Order Code IB92011
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
U.S. Space Programs:
Civilian, Military, and Commercial
Updated May 24, 2005
Marcia S. Smith
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
U.S. Government Civilian Space Programs
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
Human Spaceflight
Science Programs
Other Civilian Government Agencies
Interagency Coordination
Commercial Space Programs
Space Launch Services
Commercial Remote Sensing, and Landsat
Space Tourism
Military Space Programs
International Cooperation and Competition
NASA and DOD Space Budgets
Space Program Issues
NASA Issues: The “Vision for Space Exploration
Military Space Issues
Space-Based Radar (SBR) and TSAT
Congressional Action
Developing New Space Launch Vehicles
International Relationships
LEGISLATION
For links to other current CRS reports on space activities, go to the CRS website
[http://www.crs.gov] and click on “Science/Technology” in the list of Current Legislative
Issues. Then click on “U.S. Space Programs.”

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U.S. Space Programs:
Civilian, Military, and Commercial
SUMMARY
The 109th Congress is addressing a broad
The Department of Defense (DOD) has
range of civilian, military, and commercial
a less visible but equally substantial space
space issues.
program. Tracking the DOD space budget is
extremely difficult since space is not identi-
The National Aeronautics and Space
fied as a separate line item in the budget.
Administration (NASA) conducts the most
DOD sometimes releases only partial
visible space activities. For FY2005, NASA
information (omitting funding for classified
received a total of $16.2 billion (including
programs) or will suddenly release without
$126 million in a supplemental for hurricane
explanation new figures for prior years that
relief). The FY2006 request is $16.46 billion.
are quite different from what was previously
The future of the U.S. human space flight
reported. Figures provided to CRS show a
program is dominating debate about NASA.
total (classified and unclassified) space budget
NASA hopes to return the space shuttle to
of $19.4 billion for FY2003, $20 billion for
flight status between July 13-31, 2005; the
FY2004, $19.8 billion for FY2005, and a
shuttle has been grounded since the February
request of $22.5 billion for FY2006. How to
2003 Columbia tragedy. Pursuant to the
manage DOD space programs to avoid the
“Vision for Space Exploration” announced by
cost growth and schedule delays that have
President Bush in January 2004, the shuttle
characterized several recent projects is a key
program then would be terminated in 2010
issue facing DOD.
after construction of the International Space
Station (ISS) is completed. The Vision directs
The appropriate role of the government
NASA to focus its activities on returning
in facilitating commercial space businesses is
humans to the Moon by 2020 and eventually
an ongoing debate. For many years, the focus
sending them to Mars. The Vision has broad
has been on space launch services, but com-
implications for the agency, especially since
mercial remote sensing satellites also pose
most of the money to implement it is expected
complex questions. President Bush signed a
to come from other NASA activities. Conse-
new commercial remote sensing policy in
quently, NASA would need to shift funds
2003, and a new space launch policy in 2004,
away from aeronautics, space science, and
that try to strike a balance between facilitating
earth science programs. It plans to reduce its
commercial activities while ensuring the U.S.
workforce by over 2,500 people by FY2007.
government has needed data and services.
Many of the personnel cuts would come from
its aeronautics program. Congress is debating
International cooperation and competi-
the many issues raised by the Vision, includ-
tion in space are affected by the world eco-
ing what the balance should be among
nomic situation and the post-Cold War politi-
NASA’s various space and aeronautics activi-
cal climate. President Clinton’s 1993 decision
ties, and whether the United States should end
to merge NASA’s space station program with
the shuttle program before a replacement is
Russia’s is symbolic of the dramatic changes,
available (not expected until 2014 under the
and the risks.
Vision’s timetable).
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
For FY2006, NASA is requesting $16.456 billion, a 2.4% increase over the $16.070
billion it received in the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-447).
Separately, NASA received $126 million for hurricane relief in a FY2005 supplemental,
giving the agency a total FY2005 budget of $16.196 billion. The FY2006 request is a 1.6%
increase over that amount. By contrast, in NASA’s FY2005 budget justification documents,
a 4.7% increase was projected for FY2006 to allow NASA to implement the Vision for
Space Exploration announced by President Bush in January 2004. For more on the NASA
FY2006 request, see CRS Report RS22063. For more on the Vision, see CRS Report
RS21720. The House Appropriations Subcommittee on Science, State, Commerce and
Justice marked up the FY2006 appropriations bill that includes NASA on May 24 (no bill
number yet), recommending $15 million more than the request.
NASA’s space shuttle remains grounded following the February 2003 space shuttle
Columbia tragedy. NASA hopes to return the shuttle to flight status during a July 13-31,
2005 launch window. For more on the shuttle, see CRS Issue Brief IB93062.
DOD is requesting $22.5 billion for space activities in FY2006, compared with the
$19.8 billion appropriated in FY2005. The House and Senate Armed Services Committees
have reported their respective versions of the FY2006 DOD authorization bill (H.R. 1815,
H.Rept. 109-89; S. 1042, S.Rept. 109-69), making significant cuts to two DOD space
programs: Space-Based Radar (SBR), and TSAT (the transformational communications
satellite program). DOD space programs in general are controversial because several have
experienced large cost overruns. DOD’s requests to initiate the SBR and TSAT programs
are the subject of debate because their cost estimates are high, and congressional overseers
are skeptical of those estimates and of DOD’s ability to manage the programs successfully.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
U.S. Government Civilian Space Programs
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
The establishment of NASA in the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (P.L.
85-568, the “NASA Act”) symbolized the entrance of the United States into the space age.
The Soviet Union had successfully orbited the first artificial satellite, Sputnik 1, on October
4, 1957, lending the U.S. space program a new urgency. The first U.S. satellite, Explorer 1
(developed and launched by the Army), was orbited on January 31, 1958 after several failures
of the Naval Research Laboratory’s Vanguard rocket. President Eisenhower’s desire to
separate military and civilian space activities led to the “NASA Act” and the creation of the
civilian NASA on October 1, 1958, with the Department of Defense (DOD) retaining control
over military space programs.
Human Spaceflight. The Soviets achieved another space “first” on April 12, 1961,
when Yuri Gagarin became the first human to orbit Earth. The United States responded by
launching Alan Shepard into space on May 5, 1961, though he made only a suborbital flight
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(the first American to orbit the earth was John Glenn in February 1962), as part of the
Mercury program. Following Shepard’s flight, on May 25, 1961, President Kennedy
announced that the United States intended to put a man on the Moon within a decade,
initiating the Apollo program. Following successful completion of the Mercury and Gemini
programs, NASA was ready to begin Apollo flights, but in January 1967, the first Apollo
crew was killed when fire erupted in their Apollo command module during a pre-launch test.
The first successful Apollo flight took place in 1968. On July 20, 1969, Neil Armstrong and
Buzz Aldrin became the first humans to walk on the Moon as the Apollo 11 spacecraft and
pilot Michael Collins orbited overhead. A total of six 2-man crews (Apollo 11, 12, 14, 15,
16 and 17) walked on the Moon through December 1972. Another crew (Apollo 13)
intended to do so, but instead made an emergency return to Earth when the craft’s Service
Module exploded enroute to the Moon. Apollo was followed by the Skylab space station (to
which 3 crews were sent in 1973-1974) and the 1975 Apollo-Soyuz Test Project in which
a U.S. Apollo spacecraft with three astronauts and a Soviet Soyuz spacecraft with two
cosmonauts docked for two days of joint experiments.
In 1972, President Nixon approved NASA’s proposal to develop a reusable vehicle for
taking crews and cargo into Earth orbit — the space shuttle. The first shuttle flight occurred
in 1981 and NASA declared the system operational in 1982. The Challenger tragedy in
January 1986 suspended shuttle operations for 32 months. Flights resumed in 1988. After
87 successful flights, on February 1, 2003, the space shuttle Columbia disintegrated during
its return to Earth (see CRS Report RS21408). The space shuttle fleet is currently grounded.
NASA hopes to resume flights during a July 13-31, 2005 launch window.
The shuttle is NASA’s sole means of launching humans into space. Beginning in the
early 1980s, NASA, sometimes with DOD, attempted to develop a replacement for it (see
Developing New Space Launch Vehicles, below). For many years, NASA’s plan was to
phase out the shuttle in 2012. The replacement programs were not successful, however, and
in November 2002, NASA announced that it would keep the shuttle operational at least until
2015, and perhaps until 2020 or longer. However, in January 2004, President Bush
announced a “Vision For Space Exploration” that calls for the space shuttle to be retired after
construction of the International Space Station (see next paragraph) is completed, currently
expected in 2010. He directed NASA to build a new “Crew Exploration Vehicle” (CEV)
to take astronauts to and from the Moon. The CEV is a spacecraft, not a launch vehicle.
What launch vehicle will be used for the CEV is yet to be determined. The CEV is
scheduled to be available for taking people to space in 2014. Between 2010 and 2014, the
United States would not have an ability to place astronauts in space. Dr Griffin, the new
Administrator of NASA, has repeatedly stressed his intent to shorten that gap.
NASA continues to build and operate the International Space Station (ISS) in
cooperation with Russia, Canada, Japan, and 10 European countries (see CRS Issue Brief
IB93017). The space station program began in 1984 (FY1985) and has been very
controversial because of cost growth and schedule delays. Twenty-two attempts in Congress
since 1991 to terminate the program in NASA funding bills failed. The ISS is being
assembled in orbit, with segments taken into space by the U.S. space shuttle or Russian
launch vehicles. The first assembly flight was in 1998, and construction is now
approximately 50% complete. Construction is suspended until the space shuttle returns to
flight because most of the remaining segments are designed to be launched on the shuttle.
Crews rotating on six-month schedules continue to live and work aboard the station using
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Russian Soyuz spacecraft for crew transport and “crew return” (essentially serving as a
lifeboat to return the crew to Earth in an emergency), and Russian Progress spacecraft for
cargo delivery. Under a 1996 agreement, Russia agreed to provide crew transport and crew
return for U.S. astronauts on 11 Soyuz missions at no cost to NASA. The 11th Soyuz is due
to be launched in October 2005, returning to Earth in April 2006. After that time, NASA
would be limited to having its crews aboard ISS only when the space shuttle is docked unless
it can negotiate an agreement with Russia to continue providing crew return services. The
shuttle typically docks for 1-2 weeks at a time, approximately five times per year (although
NASA has not yet determined exactly how many times per year the shuttle will fly in the
future). No agreement exists for Russia to provide these services to NASA, however.
NASA is not permitted to pay Russia for such services under the Iran Nonproliferation Act
(P.L. 106-178) unless President Bush makes a determination that Russia is not proliferating
certain technologies to Iran. Issues concerning U.S. access to the ISS after April 2006 are
discussed in CRS Issue Brief IB93017.
Science Programs. NASA has launched many spacecraft for space science and
earth science research. Robotic probes served as pathfinders to the Moon for astronauts, and
have visited all the planets in the solar system except Pluto, and a probe is scheduled to be
launched to that planet in 2006. Many of the probes have been quite successful, but there
were failures, too. In 1999, for example, two NASA Mars missions failed, at a combined cost
of $328.5 million. They reflected NASA’s “faster, better, cheaper” (FBC) approach to
scientific spacecraft, replacing large, complex spacecraft that can acquire more information,
but take longer and cost more to build. The FBC approach was subsequently scrutinized and
NASA restructured its Mars exploration program significantly. Two NASA probes, Mars
Odyssey and Mars Global Surveyor, are now orbiting Mars, and twin rovers, Spirit and
Opportunity, are investigating the planet’s surface (a European probe, Mars Express, also is
orbiting Mars). NASA also has sent, or plans to send, spacecraft to other planets, comets,
and asteroids. These include Cassini, which arrived at Saturn on July 1, 2004 (GMT) after
a seven-year journey; and the Stardust probe that is on its way back to Earth after collecting
samples of a comet (it will return in January 2006).
Space-based observatories in Earth orbit have studied the universe since the 1960s,
creating new fields of astronomy since space-borne telescopes can intercept wavelengths
(such as x-rays and gamma rays) that cannot penetrate Earth’s atmosphere. In the 1980s,
NASA embarked upon building four “Great Observatories” for studies in different parts of
the electromagnetic spectrum: Hubble Space Telescope, launched April 1990 (primarily for
the visible wavelengths); Compton Gamma Ray Observatory, launched April 1991, deorbited
June 2000; Chandra X-Ray Observatory, launched July 1999; and the Spitzer Space
Telescope (formerly the Space Infrared Telescope Facility or SIRTF), launched August 2003.
NASA is planning the James Webb Space Telescope for further infrared observations.
Hubble was designed to be serviced and eventually returned to Earth by the space shuttle, but
NASA announced in January 2004 it would not send any more shuttles to Hubble because
of safety concerns. The new NASA Administrator, Dr. Griffin, said that he would reassess
that decision once the shuttle returns to flight (see CRS Report RS21767).
NASA has solar-terrestrial physics programs that study the interaction between the Sun
and the Earth. In FY2001, NASA began the Living with a Star program that envisions the
launch of many spacecraft over the next decade to obtain more accurate information on how
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the Earth and society are affected by what has come to be known as “space weather” —
including, for example, negative effects of solar activity on telecommunications.
During the 1960s and 1970s, NASA developed communications, meteorological, and
land and ocean remote sensing satellites. NASA’s role in this aspect of space utilization
traditionally is R&D. Once the technology is proven, operational responsibility is transferred
to other agencies or the private sector. NASA continues to perform research in many of these
areas, however, particularly earth sciences (including global climate change). NASA,
sometimes in partnership with other countries, has a variety of earth science probes in orbit
today, including three large satellites in the Earth Observing System (EOS). The United
States also is leading the international Global Environmental Observing System and Systems
(GEOSS) program [http://iwgeo.ssc.nasa.gov/]. NASA’s FY2005 and FY2006 budgets
assume significantly reduced funding for earth sciences research, an issue that was explored
at an April 28, 2005 House Science Committee hearing.
Other Civilian Government Agencies
Beginning in the 1960s, other civilian agencies became involved in space. Operation
of weather satellites was transferred to what is now the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) in the Department of Commerce. NOAA is currently working with
DOD to build a joint weather satellite system that merges the capabilities of its Polar
Orbiting Environmental Satellite (POES) system with those of DOD’s Defense
Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP). Called the National Polar Orbiting
Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS), it is managed by an integrated program office
(see [http://www.ipo.noaa.gov/]). NASA develops new technology for NPOESS. The first
NPOESS launch is expected by 2010. Other parts of the Department of Commerce are
involved in space issues as well due to the Department’s role in trade policy and export of
items on the Commerce Control List. It also has an Office of Space Commercialization (part
of the Technology Administration) to facilitate commercial space businesses.
In 1983, the Department of Transportation (DOT) was given responsibility for
facilitating and regulating commercial launch services companies. This function is
performed through the Federal Aviation Administration. DOT and DOD co-chair a group
that oversees use of DOD’s Global Positioning System of navigation satellites
[http://www.igeb.gov/]. DOT represents civilian users and has programs to augment the
system’s utility to the civilian community. Other government agencies involved in space
include the Department of Energy, which develops nuclear power sources for spacecraft; the
U.S. Geological Survey in the Department of Interior, which operates the government’s
Landsat land remote sensing satellites; the Departments of Agriculture and other departments
that use satellite data for crop forecasting and map making, for example; and the Department
of State, which develops international space policy and determines whether to grant export
licenses for items on the Munitions List. The White House’s National Security Council and
Office of Science and Technology Policy are involved in developing policy.
Interagency Coordination
Several mechanisms have been tried since 1958 to coordinate interagency space policy.
Congress created a National Aeronautics and Space Council in the NASA Act. That Space
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Council was abolished in 1973 by President Nixon. President Carter established a Policy
Review Committee on Space under the aegis of the National Security Council (NSC), but
it was chaired by the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy. President
Reagan established a Senior Interagency Group on Space (SIG/Space) under the NSC,
chaired by the National Security Adviser. Congress was dissatisfied with SIG/Space,
however, particularly in terms of slow decision making after the 1986 space shuttle
Challenger tragedy. Congress created a National Space Council in the FY1989 NASA
authorization act (P.L. 100-685), chaired by the Vice President. Under President George H.
W. Bush, the Space Council was headed by Vice President Quayle.
President Clinton decided not to use the Space Council mechanism. It still exists in law,
but is not staffed or funded. Instead, Space Council functions were merged into a National
Science and Technology Council, administered through the Office of Science and
Technology Policy. NSTC oversaw civil and commercial space policy; while military space
activities were overseen by the National Security Council. Some space advocates hoped
President George W. Bush would reactivate the Space Council, but instead his administration
uses a Policy Coordinating Committee under the NSC (similar to SIG/Space). NASA and
DOD also have a “Partnership Council” to facilitate communication between their
organizations and identify areas for collaboration and cooperation.
On July 28, 2002, in NSPD-15, President Bush directed the NSC to chair a review of
national space policies. The first new policy, on commercial remote sensing, was signed
April 25, 2003. On January 6, 2005, the White House released a new U.S. Space
Transportation Policy, which had been authorized by President Bush on December 21, 2004.
Also, President Bush announced a new Vision for Space Exploration for NASA on January
14, 2004. An overall national space policy is still being developed.
Commercial Space Programs
Commercial communications satellites have been chiefly a private sector activity since
passage of the 1962 Communications Satellite Act (P.L. 87-624). Attempts to
commercialize other aspects of space activities have yielded mixed success.
Space Launch Services
Congress has passed several laws to facilitate the commercialization of space launch
services for putting satellites into orbit (the 1984 Commercial Space Launch Act, the 1988
Commercial Space Launch Act Amendments, the 1998 Commercial Space Act, and the 2004
Commercial Space Launch Act Amendments). The development of a U.S. commercial
launch services industry has been largely successful. DOD and NASA continue to play a role
in developing new launch vehicles, though some private companies are developing their
own. The most controversial issues are the relative roles of the government versus the
private sector in developing new systems, ensuring that U.S. companies can compete with
foreign launch services companies (primarily in Europe and Russia), and trade and missile
proliferation issues involved in exporting satellites to other countries for launch. In terms
of competition, it must be mentioned that the two major U.S. space launch service companies
operate in partnership with companies in other countries. Lockheed Martin and two Russian
companies comprise International Launch Services, which offers launches on the U.S. Atlas
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and Russian Proton vehicles. Boeing offers launches on its Delta 2 launch vehicle, and also
is a partner in the Sea Launch venture, where a Ukrainian Zenit launch vehicle with a
Russian third stage is launched from a mobile oil rig built by Norway. See CRS Issue Brief
IB93062 for more information.
Commercial Remote Sensing, and Landsat
Congress also sought to facilitate commercialization of land remote sensing satellites
by privatizing the government’s Landsat program through the 1984 Land Remote Sensing
Commercialization Act ( P.L. 98-365). Such satellites provide imagery of the Earth that can
be used for land-use planning, environmental studies, mineral exploration, and many other
purposes. The first Landsat satellite was launched in 1972. After a tumultuous eight years
that saw the effort to privatize Landsat fail, Congress repealed that act and replaced it with
the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992 (P.L. 102-555), bringing Landsat back under
government sponsorship. Landsat 5 and 7, built and operated by the government, are now
in orbit. Landsat 5, launched in 1984, is well past its design lifetime and only partially
functioning. One of the sensors on Landsat 7, launched in 1999, also is not functioning
properly. Whether and how the U.S. government should ensure the continuity of Landsat-
type data is currently being debated. NASA hoped the private sector, rather than the
government, would build the next satellite. NASA solicited bids, but only one was received
and NASA rejected it. NASA’s current plan is to place Landsat-type sensors (called OLIs
— Operational Land Imagers) on the NPOESS satellites discussed earlier. Some scientists
are concerned that Landsat 5 and 7 will fail before the first NPOESS satellite is launched,
creating a gap in data acquisition, and want a “gapfiller” satellite launched. This does not
appear to be in NASA’s plans.
The Land Remote Sensing Policy Act also promoted development of new systems by
the private sector. Coupled with a 1994 Clinton Administration policy, these actions led
several U.S. companies to initiate programs to build remote sensing satellites and offer
imagery on a commercial basis. Those companies must obtain an operating license from
NOAA for such systems. Three U.S. companies — Space Imaging, DigitalGlobe, and
Orbimage — have commercial remote sensing satellites in orbit. The market for their
products is limited, however, and they reportedly are struggling financially. Partially in
response to that concern, President Bush signed a new commercial remote sensing policy on
April 25, 2003 that is intended to sustain and enhance the U.S. remote sensing industry.
Controversy over the fact that the imagery has military as well as civilian uses
complicates this commercial space effort, however. Though not as precise as military
reconnaissance satellites, the three operating U.S. private sector satellites, Ikonos 2 (Space
Imaging), QuickBird (DigitalGlobe), and Orbview 3 (Orbimage) produce imagery with
resolution (the ability to “see” an object or feature of a certain size) of 1 meter or less.
Competitors include French, Russian, Indian, and Israeli companies that offer imagery with
2.5-meter, 1-meter, 1-meter, and 1.8-meter resolution respectively. One major issue is when
the U.S. government can exercise “shutter control,” forcing U.S. companies to discontinue
obtaining or distributing imagery of certain parts of the world in times of crisis. DOD took
a different approach to controlling access to imagery when the United States initiated attacks
in Afghanistan. For two months, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA, now
the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency or NGA) bought exclusive rights to Ikonos
imagery of that area so that no one else could use the data without NIMA’s approval, a
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practice dubbed “checkbook shutter control” in the media. The government apparently did
not limit access to commercial satellite imagery during the 2003 Iraqi war. Another issue is
the government’s role in controlling to whom the imagery is sold and which countries may
invest in the U.S.-owned systems. U.S. companies want time limits on how long the
government can take to decide whether particular sales or investments will be permitted so
they can make wise business decisions. The 2003 Bush policy states that the government
will provide a timely and responsive regulatory environment.
Special issues have arisen regarding Israel. On October 7, 1994, Senator Bingaman and
63 other Senators sent a letter to the Secretary of Commerce expressing concern that data
from Eyeglass (subsequently renamed Orbview) that could be used against Israel would be
made available to Saudi Arabia, which was providing partial financing for the system and
would be the location of a ground station. The FY1997 DOD authorization bill (P.L.
104-201) prohibits collection and release, or U.S. government declassification, of satellite
imagery of Israel unless such imagery is no more detailed or precise than what is available
from commercial sources.
Potential availability of commercial imagery also has a positive side for the military,
since the U.S. military and intelligence communities could reduce costs by acquiring imagery
commercially instead of building their own systems for some purposes. Congress has
strongly encouraged NIMA (now NGA) to purchase commercial imagery to augment
classified imagery. The 2003 Bush policy directs the U.S. government to utilize U.S.
commercial remote sensing space capabilities, for both civil and national security purposes,
to the maximum extent practicable. Foreign commercial remote sensing space capabilities
may be used consistent with national security and foreign policy objectives. (See below for
more on the use of commercial imagery by NGA/NIMA.)
Space Tourism
A nascent commercial space area is “space tourism.” On June 21, 2004, Mike Melvill
became the first person to reach space (on a suborbital flight) aboard a privately funded
launch vehicle, SpaceShipOne, designed by Scaled Composites. Mr. Melvill is sometimes
referred as the first “commercial astronaut,” but several representatives of commercial
companies, and other private individuals, have flown in space. Mr. Melvill’s flight is notable
because SpaceShipOne was developed without government funding, and some hope it will
usher in an era of “affordable” space tourism. In 2004, Congress passed the Commercial
Space Launch Act Amendments (P.L. 108-492) that, inter alia, create a regulatory structure
for space tourism. See CRS Issue Brief IB93062.
Military Space Programs
The 1958 National Aeronautics and Space Act specified that military space activities
be conducted by the Department of Defense (DOD). The Undersecretary of the Air Force
is DOD’s executive agent for space, and the Air Force acquisition executive for space. The
intelligence community makes significant use of space-based intelligence collection
capabilities. The National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), an agency within DOD, builds and
operates intelligence collection satellites, and collects and processes the resulting data, which
are provided to users such as the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) and the
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National Security Agency (NSA). The Undersecretary of the Air Force is the Director of
NRO. NRO, NGA, and NSA also are under the oversight of the new Director of National
Intelligence (DNI). See CRS Report RL32515 for more on the DNI and potential effects for
DOD intelligence agencies, including NRO, NGA, and NSA.
DOD and the intelligence community manage a broad array of space activities,
including launch vehicle development, communications satellites, navigation satellites (the
Global Positioning System — GPS), early warning satellites to alert the United States to
foreign missile launches, weather satellites, reconnaissance satellites, and developing
capabilities to protect U.S. satellite systems and to deny the use of space to adversaries
(called “space control” or “counterspace systems”). The 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War is
dubbed by some as the first “space war” because support from space displayed great
improvement over what was available during the previous major conflict, Vietnam. These
systems continue to play significant roles in U.S. military operations.
How to organize DOD and the intelligence community to work effectively on space
programs has been an issue for many years. Congress established commissions to review
the NRO in the FY2000 intelligence authorization act, P.L. 106-120; NGA (then called
NIMA, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency) in the classified annex to the FY2000
DOD appropriations act, P.L. 106-79; and overall U.S. national security space management
and organization in the FY2000 DOD authorization act, P.L. 106-65. The NRO,
NGA/NIMA, and “Rumsfeld Space Commission” reports are discussed below.
Although U.S. military and civilian space programs are separated organizationally, the
functions performed by satellites and the vehicles that launch them are not easily divided.
Both sectors use communications, navigation, weather, and remote sensing/reconnaissance
satellites, which may operate at different frequencies or have different capabilities, but have
similar technology. The same launch vehicles can be used to launch any type of military,
civilian, or commercial satellite. DOD uses some civilian satellites and vice versa.
After the Cold War, interest in space weapons to attack satellites (antisatellite, or
ASAT, weapons) or ballistic missiles declined initially, but was rekindled beginning with the
104th Congress. Using satellites to attack ballistic missiles has been controversial since
President Reagan’s 1983 announcement of a Strategic Defense Initiative to study the viability
of building a ballistic missile defense system to protect the United States and its allies. The
Clinton Administration changed the name of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization
to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization to reflect a new focus on theater missile
defense in the wake of the Persian Gulf War, rather than national missile defense. The
George W. Bush Administration changed the name to the Missile Defense Agency (MDA)
to reflect its interest in broad missile defense goals (see CRS Report RL31111).
The concept of placing weapons in space, as part of a missile defense system or
otherwise, remains controversial. A May 18, 2005 New York Times article reported that the
new national space policy being developed by the Bush Administration (discussed earlier)
would “move the United States closer to fielding offensive and defensive space weapons.”
White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan, responding to questions at that day’s White
House press briefing, stressed that the new policy, which is still being developed, does not
represent a substantial shift in U.S. policy, as claimed by the newspaper. The same day,
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Representative Kucinich introduced a bill (H.R. 2420) to ban weapons in space, and the use
of weapons to damage or destroy objects in orbit.
International Cooperation and Competition
Virtually every country in the world uses satellites for communications and obtaining
weather data, but the usual measure of whether a country is a member of the “space-faring”
club is its ability to launch satellites. By that criterion, Russia, the United States, China,
Japan, India, Israel, Ukraine, and the European Space Agency (ESA) are members. ESA
developed the Ariane launch vehicle; Ariane launches are conducted by the French company
Arianespace. These countries, including many of the individual members of ESA, present
opportunities for cooperation, as well as competition. The 15 members of ESA are Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
The NASA Act specifically states that NASA may conduct international space
activities. Many NASA programs today have an international component. One of the major
cooperative projects today is the space station (see CRS Issue Brief IB93017). European
countries, both individually and through ESA, Canada, and Japan, in particular, have
participated in many cooperative space programs with NASA. They also compete with U.S.
companies in some space areas. Europe, India, Ukraine, and Russia compete in launch
services for placing satellites into orbit. France, Russia, India and Israel compete in satellite
remote sensing, and Europe competes in communications satellite manufacturing. n
Cooperation and competition between the United States and the former Soviet Union
attracted much attention. Competition with the Soviet Union was measured less in economic
terms than in prestige and national defense. The main area of competition today seems to
be on the economic front, although Russian and Ukrainian companies have joint ventures
with U.S. firms to provide launch services, so economic cooperation also exists.
NASA and DOD Space Budgets
NASA & DOD Budgets
The majority of U.S.
(in Billions of Unadjusted Dollars by Fiscal Year)
government space funding 25
goes to NASA and DOD.
This table shows NASA 20
and DOD space funding
from FY1959 to FY2005, 15
with projections (for NASA)
through FY2010. The DOD 10
funding figures must be used
cautiously, however. Space
is not a line item in the DOD 5
budget, and DOD’s annual
budget justifications do not 0 59 61 63 65 67 69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 '01 '03 '05 '07 '09
include a figure for “space
activities.” DOD sometimes
NASA
DOD
releas es only partial
Does not include transition quarter. See text for other notes.
information or will release
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without explanation new figures for prior years that are quite different from what was
previously reported. Space spending by all federal government agencies, by year since
FY1959, is provided in Appendix E of the annual Aeronautics and Space Report of the
President, submitted to Congress by NASA. The most recent edition
[http://history.nasa.gov/presrep2003.pdf]covers through FY2003. This table uses data from
that report for NASA and DOD through FY2003. NASA figures for FY2004 and beyond,
including projections through FY2010, are from NASA’s annual budget justifications. The
DOD figures for FY2004-FY2006 were supplied to CRS by DOD’s Office of the
Comptroller; out-year projections were not provided. According to the DOD data provided
in March 2004 and March 2005, DOD requested $21.7 billion for space programs in
FY2005, while Congress provided $19.8 billion; the FY2006 request is $22.5 billion.
According to NASA budget documents, NASA requested $16.2 billion for FY2005 and
received $16.07 billion in the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act (adjusted for the
across-the-board rescission), plus $126 million in a FY2005 supplemental for hurricane
relief, for a total FY2005 budget of $16.2 billion. Its FY2006 request is $16.5 billion. All
NASA figures include aeronautics funding ($400 million-$1 billion annually in recent years).
Space Program Issues
NASA Issues: The “Vision for Space Exploration”
President Bush’s January 14, 2004 announcement of a new “Vision for Space
Exploration” (see CRS Report RS21720) is capturing the spotlight of NASA issues. The
President’s directive called for redirecting NASA’s human exploration program from low
Earth orbit to the Moon, Mars, and “worlds beyond.” Achieving that goal involves both
robotic and human missions. According to the President’s speech, humans would return to
the Moon in 2015-2020, and eventually go to Mars (no date given). The space shuttle
program would be terminated when construction of the International Space Station (ISS) is
completed, currently expected in 2010. The President also asserted that the United States
would meet its obligations to the other partners in the program (see CRS Issue Brief
IB93017). How it will do so without the shuttle is uncertain. The President invited other
countries to join the United States in the Vision.
U.S. research aboard the ISS would focus only on that which is needed to support the
Vision instead of the broadly-based program that was planned. According to a budget chart
released the same day as the President’s speech, NASA would end its involvement in the
ISS program by FY2017. The plan called for NASA to build a Crew Exploration Vehicle
(CEV) to ferry crews to and from the Moon, with an Earth-orbital capability by 2014. U.S.
astronauts would have to rely on Russia to take them to and from ISS between the end of the
shuttle program in 2010 and the availability of the CEV. As noted elsewhere, NASA
Administrator Griffin is committed to reducing the gap between the end of the shuttle system
and the availability of CEV. If the CEV remains on its original schedule, obtaining services
from Russia could be problematical. As discussed earlier (see Human Spaceflight), Russia
currently provides NASA with crew transport and crew return services at no cost under a
1996 agreement. Russia’s obligations under that agreement will be fulfilled with a Soyuz
spacecraft scheduled for launch in October 2005 and return to Earth in April 2006.
Assuming that the space shuttle has returned to flight status by then, NASA could continue
to place U.S. astronauts aboard the ISS as long as the shuttle is flying, but they could not
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remain there for long duration missions without access to the Russian crew return
(“lifeboat”) services. They would have to depart with the shuttle, which typically remains
at the ISS for 1-2 weeks, unless NASA changes its policy requiring an emergency escape
route for its astronauts. Once the shuttle is retired, U.S. astronauts would not be able to visit
the ISS without access to Russia crew transport services. Russian space officials have
repeatedly indicated that they will not provide these services for free, yet, under the terms of
the Iran Nonproliferation Act (INA, P.L. 106-178), NASA is prohibited from making
payments to Russia for ISS-related services unless the President makes a determination that
Russia is not proliferating certain technologies to Iran. NASA officials state that the Bush
Administration is working on an approach to resolve these issues, but details have not been
made public. For more on the INA/ISS relationship see CRS Report RS22072.
In February 2004, NASA estimated that returning humans to the Moon by 2020 would
cost $64 billion in 2003 dollars, not including the cost of associated robotic missions. A
September 2004 Congressional Budget Office report [http://www.cbo.gov] concluded that,
based on historical NASA experience, that cost could be much higher. NASA has not
provided an estimate for sending astronauts to Mars. Most of the required funding would
come from redirecting funds from other NASA programs. In the FY2005 budget, the White
House projected approximately 5% increases for NASA each year for FY2005-2007, but the
FY2006 request for FY2006 does not meet that expectation (see below).
The House and Senate Appropriations Committees expressed support for the Vision in
their reports on the FY2005 VA-HUD-IA appropriations bill (H.Rept. 108- 674; S.Rept. 108-
353), but each committee cut funding for it. The final version of the bill (incorporated in the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, H.R. 4818, P.L. 108-447) funds NASA almost at its
requested level, which many supporters of the Vision viewed as an endorsement of the plan.
However, conferees noted that they were giving NASA funding for the Vision even though
“there has been no substantive Congressional action endorsing” it. At a February 17, 2005
hearing on the FY2006 NASA budget request, House Science Committee Chairman Boehlert
echoed that comment, saying in his opening statement that “Congress has never endorsed —
in fact, has never discussed — the Vision.” (The statement is available at
[http://www.house.gov/science/hearings/full05/feb17/SBopening.pdf].)
For FY2006, NASA is requesting a total of $16.456 billion, a 2.4% increase over the
amount included in the FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act ($16.070 billion). NASA
also received a $126 million FY2005 supplemental for hurricane relief, making its total
FY2005 budget $16.196 billion. The FY2006 request is a 1.6% increase over that amount.
As noted above, in FY2005 budget documents, the NASA budget was projected to increase
approximately 5% for each year FY2005-2007. Some view the lower than expected increase
as a sign of soft White House support for the Vision. The House Appropriations
Subcommittee on Science, State, Commerce and Justice marked up the FY2006
appropriations bill that includes NASA on May 24 (no bill number yet), recommending $15
million more than the request.
NASA Administrator Griffin has outlined how he plans to implement the Vision in
congressional testimony and other public venues. His first priority is returning the shuttle
to flight status and completing construction of the ISS. He considers 2010 to be a firm date
for terminating the space shuttle, even if ISS construction is not completed then, however.
He is assessing alternatives to the shuttle for fulfilling that task. He wants to accelerate
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development of the CEV to avoid the multi-year gap between when the shuttle is terminated
and the CEV becomes available. He agreed to reconsider whether to send the shuttle to
service the Hubble Space Telescope once the shuttle returns to flight and more is known
about its risk factors now that various redesigns have been made. He told a Senate
Appropriations subcommittee that increased costs for Return to Flight activities, costs
associated with preserving the option to do a Hubble shuttle servicing mission, costs for
other congressionally directed items in NASA’s FY2005 budget, and cost increases in
several other programs, means that NASA does not have enough funding to pursue all the
programs now on its plate. Cutbacks therefore will have to be made in a number of areas —
including future robotic Mars exploration, future astronomy programs, development of
nuclear power and propulsion (Project Prometheus), and research aboard the space station.
Military Space Issues
For many years, questions have arisen about whether DOD effectively manages its space
activities, and several commissions and task forces have studied the issue. Congress created
a commission in the FY2000 DOD authorization bill to make recommendations on the
overall management of national security space programs. Chaired by Donald Rumsfeld, the
Commission released its report on January 11, 2001, shortly after Mr. Rumsfeld became
Secretary of Defense. The “Rumsfeld Space Commission” made sweeping recommendations
for management of DOD and intelligence community space programs (see CRS Report
RS20824 for a synopsis). According to two GAO reports (GAO-02-772, June 2002; GAO-
03-379, April 2003), DOD plans to implement 10 of the 13 organizational recommendations.
Several DOD space programs have experienced significant cost overruns and schedule
delays, raising concerns about DOD’s acquisition process for space systems. The Defense
Science Board (DSB) and Air Force Scientific Advisory Board (AFSAB) commissioned a
task force to review DOD space program acquisition because of significant cost increases in
several programs. Chaired by retired Lockheed Martin executive Tom Young, its May 2003
r e p o r t w a s p u b l i c l y r e l e a s e d i n S e p t e m b e r 2 0 0 3
[http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/space.pdf]. Four key points are that cost has replaced
mission success as the primary driver in managing acquisition processes, creating excessive
technical and schedule risk; the space acquisition system is strongly biased to produce
unrealistically low cost estimates; government capabilities to lead and manage the acquisition
process have seriously eroded; and there are long term concerns about the space industrial
base. According to press reports (e.g., Wall Street Journal, August 25, 2004, B7), the task
force produced an update in August 2004 that concluded that some of the space programs it
criticized were making progress but still required close review, and that better coordination
in needed between the military and intelligence agencies in setting requirements.
Meanwhile, figures from the DOD Comptroller’s Office over several years showed that
the Bush Administration planned to increase DOD’s space budget significantly — from
$15.7 billion in FY2002, to $20 billion in FY2004, to a request of $21.7 billion for FY2005,
and continued increases to a projected $28.7 billion in FY2008. However, in its report on
the FY2005 DOD appropriations bill (S. 2559, S.Rept. 108-284), the Senate Appropriations
Committee cautioned that funding for DOD’s space activities may not be sustainable.
Figures provided to CRS by the DOD Comptroller’s Office in March 2005 showed that DOD
received $19.8 billion for FY2005 (compared to the $21.7 billion requested). The FY2006
request is $22.5 billion. Projected future year funding was not provided.
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Space-Based Radar (SBR) and TSAT. A number of DOD space programs are
encountering cost growth and schedule delays, including the Air Force’s Space Based
Infrared System-High (SBIRS-High) for early warning of missile launches (see CRS Report
RS21148), the Air Force’s Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) communications
satellite system, and the National Reconnaissance Office’s (NRO’s) Future Imagery
Architecture reconnaissance satellite system. DOD’s requests to initiate new programs,
including a Space-Based Radar (SBR) program, and the Transformational Satellite (TSAT)
communications satellite program, are controversial because of the potentially large costs
involved, whether the technologies they require are ready, and how to avoid the cost growth
and schedule delays experienced in other DOD space programs.
SBR would be a system of many satellites (the exact number has not been determined)
that would track mobile targets (as opposed to fixed targets) on the ground. The House
Appropriations Committee has sharply criticized the SBR program for the past several years.
Most recently, in its report on the FY2005 DOD appropriations bill (H.Rept. 108-557), the
committee noted that the estimated cost for a 9-satellite constellation is $34 billion, and the
Air Force considers nine satellite to be less than half the number required. The committee
expressed skepticism about the $34 billion estimate, as well.
The TSAT program would be a follow-on to the AEHF program, which, in turn, is a
follow-on to the current series of Milstar satellites. AEHF itself is controversial because of
cost overruns, and, in 2002, DOD decided to procure only three instead of five AEHF
satellites. The first AEHF launch is scheduled for 2008. TSAT is expected to “transform”
DOD communications by providing vastly greater capacity than is available today by
operating at much higher (optical) frequencies. If TSAT is delayed, additional AEHF
satellites may be needed.
Congressional Action. The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) reported
its version of the FY2005 DOD authorization bill on May 17, 2005 (S. 1042, S.Rept. 109-
69). The House Armed Services Committee (HASC) reported its version (H.R. 1815,
H.Rept. 109-89) on May 20.
The request for SBR was $226 million. SASC recommended a cut of $75 million;
HASC cut it by $126 million. Both committees commented extensively on the program (pp.
200-201 in the Senate report, pp. 214-216 in the House report), each referring to it as the
“space radar” (instead of “space-based radar”) program. Both discussed the need to integrate
the space radar into a broader architecture of radar capabilities, including airborne radars.
SASC also emphasized the need for a single space radar system to meet military and
intelligence needs, and expressed concern about the lack of certainty about cost and other
issues. HASC noted a number of concerns, including that the Air Force has not sufficiently
emphasized affordability as a key objective, or fully considered the requirements for a
demonstration program. HASC provided specific direction as to what is needed for such a
program, utilizing ground, airborne, and existing space assets.
The request for TSAT was $836 million. SASC recommended a cut of $200 million;
HASC cut it by $400 million. SASC expressed support for TSAT, but noted that GAO
found that only one of its seven critical technologies is mature (p. 200). Thus, SASC
recommended that a fourth AEHF satellite be procured (adding $100 million for that
satellite) while the TSAT technologies are developed, and that some could be incorporated
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into that fourth AEHF satellite if feasible. HASC also supported the concept of TSAT, and
commended the Air Force on its vision for revolutionary solutions (pp. 216-217). However,
it cited the recent history of cost overruns and schedule growth associated with other Air
Force space programs as cause for skepticism about the ability of the current acquisition
system to accommodate the risks associated with revolutionary technologies. The committee
directed that the focus of the TSAT program shift to technology development rather than
acquisition. It added that it did not believe additional funding for AEHF would be needed
until FY2007.
In addition to discussing problems with DOD’s space acquisition system in connection
with specific requests for programs such as TSAT, the two committees included a number
of recommendations about DOD’s acquisition system (SASC, Title VIII; HASC, pp. 13-14,
202). HASC also expressed concern about the need to develop closer relationships between
“black” (classified) and “white” (unclassified) space activities (pp. 208-209)
Developing New Space Launch Vehicles
Government and private sector launch vehicles are discussed in CRS Issue Brief
IB93062. There are two types of launch vehicles: Expendable Launch Vehicles (ELVs,
which can only be used once) and Reusable Launch Vehicles (RLVs). The space shuttle is
the only RLV in the world.
NASA began its attempts to develop a new RLV to replace the space shuttle in the
1980s that would cost less and improve safety. Several programs were started and later
abandoned: the National Aero-Space Plane (NASP), jointly with DOD; X-33; X-34; and the
Space Launch Initiative (SLI). SLI was terminated following President Bush’s January 2004
announcement of the Vision for Space Exploration, The Vision involves sending astronauts
back to the Moon, but NASA officials have not yet determined what launch vehicles are
needed to take crews there, or cargo. NASA has concluded that it is preferable to separate
the functions of crew transport and cargo (the shuttle does both).

Under a 1994 Clinton policy, NASA was the lead agency for developing new RLVs,
while DOD was the lead agency for ELVs. DOD initiated the Evolved Expendable Launch
Vehicle (EELV) program to upgrade U.S. expendable launch vehicles to reduce launch costs
by at least 25%. Lockheed Martin and Boeing each built EELVs: the Atlas V and the Delta
IV respectively, which are now in operation. The companies and DOD shared the
development costs, with the expectation that the companies would recoup their costs through
selling launches to commercial customers. Market demand did not materialize as expected,
however, and the companies now are seeking additional funds from DOD. DOD has been
supportive of industry’s position, asserting that by ensuring the health of both companies, it
will have “assured access to space” should technical problems arise with one of the vehicles.
DOD notified Congress in 2004 that the EELV program breached a “Nunn-McCurdy” limit
of 25% cost growth, which required DOD to cancel or restructure the program, or certify that
it is essential to national security. In April 2004, DOD certified that the program is essential
for national security. Questions began to arise, however, about whether the government
could afford both EELV service providers. In May 2005, Boeing and Lockheed Martin
announced they would merge their EELV launch services for U.S. government customers.
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In January 2005, the Bush White House released a new U.S. space launch policy
[http://www.ostp.gov/html/SpaceTransFactSheetJan2005.pdf]. Under the new policy, DOD
is the lead agency for the national security space sector, and NASA is the lead agency for the
civil sector. DOD is directed to maintain the capability to develop, evolve, operate and
purchase services for the space transportation systems, infrastructure, and support activities
necessary to meet national security requirements. NASA is directed to do the same for the
civil sector, but is permitted to engage in development activities only for requirements that
cannot be met by capabilities being used by the national security or commercial sectors.
Regarding the EELV program, DOD is directed to fund the annual fixed costs for both
launch service providers unless or until the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) certifies to the
President that a capability to reliably assure access to space can be maintained without two
EELV providers. No later than 2010, the SecDef, Director of Central Intelligence, and the
Administrator of NASA are to evaluate the long term requirements for the EELV, including
a recommended “proportionate shift” of funding responsibility to reflect any change in the
balance between national security and civil missions requiring an EELV. Any department
or agency seeking to modify or develop new launch systems derived from the EELV,
including human rating (such as may be needed for NASA to accomplish the Vision for
Space Exploration), is responsible for related funding.
NASA Administrator Griffin has emphasized in several public fora that he believes a
“shuttle derived launch vehicle” is a promising option for supporting the Vision for Space
Exploration. Under this concept, the space shuttle’s airplane-like orbiter, where the crew and
cargo are located, would be replaced by a cargo pod (no crew). It could place approximately
100 tons of cargo into low Earth orbit, compared to about 20 tons that could be launched
with the EELVs. Options for launching the Crew Exploration Vehicle, which will take
astronauts to and from space, are still under evaluation.
Several private companies are attempting to develop their own launch vehicles. One
focus today is building suborbital launch vehicles that would take passengers into space
(though not to orbit). The first successful launch of a person into space on a craft
(SpaceShipOne) that was developed with private capital was conducted on June 21, 2004
(discussed earlier). The 2005 Bush policy calls both for continued government support for
space transportation capabilities, and for capitalizing on the U.S. private sector’s
“entrepreneurial spirit.” NASA is hoping that the private sector can field systems to take
cargo to and from the ISS after the space shuttle is retired in 2010.
International Relationships
The shifting world political situation has allowed new relationships to evolve in
international space cooperation. Increased cooperation is the result not only of changed
political circumstances, but also of constrained budgets throughout the world. All the major
space-faring countries are questioning how much they should invest in space. The same
budget constraints may preclude the initiation of new programs if a critical mass of funding
is not available. Other countries are responding cautiously to President Bush’s invitation to
join in the new Vision for Space Exploration. Some of the partners in the ISS program say
they want that program completed before agreeing to further cooperation. Still, many of
NASA’s current partners, as well as potentially new partners such as China, are participating
in NASA-led discussions about the Vision. Also, European companies are teaming with
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U.S. companies in bids for the CEV contract. Thus, international cooperation at both the
government and industrial levels may be part of achieving the Vision.
LEGISLATION
H.R. 1815 (Hunter)/S. 1042 (Warner). FY2006 DOD authorization bill. Reported
from House Armed Services Committee May 20, 2005, H.Rept. 109-89; reported from
Senate Armed Services Committee May 17 (S.Rept. 109-69).
H.R. 2420 (Kucinich). To prohibit weapons in space, and the use of weapons to
destroy or damage objects in orbit. Introduced May 18, 2005; referred to House Science,
Armed Services, and International Relations Committees.
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