Order Code RL32731
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Navy Aircraft Carriers: Proposed Retirement of
USS John F. Kennedy —
Issues and Options for Congress
Updated April 7, 2005
Ronald O’Rourke
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Navy Aircraft Carriers: Proposed Retirement of USS
John F. Kennedy — Issues and Options for Congress
Summary
The Navy’s FY2006 budget proposes retiring the conventionally powered
aircraft carrier John F. Kennedy (CV-67) in FY2006 and reducing the size of the
carrier force from 12 ships to 11. The Kennedy is homeported in Mayport, FL. The
proposal would not retire any other ships or any of the Navy’s carrier air wings. Prior
to this proposal, the Navy’s plan was to maintain a force of 12 carriers and keep the
Kennedy in operation until 2018.
The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the proposal to
retire the Kennedy and reduce the carrier force to 11 ships. Congress’ decision on
this issue could affect U.S. military capabilities, Department of Defense (DOD)
funding requirements, the Mayport home port, and the shipbuilding overhaul and
repair industrial base.
DOD has estimated that retiring the Kennedy in FY2006 would reduce DOD
funding requirements for FY2006-FY2011 by a net total of about $1.2 billion. The
Kennedy had been scheduled to begin a $350-million, 15-month overhaul in May
2005. In light of the proposal to retire the Kennedy, the Navy wants to use the $350
million to finance other Navy needs. On April 1, 2005, the Navy announced that it
had canceled the overhaul. The Navy and DOD reportedly are also considering
eventually reducing the carrier force further, to 10 or 9 ships.
Many observers consider the Navy’s carriers to be its most important ships.
Since the end of the Cold War, Navy carriers and their air wings have participated in
numerous operations. Carriers and their air wings are considered particularly useful
in situations where U.S. access to overseas air bases is absent or restricted.
One potential issue for the 109th Congress is whether the carrier force should
include 12 ships or some other number. If a carrier is to be retired in the near term
so as to reduce the carrier force to 11 ships, a second potential issue is whether that
carrier should be the Kennedy or another ship. Potential alternatives to the Kennedy
include the conventionally powered Kitty Hawk and the nuclear-powered carriers
Enterprise and Vinson. A third potential issue for Congress concerns the relative
military advantages of different homeporting arrangements for the carrier force.
Options for Congress for preserving at least 12 carriers include permanent
legislation, annual legislation, binding report language, and bill or report language
expressing the sense of the Congress. Options for retiring a carrier and reducing the
force to 11 ships include retiring the Kennedy in FY2006, retiring the Kennedy when
Mayport, FL is qualified as a nuclear-carrier home port, retiring the Kitty Hawk and
transferring the Kennedy to the Kitty Hawk’s home port in Japan, retiring the Kitty
Hawk and transferring a nuclear-powered carrier to Japan, retiring the Enterprise, and
retiring the Vinson. Senate Amendment 265 would add a provision to H.R. 1268,
the emergency supplemental appropriations bill for 2005, that would effectively
prohibit FY2005 funds from being used to reduce the carrier from 12 ships to 11.

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Contents
Introduction and Issue For Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Proposal To Retire Kennedy And Reduce To 11 Carriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Reported Consideration Of Reduction To 10 or 9 Carriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Size Of Carrier Force In Recent Years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Current Carrier Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Roles and Missions of Carriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Carrier Home Ports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
BRAC 2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Size Of Carrier Force . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Carrier To Be Retired . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Carrier Homeporting Arrangements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Options For Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Options for Preserving 12 Carriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Permanent Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Annual Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Binding Annual Report Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Non-Binding Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Options For Retiring A Carrier And Reducing To 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Retire Kennedy In FY2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Retire Kennedy When Mayport Is Nuclear-Qualified . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Retire Kitty Hawk and Transfer Kennedy To Yokosuka . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Retire Kitty Hawk and Transfer A Nuclear Carrier to Yokosuka . . . . 17
Retire Enterprise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Retire Vinson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Legislative Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
H.R. 304/S. 145 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
List of Tables
Table 1. Estimated Funding Changes From Carrier Retirement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Table 2. Current and Projected Navy Aircraft Carriers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

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Navy Aircraft Carriers: Proposed Retirement
of USS John F. Kennedy —
Issues and Options for Congress
Introduction and Issue For Congress
The Navy’s FY2006 budget proposes retiring the conventionally powered
aircraft carrier John F. Kennedy (CV-67) in FY2006 and reducing the size of the
carrier force from 12 ships to 11. The Kennedy is homeported in Mayport, FL, near
the Georgia border. The proposal would not retire any other ships or any of the
Navy’s carrier air wings. Prior to this proposal, the Navy’s plan was to maintain a
force of 12 carriers and keep the Kennedy in operation until 2018.
The issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the proposal to
retire the Kennedy and reduce the carrier force to 11 ships. Congress’ decision on
this issue could affect U.S. military capabilities, Department of Defense (DOD)
funding requirements, the Mayport home port, and the shipbuilding overhaul and
repair industrial base.
Background
Proposal To Retire Kennedy And Reduce To 11 Carriers
The proposal to retire the Kennedy in FY2006 first came to light in an internal
DOD budget-planning document called Program Budget Decision (PBD) 753, which
was approved on December 23, 2004, by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul
Wolfowitz. PBD 753 set forth a number of significant adjustments to the FY2006
budget and FY2006-FY2011 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP), including the
proposal to retire the Kennedy.1 The net effect of the various adjustments proposed
in PBD 753 would be to reduce projected DOD funding requirements for FY2006-
FY2011 by $30 billion, or an average of $5 billion per year.
PBD 753 estimated that retiring the Kennedy in FY2006 would reduce DOD
funding requirements for FY2006-FY2011 by a net total of about $1.2 billion, or
about 4% of the $30 billion in net savings proposed in PBD 753. Although PBD 753
1 Although PBD 753 was an internal DOD planning document, press reports on the
document began to appear by the end of December, and the text of the document was posted
in early January 2005 on a publicly accessible defense trade press website
[http://www.defensenews.com/content/static/dn.pbd753.pdf].

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CRS-2
proposes cancelling or reducing many DOD weapon procurement programs, the
retirement of the Kennedy and the resulting reduction of the Navy’s carrier force to
11 ships is the only adjustment in PBD 753 that clearly called for a reduction in the
operational force structure of a military service.
The Kennedy had been scheduled for a $350-million overhaul that was to begin
at its home port of Mayport, FL, on May 2, 2005, shift to the government-operated
Norfolk Naval Shipyard at Norfolk, VA, on June 17, 2005, and be finished there on
August 18, 2006.2 In light of the proposal to retire the Kennedy, the Navy wants to
use the $350 million to finance other Navy needs.3 On April 1, 2005, the Navy
announced that it had canceled the overhaul.4
Navy officials have said that following its retirement, the Kennedy would be
placed in preservation status (i.e., it would be “mothballed”) to preserve the option
of reactivating it at some point. The ship might be reactivated, they have said, if a
conventionally powered carrier is needed to succeed the conventionally powered
Kitty Hawk (CV-63) as the carrier that is forward-homeported in Japan (see section
below on carrier home ports).5
Table 1 on the next page shows the year-by-year funding changes for FY2006-
FY2011 of retiring the Kennedy in FY2006, as estimated in PBD 753. As shown in
the table, retiring the Kennedy would result in an estimated steady-state savings of
roughly $300 million per year starting in FY2008, including roughly $200 million per
year for crew pay and allowances, and roughly $100 million per year in ship
operation and maintenance (O&M) costs. The $179 million additional cost in
FY2006 is a financial payment to the Norfolk Naval Shipyard to compensate that
yard for the loss of the Kennedy overhaul. The payment is intended to avoid
furloughs at the yard and prevent a steep increase in the man-day rates (i.e., daily
2 The total cost of the overhaul was estimated at about $350 million. Congress provided
funds for the total cost of the overhaul in the FY2005 defense budget. Of the approximate
$350-million total cost, the work at Mayport was estimated at roughly $20.5 million, another
$254 million was budgeted for the Norfolk Naval Shipyard, and another $75 million or so
was budgeted for work to be done, or materials to be provided by, various public- and
private-sector organizations in the Norfolk area and other locations. As of early January
2005, a total of about $24 million had been spent for advance planning for the overhaul.
(Source: Telephone conversations with Navy Office of Legislative Affairs and OPNAV
N431 — a branch of the Navy’s Fleet Readiness and Logistics [N4] office — on Jan. 7,
2005.)
3 See, for example, Geoff Fein, “Navy To Redirect Funds For Kennedy Overhaul To
Maintain Other Ships,” Defense Daily, March 17, 2005; Dale Eisman, “Carrier Speeding To
Retirement,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, March 11, 2005. Competitive bids for work involved
in the overhaul were originally scheduled to be submitted by January 19, but the Navy in
January postponed that deadline to March. (Allison Connolly, “Navy Delays Overhaul Bids
On JFK,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, Jan. 7, 2005.)
4 William H. McMichael, “Kennedy Overhaul Work Stops,” NavyTimes.com, April 1, 2005.
5 See, for example, Geoff Fein, “Navy To Redirect Funds For Kennedy Overhaul To
Maintain Other Ships,” Defense Daily, March 17, 2005; Dale Eisman, “Navy Plans To
Mothball Carrier JFK, Not Scrap It,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, February 18, 2005.

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CRS-3
laborer costs) that the yard charges for overhaul and repair work to be done there on
other Navy ships.
Table 1. Estimated Funding Changes From Carrier Retirement
(FY2006-FY2011, in millions of then-year dollars)
FY06-
FY06
FY07
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
FY11
Total
Personnel pay
- 90.0
- 184.0
- 189.0
- 197.0
- 203.0
- 863.0
& allowances
Ship operations
- 33.8
- 26.8
- 49.9
- 46.4
- 47.3
- 40.2
- 244.4
Ship
- 10.9
- 40.5
- 54.4
- 41.0
- 60.0
- 63.3
- 270.1
maintenance
Workload loss
179.0
179.0
TOTAL
134.3
- 157.3
- 288.3
- 276.4
- 304.3
- 306.5
- 1,198.5
Source: U.S. Department of Defense. Program Budget Decision, PBD 753. Washington, 2004.
(Dec. 23, 2004) pp. 8, 11, 12.
Reported Consideration Of Reduction To 10 or 9 Carriers
In addition to the proposal to retire the Kennedy and reduce the carrier force to
11 ships, the Navy and DOD reportedly are considering reducing the carrier force
further, to 10 or 9 ships, perhaps following the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
that DOD is scheduled to submit to Congress in late 2005 or early 2006.6
Size Of Carrier Force In Recent Years
The Navy’s force of large-deck aircraft carriers has generally fluctuated between
12 and 15 carriers since FY1951. It reached a late-Cold War peak of 15 ships in
FY1987-1991, and began declining after that, along with the size of the Navy as a
whole. The carrier force declined to 12 ships in FY1994, and has remained there
since, even while the total number of ships in the Navy has continued to decline.7
6 Jason Sherman, “More Cuts To Major Weapons Programs Could Be On The Way,” Inside
the Pentagon, Jan. 6, 2005; Bryan Bender, “Arms Reductions, Troop Increase Eyed,” Boston
Globe, Dec. 17, 2004: 1. See also Loren B. Thompson, “QDR Targets Weapons Programs;
FCS, JSF Likely Hit,” Defense Today, Dec. 10, 2004: 1, 3-4. For additional discussion on
the possibility of reducing the carrier force to nine ships and other potential Navy force-
structure reductions, see CRS Report RL32665, Potential Navy Force Structure and
Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
7 The carrier force reached 16 carriers in FY1962 and FY1965. The carrier force numbered
13 ships from FY1976 through FY1981, 14 ships from FY1982 through FY1986, 15 ships
from FY1987 through FY1991, 14 ships in FY1992, 13 ships in FY1993, and 12 ships since
(continued...)

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CRS-4
From FY1995 through FY2000, the Kennedy was operated as an
“operational/reserve training carrier” with a partially reserve crew. During this
period, the Navy’s force of 12 carriers was often characterized as an “11+1” force.
The Kennedy reverted to being a fully active carrier in FY2001.
Current Carrier Force
Table 2 on the next page summarizes the Navy’s carrier force. As shown in the
table, the force currently includes two conventionally powered carriers — the Kitty
Hawk (CV-63) and the Kennedy (CV-67) — and 10 nuclear-powered carriers — the
one-of-a-kind Enterprise (CVN-65) and nine Nimitz-class ships (CVN-68 through
-76). The paragraphs below provide information about individual carriers that is of
potential relevance to the proposal to retire the Kennedy in FY2006.
The Kitty Hawk, Navy’s oldest carrier, entered service in April 1961. In 1991,
the ship completed an extensive service life extension program (SLEP) overhaul that
was intended to extend its service life from about 30 years to about 45 years. The
ship is scheduled to be replaced in 2008, at age 47, by the George H. W. Bush (CVN-
77), which was procured in FY2001.
The Enterprise, the Navy’s next-oldest carrier, entered service in November
1961, seven months after the Kitty Hawk. In 1994, the ship completed a nuclear
refueling complex overhaul (RCOH) that was intended to extend its service life by
about 20 years, to 2014. The ship is scheduled to be replaced in 2015 by CVN-21
(also called CVN-78), a new carrier that the Navy plans to procure in FY2008.8
Unlike the Navy’s newer Nimitz-class carriers, each of which is powered by two
nuclear reactors, the Enterprise is powered by eight nuclear reactors, making the
Enterprise’s reactor plant more complex and expensive to maintain, at least in the
view of some observers, than the reactor plants of the Nimitz-class ships.
The Kennedy, the Navy’s third-oldest carrier, entered service in 1968. Unlike
the Kitty Hawk, which was given an extensive SLEP overhaul, the Kennedy was
given a less extensive (but still fairly substantial) complex overhaul (COH) that was
completed in 1995.9 Prior to the proposal to retire the Kennedy in FY2006, the
Kennedy was scheduled to replaced in FY2018, at age 50, by CVN-22 (also called
7 (...continued)
FY1994. These figures are for the end of each fiscal year. The total size of the Navy
reached a late-Cold War peak of 568 battle force ships in FY1987 and began declining
thereafter. In 1994, when the current total of 12 carriers was reached, the total number of
battle force ships had declined to 391 ships. The Navy has since declined to 289 battle force
ships as of March 18, 2005.
8 For more on CVN-21, see CRS Report RS20643, Navy CVN-21 Aircraft Carrier Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.
9 The SLEP overhaul for the Kitty Hawk lasted about 3½ years, from January 28, 1988, to
August 31, 1991. The complex overhaul for the Kennedy lasted two years, from September
13, 1993, to September 15, 1995, and was budgeted at about $491 million. (Source: Polmar,
Norman. The Naval Institute Guide to the Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet. Annapolis
(MD), Naval Institute Press, 1997 (17th edition). p. 118.

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CRS-5
CVN-79), an aircraft carrier that the Navy had planned to procure in FY2011. (The
FY2006 budget and FY2006-FY2011 FYDP defers the procurement of CVN-22 to
a year beyond FY2011.)10 Since the Kennedy did not receive a SLEP overhaul at
about age 30, some observers have questioned whether the ship could be kept in
service to age 50.
Table 2. Current and Projected Navy Aircraft Carriers
(projected carriers in italics)
Hull
In
Name
Procured
Notes
Number
Service
CV-63
Kitty Hawk
FY56
4/1961
Home port Yokosuka, Japan.
SLEP completed 1991. To be
replaced by CVN-77 in 2008.
CVN-65
Enterprise
FY58
11/1961
Home port Norfolk, VA. RCOH
completed 1994. To be replaced
by CVN-21 in 2014.
CV-67
John F. Kennedy
FY63
1968
Home port Mayport, FL. COH
completed 1995. Was to be
replaced by CVN-22 in 2018 .
CVN-68
Nimitz
FY67
1975
RCOH completed 2001.
CVN-69
Dwight D. Eisenhower
FY70
1977
RCOH to be completed 2004.
CVN-70
Carl Vinson
FY74
1982
Home port Bremerton, WA.
RCOH scheduled 2005-2008.
CVN-71
Theodore Roosevelt
FY80
1986
CVN-72
Abraham Lincoln
FY83
1989
CVN-73
George Washington
FY83
1992
CVN-74
John C. Stennis
FY88
1995
CVN-75
Harry S. Truman
FY88
1998
CVN-76
Ronald Reagan
FY95
2003
CVN-77
George H. W. Bush
FY01
2008
Is to replace CV-63 in 2008.
CVN-21
TBD
FY08
2015
Is to replace CVN-65 in 2015.
CVN-22
TBD
FY12 or
2019 or
Previous plan was to procure ship
later
later
in FY2011 and have it replace
CV-67 in 2018.
Notes: CV = conventionally powered carrier; CVN = nuclear-powered carrier; SLEP = service life
extension program overhaul; RCOH = refueling complex overhaul; COH = complex overhaul. CVN-
21 and CVN-22 also known as CVN-78 and CVN-79, respectively. Home port locations as of
December 2004.
10 For more on CVN-22, see CRS Report RS20643, op cit.

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CRS-6
The Nimitz (CVN-68), the first of the Navy’s Nimitz-class carriers, entered
service in 1975 and completed an RCOH in 2001. The Dwight D. Eisenhower
(CVN-69), which entered service in 1977, was scheduled to complete an RCOH in
November 2004. These RCOHs, like the Enterprise RCOH, are intended to permit
each ship to remain in service for an additional 20 years.
The Carl Vinson (CVN-70), the third Nimitz-class carrier, entered service in
1982. The ship is scheduled for an RCOH that is to begin in November 2005 and
finish in November 2008. The total estimated cost of this RCOH is $3,134.3 million,
of which $861.5 million in advance procurement funding has been provided from
FY2001 through FY2005. The Navy has requested another $1,493.6 for FY2006,
and plans to request the final $779.2 million in FY2007. Nimitz-class RCOHs are
performed by Northrop Grumman’s Newport News (NGNN) shipyard, located at
Newport News, VA.
Roles and Missions of Carriers
Many observers consider the Navy’s carriers to be its primary capital ships —
its most important ships, both operationally and symbolically.11 Shorthand
descriptions of the Navy have often been based on the number of carriers in the fleet.
The 600-ship Navy planned by Reagan administration in the 1980s, for example, was
often referred to as a 15-carrier Navy. Observers have noted over the years that when
a crisis occurs overseas, one of the first questions asked by U.S. leaders has often
been, “Where are the carriers?”
Carrier-based aircraft are capable of performing various missions. Since the end
of the Cold War, Navy carriers and their air wings have spent much of their time
enforcing no-fly zones over Iraq and conducting land-attack operations in the
Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Carriers and their air wings are considered
particularly useful in situations where U.S. access to overseas air bases is absent or
restricted — a circumstance that some observers believe has become more likely
since the end of the Cold War. Carriers can also be used for other purposes. In 1994,
a carrier was used to transport a helicopter-borne Army unit to the vicinity of Haiti,
and in 2001-2002, a carrier was used to embark helicopter-borne special operations
forces that were used in Afghanistan. Carries have also been used in disaster-relief
operations, such as the recent one for assisting countries affected by the Indian Ocean
tsunami. Given their ability to embark different combinations of aircraft, carriers are
considered to be highly flexible naval platforms.
Carrier Home Ports
As of December 3, 2004, the Navy’s 6 Pacific Fleet carriers were homeported
at San Diego, CA (2 ships), Bremerton, WA (2 ships), Everett, WA (1 ship), and
Yokosuka, Japan (1 ship), while the Navy’s 6 Atlantic Fleet carriers were
homeported at Norfolk, VA (5 ships) and Mayport, FL (1 ship — the Kennedy).
11 The Navy’s ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) are also often considered the Navy’s
primary capital ships. SSBNs are dedicated to the specialized mission of strategic nuclear
deterrence.

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CRS-7
The Kennedy, whose crew numbers about 2,900, contributes about $250 million
each year to the local Mayport economy.12
In addition to the Kennedy, Mayport as of December 3, 2004 was the home port
for 20 other Navy ships — four cruisers, five destroyers, and 11 frigates. Some of
these ships belong to the Kennedy battle group. Mayport currently is not qualified
to serve as the home port for a nuclear-powered carrier, but some studies on what it
would take to qualify Mayport as a nuclear-carrier home port have been undertaken
in recent years. Mayport is close to the naval air station at Jacksonville, FL, where
some of the Navy’s aircraft are based, and to the naval aviation depot at Jacksonville,
which repairs some of the Navy’s planes.
The Navy has forward-homeported a carrier at Yokosuka (pronounced yo-KOS-
ka) since the early 1970s. The forward homeporting of a carrier in Japan
considerably reduces the total number of carriers needed in the force to maintain day-
to-day deployments of carriers in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean. The Kitty
Hawk is the third Navy carrier to be homeported there. All three have been
conventionally powered. (The other two have since been retired.) In light of strong
anti-nuclear sentiments in Japan that date back to the U.S. use of two nuclear bombs
against Japan in World War II, observers believe that a Navy proposal to homeport
one of its nuclear-powered carriers there would meet with potentially substantial
public opposition.13
The Navy is reportedly considering transferring one of its carriers to Hawaii or
Guam. Homeporting a carrier in Hawaii or Guam would further reduce the total
number of carriers needed in the force to maintain day-to-day deployments of carriers
in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean.
BRAC 2005
The proposal to retire the Kennedy, which would leave Mayport at least
temporarily without a carrier, comes in the midst of the 2005 round of the Base
Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process. BRAC rounds can generate concern
among Members and their constituents regarding the potential fate of military bases
in their areas. In the midst of a BRAC round, actions that might reduce the
importance of a base — such as the removal of a major military unit — can increase
concerns regarding the fate of that base.14
Senator John Warner, the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee,
has expressed concern that conducting an environmental impact study (EIS) on
12 Source for crew size and $250-million figure: January 19, 2005, email from Navy Office
of Legislative Affairs. The figure of 2,900 is for the crew that operates the ship. An
additional 2,500 or so personnel operates the ship’s embarked air wing, but most or all of
those personnel are based in locations elsewhere in the United States.
13 For a discussion of this issue, see Christopher P. Cavas, “Next U.S. Carrier in Japan May
Be Nuclear,” DefenseNews.com, February 21, 2005.
14 For more on BRAC 2005, see CRS Report RL32216, Military Base Closures:
Implementing the 2005 Round, by David E. Lockwood.

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CRS-8
qualifying Mayport as a home port for nuclear-powered carriers could raise questions
about the integrity of the BRAC process. Secretary of the Navy Gordon England has
responded by saying that, in his view, conducting an EIS would not interfere with the
BRAC process.15
Issues for Congress
DOD’s proposal to retire the Kennedy in FY2006 and thereby reduce the carrier
force to 11 ships raises potential issues for Congress concerning the appropriate size
of the carrier force, the Navy’s selection of the Kennedy as the carrier to retire, and
carrier homeporting arrangements. Each of these is discussed below.
Size Of Carrier Force
The appropriate size of the carrier force is a frequent, even classic, topic of
debate in military force-structure planning. Over the years, as strategic,
technological, and budgetary circumstances have evolved, some observers have
argued in favor of a force of 12 or more carriers, while others have argued for a force
of 11 or fewer carriers.
Supporters of maintaining a force of 12 or more carriers, at least for the time
being, could argue the following:
! Decisions on important force-structure issues like the size of the
carrier force should be made not through a budget-planning
document such as PBD 753, but rather through a more deliberate
policy-review process such as the 2005 QDR. A decision to reduce
the carrier force to 11 ships prior to the completion of the QDR is
premature.
! During the past half century, carrier force has never dropped below
12 ships, illustrating the enduring need for a force of at least that
many ships. After experimenting with an “11+1” carrier force in
FY1995-FY2000 (11 fully active carriers plus one
operational/reserve training carrier), DOD returned to a force of 12
fully active carriers, suggesting that DOD was dissatisfied with a
force of less than 12 fully active carriers.
! Since the end of the Cold War, carriers have been kept very busy and
have proven their value in numerous operations.
15 Christopher J. Castelli, “Disagreeing With Warner, Navy Insists Mayport Study Not
BRAC Issue,” Inside the Navy, March 7, 2005; Dale Eisman, “Sen. Warner Opens Battle
To Maintain Norfolk Fleet,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, February 11, 2005.

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CRS-9
! In an era of uncertain U.S. access to overseas air bases, the value of
carriers as sovereign U.S. bases that can operate in international
waters, free from political constraints, is particularly significant.16
! The increasing number of targets that can be attacked each day by a
carrier air wing17 is making carriers even more cost effective as U.S.
military platforms, which argues in favor of retaining them in the
U.S. force structure, not retiring them.
! The Navy, like the other services, is moving to implement network-
centric warfare, which refers to the use of computers and networking
technology to link individual military units into a series of local- and
wide-area networks.18 Carrier-based aircraft are to constitute many
of the “nodes” in the network, which argues in favor of retaining
carriers in the U.S. force structure, not retiring them.
! Retiring the Kennedy would produce only 4% of the $30 billion in
net cost reductions in PBD 753. This relatively small contribution
to the total net savings in PBD 753 is not worth the operational risks
of reducing the carrier force to 11 ships. In addition, the
Quadrennial Defense Review may result in additional reductions to
weapon procurement programs, permitting the savings that would
result from retiring the Kennedy to be achieved in other ways.
Supporters of reducing the carrier force to 11 or fewer carriers starting in
FY2006 could argue the following:
! Due to changes over time in factors such as carrier missions, the
technologies that are available to carriers and their air wings for
performing missions, and policies for basing and deploying carriers,
historical figures for carrier force size are not a precise guide to
whether a future carrier force size would be adequate for performing
its required missions.
16 For a discussion of base access and its potential effect on military force planning, see CRS
Report RL31946, Iraq War: Defense Program Implications for Congress, coordinated by
Ronald O’Rourke.
17 This increase is due in large part to the advent of precision-guided munitions, which has
changed the traditional situation of needing multiple aircraft to attack a single target (i.e.,
multiple sorties per target) into one where a single aircraft can attack several individual
targets per flight (i.e., multiple targets per sortie). The Navy testified in February 2005 that
the number of targets per day that a carrier air wing can attack has increased from about 200
in 1997 to about 700 today, and will increase to more than 1,000 by 2010. See Statement
of Admiral Vernon Clark, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, Before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, 10 February 2005, page 18 (figure 6).
18 For more on NCW, see CRS Report RL32411, Network Centric Warfare: Background and
Oversight Issues for Congress, by Clay Wilson, and CRS Report RS20557, Navy
Network-Centric Warfare Concept: Key Programs and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O’Rourke.

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CRS-10
! DOD and the Navy have studied the issue of carrier force size for
many years and are familiar with the policy consequences of moving
to a force of 11 ships. In this sense, it is not inappropriate for a
proposal to reduce the carrier force level to be announced through a
budget document, and there is no need to wait for the completion of
a major policy review such as the QDR.
! The increasing number of targets that can be attacked each day by a
carrier air wing will make it possible to conduct future contingency
operations with fewer carriers than were required in the past,
reducing the number of carriers needed for warfighting purposes.
! The Navy’s recently implemented Fleet Response Plan (FRP) has
increased the Navy’s ability to surge carriers to respond to overseas
contingencies, which likewise reduces the number of carriers needed
for warfighting purposes.
! The Navy’s ability to base tactical aircraft at sea will be augmented
in future years by the Navy’s planned LHA(R)-class amphibious
assault ships, which can be viewed as medium-sized aircraft carriers.
The first LHA(R) is to be procured in FY2007.
! The Navy is currently considering a proposal to transfer an aircraft
carrier to Hawaii or Guam. Such a step would make it possible to
maintain day-to-day deployments of carriers in the Western Pacific
and Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf regions with a smaller total number
of carriers, reducing the number of carriers needed for purposes of
maintaining day-to-day forward deployments.
! The Navy also has the option of adopting a variant of multiple
crewing for its aircraft carriers, which would also reduce the number
of carriers needed for purposes of maintaining day-to-day forward
deployments.19
! Keeping the carrier force at 12 ships rather than reducing it to 11
would add $1.2 billion in funding requirements back into the
FY2006-FY2011, which could require making offsetting reductions
to other DOD programs, such as Navy, Air Force, or Army
procurement programs, or other elements of DOD force structure.
Those offsetting reductions could pose greater operational risks than
reducing the carrier force to 11 ships.
At hearings on the proposed FY2006 defense budget, DOD and Navy officials
have argued that an 11-carrier force is acceptable in light of the increasing
19 For more on the Fleet Response Plan, the possibility of transferring a carrier to Hawaii or
Guam, and the option of using a variant of multiple crewing for carriers, see CRS Report
RS21338, Navy Ship Deployments: New Approaches — Background and Issues for
Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

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CRS-11
capabilities of carrier air wings, the increased deployability of Navy carriers under
the FRP, the aviation capabilities of the Navy’s planned LHA(R) ships, and
operational risks of cutting other DOD programs to pay for keeping the carrier force
at 12 ships.20 The Chief of Naval Operations has testified that with a 12-carrier force,
the Navy, under the FRP, could surge six carriers within 30 days and another two
carriers within 60days after that — a capability referred to as “6+2.” With an 11-
carrier force, he has testified, that would change to either 6+1 or 5+2.
Carrier To Be Retired
If a carrier is to be retired in the near term so as to reduce the carrier force to 11
ships, a second potential issue for Congress is whether that carrier should be the
Kennedy or another ship. Potential alternatives to the Kennedy include the Kitty
Hawk, the Enterprise, and the Vinson.
Supporters of retiring the Kennedy rather than the Kitty Hawk, Enterprise, or
Vinson could argue the following:
! The Kennedy did not receive a full service life extension program
(SLEP) overhaul at about age 30, so keeping it in service in coming
years could become increasingly difficult and expensive. The Kitty
Hawk, in contrast, received a full SLEP overhaul at about age 30,
giving it a firmer engineering foundation for being operated to about
age 45.
! Retiring the Kitty Hawk would leave the Navy without a carrier
forward homeported in Japan, making it significantly more difficult
for the Navy to maintain carrier forward deployments in the Western
Pacific and Indian Ocean/Persian Gulf region with its remaining 11-
carrier force. Shifting the Kennedy to Japan to replace the Kitty
Hawk there would mean, at least for some time, that all the Atlantic
Fleet carriers would be based in a single location (Norfolk, VA),
which might not be prudent in light of the potential ability of
terrorists to make a catastrophic one-time attack on a U.S. home port
somewhere. Shifting a nuclear-powered carrier to Japan to replace
the Kitty Hawk there would take time and money, given the need to
qualify Yokosuka as a nuclear-carrier home port, and might very
difficult politically, given anti-nuclear sentiments in Japan.
! The conventionally powered Kennedy is less capable than the
nuclear-powered Enterprise and Vinson.21
20 See, for example, Dave Ahearn, “England Says Navy Carrier Force Shrinking; Seeks
Another LCS,” Defense Today, March 17, 2005: 1, 4; Dale Eisman, “Kennedy Should Be
Retired, Navy Leader Says,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, March 17, 2005; Geoff Fein, “Navy
To Redirect Funds For Kennedy Overhaul To Maintain Other Ships,” Defense Daily, March
17, 2005.
21 As nuclear-powered ships, the Enterprise and Vinson can make high-speed transits over
(continued...)

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CRS-12
! The Navy invested more than $2 billion for the Enterprise RCOH;
retiring the Enterprise in the near term rather than in 2014 would not
realize a full return on this investment.
! Retiring the Vinson and not performing the RCOH now scheduled
for the ship would significantly reduce the work load at Northrop
Grumman’s Newport News shipyard (NGNN), the yard that would
perform the work, which would increase the cost of other work
being done at the yard (including construction of new carriers and
construction of new attack submarines) due to reduced spreading of
fixed costs and other factors at NGNN. Increases in costs for other
work being done at NGNN would offset, perhaps significantly, the
savings associated with avoiding the Vinson RCOH and the
Vinson’s annual personnel, operation, and maintenance costs.
Supporters of retiring the Kitty Hawk, Enterprise, or Vinson rather than the
Kennedy could argue the following:
! The Kitty Hawk is generally no more capable than the Kennedy, and
is about 6½ years older than the Kennedy. Since the Kitty Hawk is
currently scheduled to be retired in 2008, about four years from now,
retiring it in the near term would not represent much of a change
from current life-cycle plans for the ship. The Kennedy, in contrast,
had been scheduled to remain in service until 2018, 14 years from
now, so retiring it in FY2006 would involve a significant change
from current life-cycle plans for the ship.
! The Kennedy could be shifted to Yokosuka to replace the Kitty
Hawk there. The first carrier homeported at Yokosuka, the Midway
(CV-41), did not receive a full SLEP overhaul, but careful
maintenance on the ship during its stay at Yokosuka permitted it to
remain in operation to age 46. In the meantime, Mayport, FL could
be qualified as quickly as feasible as a nuclear-carrier home port. A
nuclear-powered carrier could then be transferred there so as to once
again divide Navy’s Atlantic Fleet carriers between two ports rather
than concentrating them at a single home port. Since the Kitty Hawk
21 (...continued)
long distances to respond to urgent crises without need for stopping or slowing down to
refuel along the way. They do not need to be refueled upon arriving at the area of
operations, ensuring that they can commence combat operations immediately upon arrival.
And since they do not need large fuel tanks to store fossil fuel for their own propulsion
plant, they can devote more of their internal volume to the storage of aircraft fuel and
ammunition, which permits them to sustain combat operations for longer periods of time
before they need to be resupplied. The capability advantages of nuclear power are what
have justified the higher procurement and life-cycle costs of nuclear-powered carriers. In
addition, since the Enterprise (90,000 tons full load displacement) and Vinson (91,500 tons)
are somewhat larger than the Kennedy (81,500 tons), the Enterprise and Vinson might be
more able to remain stable in the water — and thus capable of conducting air operations —
in certain rough seas.

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CRS-13
is currently scheduled to be retired in 2008, retiring the Kitty Hawk
in the near term might only accelerate a plan that the Navy may
already have for taking these actions.
! Compared to the two-reactor propulsion plants on the Navy’s
Nimitz-class carriers, the eight-reactor propulsion plant on the
Enterprise can be more difficult and expensive to maintain.
Although the Enterprise was given an RCOH with the intention of
keeping it in service until 2014, retiring it in the near term would
give the Navy an all-Nimitz-class nuclear-carrier fleet, streamlining
nuclear-carrier logistics and reducing nuclear-carrier support costs.
! Retiring the Vinson in the near term would avoid a $2.27-billion
cost in FY2006 and FY2007 to complete funding for the Vinson’s
RCOH. It would also eliminate the annual personnel, operation, and
maintenance costs for the Vinson, which might be comparable to, or
even greater than, those of the Kennedy. Equipment purchased with
the $861.5 million in FY2005 and prior-year funding for the Vinson
RCOH could be used, where possible, for the RCOH on the next
Nimitz-class ship.22
At hearings on the proposed FY2006 defense budget, DOD and Navy officials
have noted that the Kennedy has not been fully modernized and that the additional
warfighting capability provided by the Kennedy is marginal.23
If DOD plans to reduce the carrier force to 10 or 9 ships, perhaps following the
QDR, then the leading candidates for the additional carriers to be retired would be
the Kitty Hawk, the Enterprise, and the Vinson (or if not the Vinson, then perhaps the
Theodore Roosevelt [CVN-71], which is next in line for a RCOH after the Vinson).
If so, then one or more of the arguments made above for retiring the Kitty Hawk, the
Enterprise, or the Vinson (or if not the Vinson, then the Roosevelt) might soon be
made by DOD officials themselves.
Carrier Homeporting Arrangements
A third potential issue for Congress raised by the proposal to retire the Kennedy
concerns carrier homeporting arrangements. In addition to the local economic
benefits associated with homeporting a carrier — e.g., carrier crew members
spending their pay and allowances in the local economy and thus generating local
22 For an article mentioning the Kitty Hawk, the Enterprise, and the Vinson as candidates
for retirement in the context of a potential reduction in the carrier force to 10 or 9 ships, see
Christopher P. Cavas, “Carrier Carl Vinson Considered For Early Retirement,”
NavyTimes.com, January 3, 2005.
23 See, for example, “Navy Defends Decision To Retire Carrier,” GovExec.com, March 17,
2005; Dave Ahearn, “England Says Navy Carrier Force Shrinking; Seeks Another LCS,”
Defense Today, March 17, 2005: 1, 4; Dale Eisman, “Kennedy Should Be Retired, Navy
Leader Says,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, March 17, 2005; Geoff Fein, “Navy To Redirect
Funds For Kennedy Overhaul To Maintain Other Ships,” Defense Daily, March 17, 2005.

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CRS-14
jobs, and non-depot ship-maintenance work being done by local ship-repair firms,
thus generating additional jobs — a potential additional factor to consider concerns
the relative military advantages of different homeporting arrangements.
If the Kennedy is retired, then as mentioned earlier, all of the Atlantic Fleet’s
carriers would be, for some time at least, homeported in a single location (Norfolk,
VA). Possible advantages of such an arrangement include economies of scale in
carrier maintenance and the training of carrier crew members. Possible
disadvantages include the effect on fleet operations of a terrorist attack on that single
location.24
At hearings on the proposed FY2006 defense budget, Navy officials have noted
the potential efficiencies of co-locating carriers but have also acknowledged the
potential security risks of having carriers concentrated into a small number of home
ports.25
Potential questions for Congress to consider include the following:
! How much time would be required to qualify Mayport, FL as a
nuclear-carrier home port? How much could this schedule be
accelerated, and what actions would be necessary to accelerate it?
How much would it cost to qualify Mayport, FL as a nuclear-carrier
home port, and how might this cost be affected by accelerating the
schedule?26
24 In the 1980s, the Navy initiated a program, known as strategic homeporting, to disperse
its ships to a greater number of home ports around the United States, so as to reduce the
vulnerability of the fleet to a potential Pearl Harbor-style attack by Soviet/Warsaw Pact
forces at start of a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. For discussions of strategic homeporting,
see CRS Issue Brief IB85193, The Navy’s Strategic Homeporting Program: Issues for
Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke; and CRS Issue Brief IB90077, Strategic Homeporting
Reconsidered, by Ronald O’Rourke. (Both archived and available from the author.) See
also Alva M. Bowen and Ronald O’Rourke, “Ports for the Fleet,” U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, May 1986: 136-151.
25 A recent press article focusing on a Navy submarine base in Groton, Connecticut, quoted
Admiral Vernon Clark, the Chief of Naval Operations as saying,
We understand the rule of economies of scale, and you can concentrate
everything in one place, but then you’ve got all your eggs in one basket. Is that
the way you want to do this? My view is, that’s not a successful strategy. You’ve
got figure out how to balance it between being overly dispersed and overly
centralized....
We’ll see where the analysis takes us,” Clark said. “It’s a key part of the
BRAC discussions, and the analysis. And honestly, I don’t know where we are
or where we’re going to end up on it.
(Robert A. Hamilton, “CNO’s Doctrine Could Bode Well For Sub Base,”
New London (CT) Day, January 5, 2005.)
26 One recent press article stated: “Early estimates indicate the cost of making Mayport
(continued...)

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CRS-15
! What would it cost to transfer a nuclear carrier from Norfolk, VA,
to Mayport?27
! On a steady-state basis, what would be the annual difference in cost
between homeporting all Atlantic Fleet carriers at Norfolk vs.
homeporting one nuclear carrier at Mayport and the rest at Norfolk?
! What are the relative operational advantages and disadvantages of
homeporting all Atlantic Fleet carriers at Norfolk versus
homeporting one nuclear carrier at Mayport and the rest at Norfolk?
What are the relative vulnerabilities of Norfolk and Mayport to a
potential one-time terrorist attack?28
Another potential additional factor to consider concerns the possibility of
transferring a carrier to Hawaii or Guam, an action that could form a significant part
of the justification for reducing the carrier force to 11 ships. Potential questions for
Congress here include the following:
! What home port would the carrier be transferred from?
! How might the transfer affect the local economy of that home port?
! Would the homeporting of a carrier in Hawaii or Guam affect the
issue of whether to homeport a carrier at Mayport, FL, and if so,
how?
Options For Congress
Options for Congress arising from the proposal the retire the Kennedy in
FY2006 and reduce the carrier force to 11 ships include the following:
26 (...continued)
nuclear-ready would be $100 million. The city and state are paying for a report detailing
what it would cost.” (David DeCamp, “Bill Will Fight For Kennedy, and Mayport,” Florida
Times-Union, January 24, 2005.) See also Gregory Piatt, “Nuclear Mayport May Not Need
New Study,” Florida Times-Union (Jacksonville), February 16, 2005.
27 One recent press article stated: “The movement of a nuclear-powered flattop would be
particularly expensive — in excess of $200 million, according to some authorities’
estimates. A 1994 study commissioned by the city of Jacksonville, Fla., put the cost at
$141.2 million.” (Dale Eisman and Jack Dorsey, “Battle Begins Over Carrier Kennedy,”
Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, January 6, 2005.)
28 For an article discussing this issue, see David Lerman, “Fla. Carrier Site Ranked Less
Secure,” Newport News (VA) Daily Press, February 9, 2005.

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CRS-16
Options for Preserving 12 Carriers
Permanent Legislation. This option could involve adding a provision to
Title 10 of the U.S. Code (the primary title covering DOD) stating that the Navy shall
include not less than 12 large-deck aircraft carriers or prohibiting the Navy from
taking any steps to reduce the carrier force to less than 12 ships. The provision could
be somewhat similar to 10 USC 5063, which Congress amended in 195229 to state in
part: “The Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall be so organized
as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such other
land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein.”30
Annual Legislation. This provision could involve adding a provision to the
annual defense authorization bill or appropriations bill (or both) directing DOD to
maintain a force of at least 12 carriers for the fiscal year in question, or prohibiting
DOD from expending any funding that year to plan or carry out the retirement of an
aircraft carrier. Such a provision could be used to defer the decision on whether to
retire any aircraft carriers until, for example, the completion of the Quadrennial
Defense Review.
Binding Annual Report Language. This option is similar to the previous
option except that the direction to DOD would be provided through report language
rather than bill language. Such a provision, like the previous one, could be used to
defer the decision on whether to retire any aircraft carriers until, for example, the
completion of the Quadrennial Defense Review.
Non-Binding Language. This could take the form of bill or report language
expressing sense of the Congress that the Navy should maintain a force of not less
than 12 carriers. This option would have considerably less force than the previous
options, since it would do nothing concrete to compel DOD to maintain a force of 12
carriers. Its effectiveness would depend on how much weight DOD would give it in
29 Public Law 416, June 28, 1952, Chapter 479, Section 1, 66 Stat. 282.
30 Supporters could argue that a provision in permanent law specifying a minimum number
of carriers would formally recognize the operational value of carriers and follow the
precedent set by 10 USC 5063 regarding the minimum number of Marine Corps divisions
and air wings. It would also be consistent, they could argue, with the fact that the carrier
force has not dropped below 12 ships since 1951, and has frequently included more than 12
carriers during that time. Legislating a minimum of 12 carriers, supporters could argue,
would help stabilize Navy force-structure planning and budget planning by reassuring Navy
leaders that this important element of Navy force structure would consist of a known
minimum number of ships.
Opponents could argue that such a provision would reduce DOD’s flexibility in
determining military force structure levels so as to best balance DOD capabilities against
projected threats, and set a modern precedent for writing additional provisions into Title 10
covering other elements of military force structure, which would further reduce DOD’s
flexibility in this area. Opponents could argue that 10 USC 5063 is not as strong a precedent
as it might seem at first because it does not specify the size or composition of the divisions
or air wings, or whether they are to be active or reserve units, and that the provision in any
event is a sole exception, dating back 53 years, to a pattern of not legislating military force
structure levels.

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CRS-17
DOD’s own deliberations. DOD could decide to politely ignore the provision,
making it totally ineffective.
Options For Retiring A Carrier And Reducing To 11
Retire Kennedy In FY2006. This option could be supplemented by taking
steps, such as adding military construction or other funding to the DOD budget, to
accelerate the process of qualifying Mayport as a nuclear-carrier home port. It could
also involve bill or report language directing the Navy to transfer a nuclear-powered
carrier to Mayport as soon as the port is qualified to receive it.
Retire Kennedy When Mayport Is Nuclear-Qualified. This option
would defer the retirement of the Kennedy until Mayport is qualified as a nuclear-
carrier home port. As with the previous option, this option could include taking steps
to accelerate the process of qualifying Mayport as a nuclear-carrier home port, as well
as bill or report language directing the Navy to transfer a nuclear-powered carrier to
Mayport as soon as the port is qualified to receive it.
Retire Kitty Hawk and Transfer Kennedy To Yokosuka. This option,
too, could involve taking steps to accelerate the process of qualifying Mayport as a
nuclear-carrier home port, as well as bill or report language directing the Navy to
transfer a nuclear-powered carrier to Mayport as soon as the port is qualified to
receive it.
Retire Kitty Hawk and Transfer A Nuclear Carrier to Yokosuka.
Compared to the option of transferring the Kennedy to Yokosuka, this option would
not require taking steps to accelerate the process of qualifying Mayport as a nuclear-
carrier home port (though such steps could be taken anyway). Another difference is
that this option could require more extensive consultations with the Japanese
government (and possibly local Japanese authorities and private groups as well), and
in the end could be deemed politically unacceptable by the Japanese government due
to anti-nuclear sentiments in Japan.
Retire Enterprise. This option could be timed so that the ship is retired
following the completion of its next deployment.31
Retire Vinson. This option, too, could be timed so that the ship is retired
following the completion of its next deployment.32
31 According to the ship’s website [http://www02.clf.navy.mil/enterprise/], the Enterprise
as of January 2005 “is three months into an Extended Selected Restricted Availability [i.e.,
a type of overhaul] in the shipyard, during which extensive repair and maintenance work is
being performed on the ship by shipyard personnel, civilian contractors and the crew.”
32 The Vinson in mid-January 2005 began a six-month deployment and is scheduled to arrive
at Norfolk, VA in November 2005 to begin its RCOH. (Source: “Carl Vinson Heads To
New Home,” NavyTimes.com, Jan. 13, 2005.)

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CRS-18
Legislative Activity
S.Amdt. 265 to H.R. 1268
Senate Amendment 265, introduced on April 4, 2005 and referred to the
Committee on Appropriations, would add a provision to H.R. 1268, the emergency
supplemental appropriations bill for 2005, stating:
(a) PROHIBITION. — No funds appropriated or otherwise made available by
this Act, or by any other Act, for fiscal year 2005 may be obligated or expended
to reduce the number of operational aircraft carriers of the Navy from 12
operational aircraft carriers to 11 operational aircraft carriers.

(b) OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT CARRIER. — In this section, the term
“operational aircraft carrier” includes an aircraft carrier that is unavailable due
to maintenance or repair.
H.R. 304/S. 145
These identical bills, introduced on January 25, 2005, would amend Section
5062 of Title 10 to state: “The naval combat forces of the Navy shall include not less
than 12 operational aircraft carriers. For purposes of this subsection, an operational
aircraft carrier includes an aircraft carrier that is temporarily unavailable for
worldwide deployment due to routine or scheduled maintenance or repair.”

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