Order Code RL32476
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
U.S. Army’s Modular Redesign:
Issues for Congress
Updated May 20, 2005
Andrew Feickert
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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U.S. Army’s Modular Redesign:
Issues for Congress
Summary
In what the Army describes as the “most significant Army restructuring in the
past 50 years,” the Army is redesigning its current 10 active duty division force to
a 43 or 48 brigade-level unit of action or UA force by FY2007. The Army National
Guard will also redesign its force structure in a similar fashion. The addition of up
to 15 additional active duty and the conversion of Army National Guard brigades
into 31 UA brigade combat teams could provide an additional force pool of
deployable units to ease the burden on units presently deployed, and possibly to
shorten the length of time that units are deployed on operations. The Army has two
other concurrent initiatives underway that it considers inextricably linked to its
brigade-centric redesign: rebalancing to create new “high demand” units and
stabilizing the force to foster unit cohesion and enhance predictability for soldiers
and their families. Both initiatives involve substantial policy, organizational, and
personnel changes from FY2004 - FY2009.
Some experts believe that modular redesign, selective rebalancing, and
stabilizing of the Army are prudent actions that should provide the Army with
additional deployable units and also eventually bring stability to soldiers and their
families. As long as no additional significant long term troop commitments arise,
many feel that these initiatives could help ease the stress on both the active and
reserve forces. As the Army continues its modular conversion, it may have to contend
with personnel and equipment shortages which could impede plans to build this new
force as intended. Some analysts and government officials also question if the Army
can afford both its Future Combat System (FCS) program and its modularity
program. In addition to funding considerations, recruiting and retention and
equipment issues could also affect the Army’s modularization plans.
Rebalancing and stabilization efforts are currently underway but at this early
stage, it is difficult to gauge their impact on the modularization process. Where these
new units of action will eventually be based is also of interest to many analysts, and
the Global Basing Strategy as well as the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure
(BRAC) process will likely influence where the Army will base its forces. With a
number of active duty brigades already converted to the UA structure and the
modular 3rd Infantry Division presently serving in Iraq, the 109th Congress might
examine how effectively these new UAs perform in an operational setting and how
potential personnel and equipment shortages could affect the Army’s plans to convert
the rest of the Army into the Army Modular Force (AMF). This report will be
updated.

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Contents
Issues For Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
What the Army Intends to Achieve by Modularization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Modular Conversions in FY2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Modular Conversions in FY2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Modular Army FY2006 and Beyond . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Modularization Plans FY2006 - FY2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
National Guard Modularization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Support Unit Modularization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Cost Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
FY2005 Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Modularity Cost Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Modularity Versus the Future Combat System (FCS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Non-Budgetary Issues Affecting Modularization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Personnel Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Recruiting and Retention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Possible Limitations of Female Soldiers in Forward
Support Companies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Equipment Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
National Guard Equipment Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Demands on Army Depots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Basing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Army’s Preliminary Basing Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
BRAC Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Rebalancing and Stabilizing the Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Other Critical Army Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Rebalancing the Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Stabilizing the Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Potential Oversight Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Modularity “ Lessons Learned” From Deployments to Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Personnel and Equipment Shortages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Basing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Rebalancing and Stabilizing the Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Additional Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
List of Tables
Table 1. Army National Guard Modular Conversions, FY2006-2010 . . . . . . . . . 5
Table 2. Numbers of Active, Guard, and Reserve Support Units
of Action (SUAs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

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Table 3. FY2005 Supplemental Request for Army Modularization . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Table 4. Restructuring of Units, FY2004 - FY2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

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U.S. Army’s Modular Redesign:
Issues for Congress
Issues For Congress
The United States Army is undertaking a total organizational redesign of its
combat and associated support units to better meet current and future operational
requirements. This redesign effort, as well as associated rebalancing and stabilization
initiatives, are deemed important by proponents as they are intended to sustain both
the active and reserve Army through a potentially long term, manpower and resource
intensive war on terror.
The overall issue facing Congress is how well the Army’s modularity program
is progressing and what are some of the issues affecting this major redesign effort.
Also of critical importance is the Army’s ability to fund both the Future Combat
System (FCS) program and its modularity program concurrently. Key oversight
questions can be summarized as follows:
! How well are the Army’s first two modular units performing in Iraq
and what has been learned during these operations that could affect
the modularization of the rest of the Army?
! What are the specific modularity-related personnel and equipment
shortages facing the Army?
! What is the Army’s current basing plan for its modular forces and
how might these plans be effected by the global repositioning of
forces as well as the FY2005 Base Realignment and Closure
(BRAC) process?
! How are the Army’s complementary force rebalancing and
stabilization efforts progressing?
Congress’ decisions on these and other related issues could have significant
implications for U.S. national security, Army funding requirements, and future
congressional oversight activities. This report addresses the U.S. Army’s redesign
of its current force structure, based on large divisions, into one based on brigade-
level modular “units of action” (UA).1
1 According to Department of the Army Pamphlet 10-1, “Organization of the United States
Army,” dated June 14, 1994, a division consists of approximately 10,000 to 18,000 soldiers
and a brigade consists of approximately 3,000 to 5,000 soldiers.

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Background
What the Army Intends to Achieve by Modularization
The Army maintains that by organizing the Army around UA Brigade Combat
Teams (BCTs) and Support Units of Action (SUA), that it will be able to “better
meet the challenges of the 21st century security environment and, specifically, jointly
fight and win the Global War on Terrorism.”2 Accordingly, the Army hopes that
modularization will result in:
! “At least a 30 percent increase in the combat power of the active
component of the force”;
! “An increase in the rotational pool of ready units by at least 50
percent”;
! “Creation of a deployable joint-capable headquarters”;
! “Force design upon which the future network centric developments
[Future Combat System] can be readily applied”;
! “Reduced stress on the force through a more predictable deployment
cycle:”
— “One year deployed and two years at home station for the active
component”;
— “One year deployed and four years at home station for the Reserve
Force”;
— “One year deployed and five years at home station for the National
Guard Force”; and
— “Reduced mobilization times for the reserve component as a whole.”3
Some, however, question some of the Army’s claims. A recent Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) study, “Options for Restructuring the Army” notes the
following:
The modularity initiative will boost the number of combat forces available to the
Army by up to 5 percent. But it may require an additional 60,000 personnel to do
so (or twice the temporarily authorized increase), and it will make the Army
more reliant on reserve support units. Moreover, modularity is unlikely to lead
to substantial improvements in deployment times.4
2 Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2005, January 15, 2005, p. 9.
3 Ibid.
4 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) Study, “ Options for Restructuring the Army,” May
2005, p . Xii.

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Modular Conversions in FY2004
In FY2004, the Army began converting three of its ten active duty divisions into
modular forces. Two of these divisions — the 3rd Infantry Division from Ft. Stewart,
Georgia and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) from Ft. Campbell, Kentucky
— were totally converted in FY2004 and their respective division headquarters were
converted into UE x’s - headquarters units which are designed to command up to six
UAs as well as Supporting Units of Action. The 10th Mountain Division (Light
Infantry) from Ft. Drum, New York also began its modular conversion in FY2004 by
adding a third UA brigade combat team as well as converting its division
headquarters to a UE x structure. A fourth UA is scheduled to be added to the 10th
Mountain Division in FY2005 and will be stationed at Ft. Polk, Louisiana at the Joint
Readiness Training Center.5 Also in 2004, the Army’s third Stryker Brigade Combat
Team (SBCT) will be stood up as part of Hawaii-based the 25th Infantry Division
(Light).6
In March 2005, the converted 3rd Infantry Division was sent back to Iraq for a
year-long deployment.7 The 3rd Infantry Division led the U.S. assault on Baghdad in
in March of 2003 under the Army’s traditional three brigade, division design and
experts suggest that the current deployment of the reconfigured 3rd Infantry Division
will yield a significant amount of valuable information which could help with
ongoing and future modular conversions. The 101st Airborne Division, which also
converted in FY2004, is slated to return to Iraq for the second time in late summer
or early fall of 2005.8
Modular Conversions in FY2005
In addition to the creation of the 10th Mountain Division’s fourth UA in 2005,
a number of other conversions are planned to occur this year. The 4th Infantry
Division at Ft. Hood, Texas is scheduled to begin its modularization, with the
division headquarters converting to a UE x. The 1st Corps headquarters, stationed at
Ft. Lewis, Washington is planned to be downgraded and converted to a UE x in 2005
5 Matthew Cox, “Army Announces Locations for Its 10 New Brigades,” Army Times, July
23, 2004.
6 The SBCTs are organized around motorized infantry battalions and have a unique
reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition (RSTA) squadron and are intended to
be used primarily in small-scale contingency operations in complex and urban terrain in a
variety of roles ranging from combat to stability operations. These forces are considered
“medium” forces and were viewed by the Army’s previous Chief of Staff — General Eric
Shinseki — as an interim forces until Future Combat System (FCS) equipped brigades were
fielded. Under new transformation plans, Stryker units will remain part of the Future Force.
7 Donna Miles, “Two Years in Iraq: 3rd ID Returns with New Mission, Focus,” American
Forces Information Services, March 22, 2005.
8 Conversation with the 101st Airborne Division Public Affairs Officer, April 12, 2005.

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and its has been reported that the Army is attempting to station the former 1st Corps
headquarters at Camp Zama, Japan.9
In FY2005, the 25th Infantry Division plans to stand up its fourth UA, with an
airborne capability for forced entry operations, at Ft. Richardson, Alaska, and the 4th
Infantry Division plans to add a fourth UA at Ft. Hood.10 Also in 2005, the 172nd
Separate Infantry Brigade stationed at Ft. Richardson, Alaska is scheduled to convert
to the Army’s third SBCT.
The Modular Army FY2006 and Beyond
Modularization Plans FY2006 - FY2007
In FY2006, the Army plans to convert three division headquarters — the Ft.
Hood, Texas-based, 1st Cavalry Division, the 25th Infantry Division (Light), and the
82nd Airborne Division from Ft. Bragg, North Carolina — to the UE x structure.
These division’s current brigades are scheduled to convert to UAs during this time
period. The 1st Cavalry Division and the 82nd Airborne Division are scheduled to
build a fourth UA, respectively and the 25th Infantry Division (Light) will build two
additional UAs. The 1st Cavalry Division’s fourth UA is planned to be stationed at
Ft. Bliss, Texas. The 25th Infantry’s third UA will be stationed at Ft. Benning,
Georgia and the fourth UA at Ft. Riley, Kansas. In addition, the 173rd Airborne
Brigade stationed in Vincenza, Italy is scheduled to add about 2,000 soldiers and
become a UA and the Army plans to activate its fourth SBCT at Ft. Lewis,
Washington, when the 2nd Cavalry Regiment — the former opposing forces at the
Army’s Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) — converts to a SBCT.
According to the 2005 Army Modernization Plan dated February 2005, the
Army will decide in FY2006 whether or not to add five additional UA brigade
combat teams (BCTS) to the Active component, eventually resulting in 48 Active
component UA BCTs.11 According to sources, the Army has already decided this
year not to add the additional five UA BCTs in FY2007 due to anticipated personnel
and funding shortages.12 In addition, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
reports that the Army is currently considering adding an additional combat battalion
9 Hal Bernton, “No Decision Yet on Shift of I Corps Headquarters,” Seattle Times,
November 5, 2004.
10 Matthew Cox, “Army Announces Locations for Its 10 New Brigades,” Army Times, July
23, 2004.
11 2005 Army Modernization Plan, February 2005, p. 5.
12 From discussions during the Eisenhower Series Conference, “The United States Army in
Asia: Legacies of the Past, Current Challenges, and Prospects for the Future,” March 31,
2005, Alexandria, Virginia and Lisa Troshinsky, “Official: Army Could Decide by 2007 to
Permanently Boost End Strength,” Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, April 12, 2005.

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to the UAs that could have further personnel and equipment implications for the
Army’s modularization efforts.13
In FY2007, the Army plans to convert the headquarters of the Korea-based 2nd
Infantry Division to the UE x structure as well as the headquarters of the Germany-
based 1st Armored Division and the 1st Infantry Division. If the Army does decide to
add five additional UAs in FY2007, two are scheduled to be stood up in the 2nd
Infantry Division, one each in the 1st Armored and 1st Infantry Division, and an
additional non-aligned infantry UA would also be created. Also in FY2007, the
Army’s fifth SBCT is scheduled to be activated under the 25th Infantry Division
(Light).
The Army’s modernization and campaign plans call for the modularization of
the Active Army to be completed by the end of FY2007 but it is not unreasonable to
assume that modularization activities will extend beyond 2007. Some suggest that
personnel, equipment, and budget demands, as well as modifications to UAs based
on experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan could extend the Army’s modularization
window beyond 2007.
National Guard Modularization
The Army National Guard is scheduled to start its modularization efforts in
FY2005. One National Guard division headquarters is scheduled to be converted into
a UE x in FY2005 and three National Guard combat brigades are schedule to be
converted to UAs. The Army’s 2005 Modernization Plan calls for a total of 34 UA
BCTs by 2010 and the following table depicts Army National Guard UE x and UA
conversions from FY2006 through FY2010:
Table 1. Army National Guard Modular Conversions,
FY2006-2010
Fiscal
UE x
UA BCT
Year (FY)
Conversions
Conversions
2006
2
6
2007
2
6
2008
2
7*
2009
1
6
2010
0
6
Total
7
31
* This total includes a National Guard Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT).
13 Testimony before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, House Armed
Services Committee, GAO-05-443T, “Force Structure: Preliminary Observations on Army
Plans to Implement and Fund Modular Forces,” Government Accountability Office (GAO),
March 16, 2005, p. 2.

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Many experts maintain that Army National Guard modularization efforts will
be subject to the same personnel, equipment, and budgetary influences that will likely
affect Active Army modularization plans. Some suggest that these issues will present
even more of a challenge in the National Guard, given recently publicized recruiting
and retention shortfalls and equipment shortages.
Support Unit Modularization
The Army has further defined its modular supporting units in terms of
personnel, functions, and numbers of units to be developed. These Support Units of
Action (SUAs) are14
! Aviation Brigade: Consisting of between 2,600 to 2,700 personnel
and a variety of Army aviation assets.
! Fires Brigade: Consisting of between 1,200 and 1,300 personnel, the
Fires Brigade is to have a mix of cannon, rocket, and missile artillery
systems and is to be able to employ Joint fires (Navy, Marine Corps,
and Air Force) as well.
! Maneuver Enhancement Brigade: Consisting of 435 personnel, the
Maneuver Enhancement Brigade is to have engineer, military police,
nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense, and air defense
units assigned to it. In addition, the brigade could also have
explosive ordnance disposal and civil affairs units assigned to it if
required.
! Battlefield Surveillance Brigade: Consisting of 997 personnel, the
Battlefield Surveillance Brigade is to consist of an intelligence
battalion, support troops, and a long-range surveillance detachment.
In addition, the brigade can be augmented with special forces units
as well as additional unmanned aerial vehicles.
! Sustainment Brigade: Consisting of 487 personnel, the Sustainment
Brigade is to have medical, finance, human resources, ammunition,
transportation, maintenance, and supply and service units.
14 U.S. Army Briefing, Modular Forces Overview, January 19, 2005.

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The Army currently plans to field the following numbers of SUAs as indicated
in Table 2.
Table 2. Numbers of Active, Guard, and
Reserve Support Units of Action (SUAs)
Type of SUA
Number to be Fielded
Aviation Brigade
25
Fires Brigade
11
Maneuver Enhancement Brigade
16
Battlefield Surveillance Brigade
5
Sustainment Brigade
35
TOTAL
92
Source: U.S. Army Paper, “The Army Modular Force and Future Combat
Systems Strategy,” Version 1.2, April 2005, p. 16.
Some analysts observe that there is still a great deal of detail lacking regarding
SUAs. According to GAO, the Army has not yet finalized the design of higher
echelon (above UE x level) and support units and that until these designs are final,
the Army will not know the types and quantities of personnel and equipment needed
to fully implement modular redesign.15 The Army reportedly plans to field 92 SUA
brigades by FY2009 - 2010 which, some contend, creates a number of concerns. One
concern is that while most or all of the active Army’s combat brigades will be
transformed to the UA structure by 2007, the rest of the Army will still be organized
along traditional lines. Exacerbating this concern is that a substantial number of
soldiers and selected equipment from these supporting units were incorporated into
the UAs, leaving the supporting units with only a residual support capability.
Although UAs — theoretically — should be more self-supporting, some question the
ability of these “down-sized” support units to provide UAs with required support.
Another concern is that these support units, as they develop and come into
being, will compete with the UAs for both personnel and equipment. Support unit of
action development will likely occur in an environment of personnel shortages
attributed to lower enlistment and retention rates and that of a high demand for
equipment, particularly wheeled vehicles and communications equipment,
complicated by both combat losses and wear resulting from greater than anticipated
operational usage in Iraq and Afghanistan. With limited personnel and equipment
resource, as well as budget constraints, the Army will likely give resourcing priorities
to UA BCTs which could result in even more pronounced shortages in manning and
equipping the new SUAs.
15 Testimony before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, House Armed
Services Committee, GAO-05-443T, “Force Structure: Preliminary Observations on Army
Plans to Implement and Fund Modular Forces,” Government Accountability Office (GAO),
March 16, 2005, p. 2.

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Cost Considerations
FY2005 Costs
In DOD’s FY2005 Supplemental Request, DOD requests $ 5 billion in FY2005
for Army modularization in the following budget categories:
Table 3. FY2005 Supplemental Request
for Army Modularization
Category
Dollars in Millions
Operations and Maintenance
24.8
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
3
Military Construction
261
Procurement of Equipment and Weapons
4711.2
Total
5,000
Source: Information in this table is taken from the Department of Defense FY2005
Supplemental Request, Chapter 1: Force Restructuring, Detailed Justification,
February 2005, p. 11.
To date, Congress has viewed this request favorably but with reservations. In
H.Rept. 109-16, Making Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for the Fiscal Year
Ending September 30, 2005, and For Other Purposes, the committee reports that
Though concerns are being raised about the advisability of funding this Army
restructuring program through emergency supplemental appropriations, the
Committee is compelled to fully fund the Army request at this time by an
urgency to address the significant challenges the Army now faces.16
The Committee also directed the Secretary of Defense to
Submit to the congressional defense committees a report no later than July 1,
2005, detailing the Department’s long-range plan for executing and funding
Army modularity. The report should identify personnel and equipment
requirements, unit restructuring timelines, and associated costs.17
The Senate, in S.Rept. 109-52 on the FY2005 Emergency Supplemental,
cautions DOD and the Army that:
The Department has now had ample time to incorporate requirements to support
Modularity into its annual budget requests. The Committee is unlikely to regard
16 H.Rept. 109-16, Making Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for the Fiscal Year
Ending September 30, 2005, and For Other Purposes, March 11, 2005, p. 6.
17 Ibid., p. 7.

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supplemental appropriations as an appropriate vehicle for future efforts
supporting modularity.18
Although Congress has been supportive of modularity, it can be inferred that
Congress has been less than pleased with DOD and the Army in terms of planning
and budgeting and that the Army’s assumption that modularity would be paid for
through supplemental appropriations19 appears to be in jeopardy.
Modularity Cost Estimates20
According to GAO, modularity costs are “substantial and likely to grow.” Army
cost estimates have increased significantly since January 2004 when the Army
estimated that it would cost $20 billion from FY2004 - FY2011, based on a “rough
order of magnitude estimate, to increase the number of active Army brigade combat
teams from 33 to 48. In July 2004, the Army added $ 8 billion to reorganize the
reserve component — bringing the cost for the entire force to $28 billion.

In March 2005, the Army revised their estimate and now estimate that
modularity will cost at total of $ 48 billion from FY2005 - FY2011, a 71% increase
over the earlier $28 billion estimate. This new estimate covers the total costs for 43
active component brigades including upgrades to the existing 33 brigades and the
creation of 10 new brigades, as well as 34 brigades in the Army National Guard.
GAO believes that there are additional factors which will likely make
modularity costs exceed the current $ 48 billion estimate.
! The Army’s current $ 48 billion estimate does not use the tested UA
design as the basis for determining equipment costs. Instead, the $48
billion figure reflects costs for a lesser amount of equipment than
called for in the tested design.
! If the Army does decide to add five additional UA BCTs or if it
plans to add an additional maneuver battalion to some or all UAs,
modularity costs could increase significantly. These costs would
include additional soldiers needed above and beyond existing force
structure as well as costs for equipment, facilities, and training.
! While the Army’s current estimate includes costs for permanent
facilities needed for UA BCTs, plans for constructing these
facilities remain uncertain due to pending decisions from the Base
18 S.Rept. 109-52, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global
War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, April 6, 2005, pp. 33-34.
19 “The Army Campaign Plan (Unclassified),” The Department of the Army, March 31,
2004, p. 5.
20 Information in this section is taken from GAO Testimony before the Subcommittee on
Tactical Air and Land Forces, House Armed Services Committee, GAO-05-443T, “Force
Structure: Preliminary Observations on Army Plans to Implement and Fund Modular
Forces,” Government Accountability Office (GAO), March 16, 2005, pp. 8-10.

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Realignment and Closure (BRAC)21 process as well as the planned
restationing of forces from overseas.
Modularity Versus the Future Combat System (FCS)22
According to reports, the Army plans to tell the Department of Defense that it
can fund both modularity and the Future Combat System (FCS).23 This response to
DOD is a requirement originating from DOD’s Program Budget Decision (PBD) 753
dated December 23, 2004 which “Direct(s) the Army to submit to the Deputy
Secretary of Defense by April 1, 2005, an executable plan that rationalizes and
integrates its Future Combat System (FCS) and modularity programs.”24 In addition,
the Army reportedly will establish an “Army Modular Force Integration Office” to
formally link the FCS and modularity programs.25
Some reportedly question the Army’s ability to fund both programs. In his
opening statement during a March 16, 2005 Tactical Air and Land Forces
Subcommittee hearing on FCS, committee chairman, Representative Curt Weldon,
noted that:
FCS and modularity are costly programs. FCS will require $ 25 billion in R&D
alone through 2011. The current plan for modularizing the Army will cost at least
$ 69 billion between 2005 and 2011. However, of the $ 69 billion, only $ 48
billion has been programmed. And some estimate modularity costs will reach as
high as $ 90 billion, including all potential costs of procurement, operations and
maintenance, military construction and replenishment of pre-positioned stocks.
Proceeding concurrently with modularity and FCS creates a challenging fiscal
dilemma for the Army.26
When asked by Representative Weldon if the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) believed that we could afford both programs [FCS and modularity] as
currently planned, GAO’s witness, Paul Francis, GAO Director of Acquisition and
Sourcing Management stated:
21 For additional information on BRAC, see CRS Report RL32216, Military Bases Closures:
Implementing the 2005 Round, by David E. Lockwood.
22 For additional information on the Future Combat System (FCS) see CRS Report
RL32888, The Army’s Future Combat Systems (FCS): Background and Issues for Congress,
by Andrew Feickert.
23 Jen DiMascio, “Plans Maintain PBD 753 Funding Level Past FY-11: Army to Tell
Defense Department it Can Fund Modularity and FCS,” Inside the Army, Vol. 17, No. 14,
April 11, 2005, pp. 1 and 6.
24 DOD’s Program Budget Decision (PBD) 753, December 23, 2004, p. 1.
25 Jen DiMascio, “Plans Maintain PBD 753 Funding Level Past FY-11: Army to Tell
Defense Department it Can Fund Modularity and FCS,”p. 6.
26 Hearing of the Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee, House Armed Services
Committee on the Future Combat System, March 16, 2005, p. 4.

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Mr. Chairman, I think right now we’d say, if everything went perfectly, just as
planned, if modularity costs $ 48 billion and we could bring the FCS
development in for $ 30 billion, I think the numbers work. If things don’t go as
planned, I think that there is going to be a real challenge here.27
Critics maintain that, given traditional DOD program cost growths of 20 to 40
percent, that the Army is highly unlikely to stay within their budget for either
program.28 This being the case, some believe that program trade offs between
modularity and FCS will become inevitable if program costs do in fact exceed
program budgets.
Non-Budgetary Issues
Affecting Modularization
Personnel Issues
In its testimony to Congress, GAO suggested that its preliminary work indicated
that there were “significant shortfalls in the Army’s capacity to equip and staff
units.”29 While specific in formation on personnel shortages in terms of rank, military
occupational specialities, and numbers have not been made public by the Army, GAO
reports that modular BCTs will require additional truck drivers, civil affairs
specialists, and military police and that military intelligence specialists were a critical
shortage.30 The Army has reportedly stated that it will require an additional 2,800
military intelligence specialists by the end 0f FY2005 to meet near-term shortages
and an additional 6,200 by 2010 to meet modularity requirements.31
Recruiting and Retention. Given the Army’s current recruiting and
retention challenges, it is possible that the Army may be unable to rectify these
shortages which could have a significant impact on implementing modularity. The
Army has reportedly missed its April recruiting goal, making it the third consecutive
monthly shortfall and the Army National Guard and Reserve are facing even greater
difficulties.32 The Army Reserve has reportedly not met a monthly recruiting goal
since December 200433 and despite strengthened recruiting efforts, Guard and
27 Ibid., p. 12.
28 Jen DiMascio, “Weldon Wary of Future Comanche-Like “Embarrassment: GAO Says
FCS, Modularity Costs Could Increase More than Anticipated,” Inside the Army, Vol. 17,
No. 11, March 21, 2005, p. 10.
29 GAO Testimony before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, House
Armed Services Committee, GAO-05-443T, “Force Structure: Preliminary Observations on
Army Plans to Implement and Fund Modular Forces,” Government Accountability Office
(GAO), March 16, 2005, p 5.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 “ Recruiting Goal Missed for Third Straight Month,” Associated Press, May 2, 2005.
33 Ibid.

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Reserve officials have said that many of their shortages are likely to be resolved in
the foreseeable future.34 Of particular concern is the development of leaders, with an
estimated shortage of 5,000 captains and 7,000 officers in other grades currently
confronting the Guard and Reserve.35
While recruiting may be problematic, retention (the rate at which military
personnel voluntarily decide to remain in the military) has been relatively favorable
in the Active component.36 While FY2005 Army active duty retention rates fell short
for first term-enlistees and mid-career enlisted personnel, these rates are ahead of
FY2004 first quarter rates and the final FY2004 retention rate eventually exceeded
its goal, so it is possible that the Army might also achieve its FY2005 retention goal
by year’s end.37 Retention, however, in the Guard and Reserve is not as favorable.
According to DOD, retention in the Guard and Reserve to date are well behind
FY2004 rates,38 which combined with recruiting shortfalls, could result in
pronounced personnel shortages in the Guard and Reserve which could have an
adverse impact on modularity.
Possible Limitations of Female Soldiers in Forward Support
Companies. Recent reports concerning female soldiers in UA Forward Support
Companies (FSC), although focused on the women in combat issue, suggest that
there may be “insufficient male soldiers in the inventory to fill forward support
companies and that the pool of available male recruits may be too small to sustain the
force.”39 FSCs are intended to collocate with and provide maintenance and logistic
support to UA combat battalions which, according to some is a violation of the
Army’s 1994 policy which not only banned women from units that engage in direct
ground combat such as infantry and armor but also excluded women “from
assignments below brigade level whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat
on the ground.”40
34 Harold Kennedy, “Army Guard, Reserves Confront Long-Term Personnel Problems,”
National Defense, May 2005.
35 Ibid.
36 Information in this section is taken from CRS Report RS22012, Recruiting and Retention:
A Brief Overview of FY2004 and FY2005 Results for Active Component Personnel, by
Lawrence Kapp.
37 Ibid., p. 4.
38 Data provided to CRS from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Assistant Director for
Military Personnel Policy, April 21, 2005.
39 Rowan Scarborough, “Army Agrees No Women in Combat for Now,” Washington Times,
January 13, 2005; Bryan Bender, “U.S. Women Get Closer to Combat,” Boston Globe,
January 26, 2005; Rowan Scarborough, “Women in Combat Ban Again at Issue,”
Washington Times, February 4, 2005.
40 Department of Defense Memorandum, Subject: Direct Ground Combat Definition and
Assignment Rule, January 13, 1994.

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In opposition to the Army leadership,41 the House Armed Services Committee
Personnel Subcommittee introduced and passed an amendment to the FY2006
Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 1815) requiring the Army to prohibit women from
serving in any-company sized unit that provides support to combat battalions or their
subordinate companies.42 This amendment was reportedly modified by the House
Armed Services Committee in markup to put into law the Army’s policy barring
women from assignment to units that engage in direct ground combat and units that
could accompany these units into combat.43 In addition, the amendment calls for the
Defense Department to conduct a detailed review, to be provided to Congress by
March 2006, of the Army’s 1994 policy on assigning women, paying special
attention of the issue women being “co-located” with combat units.44 Some suggest
that this issue might influence the assignment of women to FCSs that could have an
impact on their ability to support UA combat forces.
Equipment Issues
As previously stated, the Army is also faced with equipment shortages as it
implements its modularity program. According to GAO, modular brigade combat
teams will “require significant increases in the levels of equipment, particularly
command, control, and communications equipment; wheeled vehicles; and artillery
and mortars.”45 Command, control, and communications equipment are of particular
concern as they constitute what the Army considers the key enablers for the modular
brigade combat teams.
GAO visits to the 3rd Infantry Division (the first Army unit to undergo modular
reconfiguration) and the 101st Airborne Division (the Army’s second modular unit)
suggest that equipment shortages may also have a detrimental impact on unit training.
Regarding command, control, and communications equipment, both units reportedly
expressed concern that because of these shortages that their soldiers might not be able
to achieve proficiency “with some of this high-tech equipment because the equipment
is not available in sufficient numbers.”46 In addition, the GAO report noted that both
units were significantly short their authorizations of tactical unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs).
41 Letter from General Richard A. Cody, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army to Representative
Ike Skelton, May 11,2005.
42 Ann Scott Tyson, “Panel Votes to Ban Women from Combat,” Washington Post, May 12,
2005.
43 Gayle S. Putrich and Anne Plummer, “House Panel Moves Massive Defense
Authorization in Marathon Markup,” Congressional Quarterly (CQ), May 18, 2005.
44 Ibid.
45 GAO Testimony before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, House
Armed Services Committee, GAO-05-443T, “Force Structure: Preliminary Observations on
Army Plans to Implement and Fund Modular Forces,” Government Accountability Office
(GAO), March 16, 2005, p 6.
46 Ibid.

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CRS-14
Equipment shortages in the 3rd Infantry and 101st Airborne Divisions — the first
two Army divisions to undergo modularization — raises additional issues for
consideration. One concern is that if the Army’s first two divisions to undergo
modularization could not be fully or even adequately equipped for training, what
implications does that hold for the Army’s eight other active combat divisions that
are scheduled for modularization? Some suggest that it would not be unreasonable
to assume that these other eight divisions will also likely experience equipment
shortages at levels experienced by the 3rd Infantry and 101st Airborne, and perhaps
even greater. If this is indeed the case, then questions could arise as to how efficient
these partially-equipped brigade combat teams would be. Analysts also note that the
3rd Infantry Division has been recently redeployed to Iraq and that the 101st is
scheduled to return to Iraq later this year which raise questions as to whether or not
these units were or will be fully equipped when they arrive in Iraq.
National Guard Equipment Issues. Another issue concerns National
Guard modulariztion, currently scheduled to begin this year. Some maintain that
equipment shortages for Guard units converting to the modular structure could be
even more pronounced than those of active duty units. The National Guard Bureau,
Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, reportedly stated that the Army National Guard
was already “under-equipped and “under-resourced “ before the war47 — a condition
some suggest is historical as Guard units traditionally have older and less equipment
than their active duty counterparts.
This condition is further exacerbated in that many Guard units that have
deployed have been required to leave their equipment in Iraq for other units, both
Active and Guard, to use.48 In some instances, Guard units left all but their soldier’s
individual equipment in Iraq, which has had a significant impact on those unit’s
ability to train and also to fulfil their state missions, such as disaster relief and
homeland defense. Such extreme shortages might also have a significant impact on
Guard units converting to modular brigade combat teams.
Demands on Army Depots. Reports suggest that the demands at Army
depots to maintain and repair equipment needed in Iraq and Afghanistan is having a
detrimental effect on the depots ability to provide equipment for modularization.49
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in recent testimony to the House
Subcommittee on Readiness, noted that as a results of the wars “many of the
hundreds of thousands of pieces of equipment that have been used in operations in
47 “NGB Chief: Guard Needs $20 Billion for Equipment,” National Guard Magazine,
January 2005, p. 12.
48 Information in this section is from Wayne Woolley, “Looking for a Fair Fight: Citizen
Soldiers Given More Responsibilities Without the Resources,” New Jersey Star-Ledger,
November 23, 2003 and Christopher Prawdzik, “Fracture Inventory,” National Guard
Magazine, April 2005.
49 See Jonathan Weisman, “Army Repair Posts Scramble to Keep the Troops Equipped,”
Washington Post, December 13, 2004, p. A01 and Dave Moniz, “Worn-Out Army
Equipment to Cost U.S.,” USA Today, January 26, 2005, p. 7.

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CRS-15
Iraq and Afghanistan are in need of replacement or repair.”50 According to CBO, the
Army’s trucks are being driven “roughly ten times more miles per year than has been
the average over the past several years; tanks and armored vehicles are being driven
at rates roughly five times those of peacetime; and helicopters flown at roughly twice
peacetime rates.”51 Adding to the problem of excessive equipment utilization is that
equipment and vehicles are also being destroyed as a result of enemy action and in
non-combat related activities such as vehicle accidents. Army depots are reportedly
confronting four to five times more equipment wear than the Army anticipated and
are said to be experiencing significant stress in not only repairing equipment needed
for Iraq and Afghanistan, but also trying to meet the Army’s modularity demands.52
Given this situation of competing demands on the Army’s industrial base, it is
possible that the equipment shortages resulting from unit reorganization and the
creation of new brigades might be further exacerbated by demands to repair
equipment damaged or worn out by the war.
Basing
The basing of the Army’s modularized forces is affected by a number of factors,
some of which are likely outside the Army’s ability to directly control. The Army’s
decision to add an additional 10 to 15 active modular brigade combat teams and
associated support units of action likely was made on the assumption that no new
bases would be constructed for these units and that they would instead be stationed
at existing Army as well as other service’s posts and bases. Also affecting the basing
of the Army’s modular force is DOD’s 2004 Integrated Presence Global Basing
Strategy where reportedly 70,000 U.S. troops and 100,000 of their family members
will be withdrawn from their bases in Germany and South Korea to bases in the
United States.53 Recommendations for both overseas and domestic base closures
made by the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission,54 will also
likely affect the Army’s final basing decision.
Army’s Preliminary Basing Plans.55 The Army, recognizing that Global
Rebasing and particularly the 2005 BRAC process could alter its basing plans for
50 Statement of Douglas Holtz-Eakin, CBO, on “The Potential Costs Resulting from
Increased Usage of Military Equipment in Ongoing Operations,” presented to the
Subcommittee on Readiness, House Armed Services Committee, April 6, 2005, p, 1.
51 Ibid., p. 2.
52 See Jonathan Weisman, “Army Repair Posts Scramble to Keep the Troops Equipped,”
Washington Post, December 13, 2004, p. A01 and Dave Moniz, “Worn-Out Army
Equipment to Cost U.S.,” USA Today, January 26, 2005, p. 7.
53 “U.S. to Close 35 Percent of Overseas Bases,” New York Times on the Web, September
23, 2004.
54 For additional information on 2005 BRAC see CRS Report RS22061, Military Base
Closures: The 2005 BRAC Commission, by Daniel H. Else and David E. Lockwood.
55 Information in this section is from Sean D. Naylor, “The Coming Brigade Shuffle: How
Adding New Combat Units Will Radically Alter the Army’s U.S. Footprint,” Army Times,
January 31, 2005, pp. 14-16 and George Cahlink, “Army Decision on New Brigades May
Hold Clues to Base Closings,” GovExec.com, August 3, 2004.

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modular forces has reportedly made some preliminary basing plans. Given
modularization and rebasing from Korea and Germany, the Army could potentially
be required to find “new homes” for up to 19 new brigade combat teams as well as
a number of supporting units. In general, Army posts that already have combat units
such as Ft. Bragg, Ft. Carson, and Ft. Hood are scheduled to receive additional
brigade combat teams and supporting units and some experts maintain that these
bases run a low risk of being recommended for closure under BRAC 2005. Some
other posts not normally associated with large combat formations, including National
Guard posts, reportedly under consideration for the stationing of active modular
brigade combat teams and support units of action include:
! Ft. Knox, KY;
! Ft. Bliss, TX;
! Ft. Polk, LA;
! Ft. Irwin, CA;
! Camp Grayling, MI;
! Ft. Chaffee, AR;
! Yuma Proving Ground, AZ;
! Ft. Irwin, CA;
! Ft. Hunter-Liggett, NV;
! Dugway Proving Ground; UT; and
! Gowen Field, ID.
The Army has stressed that these post are only under consideration and that its
final decision on basing units will not be made until after the President certifies the
base closure and realignment list and transmits it to Congress in November 2005. The
Army reportedly, however, tried to anticipate what posts could be included in BRAC
2005 when making its tentative basing list in order to reduce turbulence that could
result from assigning a brigade to a post and then having the post closed under
BRAC. The Army’s criteria for choosing its tentative bases included sufficient
training areas; ability to support rapid deployment, and base infrastructure.
Overseas Basing Commission Recommendations.56 The Overseas
Basing Commission in its report recommends that in addition to the Army’s plan to
station a Stryker Brigade and a modular aviation brigade in Germany and an airborne
brigade combat team in Italy57 that one heavy brigade should also remain in Europe.
If so approved by the President and Congress, a heavy brigade combat team
tentatively planned to be stationed in the United States could instead be stationed
somewhere in Europe.
BRAC Recommendations. On May 13, 2005, DOD released its BRAC
2005 Closure and Realignment list. According to the list, none of the posts
reportedly under consideration for stationing modular forces were recommended for
closure, although a number were recommended for realignment which could either
56 Report of the Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the
United States to the President and the Congress, May 9, 2005.
57 General B.B. Bell, Update on the Impacts of Global Rebasing on United States Army
Forces in Europe, United States Army, Europe, April 7, 2005.

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add or decrement the number of soldiers presently stationed at those posts. Some
specific modularity-related recommendations for active Army posts include:58
! Ft. Bragg, NC: Activate the 4th Brigade Combat Team and receive
relocated Combat Service Support units returning from Europe to
support Army modularization;
! Ft. Hood, TX: Relocate a brigade combat team to be activated in FY
06 and a UEx headquarters to Ft. Carson, CO as Ft. Hodd does not
have sufficient facilities and available maneuver training area to
support six permanent heavy BCTs while Ft. Carson does have the
capacity;
! Ft. Knox, KY: Relocate the Armor Center and School to Ft.
Benning, GA in order to activate an infantry BCT as well as receive
relocated engineer, military police, and combat service support units
from Europe and Korea;
! Ft. Bliss, TX: Receive 1st Armored Division from Germany and
various echelon above division units from Germany and Korea;
! Ft. Rily, KS: Activate a brigade combat team and receive 1st Infantry
Division units returning from Germany and various echelon above
division units returning from Germany and Korea.
Rebalancing and Stabilizing the Force
Other Critical Army Initiatives
The Army has two other concurrent initiatives underway which have been
described as “critical enablers” in the Army’s brigade-centric reconfiguration:
rebalancing and stabilizing the force. Both initiatives involve substantial policy,
organizational, and personnel changes from FY2004 - FY2009 and some observers
contend that these two initiatives may be more be difficult to achieve than the
creation of 10 to 15 additional brigade-sized units.
Rebalancing the Force
In what the Army describes as its “most significant restructuring in 50 years,”
the Army is presently converting a number of units deemed less relevant to the
GWOT into units more appropriate to the types of operations ongoing in Iraq and
Afghanistan. This change involves over 100,000 active and reserve personnel and
involves decreasing certain types of units while increasing others as described in the
following table:
58 Department of Defense Base Closure and Realignment Report, Volume II Detailed
Recommendations, May 2005, pp. A-5 - A-19..

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Table 4. Restructuring of Units, FY2004 - FY2009 59
Decrease
Increase
36 - Field Artillery Units
149 - Military Police Units
10 - Air Defense Units
16 - Transportation Units
11 - Engineer Units
9 - Petroleum/Water Distribution Units
19 - Armor Units
8 - Civil Affairs Units
65 - Logistic Units
4 - Psychological Operations Units
11 - Biological Detection Units
Source: Department of the Army briefing to the media on “Building Army Capabilities,” Feb. 17,
2004.
According the Army’s 2005 Posture Statement dated February 6, 2005 this
rebalancing is underway with more than 34,000 spaces having been converted60
although no specifics were provided as to exactly how many new units had been
developed under this initiative. The Army further maintains that rebalancing will
produce a 50 percent increase in infantry capabilities and similar increases in military
police, civil affairs, intelligence, and other “critical skills.”61 This rebalancing is also
intended to place more combat support and combat service support units back into
the active component from the Reserves to improve overall deployability and
sustainability as well as to reduce requirements for immediate mobilization of
Reserve units.62
Stabilizing the Force
This initiative transitions the Army from an individual replacement manning
system to a unit-focused system. The objective is to keep soldiers in units longer in
order to reduce historically high turnover rates of soldiers and their leaders and to
foster unit cohesion and operational effectiveness.63 In addition this initiative is
intended to provide stability to Army families and could ultimately save the Army
money as it could result in fewer moves for soldiers and their families. The 172nd
Separate Infantry Brigade in Alaska was the first unit to implement the unit stability
program and four additional brigades are scheduled to implement unit stability in
2005.64
59
60 U.S. Army’s 2005 Posture Statement (Unclassified), February 6, 2005, p. ii.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid., p. 9.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.

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Potential Oversight Issues for Congress
Modularity “ Lessons Learned” From Deployments to Iraq
It is possible that Congress might explore with the Department of Defense and
the Army the initial “lessons learned” from the 2005 deployment to Iraq of 3rd
Infantry Division and the 101st Airborne Division — the Army’s first two
modularized divisions. The performance of these two restructured divisions that
participated in the March 2003 ground invasion of Iraq in the traditional divisional
structure, will likely be closely scrutinized and extensively documented. The Army
has suggested that these operational and combat lessons learned from the current
rotation of these two new units will help the Army to refine not only tactics and
operational procedures for modular forces but also force structure as well as unit
manning, two areas of considerable congressional interest. Congressional exposure
to these lessons learned could potentially provide valuable insight to Congress as it
performs it’s oversight and budgetary roles regarding the Army’s transformation to
a modular force.
Personnel and Equipment Shortages
Congress may decide to examine the impact of personnel and equipment
shortages on modularization of the active Army and National Guard in greater detail.
Some contend that personnel, in particular, and equipment shortages could result in
the Army not achieving its goals in terms of both timelines for conversion as well as
total number of additional brigade combat teams and support units of action created.
Such an examination could focus on individual units and identify not only current
and projected equipment and personnel shortfalls in those units, but perhaps trends
throughout both the active Army and National Guard. Some have questioned the
benefit, for example, of creating ten additional active brigades if those brigades and
existing brigades will be undermanned and underequipped as a result of
modularization, when, under the current divisional configuration, brigades are
relatively well-equipped and manned. Given the National Guard’s more pronounced
personnel shortfalls and its historic equipment shortages, Congress may opt for a
much more detailed examination of shortages as well as the overall timeline to
convert Guard units to a modular force.
Basing
Congress might act to review the Army’s evolving basing plans for modular
forces, particularly during its examination of 2005 BRAC recommendations, in
terms of not only the base’s and the surrounding local community’s ability to support
and sustain modular forces but also how these bases support the Army’s vision of an
“expeditionary Army.” Some have suggested that BRAC-directed moves, DOD’s
2004 Global Rebasing Initiative, and the Army’s desire to station its forces in a more
“expeditionary” posture could result not only in difficulty in deploying these forces
in the event of a crisis but also a situation where the Army is in a perpetual state of
transit for at least the next decade as units and soldier’s families move to their new

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CRS-20
bases.65 The Report of the Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility
Structure of the United States to the President and the Congress notes:
That “to launch major realignments of bases and unit configurations at a time
when we are in midst of two major conflicts (Operation Enduring Freedom and
Operation Iraqi Freedom) takes us to the edge of our capabilities” and the
committee “finds no imperative for doing all of this in the short spate of time
now planned,” noting that “if we continue at the current pace we are liable to
handicap operational capability.”66
Given concerns about basing both in the United States and overseas, Congress
might choose to review the capacity for bases to accommodate new Army units as
well as soldiers and their families and the impact of these moves on local surrounding
communities. Congress might also look at the proposed timeline for moving Army
units with the view that the proposed timings of these moves could possibly have a
detrimental impact on the operational availability of transitioning units.
Rebalancing and Stabilizing the Force
Congress might act to review, in greater detail, the Army’s rebalancing and
stabilization initiatives. The Army has characterized these initiatives as “critical” to
the modular transformation of the Army, but little is publically known as to how well
they are progressing in terms of new units that have been created or how stabilization
is affecting unit cohesion or family life for soldiers. Given that these two initiatives
involve significant structural and cultural change for the Army, they also likely have
significant budgetary implications that some feel are not adequately discussed as part
of Army modularity.
65 See Esther Schrader, “Iraq Conflict Disrupts U.S. Plans for Military,” Los Angeles Times,
June 15, 2004; Peter Grier and Faye Bowers, “15 Years After Cold War, A Troop Shift,”
Christian Science Monitor, August 17, 2004; David S. Cloud, “Pentagon’s Plan to Transfer
Troops is Faulted by Panel,” New York Times, May 5, 2005.
66 Report of the Commission on Review of Overseas Military Facility Structure of the
United States to the President and the Congress, May 2005, pp. 4-5.

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CRS-21
Additional Reading
CRS Report RL32888. The Army’s Future Combat System (FCS): Background and
Issues for Congress.
CRS Report RS22012. Recruiting and Retention: A Brief Overview of FY2004 and
FY2005 Results for Active Component Personnel.
CRS Report RL32238. Defense Transformation: Background and Oversight Issues
for Congress.
CRS Report RS20787. Army Transformation and Modernization: Overview and
Issues for Congress.
CRS Report RS21754. Military Forces: What is the Appropriate Size for the United
States?
CRS Report RS20649. U.S. Military Dispositions: Fact Sheet.
CRS Report RL31805. Authorization and Appropriations for FY2004: Defense.
CRS Report RL32305. Authorization and Appropriations for FY2005: Defense.

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