Order Code RL32564
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Immigration: Terrorist Grounds
for Exclusion of Aliens
Updated May 5, 2005
Michael John Garcia
Legislative Attorney
American Law Division
Ruth Ellen Wasem
Specialist in Immigration Policy
Domestic Social Policy Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Immigration: Terrorist Grounds for Exclusion of Aliens
Summary
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) spells out a strict set of admissions
criteria and exclusion rules for all foreign nationals, whether coming permanently as
immigrants (i.e., legal permanent residents) or temporarily as nonimmigrants.
Notably, any alien who has engaged in or incited terrorist activity, is reasonably
believed to be carrying out a terrorist activity, or is a representative or member of a
designated foreign terrorist organization is inadmissible.
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the INA was broadened to deny
entry to representatives of groups that endorse terrorism, prominent individuals who
endorse terrorism, and spouses and children of aliens who are removable on terrorism
grounds (on the basis of activities occurring within the previous five years). The INA
also contains grounds for inadmissibility based on foreign policy concerns.
The report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States (also known as the 9/11 Commission) concluded that the key officials
responsible for determining alien admissions (consular officers abroad and
immigration inspectors in the United States) were not considered full partners in
counterterrorism efforts prior to September 11, 2001, and as a result, opportunities
to intercept the September 11 terrorists were missed. The 9/11 Commission’s
monograph, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel, underscored the importance of the border
security functions of immigration law and policy.
This report opens with an overview of the grounds for inadmissibility and
summarizes key legislation enacted in recent years. The section on current law
explains the legal definitions of “terrorist activity,” “terrorist organization,” and other
security-related grounds for inadmissibility and analyzes the legal implications of
these provisions. The report then discusses the alien screening process to identify
possible terrorists during the visa issuance process abroad and the inspections process
at U.S. ports of entry. Where relevant, the report also discusses how recently enacted
legislation — the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L.
108-458) — affects these matters. Provisions in the REAL ID Act (H.R. 418),
introduced in the 109th Congress by Representative James Sensenbrenner and passed
by the House on February 10, 2005, and passed by the House on March 12, 2005 as
part of the FY2005 supplemental appropriations for military operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan, other foreign aid (H.R. 1268) are also discussed.
For legislative analysis of related issues, see CRS Report RL32754,
Immigration: Analysis of the Major Provisions of H.R. 418, the REAL ID Act of
2005; CRS Report RL32616, 9/11 Commission: Legislative Action Concerning U.S.
Immigration Law and Policy in the 108th Congress; CRS Report RL32399, Border
Security: Inspections Practices, Policies and Issues; CRS Report RL32621, U.S.
Immigration Policy on Asylum Seekers; CRS Report RL32234, U.S. Visitor and
Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program (US-VISIT); and CRS Report
RL31512, Visa Issuances: Policy, Issues, and Legislation. This report will be
updated as events require.

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Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Overview of Terrorist Exclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Grounds for Inadmissibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Key Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Current Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
“Terror-Related” Grounds for Inadmissibility or Deportability
under Immigration Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Terror-Related Grounds for Inadmissibility under the INA . . . . . . . . . . 5
Definitions of Terror-Related Terms in the INA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Definition of “Terrorist Activity” under the INA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Definition of “Engaged in Terrorist Activity” under the INA . . . . . . . . 7
Definition of “Terrorist Organization” under the INA . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Security-Related and Foreign Policy Grounds for Deeming
an Alien Inadmissible . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Screening Aliens for Admissibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Visa Issuance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Terrorist Screening . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Controlled Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Biometric Visas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Terrorist Travel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Admissibility at Ports of Entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Border Inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
US-VISIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Pre-inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Expedited Removal under INA § 235(c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Legislation in the 109th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
The REAL ID Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

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Immigration: Terrorist Grounds
for Exclusion of Aliens
Introduction
In the years following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, considerable
concern has been raised because the 19 terrorists were aliens (i.e., noncitizens or
foreign nationals) who apparently entered the United States on temporary visas
despite provisions in immigration law that bar the admission of suspected terrorists.
The report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
(also known as the 9/11 Commission) contended that “(t)here were opportunities for
intelligence and law enforcement to exploit al Qaeda’s travel vulnerabilities.” The
9/11 Commission maintained that border security was not considered a national
security matter prior to September 11, and as a result the consular and immigration
officers were not treated as full partners in counterterrorism efforts.1 The 9/11
Commission’s monograph, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel, underscored the importance
of the border security functions of immigration law and policy.2
Several proposals in the 108th Congress to implement the recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission had notable implications for U.S. counterterrorism efforts and
border security.3 The most significant of these proposals were H.R. 10, the 9/11
Recommendations Implementation Act, as amended, introduced by the Speaker of
the House of Representatives Dennis Hastert and passed by the House as S. 2845 on
October 8, 2004, and S. 2845, the National Intelligence Reform Act of 2004, as
amended, introduced by Senators Susan Collins and Joseph Lieberman and passed
by the Senate on October 8, 2004. The conference report on S. 2845 passed the
House on December 7 and the Senate on December 8, 2004.4 The Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458), a compromise bill
signed on December 17, 2004, includes some — but not all — of the immigration
provisions that were originally under consideration.
1 H.R. 418 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11
Commission Report, Executive Summary, at 14 (Jul. 2004).
2 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, 9/11 and Terrorist
Travel (Aug. 2004).
3 For further analysis, see CRS Report RL32616, 9/11 Commission: Current Legislative
Proposals for U.S. Immigration Law and Policy, by Michael John Garcia and Ruth Ellen
Wasem.
4 108th Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives, Conference report to accompany
S. 2845, H.Rept. 108-796, Dec. 7, 2004.

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CRS-2
H.R. 418, the REAL ID Act of 2005, was introduced by Representative James
Sensenbrenner on January 26, 2005, and passed the House, as amended, on February
10, 2005, on a vote of 261-161. House-passed H.R. 418 contains both a number of
provisions related to immigration reform and document security that were considered
during congressional deliberations on the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act, but which were ultimately not included in the act’s final version, and
some new proposals. House-passed H.R. 418 also includes some provisions that were
not considered during final deliberations over the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act. The text of House-passed H.R. 418 was subsequently added to H.R.
1268, the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War
on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, which was introduced by Representative Jerry
Lewis on March 11, 2005, and passed the House, as amended, on March 16, 2005 on
a vote of 388-43. H.R. 1268 passed the Senate on April 21, 2005, as amended, on a
vote of 99-0, but does not include the REAL ID Act provisions. On May 3, 2005, a
conference report resolving differences between the House and Senate versions of
H.R. 1268, which contained most of the terror-related provisions of the REAL ID
Act, was released as H.Rept. 109-72.
Under current law, three departments — the Department of State (DOS), the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) —
play key roles in administering the law and policies on the admission of aliens.5
DOS’s Bureau of Consular Affairs (Consular Affairs) is the agency responsible for
issuing visas, DHS’s Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) is charged with
approving immigrant petitions, and DHS’s Bureau of Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) is tasked with inspecting all people who enter the United States. DOJ’s
Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) has a significant policy role
through its adjudicatory decisions on specific immigration cases.
This report focuses on the terrorism-related grounds for inadmissibility. It
opens with an overview of the terror-related grounds as they evolved through key
legislation enacted in recent years. The section on current law explains the legal
definitions of “terrorist activity,” “terrorist organization,” and other security-related
grounds for inadmissibility and analyzes the legal implications of these provisions.
The report then discusses the alien screening process to determine admissibility and
to identify possible terrorists, both during the visa issuance process abroad and the
inspections process at U.S. ports of entry.
5 Other departments, notably the Department of Labor (DOL) and the Department of
Agriculture (USDA), play roles in the approval process depending on the category or type
of visa sought, and the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) sets policy on
the health-related grounds for inadmissibility.

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CRS-3
Overview of Terrorist Exclusion
Grounds for Inadmissibility
With certain exceptions,6 aliens seeking admission to the United States must
undergo separate reviews performed by DOS consular officers abroad and CBP
inspectors upon entry to the United States.7 These reviews are intended to ensure that
applicants are not ineligible for visas or admission under the grounds for
inadmissibility spelled out in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).8 These
criteria are:
! health-related grounds;
! criminal history;9
! security and terrorist concerns;
! public charge (e.g., indigence);
! seeking to work without proper labor certification;
! illegal entry and immigration law violations;
! ineligible for citizenship; and,
! aliens previously removed.
Some grounds for inadmissibility may be waived or are not applicable in the case of
nonimmigrants, refugees (e.g., public charge),10 and other aliens. For aliens seeking
to enter temporarily as nonimmigrants, even the terrorism grounds for inadmissibility
may possibly be waived for aliens who do not pose an immediate danger.11 As the
terrorism grounds broadened from active and former terrorists to representatives of
terrorist organizations to members and supporters of terrorist organizations to those
who may have endorsed or espoused terrorism at one time, many believed it was
appropriate to at least leave open the possibility of a waiver to allow temporary
admission for limited purposes and subject to strict controls.12
6 Certain classes of aliens are not required to obtain a visa to enter the United States and are
therefore exempt from the consular review process. For example, under the visa waiver
program (VWP), nationals from certain countries are permitted to enter the United States
as temporary visitors (nonimmigrants) for business or pleasure without first obtaining a visa
from a U.S. consulate abroad. See INA § 217; 8 U.S.C. § 1187. For additional background
on the VWP, see CRS Report RL32221, Visa Waiver Program, by Alison Siskin.
7 For background and analysis of alien screening and visa issuance policy, see CRS Report
RL31512, Visa Issuances: Policy, Issues, and Legislation, by Ruth Ellen Wasem.
8 INA § 212(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a).
9 For a full discussion of this ground, see CRS Report RL32480, Immigration Consequences
of Criminal Activity, by Michael John Garcia and Larry M. Eig.
10 All family-based immigrants and employment-based immigrants who are sponsored by
a relative must have binding affidavits of support signed by U.S. sponsors in order to show
that they will not become public charges.
11 INA § 212(d)(3); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3).
12 See, e.g., International Terrorism: Threats and Responses, Hearings on H.R. 1710, the
Comprehensive Antiterrorism Act of 1995, Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary , 104th
(continued...)

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Key Legislation
Prior to the Immigration Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-649), there was no express
terrorism-related ground for exclusion. Congress added the terrorism ground in the
1990 Act as part of a broader effort to streamline and modernize the security and
foreign policy grounds for inadmissibility and removal. Before 1990, certain
terrorists were excludable under security grounds, but the 1990 Act opened the door
for broader elaboration of what associations and promotional activities could be
deemed to be terrorist activities. In part as a response to the 1993 World Trade
Center bombing, Congress strengthened the anti-terrorism provisions in the INA and
passed provisions that many maintained would ramp up enforcement activities,
notably in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
(IIRIRA) of 1996 (P.L. 104-208) and the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act (P.L. 104-132). As part of the Violent Crime Control Act of 1994, Congress also
amended the INA to establish temporary authority for an “S” nonimmigrant visa
category for aliens who are witnesses and informants on criminal and terrorist
activities. In September 2001, Congress enacted S. 1424 (P.L. 107-45) providing
permanent authority for admission under the S visa.13
Enacted in October 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-56) is a broad anti-
terrorism measure that includes several important changes to immigration law.
Specifically in the context of this report, the USA PATRIOT Act amended the INA
to expand the definition of “terrorism” and amend the criteria and process for
designating “terrorist organizations.”
The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-
173) aimed to improve the visa issuance process abroad as well as immigration
inspections at the border. It expressly required the development of an interoperable
electronic data system to share information relevant to alien admissibility and
removability and the implementation of an integrated entry-exit data system. It also
required that, beginning in October 2004, all newly issued visas have biometric
identifiers. In addition to increasing consular officers’ access to electronic
information needed for alien screening, it expanded the training requirements for
consular officers who issue visas.14
12 (...continued)
Cong., 1st Sess., 243-244 (1995) (testimony of Jamie S. Gorelick, Deputy Attorney General)
(while strongly endorsing greater antiterrorism authority, also observing that it might be in
our interest to allow a member of a terrorist organization to enter in some circumstances).
Controversy has especially arisen from time-to-time on whether to waive terrorism
inadmissibility for certain Palestinians.
13 CRS Report RS21043, Immigration: S Visas for Criminal and Terrorist Informants, by
Karma Ester.
14 CRS Report RS21438, Immigration Legislation Enacted in the 107th Congress, by
Andorra Bruno.

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Current Law
“Terror-Related” Grounds for Inadmissibility or Deportability
under Immigration Law
Engaging in specified, terror-related activity has strict consequences upon an
alien’s ability to lawfully enter or remain in the United States. The INA provides that
aliens engaged in terror-related activities cannot legally enter the United States. If
an alien is legally admitted into the United States and subsequently engages in
terrorist activity, he is deportable.15 Even if an alien does not fall under terror-related
categories making him inadmissible or deportable, he might still be denied entry or
removed from the United States on separate, security-related grounds.
Terror-Related Grounds for Inadmissibility under the INA. The INA
categorizes certain classes of aliens as inadmissible, making them “ineligible to
receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the United States.”16 Pursuant to INA
section 212(a)(3)(B), an alien is inadmissible if he:
! has engaged in terrorist activity;
! is known or reasonably believed by a consular officer or the
Attorney General to be engaged in or likely to engage in terrorist
activity upon entry into the United States;
! has, under circumstances indicating an intention to cause death or
serious bodily harm, incited terrorist activity;
! is a representative of (A) a foreign terrorist organization, as
designated by the Secretary of State, or (B) a political, social or other
similar group whose public endorsement of acts of terrorist activity
the Secretary of State has determined undermines United States
efforts to reduce or eliminate terrorist activities;
15 Pursuant to INA section 237, any alien who has engaged, is engaged, or at any time after
admission engages in any terrorist activity is deportable. INA § 237(a)(4)(B); 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(4)(B). The scope of these grounds is considerably less broad than terror-related
grounds for inadmissibility. Membership in or association with a terrorist organization, the
endorsement or espousal of terrorist activity, or being the spouse or child of an alien who
was inadmissible to the United States on terror-related grounds would not appear to provide
grounds for deporting an alien legally present in the United States, even if these grounds
would make an alien seeking to enter the United States statutorily inadmissible. Compare
INA § 237(a)(4)(B); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(4)(B) (detailing terror-related grounds for
deportability) with INA § 212(a)(3)(B); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) (detailing terror-related
grounds for inadmissibility). House-passed H.R. 10 would have made the grounds for
deportability for terror-related activity the same as the grounds for inadmissibility, but this
provision was not included in the final version of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004. However, the act does make the receipt of military-type training
from or on behalf of a designated terrorist organization a ground for deportability. P.L.
108-458, § 5402.
16 INA § 212(a); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a).

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CRS-6
! is either a member of a foreign terrorist organization, as designated
by the Secretary of State, or is an officer, official, representative, or
spokesman of the Palestine Liberation Organization;
! has used his position of prominence within any country to endorse
or espouse terrorist activity, or to persuade others to support terrorist
activity or a terrorist organization, in a way that the Secretary of
State has determined undermines United States efforts to reduce or
eliminate terrorist activities; or
! is the spouse or child of an alien who is inadmissible under this
section, if the activity causing the alien to be found inadmissible
occurred within the last five years, unless the spouse or child (A) did
not and should not have reasonably known about the terrorist
activity or (B) in the reasonable belief of the consular officer or
Attorney General, has renounced the activity causing the alien to be
found inadmissible under this section.17
An additional, catch-all provision of section 212(a) provides that association with
terrorist organizations may also be grounds for inadmissibility. Any alien who either
the Secretary of State or Attorney General, after consultation with the other,
determines has been associated with a “terrorist organization and intends while in the
United States to engage solely, principally, or incidentally in activities that could
endanger the welfare, safety, or security of the United States is inadmissible.”18
Definitions of Terror-Related Terms in the INA
Terms including “terrorist activity,” “engaged in terrorist activity,” and “terrorist
organization” are specifically defined for INA purposes and refer to distinct concepts.
This section will discuss the meaning of these terms as they relate to immigration
matters.
Definition of “Terrorist Activity” under the INA. For purposes of
immigration matters covered by the INA, “terrorist activity” is defined by INA
17 INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(i); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(i).
18 INA § 212(a)(3)(F); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(F). House-passed H.R. 10 would have
modified the terror-related grounds for admissibility. Pursuant to House-passed H.R. 10,
an alien’s membership in a political, social or other similar group that endorsed or espoused
terrorist activity would have been grounds for inadmissibility, without requiring the
Secretary of State to first determine that such endorsements undermined U.S. efforts to
reduce or eliminate terrorist activities. Membership in a terrorist organization would have
been a ground for alien inadmissibility unless the alien could demonstrate by clear and
convincing evidence that he or she did not know, or should not have reasonably known, that
the organization was a terrorist organization. The endorsement or espousal of terrorist
activity, or the persuasion of others to support terrorist activity or a terrorist organization,
would also have been made sufficient grounds for inadmissibility regardless of whether the
responsible alien (1) used his or her position of prominence to espouse or incite the
terror-related activity or (2) had been determined by the Secretary of State to have acted in
a manner that undermines U.S. efforts to reduce or eliminate terrorist activities. Receiving
military-training on or behalf of a terrorist organization would also have made an alien
inadmissible.

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CRS-7
section 212(a)(3)(B). In order for an action to constitute “terrorist activity,” it must
be unlawful in the place where it was committed and involve:
! the hijacking or sabotage of an aircraft, vessel, or other vehicle;
! seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to
detain, another individual in order to compel a third person
(including a governmental organization) to do or abstain from doing
any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the
individual seized or detained;
! a violent attack upon an internationally protected person (e.g., Head
of State, Foreign Minister, ambassador);19
! an assassination;
! the use of any biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon
or device;
! the use of any explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous
device (other than for mere personal monetary gain), with intent to
endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more individuals
or to cause substantial damage to property; or
! a threat, attempt, or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing.20
Definition of “Engaged in Terrorist Activity” under the INA. The INA
treats being “engaged in terrorist activity” as a separate concept from terrorist activity
itself. Whereas “terrorist activity” includes direct acts of violence — for instance,
hijacking a plane or threatening persons with bodily harm in order to compel third-
party action — actions that constitute being “engaged in terrorist activity” include
such acts as well as specified acts that facilitate terrorist activity, such as preparing,
funding, or providing material support for terrorist activities. In order to be “engaged
in terrorist activity,” an alien must, either as an individual or as part of an
organization:
! commit or incite to commit, under circumstances indicating an
intention to cause death or serious bodily injury, a terrorist activity;
! prepare or plan a terrorist activity;
! gather information on potential targets for a terrorist activity;
! solicit funds or other things of value for a (1) terrorist activity, (2) a
designated terrorist organization, or (3) a non-designated terrorist
organization, unless the solicitor can demonstrate that he did not
know, and should not reasonably have known, that the solicitation
would further the non-designated organization’s terrorist activity;
19 “Internationally protected person” is defined under U.S. law as “(A) a Chief of State or
the political equivalent, head of government, or Foreign Minister whenever such person is
in a country other than his own and any member of his family accompanying him; or (B) any
other representative, officer, employee, or agent of the United States Government, a foreign
government, or international organization who at the time and place concerned is entitled
pursuant to international law to special protection against attack upon his person, freedom,
or dignity, and any member of his family then forming part of his household.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 1116(b)(4).
20 INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iii); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii).

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CRS-8
! solicit another individual to (1) engage in terrorist activity, (2) join
a designated terrorist organization, or (3) join a non-designated
terrorist organization, unless the solicitor can demonstrate that he
did not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the
solicitation would further the non-designated organization’s terrorist
activity; or
! commit an act that the alien knows, or reasonably should know,
provides material support — including a safe house, transportation,
communications, funds, transfer of funds or other material financial
benefit, false documentation or identification, weapons (including
chemical, biological, or radiological weapons), explosives, or
training — to (1) the commission of a terrorist activity, (2) an
individual or organization that the alien knows or should reasonably
know has committed or plans to commit a terrorist activity, (3) a
designated terrorist organization, or (4) a non-designated terrorist
organization, unless the support provider can demonstrate that he did
not know, and should not reasonably have known, that the support
would further the non-designated organization’s terrorist activity.21
An alien who has provided material support to an individual or organization engaging
in terrorist activity will not himself be considered to have “engaged in terrorist
activity” for purposes of the INA if the Secretary of State or Attorney General,
following consultation with the other, concludes in his sole, unreviewable discretion
that the definition of “terrorist activity” does not apply.22
Definition of “Terrorist Organization” under the INA. For purposes of
the INA, a “terrorist organization” includes any organization:
! designated by the Secretary of State as a terrorist organization
pursuant to INA § 219;23
! otherwise designated, upon publication in the Federal Register, by
the Secretary of State in consultation with or upon the request of the
Attorney General, as a terrorist organization, after finding that the
organization commits, incites, plans, prepares, gathers information,
or provides material support for terrorist activities; or
! is a group of two or more individuals, whether organized or not,
which commits, incites, plans, prepares, or gathers information for
terrorist activities.24
21 INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv).
22 INA § 212(a)(3)(B); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B).
23 For further discussion, see CRS Report RL32120, The ‘FTO List’ and Congress:
Sanctioning Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, by Audrey Kurth Cronin.
24 INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(iv); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv). The USA PATRIOT ACT
amended INA section 212 to expand the definition of “terrorist organization” to potentially
include terrorist organizations not designated pursuant to INA section 219. House-passed
H.R. 10 would have expanded the definition of “terrorist organization” to include any
(continued...)

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Security-Related and Foreign Policy Grounds for Deeming an
Alien Inadmissible
Even if an alien is not found inadmissible or deportable on terror-related
grounds, he may nevertheless be removed from the United States or denied entry on
separate, security-related grounds. An alien may be deemed inadmissible or
deportable if he has engaged, is engaged, or (in the case of an alien not yet admitted
into the United States) intends to engage in “any activity a purpose of which is the
opposition to, or the control or overthrow of, the Government of the United States
by force, violence, or other unlawful means.”25 In the case of aliens not yet admitted
into the United States, either a consular officer or relevant immigration authority may
designate an alien inadmissible if he has reasonable grounds to believe that the alien
seeks to enter the United States to engage in such conduct.26
Further, if the Secretary of State has reasonable grounds to believe an alien’s
entry, presence, or activities in the United States would have potentially serious
adverse foreign policy consequences for the United States, that alien may be deemed
inadmissible or deportable.27 However, an alien may not be deported or denied entry
into the United States on account of the alien’s past, current, or expected beliefs,
statements, or associations, if such beliefs, statements, or associations would be
lawful within the United States, unless the Secretary of State personally determines
that the alien’s admission would compromise a compelling United States foreign
policy interest.28
Screening Aliens for Admissibility
Visa Issuance
Personal interviews are required for all prospective legal permanent residents
and are generally required for foreign nationals seeking nonimmigrant visas.29 The
recently enacted Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 requires
an in-person consular interview of most applicants for nonimmigrant visas between
the ages of 14 and 79. Consular officers use the Consular Consolidated Database
(CCD) to screen visa applicants. Over 82 million records of visa applications are
24 (...continued)
organization with a subgroup that engages in terrorist activity.
25 INA §§ 212(a)(3)(A), 237(a)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(3)(A), 1227(a)(3)(A).
26 INA § 212(a)(3)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(A).
27 INA § 212(a)(3)(C); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(C).
28 INA §§ 212(a)(3)(C)(iii), 237(a)(3)(C)(ii); 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(3)(C)(iii),
1227(a)(3)(C)(ii).
29 22 C.F.R. §42.62. Personal interview waivers may be granted only to children under age
16, persons 60 years or older, diplomats and representatives of international organizations,
aliens who are renewing a visa they obtained within the prior 12 months, and individual
cases for whom a waiver is warranted for national security or unusual circumstances. 68
Fed. Reg. 40127-40129 (Jul. 7, 2003).

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now automated in the CCD, with some records dating back to the mid-1990s.30 Since
February 2001, the CCD has stored photographs of all visa applicants in electronic
form, and more recently the CCD has begun storing finger prints of the right and left
index fingers. In addition to indicating the outcome of any prior visa application of
the alien in the CCD, the system links with other databases to flag problems that may
affect the issuance of the visa. The CCD is the nexus for screening aliens for
admissibility, notably screening on terrorist security and criminal grounds.31
Terrorist Screening. For some years, consular officers have been required
to check the background of all aliens in the “lookout” databases, specifically the
Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) and TIPOFF databases. CLASS
contains about 19.6 million records on people ineligible to receive visas, and TIPOFF
reportedly has130,000 records of people who are suspected or known terrorists or are
associated with suspected or known terrorist organizations.32 Last year, the
Administration announced the creation of the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) to
consolidate the various watchlists into a single terrorist screening database.33 There
is also the “Terrorist Exclusion List” (TEL) which lists organizations designated as
terrorist-supporting and includes the names of individuals associated with these
organizations.34
Consular officers also send suspect names to the FBI for a name check program
called Visa Condor. Visa Condor is part of the broader Security Advisory Opinion
(SAO) system that requires a consular officer abroad to refer selected visa cases,
identified by law enforcement and intelligence information (originally certain visa
30 According to the Department of State’s Office of Legislative Affairs, consular officers
have stored photographs of nonimmigrant visa applicants in an electronic database for over
ten years. These data are now in the CCD.
31 For more on alien screening procedures and policy, see CRS Report RL31512, Visa
Issuances: Policy, Issues, and Legislation, by Ruth Ellen Wasem, pp. 7-12.
32 CLASS and TIPOFF information provided by Department of State Bureau of Legislative
Affairs, e-mail dated Sept. 7, 2004. The State Department’s CLASS and TIPOFF terrorist
databases interface with the Interagency Border Inspection System (IBIS) used by the DHS
immigration inspectors. For more background, see Testimony of Maura Harty, Assistant
Secretary of State for Consular Affairs, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States, U.S. Government Agencies Aimed at Improving Border Security, hearing,
Jan. 26, 2004.
33 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD-6) ordered the creation of the Terrorist
Screening Center (TSC) to consolidate terrorist watch lists. It was issued on September 16,
2003, and directed the operations to begin on December 1, 2003. The TSC is a multi-agency
entity, including participants from the FBI, DOS, CBP, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), Secret Service, Coast Guard, Transportation Security Administration,
and the Office of Foreign Assets Control. Its stated goal is “to consolidate the
Government’s approach to terrorism screening and provide for the appropriate and lawful
use of terrorist information in screening processes.” For more on the TSC, see CRS Report
RL32366, Terrorist Identification, Screening, and Tracking Under Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 6, by William J. Krouse.
34 For background and analysis, see CRS Report RL32120, The ‘FTO List’ and Congress:
Sanctioning Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, by Audrey Kurth Cronin.

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CRS-11
applicants from 26 predominantly Muslim countries), for greater review by
intelligence and law enforcement agencies.35
Controlled Technologies. With procedures distinct from the terrorist watch
lists, consular officers screen visa applicants for employment or study that would
give the foreign national access to controlled technologies, i.e., those that could be
used to upgrade military capabilities, and refer foreign nationals from countries of
concern (e.g., China, India, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Pakistan, Sudan, and Syria) to
the FBI and other key federal agencies.36 This screening is part of a name-check
procedure known as Visa Mantis, which has the following stated objectives: (1) stem
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery systems; (2)
restrain the development of destabilizing conventional military capabilities in certain
regions of the world; (3) prevent the transfer of arms and sensitive dual-use items to
terrorist states; and (4) maintain U.S. advantages in certain militarily critical
technologies.
Biometric Visas. Aliens who are successful in their request for a visa are
then issued the actual travel document.37 For the past several years, Consular Affairs
has been issuing machine-readable visas. By October 2004, all visas issued by the
United States must use biometric identifiers (e.g., scans of the right and left index
fingers) in addition to the digitized photograph that has been collected for some
time.38 According to the DOS, all of the over 200 visa-issuing consular posts met the
October 2004 deadline for biometric visas.39 These biometric data are available
through the CCD to CBP officers at ports of entry as well as to consular officers
abroad.
Terrorist Travel. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of
2004 establishes an Office of Visa and Passport Security in the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security of the Department of State, headed by a person with the rank of Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security. The Deputy Assistant Secretary,
in coordination with the appropriate officials of the Department of Homeland
35 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on International
Operations and Terrorism, The Post 9/11 Visa Reforms and New Technology: Achieving the
Necessary Security Improvements in a Global Environment, hearing, Oct. 23, 2003.
36 U.S. General Accounting Office, Export Controls: Department of Commerce Controls
Over Transfers of Technology to Foreign Nationals Needs Improvement, GAO-02-972
(Sept. 2002).
37 For a full discussion of biometric visas, see congressional distribution memorandum,
Biometric and Laser Visas: Background and Current Policy, by Ruth Ellen Wasem, Aug.
19, 2004.
38 Section 414 of the USA PATRIOT ACT (PL. 107-56) and Section 303 of the Enhanced
Border Security and Visa Reform Act (P.L. 107-173) require that visas and other travel
documents contain a biometric identifier and are tamper-resistant.
39 Testimony of Colin L. Powell, Secretary of State, U.S. Congress, House Committee on
the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security and Claims, Should Congress
Extend the October 2004 Statutory Deadline for Requiring Foreign Visitors to Present
Biometric Passports?, hearing, Apr. 21, 2004.

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Security, are tasked with preparing a strategic plan to target and disrupt individuals
and organizations at home and in foreign countries that are involved in the fraudulent
production, distribution, or use of visas, passports and other documents used to gain
entry to the United States. This strategic plan is to emphasize individuals and
organizations that may have links to domestic terrorist organizations or foreign
terrorist organizations as defined by INA. This office also analyzes methods used by
terrorists to travel internationally, particularly the use of false or altered travel
documents to illegally enter foreign countries and the United States, and it advises
the Bureau of Consular Affairs on changes to the visa issuance process that could
combat such methods, including the introduction of new technologies.
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 requires the
Secretary of DHS, in consultation with the Secretary of State, to submit to Congress
a plan to ensure that DHS and DOS acquire and deploy to all consulates, ports of
entry, and immigration services offices, technologies that facilitate document
authentication and the detection of potential terrorist indicators on travel documents.
The law further requires that the plan address the feasibility of using such
technologies to screen passports submitted for identification purposes to a United
States consular, border, or immigration official.
Admissibility at Ports of Entry
Border Inspections. The INA requires the inspection of all aliens who seek
entry into the United States; possession of a visa or another form of travel document
does not guarantee admission into the United States.40 Border inspections are
extremely important because many foreign nationals enter the United States without
visas. Perhaps the most notable exception to the visa is through the Visa Waiver
Program (VWP), a provision of the INA that allows the visa requirements to be
waived for aliens coming as visitors from 27 countries that meet certain standards
(e.g., Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, and Switzerland).41 In
addition to the VWP, there are exceptions to documentary requirements for a visa
that have been established by law, treaty, or regulation — most notably for citizens
of Canada.42
Primary inspection at the port of entry consists of a brief interview with a CBP
officer, a cursory check of the traveler’s documents and a query of the Interagency
Border Inspection System (IBIS).43 If the inspector is suspicious that the traveler
40 For a comprehensive analysis, see CRS Report RL32399, Border Security: Inspections
Practices, Policies, and Issues, coordinated by Ruth Ellen Wasem with Jennifer Lake,
James Monk, Lisa Seghetti, and Stephen Viña.
41 See CRS Report RL32221, Visa Waiver Program, by Alison Siskin.
42 See CRS Congressional Distribution Memorandum, Waiving the Documentary
Requirements for Visas and Passports to Enter the United States, by Ruth Ellen Wasem and
Andorra Bruno, Oct. 27, 2003.
43 IBIS is a broad system that interfaces with the FBI’s National Crime Information Center
(NCIC), the Treasury Department’s Enforcement and Communications System (TECS II),
(continued...)

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CRS-13
may be inadmissible under the INA or in violation of other U.S. laws, the traveler is
referred to a secondary inspection. During secondary inspections, travelers are
questioned extensively and travel documents are further examined. Several
immigration databases are queried as well, including lookout databases.44
US-VISIT. Many nonimmigrants are entered into the US-VISIT system that
uses biometric identification (i.e., finger scans and digital photographs) to check
identity and track presence in the United States. It collects biometric information that
is entered into an existing system called Automated Biometric Fingerprint
Identification System (IDENT).45 On January 5, 2004, US-VISIT was implemented
at 115 airports and 14 seaports, and pilot programs were established at one airport
and one seaport for the collection of biometric information of aliens leaving the
United States.46 “Exit pilot programs” are now in place at 15 air or sea ports. On
August 20, 2004, DHS added six new entry ports and deleted two entry ports that had
inadvertently been listed on the January 5, 2004 roster of ports that were part of the
US-VISIT system.47 The Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004
calls for a more accelerated implementation of a comprehensive entry and exit data
system.
Pre-inspection. To keep inadmissible aliens from departing for the United
States, IIRIRA required the implementation of a pre-inspection program at selected
locations overseas. At these foreign airports, U.S. immigration officers inspect aliens
43 (...continued)
the former INS’s National Automated Immigration Lookout System (NAILS) and Non-
immigrant Information System (NIIS) and the DOS’s Consular Consolidated Database
(CCD), Consular Lookout And Support System (CLASS) and TIPOFF terrorist databases.
Because of the numerous systems and databases that interface with IBIS, the system is able
to obtain such information as whether an alien is admissible, an alien’s criminal information,
and whether an alien is wanted by law enforcement.
44 The Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) is developing a consolidated lookout database that
is not yet fully operational. For more on lookout and terrorist screening databases of the
TSC, see CRS Report RL32366, Terrorist Identification, Screening, and Tracking Under
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6, by William J. Krouse. The National Security
Entry-Exit Registry System (NSEERS) and the Student and Exchange Visitor Information
System (SEVIS) are also used during secondary inspections. For more on NSEERS, see
CRS Report RL31570, Immigration: Alien Registration, by Andorra Bruno. For more on
SEVIS, see CRS Report RL32188, Monitoring Foreign Students in the United States: The
Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS), by Alison Siskin.
45 The US-VISIT program was established to respond to statutory provisions that require
DHS to create an integrated, automated entry and exit data system that (1) uses available
data to produce reports on alien arrivals and departures; (2) deploys equipment at all ports
of entry to allow for the verification of aliens’ identities and the authentication of their travel
documents through the comparison of biometric identifiers; and (3) records alien arrival and
departure information from biometrically authenticated documents. See CRS Report
RL32234, U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program (US-VISIT),
for a complete legislative history of the requirements.
46 69 Fed. Reg. 482 (Jan. 5, 2004).
47 69 Fed. Reg. 51695 (Aug. 20, 2004), amended by 69 Fed. Reg. 52516 (Aug. 26, 2004).

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CRS-14
before their final departure to the United States. IIRIRA also authorized assistance
to air carriers at selected foreign airports to help in the detection of fraudulent
documents. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004 directs
DHS to expand the pre-inspection program at foreign airports to at least 15 and up
to 25 airports, and submit a a report on the progress of the expansion by June 30,
2006. The act also directs DHS to expand the Immigration Security Initiative, which
places CBP inspectors at foreign airports to prevent people identified as national
security threats from entering the country. The new law requires that at least 50
airports participate in the Immigration Security Initiative by December 31, 2006.
Expedited Removal under INA § 235(c). Pursuant to INA section 235(c),
in cases where the arriving alien is suspected of being inadmissible on security or
related grounds, including terror-related activity, the alien may be summarily
excluded by the regional director with no further administrative right to appeal. The
Attorney General shall review such orders of removal.48 If the Attorney General
concludes on the basis of confidential information that the alien is inadmissible on
security or related grounds under section 212(a)(3) of the INA, and determines after
consulting with appropriate U.S. security agencies that disclosure of such information
would be prejudicial to the public interest, safety, or security, the regional director
of the CBP is authorized to deny any further inquiry as to the alien’s status and either
order the alien removed or order disposal of the case as the director deems
appropriate.49
Generally, an alien’s removal to a particular country is withheld upon a showing
that his life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of his race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.50
However, an alien is, with limited exception, ineligible for this remedy if, inter alia,
he has been convicted of an aggravated felony or “there are reasonable grounds to
believe that the alien is a danger to the security of the United States.”51 Pursuant to
U.S. legislation implementing the U.N. Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Torture Convention), all aliens —
including those otherwise ineligible for withholding of removal and/or subject to
expedited removal on security or related grounds such as terror-related activity —
may not be removed to a country where they are “more likely than not to be
tortured.”52
48 INA § 235(c)(2)(A); 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c)(2)(A).
49 See 8 C.F.R. § 235.8(b)(1).
50 INA § 241(b)(3); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3).
51 INA § 241(b)(3)(B); 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B).
52 Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act, P.L. 105-277, § 2242. For further
discussion, see CRS Report RL32276, The U.N. Convention Against Torture: Overview of
U.S. Implementation Policy Concerning the Removal of Aliens, by Michael John Garcia, pp.
10-11. House-passed H.R. 10 would have expanded the class of aliens generally ineligible
for withholding of removal to include aliens described by the terror-related grounds for
inadmissibility or deportability, unless the Secretary of DHS determines that there are not
reasonable grounds for believing that the alien is a danger to the security of the United
(continued...)

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Legislation in the 109th Congress
It was widely reported that the immigration provisions in House-passed H.R. 10
that were dropped from the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004
(P.L. 108-458) would be re-introduced in the 109th Congress and taken up early in the
first session. Many (but not necessarily all) of the immigration provisions that the
conferees dropped from the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004
have been included the REAL ID Act of 2005,53 which passed the House as H.R.
418 on February 10, 2005, and was also passed by the House on March 12, 2005 as
part of the FY2005 supplemental appropriations for military operations in Iraq and
Afghanistan, other foreign aid (H.R. 1268)
The REAL ID Act
The provisions of the REAL ID Act (§§ 103-104) relating to inadmissibility on
terror-related grounds mirror those found in § 3034 of House-passed H.R. 10, except
that the REAL ID Act would also repeal certain overlapping and potentially
conflicting provisions of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of
2004. Some of the key revisions the REAL ID Act would make are:
! would expand the applicable definition of the term “engage in
terrorist activity.” Thus, under the REAL ID Act, an alien who
solicited on behalf of or provided material support for a
non-designated terrorist organization would be inadmissible unless
he demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that he did not
and should not have reasonably known that he was soliciting on
behalf of or providing material support for a group that met the
definition of “terrorist organization” found in INA §
212(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III);
! would retain the authorities that allow a consular officer, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, or the Attorney General to declare
an alien inadmissible if the alien is known to be engaged in terrorist
activity or is likely to engage in such activity upon entry into the
United States;
! would expand this ground for inadmissibility to deny admission to
a representative of any group that constituted a “terrorist
organization,” as defined under INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(vi);
! would also make inadmissible any representative of a political,
social or other similar group that endorses or espouses terrorist;
! would substantially increase the grounds for inadmissibility on
account of membership in a terrorist organization;
52 (...continued)
States. However, it would not have limited relief under regulations implementing the
Torture Convention.
53 For a legal analysis of H.R. 418, see CRS Report RL32754, Immigration: Analysis of the
Major Provisions of H.R. 418, the REAL ID Act of 2005, by Michael Garcia, Margaret
Mikyung Lee, and Todd Tatelman.

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! would make inadmissible any alien who espouses or endorses
terrorist activity, or persuades others to support terrorist activity or
a terrorist organization, regardless of whether the alien has a position
of prominence and his espousal undermines U.S. efforts to reduce
terrorism in the opinion of the Secretary of State; and
! would make inadmissible any alien who has received military-type
training from or on behalf of any organization that, at the time the
training was received, was a terrorist organization, a term defined
under INA § 212(a)(3)(B)(vi) (and amended by REAL ID Act §
103(c)).
Opponents of the REAL ID Act argue that it would impose “guilt by
association,” rendering people deportable for wholly lawful and peaceful activity if
such activity supports any group that has engaged in the use of weapons or has
threatened to use weapons. Some maintain that anyone who has given money to
entities such as a hospital or school that has an association in any way with a group
that uses guns (or threatens to use guns) would be deportable if the REAL ID Act
were enacted.
Proponents of the REAL ID Act state that it seeks to prevent another 9/11-type
terrorist attack by disrupting terrorist travel and argue that these reforms to
inadmissibility (and removal) are essential. Supporters maintain that these provisions
close avenues that terrorists might otherwise use to gain entry to the United States
and bring consistency to the treatment of aliens who are inadmissible as well as those
who are removable on terrorist grounds.
After two days of debate, H.R. 418 as amended passed the House on February
10, 2005, by a vote of 261-161. The REAL ID Act also passed the House on March
12, 2005 as part of the FY2005 supplemental appropriations for military operations
in Iraq and Afghanistan, reconstruction in Afghanistan and other foreign aid (H.R.
1268). Although the version of H.R. 1268 which passed the Senate did not include
the REAL ID Act, the act’s provisions concerning the terrorist-related grounds for
inadmissiblity and deportability are contained in the conference report resolving
differences between the House and Senate versions of H.R. 1268.

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