Order Code RL32534
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Belarus: Background and
U.S. Policy Concerns
Updated April 5, 2005
Steven Woehrel
Specialist in European Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Belarus: Background and U.S. Policy Concerns
Summary
In the past decade, Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko has snuffed out
Belarus’s modest progress toward democracy and a free market economy and created
an authoritarian, Soviet-style regime. Belarus held parliamentary elections in
October 2004, as well as a referendum to permit Lukashenko to seek a third term in
office in 2006. In a vote condemned by the U.S., EU and OSCE as falling well short
of international standards, Lukashenko won the referendum and his supporters won
all of the seats in the parliament. Belarus’s economy is the most unreformed in
Europe, according to an assessment by the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD). Repression in Belarus has increased since the victory of pro-
democratic forces in neighboring Ukraine in January 2005.
Of the republics of the former Soviet Union, Belarus has perhaps the closest
historical and cultural ties to Russia. Efforts to establish a political and economic
“union” between the two countries have had substantial public support in Belarus.
Nevertheless, the pace of integration between Belarus and Russia remains slow, in
large part due to Lukashenko’s refusal to undertake economic reforms. Current
Russian policy toward Belarus appears to be focused less on forcing the pace of
integration efforts directed from the top, and more on gaining control of Belarus’s
economic assets (particularly oil and natural gas pipelines), while minimizing the
costs of subsidizing the unreformed Belarusian economy. Russia and Belarus have
close military ties. Russian and Belarusian air defenses are closely integrated, and
Russia has supplied Belarus with its best air defense equipment. A small number of
Russian troops remain in Belarus, in part to run a naval radio station and an early
warning radar station. Russian strategic bombers are also stationed in Belarus,
although reportedly without nuclear weapons. Russia appears to value the sometimes
unpredictable Lukashenko as an ally, particularly since a pro-Western leadership
came to power in Ukraine.
U.S. officials have sharply criticized Lukashenko as “Europe’s last dictator.”
They have also expressed concerns about Belarus’s arms sales and other ties to rogue
regimes, such Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. The United States pursues a policy of
“selective engagement,” which limits ties to the regime, while providing modest
support to pro-democracy organizations in Belarus. The 108th Congress responded
to the situation in Belarus with legislation. In the first session of the 108th Congress,
the Belarus Democracy Act (H.R. 854 and S. 700) was introduced. On February 25,
2004, the House International Relations Committee approved a modified version of
the bill. The bill authorizes aid for pro-democracy forces in Belarus and funding for
increased broadcasting to Belarus by Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty. The bill supports sanctions on Belarus and top leaders of the Lukashenko
regime until Belarus meets specific democratic and human rights criteria. The bill
also requires the President to report within 90 days and every year thereafter on the
sale by Belarus of weapons or weapons-related assistance to regimes supporting
terrorism, and on the personal wealth of Lukashenko and other senior Belarusian
leaders. The President signed the modified Belarus Democracy Act on October 20,
2004 (P.L. 108-347).

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Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Political and Economic Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Economic Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Relations with Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
NATO, the European Union, and Belarus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
U.S. Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Policy Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

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Belarus: Background and U.S. Policy
Concerns
Introduction
In the past decade, Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko has snuffed out
Belarus’s modest progress toward democracy and a free market economy and created
an authoritarian regime. His regime, in rhetoric and policies a throwback to the
Soviet era, is increasingly an anachronism located among a Central Europe integrated
into Euro-Atlantic institutions, a Ukraine that has announced its intentions to follow
the same path, and a Russia that is increasingly authoritarian but moving forward
with economic modernization. Those advocating a stronger U.S. role in trying to
bring democratic change to Belarus say that the country is important to the United
States because, as what U.S. officials have called “Europe’s last dictatorship,”
Belarus is an obstacle to the U.S. goal of making Europe “whole and free.” Another
concern is Belarus’s support for pariah regimes, in particular through arms sales.
Political and Economic Situation
Lukashenko dominates the Belarusian political scene, controlling the
parliament, government, security services, and judiciary through a large presidential
administration and substantial extra-budgetary resources. He has reduced potential
threats from within his regime by frequently removing or transferring officials at all
levels, often claiming they are incompetent or corrupt. His tight control over an
unreformed economy has prevented the rise of powerful “oligarchs,” as has occurred
in Ukraine and Russia. The Lukashenko regime also controls almost all of the media,
which it uses to burnish Lukashenko’s image and attack real and imagined
adversaries. Lukashenko is known for his political unpredictability and for making
rambling and rhetorically colorful public statements.1
Lukashenko was elected as President of Belarus in 1994 on a populist, anti-
corruption platform. He called a referendum in 1996 to approve a new constitution
to dramatically increase his powers and weaken those of the legislature and judiciary
and extend his term until 2001. The proposal was approved by an overwhelming
majority. Lukashenko won re-election in September 2001. Observers from the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) condemned the 1996
referendum and 2001 vote as not free and fair. Belarus held parliamentary elections
in 2000 that were also condemned by international observers as not free and fair.
1 Vitalii Silitski, “The Tsar and His Boyars,” Transitions Online, June 4, 2004,
[http://www.tol.cz].

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The State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights for 2004 judged
Belarus’s human rights record to be “very poor.” It says the government has
harassed, arrested, and beaten opposition figures and forced the closure of
independent media and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The regime sharply
restricts activities of independent trade unions and some religious groups.
A continuing human rights issue in Belarus has been the disappearances of
former parliament chairman Viktor Gonchar, his associate Anatoly Krasovsky,
former Interior Minister Yuri Zakharenko, and Russian television cameraman
Dimitry Zavadsky in 1999. All had been involved in opposition activities or criticized
the Lukashenko regime. U.S. officials have demanded that the Belarusian
government bring to justice all those involved in the disappearances. In March 2002,
the regime convicted four Interior Ministry soldiers for the murder of Zavadsky. The
2004 State Department human rights report said that there were “credible reports” of
the involvement of high ranking government officials in the murders, but that the
Belarusian regime has made “no credible efforts” to investigate their possible
involvement.
Belarus held parliamentary elections on October 17, 2004. An OSCE
observation mission found the election to fall significantly short of international
standards. The report cited the exclusion of opposition candidates, detention of
opposition campaign workers and domestic observers, restrictive campaigning rules,
unbalanced media coverage, flawed vote counting, and a lack of transparency in vote
tallying. As a result, government-supported candidates won all 110 seats in the lower
house of the parliament.
Simultaneously with the parliamentary vote, Lukashenko held a referendum on
lifting the two-term limit for the Presidency in the Belarusian constitution. In order
for the referendum to be approved, at least half of all registered voters has to vote in
favor. Belarusian election officials claimed that 77% of all registered voters
approved the referendum, with turnout of 89%. However, an independent exit poll
by Gallup/Baltic Surveys found that no more than 48% of registered voters approved
the referendum. Moreover, the actual figure vote in favor was likely small, since the
survey used official turnout figures, which most observers viewed as inflated. The
approval of the referendum question clears the way for Lukashenko to run for a third
term as President in 2006.
Since his “victory” in the October 2004 elections, Lukashenko has intensified
a crackdown against his opponents that began well before the vote. In just one
example, in December 2004, a Belarusian court sentenced Mikhail Marinich, a
prominent opposition leader, to five years in prison on the charge of having stolen
computer equipment from an NGO he headed. The legal owner of the equipment,
the U.S. Embassy in Belarus, also said that Marinich had not stolen it.
The increased repression may be motivated in part by the success of the
democratic “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine from November 2004-January 2005 and
the overthrow of the Akayev regime in Kirghizstan in March 2005. Opposition
groups are preparing to oppose Lukashenko in 2006 Presidential elections, but they
face many problems, including weak organizational structures outside of Minsk and
other large cities; ideological and personal divisions that may make choosing a united

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opposition candidate difficult; and of course, heavy government repression and media
bias. It may therefore be very difficult for the opposition to beat Lukashenko in the
2006 election or to force his ouster in a way similar to events in Ukraine and
Kirghizstan in2005.
Economic Situation
Belarus’s economy is the most unreformed in Europe, according to most
observers. Fiscal and monetary policies remain lax, although the government has
avoided a return to hyperinflationary policies of the 1990s. Inflation in 2004 was
19.5%, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Very little progress has
been made toward privatization of state-owned firms or collective farms. Indeed, in
2004 Lukashenko expanded an existing “golden share” law. According to the law,
the government can exercise control of a privatized state firm even if it holds only a
small percentage of the shares. Lukashenko proposed extending this law to all firms,
including wholly private ones that were once state-owned. Lukashenko may be
motivated by fears that Russian companies might openly or covertly buy up control
of Belarusian firms.
However, despite these problems, Belarus’s Gross Domestic Product grew by a
reported 9.9% in 2004. Although Belarus’s economy may be buoyed by rapid, growth
in neighboring Russia, many experts doubt that Belarusian statistics are entirely
accurate. Using different statistical methods, the IMF put Belarusian GDP growth at
6.4% in real terms in 2004. In addition, production figures may be exaggerated by
officials to avoid punishment by Lukashenko for not meeting planned targets. Growth
in industrial production is also made possible by government subsidies to ailing firms.
Collective farms are also propped up by subsidies, although private plots held by
peasants are more productive. It is unclear how long Lukashenko can maintain such
growth rates and stable but low real wages without large privatization revenues or
external financing from Russia or international financial institutions.2
Relations with Russia
Of the republics of the former Soviet Union, Belarus has perhaps the closest
historical and cultural ties to Russia. Efforts to establish a political and economic
“union” between the two countries have had substantial public support in Belarus. In
a July 2003 State Department-sponsored poll, 44% of Belarusians said they support
full merger of Belarus and Russia into a joint state, with a single president and
parliament, while 30% favored keeping separate Russian and Belarusian states. In a
similar survey undertaken in February 2002, 54% favored separate states and 34%
supported a single state. Some Belarusians may favor union with Russia in order to
participate in Russia’s increasing economic dynamism.3
2 "Belarus: Economy Benefits from Russian Growth," Oxford Analytica Daily Brief,
February 17, 2004 and Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report: Belarus, June 3, 2004.
3 Belarus Opinion Alert, State Department Office of Research, July 28, 2003.

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The pace of integration between Belarus and Russia remains slow. During the
1990s, Russia and Belarus adopted a large number of documents on the establishment
of political and economic “union” between the two countries, most of which remain
unimplemented. Putin has been openly contemptuous of Lukashenko’s grandiose
rhetoric about integration. In a gesture that may have signaled impatience, perhaps
even contempt, for Lukashenko, Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed in June
2002 that the best form of integration would be the simple incorporation of Belarus
into Russia, an idea vehemently rejected by Lukashenko. Lukashenko has apparently
also feared that Russia would try to replace him with a more pliable figure.
Lukashenko has at times restricted retransmission in Belarus of largely state-
controlled Russian television, which sometimes carries stories critical of Lukashenko.
Lukashenko has also harassed opposition figures reportedly linked to Moscow and has
replaced senior intelligence officials having especially close ties with their Russian
counterparts with staunch loyalists. However, after democratic revolutions in Ukraine
and Kirghizstan in 2005, Moscow may decide that, despite his failings, Lukashenko
is Russia’s most dependable ally among the former Soviet countries, and may
therefore now seek to bolster rather than undermine him.
Efforts to move forward on economic union have been stymied by Lukashenko’s
reluctance to cede control of monetary policy to Moscow as a condition for a currency
union, which would involve the adoption of the Russian ruble by Belarus. As a result,
Russia has repeatedly postponed setting a date for a joint currency for the two
countries. Current Russian policy toward Belarus appears to be focused less on
forcing the pace of integration efforts directed from the top, and more on gaining
control of Belarus’s economic assets, while minimizing the costs of subsidizing the
unreformed Belarusian economy. For his part, Lukashenko has attempted to prevent
Russia’s takeover of key Belarusian firms.
One important example has been Belarus’s dependence on cheap Russian natural
gas and the battle for control of oil and natural gas pipelines in Belarus. Since the
collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia’s state-owned natural gas firm Gazprom has
supplied Belarus with natural gas at Russian domestic prices, $30 per 1000 cubic
meters, providing a large indirect subsidy to the Lukashenko regime. However, in
January 2004, Gazprom cut off supplies to Belarus and demanded it pay $50 per 1000
cubic meters, the price paid by Ukraine, but still short of the $80 paid by other
international customers. Gazprom reportedly made the move because of Belarus’s
refusal in 2003 to sell it a controlling share in Belarus’s gas-pipeline network.
Lukashenko angrily blasted the Russian government, accusing it of “terrorism” and
of taking the most hostile steps against Belarus since the Nazis invaded the country
in 1941. He said his country would tighten its belt to find the money to pay the
increased gas prices.4 The two sides reached agreement on a price of $47 per 1000
cubic meters at a June 2004 summit. They also confirmed Russian control of oil
pipelines on Belarusian soil, but the issue of the gas pipelines has not been resolved.
The two sides have agreed to keep 2006 gas prices at the same level as 2005.
Russia and Belarus have close military ties. Russian and Belarusian air defenses
are closely integrated, and Russia has supplied Belarus with its best air defense
4 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Belarus and Ukraine Report, March 2, 2004.

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equipment. Although they do not have joint armed forces, a regional task force of
Belarusian and Russian ground forces conducts joint military exercises. A small
number of Russian troops remain in Belarus, in part to run a naval radio station and
an early warning radar station.
NATO, the European Union, and Belarus
Belarus’s relations with NATO are poor. Belarus strongly opposed NATO
enlargement, often with more bitterness than Russia did. In 2004, after the second
wave of enlargement, Lukashenko continued to say that NATO represents a military
threat to Belarus. Belarus is a member of the Partnership for Peace program, but has
not been very active in it.
Belarus’s ties with the European Union have also been difficult. Although
Lukashenko has often called for closer economic ties with the EU, he has strongly
condemned EU criticisms of his regime as interference in the country’s affairs. Since
1997, the EU has followed a policy of limiting its official contacts with the
Lukashenko regime. Belarus is the only ex-Soviet country without a Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with the EU. What little aid the EU gives to Belarus
is focused on supporting civil society groups, independent media and other pro-
democracy elements in Belarus. Because it does not have a PCA, Belarus is excluded
from the EU’s recently unveiled “European Neighborhood” policy, which seeks to
improve ties with countries around the newly-enlarged EU. The strategy includes
“action plans” for Ukraine, Moldova and countries in the Middle East and North
Africa, but not Belarus. EU officials have stressed that the EU would continue to
support “political change” in Belarus.5 The EU has budgeted 10 million Euros in aid
to Belarus’s population under the TACIS program for 2005-2006
On August 6, 2004, the EU announced that it had agreed that Yuri Sivakov, the
Minister of Sport of Belarus should be barred from entering Greece to attend the
Olympic Games in Athens. The statement noted that Sivakov, formerly Interior
Minister of Belarus, had been identified as one of the key figures in the 1999
disappearances of Viktor Gonchar, Anatoly Krasovsky, Yuri Zakharenko, and Dimitry
Zavadsky, in an April 2004 Council of Europe report. After the announcement,
Sivakov announced that he would not attend the Games. Belarusian officials angrily
denounced the EU move.
In September 2004, the EU barred from its territory high officials involved in the
murder of the four murdered and disappeared journalists and politicians, as well as
those involved in subsequent cover-ups. In December 2004 elections, the EU
announced an extension of its visa ban to “persons who are directly responsible for the
fraudulent elections and referendum in Belarus on October 17, 2004 and those who
are responsible for severe human rights violations in the repression of peaceful
demonstrators in the aftermath of the elections and referendum in Belarus.”6
5 RFE/RL Newsline, Part II, May 13, 2004.
6 “ E U ’ s R e l a t i o n s w i t h B e l a r u s , ” E U C o m m i s s i o n w e b s i t e ,
(continued...)

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On March 10, 2005, the European Parliament passed a resolution calling on EU
states to recognize that Lukashenko is a “dictator.” The resolution calls on the EU and
member governments to freeze the assets of Lukashenko and his senior officials;
expand the list of Belarusian officials banned from receiving visas; create radio and
televisions stations in neighboring countries to counter regime propaganda; regularly
bring up the issue of human rights in Belarus in EU consultations with Moscow; and,
working with other democratic countries, increase support for independent media,
civil society groups and other democratic forces in Belarus.7 However, the EU has not
so far not supported economic sanctions on Belarus as a whole. Indeed, Belarus
currently enjoys EU tariff reductions under the Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP), although these are currently under investigation by the EU due to
Lukashenko’s repression of independent trade unions.

Poland has urged the EU to not establish new dividing lines in Europe. Poland’s
position is based on several factors, including the fact that since joining the EU in
May 2004, Poland has the main responsibility for guarding the EU’s border with
Belarus. Lukashenko and other Belarusian officials have issued veiled threats that the
situation on the border could worsen if ties with Western countries deteriorate.
Belarus could make the situation uncomfortable for Poland by allowing more human
trafficking to occur through Belarus to Poland or by creating obstacles for goods
transiting Belarus to or from Poland. Belarusian border guards have reportedly seized
and confiscated cargos in the past, often with dubious legal justification.8 Another
factor is long-standing historical links to Belarus, including a significant Polish ethnic
minority. Polish officials have spoken in favor of eventual EU membership for a
reformed Belarus, albeit in the “very long term.” Poland has opposed trade sanctions
on Belarus.9 The Baltic states, new EU members that also border on Belarus, have also
called for closer Western engagement in bringing democracy to Belarus. Both Poland
and the Baltic states have worked closely with Belarus’s pro-democracy media, labor
unions and political parties, including by sponsoring international conferences on
Belarus.
U.S. Policy
The United States recognized independent Belarus on December 25, 1991. U.S.
officials hailed the removal of all nuclear weapons from Belarus in November 1996.
However, U.S.-Belarus relations deteriorated as Lukashenko become increasingly
authoritarian. In March 1997, a State Department spokesman announced a policy of
“selective engagement” with Belarus on issues of U.S. national interests and “very
limited dealings” on other issues. U.S. aid to Belarus has been meager in recent years,
reflecting the selective engagement strategy. The United States provided $8 million
6 (...continued)
[http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/belarus/intro/index.htm#initiatives]
7 See the European Parliament website, [http://www.europarl.eu.int/home/default_en.htm]
8 Mikhail Vanyashkin, “Rubber-Stamped Daylight Robbery,” Transitions Online, January
30, 3004.
9 “Polish Foreign Minister: Eastern Dimension Must Become Key EU Policy,” Ukraine
Business Report, April 29, 2004.

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in bilateral aid to Belarus in FY2004, focused mainly on supporting por-democracy
NGOs and independent media, as well as fighting HIV/AIDS (a serious problem in
Belarus) and trafficking in persons. The Administration estimates it will provide $6.8
million in aid in FY2005, and has requested $7.55 million for FY2006.10
The United States has been strongly critical of Belarus’s failures in democratic
development and human rights. After Lukashenko’s victory in the September 2001
presidential election, the Administration sharply criticized Lukashenko, charging that
he had “stolen” the election and calling him “Europe’s last dictator.”11 U.S. officials
have demanded that the Belarusian government bring to justice all those involved in
the disappearances of the four members of the opposition in 1999. In November
2002, the United States announced that it would join 14 EU countries in imposing a
visa ban against Lukashenko and other top Belarusian officials due to Belarus’s
closure of an OSCE human rights monitoring mission in the country. The visa ban
was lifted in April 2003 after the OSCE office was reopened.
In addition to U.S. opposition to Lukashenko’s domestic policy, the United States
has criticized Belarus’s relations with rogue regimes. In April 2003, Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State Stephen Pifer charged that substantial evidence existed that Belarus
had provided weapons and training to countries and groups that support terrorism,
including Iran and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.12 Belarus’s assistance to Saddam’s regime
may have also extended beyond the regime’s collapse. One high-ranking aide to
Saddam was reportedly captured by U.S. forces last year with Belarusian passports for
himself and other key regime leaders, including Saddam’s sons.13
The United States has worked closely with the European Union on policy toward
Belarus. On March 19, 2004, Pifer visited Minsk in a joint mission with EU
representatives. A U.S.-EU joint statement after talks with the Belarusian government,
political parties, civil society groups, independent media, and others, expressed “deep
concern over the deteriorating democratic situation in the country,” in such areas as
infringement of media freedoms, banning of NGOs dealing with human rights,
restrictions on freedom of association and on demonstrations, and attacks on academic
freedom. The delegation stressed the importance of a “free and fair process leading
up to the October 2004 parliamentary elections.” The statement said that U.S. and EU
relations with Belarus could improve if Belarus implements political reforms.14
On October 20, 2004, in a statement announcing his signing of the Belarus
Democracy Act of 2004, President Bush said the October 17 Belarusian elections were
undertaken “in a climate of abuse and fear,” noting that OSCE and other observers
found that Lukashenko’s victory “was achieved by fraudulent means.” He added that
10 State Department FY2006 Congressional Presentation on Foreign Assistance, February
2005.
11 Associated Press wire dispatch, September 17, 2001.
12 AP wire dispatch, April 16, 2003
13 Andrei Sannikov and Mark Lenzi, “Belarus’s Terrorist Ties," Washington Post, June 12,
2004, 21.
14 Press Statement by Joint EU-U.S. Mission to Belarus, March 19, 2004.

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“at a time when freedom is advancing around the world... there is no place in a Europe
whole and free for a regime of this kind.” The President stressed that “the fate of
Belarus will rest not with a dictator, but with the students, trade unionists, civic and
religious leaders, journalists, and all citizens of Belarus claiming freedom for their
nation.” In December 2004, the United States, in concert with the EU, enacted a visa
ban on Belarusian officials involved in electoral fraud and human rights violations.
The United States is also concerned about human trafficking in Belarus.
According to the State Department’s 2004 Trafficking in Persons report, Belarus is
a country of origin and transit for women and children trafficked for sexual
exploitation. It is listed as a “Tier 2” country. This means that it does not meet
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking, but is making “significant”
efforts to do so. The report says Belarus has demonstrated “political will” to fight
trafficking, but needs to do more in the protection and assistance to victims. Belarus’s
record has improved in recent years. In the 2002 report, Belarus was listed as a “Tier
3” country, that is, one not meeting minimum standards for ending trafficking and not
making significant efforts to do so. Such countries may be subject to U.S. sanctions
under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (P.L. 106-386).
Congressional Action
Members of Congress have spoken out strongly against human rights abuses in
Belarus in Congressional hearings, floor statements, speeches and proposed
legislation. In the first session of the 108th Congress, the Belarus Democracy Act
(H.R. 854 and S. 700) was introduced. On February 25, 2004, the House International
Relations Committee unanimously approved a modified version of the bill. It
authorizes aid for pro-democracy forces in Belarus, as well as funds for increased
broadcasting to Belarus by Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
The bill calls for sanctions on Belarus, including expressing the sense of the Congress
in favor of a visa ban against senior Belarusian officials; a prohibition on strategic
exports to Belarus; a prohibition on U.S. financial assistance to the Belarusian
government; and expressing the sense of the Congress that the United States should
oppose multilateral financial aid to Belarus. These conditions would remain in place
until Belarus meets specific democratic and human rights criteria. The President can
waive the sanctions if he certifies that it is in the U.S. “national interest” to do so. The
bill expresses the sense of the Congress that the President should coordinate with
European countries to take similar measures against Belarus.
The bill also requires the President to report within 90 days and every year
thereafter on the sale of weapons or weapons-related assistance to regimes supporting
terrorism, and on the personal wealth of Lukashenko and other senior Belarusian
leaders. While supporting the bill’s objectives, the Administration opposed mandated
sanctions included in previous versions of the bill, saying they would reduce needed
diplomatic flexibility.15 The President signed the modified Belarus Democracy Act
on October 20, 2004 (P.L. 108-347).
15 Discussions with U.S. officials.

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On July 22, 2004, the House passed H.Res. 652 by a vote of 421-0. The
resolution calls on Belarus to hold free and fair parliamentary elections this fall,
including by guaranteeing full transparency of election procedures; multiparty
representation on all election commissions; unimpeded access by opposition parties
to the media; an end to harassment of candidates, opposition parties and independent
media; freedom for local and international election observers to operate; and other
criteria for a free and fair vote.
In the 109th Congress, Representative Christopher Smith introduced H.Con.Res.
102 on March 16, 2005. The resolution condemns the repression of the Lukashenko
regime, including during the October 2004 elections and subsequently, called on
Belarus to cease its repression, called on the U.N. Human Rights Commission to pass
a resolution condemning Belarus’s human rights violations, and calls on the U.S.
government and other governments to continue to speak out against human rights
abuses of the Lukashenko regime.
Policy Options
Many policy options have been proposed to deal with the problems posed by the
Lukashenko regime. These options are not mutually exclusive and may be used in
combination. Unilateral U.S. action, while it may put some pressure on the regime,
could be less effective than actions supported by the European Union and, if possible,
Russia, due to the greater economic and other links they have with Belarus.
! One approach would be to bolster the Belarusian opposition,
particularly in the run-up to the 2006 Presidential elections. The
United States and its allies could increase aid to Belarusian
independent media, opposition political parties and non-governmental
organizations from current, modest levels. However, the regime
shows little sign of relaxing its grip to permit the opposition to
contest a free and fair election, as it showed during the October 2004
parliamentary elections. Indeed, it appears to be stepping up
repression. There may also be a limit to how much additional aid the
relatively weak, oppressed, and internally divided opposition to
Lukashenko can absorb. Moreover, Lukashenko has taken every
opportunity to paint the opposition as taking orders from foreign
powers because of the aid it receives.
! One could try to ease the isolation of the Belarusian population by
expanding exchange programs to permit more Belarusians to be
exposed to changes taking place in neighboring Poland and the Baltic
states. Internationally-supported media outlets operating in
neighboring countries could serve to break the regime’s media
monopoly.

! Another possible course of action would be to impose additional
sanctions on Belarus or the Lukashenko regime. The United States
and the EU have imposed a visa ban on a number of top Belarusian
leaders. However it is unclear whether increased sanctions against
the leadership would have any effect, other than causing it to dig in

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its heels. Sanctions against Belarus as a whole could cause hardship
to ordinary Belarusians.
! The United States could also try to enlist the assistance of Russia,
arguing that Russia would be better off with a democratic, market-
oriented Belarus than a sometimes unpredictable dictatorship.
Russia’s support, overt or tacit, would be very valuable, given
Belarus’s economic and psychological dependence on Russia.
However, Moscow appears to view Lukashenko as a useful ally on its
borders. As noted above, Russian policy under Putin has so far
focused on gaining control of Belarus’s economic assets, not in
ousting Lukashenko. Moreover, while Russia has urged Belarus to
undertake economic reforms, it may be less eager to promote
democracy there, particularly at a time when Russia itself appears to
be moving toward authoritarianism. In addition, Russia has tended
to view Belarus as lying within its own sphere of interests, in which
it would prefer to act without Western support or interference. This
Russian attitude has been reinforced by the victory of pro-Western
Viktor Yushchenko in Ukraine’s December 2004 Presidential
elections, which Russian leaders viewed as a humiliation for Moscow
and a challenge to its geopolitical interests in the region.
! The United States could attempt to re-engage with the Lukashenko
regime as a way to encourage it to move toward a democratic course.
Although Lukashenko’s grumbling about Russia’s hard bargaining
over energy and other issues could conceivably be viewed as an
opening, this option has generated very little if any support, mainly
due to the belief among many observers that Lukashenko is firmly
committed to his present course, and therefore that true change can
only come after Lukashenko is gone.

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