Order Code RL32754
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Immigration: Analysis of the
Major Provisions of H.R. 418,
the REAL ID Act of 2005
Updated May 9, 2005
Michael John Garcia, Margaret Mikyung Lee,
Todd Tatelman, and Larry M. Eig
Legislative Attorneys
American Law Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Immigration: Analysis of the Major Provisions
of H.R. 418, the REAL ID Act of 2005
Summary
During the 108th Congress, a number of proposals related to immigration and
identification-document security were introduced, some of which were considered
in the context of implementing recommendations made by the National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (also known as the 9/11 Commission)
and enacted pursuant to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004 (P.L. 108-458). At the time that the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act was adopted, some congressional leaders reportedly agreed to revisit
certain immigration and document-security issues in the 109th Congress that had been
dropped from the final version of the act.
The REAL ID Act of 2005 was first introduced as H.R. 418 by Representative
James Sensenbrenner on January 26, 2005, and passed the House, as amended, on
February 10, 2005. The text of House-passed H.R. 418 was subsequently added to
H.R. 1268, the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global
War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, which was introduced by Representative
Jerry Lewis on March 11, 2005, and passed the House, as amended, on March 16,
2005. H.R. 1268 passed the Senate on April 21, 2005, as amended, on a vote of 99-
0, but did not include the REAL ID Act provisions. A conference report resolving
differences between the two versions of the bill, H.Rept. 109-72, passed the House
on May 5, 2005. The conference report contains most of the REAL ID Act
provisions (though not those relating to the bond of aliens in removal proceedings),
though some changes were made to certain REAL ID Act provisions.
This report analyzes the major provisions of the REAL ID Act, as contained in
the conference report to H.R. 1268, which would, inter alia, (1) modify the eligibility
criteria for asylum and withholding of removal; (2) limit judicial review of certain
immigration decisions; (3) provide additional waiver authority over laws that might
impede the expeditious construction of barriers and roads along land borders,
including a 14-mile wide fence near San Diego; (4) expand the scope of terror-related
activity making an alien inadmissible or deportable, as well as ineligible for certain
forms of relief from removal; (5) require states to meet certain minimum security
standards in order for the drivers’ licenses and personal identification cards they issue
to be accepted for federal purposes; (6) require the Secretary of Homeland Security
to enter into the appropriate aviation security screening database the appropriate
background information of any person convicted of using a false driver’s license for
the purpose of boarding an airplane; and (7) require the Department of Homeland
Security to study and plan ways to improve U.S. security and improve inter-agency
communications and information sharing, as well as establish a ground surveillance
pilot program.

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Contents
I. Preventing Terrorists from Obtaining Asylum or Relief from Removal . . . . . 2
Standards for Granting Asylum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Current Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Changes Proposed by the REAL ID Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Standards for Granting Withholding of Removal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Current Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Changes Proposed by the REAL ID Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Standards for Granting Other Forms of Removal Relief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Current Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Changes Proposed by the REAL ID Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Standards of Judicial Review for Certain Determinations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Current Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Changes Proposed by the REAL ID Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Judicial Review of Denials of Discretionary Relief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Current Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Changes Proposed by the REAL ID Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Removal of Caps on Adjustment of Status for Asylees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Current Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Changes Proposed by the REAL ID Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Repeal of the Study and Report on Terrorists and Asylum . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Current Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Changes Proposed by the REAL ID Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
II. Waiver of Laws to Facilitate Barriers at Border . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Current Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Changes Proposed by the REAL ID Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
III. Judicial Review of Orders of Removal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Current Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Changes Proposed by the REAL ID Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
IV. Inadmissibility and Deportability Due to Terrorist and
Terrorist-Related Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Definition of “Engage in Terrorist Activity” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Current Law Defining “Engage in Terrorist Activity” . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Changes Proposed by the REAL ID Act to the Definition of
“Engage in Terrorist Activity” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Definition of “Terrorist Organization”
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Current Law Defining “Terrorist Organization” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Changes Proposed by the REAL ID Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Terror-Related Grounds for Inadmissibility of Aliens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Current Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Changes to Terror-Related Grounds for Inadmissibility Proposed
by the REAL ID Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Waiver of Certain Grounds for Inadmissibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Terror-Related Grounds for Deportability of Aliens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Current Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

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Changes Proposed by the REAL ID Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Consequences of Terror-Related Activities on Eligibility for
Relief from Removal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Asylum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Withholding of Removal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
V. Improved Security for Drivers’ Licenses and Personal Identification Cards . 38
Current Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Changes Proposed by the REAL ID Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Minimum Issuance Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Evidence of Legal Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Temporary Drivers’ Licenses and Identification Cards . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Other Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Trafficking in Authentication Features for Use in False
Identification Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Additional Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
VI. Improving Border Infrastructure and Technology Integration . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Vulnerability and Threat Assessment Relating to Border
Infrastructure Weaknesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Establishment of a Ground Surveillance Pilot Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Enhancement of Border Communications Integration and
Information Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

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Immigration: Analysis of the Major
Provisions of H.R. 418,
the REAL ID Act of 2005
The 109th Congress is considering several issues carried over from the 108th
Congress related to immigration enforcement and identification-document security.
During the 108th Congress, a number of proposals were made to strengthen
identification-document security and make more stringent requirements for alien
admissibility and continuing presence within the United States.1 Certain immigration
and identification-document security proposals were considered in the context of
implementing recommendations of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States (also known as the 9/11 Commission) to improve homeland
security, and some of these were enacted pursuant to the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.2 However, other proposals did not appear in the
final legislation, certain document-security provisions being notable among them.
At the time that the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act was enacted,
some congressional leaders reportedly agreed to revisit certain immigration and
document-security issues in the 109th Congress that had been dropped from the final
version of the act.3
The REAL ID Act of 2005 was first introduced as H.R. 418 by Representative
James Sensenbrenner on January 26, 2005, and passed the House, as amended, on
February 10, 2005, on a vote of 261-161. House-passed H.R. 418 contains both a
number of provisions related to immigration reform and document security that were
considered during congressional deliberations on the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act, but which were ultimately not included in the act’s final
version, and some new proposals. House-passed H.R. 418 also includes some
provisions that were not considered during final deliberations over the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. The text of House-passed H.R. 418 was
subsequently added to H.R. 1268, the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act
for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, which was
introduced by Representative Jerry Lewis on March 11, 2005, and passed the House,
as amended, on March 16, 2005 on a vote of 388-43. H.R. 1268 passed the Senate
on April 21, 2005, as amended, on a vote of 99-0, but did not include the REAL ID
1 See generally CRS Report RL32169, Immigration Legislation and Issues in the 108th
Congress, Andorra Bruno, Coordinator.
2 P.L. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004). For further background, see CRS Report RL32616,
9/11 Commission: Legislative Action Concerning U.S. Immigration Law and Policy in the
108th Congress, by Michael John Garcia and Ruth Ellen Wasem.
3 See Mary Curtius, The Nation; GOP Congressman Renews Push for Immigration Curbs,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2005, at A18.

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Act provisions, and a conference was held to resolve differences between the House-
and Senate-passed versions of H.R. 1268. The conference report, H.Rept. 109-72,
passed the House on a vote of 368-58 on May 5, 2005. A Senate vote on the
conference version of H.R. 1268 is expected shortly.
The conference report on H.R. 1268 contains most of the REAL ID Act
provisions contained in House-passed H.R. 418 and the version of H.R. 1268 that
originally passed the House. However, some notable changes were made, including,
inter alia, (1) removing provisions relating to the release of aliens in removal
proceedings on bond; (2) making asylum and withholding of removal eligibility and
credibility standards less stringent than those proposed in earlier versions of the
REAL ID Act; (3) providing for limited judicial review of Secretary of Homeland
Security decisions to waive certain legal requirements to facilitate the construction
of barriers at the borders; (4) providing broader waiver authority to the Secretary of
State and Secretary of Homeland Security regarding terrorist-related grounds for
inadmissibility and removal; and (5) modify, and in some cases make more stringent,
REAL ID Act provisions concerning minimum security standards for state-issued
drivers’ licenses and personal identification cards accepted for federal purposes
This report analyzes the major provisions of the REAL ID Act of 2005, as
contained in the conference report to H.R. 1268. It describes relevant current law
relating to immigration and document-security matters, how the REAL ID Act would
alter current law if enacted, and the degree to which the bill duplicates existing law.
I. Preventing Terrorists from Obtaining Asylum
or Relief from Removal4
The 9/11 Commission Report5 documented instances where terrorists had
exploited the availability of humanitarian relief under immigration law.6 Although
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)7 and the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)8 amended
asylum procedures to reduce fraudulent claims and limited judicial review of removal
orders, provisions in the REAL ID Act would again amend the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA)9 for the purpose of further diminishing the prospect of
terrorists using the immigration system to their advantage.
4 Discussion of this topic was prepared by Margaret Mikyung Lee, Legislative Attorney.
5 FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED
STATES, July 2004.
6 Id. at 72. Ramzi Yousef, one of the terrorists involved in the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing, entered the United States on a political asylum claim.
7 P.L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
8 Division C of P.L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996).
9 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq.

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Standards for Granting Asylum
Current Law. Section 208(b) of the INA10 provides that the Attorney General
may grant asylum to an alien whom he determines is a refugee as defined in §
101(a)(42)(A) of the INA. That section defines a refugee as a person who is
persecuted or who has a well-founded fear of persecution because of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.11 An alien
who is physically present or arrives in the United States, regardless of the alien’s
immigration status, may apply for asylum. Although the burden of proof is not
currently explicitly described in the INA, regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a) and (b)
place the burden of proof on the asylum applicant, as did previous statutory
provisions.12 Also, case law places the burden of proof on the asylum applicant.13
The grant of asylum is discretionary and even if an applicant meets the burden of
proof for asylum eligibility, asylum may be denied on discretionary grounds.
There are no explicit standards in the INA on determining the credibility of an
asylum applicant and the necessity for corroborating evidence of applicant testimony.
In the absence of explicit statutory guidelines, standards for determining credibility
and sufficiency of evidence have evolved through the case law of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) and federal courts. However, these standards are not
necessarily consistent across federal appellate courts, which may yield different
results in otherwise apparently similar cases.14 Generally, an asylum adjudicator may
base an adverse credibility finding on factors such as the demeanor of the applicant
or witness, inconsistencies both within a given testimony and between a given
testimony and other testimony and evidence (which may include country conditions,
news accounts, etc.), and a lack of detail or specificity in testimony. The U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Ninth Circuit) has held that an adjudicator must
make explicit the reasons for an adverse credibility finding or the court will accept
the applicant’s testimony as credible.15
10 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b).
11 8 U.S.C. § 1101(A)(42)(A).
12 See INA § 203(a)(7) between P.L. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965) and P.L. No. 96-212, 94
Stat. 109 (1980), [current version at 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(7)] and Shubash v. District Director,
450 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1971).
13 C. Gordon, S. Mailman, & S. Yale-Loehrer, IMMIGRATION LAW & PROCEDURE, § 34.02
(2004) (hereinafter IMMIGRATION LAW & PROCEDURE).
14 See id. § 34.02[9] for a discussion of the case law concerning evidentiary standards.
15 “It is well established in this circuit that the BIA may not require independent
corroborative evidence from an asylum applicant who testifies credibly in support of his
application. . . . It is also well settled that we must accept an applicant’s testimony as true
in the absence of an explicit adverse credibility finding.” Kataria v. INS, 232 F.3d 1107,
1113-14 (9th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). “Even under the substantial evidence standard,
an adverse credibility finding must be based on ‘specific cogent reasons,’ which are
substantial and ‘bear a legitimate nexus to the finding.’” Cordon-Garcia v. INS, 204 F.3d
985, 993 (9th Cir. 2000).

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CRS-4
An adverse credibility finding may be based in part but not solely on an
applicant’s failure to provide corroboration. The Ninth Circuit has held that where
there is reason for an adjudicator to question the applicant’s credibility and the
applicant fails to provide easily obtainable corroborating evidence with no
explanation for such failure, an adverse credibility finding will withstand judicial
review.16 With regard to sufficiency of the evidence, the BIA and the federal courts
agree that credible testimony alone may suffice to sustain the applicant’s burden of
proof in some cases, but disagree on when credible testimony alone meets the burden
and when corroboration is needed. The BIA standard is that where it would be
reasonable to expect corroboration, it must be provided or an explanation for failure
to provide it must be given.17 However, some circuits have criticized the BIA for
failing to articulate what corroboration it expected in particular cases and why. The
Ninth Circuit has adopted a standard that an applicant’s credible testimony alone
always suffices to sustain the burden of proof of eligibility where it is unrefuted,
direct and specific.18 One authority argues that the BIA’s approach is contrary to
international standards under which an asylum applicant should be given the benefit
of the doubt, given the difficulties in obtaining corroborating evidence, although the
applicant should try to provide any available corroborating evidence.19 On the other
hand, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has asserted that the BIA
standards are consistent with international standards because an applicant is supposed
to try to provide corroboration for his or her claim or satisfactorily explain its
absence.20
Currently, an alien who is inadmissible on certain terrorist grounds or who is
removable for engaging or having engaged in terrorist activities is not eligible for
asylum. Not foreclosed from relief is a person who is inadmissible as a member of
a terrorist organization, the spouse or child of a person inadmissible on terrorist
grounds, or a person who is a representative of a terrorist organization where the
Attorney General has determined that there are not reasonable grounds for regarding
the representative as a danger to the security of the United States.21 As discussed
below, however, changes made elsewhere in the REAL ID Act would much more
narrowly restrict the availability of asylum to those with terrorist ties.
16 Sidhu v. INS, 220 F.3d 1085, 1092 (9th Cir. 2000).
17 In re S-M-J-, Applicant, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722, 1997 WL 80984 (B.I.A. 1997).
18 Ladha v. I.N.S., 215 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2000).
19 See IMMIGRATION LAW & PROCEDURE § 34.02[9][c][ii][B], notes 288-292 and
accompanying text.
20 “[I]nternational standards do not conflict with the BIA’s expectation of corroborating
evidence in certain cases. The Handbook of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees notes that applicants should ‘make an effort to support [their] statements by any
available evidence and give a satisfactory explanation for any lack of evidence.’” Diallo v.
INS, 232 F.3d 279, 286 (2nd Cir. 2000).
21 While such a person may have applied for asylum, CRS has not found an instance in
which such a person was granted asylum.

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CRS-5
Changes Proposed by the REAL ID Act. Subsection 101(a) of the REAL
ID Act would amend § 208(b)(1) of the INA22 by clarifying that the Secretary of
Homeland Security and the Attorney General both have authority to grant asylum and
by strengthening and codifying the standards for establishing a well-founded fear of
persecution. These changes address the asylum process generally. Proposed changes
that could specifically affect the eligibility for asylum of aliens associated with
terrorist organizations are discussed elsewhere in this report.
Authority of Secretary of Homeland Security. Although the Homeland
Security Act of 200223 and Reorganization Plan under that act24 provided generally
for the transfer of the functions of the defunct Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) to the Department of Homeland Security, most provisions of the INA
still refer to the Attorney General and/or Commissioner of the INS. Both the
Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General may now exercise
authority over asylum depending on the context in which asylum issues arise, and §
101(a)(1) and (2) of the REAL ID Act would accordingly amend § 208(b)(1) of the
INA to insert references to both the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland
Security. However, this would only address references for that particular subsection
and would not amend the rest of § 208, which would continue to refer only to the
Attorney General. It is not clear whether this omission is intended to limit the
authority of the Secretary with respect to changes in asylum status or procedures for
considering asylum applications.
Burden of Proof and Central Reason. Subsection 101(a)(3) of the REAL
ID Act would codify the existing regulatory and case law standard that the burden of
proof is on the asylum applicant to establish eligibility as a refugee.
However, the subsection appears to create a new standard requiring that the
applicant must establish that at least one central reason for persecution was or will
be race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion. Neither § 208 nor § 101(a)(42)(A) of the INA nor the relevant regulation
currently refers to or defines the concept of a “central reason,” which appears to be
a modification of established refugee/asylum laws, although possibly a slight one,
since existing case precedents recognize similar standards. The conference report for
H.R. 1268 notes that a past proposed change to asylum regulations would have
required that a protected statutory ground be a central, not incidental or tangential,
motive for persecution.25
Case law concerning asylum has addressed the concept of “mixed motives” for
the persecution of an alien. Where there is more than one motive for persecution, a
person may be granted asylum as long as one of the motives is a statutory ground of
22 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1).
23 P.L. 107-296, §§ 1102, 1502, 116 Stat. 2135, 2273, 2308, as amended by P.L. 108-7, Div.
L, § 105(a), 117 Stat. 11, 531 (2003).
24 At [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/11/reorganization_plan.pdf], last
visited Jan. 13, 2005.
25 H.Rept. 109-72, at 163 (2005).

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CRS-6
persecution.26 For example, a person may be economically persecuted, e.g., he may
receive an extortion demand. If the extortion is motivated by both a desire to obtain
money and by a desire to punish the person for a political opinion, or being a member
of a race, religion, nationality, or particular social group, then that person may be
granted asylum. However, a person may be denied asylum where economic
persecution is motivated solely by the desire to obtain money rather than for the
motives enumerated in the statute. The standard for the importance of the statutory
motive ranges from being one of the motives to being a meaningful motive to being
a principal motive. Thus, the statutory establishment of a central reason standard
appears to be a modification to the mixed motives standard in some case precedents,
but consistent with the operative standard in others.
Corroboration and Credibility. Subsection 101(a)(3) of the REAL ID Act
would attempt to bring some clarity and consistency to evidentiary determinations
by codifying standards for sustaining the burden of proof, determining credibility of
applicant testimony, and determining when corroborating evidence may be required.
Under the REAL ID Act, the testimony of the applicant may suffice to sustain
the applicant’s burden without corroboration, but only if the adjudicator determines
that it is credible, persuasive and refers to specific facts demonstrating refugee status.
The adjudicator is entitled to consider credible testimony along with other evidence.
If the adjudicator determines in his/her discretion that the applicant should provide
26 IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 33.04 (2004), comparing, e.g., Fadul v. INS, No.
99-2029, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 4952 (7th Cir. Mar. 20, 2000) (death threats by the New
People’s Army motivated by extortion efforts, not political opinion) with Chen v. Ashcroft,
289 F.3d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 2002) (vacated on grounds unrelated to the motive analysis,
314 F.3d 995 (9th Cir. 2002)) (“It is not necessary that persecution be solely on account of
one of the forbidden grounds for an asylum applicant to secure asylum. It is enough that a
principal reason for the persecution be on account of a statutory ground”). See also Singh
v. Ashcroft, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 18925, at *5 (9th Cir., Sept. 3, 2004); Girma v. INS, 283
F.3d 664, 668 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[under a mixed motive analysis] the predominant motive for
the abuse is not determinative . . . an applicant for asylum must present evidence sufficient
for one to reasonably believe that the harm suffered was motivated in meaningful part by
a protected ground”); Agbuya v. INS, 241 F.3d 1224, 1228 (9th Cir. 2001); Borja v. INS,
175 F.3d 732, 734-36 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (“ . . . ‘the plain meaning of the phrase
‘persecution on account of the victim’s political opinion,’ does not mean persecution solely
on account of the victim’s political opinion. That is, the conclusion that a cause of
persecution is economic does not necessarily imply that there cannot exist other causes of
the persecution.’ As the United Nations’ Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for
Determining Refugee Status says, ‘What appears at first sight to be primarily an economic
motive for departure may in reality also involve a political element, and it may be the
political opinions of the individual that expose him to serious consequences, rather than his
objections to the economic measures themselves.’ (quoting U.N. Handbook at §§ 62-64).
To quote the Board’s decision in this case, ‘An applicant for asylum need not show
conclusively why persecution occurred in the past or is likely to occur in the future.
However, the applicant must produce evidence from which it is reasonable to believe that
the harm was motivated, at least in part, by an actual or implied protected ground.’” (other
cites omitted, emphasis added)); Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995)
(“Persecutory conduct may have more than one motive, and so long as one motive is one of
the statutory grounds, the requirements have been satisfied.”). See also CRS Report
RL32621, U.S. Immigration Policy on Asylum Seekers, by Ruth Ellen Wasem.

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corroborating evidence for otherwise credible testimony, such corroborating evidence
must be provided unless the applicant does not have it and cannot reasonably obtain
it.27 Considering the totality of circumstances and all relevant factors, the adjudicator
may base an applicant or witness credibility determination on, among other relevant
factors, demeanor, candor, responsiveness, inherent plausibility of the account,
consistency between the written and oral statements (regardless of when they were
made, whether they were under oath, and considering the circumstances under which
the statements were made), internal consistency of a statement, consistency of
statements with other evidence of record (including the Department of State reports
on country conditions), and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such statements,
without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy or falsehood goes to the heart
of an applicant’s claim. There is no presumption of credibility; however, if no
adverse credibility determination is explicitly made, the applicant or witness shall
have a rebuttable presumption of credibility on appeal.
Given the flexibility afforded the adjudicator, it is not clear that the REAL ID
Act would represent either a significant departure from current case law standards for
credibility and corroboration or a clear resolution of inconsistencies among case
precedents in different federal appellate courts and also the BIA. The proposed new
§ 208(b)(1)(B)(ii) of the INA appears to permit an adjudicator to make an adverse
credibility finding based on the applicant’s failure to provide corroborating evidence
for otherwise credible testimony, unless the applicant does not have it or cannot
reasonably obtain it. This provision appears to be intended primarily to resolve the
difference between the BIA and the Ninth Circuit with regard to credibility and
sufficiency of evidence by adopting the BIA position with some modification
(specifying what excuses failure to provide corroboration). On the other hand, the
proposed new § 208(b)(1)(B)(iii) of the INA in general appears to be a codification
of, but not a significant change from, current case law which permits an asylum
adjudicator to consider the totality of circumstances including relevant factors such
as demeanor, inconsistencies, and the like in making credibility determinations, as
long as they are not actually speculation or conjecture, rather than factual
observation. However, the clause providing that an adjudicator may consider an
inconsistency, inaccuracy or falsehood regardless of whether it goes to the crux of an
asylum claim appears intended to supersede Ninth Circuit precedent that
inconsistencies, inaccuracies and falsehoods that do not go to the heart of a claim will
not support an adverse credibility finding.28 But any such consideration would have
to take into account the totality of circumstances and relevant factors.29 The clause
regarding no presumption of credibility appears to adopt Ninth Circuit precedent that
27 The current text drops language that would have further required that the applicant could
not reasonably obtain the evidence without leaving the United States and that the inability
to obtain corroborating evidence would not excuse the applicant from sustaining the burden
of proof.
28 See, e.g., Mendoza Manimbao v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 655, 660 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Minor
inconsistencies in the record that do not relate to the basis of an applicant’s alleged fear of
persecution, go to the heart of the asylum claim, or reveal anything about an asylum
applicant’s fear for his safety are insufficient to support an adverse credibility finding”).
This clause was not in H.R. 418 as introduced.
29 H.Rept. 109-72 at 167 (2005).

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CRS-8
presumes credibility on appeal where neither the immigration judge nor the BIA has
made an explicit adverse credibility finding,30 with the modification or clarification
that the presumption is rebuttable.
Terrorist Exceptions to Asylum Eligibility. Subsection 101(b) of the
REAL ID Act would amend § 208(b)(2)(A)(v) to provide that an alien described in
the terrorism grounds for inadmissibility and removal shall not be eligible for asylum,
with certain narrow exceptions noted above in current law.
Effective Dates. Subsection 101(h)(1) of the REAL ID Act would provide
that the references to the authority of the Secretary of Homeland Security would take
effect as if enacted on March 1, 2003, which was the official date of transfer of
immigration enforcement functions from the INS to the Department of Homeland
Security under the Reorganization Plan. Subsection 101(h)(2) would provide that the
asylum standards established in § 101(a)(3) and (b) of the REAL ID Act take effect
on the date of enactment and apply to applications for asylum made on or after such
date. Therefore, the standards would not apply by statute to asylum applications filed
before the date of enactment; rather, standards in existing case law would apply.
Standards for Granting Withholding of Removal
Current Law. Subsection 241(b)(3) of the INA places restrictions on removal
to a country where an alien’s life or freedom would be threatened because of the
alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.31 Although there are similarities between asylum and withholding of
removal, there are also significant differences. Asylum is a discretionary form of
relief, for which the standard is a “well-founded fear of persecution.” Withholding
of removal is mandatory relief from removal for those who can satisfy the higher
standard of a “clear probability of persecution,” also expressed as “more likely than
not” that one would be persecuted.32 A person who has been granted asylum has
been admitted into the United States, although the status is not a right to reside
permanently in the United States. A person who is granted withholding has not been
granted legal entry into the United States and may be more readily removed to his
country when there is no longer any threat to his life or freedom. Withholding of
removal is only specific to a particular country and therefore does not preclude
removal to another country under INA § 241(b)(1)(C). An alien granted withholding
of removal may not adjust to the status of a lawful permanent resident and the alien’s
30 See Canjura-Flores v. INS, 784 F.2d 885, 888-89 (9th Cir. 1985) ( “We will continue to
remand to the Board for credibility findings when we reverse a decision in which the Board
has avoided the credibility issue by holding that a petitioner has failed to establish either a
well-founded fear of persecution or a clear probability of persecution even if his testimony
is assumed to be credible [cites omitted], or when the basis of the Board’s decision cannot
be discerned from the record [cites omitted]. When the decisions of the Immigration Judge
and the Board are silent on the question of credibility, however, we will presume that they
found the petitioner credible”). This clause was not in H.R. 418 as introduced.
31 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3).
32 Compare INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) with INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407
(1984).

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CRS-9
family members are not eligible to come to the United States via the alien’s status in
the United States. In contrast, within numerical limits for asylee adjustments,33 an
alien granted asylum may adjust status under § 209(b) of the INA34 after being
present in the United States for one year after the grant of asylum if the alien still
meets the definition of refugee, is not firmly resettled in any other country and is
otherwise admissible as an immigrant (with exemptions from certain grounds of
inadmissibility). Additionally, under § 208(b)(3) of the INA the spouse and children
of an alien granted asylum, if not otherwise eligible for asylum, may be granted
asylum themselves if accompanying or following to join the alien.35 Aside from the
higher standard of proof, withholding of removal involves similar consideration of
credibility and corroboration factors36 and some of the same issues regarding Ninth
Circuit jurisprudence.37
INA § 241(b)(3)(A) enumerates certain classes of aliens who are ineligible for
withholding of removal, including aliens reasonably believed by the Attorney
General to be a danger to the security of the United States. The statute further states
that an alien who is removable for engaging in terrorist activities under §
237(a)(4)(B) of the INA38 shall be considered to be an alien with respect to whom
there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the United
States.
Changes Proposed by the REAL ID Act. Subsection 101(c) of the REAL
ID Act would amend § 241(b)(3) of the INA39 by applying to and codifying for
withholding of removal the same standards for sustaining the applicable burden of
proof40 and for assessing credibility that would be used for asylum adjudications
under § 208(b)(1)(B)(ii) and (iii) as added by REAL ID Act § 101(a)(3). The
discussion above concerning specific changes with regard to central reason,
credibility determinations, and corroborating evidence applies to this change as well.
Proposed changes that could specifically affect the eligibility of aliens associated
with terrorist organizations are discussed elsewhere in this report.
REAL ID Act § 101(h)(2) would provide that the withholding of removal
standards established in § 101(c) shall take effect on the date of enactment and apply
to withholding applications made on or after such date; therefore, the standards
33 Section 101(f) of the REAL ID Act would eliminate the cap for adjustment of status for
asylees, which is currently set at 10,000 persons each fiscal year.
34 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b).
35 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3).
36 See IMMIGRATION LAW & PROCEDURE § 34.02[11][c].
37 The Ninth Circuit has held that with regard to withholding of deportation/removal,
administrative adjudicators improperly denied the application for lack of corroboration
where the applicant gave credible testimony. E.g., Mendoza Manimbao v. Ashcroft, 329
F.3d 655 (9th Cir. 2003); Canjura-Flores v. INS, 784 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1985).
38 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(B).
39 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3).
40 Again, the standard is “clear probability of persecution” in withholding cases.

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CRS-10
would not apply by statute to applications filed before the date of enactment. Only
those standards in existing law would apply.
Standards for Granting Other Forms of Removal Relief
Current Law. In addition to asylum and withholding of removal, there are
other forms of relief from removal, including cancellation of removal, voluntary
departure, withholding or deferral of removal under the United Nations Convention
Against Torture [Torture Convention],41 and suspension of deportation (for those
eligible for such pre-IIRIRA relief). In addition, temporary protected status and any
applicable waivers of inadmissibility or deportability might be construed as relief
from removal. Different eligibility conditions apply to each of these forms of relief
from removal. Cancellation of removal itself has different conditions applicable to
permanent residents, nonpermanent residents, battered spouses and children, and
beneficiaries of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act
(NACARA).42 The evidentiary standards are generally not specified in current
statutes. However, section 240A(b)(2)(D) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2)(D))
does provide that the Attorney General shall consider any credible evidence relevant
to an application for cancellation of removal for a battered spouse or child and that
the determination of what evidence is credible and the weight to be given that
evidence shall be within the sole discretion of the Attorney General.
Various regulations address burden of proof and evidentiary standards for some
forms of removal relief. Generally, the applicant for removal relief shall have the
burden of establishing that he or she is eligible for any requested benefit or privilege
and that it should be granted in the exercise of discretion.43 If the evidence indicates
that one or more of the grounds for mandatory denial of the application for relief may
apply, the alien shall have the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
that such grounds do not apply. The burden of proof is on the applicant for
withholding or deferral of removal under the Torture Convention to establish that it
is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed
country of removal.44 The testimony of the applicant, if credible, may be sufficient
to sustain the burden of proof without corroboration. Evidence to be considered
includes but is not limited to certain factors enumerated in the regulations. The
burden of proof is on the applicant for removal relief under NACARA to establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she is eligible for such relief.45 In
certain cases a presumption of extreme hardship applies, and in such cases, the
burden of proof shall be on the government to establish that it is more likely than not
41 United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, Annex, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc.
A/39/51 (1984). For a discussion of the Convention, see CRS Report RL32276, The U.N.
Convention Against Torture: Overview of U.S. Implementation Policy Concerning the
Removal of Aliens, by Michael John Garcia.
42 P.L. 105-100, § 203, 111 Stat. 2160 (Nov. 19, 1997), as amended.
43 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d).
44 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16(c), 1208.16(c).
45 8 C.F.R. §§ 240.64, 1240.64.

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CRS-11
that neither the applicant nor a qualified relative would suffer extreme hardship if the
applicant were removed from the United States. In those cases where a presumption
of extreme hardship applies, the burden of proof shall be on the Service to establish
that it is more likely than not that neither the applicant nor a qualified relative would
suffer extreme hardship if the applicant were deported or removed from the United
States. For temporary protected status, the applicant must provide supporting
documentary evidence of eligibility apart from his or her own statements to meet his
or her burden of proof.46 The applicant must submit documentary evidence required
in the instructions and may be required to submit evidence of unsuccessful attempts
to obtain required documents or alternative evidence.
The BIA has ruled that the general standards developed in case law for
suspension of deportation, the pre-IIRAIRA form of relief analogous to cancellation
of removal, should be applied to the newer form of relief.47 Under suspension of
deportation, the applicant had the burden of establishing his or her eligibility, and
documents and other evidence presented during the proceedings would be considered
in deciding his or her eligibility for relief.48
Changes Proposed by the REAL ID Act. The REAL ID Act as originally
introduced did not establish standards for removal relief other than asylum and
withholding of removal. However, section 101(d) of the current version of the REAL
ID Act would amend § 240(c) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)) concerning the
burden of proof in removal proceedings by establishing standards for the burden of
proof and credibility determinations for removal relief in general that are similar to
those specifically for asylum and withholding of removal. An alien would have the
burden of proof to establish eligibility for relief and that he or she merits a favorable
exercise of discretion for any discretionary relief. The alien must comply with
requirements to submit supporting documents or other information for relief as
provided by law, regulation, or instructions on the relief application form. The
immigration judge will determine whether or not the testimony of an applicant or
witness is credible, persuasive, and refers to specific facts demonstrating satisfaction
of the burden of proof. The immigration judge shall weigh credible testimony along
with other evidence of record. The standards established by § 101(a) and (c) for
asylum and withholding of removal would provide that the adjudicator may weigh
credible testimony with other evidence of record since credible testimony alone may
satisfy the burden of proof. This difference appears to result from the special
circumstances for asylum and withholding of removal, where persecution and flight
from persecution may make corroboration difficult or impossible, so that credible
testimony may be the only evidence obtainable, and where the removal may endanger
the safety of the alien. Other forms of relief may not entail such special
consideration. If the immigration judge determines in his/her discretion that the
applicant should provide corroborating evidence for otherwise credible testimony,
such corroborating evidence must be provided unless the applicant does not have it
and cannot reasonably obtain it without leaving the United States. The inability to
46 8 C.F.R. §§ 244.9, 1244.9
47 See IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 64.04[3][b][v].
48 See id. § 74.07[7][a].

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CRS-12
obtain corroborating evidence does not relieve the applicant from sustaining the
burden of proof.
Considering the totality of the circumstances and all relevant factors, the
immigration judge may base an applicant or witness credibility determination on,
among other factors, demeanor, candor, responsiveness, inherent plausibility of the
account, consistency between the written and oral statements (regardless of when
they were made, whether they were under oath, and considering the circumstances
under which the statements were made), internal consistency of a statement,
consistency of statements with other evidence of record (including the Department
of State reports on country conditions), and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such
statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy or falsehood goes
to the heart of an applicant’s claim. There is no presumption of credibility; however,
if no adverse credibility determination is explicitly made, the applicant or witness
shall have a rebuttable presumption of credibility on appeal.
Subsection 101(h)(2) would provide that the standards established in § 101(d)
of the REAL ID Act shall take effect on the date of enactment and apply to
applications for removal relief made on or after such date, therefore, the standards
would not apply by statute to applications filed before the date of enactment.
Standards of Judicial Review for Certain Determinations
Current Law. Section 242(b)(4) of the INA limits the scope and standard for
judicial review of removal orders.49 A court of appeals can only base its decision on
the administrative record on which the removal order was based; administrative
findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled
to conclude to the contrary; a decision that an alien is not eligible for admission to
the United States is conclusive unless manifestly contrary to law; and the Attorney
General’s discretionary judgment whether to grant asylum is to be conclusive unless
manifestly contrary to the law and an abuse of discretion. Case law also reflects
these standards. The standard of judicial review for discretionary denial of an asylum
claim is whether there has been an abuse of discretion. The standard of review for
a denial of asylum based on a finding of fact (no persecution or well-founded fear of
persecution) is whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence.50 The
standard of review for a denial of withholding of removal is whether the decision is
supported by substantial evidence, since the relief is not discretionary.51 For
withholding of removal, a finding of fact that the applicant’s testimony is not credible
is also subject to the substantial evidence standard.
Changes Proposed by the REAL ID Act. REAL ID Act § 101(e) would
amend § 242(b)(4) of the INA52 by establishing standards of judicial review for
reversing certain evidentiary determinations of the adjudicator for asylum,
49 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4).
50 IMMIGRATION LAW & PROCEDURE § 34.02[12][g].
51 Id. § 33.06[8].
52 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4).

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CRS-13
withholding of removal or other relief from removal. It would limit judicial review
by barring a court from reversing the decision of the adjudicator about the availability
of corroborating evidence, unless it finds that a reasonable adjudicator is compelled
to conclude that such evidence is unavailable.
It is unclear whether this amendment would significantly change existing law,
since the current statutory language already states that administrative findings of fact
— which apparently would include a conclusion about the availability of evidence
— would not be reversed unless a reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to
find otherwise. It appears that this provision, together with REAL ID Act provisions
establishing standards for determining credibility and use of corroborating evidence,
is intended to ensure uniformity of standards for judicial review of findings of fact
on availability of corroboration, although even the Ninth Circuit has held that
administrative findings of fact would not be reversed unless a reasonable adjudicator
would be compelled to find otherwise under § 242(b)(4) of the INA.53
REAL ID Act § 101(h)(3) would provide that the judicial review standards
established in § 101(e) shall take effect on the date of enactment and apply to all
cases in which the final administrative removal order was issued before, on, or after
such date.
Judicial Review of Denials of Discretionary Relief
Current Law. Section 242(a)(2)(B) of the INA limits judicial review of
denials of discretionary relief.54 Notwithstanding any other laws, it bars any court
from jurisdiction to review any judgment on relief under various inadmissibility
waivers, cancellation of removal, voluntary departure and adjustment of status, or
any other discretionary decision or action of the Attorney General regarding title II
of the INA (immigration laws for the admission and removal of aliens in the United
States), other than the granting of asylum.
Changes Proposed by the REAL ID Act. REAL ID Act § 101(f)(1) would
amend 242(a)(2)(B)(ii)of the INA55 by adding a reference to the Secretary of
Homeland Security, which would help clarify the text and make it consistent with the
aims of the Reorganization Plan for the Department of Homeland Security.
Subsection 101(f)(2) would amend § 242(a)(2)(B) of the INA56 by clarifying that
jurisdiction is barred regardless of whether the discretionary judgment, decision, or
action is made in removal proceedings. This language appears to be intended to
supersede certain precedential federal district court decisions which have ruled that,
considering that the title of § 242 is “judicial review of orders of removal” and that
the context of § 242 as a whole concerns removal orders or actions, the bar on
judicial review of discretionary decisions or actions of the Attorney General only
53 E.g., Hoxha v. Ashcroft, 319 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2003).
54 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2).
55 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii).
56 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B).

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CRS-14
applies to such decisions or actions made in the context of removal proceedings.57
Although an affirmative asylum application may be made outside the context of a
removal proceeding, such denials are not reviewable until they may be raised again
in the context of a removal proceeding. In any case, the statute specifically exempts
the granting of asylum relief from the jurisdictional bar, but § 101 of the REAL ID
Act is intended to prevent terrorists from obtaining asylum.
REAL ID Act § 101(h)(4) would provide that the judicial review standards
established in REAL ID Act § 101(f) shall take effect on the date of enactment and
apply to all cases pending before any court on or after such date.
Removal of Caps on Adjustment of Status for Asylees
Current Law. Section 209 of the INA provides that the Attorney General may
adjust the status of aliens granted asylum to lawful permanent residence if they
satisfy certain conditions, subject to a cap of 10,000 persons per fiscal year (aside
from certain groups of asylees who are or have been exempt from the cap or subject
to limits set in other legislation). Section 207(a)(5) of the INA limits the number of
refugees and asylees admitted pursuant to a determination of persecution for
resistance to coercive population control methods to not more than a total of 1,000
for any fiscal year.
Changes Proposed by the REAL ID Act. Subsection 101(g)(1) of the
REAL ID Act would eliminate the cap for adjustment of status for asylees.58 It would
also replace references to the “Immigration and Naturalization Service” with
references to the “Department of Homeland Security” and replace references to the
“Attorney General” with references to the “Secretary of Homeland Security or the
Attorney General.” Subsection 101(g)(2) of the REAL ID Act would eliminate the
cap for refugees and asylees resisting coercive population control. These provisions
were not in the REAL ID Act as introduced. The REAL ID Act § 101(h)(5) would
provide that subsection 101(g) shall take effect on the date of enactment of the
legislation.
Repeal of the Study and Report on Terrorists and Asylum
Current Law. Section 5403 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 provides that “the Comptroller General of the United States
shall conduct a study to evaluate the extent to which weaknesses in the United States
57 See, e.g., Mart v. Beebe, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1123-4 (D. Or. 2000). On the other hand
other cases such as CDI Information Services, Inc. v. Reno, 278 F.3d 616, 618-20 (6th Cir.
2002), have held that the plain language of the statute bars judicial review of all
discretionary decisions or actions of the Attorney General under title II of the INA
regardless of whether they were made in the context of a removal proceeding and that the
title of a statute or statutory section generally cannot be used to constrict the plain language
of the statute.
58 By the end of FY2003, there were nearly 160,000 cases pending for asylees to adjust to
legal permanent resident status. For background, see CRS Report RL32621, U.S.
Immigration Policy on Asylum Seekers, by Ruth Ellen Wasem.

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CRS-15
asylum system and withholding of removal system have been or could be exploited
by aliens connected to, charged in connection with, or tied to terrorist activity”
including the extent to which precedential court decisions may have affected the
ability of the Federal Government to prove that an alien is a terrorist who should be
denied asylum and/or removed.
Changes Proposed by the REAL ID Act. Subsection 101(i) of the REAL
ID Act would repeal the requirement for the study and report, apparently because the
other provisions in REAL ID Act § 101 would, or at least are intended to, resolve the
vulnerability of the asylum and withholding of removal systems to terrorists.
II. Waiver of Laws to Facilitate Barriers at Border59
Section 102 of the IIRIRA generally provides for construction and strengthening
of barriers along U.S. land borders to deter illegal crossings in areas of high illegal
entry and specifically provides for 14 miles of barriers and roads along the border
near San Diego, beginning at the Pacific Ocean and extending eastward. IIRIRA §
102(c) provides for a waiver of the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA)60 and the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)61 to the extent the Attorney
General determines is necessary to ensure expeditious construction of barriers and
roads. Despite the waiver of specific laws, construction of the San Diego area
barriers has been delayed due to a dispute involving other laws.62 California’s
Coastal Commission has prevented completion of the San Diego barriers on the
grounds that plans to fill a canyon in order to complete it are inconsistent with the
California Coastal Management Program, a state program approved pursuant to the
federal Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA).63 The Bureau of Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) within the Department of Homeland Security believed that
the requirements of § 102(c) of the IIRIRA and the CZMA could not be reconciled.
Consequently, legislation was proposed and considered in the 108th Congress that
would have waived either a broader range of specific environmental, conservation,
and cultural laws or all laws. Also, reportedly the CBP has complied with a NEPA
requirement despite the waiver available to it.64
The REAL ID Act would provide additional waiver authority over laws that
might impede the expeditious construction of barriers and roads along the border and
also provide for limited judicial review of a waiver decision by the Secretary of
Homeland Security.
59 Discussion of this topic was prepared by Margaret Mikyung Lee, Legislative Attorney.
60 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531 et seq.
61 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq.
62 See CRS Report RS22026, Border Security: Fences Along the U.S. International Border,
by Blas Nuñez-Neto and Stephen R. Viña.
63 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464.
64 See California Coastal Commission, W8a Staff Report and Recommendation on
Consistency Determination, CD-063-03, October 2003, at 14.

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Current Law. Section 102(c) of the IIRIRA provided for a waiver of the ESA
and NEPA to the extent the Attorney General determines is necessary to ensure
expeditious construction of barriers and roads.
Changes Proposed by the REAL ID Act. Section 102 of the REAL ID
Act would amend the current provision to authorize (but not require, as in earlier
versions) the Secretary of Homeland Security to waive all legal requirements as he
determines necessary, in his sole discretion, to ensure the expeditious construction
of barriers and roads under IIRIRA § 102. The term “legal requirements” refers to
any local, state or federal statute, regulation, or administrative order.65 Any waiver
decision by the Secretary would be effective upon publication in the Federal Register,
thereby ensuring public notice of the action. Additionally, § 102 of the REAL ID Act
would provide for federal judicial review of a cause of action or claim alleging that
a waiver decision or action taken by the Secretary of Homeland Security violates the
U.S. Constitution. A claim could be brought in a federal district court not later than
60 days after the date of the challenged action or decision of the Secretary. Appellate
review could only be sought by a petition for a writ of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme
Court. Congress intends to prevent a flurry of lawsuits challenging waiver decisions
from hindering construction of the barrier and defeating the purpose of the waiver,66
while still complying with constitutional requirements.67 Waivers of similar breadth
do not appear to be common in federal law.68 The judicial review and remedies
provisions appear to bar state courts and also agencies or entities such as the
California Coastal Commission, from exercising jurisdiction over waiver decisions
and their consequences. This may also raise constitutional issues with regard to
Congress’ power to restrict state court jurisdiction directly.69
As discussed above, current statutes and the Reorganization Plan for the
Department of Homeland Security have not been amended and clarified references
to executive authority throughout the INA. Accordingly, the reference in current law
to the Attorney General would be replaced by a reference to the Secretary of
Homeland Security.
65 H.Rept. 109-72, at 171 (2005).
66 H.Rept. 109-72, at 172 (2005). This provision appears to address concerns raised during
debate in the House of Representatives that providing for a waiver of all laws would result
in a spate of lawsuits challenging the provision that would further delay construction. 151
Cong. Rec. H8899 (daily edition Oct. 8, 2004) (statement of Rep. Farr).
67 The waiver authority may not include a waiver of constitutional violations. For further
discussion of the scope of the waiver and other legal issues regarding § 102, see CRS
Congressional Distribution Memorandum, Sec. 102 of H.R. 418, Waiver of Laws Necessary
for Improvement of Barriers at Borders, Stephen R. Viña and Todd Tatelman (Feb. 9,
2005).
68 Id.
69 Id.

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CRS-17
III. Judicial Review of Orders of Removal70
Current Law. In the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA)71 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996 (IIRIRA)72 Congress restricted the availability of judicial review of removal
orders. Consequently, section 242(a)(2) of the INA restricts judicial review of
decisions relating to expedited removal of arriving aliens, certain denials of
discretionary relief, and removal orders for aliens removable for certain criminal
offenses. In cases resulting from the 1996 restrictions on judicial review, the
Supreme Court held that there is a strong presumption in favor of judicial review of
administrative actions; therefore, in the absence of a clear statement of congressional
intent to repeal habeas corpus jurisdiction over removal-related matters, such review
was still available after the 1996 changes.73 Furthermore, the Court also found that
eliminating any judicial review, including habeas review, without any substitute for
review of questions of law, including constitutional issues, would raise serious
constitutional questions.74 Therefore, it chose a statutory construction (habeas review
was not eliminated) which would not raise serious constitutional questions.
Changes Proposed by the REAL ID Act. The provision restricting
judicial review of orders of removal was not in the REAL ID Act as originally
introduced. It is similar to § 3010 of House-passed H.R. 10 in the 108th Congress and
to H.R. 100 in the 109th Congress.75 Section 106(a)(1) in the House-passed version
of the REAL ID Act would restrict habeas review and certain other non-direct
judicial review for certain removal matters under § 242(a)(2) of the INA and would
clarify that such restrictions (and other judicial review restrictions under the INA) do
not preclude federal appellate court consideration of constitutional claims or other
legal issues raised in accordance with current review procedures under § 242 of the
INA. The list of matters for which judicial review is limited is expanded to include
70 Discussion of this topic was prepared by Margaret Mikyung Lee, Legislative Attorney.
71 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
72 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996).
73 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001); Calcano-Martinez v. INS, 533 U.S. 348 (2001).
74 According to the Court, the Suspension Clause, Article I, § 9, cl. 2, of the Federal
Constitution, requires some judicial intervention in removal/deportation cases and at least
protects the writ of habeas corpus as it existed in 1789. In light of ambiguities in the scope
of the writ of habeas corpus at common law and Supreme Court decisions suggesting that
judicial intervention can only be restricted to the extent consistent with the Constitution, the
Court found that a serious Suspension Clause issue would arise if it were to accept the INS
position that the 1996 acts eliminated habeas review without any substitute. To preclude
review of a pure question of law by any court would give rise to substantial constitutional
questions. The Court observed that traditionally the courts distinguished between ruling on
eligibility for relief (a question of law) and ruling on the favorable exercise of discretion (a
factual issue). Although a court could not rule on the validity of the actual granting of
discretionary relief, which is not a matter of right, it could rule on the legality of an
erroneous failure to exercise discretion at all.
75 H.R. 100 deals solely with judicial review of removal orders (sponsored by Reps. Dreier
and Sensenbrenner).

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CRS-18
claims under the Torture Convention; federal appellate review in accordance with
current procedures under § 242 of the INA is to be the sole and exclusive avenue for
judicial review of claims under the Torture Convention, except for the review
procedure specified for expedited removal orders for arriving aliens under § 242(e)
of the INA. Section 106 would clarify that in all immigration provisions restricting
judicial review, “judicial review”and “jurisdiction to review” include habeas and
other non-direct review and that federal appellate review in accordance with current
procedures under § 242 of the INA is the only avenue available for review of a
removal order issued under any provision of the INA, except for the review
procedure specified for expedited removal orders for arriving aliens under § 242(e)
of the INA.
Section 106(a)(2) would amend § 242(b)(9), concerning consolidation of issues
for judicial review, to clarify that, except as otherwise provided in § 242 of the INA,
no court is to have jurisdiction for habeas review or other non-direct judicial review
of a removal order or questions of law or fact arising from such an order. Subsection
242(g) of the INA concerning exclusive jurisdiction would also be amended to clarify
that no habeas review or other non-direct judicial review would be available for any
claim arising from a decision or action by the Attorney General regarding the
initiation and adjudication of removal proceedings or the execution of removal orders
against any alien.
The effective date of these amendments would be the date of enactment of the
legislation and the amendments would apply to cases in which the final
administrative order of removal, deportation or exclusion was issued before, on, or
after the date of enactment. Subsection 106(c) of the REAL ID Act would provide
for the transfer of pending habeas cases from district courts to federal appellate courts
in which they could have been properly filed under § 242(b)(2) of the INA or the
transitional rules of the IIRIRA. Subsection 106(d) of the REAL ID Act would
further provide that IIRIRA transition-rule cases filed under former § 106(a) of the
INA, concerning judicial review of deportation and exclusion cases and repealed by
the IIRIRA, shall be treated as if they had been filed under § 242 of the INA and that
such petitions shall be the sole avenue for judicial review of deportation or exclusion
orders, notwithstanding any other provisions of law, including habeas review or other
non-direct judicial review.
While eliminating habeas and other non-direct judicial review, § 106 provides
that questions of law, including constitutional issues, still have a forum for review.
This appears intended to resolve the constitutional concerns raised previously by the
Supreme Court.

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CRS-19
IV. Inadmissibility and Deportability Due to
Terrorist and Terrorist-Related Activities76
Engaging in terror-related activity has strict consequences relative to an alien’s
ability to lawfully enter or remain in the United States.77 The Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) provides that aliens at any time engaged in specified
terror-related activities, or indirectly supporting them in specified ways, cannot
legally enter the United States. Also, aliens at any time engaged in terrorist activities
are deportable if in the U.S., but the terrorism grounds for deportation do not now
extend to certain indirect support, such as representation of or membership in a
terrorist organization. If implemented, the REAL ID Act would, inter alia, (1)
broaden the INA’s definitions of “terrorist organization” and “engage in terrorist
activity”; (2) expand the grounds for inadmissibility based on support of
terror-related activity; and (3) make the terror-related grounds for deportability
identical to those for inadmissibility.
Definition of “Engage in Terrorist Activity”
Under the INA, to “engage in terrorist activity” is a separate concept from
terrorist activity itself. Whereas “terrorist activity” includes direct acts of violence78
— for instance, hijacking a plane or threatening persons with bodily harm in order
to compel third-party action — actions that constitute being “engage[d] in terrorist
activity” include both these types of acts and other, specified acts that facilitate
terrorist activity, such as preparing, funding, or providing material support for
terrorist activities. Aliens who engage in terrorist activity are inadmissible and
deportable.79
Again, and as elaborated upon below, the term “engage in terrorist activity,”
while including certain actions in direct support of terrorist acts or organizations, is
not an essential element of all terrorism-based grounds for inadmissibility (as
opposed to deportation). Distinct from support activities that amount to “engaging
in terrorist activities” are actions that support terrorism more indirectly through group
membership or advocacy, some of which render an alien inadmissible but, as of now,
not deportable.
Current Law Defining “Engage in Terrorist Activity”. In order to
“engage in terrorist activity” for purposes of the INA, an alien must either as an
individual or as part of an organization:
! commit or incite to commit, under circumstances indicating an
intention to cause death or serious bodily injury, a terrorist activity;
76 Discussion of this topic was prepared by Michael John Garcia, Legislative Attorney.
77 For further background, see CRS Report RL32564, Immigration: Terrorist Grounds for
Exclusion of Aliens, by Michael John Garcia.
78 INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (defining “terrorist activity”).
79 INA §§ 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(I), 237(a)(4)(B); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(I), 1227(a)(4)(B).

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! prepare or plan a terrorist activity;
! gather information on potential targets for a terrorist activity;
! solicit funds or other things of value for a (1) terrorist activity, (2) a
designated terrorist organization, or (3) a non-designated terrorist
organization, unless the solicitor can demonstrate that he did not
know, and should not reasonably have known, that the solicitation
would further the non-designated organization’s terrorist activity;
! solicit another individual to (1) engage in terrorist activity, (2) join
a designated terrorist organization, or (3) join a non-designated
terrorist organization, unless the solicitor can demonstrate that he
did not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the
solicitation would further the non-designated organization’s terrorist
activity; or
! commit an act that the alien knows, or reasonably should know,
provides material support — including a safe house, transportation,
communications, funds, transfer of funds or other material financial
benefit, false documentation or identification, weapons (including
chemical, biological, or radiological weapons), explosives, or
training — to (1) the commission of a terrorist activity, (2) an
individual or organization that the alien knows or should reasonably
know has committed or plans to commit a terrorist activity, (3) a
designated terrorist organization, or (4) a non-designated terrorist
organization, unless the support provider can demonstrate that he did
not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the support
would further the non-designated organization’s terrorist activity.80
With respect to acts related to a “terrorist organization,” acts through or on
behalf of an organization formally designated by the Government as terrorist are
covered regardless of an individual’s knowledge of the organization’s terrorist
connections. However, if an alien has acted as a solicitor or provided material
support for an organization that has not been formally designated as a terrorist
organization by the United States, but which has nevertheless committed, incited,
planned, prepared, or gathered information for a terrorist activity, the alien may be
deemed not to have engaged in terrorist activity himself if he can demonstrate that
he did not and should not have reasonably known that his solicitation or material
support would further the organization’s terrorist activities.81
The material support clause within the INA’s definition of “engage in terrorist
activity” may be waived in application to a specific alien if the Secretary of State,
after consultation with the Attorney General, or the Attorney General, after
80 INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv).
81 INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(IV)-(VI); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(IV)-(VI). If an alien
provides material support for, or solicits funding or participation in, a terrorist activity or
a group designated as a terrorist organization by the United States, he is deemed to have
engaged in terrorist activity.

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CRS-21
consultation with the Secretary of State, concludes in his sole unreviewable
discretion that this clause should not apply.82
Changes Proposed by the REAL ID Act to the Definition of “Engage
in Terrorist Activity”. Section 103(b) of the REAL ID Act would replace the
current definition of “engage in terrorist activity” found in INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)
with a new definition. For the most part, this definition would be identical to the
previous version. However, a few significant changes would also be made.
More Stringent Provisions Relating to Material Support, Solicitation
of Funds or Participation in Nondesignated Terrorist . The REAL ID Act
would make it more difficult for an alien who has provided material support or acted
as a solicitor for either a person engaged in terrorist activity or a non-designated
terrorist organization to avoid being found to have engaged in terrorist activity
himself. Under present law, an alien may avoid being found to have engaged in
terrorist activity if he can demonstrate that he did not and should not have reasonably
known that his solicitation or material support to an individual or non-designated
terrorist organization would further terrorist activities.83 Pursuant to the amendments
proposed by REAL ID Act § 103(b), an alien would have to demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence (a higher standard) that he did not and should not have
reasonably known that his solicitation or material support would further a terrorist
activity or organization in order to be found not to have engaged in terrorist activity
himself.84 As is the case under current law, the REAL ID Act would permit the
material support clause of the definition of “engage in terrorist activity” to be waived
in application to a specific alien if the Secretary of State, after consultation with the
Attorney General, or the Attorney General, after consultation with the Secretary of
State, concludes in his sole unreviewable discretion that this clause should not apply.
Material Support to Members of Designated Terrorist
Organizations. The REAL ID Act would expand the definition of “engage in
terrorist activity” to include providing material support to a member of a designated
terrorist organization. Under current law, a person who provides material support to
a member of a terrorist organization, but not to the organization directly, might not
be considered to have engaged in terrorist activity himself unless he knew or should
have known that his support was going to a person that had committed or planned to
commit a terrorist activity.
Effective Date of Proposed Changes to the Definition of “Engage
in Terrorist Activity”. Pursuant to § 103(c) of the REAL ID Act, the proposed
changes to the INA’s definition of “engage in terrorist activity” would be effective
on the date of the REAL ID Act’s enactment, and apply to removal proceedings
instituted before or after the REAL ID Act’s enactment, as well as to acts and
82 INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI).
83 INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(IV)-(VI); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(IV)-(VI).
84 Under the REAL ID Act, if an alien solicits funding or participation or material support
for either a terrorist activity or a group designated as a terrorist organization by the United
States, he is deemed to have engaged in terrorist activity. See H.R. 418 § 103(b). This
standard is the same as that found in current law.

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CRS-22
conditions constituting a ground for inadmissibility occurring or existing before or
after the REAL ID Act’s enactment.
Definition of “Terrorist Organization”
The INA defines “terrorist organization” to include two general categories of
groups. The first category are those groups that are designated as terrorist
organizations by the U.S., thereby providing the public with notice of these
organizations’ involvement in terrorism. The second category includes other groups
that carry out specified terror-related activities, but have not been designated as
terrorist groups.85 For simplicity, this report refers to groups falling within this
second category as nondesignated terrorist organizations. Certain forms of assistance
to a “terrorist organization”are grounds for inadmissibility and deportability because
they amount to “engaging in a terrorist activity.” Furthermore, under current law,
certain memberships in or associations with a “terrorist organization” may be
grounds for inadmissibility even though such membership or association, vel non,
may not make an alien deportable.86 Accordingly, amending the definition of
“terrorist organization” might have a considerable impact on the reach of other
terrorism-related provisions of the INA.
Current Law Defining “Terrorist Organization”. INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)
presently defines “terrorist organization” as including:
! any group designated by the Secretary of State as a terrorist
organization pursuant to INA § 219;87
! upon publication in the Federal Register, any group designated as a
terrorist organization by the Secretary of State in consultation with
or upon the request of the Attorney General, after finding that the
organization commits, incites, plans, prepares, gathers information,
or provides material support for terrorist activities; or
! a group of two or more individuals, whether organized or not, which
commits, incites, plans, prepares, or gathers information for terrorist
activities.88
85 The USA PATRIOT Act amended INA § 212 to expand the definition of “terrorist
organization” to potentially include terrorist organizations not designated by the Secretary
of State pursuant to INA § 219. A group that is engaged in terrorist activities might not be
designated as a terrorist organization because, inter alia, the group’s activities escape the
notice of U.S. officials responsible for designated organizations as terrorist; the group has
shifting alliances; or designating the group as a terrorist organization would jeopardize
ongoing U.S. criminal or military operations.
86 See INA §§ 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV)-(V), 212(a)(3)(F); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182 (a)(3)(B)(i)(IV)-(V),
1182(a)(3)(F).
87 For further discussion of this provision, see CRS Report RL32120; The ‘FTO List’ and
Congress: Sanctioning Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, by Audrey Kurth
Cronin.
88 INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(vi); 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(3)(B)(vi).

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Changes Proposed by the REAL ID Act. Section 103(c) of the REAL ID
Act amends the current definition of “terrorist organization” found in INA §
212(a)(3)(B)(vi). The proposed amendments, discussed below, are significant and,
in combination with the proposed expansion of the types of associations with a
terrorist organization that can lead to an alien’s inadmissibility/deportation, may
greatly amplify the reach of the terrorism provisions of the INA generally. Among
other contexts, the proposed changes could especially impact aliens associated with
groups that are part of a web of fund raising that is found to support a terrorist
activity in some measure.
Retention of Attorney General’s Role in the Designation of Terrorist
Organizations. Most of the authority to administer immigration law that formerly
was held by the Attorney General has been transferred to the Secretary of Homeland
Security, though some authorities have been retained. Section 103(c) of the REAL
ID Act provides both the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General
with an express role in the designation of groups as terrorist organizations that are not
otherwise designated as such by the Secretary of State pursuant to INA § 219. The
REAL ID Act would amend the INA’s definition of “terrorist organization” to
include any group designated as such by the Secretary of State, in consultation with
or upon the request of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security,
to designate a group as a terrorist organization after finding that the organization
“engages in terrorist activity,” as defined under INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv).
Expanding the Activities Qualifying a Nondesignated Group as a
Terrorist Organization. The REAL ID Act’s proposed amendment to the INA’s
definition of “terrorist organization” could significantly increase the number of
groups that would constitute terrorist organizations despite not being designated as
such by the Secretary of State.
First, under current law, a group not otherwise designated by the Secretary of
State can only be deemed a terrorist organization if the group commits, incites,
plans, prepares, or gathers information for terrorist activity.89 Under the REAL ID
Act, a group not otherwise designated as a terrorist organization could also be
considered such if it solicits funds or membership for a terrorist activity or terrorist
organization or otherwise provides material support for a terrorist activity or
organization. The reach of this extension may not be altogether clear: it appears
uncertain as to whether or how a group could escape coverage by showing that it
could not reasonably have known that an organization for which it solicited or
provided material support was itself involved in conducting terrorist acts or
supporting a “terrorist organization,” (as redefined), and so on down the chain.
Second, REAL ID Act § 103(c) would further amend “terrorist organization”
to include any non-designated group that has a subgroup that “engages in terrorist
activity,” as expanded by the REAL ID Act in this context to include either (1) direct
participation in or support of a terrorist activity or organization, or (2) indirect
support through solicitation, recruitment, etc. The upshot of the inclusion of
subgroups may be to further lower the threshold for how substantial, apparent, and
89 See INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III); 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(3)(B)(vi)(III).

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CRS-24
immediate a group’s support must be for a terrorist activity or organization for the
group to be considered “terrorist” and for its members to potentially fall within the
terrorism provisions of the INA. For example, if organization A has a subgroup A1
that raises funds for organization B (among other groups) and organization B
distributes funds to organization C (among other groups), which has a subgroup C1
that at some point provided support to a terrorist activity or organization,
organization A apparently would qualify as a terrorist organization (and its member
fall under the grounds of inadmissibility/deportability discussed below) absent the
group’s ability to somehow extricate itself by showing it could not have reasonably
drawn the connection between its subgroup’s fund raising and subgroup C1.
Pursuant to § 104 of the REAL ID Act, as added by the conference report to
H.R. 1268, the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
consultation with the other and the Attorney General, may waive the INA provision
defining certain non-designated groups as “terrorist organizations” with respect to a
particular group when the provision’s applicability is based solely on the group
having a subgroup that has engaged in terrorist activity.
Effective Date of Proposed Changes to the Definition of “Terrorist
Organization”. Pursuant to § 103(c) of the REAL ID Act, the proposed changes to
the INA’s definition of “terrorist organization” would be effective on the date of the
REAL ID Act’s enactment, and apply to removal proceedings instituted before or
after the REAL ID Act’s enactment, as well as to acts and conditions constituting a
ground for inadmissibility occurring or existing before or after the REAL ID Act’s
enactment.
Terror-Related Grounds for Inadmissibility of Aliens
The INA categorizes certain classes of aliens as inadmissible, making them
“ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United States.”90
Aliens who “engage in terrorist activity,” as defined by INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv), are
inadmissible. In addition, several other terror-related activities are grounds for
inadmissibility.
Current Law. Pursuant to INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(i),91 an alien is inadmissible on
terror-related grounds if the alien:
! has engaged in terrorist activity;
! is known or reasonably believed by a consular officer or the
Attorney General to be engaged in or likely to engage in terrorist
activity upon entry into the United States;
! has, under circumstances indicating an intention to cause death or
serious bodily harm, incited terrorist activity;
! is a representative of (1) a foreign terrorist organization, as
designated by the Secretary of State, or (2) a political, social or other
similar group whose public endorsement of acts of terrorist activity
90 INA § 212(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a).
91 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i).

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CRS-25
the Secretary of State has determined undermines United States
efforts to reduce or eliminate terrorist activities;
! is a member of a foreign terrorist organization as designated by the
Secretary of State under INA § 219, or an organization which the
alien knows or should have known is a terrorist organization;
! is an officer, official, representative, or spokesman of the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO);
! has used his position of prominence within any country to endorse
or espouse terrorist activity, or to persuade others to support terrorist
activity or a terrorist organization, in a way that the Secretary of
State has determined undermines United States efforts to reduce or
eliminate terrorist activities; or
! is the spouse or child of an alien who is inadmissible under this
section, if the activity causing the alien to be found inadmissible
occurred within the last five years, unless the spouse or child (1) did
not and should not have reasonably known about the terrorist
activity or (2) in the reasonable belief of the consular officer or
Attorney General, has renounced the activity causing the alien to be
found inadmissible under this section.92
In addition, INA § 212(a)(3)(F) designates an alien as inadmissible if the
Secretary of State, after consultation with the Attorney General, or the Attorney
General, after consultation with the Secretary of State, determines that the alien has
been associated with a terrorist organization and intends while in the United States
to engage solely, principally, or incidentally in activities that could endanger the
welfare, safety, or security of the United States.
Changes to Terror-Related Grounds for Inadmissibility Proposed
by the REAL ID Act. Section 103(a) of the REAL ID Act would reorganize and
generally expand the terror-related grounds for inadmissibility. Given that REAL ID
Act § 103(b)-(c) would broaden the INA’s definitions of “terrorist organization” and
“engage in terrorist activity” — two phrases frequently used in the INA provisions
establishing the terror-related grounds for inadmissibility — the REAL ID Act would
expand the terror-related grounds for inadmissibility more broadly than might first
appear. The interplay between the proposed definition of “terrorist organization,”
discussed above, and the expansion of covered support and associational activities,
discussed below, may be particularly significant in broadening the grounds for
inadmissibility.
The following paragraphs discuss the alterations that the REAL ID Act would
make to the terror-related grounds for inadmissibility.
92 The limited exception to inadmissibility for the spouse and child of an alien who is
inadmissible on terror-related grounds is found in INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(ii).

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CRS-26
Effects of Expanded Definition of “Engage in Terrorist Activity” on
Terror-Related Grounds for Inadmissibility. As in current law, the REAL ID
Act provides that any alien who has engaged in a terrorist activity is inadmissible.93
As previously mentioned, § 103(b) of the REAL ID Act would expand the applicable
definition of the term “engage in terrorist activity.” Thus, under the REAL ID Act,
an alien who solicited on behalf of or provided material support for a non-designated
terrorist organization would be inadmissible unless he demonstrated by clear and
convincing evidence that he did not and should not have reasonably known that he
was soliciting on behalf of or providing material support for a group that met the
definition of “terrorist organization” found in INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III).
Retention of Attorney General’s Role in Deeming an Alien
Inadmissible for Terror-Related Activity. Though recent law has transferred
most immigration enforcement authority to the Department of Homeland Security,
the REAL ID Act would allow a consular officer, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, or the Attorney General to declare an alien inadmissible if the alien is
known to be engaged in terrorist activity or is likely to engage in such activity upon
entry into the United States.94
Incitement of Terrorist Activity. The REAL ID Act does not alter the
current ground for inadmissibility on account of the incitement of terrorist activity.
Representation of a Terrorist Organization or Political Group
Espousing Terrorist Activity. Under current law, a representative of a foreign
terrorist organization designated as such by the Secretary of State is inadmissible.
The REAL ID Act would expand this ground for inadmissibility to deny admission
to a representative of any group that constituted a “terrorist organization,” as defined
under INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(vi). As previously discussed, the REAL ID Act would
expand the breadth of the term “terrorist organization” for purposes of the INA.
The REAL ID Act would also make inadmissible any representative of a
political, social or other similar group that endorses or espouses terrorist activity.95
Under current law, such representatives are only inadmissible if (1) the organization
publicly endorses terrorist activity and (2) the Secretary of State determines that such
endorsement undermines U.S. efforts to reduce or eliminate terrorist activities.96
Pursuant to § 104 of the REAL ID Act, as added by the conference report to
H.R. 1268, the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
consultation with the other and the Attorney General, may waive this provision with
respect to a particular alien.
Membership in a Terrorist Organization. The REAL ID Act would
substantially increase the grounds for inadmissibility on account of membership in
93 H.R. 418, § 103(a).
94 INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(II); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(II).
95 H.R. 418, § 103(a).
96 INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV).

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CRS-27
a terrorist organization. Presently, membership in a foreign terrorist organization
designated by the Secretary of State under INA § 219, or membership in an
organization that the alien knows or should have known is a terrorist organization,
makes an alien inadmissible.97 The REAL ID Act would facilitate the removal of a
member of a non-designated terrorist organization by shifting the burden from the
Government to show that the alien knew or should have known the nature of the
organization to the alien to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he did
not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the organization was a
terrorist organization.
Again, the proposed expansion of “terrorist organization” could significantly
amplify the potential impact of these changes.
Officers, Spokesmen, and Representatives of the Palestine
Liberation Organization. In both current law and the REAL ID Act, an alien who
is an officer, official, representative, or spokesman of the PLO is inadmissible.
Expanding Inadmissibility Grounds for Espousal of Terrorist
Activity. Under current law, aliens are inadmissible for the espousal of terrorist
activity only if they (1) use positions of prominence (within any country) to endorse
or espouse terrorist activity, or to persuade others to support terrorist activity or a
terrorist organization, and (2) do so in a way that undermines U.S. efforts to reduce
or eliminate terrorist activities, based on a determination by the Secretary of State.
The REAL ID Act would make inadmissible any alien who espouses or endorses
terrorist activity, or persuades others to support terrorist activity or a terrorist
organization, regardless of whether the alien has a position of prominence and his
espousal undermines U.S. efforts to reduce terrorism in the opinion of the Secretary
of State.
It is important to note that this ground for inadmissibility does not include a
mens rea requirement. It appears that an alien who persuades others to support a
terrorist organization would be deemed inadmissible even if the alien had no
knowledge of the organization’s terrorist activities. The possibility of this occurring
may not be improbable, given the REAL ID Act’s proposed expansion of the
definition of “terrorist organization” to include any group that engages, or has a
subgroup that engages in terrorist activity, including soliciting funds or otherwise
providing material support for a “terrorist organization” (which itself may be one
solely because it has, for example, a subgroup that has solicited or provided funds to
another “terrorist organization”).
Pursuant to § 104 of the REAL ID Act, as added by the conference report to
H.R. 1268, the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Homeland Security, in
consultation with the other and the Attorney General, may waive this provision with
respect to a particular alien.
Receiving Military-Type Training from or on Behalf of a Terrorist
Organization. The REAL ID Act would make inadmissible any alien who has
97 INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(V); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(V).

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received military-type training98 from or on behalf of any organization that, at the
time the training was received, was a terrorist organization, a term defined under INA
§ 212(a)(3)(B)(vi) (and amended by REAL ID Act § 103(c)). Currently, the receipt
of such training is only a deportable offense.99 It is important to note that this ground
for inadmissibility does not include a mens rea requirement, and does not specify that
the organization must be designated as a terrorist organization by the United States.
Accordingly, it appears that an alien who receives military-type training from or on
behalf of a terrorist organization would be inadmissible, regardless of whether the
alien was aware or should have been aware that the organization was engaged in
terrorist activity.
Inadmissibility of a Spouse or Child of an Alien Inadmissible on
Terror-Related Grounds. The REAL ID Act neither alters the inadmissibility of
the spouse or child of an alien who was deemed inadmissible on terror-related
grounds nor eliminates the current exception to inadmissibility for an alien’s spouse
or child who (1) did not and should not have reasonably known about the terrorist
activity or (2) in the reasonable belief of the consular officer or Attorney General, has
renounced the terror-related activity causing the alien to be found inadmissible.
Association with a Terrorist Organization. The REAL ID Act does not
amend INA § 212(a)(3)(F), which designates an alien as inadmissible if the Secretary
of State, after consultation with the Attorney General, or the Attorney General, after
consultation with the Secretary of State, determines that the alien has been associated
with a terrorist organization and intends while in the United States to engage solely,
principally, or incidentally in activities that could endanger the welfare, safety, or
security of the United States.
Effective Date of Proposed Changes to the Terror-Related Grounds
for Inadmissibility. Pursuant to § 103(c) of the REAL ID Act, the proposed
changes to the terror-related grounds for inadmissibility would be effective on the
date of the REAL ID Act’s enactment, and apply to removal proceedings instituted
before or after the REAL ID Act’s enactment, as well as to acts and conditions
constituting a ground for inadmissibility occurring or existing before or after the
REAL ID Act’s enactment.
Waiver of Certain Grounds for Inadmissibility
The conference report to H.R. 1268 added § 104 to the REAL ID Act, to provide
designated officials with waiver authority over certain terrorism-related immigration
provisions. The Secretary of State or Secretary of Homeland Security, in
consultation with the other and the Attorney General, may waive the applicability of
98 18 U.S.C. § 2339D(c)(1) defines “military-type training” as including “training in means
or methods that can cause death or serious bodily injury, destroy or damage property, or
disrupt services to critical infrastructure, or training on the use, storage, production, or
assembly of any explosive, firearm or other weapon, including any weapon of mass
destruction.”
99 See INA § 237(a)(4)(E); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(E) (as amended by the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004, P.L. 108-458, § 5402).

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! INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(IV)(bb), as amended, which makes
representatives of political, social, or other groups that endorse or
espouse terrorist activity inadmissible;
! INA § 212(a)(3)(B(i)(VII), as amended, which makes aliens who
endorse or espouse terrorist activity, or persuade others to endorse
or espouse terrorist activity or support a terrorist organization,
inadmissible;
! INA § 212(a)(B)(iv)(VI), as amended, which defines “terrorist
organization,” on the condition that this provision may only be
waived with respect to a group who would constitute a “terrorist
organization” solely on account of having a subgroup that has
engaged in terrorist activity; and
! INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI), as amended, which defines material
supports constituting engagement in terrorist activity for purposes of
the INA.
The Secretary of State (but not the Secretary of Homeland Security) may not
exercise waiver authority with respect to an alien after removal proceedings against
the alien are instituted.
REAL ID Act § 104 also imposes reporting requirements on the Secretary of
State and Secretary of Homeland Security regarding their exercise of waiver authority
under this section. They would be required to provide specified House and Senate
committees100 with an annual report regarding the aliens with respect to whom waiver
authority under REAL ID Act § 104 was exercised. Additionally, the Secretary of
State and/or Secretary of Homeland Security would be required to report to specified
House and Senate committees within one week of exercising REAL ID Act § 104
waiver authority with respect to a group (i.e., determining that a group that has a
subgroup engaged in terrorist activity is not itself a “terrorist organization” for
purposes of the INA).
While § 104 provides the Secretary of State and Secretary of Homeland Security
with authority to waive certain terrorism-related grounds making an alien
inadmissible under INA § 212, no similar waiver authority is provided over the
terrorism-related grounds that make an alien deportable under INA § 237.
Terror-Related Grounds for Deportability of Aliens
Aliens found to have engaged in terror-related activities following admission
into the United States may be deportable. Presently, the terror-related grounds for
inadmissibility are significantly broader than those for deportability.
Current Law. INA § 237(a)(4)(B) provides that an alien is deportable if he
commits any of the actions falling under the INA’s definition of “engage in terrorist
activity.” Pursuant to § 5402 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
100 These committees are the House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary, the House
Committee on International Relations, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and the
House Committee on Homeland Security.

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Act of 2004, any alien who has received military-type training from or on behalf of
any organization that, at the time the training was received, was designated as a
terrorist organization by the Secretary of State, is deportable.101
Changes Proposed by the REAL ID Act. Section 105(a) of the REAL ID
Act would significantly expand the terror-related grounds for deportability, so that
any alien who is described in the inadmissibility provisions of INA §§ 212(a)(3)(B)
(relating to terrorist activity) or 212(a)(3)(F) (relating to association with a terrorist
organization) would also be deportable. The following sections discuss the new
deportation grounds that would be added by the REAL ID Act, presuming that the
REAL ID Act’s provisions expanding the scope of INA § 212(a)(3)(B) (terror-related
grounds for inadmissibility) were also enacted.
Effects of Expanded Definition of “Engage in Terrorist Activity” on
Terror-Related Grounds for Deportability. A person who engages in terrorist
activity is both inadmissible and deportable under current law. If the REAL ID Act
is enacted, this would remain the case. However, as previously mentioned, § 103(b)
of the REAL ID Act would also expand the applicable definition of the term “engage
in terrorist activity.” Thus, an alien who provided material support or solicited funds
or participation in a non-designated terrorist organization would be deportable unless
he demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that he did not and should not
have reasonably known that the organization was a terrorist organization.
Designation as Deportable for Terror-Related Activity by a Consular
Officer, the Attorney General, or the Secretary of Homeland Security.
The REAL ID Act would enable a consular officer, the Attorney General, or the
Secretary of Homeland Security to declare an alien inadmissible who is known to be
engaged in terrorist activity or is likely to engage in such activity upon entry into the
United States. Although the REAL ID Act provides that “any alien considered
inadmissible [on terror-related grounds]...is deportable,”102 it is unclear whether this
would mean that a consular officer, the Attorney General, or the Secretary of
Homeland Security could declare an alien deportable if the alien was known to be
engaged in terrorist activity or was likely to engage in such activity within the United
States or what procedures would apply in such a circumstance.
Incitement of Terrorist Activity. The REAL ID Act would make any alien
who incited terrorist activity, under circumstances indicating an intention to cause
death or serious bodily harm, deportable as well as inadmissible.
Representation of a Terrorist Organization or Political Group
Espousing Terrorist Activity. The REAL ID Act would make deportable as well
as inadmissible any representative of either (1) a terrorist organization or (2) a
political, social or other similar group that endorses or espouses terrorist activity.
Membership in a Terrorist Organization. The REAL ID Act would make
it a deportable offense for an alien to be either (1) a member of a terrorist
101 Id.
102 REAL ID Act, § 105(a) (as contained in the conference report to H.R. 1268).

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organization designated by the Secretary of State, or (2) a member of any group that
constitutes a terrorist organization, unless the alien can demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence, that he did not know, and should not reasonably have known,
that the organization was a terrorist organization.
Officers, Spokesmen, and Representatives of the Palestine
Liberation Organization. Pursuant to the REAL ID Act, an alien who is an
officer, official, representative, or spokesman of the PLO would be made deportable.
Espousal of Terrorist Activity. An alien who espouses or endorses terrorist
activity, or persuades others to support terrorist activity or a terrorist organization,
would be deportable as well as inadmissible if the REAL ID Act were enacted. As
discussed previously, this ground for inadmissibility/deportability does not include
a mens rea requirement, meaning that an alien who persuades others to support a
terrorist organization would be considered deportable even if the alien had no
knowledge of the organization’s terrorist activities.
Receiving Military-Type Training from or on Behalf of a Terrorist
Organization. Section 105(b) of the REAL ID Act would repeal the current
grounds for deportability on account of receiving military-type training from or on
behalf of a terrorist organization designated by the Secretary of State. Instead, the
provision added by the REAL ID Act making aliens who receive military-type
training from or on behalf of any terrorist organization (i.e., not simply those
designated as such by the Secretary of State) inadmissible would also be grounds for
deporting an alien. Given the REAL ID Act’s amendments to the INA’s definition
of “terrorist organization” and the terror-related grounds for inadmissibility, it
appears that an alien who receives military-type training from or on behalf of a
terrorist organization would be deportable regardless of whether the alien was aware
that the organization was engaged in terrorist activity.
Deportability of a Spouse or Child of an Alien Inadmissible on
Terror-Related Grounds. The REAL ID Act would make the spouse or child of
an alien inadmissible on terror-related grounds deportable, if the terror-related
activity causing the alien to be inadmissible occurred within the last five years, unless
the alien’s spouse or child (1) did not and should not have reasonably known about
the terrorist activity or (2) in the reasonable belief of the consular officer or Attorney
General, has renounced the terror-related activity causing the alien to be found
inadmissible.
Association with a Terrorist Organization as Grounds for
Deportability. The REAL ID Act would make an alien deportable on the same
grounds that the alien would be inadmissible pursuant to INA § 212(a)(3)(F).
Accordingly, an alien would be deportable if the Secretary of State, after consultation
with the Attorney General, or the Attorney General, after consultation with the
Secretary of State, determines that the alien has been associated with a terrorist
organization and intends while in the United States to engage solely, principally, or
incidentally in activities that could endanger the welfare, safety, or security of the
United States.

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Effective Date of Proposed Changes to the Terror-Related Grounds
for Deportability. Pursuant to § 105(a)(2) of the REAL ID Act, the proposed
changes to the terror-related grounds for deportability would be effective on the date
of the REAL ID Act’s enactment, and would apply to acts and conditions constituting
a ground for removal occurring or existing before or after the REAL ID Act’s
enactment.
Consequences of Terror-Related Activities on Eligibility for
Relief from Removal
An alien found to have engaged in terror-related activities is not only
inadmissible and potentially deportable, but is also ineligible for various forms of
relief from removal. In modifying the terror-related grounds for inadmissibility and
deportability, the REAL ID Act would also affect certain aliens’ eligibility for relief
from removal. Specifically, the REAL ID Act would expand the scope of aliens who
were ineligible for asylum, withholding of removal, and cancellation of removal.
Asylum. Asylum is a discretionary form of relief from removal available to
aliens in the U.S. who have a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.
Aliens who have been admitted into the U.S. or who entered surreptitiously are
generally in the posture of potentially “deportable” aliens and removable under
grounds for deportation. Aliens otherwise present in the U.S. — “paroled” aliens and
aliens presently arriving at an airport or other port of entry, for example — are in the
posture of potentially “inadmissible” aliens and removable under the grounds for
inadmissibility.
Aliens engaged in terrorist activity are ineligible for asylum, as are aliens who
fall under most other terrorism provisions. Mere membership in a terrorist
organization is perhaps the most notable exception to this automatic disqualification.
The REAL ID Act would preserve this exception for inadmissible aliens, but as
explained below, it might, as presently drafted, deny this exemption to deportable
aliens. Other changes in current law also might result due to changes in
cross-references and section numbering arising from the REAL ID Act.
Current Restrictions on Asylum Eligibility for Aliens Deportable on
Terror-Related Grounds. Presently, a deportable alien is ineligible for asylum
relief on terror-related grounds if he is “removable under [INA] § 237(a)(4)(B)
(relating to terrorist activity).” Presently, an alien is removable under § 237(a)(4)(B)
only if he commits certain actions defined as “engaging in terrorist activity” under
INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv). As previously mentioned, “engaging in terrorist activity” is
only one of several terror-related grounds under which an alien may be deemed
inadmissible.
The REAL ID Act’s Effects upon Asylum Eligibility Restrictions for
Aliens Deportable on Terror-Related Grounds. INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(v)
currently makes ineligible for asylum any alien who is (1) inadmissible on specified
terrorism grounds (those terror-related grounds for inadmissibility provided under
subclause (I), (II), (III), (IV), and (VI) of INA § 212 (a)(3)(B)(i)) or (2) deportable

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under INA § 237(a)(4)(B) (relating to terrorist activity). With regard to (2), the
REAL ID Act would amend INA § 237(a)(4)(B), so that a deportable alien would not
only be deportable for engaging in terrorist activity, but also for committing
terror-related activity that would make the alien inadmissible under INA § 212 —
including those activities that do not make an alien who is inadmissible on
terror-related grounds ineligible for asylum. Accordingly, if enacted in its present
form, the REAL ID Act would appear to create a disparity in asylum eligibility, under
which an alien designated as inadmissible on account of certain terror-related
activities, would be eligible for asylum relief, while an alien who was deportable on
the same grounds would be ineligible.
Pursuant to amendments made by the REAL ID Act, which do not directly alter
the INA’s asylum eligibility provisions but do make the terror-related grounds for
deportability the same as those for inadmissibility, a deportable alien would be
ineligible for asylum on terror-related grounds if:
! the alien has engaged in a terrorist activity;
! a consular officer, the Attorney General, or the Secretary of
Homeland Security knows, or has reasonable ground to believe, that
the alien is engaged in or is likely to engage after entry in any
terrorist activity;
! the alien has, under circumstances indicating an intention to cause
death or serious bodily harm, incited terrorist activity;
! the alien is a representative of a terrorist organization, or a political,
social or other similar group that endorses or espouses terrorist
activity;
! the alien is an officer, official, representative, or spokesman of the
PLO;
! the alien is a member of a group designated as a terrorist
organization by the United States;
! the alien is a member of a group of two or more individuals, whether
organized or not, that engages in, or has a subgroup that engages in
a terrorist activity, unless the alien can demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence that the alien did not know, and should not
reasonably have known, that the organization was a terrorist
organization;
! the alien endorses or espouses terrorist activity or persuades others
to endorse or espouse terrorist activity or support a terrorist
organization (possibly including an organization that the alien does
not know has engaged in terrorist activities, but nevertheless meets
the INA’s definition of “terrorist organization”);
! the alien has received military-type training from or on behalf of any
organization that, at the time the training was received, was a
terrorist organization (possibly including an organization that the
alien does not know to engage in terrorist activities, but nevertheless
meets the INA’s definition of “terrorist organization”);
! a spouse or child of an alien who is inadmissible on terror-related
grounds, if the activity causing the alien to be found inadmissible
occurred within the last five years, unless the spouse or child (1) did
not and should not have reasonably known about the terrorist

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activity or (2) in the reasonable belief of the consular officer or
Attorney General, has renounced the terror-related activity causing
the alien to be found inadmissible; or
! the Secretary of State, after consultation with the Attorney General,
or the Attorney General, after consultation with the Secretary of
State, determines that the alien has been associated with a terrorist
organization and intends while in the United States to engage solely,
principally, or incidentally in activities that could endanger the
welfare, safety, or security of the United States.103
Current Restrictions on Asylum Eligibility for Aliens Inadmissible
on Terror-Related Grounds. Pursuant to INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(v), an inadmissible
alien is ineligible for asylum only if the alien “is inadmissible under subclause (I),
(II), (III), (IV), or (VI) of [INA] § 212(a)(3)(B)(i).” Under current law, an
inadmissible alien would be denied eligibility on terror-related grounds if:
! he has engaged in a terrorist activity (subclause I);
! a consular officer or the Attorney General knows, or has reasonable
ground to believe, that the alien is engaged in or is likely to engage
after entry in any terrorist activity (subclause II);
! the alien has incited terrorist activity, under circumstances indicating
an intention to cause death or serious bodily harm (subclause III);
! the alien is a representative of a foreign terrorist organization
designated by the Secretary of State under INA § 219 or a political,
social or other similar group whose public endorsement of acts of
terrorist activity the Secretary of State has determined undermines
United States efforts to reduce or eliminate terrorist activities, unless
the Attorney General determines, in the Attorney General’s
discretion, that there are not reasonable grounds for regarding the
alien as a danger to the security of the United States (subclause
IV);104 or
! the alien has used the alien’s position of prominence within any
country to endorse or espouse terrorist activity, or to persuade others
to support terrorist activity or a terrorist organization, in a way that
the Secretary of State has determined undermines United States
efforts to reduce or eliminate terrorist activities (subclause VI).105
Changes to Asylum Eligibility for Inadmissible Aliens Made by the
REAL ID Act. INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(v) makes ineligible for asylum any alien who
103 Id. §§ 105(a) (proposing amendments to the terror-related grounds for inadmissibility
found in INA § 212(a)(B)(i)), 105(a); INA § 212(a)(3)(F), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(F).
104 This exception exists because of the express language of INA § 208(b)(2)(v), which
provides that an alien is ineligible for asylum if “the alien is inadmissible under subclause
(I), (II), (III), (IV), or (VI) of [INA] § 212(a)(3)(B)(i)...unless, in the case only of an alien
inadmissible under subclause (IV)...the Attorney General determines, in the Attorney
General’s discretion, that there are not reasonable grounds for regarding the alien as a
danger to the security of the United States.”
105 INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(v); 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(v).

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“is inadmissible under subclause (I), (II), (III), (IV), or (VI) of [INA]
§ 212(a)(3)(B)(i)” (terror-related grounds for alien inadmissibility). As discussed
previously, § 103(a) of the REAL ID Act would significantly modify INA
§ 212(a)(3)(B)(i) by amending and rearranging the terror-related grounds for
inadmissibility found in INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(i). For example, whereas under current
law subclause (VI) of INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(i) makes inadmissible (and also ineligible
for asylum, when as referenced by INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(v)) any alien who has used
his position of prominence to endorse or espouse terrorist activity, pursuant to the
amendments made by the REAL ID Act, subclause (VI) would instead describe the
inadmissibility ground for aliens who are members of non-designated terrorist
organizations (espousal of terrorist activity would still be a ground for
inadmissibility, but would now be found in subclause (VII) of INA
§ 212(a)(3)(B)(i)). By rearranging and amending the INA provisions relating to the
terror-related grounds for inadmissibility, the REAL ID Act would affect the scope
of the terror-related grounds for asylum ineligibility that refer to those amended
provisions.
If the REAL ID Act is enacted in its current form, asylum eligibility would
continue to be denied only those aliens who are inadmissible under subclause (I), (II),
(III), (IV), or (VI) of INA § 212(a)(3)(B). Pursuant to the amendments proposed by
the REAL ID Act to the terror-related grounds for inadmissibility, which amend and
rearrange the terror-related grounds for inadmissibility described in INA
§ 212(a)(3)(B), an inadmissible alien would be denied asylum on terror-related
grounds if:
! the alien has engaged in a terrorist activity (subclause I, as
amended);
! a consular officer, the Attorney General, or the Secretary of
Homeland Security knows, or has reasonable ground to believe, that
the alien is engaged in or is likely to engage after entry in any
terrorist activity (subclause II, as amended);
! the alien has, under circumstances indicating an intention to cause
death or serious bodily harm, incited terrorist activity (subclause III,
as amended);
! the alien is a representative of a terrorist organization, or a political,
social or other similar group that endorses or espouses terrorist
activity, unless the Attorney General determines, in the Attorney
General’s discretion, that there are not reasonable grounds for
regarding the alien as a danger to the security of the United States
(subclause IV, as amended); or
! the alien is a member of non-designated terrorist organization,
whether organized or not, which engages in, or has a subgroup
which engages in a terrorist activity, unless the alien can
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the alien did not
know, and should not reasonably have known, that the organization
was a terrorist organization (subclause VI, as amended).106
106 See H.R. 418 § 103(amending the terror-related grounds for inadmissibility and the INA’s
(continued...)

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Because of the manner in which the REAL ID Act would amend the INA
provision concerning the terror-related grounds for inadmissibility, an inadmissible
alien would no longer be automatically ineligible for asylum if he has used a position
of prominence to endorse or espouse terrorist activity (although, as discussed
previously, a deportable alien would be ineligible for asylum on such grounds).107
On the other hand, membership in a non-designated terrorist organization would
automatically deny an alien eligibility for asylum relief, unless the alien could
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the alien did not know, and
should not reasonably have known, that the organization was a terrorist organization.
Withholding of Removal. Apart from asylum is the separate remedy of
withholding of removal. Like asylum, withholding of removal is premised upon a
showing of prospective persecution of an alien if removed to a particular country.108
In certain circumstances, aliens are ineligible for withholding of removal, including
in cases where the Attorney General decides:
! that having been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly
serious crime, an alien is a danger to the community of the United
States;
! there are serious reasons to believe that the alien committed a
serious nonpolitical crime outside the United States before the alien
arrived in the United States; or
! that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the alien is a danger
to the security of the United States.109
By statute, an alien who is described in INA § 237(a)(4)(B) (i.e., is engaged or
has engaged in terrorist activity) is reasonably regarded as a danger to the security of
the United States, and is therefore ineligible for withholding of removal.110
Current Restrictions on Withholding of Removal Eligibility for
Aliens Deportable on Terror-Related Grounds. Presently, an alien lawfully
admitted into the United States is ineligible for withholding of removal on
terror-related grounds only if he is deportable under INA § 237(a)(4)(B), which
makes an alien deportable if he is “engaged in terrorist activity,” as defined under
INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv).
The REAL ID Act’s Effects upon Withholding of Removal Eligibility
for Aliens Deportable on Terror-Related Grounds. The REAL ID Act would
amend INA § 237(a)(4)(B) to make an alien deportable on the same terror-related
grounds that make an alien inadmissible. Because the REAL ID Act does not modify
106 (...continued)
definition of “terrorist organization” and “engage in terrorist activity”).
107 Compare INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(i)(VI) with H.R. 418 § 103(a) (as passed the House)
(amending and rearranging the terror-related grounds for inadmissibility).
108 See INA § 241(b)(3); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). See also 8 C.F.R. § 208.16.
109 INA § 241(b)(3)(B); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B).
110 Id.

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the present wording of the INA’s withholding of removal eligibility requirements, an
alien who is removable pursuant to any of the expanded, terror-related grounds for
deportability would also be ineligible for withholding of removal.
Current Restrictions on Withholding of Removal Eligibility for
Aliens Inadmissible on Terror-Related Grounds. The INA does not specify
that aliens who are inadmissible on terror-related grounds are automatically ineligible
for withholding of removal, though they might nevertheless fulfill the criteria for
relief ineligibility. Currently, for example, an alien who is deportable on the grounds
that he has engaged in terrorist activity is ineligible for withholding of removal on
account of the danger he likely poses to the United States.111 An alien who is
inadmissible on account of engaging in terrorist activity would be ineligible for
withholding of removal for the same reason.
The REAL ID Act’s Effects upon Withholding of Removal Eligibility
for Aliens Inadmissible on Terror-Related Grounds. The REAL ID Act
would appear to make aliens who are inadmissible on terror-related grounds
ineligible for withholding of removal. INA § 241(b)(3) provides that an alien who
is described by INA § 237(a)(3)(B) is ineligible for withholding of removal. The
REAL ID Act amends § 237(a)(3)(B) to cover any alien who would be considered
inadmissible on terror-related grounds.112 Accordingly, it would appear that if the
REAL ID Act was enacted, an alien who is inadmissible on terror-related grounds
would also be ineligible for withholding of removal.
Cancellation of Removal. The INA provides the Attorney General with the
discretionary authority to cancel the removal of certain permanent and nonpermanent
residents. However, aliens who are inadmissible or deportable on account of terror-
related activity are ineligible for such relief.
Current Restrictions on Cancellation of Removal Eligibility for
Aliens Deportable on Terror-Related Grounds. An alien is ineligible for
cancellation of removal if he is deportable under INA § 237(a)(4).113 Presently, the
only terror-related grounds under which an alien would be expressly ineligible for
cancellation of removal would be if the alien either engaged in terrorist activity, as
defined by INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv) or received military-type training from or on
behalf of a designated terrorist organization.114
The REAL ID Act’s Effects upon Cancellation of Removal Eligibility
for Aliens Deportable on Terror-Related Grounds. The REAL ID Act would
amend INA § 237(a)(4)(B) so that any alien who would be considered inadmissible
on terror-related grounds (as amended by the REAL ID Act) would also be
111 Id.
112 H.R. 418, § 104(a)(1) (as passed the House).
113 INA § 240A(c)(4); 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(c)(4).
114 See INA § 237(a)(4); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4). A deportable alien involved in terror-related
activity might nevertheless be ineligible for cancellation of removal on security or foreign
policy grounds. See INA §§ 237(a)(4)(A), (C); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(4)(A), (C).

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deportable, significantly increasing the terror-related grounds that may disqualify a
deportable alien from having his removal canceled.
Current Restrictions on Cancellation of Removal Eligibility for
Aliens Inadmissible on Terror-Related Grounds. An alien is ineligible for
cancellation of removal if he is inadmissible under INA § 212(a)(3), which contains
both security and terror-related grounds for inadmissibility.
The REAL ID Act’s Effects upon Cancellation of Removal Eligibility
for Aliens Inadmissible on Terror-Related Grounds. As discussed
previously, the REAL ID Act would amend INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(i) to broaden the
terror-related grounds for inadmissibility. Accordingly, the category of inadmissible
aliens who would be ineligible for cancellation of removal on terror-related grounds
would be expanded.
V. Improved Security for Drivers’ Licenses and
Personal Identification Cards115
Prior to the passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
of 2004, standards with respect to drivers’ licenses and personal identification cards
were determined on a state-by-state basis with no national standards in place.116
Even with the passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004, it appears that, with the exception of what is specifically provided for by the
legislation, a majority of the standards remain at the discretion of state and local
governments.117
The REAL ID Act contains a number of provisions relating to improved security
for drivers’ licenses and personal identification cards, as well as instructions for
states that do not comply with its provisions. The REAL ID Act would also repeal
115 Discussion of this topic was prepared by Todd B. Tatelman, Legislative Attorney.
116 Congressional action prior to 9/11 on national standards in this direction proved highly
controversial. For example, § 656 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (Pub. L. No.104-208, Division C) provided federal standards for
state drivers’ licenses and birth certificates when used as identification-related documents
for federal purposes. A state had two choices under this provision. It could require that each
of its licenses include the licensee’s Social Security number in machine-readable or
visually-readable form. Or the state could more minimally require that each applicant submit
the applicant’s Social Security number and verify the legitimacy of that number with the
Social Security Administration. However, this section became subject to widespread public
criticism shortly after its enactment, with opponents most frequently alleging that it could
be construed as a step toward a national identification card system. Congress blocked funds
to implement regulations aimed at assisting the states to adopt the Social Security number
requirements, and the underlying requirement itself was subsequently repealed in § 355 of
the Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act 2000 (Pub. L.
No. 106-69). Prior to 9/11, legislation aimed at discouraging national standards for
identification documents had gained bipartisan support and was thought likely to pass.
117 P.L. 108-458, §§ 7211-7214.

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certain overlapping and potentially conflicting provisions of the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.118
Current Law. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
delegates authority to the Secretary of Transportation, in consultation with the
Secretary of Homeland Security, empowering them to issue regulations with respect
to minimum standards for federal acceptance of drivers’ licenses and personal
identification cards.119
Currently, federal law requires that the Secretary issue regulations within 18
months of enactment that require each driver’s license or identification card, to be
accepted for any official purpose by a federal agency, to include the individual’s: (1)
full legal name; (2) date of birth; (3) gender; (4) driver’s license or identification card
number; (5) digital photograph; (6) address; and (7) signature.120 In addition, the
cards are required to contain physical security features designed to prevent tampering,
counterfeiting or duplication for fraudulent purposes; as well as a common
machine-readable technology with defined minimum elements.121 Moreover, states
will be required, pursuant to the new regulations, to confiscate a driver’s license or
personal identification card if any of the above security components is
compromised.122
The statute also requires that the regulations address how drivers’ licenses and
identification cards are issued by the states. Specifically, the regulations are required
to include minimum standards for the documentation required by the applicant, the
procedures utilized for verifying the documents used, and the standards for
processing the applications.123 The regulations are, however, prohibited from not
only infringing upon the “State’s power to set criteria concerning what categories of
118 As mentioned previously, a bill containing only the provisions of THE REAL ID ACT
relating to drivers’ licenses and personal identification cards, has also been introduced. See
Driver’s License Security and Modernization Act, H.R. 368, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005).
119 See P.L. 108-458, § 7212. Whether limiting the standards to federal acceptance - as
opposed to direct federal prescriptions on the states - obviates federalism concerns under
Supreme Court jurisprudence, remains to be seen. The Court has held that in exercising its
power under the Commerce Clause, Congress may not “commandeer” the state regulatory
processes by ordering states to enact or administer a federal regulatory program. See New
York v United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). The Court has extended this principle by
holding, in Printz v. United States, that Congress may not circumvent the prohibition on
commandeering a state’s regulatory processes “by conscripting the State’s officers directly.”
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997). It may be possible to argue that, because
the issuance of drivers’ licenses remains a state regulatory function, the minimum issuance
and verification requirements established in this bill, even if limited to federal agency
acceptance, constitute an effective commandeering by Congress of the state regulatory
process, or a conscription of the state and local officials who issue the licenses.
120 P.L. 108-458, § 7212(b)(2)(D)(i)-(vii).
121 Id. at § 7212(b)(2)(E)-(F).
122 Id. at § 7212(b)(2)(G).
123 Id. at § 7212(b)(2)(A)-(C).

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individuals are eligible to obtain a driver’s license or personal identification card
from that State,”124 but also from requiring a state to take an action that “conflicts
with or otherwise interferes with the full enforcement of state criteria concerning the
categories of individuals that are eligible to obtain a driver’s license or personal
identification card.”125 In other words, it would appear that if a state grants a certain
category of individuals (i.e., aliens, legal or illegal) permission to obtain a license,
nothing in the forthcoming regulations is to infringe on that state’s decision or its
ability to enforce that decision. In addition, the regulations are also not to require a
single uniform design, and must include procedures designed to protect the privacy
rights of individual applicants.126
Finally, the law requires the use of negotiated rulemaking pursuant to the
Administrative Procedure Act.127 This process is designed to bring together agency
representatives and concerned interest groups to negotiate the text of a proposed rule.
The rulemaking committee is required to include representatives from: (1) state and
local offices that issue drivers’ licenses and/or personal identification cards; (2) state
elected officials; (3) Department of Homeland Security; and (4) interested parties.128
Changes Proposed by the REAL ID Act. In general, while the REAL ID
Act does not directly impose federal standards with respect to states’ issuance of
drivers’ licenses and personal identification cards, states would nevertheless appear
to need to adopt such standards and modify any conflicting laws or regulations in
order for such documents to be recognized by federal agencies for official purposes.
Unlike previous versions of the REAL ID Act, the version contained in the
conference report contains a definition of the phrase “official purpose.” For purposes
of the act, an “official purpose” is defined as including, but not limited to, “accessing
Federal facilities, boarding federally regulated commercial aircraft, entering nuclear
power plants, and any other purposes that the Secretary [of Homeland Security] shall
determine.” In addition, the REAL ID Act contains a provision that specifically
repeals the recently enacted § 7212 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004, which contains the current law with respect to national
standards for drivers’ licenses and personal identification cards.
Minimum Issuance Standards. Section 202(c) of the REAL ID Act would
establish minimum issuance standards for federal recognition requiring that before
a state could issue a driver’s license or photo identification card, a state would have
to verify with the issuing agency, the issuance, validity and completeness of: (1) a
photo identification document or a non-photo document containing both the
individual’s full legal name and date of birth; (2) date of birth; (3) proof of a social
security number (SSN) or verification of the individual’s ineligibility for a SSN; and
124 Id. at § 7212(b)(3)(B).
125 Id. at § 7212(b)(3)(C).
126 P.L. 108-458, § 7212(b)(3)(D)-(E).
127 See Negotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, P.L. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4970 (1990) (codified
as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 581 et seq.).
128 See P.L. 108-458, § 7212(b)(4)(A)-(B).

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(4) name and address of the individual’s principal residence. To the extent that
information verification requirements exist, they are currently a function of state law
and likely vary from state to state. This provision would appear to preempt any state
verification standards and replace them with the new federal standards as established
by this statutory language.
Evidence of Legal Status. Section 202(c)(2)(B) of the REAL ID Act
appears to require states to verify an applicant’s legal status in the United States
before issuing a driver’s license or personal identification card. Currently, the
categories of persons eligible for drivers’ licenses are determined on a state-by-state
basis. As indicated above, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of
2004 specifically prevents the Secretary of Transportation from enacting regulations
that would interfere with this authority. If enacted, this section of the REAL ID Act
would appear to preempt any state law requirements and appears to require the states
to verify the legal status of the applicant.129
Temporary Drivers’ Licenses and Identification Cards. Section
202(c)(2)(C) of the REAL ID Act establishes a system of temporary licenses and
identification cards that can be issued by the states to applicants who can present
evidence that they fall into one of six categories.130 Under the REAL ID Act, a state
may only issue a temporary driver’s license or identification card with an expiration
date equal to the period of time of the applicant’s authorized stay in the United
States. If there is an indefinite end to the period of authorized stay, the card’s
expiration date shall be one year. The temporary card shall clearly indicate that it is
temporary and shall state the expiration date. Renewals of the temporary cards would
be done only upon presentation of valid documentary evidence that the status had
been extended by the Secretary of Homeland Security. If such provisions exist under
current law, they exist as a function of state law and would be preempted should the
REAL ID Act be enacted.
Other Requirements. Pursuant to § 202(d) of the REAL ID Act, states are
required to adopt procedures and practices to: (1) employ technology to capture
digital images of identity source documents; (2) retain paper copies of source
documents for a minimum of seven years or images of source documents presented
for a minimum of ten years; (3) subject each applicant to a mandatory facial image
capture; (4) establish an effective procedure to confirm or verify a renewing
applicant’s information; (5) confirm with the Social Security Administration a SSN
129 For more information relating to current state laws regarding the issuance of drivers’
licenses to aliens see CRS Report RL32127, Summary of State Laws on the Issuance of
Driver’s Licenses to Undocumented Aliens, by Allison M. Smith.
130 According to the REAL ID Act, persons would only be eligible for temporary drivers’
licenses or identification cards if evidence is presented that they: (1) have a valid, unexpired
non-immigrant visa or non-immigrant visa status for entry into the United States; (2) have
a pending or approved application for asylum in the United States; (3) have entered into the
United States in refugee status; (4) have a pending or approved application for temporary
protected status in the United States; (5) have approved deferred action status; or (6) have
a pending application for adjustment of status to that of an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence in the United States or conditional permanent resident status in the
United States.

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presented by a person using the full Social Security account number;131 (6) refuse
issuance of a driver’s license or identification card to a person holding a driver’s
license issued by another state without confirmation that the person is terminating or
has terminated the driver’s license; (7) ensure the physical security of locations where
cards are produced and the security of document materials and papers from which
drivers’ licenses and identification cards are produced; (8) subject all persons
authorized to manufacture or produce drivers’ licenses and identification cards to
appropriate security clearance requirements; (9) establish fraudulent document
recognition training programs for appropriate employees engaged in the issuance of
drivers’ licenses and identification cards; (10) would limit the length of time a
drivers’ license or personal identification card is valid to eight years.
In addition to these requirements, the conference report version of the REAL ID
Act contains language requiring that states, if they elect to issue a drivers’ license or
personal identification card that does not conform to the requirements of this act, be
required to use a unique color identifier or design to alert officials that the document
is not to be accepted for any official purpose. Moreover, the state will be required
to clearly state on the face of the document that it is not to be accepted for federal
identification or for any official purpose. Further, the conference version includes
a provision requiring the states to maintain a motor vehicle database that, at a
minimum, contains all data fields printed on the drivers’ license or identification card
and all motor vehicle driver histories, including violations, suspensions or “points.”
Finally, the act would require the states to provide electronic access to their databases
to all other states. To the extent that any of these requirements currently exist, they
do so as a function of state law. Thus, should the REAL ID Act be enacted, it would
appear that the state laws would be preempted in favor of the new federal standards.
Trafficking in Authentication Features for Use in False Identification
Documents. Section 203 of the REAL ID Act amends 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(8),
which makes it a federal crime to either actually, or with the intent to, transport,
transfer, or otherwise dispose of to another, materials or features132 used on a
document of the type intended or commonly used for identification purposes. By
replacing the phrase “false identification features” with “false or actual authentication
features,” this provision would appear to broaden the scope of the criminal provision,
making it a crime to traffic in identification features regardless of whether the feature
is false. In addition, section 203 requires that the Secretary of Homeland Security
enter into the appropriate aviation-screening database the personal information of
anyone convicted of using a false drivers’ license at an airport.
Additional Provisions. Section 204 of the REAL ID Act authorizes the
Secretary of Homeland Security to make grants to the states, for the purpose of
assisting them in conforming to the new national standards. The section also
131 In the event that a SSN is already registered to or associated with another person to whom
any state has issued a driver’s license or identification card, the state shall resolve the
discrepancy and take appropriate action.
132 These include, but are not limited to, holograms, watermarks, symbols, codes, images,
or sequences. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(1) (2004).

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contains the necessary language authorizing the appropriation of federal funds for the
grant program.
Section 205 provides the Secretary of Homeland Security with the statutory
authority to promulgate regulations, set standards, and issue grants. The Secretary
is required by the statute to consult with both the Secretary of Transportation as well
as with the states when acting pursuant to this authority. Moreover, the Secretary is
authorized to extend the three-year deadline contained in section 202(a)(1) for any
state on the condition that the state provide an adequate justification for their
non-compliance.
VI. Improving Border Infrastructure
and Technology Integration133
Title III of the REAL ID Act is directed at improving border infrastructure and
technology integration between state and federal agencies.134 It would require DHS
to conduct a study on U.S. border security vulnerabilities, establish a pilot program
to test ground surveillance technologies on the northern and southern borders to
enhance U.S. border security, and implement a plan to improve communications
systems and information-sharing between federal, state, local, and tribal agencies on
matters relating to border security. DHS would also be required to submit reports to
Congress regarding its implementation of these requirements.

Vulnerability and Threat Assessment Relating to Border
Infrastructure Weaknesses
Section 301 of the REAL ID Act requires the Under Secretary of Homeland
Security for Border and Transportation Security, in consultation with the Under
Secretary of Homeland Security for Science and Technology and the Under Secretary
of Homeland Security for Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, to
study the technology, equipment, and personnel needed by field offices of the Bureau
of Customs and Border Protection to address security vulnerabilities within the
United States, and conduct a follow-up study at least once every five years thereafter.
The Under Secretary of Homeland Security for Border and Transportation Security
is required to submit a report to Congress of findings and conclusions from each
study, along with legislative recommendations for addressing security vulnerabilities.
Section 301(c) authorizes necessary appropriations for fiscal years 2006 through
2011 to carry out recommendations from the first study.
Establishment of a Ground Surveillance Pilot Program
The U.S. borders with Mexico and Canada are monitored in a variety of ways,
including through the use of border patrol agents, video cameras, ground sensors, and
133 Discussion of this topic was prepared by Michael John Garcia, Legislative Attorney.
134 Title III was added to H.R. 418 pursuant to an amendment offered by Rep. James Kolbe.

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aircraft.135 Pursuant to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of
2004, a pilot program was established to test various advanced technologies —
including sensors, video, and unmanned aerial vehicles — to improve surveillance
along U.S.-Canadian border.136 Section 302 of the REAL ID Act requires the
Department of Homeland Security to establish a pilot program to identify and test
ground surveillance technologies to enhance border security. The program would
cover both northern and southern border locations. The REAL ID Act also requires
DHS to submit a report to designated House and Senate committees within a year of
program implementation describing the program and recommending whether it
should terminate, be made permanent, or be enhanced.
Enhancement of Border Communications Integration and
Information Sharing
Section 303 of the REAL ID Act requires the Secretary of Homeland Security,
in consultation with various federal, state, local, and tribal agencies, to develop and
implement a plan to improve interagency communication systems and enhance
information-sharing on matters related to border security on the federal, state, local,
and tribal level. DHS would submit a report to designated House and Senate
committees within a year of plan implementation which would include any
recommendations that the Secretary of Homeland Security found appropriate.
135 For additional background on border surveillance, see CRS Report RL32562, Border
Security: The Role of the U.S. Border Patrol, by Blas Nunez-Neto; and CRS Report
RS21698, Homeland Security: Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Border Surveillance, by
Christopher Bolkcom.
136 P.L. 108-458, §§ 5101-5105.

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