Order Code RL30957
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990
Updated May 27, 2005
Shirley A. Kan
Specialist in National Security Policy
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990
Summary
This report, updated as warranted, discusses U.S. security assistance to Taiwan,
or Republic of China (ROC), including policy issues for Congress and legislation.
The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8, has governed U.S. arms sales to Taiwan
since 1979, when the United States recognized the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
instead of the ROC. Two other relevant parts of the “one China” policy are the
August 17, 1982 U.S.-PRC Joint Communique and the “Six Assurances” made to
Taiwan. (Also see CRS Report RL30341, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One
China” Policy — Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei
, by Shirley
Kan.) Despite the absence of diplomatic relations or a defense treaty, U.S. arms sales
to Taiwan have been increasingly significant. In addition, the United States has
expanded military ties with Taiwan after the PRC’s missile firings in 1995-1996.
At the U.S.-Taiwan arms sales talks on April 24, 2001, President George W.
Bush approved for possible sale: diesel-electric submarines, P-3 anti-submarine
warfare (ASW) aircraft (linked to the submarine sale), four decommissioned U.S.
Kidd-class destroyers, and other items. Bush also deferred decisions on Aegis-
equipped destroyers and other items, while denying other requests. Since then,
attention has turned to Taiwan, where the military, civilian officials, and legislators
from competing political parties have debated contentious issues about how much to
spend on defense and which U.S. weapons systems to acquire, despite the increasing
threat (including a missile buildup) from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), as
described in the Pentagon’s reports to Congress on PRC military power. In February
2003, the Administration pointed Taiwan to three priorities for defense: command
and control, missile defense, and ASW. The Administration and others have
questioned Taiwan’s seriousness about its self-defense, level of defense spending,
and protection of secrets. Since 2004, U.S. officials and Members of Congress
repeatedly have urged Taiwan’s legislature to pass a Special Budget (about US$15.5
billion) for PAC-3 missile defense systems, P-3C ASW aircraft, and submarines.
Several policy issues are of concern to Congress for legislation, oversight, or
other action. One issue concerns the effectiveness of the Administration in applying
leverage to improve Taiwan’s self-defense as well as to maintain peace and stability.
Another issue is the role of Congress in determining security assistance, defense
commitments, or policy reviews. A third issue concerns whether trends in the
Taiwan Strait are stabilizing or destabilizing and how the Administration’s
management of policy has affected these trends. The fundamental issue is whether
the United States would go to war with China and how conflict should be avoided.
On May 25, 2005, the House passed its National Defense Authorization Act for
FY2006 (H.R. 1815), which would change policy to allow U.S. flag and general
officers and senior defense officials to visit Taiwan, reciprocating visits by senior
officers and officials from Taiwan that already take place in the United States. The
bill added new language that would ensure that Capstone classes at the National
Defense University (for new general and flag officers) conduct trips to the PRC and
Taiwan. On May 27, Rep. Simmons and 32 other Members wrote to an opposition
party leader in Taiwan urging his support for the long-delayed Special Budget.

Contents
U.S. Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Policy Statements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Broad Indicators of Arms Transfers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Military Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
“Software Initiative” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Assessments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Normalized Relations and “Major Non-NATO Ally” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Senior-Level Exchanges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
April 2001 Arms Requests and Status of Arms Sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Amphibious Assault Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Attack Helicopters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Kidd-Class Destroyers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Aegis-equipped Destroyers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Submarines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
P-3C ASW Aircraft . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
PAC-3 Missile Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Early Warning Radars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
C4ISR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
AMRAAM and SLAMRAAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Taiwan’s Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Other Possible Future Sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Policy Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Extent of U.S. Commitment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Jiang Zemin’s Offer on Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Taiwan’s Commitment to Self-Defense and Budgets . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Policy Reviews and U.S. Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Visits by Generals to Taiwan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Major Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
105th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
106th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
107th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
108th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
109th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Major U.S. Arms Sales as Notified to Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
List of Tables
Taiwan’s Defense Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990
U.S. Policy
This report discusses U.S. security assistance for Taiwan, formally called the
Republic of China (ROC), including policy issues for Congress. It also lists sales of
major defense articles and services to Taiwan, as approved by the Administration,
proposed in Letters of Offer and Acceptance, and notified to Congress since 1990.
Policy Statements
The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8, has governed U.S. arms sales to
Taiwan since 1979, when the United States recognized the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) instead of the ROC.1 The TRA specifies that it is U.S. policy, among
the stipulations: to consider any non-peaceful means to determine Taiwan’s future
of “grave concern” to the United States; “to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive
character;” and “to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to
force or other forms of coercion” jeopardizing the security, or social or economic
system of Taiwan’s people. Section 3(a) states that “the United States will make
available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as
may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.”
The TRA also specifies a congressional role in decision-making on security
assistance for Taiwan. Section 3(b) stipulates that both the President and the
Congress shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services
based solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan. Section 3(b) also says that
“such determination of Taiwan’s defense needs shall include review by United States
military authorities in connection with recommendations to the President and the
Congress.” The TRA set up the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), a nonprofit
corporation, to handle the relationship with Taiwan. AIT implements policy as
directed by the Departments of Defense and State, and the National Security Council
(NSC) of the White House.
There are two other elements of the “one China” policy relevant to the issue of
arms sales to Taiwan. In 1982, President Reagan issued the August 17 Joint
Communique on reducing arms sales to Taiwan, but he also stated that those sales
will continue in accordance with the TRA and with the full expectation that the
PRC’s approach to the resolution of the Taiwan issue will be peaceful. In referring
to what have been known as the “Six Assurances” made to Taipei, U.S. policy-
makers have said that, in 1982, Washington did not agree to set a date for ending
1 For more on this policy, see CRS Report RL30341, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One
China” Policy — Key Statements From Washington, Beijing, and Taipei
, by Shirley Kan.

CRS-2
arms sales to Taiwan nor to consult with Beijing on arms sales to Taiwan. The “Six
Assurances” also included the assurance of not revising the TRA.
Broad Indicators of Arms Transfers
As for U.S. arms transfers to Taiwan, they have been significant despite the
absence of diplomatic relations or a treaty alliance. The value of deliveries of U.S.
defense articles and services to Taiwan totaled $7.2 billion in the 1996-1999 period
and $4.5 billion in 2000-2003, ranking first among Asian recipients. Worldwide,
Taiwan ranked second (behind Saudi Arabia) in 1996-1999, and third (behind Saudi
Arabia and Egypt) in 2000-2003. In 2003 alone, Taiwan ranked 8th among
worldwide recipients, receiving $540 million in U.S. defense articles and services.2
Values for U.S. agreements with and deliveries to Taiwan are summarized below.
1996-1999 period
2000-2003 period
2003
Agreements
$1,700 million
$820 million
$390 million
Deliveries
$7,200 million
$4,500 million
$540 million
From worldwide sources, including the United States, Taiwan received $19.4
billion in arms deliveries in the eight-year period from 1996 to 2003 — with Taiwan
ranked second behind Saudi Arabia among leading recipients in the developing
world. Of that total, Taiwan received $15.3 billion in arms in 1996-1999, and $4.1
billion in 2000-2003. (The PRC, ranked third, receiving $10.2 billion in arms during
the same eight-year period.) However, in 2003 alone, Taiwan received $500 million
in arms deliveries, while the PRC received arms deliveries valued at $1.0 billion.3
Moreover, as an indication of future arms acquisitions, China ranked first
among developing nations in arms purchase agreements during 2000-2003, with a
total value of $9.3 billion, while Taiwan’s agreements did not place it among the top
10 recipients. China ranked second in arms purchase agreements in 2003 alone, with
a total value of $1.6 billion. Taiwan was in 10th place with $400 million.
Military Relationship
“Software Initiative”. In addition to transfers of hardware, beginning after
tensions in the Taiwan Strait in 1995-1996 during which President Clinton deployed
two aircraft carrier battle groups near Taiwan, the Clinton Administration quietly
expanded the sensitive military relationship with Taiwan to levels unprecedented
2 CRS Report RL32689, U.S. Arms Sales: Agreements with and Deliveries to Major Clients,
1996-2003
, December 8, 2004, by Richard Grimmett, compiled from U.S. official,
unclassified data as reported by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).
3 CRS Report RL32547, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1996-2003,
August 26, 2004, by Richard Grimmett, compiled from unclassified data from DSCA.

CRS-3
since 1979.4 The broader exchanges have increased attention to “software,”
including discussions over strategy, training, logistics, command and control, and
plans in the event of an attack from the PRC. These increased exchanges were
prompted by U.S. concerns about Taiwan’s self-defense capabilities. At a conference
on Taiwan’s defense in March 2002, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz
said that the United States wanted to help Taiwan’s military to strengthen civilian
control, enhance jointness, and rationalize arms acquisitions.5 In April 2004,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Peter Rodman told
Congress that the Pentagon believed Taiwan’s military needed to improve readiness,
planning, and interoperability among its services.6
Assessments. The Pentagon has also conducted its own assessments of
Taiwan’s defense needs, with over a dozen studies from 1997 to early 2004.7
Congress could inquire about these assessments and any other reports. In September
1999, to enhance cooperation, a Pentagon team was said to have visited Taiwan to
assess its air defense capability.8 The Pentagon reportedly completed its classified
assessment in January 2000, finding a number of problems in the Taiwan military’s
ability to defend against aircraft, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles, and those
problems included international isolation, inadequate security, and sharp inter-service
rivalries.9 In September 2000, the Pentagon reportedly conducted a classified
assessment of Taiwan’s naval defense needs — as the Clinton Administration had
promised in April 2000 while deferring a sale of Aegis-equipped destroyers. The
report, “Taiwan Naval Modernization,” was said to have found that Taiwan’s navy
needed the Aegis radar system, Kidd-class destroyers, submarines, an anti-submarine
underwater sonar array, and P-3 anti-submarine aircraft.10 In January 2001, a
Pentagon team reportedly examined Taiwan’s command and control, air force
4 Mann, Jim, “U.S. Has Secretly Expanded Military Ties with Taiwan,” LA Times, July 24,
1999; Kurt M. Campbell (former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and
Pacific Affairs) and Derek J. Mitchell, “Crisis in the Taiwan Strait?”, Foreign Affairs,
July/August 2001.
5 Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, “Remarks to the U.S.-Taiwan Business
Council,” March 11, 2002.
6 Testimony before the House International Relations Committee, hearing on “The Taiwan
Relations Act: The Next 25 Years,” April 21, 2004.
7 Statement of Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Peter
Rodman at a hearing on “The Taiwan Relations Act: The Next 25 Years” held by the House
International Relations Committee on April 21, 2004.
8 “U.S. Military Team Arrives in Taiwan for Visit,” Lien-ho Pao [United Daily News], Sept.
19, 1999, in FBIS.
9 Ricks, Thomas, “Taiwan Seen as Vulnerable to Attack,” Washington Post, March 31,
2000.
10 Tsao, Nadia, “Pentagon Report Says Taiwan Can Handle AEGIS,” Taipei Times, Sept. 27,
2000; Michael Gordon, “Secret U.S. Study Concludes Taiwan Needs New Arms,” New York
Times
, April 1, 2001.

CRS-4
equipment, and air defense against a first strike.11 In September 2001, a Defense
Department team reportedly visited Taiwan to assess its army, as the Bush
Administration promised in the April 2001 round of arms sales talks.12 In August
2002, a U.S. military team studied Taiwan’s Po Sheng command, control,
communication, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR)
program.13 In November 2002, another U.S. team visited Taiwan to assess its
marine corps and security at ports and harbors, and reported positive findings.14 In
November 2003, a U.S. defense team visited Taiwan to assess its anti-submarine
warfare (ASW) capability and rated the overall capability as poor.15
Normalized Relations and “Major Non-NATO Ally”. The George W.
Bush Administration has continued and expanded the closer military ties at different
levels. In April 2001, President Bush announced he would drop the 20-year-old
annual arms talks process used to discuss arms sales to Taiwan’s military in favor of
normal, routine considerations of Taiwan’s requests on an as-needed basis — similar
to interactions with other governments.16 In July 2001, after U.S. and Taiwan media
reported on a U.S.-Taiwan military meeting in Monterey, CA, the Pentagon revealed
it was the seventh meeting (since 1997) held with Taiwan’s national security
authorities “to discuss issues of interaction and means by which to provide for the
defense of Taiwan.”17 Another round of such strategic talks took place in July
2002.18 U.S. military officers observed Taiwan’s Hankuang-17 annual military
exercise in 2001, the first time since 1979.19 The Pacific Command’s Asia-Pacific
Center for Security Studies accepted fellows from Taiwan in its Executive Course
for the first time in the summer of 2002.20 By the summer of 2002, the U.S. and
Taiwan militaries reportedly discussed setting up an undersea ASW link to monitor
11 China Times (Taiwan), January 14, 2001; Taipei Times, January 15, 2001.
12 Taipei Times (Taiwan), September 10, 2001.
13 Taiwan Defense Review (Taiwan), August 27, 2002.
14 Taipei Times, November 21, 2002; January 1, 2003; Tzu-Yu Shih-Pao [Liberty Times]
(Taipei), April 14, 2003; Taipei Times, August 22, 2003.
15 Jane’s Defense Weekly, December 3, 2003; Taiwan Defense Review, January 12, 2004;
Jane’s Defense Weekly, June 30, 2004.
16 On the annual arms talks, see CRS Report RS20365, Taiwan: Annual Arms Sales Process,
updated June 5, 2001, by Shirley Kan.
17 China Times (Taiwan), July 18, 2001; Washington Times, July 18, 2001; Department of
Defense News Briefing, July 19, 2001.
18 Central News Agency, Taipei, July 17, 2002.
19 Chung-Kuo Shih-Pao [China Times], Taipei, July 18, 2001. The China Times (May 27,
2004) quotes Defense Minister Lee Jye confirming that U.S. military personnel observed
Hankuang-17, Hankuang-18, and Hankuang-19 exercises to evaluate Taiwan’s military.
20 CNN.com, March 18, 2002; Author’s discussions in Hawaii in July 2002.

CRS-5
the PLA Navy’s submarines.21 The U.S. and Taiwan militaries set up a hotline in
2002 to deal with possible crises.22
In addition, in 2002, the Administration asked Congress to pass legislation to
authorize the assignment of personnel from U.S. departments (including the Defense
Department) to AIT, with implications for the assignment of active-duty military
personnel to Taiwan for the first time since 1979. Also, the Acting Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Michael Wynne, submitted
a letter to Congress on August 29, 2003, that designated Taiwan as a “major non-
NATO ally.” (See 107th Congress.) The assignment of the first active-duty Army
officer has been scheduled to begin in mid-2005,23 similar to duty in Hong Kong.
Senior-Level Exchanges. The United States and Taiwan have held high-
level defense-related meetings in the United States. The Bush Administration
granted a visa for Defense Minister Tang Yiau-ming to visit the United States to
attend a private conference held by the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council on March 10-
12, 2002, in St. Petersburg, FL, making him the first ROC defense minister to come
to the United States on a non-transit purpose since 1979.24 Tang met with Deputy
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, who also spoke at the conference.25 However,
after this visit, Taiwan’s defense minister has declined to travel to the United States.
In September 2002, a deputy defense minister, Kang Ning-hsiang, visited
Washington and was the first senior Taiwan defense official to have meetings inside
the Pentagon since U.S.-ROC diplomatic ties severed in 1979, although a meeting
with Wolfowitz took place outside the Pentagon.26
In January 2003, a Taiwanese newspaper leaked information that a U.S. military
team planned to participate in — beyond observe — the Hankuang-19 military
exercise and be present at Taiwan’s Hengshan Command Center for the first time
since 1979.27 On the same day, General Chen Chao-min, a deputy defense minister,
confirmed to Taiwan’s legislature a U.S. plan for a non-combatant evacuation
operation (NEO). However, the leak and confirmation reportedly prompted
annoyance in Washington and contributed to a U.S. decision to limit General Chen’s
visit to the United States in February 2003 to attendance at a private sector
conference on Taiwan’s defense in San Antonio, TX (without a visit to
Washington).28 Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless and Deputy
21 Tzu-Yu Shih-Pao [Liberty Times], Taipei, July 20, 2002.
22 Jane’s Defense Weekly, October 29, 2003.
23 Jane’s Defense Weekly, December 22, 2004.
24 In December 2001, the previous ROC Defense Minister, Wu Shih-wen, made a U.S.
transit on his way to the Dominican Republic.
25 Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, “Remarks to the U.S.-Taiwan Business
Council,” March 11, 2002.
26 Reuters, September 10, 2002.
27 Chung-Kuo Shih-Pao [China Times], January 2, 2003.
28 Taiwan Defense Review, January 18, 2003; Straits Times (Singapore), January 21, 2003.

CRS-6
Assistant Secretary of State Randall Schriver met with General Chen. The
Hankuang-19 exercise reportedly took place in April-May 2003, with about 20 U.S.
military personnel participating. The exercise reportedly raised questions about
Taiwan’s ability to sustain defense before potential U.S. support and the military’s
will to fight.29 Deputy Defense Minister Lin Chong-pin visited Washington in June
2003 to respond to concerns about Taiwan’s commitment to self-defense. The
Hankuang-20 exercise included a reportedly U.S.-provided computer simulation in
August 2004 that resulted in the PLA invading and capturing the capital, Taipei,
within six days.30 In October 2004, Taiwan’s Deputy Minister for Armaments,
General Huoh Shoou-yeh, attended a private U.S.-Taiwan defense conference in
Scottsdale, Arizona. In May 2005, the Chief of General Staff, General Lee Tien-yu,
visited the United States, but he was the first Chief of General Staff to visit since
Tang Fei’s visit in 1998.31
April 2001 Arms Requests and Status of Arms Sales
In 2001, arms sales talks took place on April 24 in Washington, DC, and Taiwan
was represented by its Vice Chief of General Staff, General Huoh Shou-yeh.
According to the Administration and news reports,32 President Bush approved
Taiwan’s request for: 8 diesel-electric submarines, 12 P-3C Orion anti-submarine
warfare (ASW) aircraft (linked to the submarine sale), 54 Mark-48 ASW torpedoes,
44 Harpoon submarine-launched anti-ship cruise missiles, 144 M109A6 Paladin self-
propelled howitzers, 54 AAV7A1 amphibious assault vehicles, AN/ALE-50
electronic countermeasure (ECM) systems for F-16s, and 12 MH-53 mine-sweeping
helicopters. Also approved for sale were four decommissioned Kidd-class
destroyers, offered as Excess Defense Articles (EDA), not FMS. The Administration
also decided to brief Taiwan’s military on the PAC-3 missile defense missile.33
President Bush deferred decisions on destroyers equipped with the Aegis
combat system. Bush also deferred decisions on M1A2 Abrams main battle tanks
and AH-64D Apache Longbow attack helicopters, pending a U.S. assessment of
Taiwan’s army.
29 Lien-Ho Pao [United Daily News] (Taipei), April 16, 2003; China Times (Taipei), April
19, 2003; Taipei Times, April 25, 2003; Central News Agency (Taipei), May 9, 2003.
30 AFP, August 11, 2004; Taiwan News, August 12, 2004.
31 Lien-Ho Pao [United Daily News] (Taipei), May 26, 2005.
32 White House, press briefing, April 24, 2001; Department of Defense, news briefing, April
24, 2001;David Sanger, “Bush is Offering Taiwanese Some Arms, But Not the Best,” New
York Times
, April 24, 2001; Steven Mufson and Dana Milbank, “Taiwan to Get Variety of
Arms,” Washington Post, April 24, 2001; Neil King Jr., “Bush Defers Sale of Aegis to
Taiwan, Will Offer Four Kidd-Class Destroyers,” Wall Street Journal, April 24, 2001; “U.S.
Refuses Taiwan Request for JDAM, HARM, and PAC-3 Missiles,” Aerospace Daily, April
25, 2001; and “U.S. Formally Informs ROC of Arms Sales Decision,” Central News Agency
(Taiwan), April 25, 2001.
33 Taiwan Defense Review, January 18, 2003, reported the briefing took place in late 2001.

CRS-7
President Bush denied Taiwan’s requests for Joint Direct Attack Munitions
(JDAM) and High-speed Anti-radiation Missiles (HARM) that target radar-equipped
air defense systems. At the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council’s conference in February
2003, however, Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force Willard Mitchell indicated
that these requests were under review. A possible basis for reviewing any renewed
requests from Taiwan was found in the Pentagon’s report on PRC Military Power
submitted in July 2003 to Congress, which confirmed that the PLA procured from
Israel “a significant number of HARPY anti-radiation systems.” The press first
reported on the PLA’s acquisition of the HARPY drones in 2002.34 By the second
half of 2004, the Administration reportedly considered a new request for HARM
missiles (submitted in August 2004), while a decision on JDAM guidance kits also
remained pending.35
Amphibious Assault Vehicles. Taiwan agreed to purchase the AAV7A1
amphibious assault vehicles, under a program administered by the U.S. Marine
Corps. The Administration notified Congress in September 2002. United Defense
Industries obtained a contract in June 2003, and deliveries began in March 2005.36
Attack Helicopters. After deferring a decision on Taiwan’s request, the Bush
Administration, in May 2002, approved the request for attack helicopters, and
Taiwan began negotiations on 30 Apache helicopters sold by Boeing.37 Later,
Taiwan also has considered the AH-1Z Cobra helicopter sold by Bell.38
Kidd-Class Destroyers. In October 2002, the Defense Committee of
Taiwan’s legislature engaged in a sharp partisan debate over whether to approve
funding (about $800 million) to buy the U.S. Navy’s four currently available Kidd-
class destroyers, ending with 18 lawmakers from the ruling Democratic Progressive
Party (DPP) and Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) voting in favor, against 16
legislators from the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) and People’s First Party (PFP).39
Then, legislators conditioned funding on bargaining with the U.S. Navy on a 15%
price reduction. On May 30, 2003, Taiwan’s legislature finally voted to release the
funding. The U.S. Navy began reactivation and upgrade of the Kidds in July 2003,
and VSE Corp. is expected to deliver the Kidds ahead of schedule in 2005-2007.40
34 Washington Times, July 2, 2002; Guangzhou Daily (via FBIS), July 4, 2002; Ha’aretz, Tel
Aviv, July 25, 2002; Flight International, November 5-11, 2002.
35 Taiwan News, October 6, 2004; Washington Times, October 8, 2004; Taiwan Defense
Review
, November 26, 2004.
36 Jane’s International Defense Review, September 2003; Taiwan Defense Review, March
4, 2005.
37 Taipei Times, May 26, 2002; Jane’s Defense Weekly, June 5, 2002.
38 Jane’s Defense Weekly, March 10 and 24, 2004.
39 Taipei Times and China Post (Taiwan), November 1, 2002.
40 Taipei Times, September 5, 2003; Taiwan Defense Review, March 10, 2004; Taipei Times,
September 15, 2004; Jane’s Defense Weekly, November 10, 2004.

CRS-8
Aegis-equipped Destroyers. The Department of Defense considered the
Kidds as platforms to provide Taiwan’s navy with the necessary operational
experience before any possible acquisition of more advanced Aegis-equipped ships.41
The U.S. Navy deploys the Aegis combat system (e.g., on the Arleigh Burke-class
destroyer) for air defense and applies it in development of a future Navy missile
defense system (using SM-3 missiles). An alternative to the Arleigh Burke that
retains the Aegis Spy-1D radar, called the Evolved Advanced Combat System
(EACS) has been considered. The Aegis combat system has the capability to track
over 100 targets and to conduct simultaneous anti-air, anti-surface, and anti-
submarine operations. During the U.S. war in Iraq in 2003, the Aegis combat system
helped the Patriot missile defense system to detect and intercept Iraqi missiles.42 In
2003, Taiwan requested four new Arleigh Burke-class, Aegis-equipped destroyers,
for delivery in 2010 and at an estimated cost of about $4.8 billion.43
Submarines. Despite initial press reports skeptical about the sale of
submarines (because the United States no longer manufactures diesel-electric
submarines), the Department of Defense has discussed options for the program with
U.S. and foreign companies and Taiwan. In November 2001, seven companies
submitted bids and concept papers to the Department of the Navy. Companies
interested in the contract reportedly include U.S. manufacturers, Northrop Grumman
(with its Ingalls Shipbuilding shipyard) and General Dynamics (with its Electric Boat
shipyard); Germany’s HDW; the Netherlands’ RDM (which sold its Zwaardvis-class
submarine design to Taiwan in the 1980s for two Hai Lung [Sea Dragon]-class
submarines); France’s DCN; and Spain’s IZAR. Although the Administration
promised to help Taiwan buy submarines, not build them, Taiwan’s China
Shipbuilding Corporation also became interested in a part of the contract, with
support from some of Taiwan’s legislators. The Department of Navy discussed
options with Taiwan’s Navy in July 2002 and initially planned to select the
manufacturer(s) to design and build the submarines in the latter half of 2003.44 The
U.S. Navy held a second Industry Day on December 17, 2002, with General
Dynamics, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon interested in being
the prime contractor.45
However, by April 2003, the sale became at risk, when the United States and
Taiwan reached an impasse over the program start-up costs estimated by the U.S.
Navy at $333 million, but offered at $28.5 million by Taiwan. On May 20-23, 2003,
Taiwan’s Navy sent a delegation led by Vice Admiral Kao Yang to Washington to
41 Consultations; and Wendell Minnick, “What Those Systems are All About,” Topics,
November 2004.
42 Discussion with Lockheed Martin executive, June 10, 2004; and U.S. Army, 32nd Army
Air and Missile Defense Command, Fort Bliss, TX, “Operation Iraqi Freedom: Theater Air
and Missile Defense,” September 2003.
43 Lien-Ho Pao, September 1, 2004; Taiwan Defense Review, December 19, 2004.
44 Central News Agency (Taiwan), July 30, 2002; Taipei Times, July 31, 2002; Defense
Daily
, September 16, 2002.
45 Knight-Ridder/Tribune Business News, December 17, 2002.

CRS-9
discuss the issue, but the differences reportedly remained unresolved.46 Facing the
delays in Taiwan’s commitment of funds (although it first requested submarines in
1995) and a long acquisition process, the Administration then viewed the program
as a long-term solution for Taiwan that would not meet the near-term blockade and
submarine threats posed by the PLA Navy.47 Defense Minister Tang Yiau-ming told
visiting AIT Chairwoman Therese Shaheen on October 16, 2003, that Taiwan still
placed a high priority on acquiring the submarines.48 Meanwhile, in 2003, the Bush
Administration inquired with Italy about buying eight decommissioning Sauro-class
diesel-electric submarines for the estimated cost of about $2 billion for delivery
starting in 2006, but Taiwan’s military opted for newly built submarines.49
A team from the U.S. Navy’s International Program Office arrived in Taipei in
October 2003, for further talks on whether Taiwan will procure submarines.50 The
U.S. team also met with some of Taiwan’s legislators, including Lin Yu-fang of the
opposition People First Party.51 Lin was one of the sponsors of legislation passed in
May 2002, requiring Taiwan’s navy to arrange for six of the eight submarines to be
built in Taiwan using technology transfers.52 The total cost of new submarines could
reach $9-12 billion,53 requiring Taiwan’s legislature to consider a controversial
Special Budget.54 (See Taiwan’s Commitment to Self-Defense and Budgets.)
Taiwan’s new demand for domestic industrial participation added another issue
and greater potential costs to the program (about $2.5 billion), which U.S. Navy
officials discussed with potential prime contractors at the 3rd Industry Day meeting
on December 15, 2003, in Washington.55 However, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Wolfowitz told Taiwan’s visiting legislative delegation on June 21, 2004, that the
Bush Administration approved Taiwan’s request for assistance in purchasing
submarines but is opposed to Taiwan’s new proposal to build them in Taiwan.56
With U.S. opposition to Taiwan’s domestic production of submarines conveyed in
46 United Daily News (Taipei), April 21, 2003 and April 22, 2003; Taiwan Defense Review,
May 17, 2003 and May 30, 2003.
47 U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, Defense and Aerospace Report, Second Quarter 2003;
Bloomberg, July 10, 2003; Defense Daily, July 11, 2003; TDReview, September 19, 2003.
48 Central News Agency, Taipei, October 16, 2003.
49 Wendell Minnick, “Submarine Decisions Show Lack of Creativity,” Taipei Times,
October 16, 2004.
50 Lien-ho Pao [United Daily News], Taipei, October 23, 2003; Central News Agency,
Taipei, October 26, 2003.
51 Taipei Times, October 31, 2003; Central News Agency, November 2, 2003.
52 Author’s discussion with Lin Yu-fang in Taipei in December 2003.
53 Lien-ho Pao [United Daily News], August 25, 2003.
54 Taiwan Defense Review, April 30, 2004.
55 Taiwan Defense Review, February 6, 2004 and April 30, 2004.
56 United Daily News (Taipei), June 23, 2004.

CRS-10
an official letter in September 2004, Minister of Defense Lee Jye estimated that the
cost of the submarine program could be reduced.57
Thus, with delays in Taiwan’s decision-making after 2001, Taiwan’s request for
and the Bush Administration’s approval of a sale of submarines have met with mixed
opinions in Taipei and Washington. Retired Admiral Michael McDevitt asserted in
late 2004 that if Taiwan now decided to withdraw its request for submarines, “you
would hear quiet applause all over the Department of Defense.”58
In addition to the military and political implications of selling submarines to
Taiwan’s navy, issues for Congress include potential technology transfers to Taiwan
and Europeans, and leaks of secrets from Taiwan to the PRC, that could involve U.S.
submarine secrets and implications for the U.S. military.59 In a report to Congress,
as required by the National Defense Authorization Act for FYs 1992-1993, the
Secretary of the Navy reported in May 1992 that “to the extent that a potential diesel
submarine construction project would draw on U.S. resources, it has the potential to
tap into the state-of-the-art technology used in U.S. nuclear powered submarines.”
The report also noted “the fact that the diesel submarine is not a viable asset in the
U.S. Navy” and that “construction of diesel submarines for export in U.S. shipyards
would not support the U.S. submarine shipbuilding base and could encourage future
development and operation of diesel submarines to the detriment of our own forces.”
The report also said that “it may be possible to control the release of the most
important information and specific technologies of concern, but an effective system
would also have significant costs. The problem will be more difficult, however, if
a foreign entity is present in the shipyards during submarine construction.”
P-3C ASW Aircraft. After the United States approved Taiwan’s request for
12 P-3C planes, the two sides have negotiated the proposed sale. But Taiwan
questioned the estimated cost of $300 million per plane (in part due to Lockheed
Martin’s need to reopen the production line) for a total cost of $4.1 billion (including
parts and training) and sought alternatives, such as surplus P-3Cs reduced from the
U.S. Navy’s fleet. A longer-term option is the Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft
(MMA) under development by Boeing’s subsidiary, McDonnell Douglas, for the U.S.
Navy. Taiwan’s legislature has to pass a Special Budget to include funds for
modified P-3C ASW planes (sold as Excess Defense Articles) with possible delivery
in 2008-2011.60 (See discussion on budgets below.)
PAC-3 Missile Defense. After U.S. approval in 1992, Taiwan in 1997
acquired three Patriot missile defense fire units with PAC-2 Guidance Enhanced
Missiles. After the Bush Administration in 2001 decided to brief Taiwan on the
advanced PAC-3 hit-to-kill missile, Taiwan has considered a deal on the PAC-3
57 Lien-Ho Pao, September 8, 2004; Central News Agency, October 19, 2004.
58 Taipei Times, December 18, 2004.
59 As for U.S. counter-espionage concerns, the FBI sent agents to Taipei to investigate
alleged compromises of security on the PRC’s behalf at Taiwan military’s Chungshan
Institute of Science and Technology, reported the Central News Agency, August 13, 2003.
60 Taiwan Defense Review, April 30, 2004.

CRS-11
system. (The U.S. Army completed developmental testing of the PAC-3 in October
2001 and conducted operational tests in 2002. The PAC-3 has been deployed with
the U.S. Army, as seen in Operation Iraqi Freedom during March-April 2003.
Raytheon describes its Patriot system as the world’s most advanced ground-based
system for defense against aircraft, theater ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles.)
In late 2002, the Pentagon reportedly was disappointed with Taiwan’s delay in
acquiring the PAC-3 system.61 At a private sector conference on Taiwan’s defense
in February 2003, Bush Administration officials openly stressed to Taiwan’s visiting
Deputy Defense Minister Chen Chao-min the imperative of acquiring advanced
missile defense systems. (See Policy Issues for Congress below.) In March 2003,
Mary Tighe, the Director of Asian and Pacific Affairs, led a Defense Department
delegation to Taiwan to urge its acquisition of missile defense systems, including the
PAC-3.62 After Chen criticized the Patriot’s performance in Operation Iraqi Freedom
in 2003, a Pentagon spokesperson, Jeff Davis, publicly corrected Chen to Taiwan’s
media on March 27, 2003.63 According to the U.S. Army, the Patriot missile defense
system (with Guidance Enhanced Missiles and PAC-3) intercepted nine Iraqi missiles
out of nine engagements.64 In April 2003, Taiwan submitted to the United States a
request for pricing and availability data in a step towards a contract, and in May
2004, the new Defense Minister Lee Jye requested six PAC-3 units and upgrade of
three PAC-2 Plus units to the PAC-3 standard.65
Despite the failure of a referendum to pass in March 2004, Taiwan reportedly
is looking to buy PAC-3 units, which would be part of a Special Budget that is under
consideration (see discussion on budgets below).66 Acquisition of missile defense
systems has been controversial in Taiwan, with some legislators supporting the
development of offensive missiles instead. Missile defense has also become
politicized, as shown in President Chen Shui-bian’s push for a referendum on buying
more missile defense systems that was held on election day on March 20, 2004, and
the failure of that referendum to be considered valid when only 45% of eligible voters
cast ballots (with 50% needed). (Out of the valid ballots cast, 92% agreed with the
proposal.)
Meanwhile, China’s buildup of short-range ballistic missiles with “adequate
precision guidance” could destroy key leadership facilities, military bases, and
communication and transportation nodes with “minimal advanced warning,”
61 Taiwan Defense Review, December 6, 2002.
62 Central News Agency (Taiwan), March 11, 2003.
63 Taipei Times, March 29, 2003.
64 U.S. Army, 32nd Army Air and Missile Defense Command, Fort Bliss, TX, “Operation
Iraqi Freedom: Theater Air and Missile Defense,” September 2003. For a skeptical view,
see Randy Barrett, “Pentagon Releases Candid Glimpse of Missile Defense During Iraq
War,” Space News, November 10, 2003.
65 Far Eastern Economic Review, May 15, 2003; Jane’s, July 23, 2003; Taiwan Defense
Review
, June 15, 2004.
66 Central News Agency, March 3, 2004; China Times, April 13, 2004; Taiwan Defense
Review
, April 30, 2004.

CRS-12
according to the Pentagon’s 2004 report to Congress on PRC military power.67 In
March 2005, Defense Minister Lee Jye said that the PLA has an estimated 700
ballistic missiles that could be used to bomb Taiwan for 10 hours.68
Early Warning Radars. In 1999, some in Congress encouraged the Clinton
Administration to approve a sale of early warning radars (see 106th Congress below),
approval that was given in 2000. The Pentagon has stressed the importance of long-
range early warning and tracking of ballistic and cruise missile attacks against
Taiwan. Taiwan reportedly has considered two options: a radar similar to AN/FPS-
115 Pave Paws sold by Raytheon and the LM Digital UHF Radar proposed by
Lockheed Martin.69 Despite divided opinions among lawmakers, in November 2003,
Taiwan’s legislature approved the Defense Ministry’s request for about $800 million
to fund one radar site (rather than an option for two).70 Nonetheless, on March 30,
2004, the Defense Department notified Congress of the potential sale of two ultra
high frequency long range early warning radars, with the potential value of $1.8
billion, that would enhance Taiwan’s ability to identify and detect ballistic missiles
as well as cruise missiles, and other threats from the air, and improve the early
warning capability of Taiwan’s C4ISR architecture. The formal notification pointed
out that there will not be U.S. personnel assigned to the radar(s). By early 2005,
Taiwan had not contracted for the controversial program, and Lockheed Martin
withdrew its bid.71
C4ISR. In addition, after approval in 1999, the United States reportedly has
assisted Taiwan’s C4ISR program (named Po Sheng), involving sales of datalink
systems and integration of the services into a joint command and control system.72
In July 2001, the Bush Administration notified Congress of a proposed sale of Joint
Tactical Information Distribution Systems (JTIDS)/Link 16 terminals, a basis for an
expanded program. In early 2003, the Administration signaled to Taiwan that this
FMS program (managed by the U.S. Navy’s SPAWAR command) should be given
top priority. Taiwan opted for a program costing a total of about $1.4 billion, rather
than a more comprehensive option costing about $3.9 billion.73 In September 2003,
Lockheed Martin obtained a contract with the initial value of $27.6 million.74 The
notification to Congress submitted on September 24, 2003, indicated that the total
value could reach $775 million. Taiwan’s Defense Ministry also decided not to
67 Department of Defense, “Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic
of China,” May 29, 2004.
68 Central News Agency, Taipei, March 9, 2005.
69 Jane’s Defense Weekly, March 26, 2003 and February 11, 2004.
70 Taiwan Defense Review, November 26, 2003; Jane’s Defense Review, December 3, 2003.
71 Jane’s Defense Weekly, February 9, 2005.
72 Chung-Kuo Shih-Pao [China Times] (Taiwan), July 18, 2001; Defense and Aerospace
(U.S.-Taiwan Business Council), 2001; Taiwan Defense Review, August 27, 2002.
73 SPAWAR briefing at U.S.-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference, February 12-14, 2003;
Taiwan Defense Review, July 17, 2003; Tzu-Yu Shih Pao [Liberty Times], July 14, 2003.
74 Taiwan Defense Review, September 17, 2003; Jane’s Defense Weekly, October 1, 2003.

CRS-13
integrate U.S. communications security (COMSEC) equipment that could facilitate
crisis-management and interoperability.75
AMRAAM and SLAMRAAM. In April 2000, the Clinton Administration
approved the sale of AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles
(AMRAAMs) to Taiwan, with the understanding that the missiles would be kept in
storage on U.S. territory and transferred later to Taiwan, if/when the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) acquires a similar Russian missile, like the R-77 (AA-12)
air-to-air missile, or threatens to attack Taiwan. In September 2000, the
Administration notified Congress of a potential sale of 200 AMRAAMs.
On July 1, 2002, the Washington Times reported that, in June, two SU-30
fighters of the PLA Air Force test-fired AA-12 medium-range air-to-air missiles
acquired from Russia. The report raised questions as to whether the PLA already
deployed the missiles. According to Reuters (July 10, 2002), Raytheon planned to
finalize production of the AMRAAMs for Taiwan by the fall of 2003. Some in
Congress urged the Bush Administration to transfer the AMRAAMs to Taiwan after
production. (See 107th Congress.)
By the end of 2002, the Bush Administration authorized delivery of the
AMRAAMs to Taiwan and briefed its air force on ground-launched AMRAAMs.76
(The U.S. Army has developed the Surface Launched Advanced Medium Range Air-
to-Air Missile, or SLAMRAAM, for cruise missile defense.) By November 2003,
Taiwan received its first delivery of AMRAAMs, and a pilot of Taiwan’s air force
test-fired an AMRAAM at Tyndall Air Force Base in Florida on November 10,
2003.77 However, although the Clinton Administration agreed to Taiwan’s request
for 200 AMRAAMs for Taiwan’s 150 F-16 fighters, Taiwan’s Air Force actually
purchased only 120 AMRAAMs (although some U.S. observers think Taiwan needs
at least 350 AMRAAMs).78 By April 2004, the Defense Department reportedly
encouraged Taiwan to acquire the SLAMRAAM to help counter the PLA’s expected
deployment of land attack cruise missiles.79
Taiwan’s Decisions. Since the U.S. response to Taiwan’s requests in 2001,
attention has turned to Taiwan, where the military, civilian officials, and competing
political parties in a newly assertive legislature (Lifa Yuan, or LY) have debated
contentious issues. These issues include the urgency of a possible PLA attack, how
much to spend on defense, which U.S. weapons systems to buy, whether to respond
to perceived U.S. pressure, and what the defense strategy should be. The debate has
taken place as the Pentagon has warned of the PLA’s accelerated buildup in a
75 U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, “Defense & Security Report,” Third Quarter 2004.
76 Lien-Ho Pao [United Daily News], Taipei, January 5, 2003; Remarks of Deputy Under
Secretary of the Air Force Willard Mitchell at the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council’s
conference in February 2003.
77 Taiwan Defense Review, November 15, 2003; Central News Agency, November 18, 2003.
78 Wendell Minnick, op-ed, “Taiwan’s Military will Fire Blanks,” Taipei Times, May 25,
2005.
79 Jane’s Defense Weekly, April 7, 2004.

CRS-14
coercive strategy targeting Taiwan. In early 2003, the Bush Administration stressed
to Taiwan the imperatives of missile defense, C4ISR, and anti-submarine warfare.
In March 2003, Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense issued a new procurement plan
emphasizing those priorities.80 However, getting a political consensus and funding
from the legislature has remained questionable in the politicized debate over defense.
Other Possible Future Sales. In addition to the major weapon systems
discussed above, possible future arms sales to Taiwan’s military include:
! signals intelligence (SIGINT) aircraft (perhaps sold by Gulfstream,
Raytheon, or Cessna) for which Taiwan reportedly requested price
and availability data in 2002;
! C-27J Spartan medium transport aircraft (sold by Lockheed Martin);
! F-35 Joint Strike Fighters (JSF), particularly the short take-
off/vertical landing (STOVL) version, under development by
Lockheed Martin and foreign partners (including Singapore);
! Stryker armored wheeled vehicles (sold by General Dynamics);
! upgraded engines for F-16 fighters (sold by Pratt & Whitney or
General Electric);
! new or surplus F-16 fighters;
! CH-53X minesweeping helicopters (developed by Sikorsky)
! search-and-rescue helicopters (Sikorsky or Bell)
! trainer aircraft.81
Policy Issues for Congress
Since the early 1990s, and accelerated after 1999,82 the PLA has modernized
with a missile buildup and foreign arms acquisitions, primarily from Russia.83 As a
result of the PLA’s provocative exercises and missile test-firings in 1995 and 1996
that were directed against Taiwan, Congress has increasingly asserted its role vis-a-
vis the Administration in determining security assistance for Taiwan, as stipulated
by Section 3(b) of the TRA, as well as in exercising its oversight of Section 2(b)(6)
of the TRA on the U.S. capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of
coercion against Taiwan. Congress has increasingly asserted its role in determining
arms sales to Taiwan before sales are decided. Policy issues center on how
80 Taiwan Defense Review, March 12, 2003.
81 Flight International, November 25-December 1, 2003; Jane’s Defense Review, January
14, 2004; U.S.-Taiwan Business Council, Defense and Aerospace Report, First Quarter
2004; Taiwan Defense Review, May 7, 2004; Central News Agency, June 21, 2004; Flight
International
, July 13-19, 2004; Flight International, September 7-13, 2004; Flight
International
, December 7-13, 2004; Taiwan Defense Review, December 30, 2004; AFP,
Hong Kong, March 8, 2005; Jane’s Defense Weekly, May 4, 2005.
82 1999 as an important decision point for PRC leaders is cited in the testimony of Assistant
Secretary of State James Kelly, at the hearing of the House International Relations
Committee, “The Taiwan Relations Act: The Next 25 Years,” April 21, 2004.
83 See the Defense Department’s reports to Congress on PRC Military Power; CRS Report
97-391, China: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles, by Shirley Kan, and CRS Report RL30700,
China’s Foreign Conventional Arms Acquisitions, by Shirley Kan, Christopher Bolkcom,
and Ronald O’Rourke.

CRS-15
effectively the Administration is helping Taiwan’s self-defense, the role of Congress
in determining arms sales to Taiwan, and whether aspects of U.S. security assistance
are stabilizing or destabilizing, and should be adjusted based on changed conditions.
Extent of U.S. Commitment. The persistent question for U.S. decision-
makers in the military, Administration, and Congress is whether the United States
would go to war with the PRC over Taiwan and the purpose of any conflict. The
TRA did not replace the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 that ended in 1979.
Nonetheless, some have called for a clear commitment (to shore up deterrence and
help Taiwan’s self-defense), advanced arms sales, interoperability with Taiwan’s
military, combined operational training and planning, high-level meetings, and visits
by U.S. flag and general officers to Taiwan. Others have argued that the United
States should avoid a war with China and needs a cooperative China in a number of
global problems, that trends in the Taiwan Strait are destabilizing, and that the United
States should limit security assistance as leverage to prevent provocative moves by
Taiwan’s leaders.
In March 1996, President Clinton deployed two aircraft carrier battle groups
near Taiwan in response to the PLA’s provocative missile test-firings and exercises.
Another question arose in April 2001 when President Bush said that he would do
“whatever it took to help Taiwan defend herself” if China attacked. Supporters have
viewed such clarity as needed to prevent miscalculations in Beijing and deter attacks
against Taiwan. However, critics have argued that Bush encouraged provocations
from Taipei, even if the message was not meant for Taiwan, and weakened
willingness in Taiwan to strengthen its own defense. Later, when Taiwan’s President
Chen Shui-bian advocated referendums and a new constitution, President Bush said
that “the comments and actions made by the leader of Taiwan indicate that he may
be willing to make decisions unilaterally to change the status quo, which we oppose,”
in appearing with PRC Premier Wen Jiabao in the Oval Office on December 9, 2003.
At a hearing in April 2004, in answer to Representative Gary Ackerman’s
questions about whether President Bush’s phrase on “whatever it took to help Taiwan
defend herself” means that the United States would go to war with China if Taiwan
makes unilateral moves toward independence, Assistant Secretary James Kelly stated
that what the president said has a meaning “at the time he says it to those listeners,”
we intend to fulfill the defense responsibilities under the TRA “to the extent
necessary,” “we oppose actions that would unilaterally alter Taiwan’s status,” leaders
in Taiwan “misunderstood” if they believe that President Bush supports whatever
they do, and “decisions of war and peace are made by the president with consultation
with Congress.” Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Rodman replied that President
Bush’s phrase was a reaffirmation of the TRA, which leaves a certain ambiguity.
Rodman also warned Beijing that its use of force would “inevitably” involve the
United States.84
Jiang Zemin’s Offer on Missiles. Moreover, there has been much interest
among U.S. academic circles and think tanks for Washington to pursue talks with
84 House International Relations Committee, hearing on “The Taiwan Relations Act: The
Next 25 Years,” April 21, 2004.

CRS-16
Beijing on its military buildup and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan (instead of simply
enhancing security assistance to Taiwan).85 A catalyst for this debate among
policymakers arose out of the U.S.-PRC summit in Crawford, TX, on October 25,
2002. As confirmed to Taiwan’s legislature by its envoy to Washington, C.J. Chen,
and reported in Taiwan’s media, PRC ruler Jiang Zemin offered in vague terms a
freeze or reduction in China’s deployment of missiles targeted at Taiwan, in return
for restraint in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.86 President Bush reportedly did not
respond to Jiang’s linkage. Editorials in Taiwan were divided on whether to pursue
Jiang’s offer.
Some argued that confidence building measures, such as a freeze or reduction
in PLA missile and other military deployments, would improve the chances for cross-
strait political dialogue and lead to greater stability. They said that the United States
could explore how the PRC might reduce the threat against Taiwan, such as
dismantling missile brigades in a verifiable manner, since sales of U.S. systems are
based on Taiwan’s defense needs. They argued that Jiang’s offer represented the first
time that the PRC offered meaningfully to discuss its forces opposite Taiwan. Others
said that a freeze or redeployment of missiles would not eliminate the PRC’s
continuing and broader military threat against Taiwan (including mobile missiles)
and that the PRC still refused to hold talks with leaders in Taipei. They argued that
Jiang did not seek to reduce the PLA’s coercive threat but to undermine the
relationship between Washington and Taipei, including sales and deliveries of
weapons systems which take years to complete. They pointed out that the PLA’s
missile buildup has continued.
One issue for congressional oversight has concerned whether and how the
Administration might deal with Beijing on the question of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.
Policy considerations include the TRA, the 1982 Joint Communique (which
discussed reductions in U.S. arms sales to Taiwan premised on the PRC’s peaceful
unification policy), and the 1982 “Six Assurances” to Taiwan (including one of not
holding prior consultations with the PRC on U.S. arms sales to Taiwan). At a
hearing in March 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell assured Senator Helms that
the “Six Assurances” would remain U.S. policy and that the Administration would
not favor consulting the PRC on arms sales to Taiwan.87 The Bush Administration
reportedly did not respond to Jiang’s verbal offer, noting the accelerated missile
buildup, continued military threats against Taiwan, the need for the PRC to talk
directly to Taiwan, the TRA, and the “Six Assurances” to Taiwan. In April 2004,
85 See David Lampton and Richard Daniel Ewing, “U.S.-China Relations in a Post-
September 11th World,” Nixon Center, August 2002; David Shambaugh’s arguments at
conference by Carnegie Endowment, Stanford University, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, and National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, on “Taiwan and
U.S. Policy: Toward Stability or Crisis?,” October 9, 2002; Michael Swaine, “Reverse
Course? The Fragile Turnaround in U.S.-China Relations,” Carnegie Endowment Policy
Brief, February 2003; and David Lampton, “The Stealth Normalization of U.S.-China
Relations,” National Interest, Fall 2003.
86 Chung-Kuo Shih-Pao [China Times], Taipei, November 22, 2002; Taipei Times,
November 23, 2002.
87 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearing on U.S. Foreign Policy, March 8, 2001.

CRS-17
Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly testified that if the PRC meets its stated
obligations to pursue a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and matches its
rhetoric with a military posture that bolsters and supports peaceful approaches to
Taiwan, “it follows logically that Taiwan’s defense requirements will change.”88
Taiwan’s Commitment to Self-Defense and Budgets. Congress has
oversight of the Administration’s dialogue with Taiwan about its self-defense and
military budgets. Congress also has discussed with Taiwan these responsibilities.
Since 2002, some have expressed increasing concerns about Taiwan’s commitment
to its self-defense and lack of national consensus on national security. The
Pentagon’s report on PRC Military Power submitted to Congress in July 2002 said
that reforms in Taiwan’s military were needed to achieve a joint service capability
to meet the growing challenge from the PLA’s modernizing air, naval, and missile
forces, but warned that “the defense budget’s steady decline as a percentage of total
government spending will challenge Taiwan’s force modernization.”89 The
Pentagon’s report issued in July 2003 further stressed that the relative decline in
Taiwan’s defense budget “increasingly” will challenge its force modernization.90 In
2003, supporters of Taiwan at the Heritage Foundation urged civilian and military
leaders in Taiwan to be “serious” about its own defense.91
Taiwan’s regular defense budget for 2004 was about US$8 billion, which
accounted for 2.5% of GDP and 16.6% of the total government budget, as compared
with 3.8% of GDP and 24.3% of total spending in 1994. These relative declines took
place even as the Pentagon has warned of an increased threat posed by the PLA to
Taiwan, U.S. support for Taiwan has increased after the 1995-1996 crisis, and the
PLA has obtained higher budgets. For 2005, Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense requested
a defense budget of NT$260.7 billion, a reduction of NT$3.1 billion from 2004, and
the final defense budget is NT$258.6 billion (about US$8.3 billion).92 In May 2005,
even as Taiwan’s Defense Minister Lee Jye requested that the defense budget
increase from 2.4 percent of GDP to 3.0 percent of GDP in the next five years, an
official in charge of the government’s budget failed to express support.93
88 House International Relations Committee, Hearing on “The Taiwan Relations Act: The
Next 25 Years,” April 21, 2004.
89 Department of Defense, “Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic
of China,” July 12, 2002.
90 Department of Defense, “Report on PRC Military Power,” July 30, 2003.
91 Peter Brookes, “The Challenges and Imperatives in Taiwan’s Defense,” Heritage Lectures,
January 9, 2003; John Tkacik, “Taiwan Must Get Serious About Defense,” Defense News,
January 27, 2003; John Tkacik, “Taiwan Must Grasp on True Defense Needs,” Defense
News
, December 1, 2003.
92 Consultations in Taipei and Washington; and FBIS report, October 22, 2004.
93 Taipei Times, May 24, 2005.

CRS-18
Taiwan’s Defense Budget
Military
Military
% of total
Fiscal
Budget
Budget
% of GDP
government
Year
(NT$ bil.)
(US$ bil.)
spending
1994
258.5
9.8
3.8
24.3
1995
252.3
9.5
3.5
24.5
1996
258.3
9.5
3.4
22.8
1997
268.8
9.4
3.3
22.5
1998
274.8
8.2
3.2
22.4
1999
284.5
8.8
3.2
21.6
2000
402.9
12.9
2.9
17.4
2001
269.8
8.0
2.9
16.5
2002
260.4
7.5
2.7
16.4
2003
257.2
7.6
2.6
15.5
2004
264.1
7.9
2.5
16.6
2005
258.6
8.3
2.4
16.1
Notes: This table was compiled using data on the regular defense budgets provided by the ROC’s
Ministry of National Defense, supplemented with data on GDP and exchange rates reported by Global
Insight and other reports. The currency is the New Taiwan Dollar (NT$). The FY2000 budget
covered the 18-month period from July 1999 to December 2000.
Meanwhile, the Department of Defense assessed that the PRC’s public military
budget “markedly understates” actual defense-related expenditures (excluding
categories such as weapons research and foreign arms purchases), and the Pentagon’s
report to Congress on PRC military power estimated that China’s total defense
spending for 2003 was between $50 billion and $70 billion.94 At that level, China
had the third highest level of defense spending in the world (after the United States
and Russia) and the highest level of defense spending in Asia (followed by Japan).
Still, according to China, its announced military budget projected for 2004 was about
US$25 billion, which was a doubling of the official budget of about US$12.6 billion
for 1999. On March 5, 2005, China announced a projected defense budget for 2005
of almost US$30 billion. China has announced double-digit increases in its nominal
defense budget every year since 1989. After 1996 (the second year of the Taiwan
Strait Crisis of 1995-1996), China’s announced military budget has increased in real
terms (accounting for inflation) every year, including real double-digit increases in
consecutive years since 1998.
94 The Defense Department estimates China’s total military spending at 3.5 to 5 percent of
gross domestic product (GDP). See Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and
Response
, 2001.

CRS-19
Some legislators in Taiwan have argued that Taiwan’s defense spending is still
significant, that the legislature in the newly consolidated democracy has the right to
scrutinize the defense budget, and that economic challenges have constrained defense
spending. Taiwan’s officials and legislators have pointed out that Taiwan has funded
defense out of separate Special Budgets in addition to the regular (annual) defense
budgets. Taiwan’s Special Budgets for defense in 1994-2003 totaled US$22.6 billion
and funded procurement of fighter aircraft and military housing construction.95 By
2003, anti-American complaints appeared in news articles in Taiwan about perceived
U.S. “pressure,” “extortion,” and untrustworthiness.96 In June 2003, Deputy Defense
Minister Lin Chong-pin and a Defense Committee delegation led by Legislative Yuan
President Wang Jin-pyng visited Washington to reassure the Bush Administration
and Congress that the government in Taipei remained committed to self-defense.97
In 2002, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense said that it needed the
legislature to approve NT$700 billion (about US$21 billion) over the next 10 years
for arms procurement.98 Taiwan’s defense ministry has requested a Special Budget
of $15-20 billion to procure the PAC-3 missile defense system, submarines, and P-3
ASW aircraft over the next 10-15 years.
In April 2004, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
Peter Rodman testified to Congress that “we have made clear to our friends on
Taiwan that we expect them to reverse this budget decline. Though our
commitments to Taiwan are enduring, the American people and both the Executive
Branch and Congress expect the people of Taiwan to make their own appropriate
commitment to their freedom and security.” Rodman also stressed that “we expect
Taiwan to go forward with its plan to pass a Special Budget this summer to fund
essential missile defense and anti-submarine warfare systems and programs
[emphasis added].99 On May 29, 2004, the Defense Department issued the 2004
report to Congress on PRC Military Power, stressing that “the principal indicator of
Taiwan’s commitment to addressing its shortfalls will be the fate of its annual
defense budget” and that “the island’s apparent lack of political consensus over
addressing [its military challenges] with substantially increased defense spending is
undoubtedly seen as an encouraging trend in Beijing.” U.S. statements appeared as
Taiwan considered a Special Budget.
On May 21, 2004, Taiwan’s Defense Minister Lee Jye submitted to the
Executive Yuan (Cabinet) a request for a Special Budget for defense totaling about
95 Taiwan’s official defense budgets and special budgets were provided by Taiwan’s
representative office in Washington, DC.
96 United Daily News, April 21, 2003; China Times, May 8, 2003 and August 18, 2003.
97 Meeting at CRS with Lin Chong-pin and congressional staff, June 5, 2003; Luncheon at
the Heritage Foundation with Taiwan’s legislative delegation led by Wang Jin-pyng, June
24, 2003; TECRO, Taipei Update, July 22, 2003.
98 Chung-Kuo Shih-Pao [China Times] (Taipei), May 17, 2002; Taiwan Defense Review,
August 30, 2002.
99 Statement before the House International Relations Committee, hearing on “The Taiwan
Relations Act: the Next 25 Years,” April 21, 2004.

CRS-20
US$20 billion.100 On June 2, the Executive Yuan of the ruling Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP) then passed a Special Budget of NT$610.8 billion (about
US$18.2 billion), with about $4.3 billion for PAC-3 missile defense systems, $12.3
billion for submarines, and $1.6 billion for P-3 aircraft.101
The Special Budget became a controversial political issue in Taiwan, with
elections for the Legislative Yuan (LY) on December 11, 2004. Opposition parties
of the “blue coalition”, the Kuomintang (KMT) and People’s First Party (PFP), called
for drastic cuts in the Special Budget and retained their majority in the LY.
The Special Budget was not passed in 2004, although the United States urged
passage and welcomed the LY’s president, Wang Jin-pyng, who led a delegation to
the United States on June 17-27, 2004, to gain information on the weapons programs.
Under Wang’s leadership, legislators from different political parties reached a
preliminary consensus in support of the Special Budget during their visit. They said
they would seek a new cost estimate for the submarines, with the options of a
construction or maintenance role for Taiwan’s shipbuilding industry and delivery in
ten (not 15) years (after Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz expressed to the
delegation U.S. opposition to Taiwan’s more expensive proposal to build submarines
domestically); and that they would consider splitting up the Special Budget to
approve funds for the P-3C aircraft and PAC-3 missile defense systems, ahead of
voting for subs.102 Taiwan also has the option of not procuring all three systems.
In a speech in October 2004, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense Richard
Lawless strongly urged Taiwan’s legislature to “vote in favor of Taiwan’s national
security.”103 He warned that the Special Budget is a “litmus test” of Taiwan’s
commitment to its self-defense and that “inability” to pass the Special Budget would
have “serious long-term consequences” (for foreign support, further intimidation
from Beijing, and perceptions of Taiwan as a “liability”). Lawless also called for
Taiwan to expand its efforts from “national defense” to “national security,” including
countering coercion and managing crises by protecting critical infrastructure (national
command facilities, telecommunications, utilities, media, computer networks, etc.).
Raising U.S. frustrations, it remains questionable as to when the LY might vote
on the Special Budget and at what funding level. In January 2005, President Chen
Shui-bian told Representative Tom Lantos that PFP Chairman James Soong changed
his position on the Special Budget after visiting Washington where he reportedly met
with Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless and Deputy Assistant
100 Central News Agency, Taipei, May 26, 2004; China Times, Taipei, May 27, 2004.
101 Central News Agency, Taipei, June 2, 2004.
102 Discussion with CRS and Congress on June 22, 2004; United Daily News, June 23, 2004.
103 Richard Lawless, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Affairs,
Keynote Address, U.S.-Taiwan Defense Industry Conference, U.S.-Taiwan Business
Council, October 4, 2004, Scottsdale, AZ. One of the ROC’s Deputy Ministers of Defense,
General Huoh Shou-Yeh, attended the conference.

CRS-21
Secretary of State Randy Schriver.104 The following month, Lawless warned that
Taiwan’s failure to approve the Special Budget signaled that it lacked seriousness
about its own security, raising questions about whether U.S. support has been
necessary or not.105 In February 2005, the Defense Ministry announced that the
Special Budget’s figure dropped to NT$590 billion (after appreciation of the NT
dollar relative to the U.S. dollar) and that the request would be reduced to NT$480
billion (US$15.5 billion) (after removing certain costs, including an estimated
US$2.3 billion associated with producing submarines domestically in Taiwan).106
The reduced figure also factored in moving some infrastructure costs to the annual
defense budget, but that budget has faced cuts. The Cabinet approved the new
request on March 16 and submitted it to the LY.107 Two days earlier, China’s
National People’s Congress adopted its “anti-secession” law, warning that the
government in Beijing may use force against Taiwan.
However, Chen and Soong issued a “Ten-Point Consensus” on February 24 that
did not mention the Special Budget. Indeed, the PFP raised another objection, saying
that the major items should be funded out of the annual defense budget instead of a
Special Budget.108 The Defense Ministry began to consider asking for funds for the
PAC-3 missile defense systems out of the annual defense budget, with submarines
as the top priority rather than missile defense, as the U.S. has stressed.109 In April-
May 2005, the chairmen of the opposition parties, KMT’s Lien Chan and PFP’s
James Soong, made historic visits of reconciliation to mainland China, meeting with
Hu Jintao, head of the Communist Party of China and PRC President. These visits
further dampened prospects that the Special Budget would be passed.
On May 24, 2005, the LY’s Procedures Committee failed to place the Special
Budget on the legislative calendar, blocking consideration before the session’s end
on May 31. Unless there is a special session in July or August, the LY’s next session
is scheduled to begin in September. On May 27, Representative Simmons and 32
other House Members wrote to KMT chairman Lien Chan, urging him to help
expedite passage of the Special Budget in May. They warned that “failure to pass the
special budget has raised concerns in the United States about Taiwan’s ability to
defend itself against potential aggression.”110
Meanwhile, a former Pentagon official warned that if Taiwan does not pass the
Special Budget and there are not expected improvements in Taiwan’s self-defense,
104 Agence France Presse, Hong Kong, January 17, 2005.
105 Taipei Times, February 26, 2005; Lawless gave a speech that was not publicly released,
apparently at a meeting in Washington of the U.S.-Taiwan Business Council.
106 Taipei Times, February 16, 2005; February 23, 2005.
107 Ettoday, Taipei, March 16, 2005 (via FBIS).
108 Lien-ho Pao [United Daily News], Taipei, March 21, 2005.
109 Tzu-yu Shih-pao [Liberty Times], Taipei, March 21, 2005; China Post, March 22, 2005.
110 Rep. Simmons, et al, letter to Chairman Lien Chan, Kuomintang, May 27, 2005.

CRS-22
the United States would be more hesitant to approve future requests from Taiwan for
weapons systems and possibly conduct a review of policy toward Taiwan.111
Policy Reviews and U.S. Objectives. Congress has a role in oversight of
any reviews of policy toward Taiwan. In September 1994, the Clinton
Administration explicitly and publicly testified to Congress about a major Taiwan
Policy Review.112 Defense ties would likely be included in any policy reviews of
how to enhance leverage over Taiwan and affect the cross-strait situation, including
whether to limit defense ties, apply conditions, or strengthen ties. Policy seeks to
achieve the U.S. objectives of assisting Taiwan’s self-defense capability, preventing
conflict, minimizing the chance of U.S. intervention, and promoting cross-strait
dialogue. While U.S. objectives have been consistent, developments in China and
Taiwan since the 1970s have required U.S. re-assessments and responses.
In late 2002, the Pentagon reportedly conducted a policy review of cooperation
with Taiwan that examined whether its leaders have taken defense seriously, whether
defense cooperation with Taiwan has been effective, and whether U.S. policy should
change.113 (The NSC, State Department, and AIT would have input into any review
by the Administration of policy toward Taiwan.114) At the U.S.-Taiwan Business
Council’s conference on Taiwan’s defense in February 2003, in San Antonio, TX,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless told Taiwan’s Vice Defense
Minister Chen Chao-min and others that, while the President said that we will do
whatever it takes to help Taiwan defend itself, Taiwan “should not view America’s
resolute commitment to peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait as a substitute for
investing the necessary resources in its own defense.” At the same occasion, Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State Randall Schriver indicated a new proactive U.S.
approach to Taiwan’s defense modernization, pointing Taiwan to three priorities:
missile defense, C4ISR, and ASW.
Taiwan’s election in March 2004 brought the re-election of President Chen
Shui-bian and his continued advocacy of a new constitution for Taiwan by 2008. In
April 2004, the Departments of State and Defense testified to the House International
Relations Committee, indicating a readjustment in the Bush Administration’s policy
toward Taiwan.115 Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly clarified U.S. policy by
stating that:
111 Interview with Mark Stokes, retired Air Force Lieutenant Colonel and Country Director
in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, in Taipei Times, April 24, 2005.
112 Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Winston
Lord, “Taiwan Policy Review,” before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
September 27, 1994. See CRS Report RL30341, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One
China” Policy — Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei
, by Shirley Kan.
113 Taiwan Defense Review, January 18, 2003.
114 The Nelson Report (January 31, 2003) reported there was an interagency East Asia Policy
Review.
115 House International Relations Committee, hearing on “The Taiwan Relations Act: The
Next 25 Years,” April 21, 2004.

CRS-23
! The United States “does not support” independence for Taiwan or
unilateral moves that would change the status quo “as we define it”
and opposes statements or actions from either side that would
unilaterally alter Taiwan’s “status.”
! U.S. efforts at deterring PRC coercion “might fail” if Beijing ever
becomes convinced Taiwan is embarked upon a course toward
independence and permanent separation from China, and concludes
that Taiwan must be stopped.
! It would be “irresponsible” of us or of Taiwan’s leaders to treat the
PRC’s statements as “empty threats.”
! The United States looks to President Chen to exercise the kind of
responsible, democratic, and restrained leadership that will be
necessary to ensure a peaceful and prosperous future for Taiwan.
! There are “limitations” with respect to what the United States will
support as Taiwan considers possible changes to its constitution.
! We urge Beijing and Taipei to pursue dialogue “as soon as possible”
through any available channels “without preconditions.”
At that same hearing, Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Rodman also warned PRC
leaders that any attempt by China to use force against Taiwan would “inevitably”
involve the United States.
Moreover, Assistant Secretary of State Kelly argued that a premise of arms sales
to Taiwan has been that “a secure and self-confident Taiwan is a Taiwan that is more
capable of engaging in political interaction and dialogue with the PRC, and we
expect Taiwan will not interpret our support as a blank check to resist such
dialogue.” However, some observers have begun to question the continued validity
of this premise. James Lilley, former ambassador in Beijing and representative in
Taipei, warned in April 2004 that:
The implicit American premise was that a secure and stable Taiwan would be a
more willing and successful partner in dealing with China. Judicious arms sales
to Taiwan were part of this formula and in the past it has worked. ... If elements
of this broader formula are disregarded by the current Taiwan authorities,
however, then the successful historic pattern has been broken. U.S. military
support and arms sales cannot be used by Taiwan to move away from China —
they were meant to make Taiwan feel secure enough to move toward
accommodation with China. Our support should be conditional on upholding our
successful pattern.116
Visits by Generals to Taiwan. As for senior-level contacts, the United
States and Taiwan have held high-level defense-related meetings in the United States.
U.S. policy previously restricted high-level military contacts but changed to welcome
Taiwan’s senior military officers and defense officials to visit the United States. At
the same time, the State Department’s policy has avoided sending to Taiwan U.S.
flag and general officers or officials at or above the level of deputy assistant secretary
of defense. For a hearing in 1999, Assistant Secretary of State Stanley Roth
responded to a submitted question on this issue by writing that “following the 1994
116 James Lilley, “Strait Talk,” Wall Street Journal, April 19, 2004.

CRS-24
policy review, the Administration authorized travel by high-level officials, including
cabinet officers, from economic and technical agencies. However, restrictions
remained at the same level for visitors from military or national security agencies at
or above the position of Deputy Assistant Secretary and at the rank of one-star flag
officer or above. This policy is based on the determination that visits of such
officials would be inconsistent with maintaining an unofficial relationship.”117
Under the Bush Administration, the Pentagon and some in Congress have
sought to lift this restriction in order to advance U.S. interests in boosting Taiwan’s
deterrence capability and U.S. leverage in Taiwan. Senior-level exchanges could
help to understand Taiwan’s crisis-management capabilities and limitations. Some
have cited the NSC’s record of sending senior officials to Taipei.118 The NSC, State
Department, and some in Congress have opposed sending senior military officers and
defense officials to Taiwan as an unnecessary change to a potentially dangerous
situation in the Taiwan Strait. (See 108th and 109th Congress below.)
Major Congressional Action
105th Congress. In the 105th Congress, the FY1999 National Defense
Authorization Act (P.L. 105-261) required the Secretary of Defense to study the U.S.
missile defense systems that could protect and could be transferred to “key regional
allies,” defined as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.119 In addition, the conference
report (H.Rept. 105-746 of the FY1999 Defense Appropriations Act, P.L. 105-262)
required a report from the Pentagon on the security situation in the Taiwan Strait, in
both classified and unclassified forms.120
106th Congress. In the 106th Congress, Representative Gilman, Chairman of
the House International Relations Committee, wrote President Clinton on April 19,
1999, urging approval for the sale of long-range early warning radars to Taiwan. He
also wrote Secretary of State Madeleine Albright on April 22, 1999, saying that if the
Administration did not approve the sale, he would introduce legislation to do so. In
the end, the Clinton Administration decided in principle to sell early warning radars
to Taiwan. The State Department spokesperson confirmed that the United States
agreed on the request in principle and acknowledged that under the TRA, “the
117 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, hearing on “United States-Taiwan Relations: the
20th Anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act,” March 25, 1999.
118 The National Security Council has sent the Senior Director for Asian Affairs (James
Moriarty and Michael Green) to Taiwan (Far Eastern Economic Review, May 20, 2004).
119 Department of Defense, “Report to Congress on Theater Missile Defense Architecture
Options for the Asia-Pacific Region,” unclassified version, May 1999; CRS Report
RL30379, Missile Defense Options for Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan: A Review of the
Defense Department Report to Congress
, November 30, 1999, by Robert D. Shuey and
Shirley A. Kan.
120 Department of Defense, “Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY99 Appropriations Bill,
The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait,” unclassified version, February 1, 1999; CRS
Report RS20187, Taiwan’s Defense: Assessing the U.S. Department of Defense Report,
“The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait,”
April 30, 1999, by Robert Sutter.

CRS-25
President and Congress determined which defense articles and services Taiwan
needs.”121 The Pentagon spokesperson also confirmed that the United States “agreed
to work with the Taiwanese to evaluate their early warning radar needs, and that will
take place over the next year or so, but there is no specific agreement on a specific
type of radar, specific sale, or specific terms of sale at this time.”122
Also, Members debated whether the “Taiwan Security Enhancement Act
(TSEA)” (S. 693, Helms; H.R. 1838, DeLay) was needed to better assist Taiwan or
was unnecessary and counterproductive in a delicate situation, as the Clinton
Administration maintained. The TSEA also increased attention to U.S.-Taiwan
military exchanges, including that on communication and training. The Pentagon
was said to have supported the spirit of the bill, although not its passage.123 The
TSEA was not enacted, although the House passed H.R. 1838 on February 1, 2000,
by 341-70.
Seeking more information from the Pentagon on which to base its
considerations, Congress passed the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act
(P.L. 106-65), requiring annual reports on PRC military power and the security
situation in the Taiwan Strait.124 Also, in consolidated appropriations legislation for
FY2000 (P.L. 106-113), Congress required a report on the operational planning of
the Department of Defense to implement the TRA and any gaps in knowledge about
PRC capabilities and intentions affecting the military balance in the Taiwan Strait.125
Concerning Congress’ role before the Administration’s decisions on arms sales
and formal notifications, the 106th Congress passed language, introduced by Senator
Lott, in the FY2000 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (in Div. B of P.L. 106-
113), requiring the Secretary of State to consult with Congress to devise a mechanism
for congressional input in determining arms sales to Taiwan. Again, in the FY2001
Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (P.L. 106-429), Congress passed the Taiwan
Reporting Requirement, requiring the President to consult on a classified basis with
Congress 30 days prior to the next round of arms sales talks. (Those required
consultations took place on March 16, 2001.)
107th Congress. In the 107th Congress, some Members opposed the sale of
Aegis-equipped destroyers, because they could be interpreted as offensive rather than
defensive sales and could involve significant interaction with the U.S. military, as
Senators Feinstein and Thomas (chairman of the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on
121 Shenon, Philip, “U.S. Plans to Sell Radar to Taiwan to Monitor China,” New York Times,
April 30, 1999; Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, April 29, 1999.
122 Defense Department News Briefing, April 30, 1999.
123 Steven M. Goldstein and Randall Schriver (former official in the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs), “An Uncertain Relationship: The
United States, Taiwan, and the Taiwan Relations Act,” China Quarterly, March 2001.
124 Department of Defense, “Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic
of China,” unclassified version, June 2000 and July 2002.
125 Department of Defense, “Report to Congress on Implementation of the Taiwan Relations
Act,” unclassified version, December 2000.

CRS-26
East Asian and Pacific Affairs) wrote in the Washington Times on March 28, 2001.
Other Members — 83 in the House (led by Representatives Cox and Wu) and 20 in
the Senate (led by Senators Helms and Torricelli) — wrote letters to President Bush
on April 3, 2001, urging approval of the sale of those destroyers. A March 2001 staff
report to Senator Helms of the Foreign Relations Committee called for meeting
Taiwan’s defense needs, particularly for submarines and destroyers.126
In addition, some in Congress urged the Administration to deliver AMRAAMs
to Taiwan after the Washington Times on July 1, 2002, reported that, in June, two
SU-30 fighters of the PLA Air Force test-fired AA-12 medium-range air-to-air
missiles acquired from Russia. The report raised questions as to whether the PLA
already deployed the missiles, meeting one of the conditions by which the United
States would deliver the AMRAAMs to Taiwan — rather than keep them in storage
— as approved for sale by the Clinton Administration in 2000. On July 16, 2002,
Senators Kyl, Helms, Bob Smith, and Torricelli wrote Secretary of State Colin
Powell, urging the Bush Administration to allow the transfer of AMRAAMS to
Taiwan “as soon as they are produced” rather than “quibble over whether the AA-12
tests mean that China has an ‘operational’ capability.”
The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2002 (P.L. 107-107), enacted
on December 28, 2001, authorized the President to transfer (by sale) the four Kidd-
class destroyers to Taiwan (Sec. 1011), under Section 21 of the AECA. Also,
Section 1221 of the act required a new section in the annual report on PRC military
power (as required by P.L. 106-65) to assess the PLA’s military acquisitions and any
implications for the security of the United States and its friends and allies. The scope
of arms transfers to be covered was not limited to those from Russia and other former
Soviet states, as in the original House language (H.R. 2586).127
The Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for FY2002 (P.L. 107-115),
enacted on January 10, 2002, brought unprecedented close coordination between the
Executive and Legislative branches on arms sales to Taiwan. Section 573 required
the Departments of State and Defense to provide detailed briefings (not specified as
classified) to congressional committees (including those on appropriations) within
90 days of enactment and not later than every 120 days thereafter during FY2002.
The briefings were required to report on U.S.-Taiwan discussions on potential sales
of defense articles or services to Taiwan.
Some Members called for ensuring regular and high-level consultations with
Taiwan and a role for Congress in determining arms sales to Taiwan, after President
Bush announced on April 24, 2001 (the day of the last annual arms sales talks), that
he would drop the annual arms talks process with Taiwan in favor of normal, routine
126 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “U.S. Defense Policy Toward Taiwan: In Need of
an Overhaul,” a Staff Trip Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, S. Prt. 107-26, by
James Doran, printed April 2001.
127 Still, the Pentagon’s report, issued on July 12, 2002, discussed China’s military
acquisitions from states of the former Soviet Union, and not other countries (e.g., Israel).

CRS-27
considerations on an “as-needed” basis.128 Due to the absence of diplomatic relations,
successive administrations used a process in determining arms sales to Taiwan that
was institutionalized in the early 1980s as annual rounds of talks with Taiwan
defense authorities consisting of several phases leading up to final meetings usually
in April.129 In overseeing the new process, factors or implications to consider
included the following:
! Congress’ role in decision-making and ability to exercise oversight
! role of arms sales talks in the broader long-range and joint defense
strategy for Taiwan (vs. a narrower focus on specific requests)
! role of arms sales in U.S. diplomatic and defense policies (including
various elements of the “one China” policy)
! U.S. objectives for the Taiwan military
! nature of the U.S.-Taiwan military relationship
! extent of high-level U.S.-Taiwan military exchanges
! effect of an annual high-profile controversy on U.S. interests
! usefulness to Congress and Taiwan of a deadline for decisions
! influence of various interest groups in a more defused process
! changes in high-level, intensive attention given by the White House
and its coordination of the inter-agency debates
! changes in the Pentagon’s basis for recommendations
! Taiwan’s desire to receive similar treatment given to others
! consultations with allies, including Japan.
The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FYs 2002 and 2003 (H.R. 1646),
passed in the House on May 16, 2001, contained provisions on arms sales to Taiwan.
First, H.R. 1646 included authority (in Section 851) for the President to sell the four
Kidd-class destroyers to Taiwan. Second, as proposed by Representative Brad
Sherman in the House International Relations Committee, Section 813 sought to
require that Taiwan be treated as the “equivalent of a major non-NATO ally” for
defense transfers under the AECA or the Foreign Assistance Act, while the language
stopped short of designating Taiwan as a major non-NATO ally. According to the
Member’s office, the provision would show tangible support for Taiwan’s defense,
provide it with status similar to that given to Australia, New Zealand, and Argentina,
offer it the “right of first refusal” for EDA, and treat it with enhanced status for anti-
terrorism assistance, cooperative research and development projects in the defense
area, and expedited review in satellite licensing. Third, Representative Gary
Ackerman introduced Section 814 to require the President to consult annually with
Congress and Taiwan about the availability of defense articles and services for
Taiwan. The consultations with Taiwan would occur at a level not lower than that
of the Vice Chief of General Staff and in Washington, DC — as has been the case.
Finally enacted as P.L. 107-228 on September 30, 2002, the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act for FY2003 authorized — at the Bush Administration’s request
128 Milbank, Dana and Mike Allen, “Bush to Drop Annual Review of Weapons Sales to
Taiwan,” Washington Post, April 25, 2001.
129 See CRS Report RS20365, Taiwan: Annual Arms Sales Process, October 21, 1999,
updated June 5, 2001, by Shirley Kan.

CRS-28
— the Department of State and other departments or agencies (including the
Department of Defense) to detail employees to AIT (Section 326); required that
Taiwan be “treated as though it were designated a major non-NATO ally” (Section
1206); required consultations with Congress on U.S. security assistance to Taiwan
every 180 days (Section 1263); and authorized the sale to Taiwan of the four Kidd-
class destroyers (Section 1701).130 Section 326, amending the Foreign Service Act
of 1980, has significant implications for the assignment of government officials to
AIT, including active-duty military personnel for the first time since 1979.
(Employees have been separated from government service for a period of time in the
name of “unofficial” relations, but personnel issues have affected AIT and its
contractors. Defense Department personnel, including those supporting security
assistance, have been civilian staff and retired or resigned military personnel.)
In signing the bill into law on September 30, 2002, President Bush issued a
statement that included criticism of Section 1206 (“major non-NATO ally”). He said
that “Section 1206 could be misconstrued to imply a change in the ‘one China’ policy
of the United States when, in fact, that U.S. policy remains unchanged. To the extent
that this section could be read to purport to change United States policy, it
impermissibly interferes with the President’s constitutional authority to conduct the
Nation’s foreign affairs.”
Nonetheless, the Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and Logistics, Michael Wynne, submitted a letter to Congress on August
29, 2003, that designated Taiwan as a “major non-NATO ally” under Section 1206.
The are implications for defense industrial cooperation with Taiwan, under Section
65 of the Arms Export Control Act (P.L. 90-629).
The FY2003 National Defense Authorization Act, passed in the House on May
10, 2002, contained Section 1202 seeking to require the Secretary of Defense to
implement a comprehensive plan to conduct combined training and exchanges of
senior officers with Taiwan’s military and to “enhance interoperability” with
Taiwan’s military.131 The language was similar to that of Section 5(b) in the “Taiwan
Security Enhancement Act” proposed in the 106th Congress. The Senate’s version,
passed on June 27, 2002, did not have the language. The Washington Times reported
on August 9, 2002, that the Department of State opposed the language as unnecessary
(given U.S. support under the TRA).
As Members worked out differences in conference, Deputy Defense Secretary
Paul Wolfowitz wrote in a letter to the House and Senate Armed Services
Committees on September 27, 2002, that “while we welcome Congress’ support for
the U.S. commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act and for the President’s
commitment to the defense of Taiwan, we believe that the objectives of Section 1202
are best achieved by preserving the traditional statutory role of the Secretary to
130 For more details on proposed House and Senate language, see “Arms Sales to Taiwan,”
in CRS Report RL31046, Foreign Relations Authorization, FY2003: An Overview.
131 For an argument for enhancing interoperability with Taiwan, see Justin Bernier (staffer
for the House Armed Services Committee) and Stuart Gold, “China’s Closing Window of
Opportunity,” Naval War College Review, Summer 2003.

CRS-29
exercise authority, direction, and control over the Department of Defense to conduct
such activities as are needed to support those commitments, including his authority
to preserve the confidentiality of those activities.” The Pentagon “strongly
recommends that this provision be deleted, although we would not object to language
that would call upon the Department to brief the Congress periodically on progress
we are making to meet our commitments to Taiwan security,” Wolfowitz wrote. As
enacted on December 2, 2002, the FY2003 National Defense Authorization Act
(P.L. 107-314) contained a revised section (1210), requiring a Presidential report 180
days after the act’s enactment (due May 31, 2003) on the feasibility and advisability
of conducting combined operational training and exchanges of senior officers with
Taiwan’s military. (U.S. policy has allowed Taiwan’s senior military officers and
defense officials to visit the United States, while not sending U.S. flag and general
officers to Taiwan, or senior officials.)
108th Congress. On May 20, 2004, the House passed H.R. 4200 (FY2005
National Defense Authorization Act) with Sec. 1013 to authorize the sale to Taiwan
of a dock landing ship (Anchorage) as an Excess Defense Article and Sec. 1215 to
require the Defense Department to send general or flag officers and officials at or
above the level of deputy assistant secretary of defense to Taiwan (as proposed by
Representative Jim Ryun). After a floor debate about whether Representative Ryun’s
amendment was necessary or dangerous, the House passed it by 290-132. Supporters
cited the Defense Department’s support for this policy change and challenges in
Taiwan’s military in integrating new acquisitions and prioritizing self-defense needs
against the PLA. Opponents cited resistance by the NSC and State Department, the
TRA as existing authority for security assistance, and the need for caution in a tense
part of Asia. On May 19, 2004, Senator Sam Brownback submitted for the record
a similar amendment intended to be proposed to the Senate’s bill (S. 2400).
However, on June 23, 2004, the Senate passed S. 2400 without considering or voting
on such language. During conference, the House receded, and the conference report
did not contain Sec. 1215 (H.Rept. 108-767, issued on October 8, 2004). President
Bush signed H.R. 4200 into law (P.L. 108-375) on October 29, 2004.
109th Congress. In January 2005, eight Members led by Representative Rob
Simmons wrote to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to express concerns that the
Bush Administration has delayed notifications to Congress on the three major items
until after LY decided on the Special Budget. The State Department responded that
it supports the President’s decision of April 2001 to make available to Taiwan P-3s,
PAC-3s, and submarines, but that it does not believe “notification at this time will
have any influence on the Taiwan Legislature’s decision.”132 At issue are the Bush
Administration’s effectiveness in encouraging Taiwan to boost its self-defense,
extent of U.S. leverage in Taiwan, and risks in relations with Beijing.
On May 20, 2005, the House Armed Services Committee reported its National
Defense Authorization Act for FY2006 (H.R. 1815, H.Rept. 109-89), again
proposing language to change U.S. policy to allow U.S. flag and general officers and
132 Letters between the State Department and Representatives Rob Simmons, Lane Evans,
Roskoe Bartlett, Chris Smith, John Hostettler, Madeleine Bordallo, Trent Franks, and Jeb
Bradley, January 31 and February 15, 2005.

CRS-30
senior officials at or above the level of deputy assistant secretary of defense to visit
Taiwan (section 1203). Such visits would reciprocate visits by senior military
officers and officials from Taiwan that already take place in the United States. Also,
Chairman Duncan Hunter’s press release noted that the Defense Department
exchanged with the PRC over 80 senior-level visits in the 1990s and about 14 in
recent years.133 The bill added new language that would ensure that Capstone classes
at the National Defense University (for new general and flag officers) conduct trips
to the PRC and Taiwan (section 528). The House passed H.R. 1815 on May 25. The
bill reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 17, 2005 (S. 1042)
does not contain similar sections.
As mentioned above on the impasse over the Special Budget, on May 27, 2005,
Representative Simmons and 32 other House Members wrote to KMT chairman Lien
Chan, urging him to help expedite passage of the Special Budget in May. They
warned that “failure to pass the special budget has raised concerns in the United
States about Taiwan’s ability to defend itself against potential aggression.”134
Major U.S. Arms Sales as Notified to Congress
The following table provides information on U.S. sales (not deliveries) of major
defense articles and services to Taiwan, as approved by the President, proposed in
Letters of Offer and Acceptance, and formally notified to Congress since 1990.
Based on unclassified notices and news reports, this list includes the date of
notification, major item or service proposed for sale, and estimated value of the
defense package. The list was compiled based on unclassified notifications to
Congress or announcements by the Administration as well as press reports. These
were primarily government-to-government FMS programs. Major FMS are notified
to Congress as required by Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA),
P.L. 90-629.135 Not all of these approved sales were necessarily purchased by
Taiwan. There have been other transfers of U.S. defense articles and services not
included in this list (that amounted to billions of dollars), including sales and
technical assistance with smaller individual values not required to be notified to
Congress, those with classified notifications, and other direct commercial sales
licensed for export by the Department of State and notified to Congress under Section
36(c) of the AECA (but subject to the confidentiality requirements of Section 38(e)).
There have also been leases of naval vessels and other equipment. Moreover, each
133 See CRS Report RL32496, U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress, by Shirley
Kan.
134 Rep. Simmons, et al, letter to Chairman Lien Chan, Kuomintang, May 27, 2005.
135 As with all U.S. arms sales, months or years after the President’s decisions on Taiwan’s
requests and Taiwan’s subsequent decisions on which sales to pursue, the role of Congress
includes informal and formal review of major proposed FMS deals notified to Congress
(during which Congress may enact a joint resolution of disapproval) as stipulated under
Section 36(b) of the AECA. See CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review
Process
, December 20, 2002, by Richard Grimmett.

CRS-31
year, hundreds of Taiwan’s military personnel at different levels receive training and
education at U.S. military colleges, academies, and other institutions or units.
Value of
Date of
Major Item or Service as Proposed
Package
Notification (usually part of a package)
($ million)
1990
07/26
Cooperative Logistics Supply Support
$108
09/06
(1) C-130H transport aircraft
$45
1991
01/07
(100) MK-46 torpedoes
$28
07/24
(97) SM-1 Standard air defense missiles
$55
09/13
(110) M60A3 tanks
$119
11/18
Phase III PIP Mod Kits for HAWK air defense
systems
$170
1992
05/27
Weapons, ammunition, support for 3 leased ships
$212
05/27
Supply support arrangement
$107
08/04
(207) SM-1 Standard air defense missiles
$126
09/14
(150) F-16A/B fighters
$5,800
09/14
(3) Patriot-derived Modified Air Defense System
(MADS) fire units136
$1,300
09/18
(12) SH-2F LAMPS anti-submarine helicopters
$161
1993
06/17
(12) C-130H transport aircraft
$620
06/25
Supply support arrangement
$156
07/29
(38) Harpoon anti-ship missiles
$68
07/30
Logistics support services for 40 leased T-38
trainers
$70
08/
(4) E-2T Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft137
$700
09/08
Logistics support services for MADS
$175
11/04
(150) MK-46 Mod 5 torpedoes
$54
136 Commercial sale. Opall Barbara and David Silverberg, “Taiwanese May Soon
Coproduce Patriot,” Defense News, February 22-28, 1993; Military Balance 1999-2000.
137 Flight International, September 1-7, 1993.

CRS-32
Value of
Date of
Major Item or Service as Proposed
Package
Notification (usually part of a package)
($ million)
11/09
Weapons, ammunition, and support for 3 leased
frigates
$238
11/23
MK-41 Mod (short) Vertical Launch Systems for
ship-based air defense missiles
$103
1994
08/01
(80) AN/ALQ-184 electronic counter measure
(ECM) pods
$150
09/12
MK-45 Mod 2 gun system
$21
1995
03/24
(6) MK-75 shipboard gun systems,
(6) Phalanx Close-In Weapon Systems
$75
06/07
Supply support arrangement
$192
1996
05/10
Improved Mobile Subscriber Equipment
communications system
$188
05/10
(30) TH-67 training helicopters,
(30) sets of AN/AVS-6 night vision goggles
$53
05/23
(465) Stinger missiles,
(55) dual-mounted Stinger launcher systems
$84
06/24
(300) M60A3TTS tanks
$223
08/23
(1,299) Stinger surface-to-air missiles,
(74) Avenger vehicle mounted guided missile
launchers,
(96) HMMWVs (high-mobility multi-purpose
wheeled vehicle)
$420
09/05
(110) MK-46 MOD 5 anti-submarine torpedoes
$66
1997
02/14
(54) Harpoon anti-ship missiles
$95
05/23
(1,786) TOW 2A anti-armor guided missiles,
(114) TOW launchers, (100) HMMWVs
$81
07/24
(21) AH-1W Super Cobra helicopters138
$479
09/03
(13) OH-58D Kiowa Warrior Armed Scout
helicopters
$172
138 Taiwan reportedly ordered 63 AH-1W helicopters, 42 of which were delivered by early
2000, and Taiwan may order an additional 24 helicopters (Defense News, March 6, 2000).

CRS-33
Value of
Date of
Major Item or Service as Proposed
Package
Notification (usually part of a package)
($ million)
11/09
Pilot training and logistics support for F-16 fighters
$280
11/09
Spare parts for various aircraft
$140
1998
01/28
(3) Knox-class frigates,139
(1) MK 15 Phalanx Close-In Weapons System
(CIWS)
$300
06/01
(28) Pathfinder/Sharpshooter navigation and
targeting pods for F-16 fighters140
$160
08/27
(58) Harpoon anti-ship missiles
$101
08/27
(61) Dual-mount Stinger surface-to-air missiles
$180
08/27
(131) MK 46 Mod 5(A)S anti-submarine torpedoes
$69
10/09
(9) CH-47SD Chinook helicopters
$486
1999
05/26
(240) AGM-114KS Hellfire II air-to-surface
missiles
$23
05/26
(5) AN/VRC-92E SINCGARS radio systems, (5)
Intelligence Electronic Warfare systems, (5)
HMMWVs
$64
07/30
Spare parts for F-5E/F, C-130H, F-16A/B, and
Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF) aircraft
$150
07/30
(2) E-2T Hawkeye 2000E airborne early warning
aircraft141
$400
2000
03/02
Modernization of the TPS-43F air defense radar
to TPS-75V configuration
$96
139 In 1992, the Bush Administration submitted legislation that Congress passed to lease 3
Knox-class frigates to Taiwan. Reports say that Taiwan leased a total of 6 (and
subsequently bought them in 1999) and purchased 2 in 1998 (plus 1 for spares).
140 The sale of the navigation/targeting pods excluded the laser designator feature, but the
Pentagon notified Congress on May 16, 2000, that 20 sets would be upgraded to include the
feature.
141 Northrop Grumman delivered the first one on August 10, 2004, at St. Augustine, FL.

CRS-34
Value of
Date of
Major Item or Service as Proposed
Package
Notification (usually part of a package)
($ million)
03/02
(162) HAWK Intercept guided air defense
missiles142
$106
06/07
(39) Pathfinder/Sharpshooter navigation and
targeting pods for F-16 fighters
$234
06/07
(48) AN/ALQ-184 ECM pods for F-16s
$122
09/28
(146) M109A5 howitzers, 152 SINCGARS radio
systems
$405
09/28
(200) AIM-120C Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-
Air Missiles (AMRAAMs) for F-16 fighters
$150
09/28
(71) RGM-84L Harpoon anti-ship missiles
$240
09/28
Improved Mobile Subscriber Equipment (IMSE)
communication system
$513
2001
07/18
(50) Joint Tactical Information Distribution Systems
(JTIDS) terminals (a version of Link 16) for data
links between aircraft, ships, and ground stations
$725
09/05
(40) AGM-65G Maverick air-to-ground missiles for
F-16s
$18
10/26
(40) Javelin anti-tank missile systems
$51
10/30
Logistical support for spare parts for F-5E/F, C-
130H, F-16A/B, and IDF aircraft
$288
2002
06/04
(3) AN/MPN-14 air traffic control radars
$108
09/04
(54) AAV7A1 assault amphibious vehicles
$250
09/04
Maintenance of material and spare parts for aircraft,
radar systems, AMRAAMS, and other systems
$174
09/04
(182) AIM-9M-1/2 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles
$36
09/04
(449) AGM-114M3 Hellfire II anti-armor missiles
to equip AH-1W and OH-58D helicopters143
$60
10/11
(290) TOW-2B anti-tank missiles
$18
11/21
(4) Kidd-class destroyers
$875
142 On June 23, 2000, the Pentagon notified Congress of a sale of 156 excess HAWK air
defense missiles to Taiwan for about $7 million.
143 On January 4, 2005, Lockheed Martin announced a letter of agreement worth about $50
million for more than 400 Hellfire missiles.

CRS-35
Value of
Date of
Major Item or Service as Proposed
Package
Notification (usually part of a package)
($ million)
2003
09/24
Multi-functional Information Distribution Systems
(for Po Sheng C4ISR data link upgrades)
$775
2004
03/30
(2) Ultra High Frequency Long Range Early
Warning Radars
$1,776