms
sales licensing to proceed. According to State Department officials, it will contain
provisions for the continued monitoring of the weapons, to address concerns about
human rights abuses by the HNP. The Administration also said it had transferred
excess U.S. law enforcement weapons to the HNP in August 2004. Some 2,600
handguns and 21 long guns were transported to Haiti. As of April 2005, 400
weapons had been issued to a police academy graduating class, 1400 were to be
distributed to upcoming recruit classes and to HNP field units, and the rest remained
in U.S. control.
Aristide’s First Term in Office
Jean-Bertrand Aristide was first elected President in December 1990, in
elections that were widely heralded as the first free and fair elections in Haiti’s then-
186-year history. A Roman Catholic priest of the radical left, Aristide’s fiery
sermons contributed to the collapse of the Duvalier dictatorship. The most
controversial of 11 presidential candidates, Aristide won a landslide victory with
67.5% of the vote. His inauguration took place in February 1991, on the fifth
anniversary of Jean-Claude Duvalier’s flight into exile.
President Aristide was faced with some of the most serious and persistent social,
economic, and political problems in the Western Hemisphere. After eight months
in office, Aristide had received mixed reviews. He was credited with curbing crime
in the capital, reducing the number of employees in bloated state enterprises, and
taking actions to bring the military under civilian control. But some observers
questioned his government’s commitment to democracy. Opposition leaders and
others criticized him for not establishing a cooperative relationship among the
democratic elements, failing to consult the legislature in appointments as required
by the Constitution, and for manipulating the judicial system in the prosecution of
Duvalierists. His record in the area of respect for human rights was also mixed. He
was criticized for appearing to condone mob violence, but was also credited with
significantly reducing human rights violations while he was in office.
Some observers believed that during his eight-month tenure, Aristide
contributed to political polarization within Haiti by refusing to condemn violent acts
of retribution, and holding out the threat of mob violence against those who disagreed
with him. On September 30, 1991, days after a speech in which some contend
Aristide threatened the bourgeoisie for not having helped his government enough,
Aristide was overthrown by the military. Some maintained that the bourgeoisie
financially supported the coup leaders.
Most human rights monitors credit Aristide’s first administration with being the
first Haitian government to address the need to improve respect for human rights, and
the needs of the poor majority. They also asserted that progress made during his term
was undone by the military regime that followed. Most sources credit Aristide with
creating a much greater sense of security in Haiti during his first term than there had
been in years. According to the State Department human rights reports for 1991 and
1992, there were no reports of disappearances during Aristide’s eight-month term and
dozens in the months following the coup. The State Department estimated coup-

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CRS-3
related deaths at 300-500 at the time, while Amnesty International estimated them to
number over 1,500.
Restoration of Aristide to Office
The leaders of the military coup faced stronger international sanctions than did
previous coup leaders in Haiti, mainly because a democratic government had been
overthrown. For over three years, the military regime resisted international demands
that Aristide be restored to office. U.S. policy consisted of pressuring the de facto
Haitian government to restore constitutional democracy to Haiti. Under the
Administration of President George H. W. Bush, measures included cutting off
assistance to the Haitian government; imposing trade embargoes, as called for by the
Organization of American States and the United Nations; and supporting OAS and
U.N. diplomatic efforts. While some observers believed that the Administration of
President William J. Clinton intensified pressure on the Haitian regime and helped
advance negotiations to restore democracy to Haiti, others felt it did not apply enough
pressure. After the collapse of the Governors Island Accord, which called for the
military regime’s resignation and Aristide’s return by October 30, 1993,4 critics
increased pressure on the Clinton Administration to change its policy. The
Administration then took a tougher stance toward the military regime, imposing ever-
stiffer sanctions, and ultimately ordering a military intervention to remove it.
On September 18, 1994, when it learned that a U.S. military intervention had
been launched, the military regime signed an agreement with the United States
providing for Aristide’s return. It also called for the immediate, unopposed entry of
U.S. troops, a legislative amnesty for the military, and the resignation of the military
leadership. President Aristide returned to Haiti on October 15, 1994, under the
protection of some 20,000 U.S. troops. On March 31, 1995, having declared that a
“secure and stable environment” had been established, the United States transferred
responsibility for the mission to the United Nations.5
4 “The Situation of Democracy and Human Rights in Haiti, Report of the Secretary-
General,” U.N. General Assembly Security Council, A/47/975, S/26063, July 12, 1993.
5 “Remarks by President William Clinton...at U.N. Transition Ceremony,” The White
House, Office of the Press Secretary (Port-au-Prince, Haiti), Mar. 31, 1995.

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CRS-4
Completion of Aristide’s First Term,
and the Preval Administration
Following his return, President Aristide took steps to break with the pattern in
which a military-dominated police force was associated with human rights abuses.
Haiti, with U.S. assistance, demobilized the old military, established an interim
police force of selected ex-military personnel, and began to train a professional,
civilian Haitian National Police force. The level of reported violence, flight of
refugees, and alleged assassinations dropped markedly from very high levels during
the de facto military regime.
Also in 1995, President Aristide took steps to hold democratic elections, with
substantial assistance from the United States and the international community. Most
first-round parliamentary and municipal elections were held in June 1995. Although
the deadly violence which had marred past Haitian elections did not occur, election
observers alleged that there were numerous irregularities. Several re-run or runoff
elections were held from July to October. Pro-Aristide candidates won a large share
of the seats. Presidential elections were held December 17, 1995. The Haitian
constitution prevented Aristide from running for a second consecutive term. Rene
Preval, an Aristide supporter, won, with 89% of votes cast, but with a low voter
turnout of only 28%, and with many parties boycotting the election.
Preval assumed office in February 1996. He launched a program to privatize
government enterprise through joint ventures with private capital. Despite public
protests against the economic reforms, the Haitian Senate passed privatization and
administrative reform laws, allowing the release of millions of dollars in foreign aid
through the International Monetary Fund. Protests against the associated austerity
measures continued, however. One of the most vocal critics of the proposed
economic austerity program was former President Aristide. In January 1997 he
formed a new party, Lavalas Family, as a vehicle for his presidential bid in the year
2000.
The 2000 Haitian Elections
The Haitian parliamentary elections in 2000 were an attempt to resolve disputed
elections from 1997, which had triggered an electoral crisis at the time. Saying that
the 1997 elections were marred by fraud, Preval’s Prime Minister resigned. Haiti
was then without a prime minister for a year and a half, with four failed attempts to
name a new one, and no resolution to the 1997 elections controversy. In January
1999, President Preval declared that most of Parliament’s term had expired, although
elections had not been held to replace them. He then installed members of his
Cabinet and an electoral council by decree. He continued to rule by decree through
the end of his term in February 2001. In July 1999, President Rene Preval signed a
new electoral law that effectively annulled the disputed April 1997 elections and
provided for new elections.
The United States allotted $16 million over two fiscal years for elections
assistance for the 2000 Haitian vote. The aid supported the provisional electoral
council, whose tasks included the registration of almost 4 million eligible voters,

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CRS-5
issuing voter identification cards for the first time, and organizing legislative and
municipal elections for some 10,000 posts in May 2000. Every elected position in
the country was on the ballot except for president and eight Senate seats.
Many observers hoped these elections would mean that, after two years of a
deadlocked government and more than a year of President Preval ruling by decree,
a new parliament could be installed and international aid released. Instead, the
elections brought Haiti into another crisis. Both domestic and international observers
noted irregularities in the tabulation of election results for some Senate seats.
Nonetheless, the electoral council affirmed those results, which favored former
President Aristide’s Lavalas party. In September 2000, thousands of protesters
shouting anti-Aristide and anti-Lavalas slogans called for the resignation of the
Lavalas-controlled legislature. The OAS tried to broker an agreement between
Lavalas and the opposition, to no avail.
Presidential elections were held on November 26, 2000. Because the Haitian
government refused to address the earlier contested election results, the United States
and other international donors withheld election assistance and refused to send
observers, and opposition parties boycotted them. Although Aristide won the
election with a reported 91.5% of the vote, turnout was very low, with estimates
ranging from 5% to 20% of eligible voters participating.
Aristide’s Second Term in Office
As President-elect, Aristide wrote a letter to outgoing U.S. President Clinton,
promising to make several political, judicial, and economic reforms, including
correcting the problems of the May 2000 elections. According to the White House
at the time, no new promises were made by the United States.6 The Administration
of George W. Bush, which took office on January 20, 2001, accepted the reforms set
forth in the letter as necessary steps for the Aristide government to make. Aristide
took office again on February 7, 2001. At his inauguration, the United States was
represented by its ambassador.
During President Aristide’s second term, increases in political violence renewed
concerns over security and police effectiveness. In 2001, President Aristide
announced a “zero tolerance” policy toward suspected criminals. According to
various human rights reports, this announcement was followed by numerous
extrajudicial killings by the Haitian National Police and lynchings by mobs. The
government’s respect for freedom of the press continued to deteriorate. According
to the State Department’s February 2004 Human Rights Practices Report, “The
[Haitian] government’s human rights record remained poor, with political and civil
officials implicated in serious abuses.”
6 Statement by the Press Secretary, The White House, Dec. 28, 2000.

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CRS-6
OAS/CARICOM Efforts to Resolve Haitian Conflict
Efforts to resolve the electoral dispute frustrated the international community
for years. At the third Summit of the Americas in April 2001, hemispheric leaders
singled out Haiti as a country whose democratic practices were in trouble and asked
the OAS to try again to help negotiate a solution to the crisis. The OAS had been
mediating on-again off-again talks between the Aristide government and the
opposition alliance Democratic Convergence. In OAS-mediated talks in July 2001,
the Aristide government and the opposition agreed to hold new elections for local
and most parliamentary seats, but could not agree on a schedule.
Tensions and violence in Haiti increased dramatically after Aristide assumed his
second term in office. Supporters of both President Aristide’s Lavalas Family party
and the opposition coalition Convergence reportedly engaged in the cycle of violent
revenge. In January 2002, the OAS Permanent Council passed Resolution 806
establishing an OAS Mission in Haiti and calling for the Haitian government to do
all it could to ensure a climate of security and confidence necessary to hold free and
fair elections. In July 2002, the OAS released a report stating that a December 2001
attack on the National Palace was not an attempted coup, as the Aristide
Administration had claimed, and that “[T]he political opposition did not participate
in the planning or in the execution of the attack.” It also said that the government
and Lavalas party officials gave arms to militants who plundered and burned the
homes and offices of opposition members after the palace attack.7
Also in July 2002, the opposition proposed that presidential elections be re-held
as well. All the OAS member states recognized Aristide as Haiti’s legitimate head
of state, however, and the OAS Secretary General said that the November 2000
elections “have never been the subject of an OAS or Summit of the Americas
mandate,” meaning that only the disputed May 2000 parliamentary elections were
within the OAS mandate to negotiate a solution.8
In September 2002, the OAS passed Resolution 822 that tried to break the
political impasse by recognizing the government’s “constitutional electoral
prerogatives.” In other words, it removed the obstacle of having to complete
negotiations with the opposition before elections could be held. A consensus
resolution, negotiated by member states and voted for by Haiti, stated that legislative
and local elections were to be held in 2003, on a date to be set by a new Provisional
Electoral Council (CEP). An “autonomous, independent, credible and neutral CEP”
was to be established by November 4, 2002. Haiti failed to meet that deadline, in
part because the Democratic Convergence refused to name a representative for the
council until the government dealt with security issues and made all reparations to
opposition forces for damage done by government supporters in December 2001.
Aristide named a partial CEP in February 2003. In June 2003, the OAS passed
Resolution 1959, regretting that neither the government nor the opposition had fully
7 “Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Events of December 17, 2001, in Haiti,”
OEA/Ser.G CP/INF.4702/02, July 1, 2002, part III.
8 “Report of the Secretary General in Response to CP/INF.4724/02,” OEA/Ser.G
CP/doc.3643/02 corr.1, Aug. 27, 2002, part I.

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CRS-7
implemented their obligations under the previous two resolutions, and urging the
government to create a safe environment for elections and the opposition to help
actively form a CEP. Those steps were not taken, and elections did not take place
in 2003.
In November 2003, the new U.S. Ambassador to Haiti, James Foley, described
the current state of Haiti as “very worrisome from all points of view: poverty,
insecurity, economic development, infrastructure, environment, health, etc.,” and said
that it was essential that Haiti resolve its political impasse so that Haiti and its
international donors “can work together to resolve all of these fundamental
problems.” A U.N.-appointed human rights expert said in November that the human
rights situation there had “again deteriorated,” criticizing the ongoing impunity of
human rights violators; the “persistent dysfunctions in the administration of justice,”
and the frequently violent suppression of freedom of expression and especially of
peaceful demonstrations. Saying he was “very disturbed” at the rising political
violence there, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell backed a proposal by the Roman
Catholic Bishops Conference of Haiti to set up a council of advisors to help Aristide
govern until new parliamentary elections were held. Aristide supported the initiative,
but the opposition, which accused Aristide of corruption and mismanagement,
rejected it. In January 2004, the CARICOM secured Aristide’s agreement to disarm
political gangs, appoint a new prime minister, and form an advisory council.
Opposition groups refused to negotiate a settlement or participate in elections unless
Aristide resigned. Two-thirds of Haitian legislators’ terms expired in January 2004
without elections having been held to replace them. President Aristide began ruling
by decree.
The conflict escalated when armed rebels seized Haiti’s fourth largest city,
Gonaives, on February 5, and the armed rebellion spread to other cities. Street battles
ensued when police forces tried to regain control, leaving dozens dead. CARICOM
continued trying to negotiate a solution to the crisis. Civil opposition groups
operating mainly in the capital denied any links to the armed rebellions. After being
criticized by some for statements appearing to indicate it might support the elected
President’s removal, Administration officials said the remarks were not intended to
signal support for Aristide’s resignation, and that the Bush Administration sought a
peaceful solution to the crisis. Secretary of State Colin Powell and other foreign
diplomats suggested the possibility of bringing in outside police forces, but only to
support the enforcement of a political agreement reached by the Haitian government
and the opposition, such as the one proposed by CARICOM. The opposition rejected
the agreement.
Aristide’s Departure
With rebel forces moving toward the capital of Port-au-Prince on February 28,
2004, the Bush Administration increased pressure on Aristide to resign, stating that
“His failure to adhere to democratic principles has contributed to the deep
polarization and violent unrest that we are witnessing in Haiti today.” Aristide
resigned the next day and flew into exile. He has since said he was kidnaped, a
charge the White House denies. Following succession protocol outlined in the
Haitian constitution, Supreme Court Chief Justice Boniface Alexandre was sworn in
as President on February 29. The United Nations unanimously passed a resolution

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CRS-8
authorizing an international force, initially comprising U.S. Marines, and French and
Canadian police and military forces, to help restore order.9 That force was replaced
by U.N. peacekeepers three months later, in June 2004. A tripartite commission,
based on an element of the CARICOM proposal, was formed to help run an interim
government. CARICOM said it was not prepared to hold discussions with Haiti’s
new leaders, however, and called for an investigation into Aristide’s “relinquishing
of the Presidency” by an independent international body such as the United Nations.
During a demonstration on March 7, 2004, in which protesters called for the
exiled Aristide to stand trial for alleged corruption and human rights violations, six
people were reportedly killed by suspected Aristide loyalists. U.S. Marines killed at
least six Haitians who they said were trying to attack them. Speaking from exile in
the capital of the Central African Republic on March 8, Aristide asserted, “I am the
elected president,” and appealed for “peaceful resistance” by his supporters to what
he called the “occupation” of Haiti.10 After Jamaica allowed Aristide to travel there
for a ten-week visit, Haiti’s acting prime minister withdrew its ambassador from
Kingston, saying Aristide was “disturbing Haiti’s fragile order” by visiting the island
only 125 miles away. The Jamaican government said Aristide agreed to their
condition that he not use his visit to launch a campaign to be reinstated as president.11
Aristide went into exile in South Africa on May 31, 2004.
The Interim Government
Following succession protocol outlined in the Haitian constitution, Supreme
Court Chief Justice Boniface Alexandre was sworn in as President on February 29,
2004. A tripartite commission, based on an element of the CARICOM proposal,
helped establish an interim government headed by Prime Minister Gerard LaTortue.
The Commission was composed of one representative each of Aristide’s Lavalas
Family party, the civil opposition, and the international community. LaTortue’s
cabinet consists of technocrats without strong party affiliations and does not include
either Lavalas or the Democratic Convergence. The new minister of Interior and
National Security is Herard Abraham, former head of the Haitian army during
Aristide’s first term, in 1991. Abraham retired about three months before the 1991
coup took place.
Showing his support for the interim government in Haiti, Secretary of State
Colin Powell visited Haiti on April 5, announcing several U.S. initiatives. These
included the immediate deployment of a seven-member team to advise the interim
government on security issues; a three-year employment generation program to
improve municipal infrastructure and provide tens of thousands of jobs; and a team
to assess the technical assistance needed by the Haitian Finance Ministry and to assist
Haitian authorities “in the recovery of assets that may have been illicitly diverted.”
The U.S. will provide an additional $9 million to the Organization of American
9 S/RES/1529 (2003), Feb. 29, 2004.
10 Paisley Dodds, Ian James, “U.S. Marines Say They Killed Haiti Gunman,” AP, Mar. 8,
2004.
11 “Haiti Decries Aristide ‘Meddling’,” BBC News, Mar. 16, 2004.

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States (OAS) Special Mission for Strengthening Democracy in Haiti, for elections
and democracy building activities; and $500,000 for a variety of elections-related
activities such as public education programs, public opinion polling, and training for
political parties to develop candidates. Powell also said that humanitarian
development programs would be expanded “to ensure that the medical and nutritional
needs of Haiti’s most disadvantaged people are met.”12 Relations between the U.S.
and other Caribbean governments remain strained as Caribbean Community
(CARICOM) nations continue to withhold recognition of the LaTortue government
and maintain that Aristide is still Haiti’s legitimate elected leader.13
On July 20, international donors pledged more than $1 billion over the next two
years to help Haiti rebuild its infrastructure, strengthen institutions, and improve
basic services. The United States committed to provide $230 million for FY2004-
FY2005. The interim government signed an agreement with the U.N. and the OAS
on August 23 to hold presidential, parliamentary, and local elections in 2005, with
a new president to take office on February 7, 2006. The U.N. established a trust fund
for the elections, started with $9 million in U.S. funds, which they hope will reach
$41 million. Members of former President Aristide’s Fanmi Lavalas party have
threatened to boycott the elections and claim to face political persecution by the
interim government.
Many observers express concern over the actions of former members of the
Haitian military since Aristide’s departure. Many former military personnel have
demanded reinstatement of the Haitian army, which was disbanded by President
Aristide in 1995 following a period of multiple military coups and gross violations
of human rights carried out under military rule. The U.S. government and human
rights organizations have objected to armed rebels being given any formal role in
Haitian security forces.
The interim government increased concerns in April when Prime Minister
LaTortue called the rebels “freedom fighters,” and Haiti’s top police official in the
northern region met with former paramilitary leader Louis Jodel Chamblain and Guy
Philippe to negotiate roles for their fighters in the police force.14 Chamberlain had
been convicted in absentia for killing a Justice Minister and chief financier of former
President Aristide; Guy Philippe was accused of leading a coup attempt against
former President Preval. In June, LaTortue assured U.S. officials that former soldiers
would be subject to the same criteria and human rights vetting procedures as other
applicants for joining the Haitian National Police. Nonetheless, some observers
remain concerned, noting that government discussions of disarmament have focused
more on former Aristide supporters than on armed rebels and former members of the
army. In addition, the government presided over a rushed re-trial of Chamblain, in
12 U.S. Dept. of State, Office of the Spokesman, “U.S. Support for Haiti,” Fact Sheet, Apr.
5, 2004.
13 Carol J. Williams, “Former Ruling Party Seeks to Keep Itself Afloat in Post-Aristide
Haiti...,” Los Angeles Times, Apr. 7, 2004.
14 “Haiti: Formal Role for Rebels Negotiated,” Latin American Weekly Report, Apr. 6, 2004.

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CRS-10
which he was acquitted of the 1993 political assassination he had been convicted of
in absentia.
The U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti
The U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) assumed authority on
June 1, 2004, although few of the U.N. troops had arrived by then. The MINUSTAH
mandate includes helping to ensure a secure and stable environment, fostering
democratic governance, and supporting the promotion and protection of human
rights. The Brazilian commander of MINUSTAH has said that without a full
complement of troops it is difficult to maintain law and order. The mission has
authorization for a force of about 8,000, made up of 6,700 military troops and 1,622
civilian police. As of May 15, 2005, forces were still below that level, with 6,435
peacekeeping troops and 1,413 civilian police from 41 countries in country.
According to the State Department, the United States had a total of four U.S. military
advisers and 25 civilian police participating in the U.N. mission. Furthermore, the
mandate was established in April 2004, prior to flooding and hurricanes that left
thousands of Haitians dead and thousands more homeless. MINUSTAH provided
assistance in the provision of emergency assistance following the natural disasters,
stretching its resources even thinner. MINUSTAH has been urging international
donors to accelerate the disbursement of $1 billion in aid pledged for 2004-2006 to
support their efforts.
Both the Haitian government and MINUSTAH have complained that the other
is not doing enough to establish security in Haiti. Nonetheless, in October 2004
Haitian police officers and U.N. soldiers made a joint show of force to try to quell a
spate of violence, arresting suspected militants and searching for weapons. Security
has improved in recent months, but the situation is expected to remain volatile,
especially in the months leading up to elections.
Following a trip to Haiti in April 2005, the U.N. Security Council said it
planned to extend MINUSTAH’s mandate when it expires in June. It noted that the
mission had improved security conditions in the preceding months but could do more
in areas such as police reform. The Security Council also urged the interim
government to implement “without delay” the mission’s proposed disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration program. The U.N. Secretary General has
recommended that the mission also be expanded and restructured to increase
MINUSTAH’s ability to deter violence and provide security for the upcoming
elections.

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CRS-11
Current Congressional Concerns
The main issue for U.S.-Haiti policy during the 109th Congress will likely be
how to foster stability and development in Haiti. Remarking on the nexus between
development, security, and human rights, the chairman of a U.N. Advisory Group on
Haiti recommended addressing poverty reduction, demobilization and reintegration,
political reconciliation, and judicial and security sector reform.15 Some policymakers
argue that security is the top priority and are debating how best to support the
existing U.N. Mission, or whether to expand the U.N.’s role, with some observers
urging some sort of long-term international intervention. As political disarray and
human rights violations continue, some observers are expressing concern that
conditions will not be conducive to safe elections. Others argue that establishing a
legitimate government through fair, credible elections is the fist step toward stability.
Support of Democracy
Many in Congress have been concerned that Haiti renew its transition to
democracy, in particular that it hold democratic elections in accordance with Haiti’s
1987 constitution. In recent congressional hearings, the Bush Administration
reiterated that U.S. policy in Haiti is to support democracy and the strengthening of
democratic institutions. Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs
Roger Noriega defended the Administration’s decision not to send in troops while
Aristide was still in Haiti. He said that although Aristide voiced support for the
CARICOM agreement, he continued to foment violence through his armed
supporters, and that the Administration decided supporting his continued rule was not
a sustainable policy and not worth risking U.S. lives for.16
At the same hearings, several Members of Congress harshly criticized the
Administration, however, for its role in Aristide’s departure from Haiti, saying that
the Bush Administration refused to provide any assistance to stop the escalating
violence in Haiti until Aristide resigned. Some voiced concern that the
Administration’s actions set a dangerous precedent, that the ouster of a
democratically elected government by violent thugs would be tolerated if the
government was no longer popular or favored by the current U.S. administration.
Some Members have called for independent investigations into what they refer to
as the coup d’état that removed Aristide from office, and the role of the U.S. in his
departure. Some observers are also concerned about the effect Aristide’s claim, and
his call for his supporters to resist the international “occupation,” will have on efforts
to restore order and stability in Haiti, and on the safety of U.S. troops in Haiti.
15 “Holding Free, Fair, Inclusive Elections in 2005 Most Pressing, Visible Challenge for
Haiti, Security Council Told.” U.N.Security Council 5178th Meeting (AM). Press Release
SC/8384, May 13, 2005.
16 Hearings before the House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the
Western Hemisphere, March 3, 2004, and before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, and Narcotics Affairs, Mar. 10, 2004.

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CRS-12
The formation of a legitimate transitional government through a constitutional
process was made difficult by Aristide’s claim that he remains Haiti’s democratically
elected president, and by the lack of a legally-constituted legislature to authorize a
transitional government. When the office of the President becomes vacant, the
Haitian constitution calls for the President of the Haitian Supreme Court to head an
interim government. Accordingly, Boniface Alexandre was named interim President,
although there was no functioning legislature to confirm his appointment, as called
for in the constitution. The constitution also calls for the election of a new President
to be held between 45 and 90 days after the vacancy occurs. In April 2004, the
interim government reached an agreement with opposition political groups to hold
elections in 2005, with a new president to take office on February 7, 2006.
A tripartite commission, consisting of one representative each from Aristide’s
Lavalas party, the civil opposition, and the international community, was formed to
help oversee the transition process. Creation of a tripartite commission, also known
as the “Council of Elders,” was part of a CARICOM proposal that was agreed to by
then-President Aristide, but rejected by the civil opposition. CARICOM is still
withholding recognition of the interim government. Some observers questioned the
validity of the tripartite commission as a legitimate part of an interim government.
Concerns have also been raised about the civil opposition as represented by the
Democratic Platform in Haiti. Some observers question the right of the civil
opposition to participate in an interim government, given their rejection of political
solutions that did not involve Aristide’s resignation, including the one proposed by
CARICOM and supported by the United States. Others wonder to what extent the
opposition had a unified agenda beyond the removal of Aristide from office. Some
have asked what, if any, relationship the opposition had with the armed rebels who
took over much of Haiti prior to Aristide’s departure. Both the opposition and the
Bush Administration state that there was no relationship between the armed and
unarmed opposition at the time.
On July 20, 2004, international donors pledged more than $1 billion over the
next two years to help Haiti rebuild its infrastructure, strengthen institutions, and
improve basic services. The interim government signed an agreement with the U.N.
and the OAS on August 23 to hold elections in fall 2005. The U.N. established a
trust fund for the elections, started with $9 million in U.S. funds, which they hope
will reach $41 million. Members of former President Aristide’s Fanmi Lavalas party
have threatened to boycott the elections and claim to face political persecution by the
interim government. Several were arrested in October; reportedly the charges have
not been made public. Local elections are scheduled for October 9, and presidential
and legislative elections for November 13, 2005, with runoff elections on December
18. Observers voice concern that holding elections will be extremely difficult as long
as the unrest continues.
U.S. Assistance to Haiti
From FY1996 to FY1999, the Clinton Administration provided approximately
$100 million annually in foreign assistance to Haiti, plus about $868 million in
Department of Defense costs for peacekeeping and security operations related to
embargo enforcement and the international intervention. Beginning in 2000, in

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CRS-13
response to the unresolved elections dispute, the Clinton Administration redirected
U.S. humanitarian assistance through non-governmental organizations, rather than
through the Haitian government. The Bush Administration has continued this policy.
Aid began to decrease at the end of the Clinton Administration, and continued to do
so for the first two years of the Bush Administration, with $79 million in FY2000,
$73 million in FY2001, and $56 million in FY2002. The original request for
FY2003 was $47 million; the Administration later increased aid to $72 million. The
Bush Administration launched an initiative in 2003 to prevent the transmission of the
HIV/AIDS virus from mothers to children; Haiti was one of 14 countries included in
the program. According to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID),
between four and six thousand Haitian children are born with the virus each year.
Before the current unrest, Haiti was going to receive an estimated $55 million
in U.S. foreign aid in FY2004. An additional $0.54 million in humanitarian
assistance was made available when the Bush Administration declared Haiti a
disaster on February 18, 2004, and more costs were incurred with the U.S. military
forces in Haiti. The initial request for FY2005, made before U.S. forces were sent
to Haiti, was for $54 million.
Congress has monitored aid to Haiti closely, and has established a number of
conditions on this assistance over the years. The FY2000 foreign aid act (P.L. 106-
113) outlined congressional priorities for assistance to Haiti, including “aggressive
action to support the Haitian National Police;” ensuring that elections are free and
fair; developing indigenous human rights monitoring capacity; facilitating more
privatization of state-owned enterprises; a sustainable agricultural development
program; and establishing an economic development fund to encourage U.S.
investment in Haiti. The act also required the president to regularly report to
Congress on the Haitian government’s progress in areas of concern to Congress.
The Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for FY2001 (P.L. 106-429) shifted
conditions, prohibiting aid to the Haitian government until Haiti held free and fair
elections to seat a new parliament and was fully cooperating with U.S. efforts to
interdict illicit drug traffic through Haiti. The only condition in FY2002 foreign aid
appropriations law (P.L. 107-115) required notification to Congress prior to provision
of any aid to Haiti. The FY2003 foreign assistance appropriations act (P.L. 108-7)
provided for “not less than $52.5 million” in food assistance program funds to be
allocated to Haiti (Sec. 551), but contained no other conditions on aid to Haiti.
The FY2004 foreign aid appropriations (P.L. 108-199, Division D) continued
to allow Haiti to purchase defense articles and services for the Haitian Coast Guard,
prohibited the use of funds to issue a visa to any alien involved in extrajudicial and
political killings in Haiti, allocated $5 million to the OAS Special Mission in Haiti
and $19 million in Refugee and Entrant Assistance funds to communities with large
concentrations of Haitian (and Cuban) refugees of varying ages for healthcare and
education.
The FY2005 consolidated appropriations act (P.L. 108-447, Conference Report
H.Rept. 108-792) contains several provisions regarding Haiti. The act (1) makes
International Military Education and Training funds and Foreign Military Financing
available only through regular notification procedures; (2) appropriates $20 million

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CRS-14
for child survival and health programs, $25 million for development assistance,
including agriculture, environment, and basic education programs; $40 million in
ESF for judicial reform, police training, and national elections; “sufficient funds” for
the OAS to help Haiti hold elections in 2005, and $2 million to Zanmi Lasante for
maternal and child health activities; (3) allows Haiti to purchase defense articles and
services for its Coast Guard; (4) notes disappointment on the Haitian government’s
role in the trial and acquittal of Louis Jodel Chamblain, and the deteriorating security
human rights situation; (5) requires a report within 90 days on a multi-year assistance
strategy; (6) and encourages the Administration to help Haitian and NGO officials
to devise a reforestation strategy and to provide a report on that strategy within 180
days. The conference report was agreed to in both houses on November 20 and
signed into law December 8, 2004. The earlier Senate version had made several
findings regarding improving security in Haiti, concluding that “the failure to
establish a secure and stable environment and to conduct credible and inclusive
elections will likely result in Haiti’s complete transition from a failed state to a
criminal state.”
The 108th Congress considered but did not pass a trade preferences bill for Haiti.
The Senate passed the Haiti Economic Recovery Opportunity (HERO) Act of 2004
(S. 2261) in July, which would have given Haiti additional preferential trade
treatment if it made certain democratic and economic reforms. Current benefits
under the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act allow duty-free access for apparel
made in the region from U.S. components.17 The House Ways and Means Trade
subcommittee held a hearing on the issue September 22, 2004. Supporters of trade
preferences for Haiti are reportedly developing a compromise bill for reconsideration
by both houses this session.18 (For further information, see CRS Report RS21839,
Haitian Textile Industry: Impact of Proposed Trade Assistance, by Bernard Gelb.)
In July 2004, the Bush Administration announced an additional $120 million in
assistance to Haiti, for a total of about $230 million for FY2004-FY2005. According
to USAID, the aid will be distributed as follows: $22 million for job creation; $45
million for government infrastructure support; $26 million for improved security
through improved administration of justice; $122 million for humanitarian aid,
including health care, nutrition, and education; and $15 million for elections support.
A portion of an additional $100 million appropriated by Congress in supplemental
disaster assistance for the Caribbean region (P.L. 108-324) will go to Haiti as well.
The emergency supplemental appropriations act for FY2005 (P.L. 109-13) provides
that $20 million in Economic Support Funds “should” be made available to Haiti,
$2.5 million of which should be made available for criminal case management, case
tracking, and the reduction of pre-trial detention in Haiti.
17 “Trade Subcommittee Considers Additional Textile Benefits for Haiti,” World Trade
Online, Sept. 24, 2004. Also, “Crane expresses Hope House Will Approve Haitian Textile
Benefits Before Adjourning,” International Trade Reporter, Sept. 30, 2004, p.1607.
18 “DeWine, Thomas work on Haiti Textile Bill despite NCTO Opposition,” Inside US
Trade, May 20, 2005.

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CRS-15
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Haiti, FY1990-FY2005
(obligations of dollars in millions)
Devel.
Food Aid
Intl.
Economic
Foreign
Fiscal
Aid/Child
Grants
Peace
Military Ed
Support
Military
Totals
Year
Survival
(P.L. 480,
Corps
& Train
Fund
Financing
& Health
Title II)
(IMET)
1990
40.2
$1.5
16.0
0.7
0.0
0.1
58.5
1991
38.5
12.3
29.1
1.0
0.0
0.3
81.2
1992
26.6
4.5
19.6
0.3
0.0
0.0
51.0
1993
23.3
24.0
41.3
0.1
0.0
0.0
88.7
1994
26.0
36.7
42.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
105.4
1995
56.6
56.0
44.0
0.0
3.0
0.0
159.6
1996
14.1
45.3
39.2
0.5
0.0
0.2
99.3
1997
24.4
53.5
22.5
0.9
0.0
0.3
101.6
1998
0.9
65.1
34.9
1.1
0.0
0.3
102.3
1999
0.0
65.1
27.0
1.4
0.3
0.2
94.0
2000a
0.0
52.5
25.1
1.4
0.0
0.3
80.0
2001
0.0
46.9
25.1
1.3
0.0
0.3
73.6
2002
0.9
30.0
23.1
1.5
0.3
0.0
55.9
2003
33.2
0.0
36.6
1.7
0.4
0.1
71.9
2004b est.
27.8
0.0
24.7
1.6
0.3
0.2
54.6
2005 req.
24.5
0.0
27.0
2.1
0.3
0.2
54.1
2004-2005c
$120.0
Total
337.0
493.4
477.9
15.6
4.6
2.5
$1,451.7
Source: U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).
a. FY2000: additional USAID operating expenses totaling $174.6 million provided in Hurricane Supplemental.
b. An additional $537,000 in humanitarian assistance, through the office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance,
was made available for Haiti on February 18, 2004.
c. On July 20, 2004, the Bush Administration announced additional funds for Haiti as follows: $22m: job
creation; $45 m: infrastructure support; $26 m: administration of justice; $122 m: humanitarian aid; $15
m: elections support.

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CRS-16
Table 2. DOD Incremental Costs of U.S. International Peace
and Security Commitments, FY1992-FY1996
(Budget authority in millions of current year dollars)
Operation
FY1992
FY1993
FY1994 FY1995 FY1996
Totals
Safe Harbor
9.3
—
—
—
—
9.3
Embargo/Interdiction/
—
2.8
65.8
—
—
68.6
Sanctions Enforcement
Uphold Democracy
—
—
198.2
448.8
—
647.0
UNMIH
—
—
—
56.5
86.9
143.4
Total Haiti
9.3
2.8
264.0
505.3
86.9
868.3
Source: Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)

Notes: This chart consists of the DOD incremental costs involved in U.S. support for and participation
in peacekeeping and in related humanitarian and security operations, including U.S. unilateral
operations, NATO operations, U.N. operations, and ad hoc coalition operations. Incremental costs
are amounts spent on operations over that which would have been normally spent on regular salaries,
and on routine training, equipment repairs and replacements. Opinion as to which of them constitute
“peacekeeping” or “peace operations” differ. U.N. reimbursements are not deducted. Totals may not
add due to rounding. The Haiti accounts do not include the DOD processing of Haitian migrants,
which totaled $108.1 million in FY1994 and $63.7 million in FY1995.
For further information on the U.S. military intervention in Haiti, see CRS Report RL30184,
Military Interventions by U.S. Forces from Vietnam to Bosnia: Background, Outcomes, and “Lessons
Learned” for Kosovo, by Nina M. Serafino, who prepared Table 2.
Protection of Human Rights, and Security Conditions
Congress has been concerned with the protection of human rights and with
security conditions within Haiti. During his first term, in 1995, President Aristide
took steps to break with the pattern in which a military-dominated police force was
associated with human rights abuses. Haiti, with U.S. assistance, demobilized the old
military, established an interim police force of selected ex-military personnel, and
began to train a professional, civilian Haitian National Police force. The level of
reported violence, flight of refugees, and alleged assassinations dropped markedly
from very high levels during the de facto military regime. Following the return to
civilian rule in 1994, Haiti made progress in the protection of human rights, but the
gains made were fragile and threatened by political tensions and problems with
impunity.
During President Aristide’s second term, increases in political violence renewed
concerns over security and police effectiveness. In 2001, President Aristide
announced a “zero tolerance” policy toward suspected criminals. According to
various human rights reports, this announcement was followed by numerous
extrajudicial killings by the Haitian National Police and lynchings by mobs. The
government’s respect for freedom of the press continued to deteriorate. According
to the State Department’s February 2004 Human Rights Practices Report, “The

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CRS-17
[Haitian] government’s human rights record remained poor, with political and civil
officials implicated in serious abuses.”
After armed rebellions led to the departure of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide
in February 2004, an interim government took over, but security conditions remain
tenuous. The destruction of prisons and subsequent escape of prisoners in the
turmoil of early 2004 and the government’s granting of amnesty to convicted
criminals in January 2005 further added to instability. Gangs linked to both former
army and pro-Aristide forces remain heavily armed. The Haitian National Police are
considered understaffed and under equipped to maintain order.
The U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has also been
understaffed, as member governments were slow to send the 6,700 troops and 1,622
civilian police that were authorized; it still did not have all of its promised forces as
of May 5, 2005. Only four U.S. troops are stationed in Haiti as part of that
international mission. Without a full complement of troops, the Brazilian
commander of MINUSTAH says it is difficult to maintain law and order.
MINUSTAH’s ability to carry out its mandate to establish law and order is further
hampered by the diversion of its resources to help protect and deliver emergency
assistance following natural disasters that left thousands dead or homeless. Three
U.N. peacekeepers have been killed.
Saying that U.N. peacekeepers had failed to maintain security, Prime Minister
reportedly asked the Bush Administration in late 2004 to send U.S. troops to Haiti.
The Department of Defense did not send troops, but about 250 U.S. military
personnel are participating in a civic assistance program to help train U.S. military
units in construction and medical care services as a show of support for Latortue’s
government.19
New concerns over human rights violations were presented by the leaders of the
armed rebellion that contributed to Aristide’s resignation. Both Louis Jodel
Chamblain and Guy Philippe were members of the Haitian military. Chamblain is
the alleged leader of death squads responsible for a bloodbath that halted elections
in 1987 and for killing thousands of civilians after the 1991 military coup against
former President Aristide. The Bush Administration expressed “deep concern” about
the rule of law in Haiti following the acquittal in a rapidly held retrial of Chamblain
and former police official Jackson Joanis in August 2004 for their roles in the 1993
murder of businessman and Aristide supporter Antoine Izmery. Chamblain had been
convicted in absentia. The State Department called on the interim Haitian
government “to ensure that trials involving accusations of gross human rights
violations and other such crimes be conducted in a credible manner.”20
Philippe, who was also a police commissioner in Cap Haitien, fled into exile
after being accused of involvement in a coup attempt against President Preval in
19 Pablo Bachelet, “U.S. Giving Haiti Aid Through Military but no Troops for U.N. Security
Force,” Miami Herald, Nov. 5, 2004.
20 U.S. Dept. of State, “U.S. Deeply Concerned About Rule of Law in Haiti,” statement by
Adam Ereli, Deputy Spokesman, Aug. 17, 2004.

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CRS-18
2000. Philippe says he wants to reconstitute the Haitian army and declared himself
its head in March 2004. Both men appear to have a high degree of popular support
that might hamper the international community’s ability to persuade them to disarm.
The Haitian army, which had a long history of human rights abuses, was disbanded
in 1995. Former soldiers have staged protests demanding the restoration of the army
and 10 years of back pay.
While some Aristide supporters have allegedly committed human rights
violations, others are reported to face persecution. Some of Aristide’s more militant
supporters have beheaded police officers and threatened to do the same to civilian
officials if Aristide is not restored to office (New York Times, October 7, 2004).
Several Lavalas party officials have been arrested; they denied inciting the violence
and blamed the government for not stopping the violence. Both the State Department
and Amnesty International report human rights abuses against Aristide supporters
under the interim government. Former Prime Minister Yvon Neptune has been held
without charge for 11 months and is reportedly near death after being on a hunger
strike. Neptune is accused of organizing a massacre of opposition supporters in
2004. He demands that he be released; CARICOM and others are calling for the
release of Neptune and others who have been held without charge. While some
groups agree that people should not be held without charge, they are urging the
government to press formal charges and provide for a fair trial. Press reports indicate
that Neptune was taken before a judge to hear charges on May 25, 2005 (Associated
Press, May 25, 2005).
Narcotics Trafficking
Haiti is a major transshipment point for illegal narcotics, mostly cocaine, being
transported from South America to the United States, according to the State
Department’s March 2003 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. Several
factors make Haiti attractive to narcotics traffickers. Located between South
America and the United States, its coasts and border with the Dominican Republic
are largely uncontrolled. Haiti’s nascent democratic institutions and ineffectual
infrastructure have been further weakened by the political impasse that has
characterized the country since 1997. Haiti’s current legal system is antiquated.
Haitian authorities charged with controlling drug trafficking are inexperienced, lack
sufficient resources, and, because of Haiti’s extreme poverty, are considered highly
susceptible to corruption. According to the State Department’s March 2004 report,
“Serious allegations persisted that high-level government and police officials are
involved in drug trafficking.” There are numerous allegations that former President
Aristide was involved in drug trafficking.
In 2001, 2002, and 2003, the Bush Administration said Haiti was not certified
as having fully cooperated, or had “failed demonstrably” to comply with U.S. drug-
control efforts. All three years President Bush determined, however, that it was in the
national interest to continue providing aid to Haiti despite its counter narcotics
performance, and granted a waiver so that aid to Haiti could continue. According to
the Bush Administration, the Haitian government took several important actions in
2002 and 2003, including putting into force a bilateral maritime narcotics interdiction
agreement with the United States, establishing a financial intelligence unit, and
extraditing four well-known traffickers to the United States. It also said, however,

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CRS-19
that “Haitian drug trafficking organizations continue to operate with relative
impunity.” The Administration has said that “Haitian poverty and hopelessness”
were chief catalysts in Haitian involvement in the drug trade and in illegal migration
to the United States. Cutting off aid to Haiti, including programs aimed at attacking
those catalysts, “would aggravate an already bad situation.”
In September 2004, President Bush found that the interim government “has
taken substantive — if limited — counternarcotics actions....” The Administration
added, however, that it remained “deeply concerned” about the Haitian government’s
ability to carry out sustained counternarcotics efforts.21
Haitian Migration
The main elements of current immigration policy regarding Haitians are migrant
interdiction on the high seas and mandatory detentions of undocumented, interdicted
Haitians. Since 1981, it has been U.S. policy to have the U.S. Coast Guard stop and
search Haitian vessels on the high sea that are suspected of transporting
undocumented Haitians. Some of the congressional debate over the years has
focused on whether interdicted Haitians are economic migrants, and should therefore
be returned to Haiti, or whether they are refugees with a well-founded fear of
persecution who should be allowed to stay in the United States while applying for
political asylum. Some Members and human rights advocates express concern that
Haitians are not given the same treatment as other aliens seeking asylum in the
United States. President Bush has said that Haitian “refugees” interdicted at sea will
be returned to Haiti.22
Attorney General John Ashcroft issued a ruling in April 2003 that unauthorized
Haitian migrants can be detained indefinitely in response to national security
concerns.23 The Administration said the ruling was needed to discourage mass
migration from Haiti and to prevent the U.S. Coast Guard and other Department of
Homeland Security agencies from being diverted from more important border
security priorities. The Attorney General further warns that terrorists may pose as
Haitian asylum seekers, a charge disputed by immigrant advocates and some U.S.
consular officials. So far there have been no significant population movements, but
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees has worked with Caribbean
states to set up contingency plans in the event of a mass exodus from Haiti.
Following the natural disasters of fall 2004,which killed almost 2,000 people
and left over 200,000 homeless, the Haitian government formally requested
Temporary Protected Status (TPS) for Haitians in October. That status would halt
the deportation back to Haiti of thousands of undocumented Haitians living in the
United States. Immigration advocates cited the precedent of Central Americans
being granted TPS following Hurricane Mitch in 1998. A bill (H.R. 2592) that
21 “U.S. Releases Annual Narcotics Certification Report,” USInfo.State.Gov, Sept.16, 2004.
22 “President Bush Welcomes Georgian President Saakashvili to White House,” The White
House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2/25/04.
23 23 I & N Dec.572 (A.G. 2003).

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CRS-20
would make Haitians eligible for TPS was introduced in Congress May 24. The
Department of Homeland Security says it has not made a recommendation at this
time, but is continuing to monitor events in Haiti. (For more information see CRS
Report RS21349, U.S. Immigration Policy on Haitian Migrants, and CRS Report
RS20844, Temporary Protected Status: Current Immigration Policy and Issues, by
Ruth Ellen Wasem.)
Humanitarian Crisis
Since February 2004, Haiti has been faced with a series of crises, including a
civil conflict and the impact of a flood disaster and tropical storm. Each disaster has
been made worse in its cumulative effect on a nation that remains the poorest in the
Western Hemisphere. The ongoing humanitarian crisis in Haiti and the conditions,
particularly in Gonaives, are of great concern. The U.S. has responded to each of the
situations with relief and recovery assistance. U.N. figures suggest that the flooding
in May (primarily near the southern border between Haiti and the Dominican
Republic) resulted in tens of thousands being displaced, 1,059 deaths, and several
hundred injured. Approximately 1,600 people were missing and presumed dead.
Thousands of homes were damaged or destroyed along with crop and livestock
losses. Hurricane Jeanne inflicted even more damage. Some 3,006 people were
killed, with more than 2,800 from Gonaives. Flooding devastated communities, and
the storm affected more than 300,000 people.
With an ongoing lack of security, assessments of the humanitarian situation
remain fluid. Lack of road security, looting, and poor road conditions have at times
impeded the delivery of aid. With the assistance of MINUSTAH, the conditions have
seen improvement.
According to USAID, in FY2004, the U.S. government provided about $180
million to Haiti for the civil conflict, flood, and hurricane relief, with approximately
$40 million for humanitarian assistance. Congress approved $100 million in
emergency assistance for Caribbean countries affected by the recent natural disasters,
including Haiti. The aid was incorporated into the FY2005 Military Construction
Appropriations and Emergency Hurricane Supplemental Appropriations Act (P.L.
108-324). Some Members criticized the level of aid as too small considering the
amount of damage wrought by the storms.
International humanitarian actors responding to the crisis included U.N.
agencies, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and bilateral
and multilateral donors. Both the United Nations and International Federation of the
Red Cross launched emergency appeals.
(Rhoda Margesson contributed to this section. For background information, see her
CRS Report RS21751, Humanitarian Crisis in Haiti: 2004, and CRS Report
RL32160, Caribbean Region: Issues in U.S. Relations, by Mark P. Sullivan.)

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Legislation in the 109th Congress
P.L. 109-13 (H.R. 1268). Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for
Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, for the fiscal year ending
September 30, 2005. Makes $20 million in Economic Support Funds available for
Haiti, of which $2.5 million should be made available for criminal case management,
case tracking, and the reduction of pre-trial detention in Haiti, notwithstanding any
other provision of law. Introduced March 11, 2005 (H.Rept. 109-72), signed into law
May 11, 2005.
H.R. 257 (Jackson-Lee). To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to
reunify families, permit earned access to permanent resident status, provide
protection against unfair immigration-related employment practices, reform the
diversity visa program, provide adjustment of status for Haitians and Liberian
nationals, and for other purposes. Introduced January 6, 2005, referred to House
Committee on the Judiciary’s Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and
Claims March 2.
H.R. 611 (Foley). To authorize the establishment of a program to provide
economic and infrastructure reconstruction assistance to the Republic of Haiti, and
for other purposes. Introduced and referred to the House Committee on International
Relations Feb. 8, 2005.
H.R. 899 (Cardin). To amend section 402 of the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 to provide a two-year extension of
supplemental security income in fiscal years 2006 through 2008 for refugees, asylees,
and certain other humanitarian immigrants. Introduced Feb. 17, 2005, referred to
House Ways and Means Committee’s subcommittee on Human Resources March 3.
H.R. 945 (Lee). To provide assistance to combat infectious diseases in Haiti
and to establish a comprehensive health infrastructure in Haiti, and for other
purposes. Introduced, referred to House Committee on International Relations Feb.
17, 2005.
H.R. 946 (Lee). To establish the Independent Commission on the 2004 Coup
d’Etat in the Republic of Haiti. Introduced, referred to House Committee on
International Relations Feb. 17, 2005.
H.R. 1130 (Waters). To provide for the cancellation of debts owed to
international financial institutions by poor countries, and for other purposes.
Introduced March 3, 2005, referred to House Financial Services Committee’s
subcommittee on Domestic and International Monetary Policy, Trade, and
Technology March 28.

H.R. 1213 (Hyde)/S. 704 (Martinez). To authorize appropriations for FY2006
for voluntary contributions on a grant basis to the Organization of American States
(OAS) to establish a Center for Caribbean Basin Trade and to establish a skills-based
training program for Caribbean Basin countries. H.R. 1213 introduced, referred to

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House Committee on International Relations March 10; Senate version introduced,
referred to Committee on Foreign Relations April 5, 2005.
H.R. 1409 (Lee). To amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to provide
assistance for orphans and other vulnerable children in developing countries, and for
other purposes. Introduced, referred to House Committee on International Relations
March 17, 2005.
H.R. 1737 (Meek). To amend the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness Act
of 1998 to benefit individuals who were children when such Act was enacted.
Introduced April 20, 2005, referred to House Judiciary Committee’s subcommittee
on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims May 10.

H.R. 2592 (Hastings). To designate Haiti under section 244 of the Immigration
and Nationality Act in order to render nationals of Haiti eligible for temporary
protected status under such section. Introduced, referred to House Committee on
Judiciary May 24, 2005.

S. 350 (Lugar). To amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to provide
assistance for orphans and other vulnerable children in developing countries, and for
other purposes. Introduced, referred to Committee on Foreign Relations Feb. 10,
2005.

S. 453 (Smith). To amend section 402 of the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 to provide for an extension of eligibility for
supplemental security income through FY2008 for refugees, asylees, and certain
other humanitarian immigrants, applies to some Haitian (and Cuban) entrants.
Introduced, referred to Committee on Finance Feb. 17, 2005.

S. 600 (Lugar). To authorize appropriations for the Department of State and
international broadcasting activities, the Peace Corps, and foreign assistance
programs for fiscal years 2006 and 2007, and for other purposes. Would allow Haiti
to purchase defense articles for the Haitian Coast Guard, would make “not less than”
$163 million in assistance available to Haiti for FY2006. Makes the finding that
“The situation in Haiti is increasingly cause for alarm and concern, and a sustained,
coherent, and active approach” by the U.S. government is needed, and would require
not later than 60 days after enactment a report describing U.S. policy toward Haiti
with specific elements detailed. Introduced March 10, 2005, referred to Foreign
Relations Committee. (S.Rept. 109-35), Senate floor actions April 26, returned to the
Calendar. Calendar No. 48.

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Legislation in the 108th Congress
The following list includes legislation that was approved and become public
law during the 108th Congress. For the status of other legislation at the end of the
108th, see the CRS online guide, Haiti: Legislation in the 108th Congress,
[http://www.crs.gov/products/browse/officialsources/haitileg.shtml], by Andy
Mendelson.
P.L. 108-7 (H.J.Res. 2). Consolidated Appropriations for FY2003. The
Commerce, Justice and State appropriations bill makes available, in the “Federal
Prison” section, an amount “not to exceed” $20 million of contract confinement
funds for the care and security in the U.S. of Haitian (and Cuban) entrants. Under the
Foreign Operations appropriations (Division E), Sec. 551 a) allows the Haitian
government to purchase defense articles and services for the Coast Guard. Sec. 551
b) provides that “not less than” $52.5 million of funds appropriated by Title II and
to carry out AID food aid programs should be allocated for Haiti. Signed into law
February 20, 2003.
P.L. 108-25 (H.R. 1298/S. 1009). The U.S. Leadership Against HIV/AIDS,
Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003. Haiti is among 13 countries (Guyana and 12
African countries) that the legislation expressly benefits, with an HIV/AIDS
Coordinator in charge of approving all U.S. activities (funding included) aimed at
combating AIDS in these countries (Sec. 102 (a)). Appropriates $3 billion per year
through FY2008 for bilateral and multilateral efforts to combat HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis and malaria. Signed into law May 27, 2003.
P.L. 108-199 (H.R. 2673). Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for FY2004
(H.R. 2800/S. 1426), incorporated into consolidated appropriations act. The
Commerce, Justice and State appropriations act makes available until expended, in
the “Federal Prison System” section, an amount “not to exceed” $20 million of
confinement funds for the care and security in the U.S. of Haitian (and Cuban)
entrants. Under the Foreign Operations appropriations (Division D), Sec. 551 allows
the Haitian government to purchase defense articles and services for the Coast Guard.
Sec. 567(b) makes $34 million available for family planning, maternal, and
reproductive health activities in 12 countries, including Haiti. Sec. 616 prohibits the
use of funds to issue a visa to any alien involved in extrajudicial and political killings
in Haiti, including exemption and reporting requirements. Allocates $5 million to
the OAS Special Mission in Haiti. Allocates $19 million in Refugee and Entrant
Assistance funds to communities with large concentrations of Haitian (and Cuban)
refugees of varying ages whose cultural differences make assimilation especially
difficult, justifying a more intense level and longer duration of federal assistance for
health care and education. Conference agreement for omnibus vehicle approved by
House December 8, 2003, and by Senate January 22, 2004. Signed into law January
23, 2004.
P.L. 108-324 (H.R. 4837). The FY2005 Military Construction Appropriations
and Emergency Hurricane Supplemental Appropriations Act includes $100 million
in emergency assistance for Caribbean countries affected by the recent natural
disasters, including Haiti. According to the supplemental budget requests from the
Bush Administration that the bill fulfills, the aid will support the temporary provision

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of electricity; housing rehabilitation and reconstruction; agriculture sector
reconstruction; water and sanitation systems reconstruction; and the rehabilitation of
rural infrastructure such as roads, schools, and health facilities.
P.L. 108-447 (H.R. 4818). The FY2005 consolidated appropriations act
contains several provisions regarding Haiti. The law (1) makes International Military
Education and Training funds and Foreign Military Financing available only through
regular notification procedures; (2) appropriates $20 million for child survival and
health programs, $25 million for development assistance, including agriculture,
environment, and basic education programs; $40 million in ESF for judicial reform,
police training, and national elections; “sufficient funds” for the OAS to help Haiti
hold elections in 2005 and $2 million to Zanmi Lasante for maternal and child health
activities; (3) allows Haiti to purchase defense articles and services for its Coast
Guard; (4) notes disappointment on the Haitian government’s role in the trial and
acquittal of Louis Jodel Chamblain and the deteriorating security human rights
situation; (5) requires a report within 90 days on a multi-year assistance strategy; (6)
and encourages the Administration to help Haitian and NGO officials to devise a
reforestation strategy and to provide a report on that strategy within 180 days. The
conference report was agreed to in both houses on November 20. Signed into law
December 8, 2004. The earlier Senate version had made several findings regarding
improving security in Haiti, concluding that “the failure to establish a secure and
stable environment and to conduct credible and inclusive elections will likely result
in Haiti’s complete transition from a failed state to a criminal state.”
S. 2261 (DeWine)/H.R. 4889 (Shaw). Haiti Economic Recovery Opportunity
Act of 2004 (HERO Act). Amends the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act to
give additional preferential trade treatment to Haiti if the President certifies to
Congress that Haiti has fulfilled certain requirements, including that Haiti “has
established or is making continual progress toward establishing”a market-based
economy that “minimizes government interference in the economy ... ;” the rule of
law; elimination of barriers to U.S. trade and investment; economic policies to reduce
poverty and achieve other goals; a system to combat corruption; protection of
internationally recognized worker rights; and that Haiti does not engage in activities
that undermine U.S. national security or foreign policy interests; and does not engage
in gross violations of human rights or support acts of international terrorism, and
cooperates in international efforts to eliminate them. Introduced March 30, 2004.
Senate version passed with an amendment by Unanimous Consent July 16, held at
Senate desk. House version introduced, referred to Committee on Ways and Means
July 21.

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