Order Code RL32394
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Indonesia: Domestic Politics,
Strategic Dynamics, and American Interests
Updated May 20, 2005
Bruce Vaughn
Analyst in Southeast and South Asian Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
Indonesia: Domestic Politics, Strategic Dynamics, and
American Interests
Summary
Indonesia is a very important country to the United States, especially since the
terrorist attacks of 9/11. Its importance stems from its status as the world’s fourth
most populous country and the most numerous Islamic country, its political
instability, its role as an unwitting host to radical Islamic and terrorist groups, and its
geographic position astride key trade routes linking the oil rich Middle East with the
developing Far East. This report surveys key aspects of Indonesia’s domestic politics
and foreign policy orientation. It provides an overview of the bilateral relationship
between the United States and Indonesia and examines Indonesia’s domestic and
international politics. The report provides information on Indonesian issues of
ongoing congressional interest, including the war against terror, international military
education and training (IMET), human rights, religious freedom, promotion of
democracy and good governance, trade, foreign assistance, and regional geopolitical
and strategic interests. The report also provides a broader context for understanding
the complex interrelated nature of many of these issues. For additional information
on Indonesia see the following Congressional Research Service (CRS) reports: CRS
Report RS22136, East Timor Potential Issues for Congress by Rhoda Margesson and
Bruce Vaughn; CRS Report RS20572, Indonesian Separatist Movement in Aceh, by
Larry Niksch; CRS Report RS21753, Indonesia-U.S. Economic Relations, by Wayne
Morrison; and CRS Report RL31672, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, by Bruce
Vaughn (coordinator), Emma Chanlett-Avery, Richard Cronin, Mark Manyin, and
Larry Niksch. This report will be updated.
Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Military to Military Ties and Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The Tsunami . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Historical Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Political Transition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
The Role of the Military . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Autonomous and Secessionist Movements and Inter-Communal Strife . . . . . . . . 8
East Timor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Aceh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
West Papua . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Inter-Communal Strife and Pan Islamic Movements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Foreign Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Indonesia and the War Against Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
United States-Indonesian Relations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Geopolitical and Strategic Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
U.S. Security Assistance to Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
List of Figures
Figure 1. Map of Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
List of Tables
Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Indonesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Indonesia: Domestic Politics, Strategic
Dynamics, and American Interests
Introduction
Indonesia is the world’s largest Muslim nation and is the world’s fourth most
populated nation overall. It has extensive natural resources. A large percentage of
world trade transits the strategically important straits of Malacca which link the
Indian Ocean littoral to the South China Sea and the larger Pacific Ocean basin.
Indonesia is also perceived by many as the geopolitical center of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which is a key actor in the geopolitical dynamics
of the larger Asia-Pacific region. Indonesia is still emerging from a period of
authoritarian rule and is struggling to consolidate its status as one of the world’s
largest democracies. For the most
part, Indonesia also represents a
moderate form of Islam that has the
Indonesia at a Glance
potential to act as a counterbalance
Population: 224 million (2004 est.) with a growth
to more extreme expressions of
rate of 1.9%, 2004 est. Life expectancy 60 for men
Islam. Despite this, radical Islamists
and 64 for women.
and terrorist cells have begun to
Area: 1,826,440 sq. km (about three times the size
thrive amidst the country’s many
of Texas )
social, economic, and political
Geography: An archipelagic state of 17,000
islands, including some 6,000 occupied islands,
uncertainties. Indonesia’s future is
which straddles the equator. Key sea lanes linking
far from certain due to ongoing
the Indian Ocean and the Southwest Pacific pass
internal strife and social dislocation
through Indonesia.
stemming from inter-communal
Capital: Jakarta, 8.8 million 2004 est.
Ethnic Groups: 490 ethnic groups, Javanese 45%,
d i s c o r d , a u t o n o m o u s a n d
Sundanese 14%, Madurese 7.5%, coastal Malay
secessionist movements, political
7.5%, others 26%.
machinations among elites, Islamic
Languages: Bhasa Indonesia, official modified
extremism, pervasive government
form of Malay, and local dialects including 270
corruption, and a faltering
Austronesian languages and 180 Papuan. 13
languages have over one million speakers.
economy. The report will identify
Literacy Rate: 85%
key issues for Congress before
Religion: approximately 87% Muslim.
returning to the broader Indonesian
GDP growth: 5.1% 2004.
context within which those issues
Per capita GDP: $1,151, 2004
are set.
Inflation: 6.4%, 2004 est.
Main exports: Oil, natural gas, appliances, textiles
Sources: U.S. Department of State, CIA World Fact
Book, Economist Intelligence Unit, BBC News.
CRS-2
Issues for Congress
Congress has played an active role in shaping the United States’ foreign policy
toward Indonesia. This has especially been the case since the end of the Cold War.
Congressional involvement is particularly evident in the area of human rights.
Elements within the Indonesian military have been accused of human rights abuses.
In light of this, Congress has acted to restrict U.S. military assistance and training to
the Indonesian military. Legislation seeking to promote human rights in Indonesia
has often been referred to collectively as the “Leahy amendments” because of the
active role that Senator Leahy has played in promoting human rights in Indonesia.
The Leahy amendments have often been attached to Foreign Operations legislation.
These amendments focus on restricting Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and
International Military Education and Training (IMET) for Indonesia.
Military to Military Ties and Human Rights. The extent to which military
to military ties should be reestablished in light of Indonesia’s progress on human
rights will likely be the focus of discussion of interested observers during President
Susilo Bamabang Yudhoyono’s visit to Washington which is scheduled to begin on
May 25, 2005.1 President Yudhoyono reportedly is hopeful that he can resolve
differences with the United States during his visit.2 Admiral William Fallon, Chief
of the United States Pacific Command, has indicated that the United States is
determined to normalize military ties with Indonesia. Secretary of State Condolezza
Rice lifted restrictions on Indonesia’s participation in International Military and
Education programs in February, 2005. This was viewed by many as a first step
toward normalizing the military to military relationship. Indonesia is viewed by many
as a key player in the war against terror in Southeast Asia. Despite these
developments many continue to have concern over human rights abuses in
Indonesia.3 Senator Leahy has stated “a key gap remains regarding justice for the
victims of atrocities,” while Senator Bond has stated that President Yudhoyono has
made “a strong commitment to reform, to a recognition of human rights and to
fighting corruption.”4
1 “Indonesian President Likely to Discuss Military Ties During US Visit 25 May,” BBC
News, May 7, 2005.
2 “US Military Embargo Hopefully Resolved During Yudhoyono’s Visit,” Organization of
Asia-Pacific News Agencies, May 16, 2005.
3 “US Determined to Restore Ties with Indonesian Military, Naval Chief,” Associated Press
Newswire, May 6, 2005.
4 Ken Guggenheim, “Fight Looms in Congress Over Easing Indonesia Military
Restrictions,” Associated Press, February 2, 2005.
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Figure 1. Map of Indonesia
Nicobar
THAILAND
Mindanao
PALAU Koror
Islands
Andaman
Zamboanga
Sea
Jolo
P a c i f i c
Basilan
PHILIPPINES
Banda Aceh
Strait of
Bandar Seri Begawan
Malacca
MALAYSIA
BRUNEI
O c e a n
Kuala Lumpur
Medan
Natuna
Celebes Sea
Simeulue
Manado
Singapore
Halmahera
Nias
Sumatra
Pontianak
Samarinda
Borneo
Siberut
Jayapura
Celebes
Seram
I n d i a n
Palembang
West Papua
Banjarmasin
O c e a n
I N D O N E S I A
N e w
Java Sea
Ujungpandang
G u i n e a
Enggano
Jakarta
Java
Semarang
Aru
Bandung
Surabaya
Surakarta
Sumbawa
(Solo)
Flores
Dili
Tanimbar
Bali
EAST
A r a f u r a
Indonesia
Kupang
Sumba
S e a
PAPUA
TIMOR
Timor
NEW
0
500 Miles
GUINEA
Darwin
0
500 KM
AUSTRALIA
Gulf of
Carpentaria
Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS. (K. Yancey 2/04)
During the Cold War, the United States was primarily concerned about
communist influence in Indonesia. Since the end of the Cold War, and particularly
after1991, congressional views on Indonesia have been influenced by ongoing
concerns over human rights abuses by the Indonesian National Defense Forces (TNI).
The events of 9/11 added the concern of how best to pursue the war against terror in
Southeast Asia. Some Members of Congress remain dissatisfied with progress on
bringing to justice Indonesian military personnel and police responsible for human
rights abuses in East Timor. Another concern of some Members of Congress is the
lack of progress toward identifying and bringing to justice the perpetrators of the
attacks on Americans in West Papua. There is further concern about alleged human
rights abuses associated with the current military operations in Aceh. As the United
States has moved from the post-Cold War world to fight the war against terror,
human rights concerns have increasingly been weighed against American security
interests, and particularly the need to develop effective counterterror cooperation
with Indonesia to combat radical Islamic groups. Many observers view such
cooperation as critical to effectively fight terrorism in Southeast Asia. There is also
concern over increasing anti-Americanism.
Some analysts have argued that the need to obtain effective counterterror
cooperation and to secure American strategic interests in the region necessitates a
working relationship with Indonesia and its key institutions, such as the military.
Other Indonesian observers take the view that the promotion of American values,
such as human rights and religious freedom, should guide U.S. relations with
Indonesia while others would put trade and investment, or the promotion of
democracy first. Some have viewed military cooperation between the U.S. military
and the Indonesian military during relief operations following the December 26
tsunami in Sumatra as having focused attention on the issue of the need for military
to military cooperation.
The Tsunami. On December 26, 2004, an undersea earthquake off the coast
of Sumatra triggered a tsunami wave that killed an estimated 122,000 (with an
additional 114,000 missing) and left over 406,000 displaced persons in Indonesia.
Most of the devastation was in Aceh in northwest Sumatra which was the closest
landfall to the epicenter of the Indian Ocean earthquake. This disaster led to a
CRS-4
massive international relief effort in which the United States has played a leading
role. In Indonesia, this included helicopter-borne assistance from the aircraft carrier
USS Abraham Lincoln, which was accompanied by the USS Bonhomme Richard, and
the USS Fort McHenry. Before their departure from the area 2,800 relief missions
were flown, some 2,200 patients were treated, and 4,000 tons of relief supplies were
delivered.5 The United States announced it will devote $907 million to tsunami
assistance in South and Southeast Asia of which $656 million remains to be divided
among the affected countries.6 (For further information see CRS Report RL32715,
Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami: Humanitarian Assistance and Relief
Operations, Rhoda Margesson, Coordinator.)
Historical Background
Modern Indonesia has been shaped by the dynamic interaction of indigenous
cultures and political forms with external influences — especially the succession of
influences of Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, Dutch colonial rule, and a powerful and
nationalistic independence movement.7 The geographic definition of modern
Indonesia began to take shape under Dutch direct colonial rule which began in 1799.8
The Dutch East Indies were occupied by Japan during World War II. Independence
was declared by nationalist leader Sukarno following the Japanese surrender in 1945.
The Republic of Indonesia then gained its independence from the Dutch in 1949 after
a four-year anti-colonial insurrection.9
Independence was followed by a period of parliamentary democracy which was
replaced in 1959 by President Sukarno’s “Guided Democracy,” which lasted until
1965.10 On September 30, 1965, the military, under General Suharto, neutralized
Sukarno. The official version of events is that the military stepped in to avert a
communist coup. In the aftermath, over 160,000, and possibly up to a million,
Indonesians lost their lives. President Suharto ruled Indonesia until1998. During this
32 year period, his authoritarian “New Order” provided the political stability thought
necessary by his supporters for fast paced economic growth. Indonesia’s economy
grew at an average rate of almost 7%11 from 1987 to 1997.12
5 “Indonesia: Tsunami Reconstruction,” USAID, May 11, 2005, [http://www.usaid.gov]
6 “US to Devote $907 million to Tsunami Reconstruction,” US Fed News, May 18, 2005.
7 Much of the background information is drawn from a comprehensive chapter by Harvey
Demaine, “Indonesia: Physical and Social Geography,” in The Far East and Australasia
(Surrey: Europa Publications, 2002).
8 Harvey Demaine, “Indonesia: Physical and Social Geography,” The Far East and
Australasia (Surrey: Europa Publications, 2002). p. 493.
9 Jusuf Wanandi, “Indonesia: A Failed State?” The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2002,
p. 136.
10 Michael Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics Under Suharto: The Rise and Fall of the New
Order (London: Routledge Publishers, 1998). p. 1.
11 “Background Note: Indonesia,” Department of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific
(continued...)
CRS-5
A period of reform, or “reformasi,” followed Suharto’s fall. Suharto was
succeeded by B.J. Habibie (1998-99), Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001), and
Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-04). Despite the political instability during this
period, a number of key reforms designed to enhance good governance and expand
democracy were implemented. By 2003, the period of reform was faltering. In 1999,
approximately 70% of Indonesians felt that Indonesia was going in the right
direction. In a December 2003 poll this figure dropped to 44%.13 Key reforms, such
as getting the military out of business and fighting corruption, including corruption
in the courts, remain to be completed. Recent efforts under President Yudhoyono’s
administration are cause for optimism. In 2004 the parliament ordered the military
to get out of business by 2009. Armed forces Chief General Endriartono Sutarto went
further in April 2005 and stated that the military would get out of business in two
years.14 Yudhoyono is a former general and went through US IMET training earlier
in his career. He is viewed as sympathetic to military reform.15
The source of legitimacy, or lack thereof, for government has changed for the
Indonesian people over time. The colonial administration was viewed as illegitimate.
Its rule, based on force, was overthrown in a freedom struggle culminating in the post
World War II era. The Sukarno Presidency sought to base its rule on the moral
concepts of Pannscila, but it did not provide sufficient economic development. This
was subsequently provided by President Suharto until 1997. At that point,
Indonesians were no longer prepared to accept what was increasingly viewed as a
corrupt and authoritarian regime. Suharto delivered economic growth, but when that
growth faltered his political support quickly vanished. This brought on the era of
democratic reform whose energy had appeared to be dissipating before fully
completing its goal of instituting responsive and representative government. A key
test for President Yudhoyono’s government will be its ability to establish its political
legitimacy based on good governance and a more firmly established civil society
while also delivering the benefits of economic prosperity to the people.16
Political Transition
Indonesia has made significant progress toward institutionalizing its democracy
and more firmly establishing civil society. For example, Parliament passed legislation
11 (...continued)
Affairs, October 2003.
12 Michael Vatikiotis, Indonesian Politics Under Suharto: The Rise and Fall of the New
Order (London: Routledge Publishers, 1998). p. xviii.
13 “Survey of Indonesian Electorate,” Asia Foundation, December 9, 2003.
14 Donald Greenless, “Indonesia ants its Military out of Business,” International Herald
Tribune, May 4, 2005.
15 Jane Perlez, “Bush Seks to Heal Long Indoensia Rift,” The New York Times, February 8,
2005.
16 Muthia Alagappa, ed. Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral
Authority (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995).
CRS-6
in 2003 to impose transparent accounting standards for government and to establish
an independent commission to prosecute corruption.17 The General Elections
Commission also functioned well during the 2004 elections.18 A vigorous and open
media is another continuing success of the developing civil society in Indonesia. The
process of decentralization currently underway also holds the prospect of greater say
for average Indonesians in the affairs of their daily lives.19 Indonesia’s free and fair
parliamentary elections in April 2004, and Presidential elections of July and
September 2005, did much to instill confidence in Indonesia’s democratic process.
The Role of the Military
The Indonesian National Defense Force (TNI) is generally regarded as the
strongest institution in Indonesia. Its origins date to the struggle for independence.
The TNI has traditionally been internally focused, playing a key role in Indonesian
politics and preserving the territorial integrity of the nation, largely from internal
threats, rather than focusing on external security concerns. Its strong tradition of
secular nationalism has acted to help integrate the nation. Government expenditures
on the military in 2003 totaled only 1.3% of GDP.20 The key elements of the military
in Indonesia are the Army Strategic Reserve Command, Kostrad, the Army Special
Forces Command, Kopassus and the Military Regional Commands, or 12 Kodams.
There are also Air Force and Naval commands. While the military now has a less
formal role in the politics of the nation than it had in the Suharto era, it remains a key
actor behind the scenes.21 While the military has been a source of authoritarian power
in the past, it has largely stood aside and allowed the political transformation of
recent years to unfold. That said, some observers are concerned about its indirect
influence over politics. The Indonesian military has attracted negative attention
through its alleged involvement with human rights abuses in East Timor, Aceh,
Papua, and Maluku.
During the period of reform, the TNI officially abandoned the doctrine of
dwifungsi, or dual function, which gave it an official role in the politics of the
nation.22 Appointed members to the legislative bodies from the military were
removed while the police were separated from the TNI. Efforts were also begun to
more firmly establish civilian control of the armed forces. Supporters of the reform
17 John McBeth, “The Betrayal of Indonesia,” Far Eastern Economic Review, June 26, 2003.
18 Christine Tjhin, “Civil Society After Akbar’s Acquittal,” The Jakarta Post, February 17,
2004.
19 Tim Meisburger, ed. Democracy in Indonesia: A Survey of the Indonesian Electorate in
2003 (Jakarta: The Asia Foundation, 2003). p. 55.
20 Asia Society, “Indonesia,” [http://www.asiasource.org].
21 Rizal Sukma, “The Military and Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia,” in Thang Nguyen and
Frank Jurgen Richter, eds., Indonesia Matters: Diversity, Unity, and Stability in Fragile
Times (Singapore: Times Media Private Ltd. 2003).
22 For a detailed analysis of earlier role of the military in politics see Harold Crouch, The
Army and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978).
CRS-7
agenda in Indonesia would like to see additional measures taken, including reform
of the army’s territorial structure, the withdrawal of the military from independent
business activities, improving the military’s sensitivity to human rights, and
eliminating links to extremist elements.23
Two theories have been put forward as to why the TNI has not acted more
effectively in suppressing ethnic and religious violence in Indonesia. One theory
argues that the military simply lacks the capability to act more effectively. It takes the
view that the chain of command from Jakarta to the outlying provinces has broken
down. The other theory is more complicated. It takes the view that elements within
the TNI have over time “deliberately fomented violence or failed to act against it...
[the objective being to] weaken the national leadership ...”24 to undermine the
democratic reform process as a way of instigating a return to authoritarian rule and/or
insuring that the privileges of the army would not be threatened. There were
allegations of military action independent of civilian authority in the events in East
Timor as well as allegations of TNI involvement with the now disbanded extremist
group Lashkar Jihad.
Some analysts of the TNI see it as having regained much of the power that it lost
with the fall of Suharto. In this view, what has changed is that this power is less
formalized. In the past, the TNI budget was estimated to have been 70% self
generated. The government is now seeking to get the TNI out of business in two
years. This part of the TNI budget was outside governmental control. The TNI has
emerged from the reformasi period with its territorial command structure intact, even
as it lost its military representatives in parliament. While most analysts do not fear
an overt coup by the military, some are concerned that the military will be inclined
to act as a king-maker.25
The TNI will likely continue to play a central role in the evolution of the
Indonesian polity in the years ahead. It could be a constructive force supporting
democratic change, or at least not obstructing it, or it could support a return to more
authoritarian government. It will also continue to play a key role in attempting to
suppress autonomous and secessionist movements in Indonesia and it will likely seek
to preserve its prominent place in Indonesian society. John Haseman and Angel
Rabasa, two leading analysts of the TNI, have pointed to several alternative outcomes
for Indonesia. In each of these the role of the military could be crucial. These include
consolidation of democracy and civil society, continuing corruption, faltering reforms
23 Angel Rabasa and John Haseman, The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges,
Politics, and Power (Santa Monica: RAND Corp. 2002).
24 John Haseman, “Indonesia: The Regional Giant,” in Bruce Vaughn ed. The Unraveling
of Island Asia: Governmental, Communal, and Regional Instability (Westport: Praeger
Publishers, 2002).
25 Col. John Haseman, William Liddle and Salim Said, “The Evolving Role of the TNI,”
USINDO Security Workshop, October 16, 2003.
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and economic stagnation, a return to authoritarianism, increasing influence of radical
Islamic views, and increasing secessionist tensions and disintegrative forces.26
Autonomous and Secessionist Movements and
Inter-Communal Strife
The primary security threats to Indonesia are generally thought to come from
within. The political center of the Indonesian archipelago is located in Jakarta on
Java. Traditionally, power has extended from Java out to the outlying areas of
Indonesia. This has been true both under Dutch rule and the modern Indonesian state.
Throughout its history there has been resistance in peripheral areas to this centralized
control. This manifested itself in the former Indonesian province of East Timor,
which is now an independent state, as well as in the far west of Indonesia, in Aceh,
and in the far eastern part of the nation, in West Papua. Threats to internal stability
also stem from inter-communal strife between various ethnic and religious groups.
There has been debate about whether Indonesia is an organic state or an artificial
creation of Dutch colonial rule. Analysis of early Indonesian history reveals a level
of integration in terms of economics and trade if not extensive political unity. While
early empires were precursors of the Indonesian state, political unity is generally
considered to have been a product of Dutch colonial rule, including a series of
lengthy wars to subdue outlying islands and independent political units. The Dutch
Aceh War lasted from 1873 to 1913; making it possibly the longest continuous
colonial war in history. It has been suggested that a key lesson of Indonesian history
is that “unifying the archipelago administratively can only be done by the use of
force.”27 Forces of economic integration, or the creation of a national identity
stemming from the nationalist movement which started in Java in 1908,28 could be
other integrative forces.
East Timor
The Portuguese, whose influence in Timor dates to the 1600s, gave up control
of the island in 1975. With the Portuguese departure, three main parties emerged. Of
these Frente Revolucionaria do Timor Leste Independente (Fretelin), a leftist leaning
group, soon emerged as the dominant party. On December 7, 1975, Indonesia
invaded East Timor with the then tacit compliance of the United States and
Australia.29 Indonesia, Australia, and the United States are thought to have been
concerned that East Timor would turn into another Soviet satellite state similar to
26 Angel Rabasa and John Haseman, The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges,
Politics, and Power (Santa Monica: RAND Corp. 2002).
27 Merle Ricklefs, “The Future of Indonesia,” History Today, December 1, 2003.
28 Jusuf Wanandi, “Indonesia: A Failed State?” The Washington Quarterly, Summer, 2002,
p. 135.
29 “Ford and Kissinger Gave Green Light to Indonesia’s Invasion of East Timor, 1975,” The
National Security Archives, December 6, 2001.
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Cuba. A third of the population of East Timor is thought to have died as a result of
fighting or war-induced famine during the subsequent guerilla war fought by Fretelin
against Indonesia’s occupation.30
On August 30, 1999, East Timorese voted overwhelmingly to become an
independent nation. 98.6% of those registered to vote in the referendum voted, with
78.5% rejecting integration with Indonesia. In the wake of the vote, pro-integrationist
militias attacked pro-independence East Timorese and destroyed much of East
Timor’s infrastructure. Some 7,000 East Timorese were killed and another 300,000,
out of a total population of 850,000, were displaced, many to West Timor. Many
believe “Indonesian complicity in this catastrophe can not be denied.”31 The TNI’s
apparent decision to act outside of civilian control in East Timor also undermined
ongoing efforts to reform it.
It is thought that the TNI had two key reasons for trying to forestall an
independent East Timor. First, there was an attachment to the territory after having
fought to keep it as a part of Indonesia. Second, was the fear that East Timorese
independence would act as a catalyst for further secession in Aceh and Papua.
Hardline elements of TNI formed pro-integrationist militias in East Timor. These
groups sought to intimidate the East Timorese into voting to remain integrated with
Indonesia under an autonomy package being offered by then President Habbibie. The
opposite took place.32 The subsequent devastation of East Timor may have been
meant as a warning to others who might seek to follow its secessionist example.
Some believe that TNI involvement in the violence stemmed largely from local
“rogue” elements. Others believe that it was orchestrated higher up in the military
command structure. General Wiranto served as Minister of Defense and Security for
President Habbibie from May 1998. It is thought that by 1999 “enough time had
passed for Wiranto to have consolidated his control over the military.”33
East Timor gained full independence in 2002. Since that time Indonesia and
East Timor have worked to develop good relations. Progress was made in
establishing the border between the two countries in April 2005 during President
Yudhoyono’s visit to East Timor. This followed the establishment of the joint
Commission of Truth and Friendship which was established to deal with past
crimes.34 (For further information CRS Report RS22136, East Timor: Potential
Issues for Congress, by Rhoda Margesson and Bruce Vaughn.)
30 Michael Mally, “Regions: Centralization and Resistance,” in Donald Emmerson ed.
Indonesia Beyond Suharto: Polity, Economy, Society, Transition (Armonk: M.E. Sharp,
1999). p. 98.
31 Donald Emmerson, “Voting and Violence: Indonesia and East Timor in 1999,” in Donald
Emmerson ed. Indonesia Beyond Suharto: Polity, Economy, Society, Transition (Armonk:
M.E. Sharp, 1999). p. 357.
32 John Haseman, “Indonesia,” in David Wiencek, ed. Asian Security Handbook 2000
(Armonk: M.E. Sharpe Publishers, 2000).
33 Emerson, p. 356.
34 “Indonesia: International Relations,” The Economist Intelligence Unit, May 17, 2005.
CRS-10
Aceh
Aceh is located at the extreme northwestern tip of the Indonesian archipelago
on the island of Sumatra. The Acehenese fought the Portuguese in the 1520s as well
as the Dutch.35 As a result of their resistance and independence, Aceh was one of the
last areas to come under Dutch control. Its struggle for independence is carried on
today by Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM). The 4.4 million Acehenese have strong
religious beliefs as well as an independent ethnic identity. While many Acehenese
had more explicitly Islamic goals for their movement in the past, they have more
recently focused on independence with ethnic, rather than religious, identity at the
core of their struggle. Many Acehenese view Indonesia as an artificial construct that
is no more than “a Javanese colonial empire enslaving the different peoples of the
archipelago whose only common denominator was that they all had been colonized
by the Dutch.”36 GAM abandoned its earlier anti-American rhetoric and appears to
have realized, as a result of the East Timor experience, the value of internationalizing
the conflict to put pressure on Jakarta. While autonomy has been offered by the
Indonesian government, GAM has favored independence.
The current crisis dates to 1976. In the late 1980s, many of GAM’s fighters
received training in Libya. GAM then began to reemerge in Aceh. This triggered
suppression by the TNI from which GAM eventually rebounded. Since 1998, GAM
has reportedly expanded its ranks five times and has controlled up to 80% of the
province. A peace process collapsed in May 2003. 37 President Megawati then called
on the military to once again suppress the Free Aceh Movement. This has been the
largest military operation for the TNI since East Timor. The decision to take a hard-
line, nationalist stance on Aceh was popular among Indonesian voters.38 Human
rights groups have accused both government and GAM forces of human rights abuses
in the past.39
In mid-May 2005, Indonesia lifted a one-year state of civil emergency while
leaving its military presence of over 40,000 troops in Aceh. GAM forces are thought
to number around 5,000. This positive step towards normalcy in Aceh, which was
ravaged by the tsunami of December 26, 2004, follows an apparent shift on
independence by Achinese rebels. The Free Aceh Movement initiated a unilateral
truce in the wake of the tsunami. It was reported that some Achinese fighters favor
a broad based autonomy solution along the lines of the autonomy that Papua New
35 S. Wiuryono, “The Aceh Conflict: The Long Road to Peace,” Indonesian Quarterly, 3rd
Quarter, 2003.
36 Kirsten Schulze, The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Movement
(Washington: East West Center, 2004). p. 7.
37 Kirsten Schulze, The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Movement
(Washington: East West Center, 2004).
38 John Haseman, “Indonesia: A Difficult Transition to Democracy,” in David Wiencek and
Ted Carpenter eds. Asian Security Handbook, 3rd ed. Terrorism and the New Security
Environment, (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. forthcoming 2004).
39 “Abuses Mount in Aceh,” Human Rights Watch, August 20, 2001.
CRS-11
Guinea is prepared to grant Boungainville.40 Security Minister Widodo Adisucipto
has stated that military counter-insurgency operations would continue even as the two
year old state of emergency would not be renewed.41 More than 12,000 people are
thought to have been killed over the past 30 year struggle for independence. Peace
talks in May 2005 in Helsinki Finland have been viewed as “very encouraging” with
a fourth round scheduled for the end of May.42 Other earlier assessments of the talks
had been less positive about the prospect of achieving a lasting peace for Aceh.43
(For further information, see CRS Report RS20572, Indonesian Separatist Movement
in Aceh, by Larry Niksch.)
West Papua
West Papua, formerly known as West Irian or Irian Jaya, refers to the western
half of the island of New Guinea. West Papua has a population of approximately two
million and an area of approximately 422,000 square kilometers, which represents
about 21% of the land mass, and less than 1% of the population of Indonesia. West
Papua has a long land border with Papua New Guinea to the east. About 1.2 million
of the two million inhabitants of West Papua are indigenous peoples from about 250
different tribes. The rest have transmigrated to West Papua from elsewhere in
Indonesia. There are some 250 language groups in Papua. Papuans are mostly
Christians and animists. The province is rich in mineral resources and timber.44
West Papuans are, like the people of Papua New Guinea (PNG), which is
situated on the eastern half of the island of New Guinea, a Melanesian people and are
distinct from the Malay peoples of the Indonesian archipelago. Like Indonesia, West
Papua was a Dutch colonial possession. West Papua did not become a part of
Indonesia at the time of Indonesia’s independence in 1949. The Dutch argued that its
ethnic and cultural difference justified Dutch control until a later date. Under
President Sukarno, Indonesia began mounting military pressure on Dutch West Papua
in 1961. The United States sponsored talks between Indonesia and the Dutch and
proposed a transfer of authority over West Papua to the United Nations. Under the
agreement the United Nations was to conduct an Act of Free Choice to determine the
political status of West Papua. The Act of Free Choice was carried out in 1969, after
Indonesia had assumed control over West Papua in 1963. The Act of Free Choice,
which led West Papua to become part of Indonesia, is generally not considered to
have been representative of the will of all West Papuans. A referendum on
40 “Rebels Favor Bougainville Model for Aceh’s Self Government,” Asian Political News,
April 18, 2005.
41 “Indonesian Government to Return Aceh to Civilian Rule,” Oster Dow Jones, May 12,
2005.
42 “Jakarta Lifts State of Emergency in Aceh,” Channel News Asia, May 18, 2005.
43 Amit Chanda, “As Aceh Talks End Without Much progress, Indonesia Looks to US,”
WMRC Dauily Analysis, January 31, 2005.
44 “A People Under the Jackboot,” The West Australian, September 18, 2004.
CRS-12
Indonesian control over West Papua was not held. Instead, a group of 1,025 local
officials voted in favor of merging with Indonesia.45
West Papuan groups continue to oppose Indonesian control over West Papua.
The Free West Papua Movement, or Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM), emerged in
opposition to Indonesian control over West Papua. Many West Papuans have a sense
of identity that is different from the main Malay, and predominately Muslim, identity
of the rest of the Indonesian archipelago, and many favor autonomy or independence
from Indonesia.46 By some estimates, as many as 100,000 Papuans are thought to
have died as the result of military operations.47 In May 2005, the Papuan’s People’s
Civil Rights Coalition reportedly protested the United Nation’s 1969 decision to
transfer control over West Papua to Indonesia.48 Coordinator of the Institute for
Human Rights and Advocacy John Rumbiak has reportedly stated that “The
Government in Jakarta has allowed the military to prevail in Papua, to take the
security approach which has denied ordinary people their rights and enriched military
officers who are making big money for themselves through dealings with mining,
logging and oil and gas interests.”49
In March 2005, it was reported that elements of the Indonesian military’s
Strategic Reserve Command, Kostrad, were to be sent to West Papua. This reportedly
could mean up to 15,000 additional troops in West Papua. Church representatives
also accused the military of using funds set aside for humanitarian purposes in West
Papua to fund operations against the OPM. It was further reported that the military
was funding the formation of East Timor style anti-separatist militias.50
A Papuan Peoples Congress attended by 2,700 leaders in June 2000 called for
international recognition of Papuan sovereignty.51 Although a Special Autonomy Law
was passed in Jakarta for Papua, it has not been implemented.52 It is thought that a
greater sharing of rich local resources and increased self government could dissipate
some anti-Jakarta sentiment in Papua.
While the State Department is aware of the human rights situation in West
Papua, other American national interests also shape the U.S. posture towards
Indonesia. Declassified documents released in July 2004 indicate that Secretary of
45 For further information see Larry Niksch, “Papua-Irian Jaya,” CRS Memorandum,
4/16/02.
46 “When Jacob Rumbiak was 11,” Port Philip Leader, April 4, 2005.
47 “Indonesian Police, Demonstrators Clash in Papua Province,” Oster Dow Jones, May 10,
2005.
48 “Papuan Protestors Reject Integration,” Jakarta Post, May 3, 2005.
49 “A People Under the Jackboot,” The West Australian, September 18, 2004.
50 “Indons to Build Up Papua Force,” Hobart Mercury, March 19, 2005.
51 Tim Huxley, Disintegrating Indonesia? Implications for Regional Security (London:
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2000). p. 42.
52 Report of an Independent Commission, Peace and Progress in Papua (New York: Council
on Foreign Relations, 2003).
CRS-13
State Kissinger advised former President Nixon to “understand the problems they
[the Suharto government] face in West Irian.” The documents reportedly indicate that
the United States estimated at the time that between 85% and 90% of West Papuans
were opposed to Indonesian rule and that as a result the Indonesians were incapable
of winning an open referendum. Such steps were evidently considered necessary to
maintain the support of Suharto’s Indonesia during the Cold War. A similar view was
taken towards East Timor.53
In February 2005, in order to resume full IMET, the Secretary of State “certified
that Indonesian cooperation in the investigation [of the August 2002 ambush and
killing of two American citizens near Timika, West Papua] had met the conditions
set by Congress.”54 Indonesian police indicated at one point that elements from the
Indonesian military may have been involved in the attack near Timika. Some of those
who believe that elements of the military may have played a role think that it could
have been done in an effort to discredit the OPM (the Free West Papua movement).
Some pro-independence supporters believe that Anthonius Wamang, who has been
indicted for the attack, may have been a military informer.55 The OPM has denied
involvement with the attack and stated that Wamang “has worked closely with the
Indonesian military for the past four years in the sandalwood business and also as
part of a pro-Indonesian militia.”56 In June 2004, Rumbiak stated that Wamang is
living in Timika.57 As of March 10, 2005, Wamang was thought to remain free, and
the Indonesian government had yet to issue an indictment for his arrest.58
In January 2003, the government of Indonesia approved a plan to divide West
Papua into Central Papua, East Papua, and West Papua, which was reportedly not
well received by Papuans as it was viewed by many as a threat to autonomy. Its
implementation was postponed. In 2005, Indonesia initiated a voluntary repatriation
of West Papuans from Papua New Guinea. Reportedly, approximately 350 families
returned to Merauke from PNG in February of 2005.59 Demonstrators and police
clashed in Jayapura in May. The Indonesian government put forward a plan to divide
53 Jim Lobe, “US Sacrificed Papua to Court Suharto,” [http://www.atimes.com] “US
‘Concern’ Over West Papua,” The Australian, and Alan Sipress, “Declassified US Papers
Spark Indonesian Rebuke,” Washington Post, July 18, 2004.
54 “State Department Issues Background Note on Indonesia,” U.S. Fed News, May 2, 2005.
“Military Program Readmits Indonesia,” Associated Press, February 28, 2005.
55 Slobodan Lekic, “Widow of American killed in Papua Ambush Urges US to Keep Ban on
Indonesian Army,” Associated Press, January 28, 2005.
56 “West Papua Rebels Accused US of Cover-up Over Ambush Killings,” Agence France
Press, July 2, 2005.
57 “Murder Accused to Face Community Meeting,” Australian Broadcasting Corporation,
June 30, 2004.
58 “Indonesia’s Transition to Democracy,-Dan Burton,” Congressional Testimony, Federal
Document Clearing House, March 10 2005.
59 “Papuans Return Home,” PACNEWS, February 28, 2005.
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West Papua into five, instead of the previously planned three, provinces. Opponents
view this as a plan to divide Papuan resistance to Indonesian rule.60
Inter-Communal Strife and Pan Islamic Movements
While the vast majority of Indonesians practice a moderate form of Islam, a very
small radical minority seek to establish an Islamic state. Other extremists are hostile
to the Christian minority and an even smaller group would use violence to establish
an Islamic Khalifate throughout the Muslim areas of Southeast Asia. While they
represent an extremely small percentage of the population, such groups have created
much internal turmoil. A distinction can be drawn between those groups, such as the
now disbanded Lashkar Jihad, which are focused on Indonesian areas of conflict,
such as between Muslims and Christians in the Malukus, and a group such as the
Jemaah Islamiya (JI), which has used terrorist methods to promote its broader
extreme Islamist agenda with linkages to al Qaeda. There have also been allegations
that Lashkar Jihad was a tool of hardliners within the military that opposed the
reform movement and who allowed, or possibly even assisted, Lashkar Jihad
activities that destabilized the nation, thereby highlighting the need for a strong
military that could impose order. There are disturbing reports of long-term trends to
violence in the region.61 There has also been inter-group conflict elsewhere in
Indonesia such as between Muslims and Christians in Poso in Central Sulawezi and
with local Dyaks and internal Madurese migrants to Kalimantan.
In the three years before a peace accord was negotiated between Christian and
Muslim communities, an estimated 5,000 people were killed and a half million
displaced in the Malukus.62 Communal unrest has continued albeit at a lower level
of intensity as a final peace settlement has not been achieved. In May 2005, seven
were killed including five police officers during an attack on a police post in
Maluku.63
Economy
The Indonesian economy was severely damaged by the Asian financial crisis of
1997-98. Per capita GDP fell from $1,088 in 1997 to $475 in 1998. It only partly
recovered to $800 by 2003.64 In 2004 per capita GDP recovered to $1,151.65
Indonesia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew by 5.1% in 2004. This looked to
improve in 2005 as Indonesia registered a 6.35% GDP increase for the first quarter
60 “Governor Wants to Split Papua into Five Provinces,” PACNEWS, February 10, 2005.
61 Sydney Jones, International Crisis Group.
62 “Indonesia Flashpoint: The Maluccas,” BBC News, June 18, 2004.
63 Amit Chanda, “Seven Killed in Indonesia, as Violence Flares up Again in Restive Maluku
Province,” Global Insight Daily, May 17, 2005.
64 John McBeth, “The Betrayal of Indonesia,” Far Eastern Economic Review, June 26, 2003.
65 “Indonesia: Economic Background,” The Economist Intelligence Unit, May 17, 2005.
CRS-15
of 2005.66 Indonesia is considered to have a well-balanced economy with all major
sectors contributing. Domestic consumption accounts for roughly two thirds of
Indonesia’s GDP, but expanded foreign investment and exports are considered
crucial for GDP growth.
Indonesian GDP,% Real change
Indonesia’s economy performed well
in early 2005 despite the devastation of the
1996
7.8%
tsunami of December 26, 2004. Slight
1997
4.7%
drops in private and public consumption
1998
-13.1%
1999
0.8%
were offset by a 13.4% jump in exports in
2000
4.9%
the forth quarter of 2004. Investment
2001
3.5%
continued to rise at the same time.67
2002
3.7%
Foreign businesses have in the past been
2003
4.1%
reluctant to invest in Indonesia in part
2004
5.1%
2005
5.4% est
because of concerns about the legal and
2006
5.9% est
judicial framework. Concern about
transparency and security conditions have
Economist Intelligence Unit Database
also inhibited past foreign investment.68
Indonesia’s key economic sectors as measured by percentage of GDP include
agriculture, 17%; industry, 41%; and services, 42%. Forty-five percent of the labor
force is occupied in agriculture, while 16% is involved in industry, and 39% in
services. Indonesia’s key exports include petroleum and petroleum products, natural
gas, and clothing and accessories. Indonesia’s major markets include Japan,
Singapore, Taiwan, Korea, the European Union, and the United States.69 (For further
information see CRS Report RS21753, Indonesia-U.S. Economic Relations, by
Wayne Morrison.)
Foreign Policy
Indonesian foreign policy has been shaped largely by two men, Presidents
Sukarno and Suharto. Once a leading force in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)
of the early Cold War era, Indonesia has traditionally sought to remain largely
independent from great power conflict and entangling alliances. Sukarno’s world
view divided the world into new emerging forces and old established forces. Sukarno
sought to fight the forces of neo-colonialism, colonialism, and imperialism, which
brought his government closer to China in 1964-65. Suharto’s New Order lessened
Sukarno’s anti-western rhetoric and focused on better relations with the region.
Under Suharto, Indonesia was one of the founding members of the Association of
Southeast Asian States (ASEAN) in 1967 and played a key leadership role in the
66 “Indonesia Registers a 6.35% Rise in GDP in First Quarter,” Thai News Service, May 19,
2005.
67 “Indonesia Economy: Quick View,” The Economist Intelligence Unit, May 16, 2005.
68 John McBeth, “Indonesia: Warning Signs,” Far Eastern Economic Review, December 4,
2003.
69 “Indonesia,” CIA World Factbook, 2003.
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organization. Indonesia’s internal problems since 1998 have kept it largely internally
focused. As a result, it has not played as active a role in the organization as in past
years. Indonesia exerts a moderate voice in the Organization of Islamic Conference
(OIC) and is a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) grouping.
Indonesia’s strategic interests are largely regional. Indonesia signed the Timor
Gap treaty with Australia in 1991. This provided for a mutual sharing of resources
located in the seabed between Australia and the then-Indonesian province of East
Timor. This lapsed with the independence of East Timor. Australia and Indonesia
also signed a security agreement in 1995 which fell short of an alliance but called for
mutual consultations on security matters. Indonesian displeasure with Australia’s
support of East Timor independence in 1999 led Indonesia to renounce the
agreement. Indonesian ties with the West have at times been strained over alleged
human rights abuses by the TNI. Indonesia and China normalized ties in 1990 which
had been strained since the alleged abortive coup by the Indonesian Communist Party
(PKI) in1965. Tensions remain over disputes related to the South China sea,
particularly near the Natuna Islands at the southern end of the South China Sea,
though in recent years ties have warmed. Under President Megawati the emphasis of
Indonesian foreign policy has shifted to focus on trade.
Indonesia has apparently embarked on a major foreign policy initiative with
China which marks a significant departure from past tensions in their bilateral
relationship. In 1967, Indonesia suspended diplomatic relations with China for its
alleged support of an attempted coup by the communist party of Indonesia. In April
2005, President Yudhoyono and Chinese President Hu Jintao signed a series of trade,
investment and maritime deals which have been described as a ‘strategic
partnership.’70 President Yudhoyono has speculated that trade between Indonesia and
China could triple to $20 billion in three years.71 The developing relationship will
also reportedly include arms sales and assistance. Indonesian Defense Minister
Juwono Sudarsono has reportedly signed a memorandum of understanding on
defense technology which includes arms sales and bilateral military cooperation.72 It
is also reported that China will work with Indonesia to develop short range missiles.73
Indonesia’s shift to enhance its relationship with China, immediately prior to
President Yudhoyono’s visit to Washington, may be seen by some as an attempt to
influence American debate over whether to reestablish military to military ties with
Indonesia.
In April and May of 2005, tensions between Indonesia and Malaysia mounted
over a maritime territorial dispute in the Ambalat area of the Sulawezi Sea. Both
Indonesia and Malaysia have reportedly awarded offshore exploration contracts in
70 Amit Chanda, “Economic Pact Between China and Indonesia,” Global Insight Daily, April
26, 2005.
71 “The Indonesia-China Partnership,” The Jakarta Post, April 27, 2005.
72 “China Offers Arms to Indonesia to Secure Malacca Strait Ally,” BBC News, April 26,
2005.
73 “Indonesia, China to Develop Missiles,” Reuters News, May 17, 2005.
CRS-17
the Ambalat area.74 Indonesian Kostrad units were placed on full alert as a result of
the tensions.75 Indonesia and Malaysia agreed to resolve the dispute peacefully after
a Malaysian patrol boat and a Indonesian Navy ship collided in the disputed area.76
Indonesia and the War Against Terrorism
Many Indonesians view of the war against terror in a fundamentally different
way than the United States. This was particularly so prior to the Bali bombing of
October 2002 in which some 200 people were killed, including many Western
tourists. The Bali bombing, and Marriott bombing of August 2003, changed the
government’s perception of the threat and evoked a rigorous response from the
police. Prior to these bombings, Indonesia viewed the terrorist organization Jemaah
Islamiya (JI) as foreign and focused on anti-western activities. Since the Bali
bombing, U.S. and Indonesian differences have decreased. Nevertheless, 30% of
Indonesians felt in March 2003 that the root cause of terrorism in Indonesia resulted
from oppression against Muslims in Indonesia or elsewhere, injustice toward Arab
countries in the Middle East, or felt that terrorists are holy warriors against the
infidels.77 Domestic perceptions limit the ability of President Yudhoyono to take on
a politically sensitive issue in Indonesia which is a priority policy issue for the United
States.78 While government-to-government cooperation is improving, past polls
indicate that the United States has become very unpopular in Indonesia. Only 15%
of Indonesians had a favorable opinion of the United States in 2003 as opposed to
75% three years earlier.79 More recent polls confirm the continuation of this negative
trend.80 Broad public opposition to U.S. attacks on Islamic countries, Indonesian’s
perceptions of U.S. global influence and fear of antagonizing extremist groups who
enjoy rising public support have all contributed to the government’s reluctance to too
aggressively pursue JI. Despite this, the government has made a significant effort to
track down those responsible for the Bali and Marriott bombings.
Indonesian counterterrorist capability resides with both the police and the
military. American human rights concerns have led to greater U.S. cooperation with
the police than with the military. The United States is helping to fund, train, and arm
the Indonesian police’s special terrorism response unit. All members of the unit are
74 “Malaysia, Indonesia Agree to Standoff in Sulawezi Sea,” Voice of America, May 6, 2005.
75 “Indonesian Strategic Reserve Troops to Guard Ambalat Waters,” BBC News, April 29,
2005.
76 “Indonesia Alleges Malaysian Navy Ship Collides with Indonesia Vessel,” Associated
Press, April 9, 2005.
77 “Polling on Indonesia,” International Republican Institute, March, 2003.
78 John McBeth and Tom McCawley, “Bleak Prospects Ahead for the Front Runner,” Far
Eastern Economic Review, October 2, 2003.
79 Ellen Nakashima, “U.S. Policy Censured in Indonesia,” The Washington Post, October
21, 2003.
80 Brian Knowlton, “Anti-US Anger Spreading in Islamic States,” International Herald
Tribune, May 19, 2005.
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checked to make sure they have not been involved in human rights violations.81
“Unit - 81” is the military’s key counterterrorist unit. It is part of the Kompassus
command. Kompassus forces are the TNI’s most elite forces. Local intelligence units
attached to regional territorial commands represent another potential resource in the
war against terrorism.82 The Indonesian High Court rejected Jemaah Islamiya leader
Abu Bakar Bashir’s appeal of his March 2005 conviction for being part of a
conspiracy that led to the Bali bombing of October 2002 that killed over 200, many
of which were Western tourists. Bashir was given a 30 month sentence.83 (For further
information, see CRS Report RL31672, Terrorism in Southeast Asia, by Bruce
Vaughn, Emma Chanlett-Avery, Richard Cronin, Mark Manyin, and Larry Niksch.)
United States-Indonesian Relations
President Yudhoyono’s visit to Washington in May 2005 will likely lead to a
renewed debate between those who would emphasize human rights in Indonesia as
opposed to those who would emphasize the need for a closer strategic relationship
with Indonesia in order to better fight the war against terror and to promote American
strategic interests in the region. The Bush Administration moved to restore IMET
assistance in early 2005 in what many view as the first step to restoring the full
military to military relationship. Many see this as necessary to be able to most
effectively fight the war against terror in Southeast Asia. Others point to continuing
human rights abuses, such as the mysterious death of human rights campaigner Munir
on a Garuda flight to the Netherlands,84 and continue to call for restrictions on the
military to military relationship.
President Bush’s October 22, 2003 visit to Indonesia sought to strengthen
bilateral counterterror ties. During his visit to Bali, President Bush described
Indonesia as a country whose democratic institutions are improving. President Bush
and President Megawati discussed issues of common concern including
counterterrorism, democratization, military cooperation, U.S. support for the
territorial integrity of Indonesia, U.S. support for the economy of Indonesia and
various developments in Asia and the Middle East. President Bush also proposed a
six-year, $157 million education support program for Indonesia.85
Other U.S. initiatives toward Indonesia include the establishment of a
congressional Indonesia Caucus in February 2004 and the 2003 Report of the
National Commission on U.S. Indonesian Relations. The caucus has been described
81 John McBeth, “Elite Force,” Far Eastern Economic Review, November 13, 2003.
82 Angel Rabasa and John Haseman, The Military and Democracy in Indonesia: Challenges,
Politics, and Power (Santa Monica: RAND Corp. 2002). pp. 33, 82.
83 “Indonesian High Court Rejects Bashir Terror Appeal,” Thai News Service, May 19, 2005.
84 “Govt Must Be Constantly Reminded to Solve Munir Case,” LKBN Antara, December 16,
2004.
85 President Bush, “President Bush, President Megawati Hold Joint Press Conference,” The
White House, October 22, 2003.
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“as an informal, bipartisan group of members of Congress dedicated to maintaining
and strengthening the U.S. Indonesia relationship.”86 Representatives Dan Burton and
Robert Wexler are the Co-Chairs of the caucus. The report was sponsored by the
United States Indonesia Society, the Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford
University, and the National Bureau of Asian Research. The report calls for a
partnership for human resource development to promote in Indonesia an effective
democracy, sustainable development, and the rule of law. As part of this initiative,
the report calls for a pledge by the United States for $200 million in additional annual
assistance in the areas of education, democratization, economic growth, and security
over a five year period.87
There has been some reported movement on developing closer economic
relations between Indonesia and the United States. In 2004, U.S. exports to Indonesia
totaled $3.2 billion while imports totaled $8.7 billion.88 It was reported that
accelerating a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement would be discussed “on
the sidelines of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s visit to the U.S.”89
In an address in Washington, DC in March 2004, former Indonesian Foreign
Minister Ali Alatas identified U.S. “unilateralism,” differences in approach to the war
against terror, and U.S. policy toward Israel and Palestine as issues that adversely
affect Indonesians’ views of the United States and cause friction in the bilateral
relationship.90 Alatas pointed out that Indonesia prefers multilateral action sponsored
by the United Nations and that it sees the need to address the root causes of terrorism,
such as poverty and social injustice, as well as its agents.
Human Rights
Much attention has been focused on human rights aspects of the bilateral
relationship. The State Department’s 2004 annual human rights report, released
February 28 2005, described the Indonesian government’s human rights record as
“poor; although there were improvements in a few areas,” adding that security force
members “continued to commit abuses, the most serious of which took place in areas
of separatist conflict.”91
An attack on American teachers near Timika in West Papua in August of 2002
has attracted the attention of many in Congress. In the attack, two Americans were
86 “Congressman Burton Establishes Indonesia Caucus,” United States Indonesia Society,
February 13, 2004.
87 Ed Masters, Report of the National Commission on U.S. Indonesian Relations (Seattle:
National Bureau of Asian Research, 2003).
88 State Department, “Background Note: Indonesia,” May 2005.
89 “RI-US Agree to Accelerate TIFA,” Bisnis Indonesia, May 19, 2005.
90 Ali Alatas, “Indonesia and the United States: Toward a New Era of Partnership,” U.S.
Indonesia Society Inaugural 10th Anniversary Lecture, March 23, 2004.
91 U.S. State Department, “Indonesia Country Report on Human Rights Practices -2004,”
February 28, 2005.
CRS-20
killed and 12 others were wounded. The Americans killed were teachers at the New
Orleans based Freeport McMoRan-owned mine. It is thought by some observers that
elements of the military at the local level were involved in the attack, either in an
attempt to extort more money from the mine 92 or to discredit the Free Papua
Organization (OPM).93 Others believe that Kompasus forces were involved. General
Endriartono Sutarto reportedly stated that an internal TNI investigation did not
indicate TNI involvement but instead pointed to the Free Papua Movement (OPM).
An initial Indonesian police investigation reportedly implicated TNI personnel.94
Former Deputy Secretary of Defense and former Ambassador to Indonesia Paul
Wolfowitz reportedly views the TNI as a bulwark against Muslim radicalism in the
region.95 In February 2005, Secretary of State Rice lifted restrictions on Indonesia’s
involvement in IMET programs.
Indonesian- and United Nations-sponsored efforts have not led to the
imprisonment of Indonesians accused of crimes against humanity related to the
events in East Timor in 1999. In February of 2003, a United Nations-sponsored
tribunal indicted former TNI chief Wiranto and six other generals, as well as East
Timor’s former Governor, of crimes against humanity.96 A total of 440 Indonesian
servicemen and militia members were indicted for crimes surrounding the 1999
referendum by the U.N. backed transitional justice structures in East Timor. A
hundred and one East Timorese have come before the court but 339 other suspects
are in Indonesia. The Indonesian investigations into the crimes acquitted the 16
Indonesian defendants. Indonesia and East Timor have opted to pursue the matter
through a joint Commission of Truth and Friendship whose findings will not lead to
prosecutions.97 A United Nations Commission of Experts was formed to carry out
an assessment of the results of the East Timor Rights Tribunal carried out by
Indonesia. They traveled to Indonesia and met with President Yudhoyono during
their visit in Indonesia from May 18-20, 2005.98
The December 2003 appointment of Brigadier General Timbul Silaen to the post
of Regional Police Commander in Papua was received with dismay by both the State
92 Karl Schoenberger, “Indonesian Military Using Terror Fears to Regain Power,” Knight
Ridder Tribune News Service, March 21, 2003.
93 “Country Report: Indonesia,” The Economist Intelligence Unit, September, 2003.
94 Bantarto Bandoro, “R.I.-U.S. Military Ties Not Out,” Jakarta Post, July 25, 2003.
95 Slobodan Lekic, “Indonesian Military Helps Shape Elections,” Associated Press, January
23, 2004.
96 Karl Schoenberger, “Indonesian Military Using Terror Fears to Regain Power,” Knight
Ridder Tribune News Service, March 21, 2003.
97 Susan Harris, “Five Years on, and East Timor is Still Waiting for Justice,” Canberra
Times, May 19, 2005.
98 “President receives UN Commission of Experts, Pledges Cooperation,” Organization of
Asia Pacific News Agencies, May 19, 2005.
CRS-21
Department and human rights groups. General Silaen was indicted for crimes against
humanity in East Timor by United Nations prosecutors.99
One argument for IMET is that Indonesian officers who are exposed to U.S.
military training are more likely to respect human rights and to value civilian control
of the military. American access to senior level military leaders has been facilitated
by the program in the past. Those skeptical of this argument do not see a correlation
between TNI officers’ participation in the program and their human rights
performance afterward.
Geopolitical and Strategic Interests
The Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok straits are some of the world’s most
important strategic sea lanes. Close to half of the total global merchant fleet capacity
transits the straits around Indonesia.100 A significant proportion of Northeast Asia’s
energy resources transit these straits. The United States continues to have both
economic and military interest in keeping the sea lanes of communication open.101
Further energy deposits may also be found in the waters of Southeast Asia.
Some analysts are concerned about growing Chinese influence in the region.
China was perceived as being more assertive in the 1990s, for example, by fortifying
Mischief Reef. China is now seen as being more subtle. China signed a Joint
Declaration on Strategic Partnership with ASEAN in October 2003 and is developing
a China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement to augment its existing bilateral trade
agreements with many ASEAN members. This has been viewed as a possible
“foundation for a strategic partnership.”102 China and Indonesia also announced a
series of agreements amounting to what some have described as a ‘strategic
partnership’ in April 2005. At the same time, China is expanding its naval capability.
Over the past year China has reportedly begun construction on 70 naval vessels and
is considering further purchases of Sovremenny class destroyers from Russia. While
usually discussed in the context of a potential conflict with Taiwan, China’s navy is
thought to have the capability to sea lift a division, or roughly 10,000 troops.103
99 “U.S. Slams Papua Police Appointment,” Far Eastern Economic Review, December 18,
2003.
100 Ed Masters, Report of the National Commission on U.S. Indonesian Relations (Seattle:
National Bureau of Asian Research, 2003).
101 John Noer with David Gregory, Chokepoint: Maritime Economic Concerns in Southeast
Asia (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1996).
102 Edward Masters, Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Asia and the
Pacific, Testimony for a Hearing on, “The United States and Asia: Continuity, Instability,
and Transition,” March 17, 2004.
103 Edward Cody, “With Taiwan in Mind, China Focuses Military Expansion on Navy,” The
Washington Post, March 20, 2004.
CRS-22
U.S. Security Assistance to Indonesia
American security assistance to Indonesia is subject to certain restrictions set
forth in P.L.108-447, The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2005. Section 572 of
P.L.108-447 states that Foreign Military Financing funds may be made available for
Indonesia if the Secretary of State certifies to Congress that the TNI is working to
“counter international terrorism, consistent with democratic principles and the rule
of law,” that the Indonesian government is “prosecuting and punishing” members of
the armed forces involved in “gross violations of human rights or to have aided or
abetted militia groups,” that the Indonesian armed forces are cooperating with
“civilian judicial authorities and with international efforts to resolve cases of gross
violations of human rights in East Timor and elsewhere,” and that the TNI is
implementing reforms “to increase the transparency and accountability of their
operations and financial management.” Under part (b) of section 572, IMET funds
may be made available to Indonesia if the Secretary of State determines that
“Indonesian Government and Armed Forces are cooperating with the Federal Bureau
of Investigation’s investigation into the August 13, 2002 murder of two American
citizens and one Indonesia citizen” near Timika. Section 590 allows FMF for the
Indonesian navy for enhancing maritime security.
Indonesia has participated in the Regional Defense Counter Terrorism
Fellowship Program which includes intelligence cooperation, civil-military
cooperation in combating terrorism and maritime security. Indonesia has also
participated in the Theater Security Cooperation Program with the U.S. Pacific
Command. This has involved Indonesia in counterterrorism seminars promoting
cooperation on security as well as subject matter expert exchanges.104 Indonesia and
the U.S. held a joint counterterror exercise with Indonesian Marines and U.S. Navy
Seals in May 2005.105
Military to military ties between the United States and Indonesia have ebbed and
flowed since the 1950s. This has been conditioned by both the disposition of the
regime in Jakarta to the United States and by U.S. perceptions of the TNI’s record on
human rights. A significant relationship was established by the 1960s. This was
expanded in the wake of Sukarno’s demise. The relationship waned in the 1980s but
increased again in 1990.106 On November 12, 1991, Indonesian soldiers killed or
wounded hundreds of unarmed civilians at the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili, East
Timor. Congress first cut IMET funding for Indonesia in 1991 in response to the Dili
massacre. Further restrictions were levied in 1999 in response to TNI involvement
with atrocities in East Timor.
104 “United States-Indonesia Military Relations,” Congressional Record, Senate, Page S734,
February 1, 2005.
105 “US, Indonesian Navies Hold Joint Anti-Terror Exercises,” Oster Dow Jones, May 10,
2005.
106 Col. John Haseman, “U.S.-Indonesia Military to Military Relations,” Asia-Pacific
Defence Reporter, November 2002.
CRS-23
Jemaah Islamiya activity in Indonesia and Southeast Asia highlights the need
for closer cooperation in the war against terror. In August of 2002, Secretary of State
Powell pledged $31 million to train police, $16 million to build a counterterrorism
unit, and $4 million for army counterterrorism training for Indonesia over several
years. At that time, Secretary Powell reportedly said that the United States and
Indonesia were beginning to normalize military to military ties though “we are not
there yet.”107
The Administration’s policy on assistance to Indonesia is informed by the role
that Indonesia can play in the war against terror. In 2004, Principal Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs Donald Keyser stated in
testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that counterterrorism is at
the top of the priority list for strategic foreign assistance goals in FY2005. “In
Indonesia for example, we intend to build on the successful efforts, funded by the
Non-proliferation, Anti-terrorism, De-mining and Related Programs (NADR)
account, to continue training and to expand the Indonesian National Police’s
Counter-terrorism Task Force.” He added that the Economic Support Fund (ESF)
will be used to support basic education “as a key element in the effort to combat
terror.”108 The United States and Indonesia cooperate on counterterrorism in a
number of areas with assistance going to the police and security officials,
prosecutors, legislators, immigration officials, banking regulators and others.
U.S.-Indonesian counterterror capacity building programs have included the $12
million for the establishment of a national police counterterrorism unit and $4.9
million for counterterrorism training for police and security officials over the period
2001-2003. Such assistance has also included financial intelligence unit training to
strengthen anti-money laundering, counterterror intelligence analysts training, an
analyst exchange program with the Treasury Department and training and assistance
to establish a border security system as part of the Terrorist Interdiction Program.109
The State Department budget justification document for FY2006 states that
“Indonesia’s contribution to the Global War on Terror is also a vital U.S. interest.”
It goes on to state that ESF funds will provide technical assistance and training to
Indonesia that will strengthen counter terrorist activities. It also states that FY2006
“counter terrorism training program activity for Indonesia will shift from two years
of Task Force operational training, equipping, formation and development to
program transition, sustainment, oversight, and liaison.”110
107 “Indonesia Gets U.S. Aid Against Terror,” BBC News, August 2, 2002.
108 “Fighting Terrorism Top U.S. Goal,” State Department Press Release, March 2, 2004.
109 Information drawn from State Department Fact Sheet, “Summary of Counter Terrorism
Assistance for Indonesia,” 10/03 update.
110 “FY2006 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations,” U.S. Department
of State, Released February 15, 2005.
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Table 1. U.S. Foreign Assistance to Indonesia
Account*
FY2004
FY2005 est
FY2006 request
CSH111
$33,000,000
$36,700,000
$27,540,000
DA
33,291,000
27,848,000
48,424,000
ESF
49,705,000
64,480,000
70,000,000
FMF
-
992,000
1,000
IMET
599,000
600,000
800,000
INCLE
—
-
5,000,000
NADR-ATA
5,778,000
5,300,000
5,300,000
NADR-EXBS
220,000
-
450,000
P.L. 480 Title II
3,315,000
11,900,000
18,190,000
The United States is promoting counterterrorism in Southeast Asia on a regional
and multilateral basis as well as on a bilateral basis with Indonesia. Such an
approach is viewed as complementing and promoting bilateral assistance and focuses
on diplomatic, financial, law enforcement, intelligence and military tools. Two key
objectives of the U.S. government are to build the capacity and will of regional states
to fight terror. These objectives are pursued through a number of programs. The
United States-ASEAN Work Plan for Counter-Terrorism has identified information
sharing, enhancing liaison relationships, capacity building through training and
education, transportation, maritime security, border and immigration controls, and
compliance with United Nations and international conventions, as goals for enhanced
regional anti-terrorism cooperation.
The Anti-terrorism Assistance Program, directed at law enforcement training
and associated hardware, has aided Indonesia, among others. In addition, Financial
Systems Assessment Teams and the Terrorist Interdiction Program (which focuses
on border controls) have also assisted Indonesia. The United States has also
supported the Southeast Asian Regional Center for Counter-terrorism in Kuala
Lumpur. Foreign Emergency Support Teams are designed for rapid deployment in
response to a terrorist related event while Technical Support Working Groups work
with regional partners to find technical solutions to problems such as bio-terrorism
warning sensors.112
111 Child Survival and Health (CSH), Development Assistance (DA), Economic Support
Funds (ESF), Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and
Training (IMET), International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), Non-
proliferation Anti-terrorism Demining and Related Programs Export Control and Border
Security Assistance NADR-EXBS, Non-proliferation Anti-terrorism Demining and Related
Programs Antiterrorism Assistance (NADR-ATA).
112 Drawn from State Department budget justification material.