Order Code RL32114
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Computer Attack and Cyberterrorism:
Vulnerabilities and Policy Issues for Congress
Updated April 1, 2005
Clay Wilson
Specialist in Technology and National Security
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service Ëœ The Library of Congress

Computer Attack and Cyberterrorism:
Vulnerabilities and Policy Issues for Congress
Summary
Many international terrorist groups now actively use computers and the Internet
to communicate, and several may develop or acquire the necessary technical skills
to direct a coordinated attack against computers in the United States. A cyberattack
intended to harm the U.S. economy would likely target computers that operate the
civilian critical infrastructure and government agencies. However, there is
disagreement among some observers about whether a coordinated cyberattack against
the U.S. critical infrastructure could be extremely harmful, or even whether
computers operating the civilian critical infrastructure actually offer an effective
target for furthering terroristsâ€™ goals.
While there is no published evidence that terrorist organizations are currently
planning a coordinated attack against computers, computer system vulnerabilities
persist worldwide, and initiators of the random cyberattacks that plague computers
on the Internet remain largely unknown. Reports from security organizations show
that random attacks are now increasingly implemented through use of automated
tools, called â€œbotsâ€, that direct large numbers of compromised computers to launch
attacks through the Internet as swarms. The growing trend toward the use of more
automated attack tools has also overwhelmed some of the current methodologies
used for tracking Internet cyberattacks.
This report provides background information for three types of attacks against
computers (cyberattack, physical attack, and electromagnetic attack), and discusses
related vulnerabilities for each type of attack. The report also describes the possible
effects of a coordinated cyberattack, or computer network attack (CNA), against U.S.
infrastructure computers, along with possible technical capabilities of international
terrorists.
Issues for Congress may include how could trends in cyberattacks be measured
more effectively; what is appropriate guidance for DOD use of cyberweapons; should
cybersecurity be combined with, or remain separate from, the physical security
organization within DHS; how can commercial vendors be encouraged to improve
the security of their products; and what are options to encourage U.S. citizens to
follow better cybersecurity practices?
Appendices to this report describe computer viruses, spyware, and â€œbot
networksâ€, and how malicious programs are used to enable cybercrime and
cyberespionage. Also, similarities are drawn between planning tactics currently used
by computer hackers and those used by terrorists groups for conventional attacks.
This report will be updated as events warrant.

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Three Methods for Computer Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Characteristics of Physical Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Characteristics of Electronic Attack (EA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Characteristics of Cyberattack (CNA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Identifying Cyberterrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Expert Opinions Differ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Cyberterrorism Defined . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Difficulty Identifying Attackers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Possible Effects of Cyberterrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Disagreement about Effects on the Critical Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Unpredictable Interactions Between Infrastructures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
SCADA Systems May Be Vulnerable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
DOD Relies on Civilian Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Why Cyberattacks Are Successful . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Hackers Search for Computer System Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Automated Cyberattacks Spread Quickly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Persistence of Computer System Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Errors in New Software Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Inadequate Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Offshore Outsourcing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Terrorist Capabilities for Cyberattack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Attractiveness of Cyberterrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Lower Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Less Dramatic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Links with Terrorist-Sponsoring Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Links Between Terrorists and Hackers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Federal Efforts to Protect Computers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Growing Technical Capabilities of Terrorists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
How Best to Measure Cyberattack Trends? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
DOD and Cyberterrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Existing Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Retaliation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Military Vulnerability and Reliance on Commercial Products . . . . . . 25
Privacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Terrorism Information Awareness Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Other Data Mining Search Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
National Director for Cybersecurity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Should Physical and Cybersecurity Issues Remain Combined? . . . . . . . . . 29
National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Commercial Software Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Awareness and Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Coordination to Protect Against Cyberterrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Information Sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

International Cooperation Against Cyberattack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Offshore Development of Software . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Legislative Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Appendix A. Planning for a Cyberattack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Appendix B. Characteristics of Malicious Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Appendix C. Similarities in Tactics Used for Cyberattacks and
Conventional Terrorist Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Computer Attack and Cyberterrorism:
Vulnerabilities and Policy Issues for
Congress
Introduction
Many Pentagon officials reportedly believe that future adversaries may resort
to strategies intended to offset U.S. military technological superiority.1 Because the
U.S. military is supported in significant ways by civilian high technology products
and services (including communications systems, electronics, and computer
software), future conflicts may involve a blurring of the distinction between civilian
and military targets.2 Therefore, civilian systems, including computers that operate
the U.S. critical infrastructure, may increasingly be seen as viable targets that are
vulnerable to attack by adversaries, including terrorist groups.
Some feel that past discussions about a coordinated attack against civilian
computers may have over-inflated the perceived risk to the U.S. critical
infrastructure, and several experts have stated that cyberterrorism does not pose the
same type of threat as Nuclear, Biological, or Chemical (NBC) threats.3 Many
experts also believe that it would be difficult to use attacks against computers to
inflict death on a large scale, and have stated that conventional physical threats
present a much more serious concern for U.S. national security.4 However, other
observers point out that terrorist groups now use the Internet to communicate via
websites, chat rooms, and email, to raise funds, and to covertly gather intelligence on
future targets. From these activities, it is evident that the knowledge that terrorist
groupsâ€™ have of computer technology is increasing, and along with that, a better
knowledge of related vulnerabilities. Should any terrorist groups initiate a
1 For example, enemy fighters in Iraq have reportedly employed a strategy of directing a
large portion of their attacks against U.S. rear guard and support units. Christopher Cooper,
â€œBlack Recruits Slide As Share of Army Forces,â€ Wall Street Journal, Oct. 7, 2004, p. B1.
2 Dan Kuehl, professor at the National Defense University School of Information Warfare
and Strategy, has pointed out that a high percentage of U.S. military messages flow through
commercial communications channels, and this reliance creates a vulnerability during
conflict.
3 The critical infrastructure is viewed by some as more resilient than previously thought to
the effects of a computer attack. Drew Clark, â€œComputer Security Officials Discount
Chances of â€˜Digital Pearl Harbor,â€™â€ June 3, 2003, [http://www.GovExec.com].
4 Joshua Green, â€œThe Myth of Cyberterrorism,â€ Washington Monthly, Nov. 2002,
[http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/external-search/104-9945259-0829500?keyword=
The+Myth+of+Cyberterrorism&mode=blended&tag=thewashington-20&Go.x=14&Go.y
=14].

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coordinated attack against computer systems in the United States, most security
experts agree that the likely scenario would be to try to disable U.S. computers or
communications systems so as to amplify the effects of, or supplement, a
conventional terrorist bombing or other major NBC attack.
Congress may wish to explore the possible effects on the U.S. economy and on
the U.S. military that might result from a coordinated attack against civilian
computers and communications systems. Congress may also wish to explore options
for protecting civilian computer systems against a coordinated attack and the possible
international consequences that might result from any U.S. military response to such
an attack.
The Background section of this report describes three methods for attacking
computers; however, the report focuses on the method most commonly known as
cyberattack or computer network attack (CNA), which involves disruption caused by
malicious computer code. It also describes the current disagreement over the
possible effects of a coordinated cyberattack on the U.S. critical infrastructure, and
why the random cyberattacks that plague the Internet continue to be successful.
There is also a brief discussion about the possible capabilities of terrorist groups and
terrorist-sponsoring nations to initiate a coordinated cyberattack.
Three appendices give a description of the tactics possibly used in planning and
executing a computer network attack.
Background
The focus of this report is possible cyberterrorism using computer network
attack, or cyberattack. However, when IT facilities and computer equipment are
deliberately targeted by a terrorist group, it is possible that a physical attack, or an
electronic attack (EA), may also fit within one or more of the expert definitions
shown below for â€œcyberterrorism.â€
Three Methods for Computer Attack
A computer attack may be defined as actions directed against computer systems
to disrupt equipment operations, change processing control, or corrupt stored data.
Different attack methods target different vulnerabilities and involve different types
of weapons, and several may be within the current capabilities of some terrorist
groups.5 Three different methods of attack are identified in this report, based on the
effects of the weapons used. However, as technology evolves, distinctions between
these methods may begin to blur.
! A physical attack involves conventional weapons directed against a
computer facility or its transmission lines;
5 All methods of computer attack are within the current capabilities of several nations. See
CRS Report RL31787, Information Warfare and Cyberwar: Capabilities and Related Policy
Issues.

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! An electronic attack (EA) involves the use the power of
electromagnetic energy as a weapon, more commonly as an
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) to overload computer circuitry, but
also in a less violent form, to insert a stream of malicious digital
code directly into an enemy microwave radio transmission; and
! A computer network attack (CNA), usually involves malicious code
used as a weapon to infect enemy computers to exploit a weakness
in software, in the system configuration, or in the computer security
practices of an organization or computer user. Other forms of CNA
are enabled when an attacker uses stolen information to enter
restricted computer systems.
DOD officials have stated that while CNA and EA threats are â€œless likelyâ€ than
physical attacks, they could actually prove more damaging because they involve
disruptive technologies that might generate unpredictable consequences or give an
adversary unexpected advantages.6
Characteristics of Physical Attack. A physical attack disrupts the
reliability of computer equipment and availability of data. Physical attack is
implemented either through use of conventional weapons, creating heat, blast, and
fragmentation, or through direct manipulation of wiring or equipment, usually after
gaining unauthorized physical access.
In 1991, during Operation Desert Storm, the U.S. military reportedly disrupted
Iraqi communications and computer centers by sending cruise missiles to scatter
carbon filaments that short circuited power supply lines. Also, the Al Qaeda attacks
directed against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001,
destroyed many important computer databases and disrupted civilian and military
financial and communications systems that were linked globally.7 The temporary
loss of communications links and important data added to the effects of the physical
attack by closing financial markets for up to a week.8
Characteristics of Electronic Attack (EA). Electronic attack, most
commonly referred to as an Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP), disrupts the reliability of
6 Advantages of EA and CNA might derive from United States reliance on a computer-
controlled critical infrastructure, along with unpredictable results depending on severity of
the attack. Jason Sherman, â€œBracing for Modern Brands of Warfare,â€ Air Force Times,
Sept. 27, 2004, [http://www.airforcetimes.com/story.php?f=1-AIRPAPER-358727.php].
7 Steven Marlin and Martin Garvey, â€œDisaster-Recovery Spending on the Rise,â€ Information
Week, Aug. 9, 2004, p.26.
8 For more on conventional, chemical, nuclear, and biological terrorism, see CRS Report
RL30153, Critical Infrastructures: Background, Policy, and Implementation; CRS Report
RL31669, Terrorism: Background on Chemical, Biological, and Toxin Weapons and
Options for Lessening Their Impact; CRS Report RL32595, Nuclear Terrorism: A Brief
Review of Threats and Responses; and CRS Issue Brief IB10119, Terrorism and National
Security: Issues and Trends.

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electronic equipment through generating instantaneous high energy that overloads
circuit boards, transistors, and other electronics.9 EMP effects can penetrate
computer facility walls where they can erase electronic memory, upset software, or
permanently disable all electronic components.10 Some assert that little has been
done by the private sector to protect against the threat from electromagnetic pulse,
and that commercial electronic systems in the United States could be severely
damaged by limited range, small-scale, or portable electromagnetic pulse devices.11
Some military experts have stated that the United States is perhaps the nation most
vulnerable to electromagnetic pulse attack.12
A Commission to Assess the Threat from High Altitude Electromagnetic Pulse
was established by Congress in FY2001 after several experts expressed concern that
the U.S. critical infrastructure and military were vulnerable to high altitude EMP
attack.13 At a July 22, 2004, hearing before the House Armed Services Committee,
panel members from the Commission reportedly stated that as more U.S. military
weapons and control systems become increasingly complex, they may also be more
vulnerable to the effects of EMP. The consensus of the Commission is that a large-
scale high altitude EMP attack could possibly hold our society seriously at risk and
might result in defeat of our military forces.14
However, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has stated that testing
of the current generation of civilian core telecommunications switches now in use has
shown that they are only minimally affected by EMP. DHS has also stated that most
of the core communications assets for the United States are housed in large, very well
constructed facilities which provide a measure of shielding against the effects of
EMP.15
9 Electrical systems connected to any wire or line that can act as an antenna may be
disrupted. [http://www.physics.northwestern.edu/classes/2001Fall/Phyx135-2/19/emp.htm].
â€œMaintenance of Mechanical and Electrical Equipment at Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR)
Facilities,â€ HEMP Protection Systems, Chapter 27, Army Training Manual 5-692-2, April
15, 2001 [http://www.usace.army.mil/publications/armytm/tm5-692-2/chap27VOL-2.pdf].
10 Kenneth R. Timmerman, â€œU.S. Threatened with EMP Attack,â€ Insight on the News, May
28, 2001, [http://www.insightmag.com/news/2001/05/28/InvestigativeReport/
U.Threatened.With.Emp.Attack-210973.shtml].
11 House Armed Services Committee, Committee Hearing on Commission to Assess the
Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack, July 22, 2004. â€œExperts Cite
Electromagnetic Pulse as Terrorist Threat,â€ Las Vegas Review-Journal, Oct. 3, 2001.
12 Seth Schiesel, â€œTaking Aim at An Enemyâ€™s Chips,â€ New York Times, Feb. 20, 2003.
13 Michael Sirak, â€œU.S. Vulnerable to EMP Attack,â€ Janeâ€™s Defence Weekly, July 26, 2004,
[http://www.janes.com/defence/news/jdw/jdw040726_1_n.shtml].
14 Dr. John Foster, Jr., et al., Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United
States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack: Volume 1: Executive Report, report to
Congress, 2004. And, Daniel G. Dupont, â€œPanel Says Society At Great Risk From
Electomagnetic Pulse Attack,â€ Inside the Pentagon, July 15, 2004, p.1.
15 Statement of Dr. Peter M. Fonash, Acting Deputy Manager, National Communications
(continued...)

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Observers believe that mounting a coordinated attack against U.S. computer
systems, using either larger-scale, smaller-scale, or even portable EMP weapons
requires technical skills that are beyond the capabilities of most terrorist
organizations. However, nations such as Russia, and possibly terrorist-sponsoring
nations such as North Korea, now have the technical capability to construct and
deploy a smaller chemically-driven, or battery-driven EMP device that could disrupt
computers at a limited range.16
For more on electromagnetic weapons, see CRS Report RL32544, High Altitude
Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) and High Power Microwave (HPM) Devices: Threat
Assessments.
Characteristics of Cyberattack (CNA). A computer network attack
(CNA), or â€œcyberattack,â€ disrupts the integrity or authenticity of data, usually through
malicious code that alters program logic that controls data, leading to errors in output
(for more detail, see Appendices A, B, and C). Computer hackers opportunistically
scan the Internet looking for computer systems that are mis-configured or lacking
necessary security software. Once infected with malicious code, a computer can be
remotely controlled by a hacker who may, via the Internet, send commands to spy
on the contents of that computer or attack and disrupt other computers.
Cyberattacks usually require that the targeted computer have some pre-existing
system flaw, such as a software error, a lack of antivirus protection, or a faulty system
configuration, for the malicious code to exploit. However, as technology evolves,
this distinguishing requirement of CNA may begin to fade. For example, some forms
of EA can now cause effects nearly identical to some forms of CNA. For example,
at controlled power levels, the transmissions between targeted microwave radio
towers can be hijacked and specially designed viruses, or altered code, can be
inserted directly into the adversaryâ€™s digital network.17
Identifying Cyberterrorism
No single definition of the term â€œterrorismâ€ has yet gained universal acceptance.
Likewise, no single definition for the term â€œcyberterrorismâ€ has been universally
accepted. Labeling a computer attack as â€œcyberterrorismâ€ is problematic because of
15 (...continued)
System, Department of Homeland Security, before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee,
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security, March 5, 2005.
16 While experts disagree about whether any terrorist organizations are capable of building
an inexpensive electromagnetic pulse device, it may be possible to acquire a device from a
terrorist-sponsoring nation. Michael Abrams, â€œThe Dawn of the E-Bomb,â€ IEEE Spectrum
Online, Nov. 2003, [http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/WEBONLY/publicfeature/nov03/
1103ebom.html].
17 Some forms of EA are intended to overpower a radio transmission signal to block or
â€œjamâ€ it, while other forms of EA are intended to overpower a radio signal and replace it
with a substitute signal that disrupts processing logic or stored data. David Fulghum,
â€œNetwork Wars,â€ Aviation Week & Space Technology, Oct. 25, 2004, p.91.

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the difficulty determining the identity, intent, or the political motivations of an
attacker with certainty.
Under 22 USC, section 2656, â€œterrorismâ€ is defined as premeditated, politically
motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub national groups
or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.18
Expert Opinions Differ. Some definitions for cyberterrorism focus on the
intent of the attackers. For example, the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) defines cyberterrorism as: â€œUnlawful attacks and threats of attack against
computers, networks, and the information stored therein when done to intimidate or
coerce a government or its people in furtherance of political or social objectives.â€19
Security expert Dorothy Denning defines cyberterrorism as the â€œpolitically motivated
hacking operations intended to cause grave harm such as loss of life or severe
economic damage.â€20 Others assert that any deliberate use of information technology
by terrorist groups and their agents to cause harm constitutes cyberterrorism.21
Some security experts define cyberterrorism based on the effects of an attack.
Included are activities where computers are targeted and the resulting effects are
destructive or disruptive enough to generate fear potentially comparable to that from
a traditional act of terrorism, even if initiated by criminals with no political motive.
Under this â€œeffectsâ€ view, even computer attacks that are limited in scope, but lead
to death, injury, extended power outages, airplane crashes, water contamination, or
major loss of confidence for portions of the economy, may also be labeled
cyberterrorism.22 Some observers state that cyberterrorism can take the form of a
physical attack that destroys computerized nodes for critical infrastructures, such as
the Internet, telecommunications, or the electric power grid, without ever touching
a keywboard.23 DHS officials have also asserted that cybersecurity cuts across all
aspects of critical infrastructure protection and that cyberoperations cannot be
separated from the physical aspects of businesses because they operate
interdependently.24
18 The United States has employed this definition of terrorism for statistical and analytical
purposes since 1983. U.S. Department of State, 2002, Patterns of Global Terrorism,2003,
[http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2001/html/10220.htm].
19 [http://www.fema.gov/pdf/onp/toolkit_app_d.pdf].
20 Dorothy Denning, â€œActivism, Hactivism, and Cyberterrorism: The Internet as a tool for
Influencing Foreign Policy,â€ in John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, ed., Networks and
Netwars, (Rand, 2001), p. 241.
21 Serge Krasavin, What is Cyberterrorism?, Computer Crime Research Center, Apr. 23,
2004, [http://www.crime-research.org/analytics/Krasavin/].
22 Dorothy Denning, Is Cyber War Next?, Social Science Research Council, Nov. 2001,
[http://www.ssrc.org/sept11/essays/denning.htm].
23 Dan Verton, A Definition of Cyber-terrorism, Computerworld, Aug. 11, 2003,
[http://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/security/story/0,10801,83843,00.html].
24 DHS press release, â€œRidge Creates New Division to Combat Cyber Threats,â€ June 6,
(continued...)

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Thus, where computers or IT facilities and equipment are deliberately targeted
by terrorist groups, methods involving physical attack and EA may each fit within the
above definitions for â€œcyberterrorism.â€
Cyberterrorism Defined. By combining the above concepts of intent and
effects, â€œcyberterrorismâ€ may be defined as the use of computers as weapons, or as
targets, by politically motivated international, or sub-national groups, or clandestine
agents who threaten or cause violence and fear in order to influence an audience, or
cause a government to change its policies. This definition, which combines several
opinions about cyberterrorism, can encompass all three methods: physical, EA, and
CNA, for attacks against computers.
Difficulty Identifying Attackers. Instructions for exploiting computer
vulnerabilities are easily obtainable by anyone via the Internet. However, to date,
there is no published evidence linking a sustained or widespread attack using CNA
with international terrorist groups.25 It remains difficult to determine the identity of
the initiators of most cyberattacks, while at the same time security organizations
continue to report that computer virus attacks are becoming more frequent, causing
more economic losses, and affecting larger areas of the globe. For example, the
Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center (CERT/CC) shows that
137,529 computer security incidents were reported to their office in 2003, up from
82,094 in 2002.26 The challenge of identifying the source of attacks is complicated
by the unwillingness of commercial enterprises to report attacks, owing to potential
liability concerns. CERT/CC estimates that as much as 80% of all actual computer
security incidents still remain unreported.27
Possible Effects of Cyberterrorism
As yet, no coordinated or widespread cyberattack has had a crippling effect on
the U.S. infrastructure. However, while the number of random Internet cyberattacks
has been increasing, the data collected to measure the trends for cyberattacks cannot
be used to accurately determine if a terrorist group, or terrorist-sponsoring state, has
initiated any of them.
24 (...continued)
2003, [http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=916].
25 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, â€œThe Advent of Netwar (Revisited),â€ Networks and
Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy, (Santa Monica: Rand, 2001), pp. 1-28.
26 An incident may involve one site or hundreds (or even thousands) of sites. Also, some
incidents may involve ongoing activity for long periods of time. The Computer Emergency
Response Team Coordination Center (CERT/CC) Statistics 1988-2004,
[http://www.cert.org/stats/cert_stats.html].
27 Many cyberattacks are unreported usually because the organization is unable to recognize
that it has been attacked, or because the organization is reluctant to reveal publicly that it
has experienced a computer attack, Government Accountability Office, Information
Security: Further Efforts Needed to Fully Implement Statutory Requirements in DOD, GAO-
03-1037T, July 24, 2003, p. 6.

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A recent private study found that during the latter half of 2002, the highest rates
for global cyberattack activity were directed against critical infrastructure industry
companies.28 A new report on industrial cybersecurity problems, produced by the
British Columbia Institute of Technology, and the PA Consulting Group, using data
from as far back as 1981, reportedly has found a 10-fold increase in the number of
successful cyberattacks on infrastructure Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition
systems since 2000.29 DOD officials have also observed that the number of
attempted intrusions into military networks has gradually increased, from 40,076
incidents in 2001, to 43,086 in 2002, 54,488 in 2003, and 24,745 as of June 2004.30
The consequences of these attacks on military operations are not clear, however.
Disagreement about Effects on the Critical Infrastructure. While
security experts agree that a coordinated cyberattack could be used to amplify the
effects of a conventional physical terrorist attack, such as an NBC attack, many of
these same experts disagree about the damaging effects that might result from an
attack directed against computers that operate the U.S. critical infrastructure. Some
observers have stated that because of U.S. dependency on computer technology, such
attacks may have the potential to create economic damage on a large scale, while
other observers have stated that U.S. infrastructure systems are resilient and would
possibly recover easily, thus avoiding any severe or catastrophic effects.
Some of Chinaâ€™s military journals speculate that cyberattacks could disable
American financial markets. China, however, is as dependent on these markets as the
United States, and could suffer even more from their disruption. As to other critical
infrastructures, the amount of potential damage that could be inflicted may be
relatively trivial compared to the costs of discovery, if engaged in by a nation state.
These constraints, however, do not apply to non-state actors like Al Qaeda, making
cyberattacks a potentially useful tool for it and others who reject the global market
economy. 31
In July 2002, the U.S. Naval War College hosted a war game called â€œDigital
Pearl Harborâ€ to develop a scenario for a coordinated cyberterrorism event, where
mock attacks by computer security experts against critical infrastructure systems
simulated state-sponsored cyberwarfare. The simulated cyberattacks determined that
the most vulnerable infrastructure computer systems were the Internet itself, and the
computer systems that are part of the financial infrastructure.32 It was also
28 Symantec, Symantec Internet Security Threat Report, Feb.2003, p. 48.
29 â€œThe Myths and Facts behind Cyber Security Risks for Industrial Control Systems,â€
Proceedings of the ISA Expo 2004, Houston, Texas, Oct. 5, 2004.
30 Frank Tiboni, â€œDOD Plans Network Task Force,â€ FCW.com, Sept. 28, 2004,
[http://www.fcw.com/fcw/articles/2004/0927/web-dod-09-28-04.asp].
31 James Lewis, â€œAssessing the Risks of Cyber Terrorism, Cyber War and Other Cyber
Threats,â€ Dec. 2002, [http://www.csis.org/tech/0211_lewis.pdf].
32 At the annual conference of the Center for Conflict Studies, Phil Williams, Director of the
Program on Terrorism and Trans-National Crime and the University of Pittsburgh, said an
attack on the global financial system would likely focus on key nodes in the U.S. financial
(continued...)

CRS-9
determined that attempts to cripple the U.S. telecommunications infrastructure would
be unsuccessful because system redundancy would prevent damage from becoming
too widespread. The conclusion of the exercise was that a â€œDigital Pearl Harborâ€ in
the United States was only a slight possibility.33
However, in 2002, a major vulnerability was discovered in switching equipment
software that threatened the infrastructure for major portions of the Internet. A flaw
in the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) would have enabled attackers
to take over Internet routers and cripple network telecommunications equipment
globally. Network and equipment vendors worldwide raced quickly to fix their
products before the problem could be exploited by hackers, with possible worldwide
consequences. U.S. government officials also reportedly made efforts to keep
information about this major vulnerability quiet until after the needed repairs were
implemented on vulnerable Internet systems.34 According to an assessment
reportedly written by the FBI, the security flaw could have been exploited to cause
many serious problems, such as bringing down widespread telephone networks and
also halting control information exchanged between ground and aircraft flight control
systems.35
Unpredictable Interactions Between Infrastructures. An important
area that is not fully understood concerns the unpredictable interactions between
computer systems that operate the different U.S. infrastructures. The concern is that
numerous interdependencies (where downstream systems may rely on receiving good
32 (...continued)
infrastructure: Fedwire and Fednet. Fedwire is the financial funds transfer system that
exchanges money among U.S. banks, while Fednet is the electronic network that handles the
transactions. The system has one primary installation and three backups. â€œYou can find out
on the Internet where the backups are. If those could be taken out by a mix of cyber and
physical activities, the U.S. economy would basically come to a halt,â€ Williams said. â€œIf the
takedown were to include the international funds transfer networks CHIPS and SWIFT then
the entire global economy could be thrown into chaos.â€ George Butters, â€œExpect Terrorist
Attacks on Global Financial System,â€ Oct. 10, 2003, [http://www.theregister.
co.uk/content/55/33269.html].
33 The simulation involved more than 100 participants. Gartner, Inc., â€œCyberattacks: The
Results of the Gartner/U.S. Naval War College Simulation,â€ July, 2002,
[http://www3.gartner.com/2_events/audioconferences/dph/dph.html.] War game
participants were divided into cells, and devised attacks against the electrical power grid,
telecommunications infrastructure, the Internet and the financial services sector. It was
determined that â€œpeer-to-peer networkingâ€, a special method of communicating where
every PC used commonly available software to act as both a server and a client, posed a
potentially critical threat to the Internet itself. William Jackson, â€œWar College Calls Digital
Pearl Harbor Doable,â€ Government Computer News, Aug. 23, 2002, [http://www.gcn.com/
vol1_no1/daily-updates/19792-1.html].
34 The vulnerability was found in Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1) encoding, and was
extremely widespread. Ellen Messmer, â€œPresidentâ€™s Advisor Predicts Cyber-catastrophes
Unless Security Improves,â€ Network World Fusion, July 9, 2002,
[http://www.nwfusion.com/news/2002/0709schmidt.html].
35 Barton Gellman, â€œCyber-Attacks by Al Qaeda Feared,â€ Washington Post, June 27, 2002,
p. A01.

CRS-10
data through stable links with upstream computers in a different infrastructure) could
possibly build to a cascade of damaging effects that are unpredictable in how they
might affect national security.36 For example, in 2003 while the newly released
â€œBlasterâ€ worm was causing disruption of Internet computers over several days in
August, it may also have added to the severity of the Eastern United States power
blackout that occurred on August 14, by degrading the performance of several
communications lines that linked the data centers used by utility companies to send
warnings to other managers downstream on the power grid.37
SCADA Systems May Be Vulnerable. Supervisory Control And Data
Acquisition (SCADA) systems are computer systems relied upon by most critical
infrastructure organizations (such as companies that manage the power grid) to
automatically monitor and adjust switching, manufacturing, and other process control
activities, based on digitized feedback data gathered by sensors. These control
systems are frequently unmanned, operate in remote locations, and are accessed
periodically by engineers or technical staff via telecommunications links.
Some experts believe that these systems may be especially vulnerable, and that
their importance for controlling the critical infrastructure may make them an
attractive target for cyberterrorists. SCADA systems, once connected only to isolated
networks using only proprietary computer software, now operate using more
vulnerable Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) software, and are increasingly being
linked directly into corporate office networks via the Internet.38 Some observers
believe that many, if not most, SCADA systems are inadequately protected against
a cyberattack, and remain persistently vulnerable because many organizations that
operate them have not paid proper attention to their unique computer security needs.39
36 The most expensive natural disaster in U.S. history, Hurricane Andrew, is reported to have
caused $25 billion dollars in damage, while the Love Bug virus is estimated to have cost
computer users around the world somewhere between $3 billion and $15 billion. However,
the Love Bug virus was created and launched by a single university student in the
Philippines, relying on inexpensive computer equipment. Christopher Miller, GAO Review
of Weapon Systems Software, Mar. 3, 2003, Email communication, MillerC@gao.gov.
37 Congestion caused by the Blaster worm delayed the exchange of critical power grid
control data across the public telecommunications network, which could have hampered the
operatorsâ€™ ability to prevent the cascading effect of the blackout. Dan Verton, â€œBlaster
Worm Linked to Severity of Blackout,â€ Computerworld, Aug. 29, 2003,
[http://www.computerworld.com/printthis/2003/0,4814,84510,00.html.]
38 Proprietary systems are unique, custom built software products intended for installation
on a few (or a single) computers, and their uniqueness makes them a less attractive target
for hackers. They are less attractive because finding a security vulnerability takes time (See
Appendix A), and a hacker may usually not consider it worth their while to invest the pre-
operative surveillance and research needed to attack a proprietary system on a single
computer. Widely used Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) software products, on the other
hand, are more attractive to hackers because a single security vulnerability, once discovered
in a COTS product, may be embedded in numerous computers that have the same COTS
software product installed.
39 Industrial computers sometimes have operating requirements that differ from business or
office computers. For example, monitoring a chemical process, or a telephone microwave
(continued...)

CRS-11
The following example may serve to illustrate the vulnerability of control
systems and highlight possible cybersecurity issues that could arise for infrastructure
nodes when SCADA controls are interconnected with office networks. In August
2003, the â€œSlammerâ€Internet computer worm was able to corrupt for five hours the
computer control systems at the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant located in Ohio
(fortunately, the power plant was closed and off-line when the cyberattack occurred).
The computer worm was able to successfully penetrate systems in the Davis-Besse
power plant control room largely because the business network for its corporate
offices was found to have multiple connections to the Internet that bypassed the
control room firewall.40
However, other observers suggest that SCADA systems and the critical
infrastructure are more robust and resilient than early theorists of cyberterror have
stated, and that the infrastructure would likely recover rapidly from a cyberterrorism
attack. They cite, for example, that water system failures, power outages, air traffic
disruptions, and other scenarios resembling possible cyberterrorism often occur as
routine events, and rarely affect national security, even marginally. System failures
due to storms routinely occur at the regional level, where service may often be denied
to customers for hours or days. Technical experts who understand the systems would
work to restore functions as quickly as possible. Cyberterrorists would need to attack
multiple targets simultaneously for long periods of time to gradually create terror,
achieve strategic goals, or to have any noticeable effects on national security.41
For more information about SCADA systems, see CRS Report RL31534,
Critical Infrastructure: Control Systems and the Terrorist Threat.
DOD Relies on Civilian Technology. During Operation Iraqi Freedom,
commercial satellites were used to supplement other military communications
channels, which at times lacked sufficient capacity.42 A cyberattack directed against
civilian communications systems could possibly disrupt communications to some
39 (...continued)
tower may require 24-hour continuous availability for a critical industrial computer. Even
though industrial systems may operate using COTS software (see above), it may be
economically difficult to justify suspending the operation of an industrial SCADA computer
on a regular basis to take time to install every new security software patch. See interview
with Michael Vatis, director of the Institute for Security Technology Studies related to
counterterrorism and cybersecurity. Sharon Gaudin, â€œSecurity Expter: U.S. Companies
Unprepared for Cyber Terror,â€ Datamation, July 19, 2002, [http://itmanagement.
earthweb.com/secu/article.php/1429851]. Also, Government Accountability Office,
Information Security: Further Efforts Needed to Fully Implement Statutory Requirements
in DOD, GAO-03-1037T, July 24, 2003, p. 8.
40 Kevin Poulsen, â€œSlammer Worm Crashed Ohio Nuke Plant Network,â€ Security Focus,
Aug. 19, 2003, [http://www.securityfocus.com/news/6767].
41 Scott Nance, â€œDebunking Fears: Exercise Finds â€˜Digital Pearl Harborâ€™ Risk Small,â€
Defense Week, Apr. 7, 2003, [http://www.kingpublishing.com/publications/dw/].
42 Brigadier Gen. Dennis Moran, U.S. Central Command/ J6, in U.S. Congress, House
Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities,
Hearing on Military C4I Systems, Oct. 21, 2003, [http://www.cq.com].

CRS-12
combat units, or could possibly lead to delayed shipment of military supplies, or a
slowdown in the scheduling and deployment of troops before a crisis.
Several simulations have been conducted to determine what effects an attempted
cyberattack on the critical infrastructure might have on U.S. defense systems. In
1997, DOD conducted a mock cyberattack to test the ability of DOD systems to
respond to protect the national information infrastructure. That exercise, called
operation â€œEligible Receiver 1997,â€ revealed dangerous vulnerabilities in U.S.
military information systems.43 In October 2002, a subsequent mock cyberattack
against DOD systems, titled â€œEligible Receiver 2003,â€ indicated a need for greater
coordination between military and non-military organizations to deploy a rapid
military computer counter-attack.44
DOD also uses Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) hardware and software
products both in core information technology administrative functions, and also in
the combat systems of all services, as for example, in the integrated warfare systems
for nuclear aircraft carriers.45 DOD favors the use of COTS products in order to take
advantage of technological innovation, product flexibility and standardization and
resulting cost-effectiveness. Nevertheless, DOD officials and others have stated that
COTS products are lacking in security, and that strengthening the security of those
products to meet military requirements may be too difficult and costly for most
COTS vendors. To improve security, DOD Information Assurance practices require
deploying several layers of additional protective measures around COTS military
systems to make them more difficult for enemy cyberattackers to penetrate.46
However, on two separate occasions in 2004, viruses reportedly infiltrated two
top-secret computer systems at the Army Space and Missile Defense Command. It
is not clear how the viruses penetrated the military systems, or what the effects were.
Also, contrary to security policy requirements, the computers reportedly lacked basic
anti virus software protection.47 Security experts have noted that for both military
and civilian systems, no matter how much protection is given to computers, hackers
are always creating new ways to defeat those protective measures, and whenever
43 Christopher Casteilli,â€DOD and Thailand Run Classified â€˜Eligible Receiverâ€™ Info-War
Exercise,â€ Defense Information and Electronics Report, 2002, vol. 77, no. 44.
44 Briefing on â€œEligible Receiver 2003â€ by DOD staff for the Congressional Research
Service, January 9, 2003.
45 Some ships of the U.S. Navy use Windows software. Bill Murray, â€œNavy Carrier to Run
Win 2000,â€ GCN.com, Sept. 11, 2000, [http://www.gcn.com/vol19_no27/dod/2868-1.html].
Major U.K. naval systems defense contractor, BAE Systems, also took the decision to
standardize future development on Microsoft Windows. John Lettice, â€œOSS Torpedoed:
Royal Navy Will Run on Windows for Warships,â€Register, Sept. 6, 2004,
[http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/09/06/ams_goes_windows_for_warships/].
46 Patience Wait, â€œDefense IT Security Canâ€™t Rest on COTS,â€ GCN.com, Sept. 27, 2004,
[http://www.gcn.com/23_29/news/27422-1.html].
47 Dawn Onley, â€œArmy Urged to Step Up IT Security Focus,â€ GCN.com, Sept.2, 2004,
[http://www.gcn.com/vol1_no1/daily-updates/27138-1.html].

CRS-13
systems are connected on a network, it is possible to exploit even a relatively secure
system by jumping from a non-secure system.48
Why Cyberattacks Are Successful
Networked computers with exposed vulnerabilities may be disrupted or taken
over by a hacker, or by automated malicious code. Should a terrorist group attempt
to launch a coordinated cyberattack against computers that manage the U.S. critical
infrastructure, they may find it useful to copy some of the tactics now commonly
used by todayâ€™s computer hacker groups to locate Internet-connected computers with
vulnerabilities, and then systematically exploit those vulnerabilities (see Appendices
A, B, and C).
Hackers Search for Computer System Vulnerabilities. Computer
hackers opportunistically scan the Internet to find and infect computer systems that
are mis-configured, or lack current software security patches. Compromised
computers can become part of a â€œbot networkâ€ or â€œbot herdâ€ (a â€œbotâ€ is a remotely-
controlled, or semi-autonomous computer program that can infect computers),
sometimes comprised of hundred or thousands of compromised computers that can
all controlled remotely by a single hacker. This â€œbot herdâ€ hacker may instruct the
computers through an encrypted communications channel to spy on the owner of
each infected computer, and quietly transmit copies of any sensitive data that is
found, or he may direct the â€œherdâ€ to collectively attack as a swarm against other
targeted computers.
Even computers with current software security patches installed may still be
vulnerable to a type of CNA known as a â€œZero-Day exploitâ€. This may occur if a
computer hacker discovers a new software vulnerability and launches a malicious
attack program to infect the computer before a security patch can be created by the
software vendor and distributed to protect users.
In results of a 2004 survey of security and law enforcement executives,
conducted in part by the Secret Service, CSO (Chief Security Officer) magazine, and
the Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center (CERT/CC), a major
reporting center for statistics on Internet security problems, hackers are cited as the
greatest cybersecurity threat. The survey also shows that while 43% of respondents
reported an increase in cybercrimes over the previous year, at least 30% of those did
not know whether insiders or outsiders were the cause. Of those respondents who
did know, 71% of attacks reportedly came from outsiders while 29% came from
insiders.49
Automated Cyberattacks Spread Quickly. The â€œSlammerâ€ computer
worm attacked Microsoftâ€™s database software and spread through the Internet over
the space of one weekend in January 2003. According to a preliminary study
48 Patience Wait, â€œDefense IT Security Canâ€™t Rest on COTS,â€ GCN.com, Sept.27, 2004,
[http://www.gcn.com/23_29/news/27422-1.html].
49 â€œE-crime Watch Survey Shows Significant Increase in Electronic Crimes,â€
CSOonline.com, May 25, 2004, [http://www.csoonline.com/releases/ecrimewatch04.pdf].

CRS-14
coordinated by the Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA), on
January 25, 2003, the SQL Slammer worm (also known as â€œSapphireâ€) automatically
spread to infect more than 90 percent of vulnerable computers worldwide within 10
minutes of its release on the Internet, making it the fastest computer worm in history.
As the study reports, exploiting a known vulnerability for which a patch has been
available since July 2002, Slammer doubled in size every 8.5 seconds and achieved
its full scanning rate (55 million scans per second) after about 3 minutes. It caused
considerable harm through network outages and such unforeseen consequences as
canceled airline flights and automated teller machine (ATM) failures.50
Whenever a cyberattack against computers or networks is reported to CERT/CC,
it is recorded as a statistic for security incidents. However, as of 2004, CERT/CC has
abandoned this practice for keeping a record of cyberattacks. This is because the
widespread use of automated cyberattack tools has escalated the number of network
attacks to such a high level, that their organization has stated that a count of security
incidents has become meaningless as a metric for assessing the scope and effects of
attacks against Internet-connected systems.51
Persistence of Computer System Vulnerabilities. Vulnerabilities in
software and computer system configurations provide the entry points for a
cyberattack. Vulnerabilities persist largely as a result of poor security practices and
procedures, inadequate training in computer security, or poor quality in software
products.52 Inadequate resources devoted to staffing the security function may also
contribute to poor security practices. Home computer users often have little or no
training in best practices for effectively securing home networks and equipment.
Errors in New Software Products. Vendors for Commercial-Off-The-
Shelf software (COTS) are often criticized for releasing new products with errors that
create the computer system vulnerabilities.53 Approximately 80 percent of successful
intrusions into federal computer systems reportedly can be attributed to software
errors, or poor software product quality.54 Richard Clarke, former White House
cyberspace advisor until 2003, has reportedly said that many commercial software
50 â€œInternet Worm Keeps Striking,â€ January 27, 2003, CBSNews.com,
[http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/01/28/tech/main538200.shtml].
51 â€œCERT/CC Statistics 1988-2004,â€ [http://www.cert.org/stats/cert_stats.html].
52 The SANS Institute, in cooperation with the National Infrastructure Protection Center
(NIPC), publishes an annual list of the 10 most commonly exploited vulnerabilities for
Windows systems and for Unix systems. The SANS/FBI Twenty Most Critical Internet
Security Vulnerabilities, 2003, SANS, Apr. 15, 2003 [http://www.sans.org/top20/].
53 In September, 2003, Microsoft Corporation announced three new critical flaws in its latest
Windows operating systems software. Security experts predicted that computer hackers may
possibly exploit these new vulnerabilities by releasing more attack programs, such as the
â€œBlaster wormâ€ that recently targeted other Windows vulnerabilities causing widespread
disruption on the Internet. Jaikumar Vijayan, â€œAttacks on New Windows Flaws Expected
Soon,â€ Computerworld, Sept. 15, 2003, vol. 37, no. 37, p. 1.
54 Jonathan Krim, â€œSecurity Report Puts Blame on Microsoft,â€ Washingtonpost.com, Sept.
24, 2003. Joshua Green, â€œThe Myth of Cyberterrorism,â€ Washington Monthly, Nov. 2002
[http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/].

CRS-15
products have poorly written, or poorly configured security features.55 Richard D.
Pethia, Director, CERT/CC, Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon
University, in testimony before the House Select Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Science, and Research and Development, stated,
â€œThere is little evidence of improvement in the security features of most products;
developers are not devoting sufficient effort to apply lessons learned about the
sources of vulnerabilities....We continue to see the same types of vulnerabilities in
newer versions of products that we saw in earlier versions. Technology evolves so
rapidly that vendors concentrate on time to market, often minimizing that time by
placing a low priority on security features. Until their customers demand products
that are more secure, the situation is unlikely to change.56â€œ
In response to complaints, the software industry reportedly has made new efforts
to design software with more secure code and with architectures that are more secure.
For example, Microsoft has created a special Security Response Center and now
works with DOD and with industry and government leaders to improve security
features in its new products. However, many software industry representatives
reportedly agree that no matter what investment is made to improve software
security, there will continue to be vulnerabilities found in software because it is
becoming increasingly more complex.57
Inadequate Resources. Although software vendors periodically release
fixes or upgrades to solve newly discovered security problems, an important software
security patch might not get scheduled for installation on an organizationâ€™s computers
until several weeks or months after the patch is available.58 The job may be too
55 Agencies operating national security systems must purchase software products from a list
of lab-tested and evaluated products in a program that requires vendors to submit software
for review in an accredited lab, a process (known as certification and accreditation under the
Common Criteria, a testing program run by the National Information Assurance Partnership)
that often takes a year and costs several thousand dollars. The review requirement
previously has been limited to military national security software, however, the
administration has stated that the government will undertake a review of the program in
2003 to â€œpossibly extendâ€ it as a new requirement for civilian agencies. Ellen Messmer,
White House issue â€œNational Strategy to Secure Cyberspace,â€ Network World Fusion,
February 14, 2003 [http://www.nwfusion.com/news/2003/0214ntlstrategy.html].
56 Richard D. Pethia, Director, CERT/CC, Software Engineering Institute, Carnegie Mellon
University, Testimony before the House Select Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Science, and Research and Development, Overview of the
Cyber Problem â€” A Nation Dependent and Dealing with Risk, hearing, June 25, 2003,
[http://www.cert.org/congressional_testimony/Pethia_testimony_06-25-03.html#factors].
57 Scott Charney, Chief Security Strategist, Microsoft, Statement before the House
Committee on Armed Services, Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities
Subcommittee, Information Technology in the 21st Century Battlespace, hearing, July 24,
2003, p.9.
58 A survey of 2000 PC users found that 42% had not downloaded the vendor patch to ward
off the recent Blaster worm attack, 23% said they do not regularly download software
updates, 21% do not update their anti-virus signatures, and 70% said they were not notified
by their companies about the urgent threat due to the Blaster worm. Jaikumar Vijayan, â€œIT
(continued...)

CRS-16
time-consuming, too complex, or too low a priority for the system administration
staff. With increased software complexity comes the introduction of more
vulnerabilities, so system maintenance is never-ending. Sometimes the security patch
itself may disrupt the computer when installed, forcing the system administrator to
take additional time to adjust the computer to accept the new patch. To avoid such
disruption, a security patch may first require testing on a separate isolated network
before it is distributed for installation on all other computers.
Because of such delays, the computer security patches actually installed in many
organizations may lag considerably behind the current cyberthreat situation.
Whenever delays are allowed to persist in private organizations, in government
agencies, or among PC users at home, computer vulnerabilities that are widely
reported may remain unprotected, leaving networks open to possible attack for long
periods of time.
One way to improve this would be to encourage the software industry to create
products that do not require system administrators to devote so much time to
installing fixes. Many security experts also emphasize that if systems administrators
received the necessary training for keeping their computer configurations secure, then
computer security would greatly improve for the U.S. critical infrastructure.59
Offshore Outsourcing. Many major software companies now outsource
code development to subcontractors who design and build large portions of COTS
products outside the United States.60 Offshore outsourcing may give a programmer
in a foreign country the chance to secretly insert a Trojan Horse or other malicious
code into a new commercial software product. GAO reportedly has begun a review
of DOD reliance on foreign software development to determine the adequacy of
measures intended to reduce these related security risks in commercial software
products purchased for military systems.
Software industry representatives have responded by saying that offshore
outsourcing should not be cited as the only possible source for malicious code. Most
core software components are designed and developed within the United States, and
58 (...continued)
Managers Say They Are Being Worn Down by Wave of Attacks,â€ Computerworld, Aug. 25,
2003, vol. 37, no. 34, P.1.
59 According to security group Attrition.org, failure to keep software patches up to date
resulted in 99 percent of 5,823 website defacements in 2003. Robert Lemos, â€œSoftware
â€œFixesâ€ Routinely Available but Often Ignored,â€ 2003 [http://news.com.com/2102-1017-
251407.html] , and Richard D. Pethia, Director, CERT/CC, Software Engineering Institute,
Carnegie Mellon University, Testimony before the House Select Committee on Homeland
Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Science, and Research and Development, Hearing
on Overview of the Cyber Problem â€” A Nation Dependent and Dealing with Risk, June 25,
2003 [http://www.cert.org/congressional_testimony/Pethia_testimony_06-25-03.html
#factors].
60 Gartner Inc., a technology research organization, has estimated that by 2004, more than
80% of U.S. companies will have had high-level discussions about offshore outsourcing, and
40% will have completed a pilot program. Patrick Thibodeau, â€œOffshoreâ€™s Rise Is
Relentless,â€ Computerworld, June 30, 2003, vol. 37, no. 26, p.1.

CRS-17
despite the emerging controversy about security and offshore outsourcing, many
software developers working and residing here also have foreign backgrounds.
Therefore, to improve national security it may be more effective to focus not on the
location where code is developed, but rather to focus on making certain that software
vendors always have rigorous quality assurance techniques in place no matter where
the code is produced. However, higher standards for quality assurance will also
involve more costs and additional time for testing.61
For more information about offshore outsourcing and national security, see CRS
Report RL32411, Network Centric Warfare: Background and Oversight Issues for
Congress, and CRS Report RL32179, Manufacturing Output, Productivity and
Employment: Implications for U.S. Policy.
Terrorist Capabilities for Cyberattack

Extensive planning and pre-operational surveillance by hackers are important
characteristics that precede a cyberattack directed at an organization.62 Some experts
estimate that advanced or structured cyberattacks against multiple systems and
networks, including target surveillance and testing of sophisticated new hacker tools,
might require from two to four years of preparation, while a complex coordinated
cyberattack, causing mass disruption against integrated, heterogeneous systems may
require 6 to 10 years of preparation.63 This characteristic, where hackers devote
much time to detailed and extensive planning before launching a cyberattack, has
also been described as a â€œhallmarkâ€ of previous physical terrorist attacks and
bombings launched by Al Qaeda (see Appendices A and C).
Attractiveness of Cyberterrorism. It is difficult to determine the level of
interest, or the capabilities of international terrorist groups to launch an effective
cyberattack. A 1999 report by The Center for the Study of Terrorism and Irregular
Warfare at the Naval Postgraduate School concluded that it is likely that any severe
cyberattacks experienced in the near future by industrialized nations will be used by
61 Scott Charney, Chief Security Strategist, Microsoft, Statement before the House
Committee on Armed Services, Terrorism, Unconventional Threats and Capabilities
Subcommittee, Information Technology in the 21st Century Battlespace, hearing, July 24,
2003, p.11.
62 The success of the Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs) used in the
May 11, 2003 terrorist attacks in Riyadh, likely depended on extensive advance surveillance
of the multiple targets. Protective measures against such attacks rely largely on watching
for signs of this pre-operational surveillance. Gary Harter, â€œPotential Indicators of Threats
Involving VBIEDs,â€ Homeland Security Bulletin, Risk Assessment Division, Information
Analysis Directorate, DHS, May 15, 2003.
63 Dorothy Denning, â€œLevels of Cyberterror Capability: Terrorists and the Internet,â€
[http://www.cs.georgetown.edu/~denning/infosec/Denning-Cyberterror-SRI.ppt],
presentation, and Zack Phillips, â€œHomeland Tech Shop Wants to Jump-Start Cybersecurity
Ideas,â€ CQ Homeland Security, September 14, 2004, [http://homeland.cq.com/hs/display.do?docid=1330150&
sourcetype=31&binderName=news-all].

CRS-18
terrorist groups simply to supplement the more traditional physical terrorist attacks.64
Some observers have stated that Al Qaeda does not see cyberterrorism as
important for achieving its goals, preferring attacks which inflict human casualties.65
Other observers believe that the groups most likely to consider and employ
cyberattack and cyberterrorism are the terrorist groups operating in post-industrial
societies (such as Europe and the United States), rather than international terrorist
groups that operate in developing regions where there is limited access to high
technology.
However, other sources report that Al Qaeda has taken steps to improve
organizational secrecy through more active and clever use of technology, and
evidence suggests that Al Qaeda terrorists used the Internet extensively to plan their
operations for September 11, 2001.66 Al Qaeda cells reportedly used new Internet-
based telephone services to communicate with other terrorist cells overseas. Khalid
Shaikh Mohammed, one of the masterminds of the plot against the World Trade
Center, reportedly used special Internet chat software to communicate with at least
two airline hijackers. Ramzi Yousef, who was sentenced to life imprisonment for the
previous bombing of the World Trade Center, had trained as an electrical engineer,
and had planned to use sophisticated electronics to detonate bombs on 12 U.S.
airliners departing from Asia for the United States. He also used sophisticated
encryption to protect his data and to prevent law enforcement from reading his plans
should he be captured.67
Lower Risk. Tighter physical security measures now widely in place
throughout the United States may encourage terrorist groups in the future to explore
cyberattack as way to lower the risk of detection for their operations.68 Also, linkages
between networked computers could expand the effects of a cyberattack. Therefore,
a cyberattack directed against only a few vulnerable computers could multiply its
effects by corrupting important information that is transmitted to other downstream
businesses.
Less Dramatic. However, other security observers believe that terrorist
organizations might be reluctant to launch a cyberattack because it would result in
less immediate drama and have a lower psychological impact than a more
conventional act of destruction, such as a bombing. These observers believe that
unless a cyberattack can be made to result in actual physical damage or bloodshed,
64 Report was published in 1999, available at [http://www.nps.navy.mil/ctiw/reports/].
65 The Ashland Institute for Strategic Studies has observed that Al Qaeda is more fixated on
physical threats than electronic ones. John Swartz, â€œCyberterror Impact, Defense Under
Scrutiny,â€ USA Today, Aug. 3, 2004, p. 2B.
66 David Kaplan, â€œPlaying Offense: The Inside Story of How U.S. Terrorist Hunters Are
Going after Al Qaeda,â€ U.S. News & World Report, June 2, 2003, pp. 19-29.
67 Robert Windrem, â€œ9/11 Detainee: Attack Scaled Back,â€ Sept. 21, 2003,
[http://www.msnbc.com/news/969759.asp].
68 â€œTerrorism: An Introduction,â€ April 4, 2003, [http://www.terrorismanswers.com/
terrorism].

CRS-19
it will never be considered as serious as a nuclear, biological, or chemical terrorist
attack.69
Links with Terrorist-Sponsoring Nations. The U.S. Department of State,
as of October 2004, lists seven designated state sponsors of terrorism: Cuba, Iran,
Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria, and Sudan.70 These countries are identified as
sponsors for funding, providing weapons, and supplying other resources used for
operations by terrorist groups.
However, a study of trends in Internet attacks determined that countries that are
state sponsors of terrorism generated less than one percent of all reported
cyberattacks directed against selected businesses in 2002.71 News sources have
reported that, other than a few website defacements, there was no evidence that a
computer attack was launched by Iraq or by terrorist organizations against United
States military forces during Gulf War II.72 The security research organization,
C4I.org, reported that prior to the March 2003 deployment of U.S. troops, traffic
increased from Web surfers in Iraq using search terms such as, â€œComputer warfare,â€
â€œNASA computer network,â€ and â€œairborne computer.â€ Experts interpreted the
increased Web traffic as an indication that Iraqâ€™s government was increasingly
relying on the Internet for intelligence gathering.73
Elements in Iran are believed by some observers to have links with Al Qaeda
as well as other terrorist groups, and North Korea has continued to sell weapons and
high-technology items to other countries designated as state sponsors of terrorism.
Other news sources have reported that North Korea may be building up their own
capabilities for cyberoperations. Security experts reportedly believe that North Korea
may have developed a considerable capability for cyberwarfare partly in response to
South Koreaâ€™s admitted build up of computer training centers and its expanding
defense budget to prepare for information warfare.74 Computer programmers from
the Pyongyang Informatics Center in North Korea have done contract work to
develop software for local governments and businesses in Japan and South Korea.
And, recent statements made by South Koreaâ€™s Defense Security Command claim
that North Korea may currently be training more than 100 new computer hackers per
69 James Lewis, â€œAssessing the Risks of Cyber Terrorism, Cyber War and Other Cyber
Threats,â€ Dec. 2002 [http://www.csis.org/tech/0211_lewis.pdf].
70 In May2003, the President lifted all terrorism related sanctions that had been imposed on
Iraq, taking it off the terrorism list, but only de facto. Libya is still on the list, although
some sanctions have been eased. U.S. Department of State, 2003 Patterns of Global
Terrorism Report, April 29, 2004, [http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2003/31644.htm].
71 Riptech Internet Security Threat Report, Attack Trends for Q1 and Q2 2002,
[http://www.securitystats.com/reports/Riptech-Internet_Security_Threat_Report_vII.200
20708.pdf]. (Riptech was purchased in 2002 by Symantec, Inc.)
72 Kim Zetter, â€œFaux Cyberwar,â€ Computer Security, May 2003, vol.6, no.5, p. 22.
73 Brian McWilliams, â€œIraqâ€™s Crash Course in Cyberwar,â€ Wired News, May 22, 2003,
[http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,58901,00.html].
74 Brian McWilliams,, â€œNorth Koreaâ€™s School for Hackers,â€ Wired News.com, June 2, 2003
[http://www.wired.com/news/conflict/0,2100,59043,00.html].

CRS-20
year, for national defense.75 However, Pentagon and State Department officials
reportedly are unable to confirm the claims made by South Korea, and defense
experts reportedly believe that North Korea is incapable of seriously disrupting U.S.
military computer systems. Also, Department of State officials have reportedly said
that North Korea is not known to have sponsored any terrorist acts since 1987.
Links Between Terrorists and Hackers. Links between computer hackers
and terrorists, or terrorist-sponsoring nations may be difficult to confirm.
Membership in the most highly-skilled computer hacker groups is sometimes very
exclusive, limited to individuals who develop, demonstrate, and share only with each
other their most closely-guarded set of sophisticated hacker tools. These exclusive
hacker groups do not seek attention because maintaining secrecy allows them to
operate more effectively.
Some hacker groups may also have political interests that are supra-national, or
based on religion or other socio-political ideologies, while other hacker groups may
be motivated by profit, or linked to organized crime, and may be willing to sell their
computer services, regardless of the political interests involved. For example, it has
been reported that the Indian separatist group, Harkat-ul-Ansar (an Islamic
fundamentalist group in Pakistan that operates primarily in Kashmir, and is also now
labeled a Foreign Terrorist Organization in 1997 for its links with bin Laden),
attempted to purchase cyberattack software from hackers in late 1998. In March
2000, it was reported that the Aum Shinrikyo cult, a designated Foreign Terrorist
Organization, had contracted to write software for 80 Japanese companies, and 10
government agencies, including Japanâ€™s Metropolitan Police Department; however,
no cyberattacks that related to these contracts were reported.76
However, information about computer vulnerabilities is now for sale online in
a hackersâ€™ â€œblack marketâ€. For example, list of 5,000 addresses of computers that
have already been infected with spyware and which are waiting to be remotely
controlled as part of an automated â€œbot networkâ€ (see Appendix A) reportedly can
be obtained for about $150 to $500. Prices for information about computer
vulnerabilities for which no software patch yet exists reportedly range from $1,000
to $5,000. Purchasers of this information are often companies that deal in spam,
organized crime groups, and various foreign governments.77
75 The civilian population of North Korea is reported to have a sparse number of computers,
with only a few locations offering connections to the Internet, while South Korea is one of
the most densely-wired countries in the world, with 70 percent of all households having
broadband Internet access. During the recent global attack involving the â€œSlammerâ€
computer worm, many Internet service providers in South Korea were severely affected.
â€œNorth Korea May be Training Hackers,â€ Miami Herald Online, May 16, 2003,
[http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/world/5877291.htm].
7 6 D o r o t h y D e n n i n g , â€œ C y b e r T e r r o r i s m , â€ A u g u s t 2 4 , 2 0 0 0 ,
[http://www.cs.georgetown.edu/~denning/infosec/cyberterror-GD.doc].
77 Hackers sell their information anonymously through secretive websites. Bob Francis,
â€œ K n o w T h y H a c k e r , â€ I n f o w o r l d , J a n u a r y 2 8 , 2 0 0 5 ,
[http://www.infoworld.com/article/05/01/28/05OPsecadvise_1.html].

CRS-21
Federal Efforts to Protect Computers
The federal government has taken steps to improve its own computer security
and to encourage the private sector to also adopt stronger computer security policies
and practices to reduce infrastructure vulnerabilities. In 2002, the Federal
Information Security Management Act (FISMA) was enacted, giving the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) responsibility for coordinating information security
standards and guidelines developed by federal agencies.78 In 2003, the National
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace was published by the Administration to encourage the
private sector to improve computer security for the U.S. critical infrastructure
through having federal agencies set an example for best security practices.79
The National Cyber Security Division (NCSD), within the Information Analysis
and Infrastructure Protection Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) oversees a Cyber Security Tracking, Analysis and Response Center
(CSTARC), tasked with conducting analysis of cyberspace threats and
vulnerabilities, issuing alerts and warnings for cyberthreats, improving information
sharing, responding to major cybersecurity incidents, and aiding in national-level
recovery efforts.80 In addition, a new Cyber Warning and Information Network
(CWIN) has begun operation in 50 locations, and serves as an early warning system
for cyberattacks.81 The CWIN is engineered to be reliable and survivable, has no
dependency on the Internet or the public switched network (PSN), and reportedly will
not be affected if either the Internet or PSN suffer disruptions.82
In January 2004, the NCSD also created the National Cyber Alert System
(NCAS), a coordinated national cybersecurity system that distributes information to
subscribers to help identify, analyze, and prioritize emerging vulnerabilities and
cyberthreats. NCAS is managed by the United States Computer Emergency
Readiness Team (US-CERT), a partnership between NCSD and the private sector,
78 GAO has noted that many federal agencies have not implemented security requirements
for most of their systems, and must meet new requirements under FISMA. See GAO Report
GAO-03-852T, Information Security: Continued Efforts Needed to Fully Implement
Statutory Requirements, June 24, 2003.
79 Tinabeth Burton, ITAA Finds Much to Praise in National Cybersecurity Plan, May 7,
2003, [http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_go1965/is_200303/ai_n7418485]
80 DHS is comprised of five major divisions or directorates: Border & Transportation
Security; Emergency Preparedness & Response; Science & Technology; Information
A n a l y s i s & I n f r a s t r u c t u r e P r o t e c t i o n ; a n d M a n a g e m e n t . S e e
[http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=52].
81 Bara Vaida, â€œWarning Center for Cyber Attacks is Online, Official Says,â€ Daily Briefing,
GovExec.com, June 25, 2003.
82 The Cyber Warning Information Network (CWIN) provides voice and data connectivity
to government and industry participants in support of critical infrastructure protection,
[http://www.publicsectorinstitute.net/ELetters/HomelandSecurityStrategies/Volume1No
1/CyberWarningNetLaunch.lsp] .

CRS-22
and subscribers can sign up to receive notices from this new service by visiting the
US-CERT website.83
However, despite growing concerns for national security, computer
vulnerabilities persist, the number of computer attacks reported by industry and
government has increased yearly, and federal agencies have, for the past three years,
come under criticism for the poor effectiveness of their computer security programs.84
For example, weaknesses in computer security at the Department of Energy
reportedly allowed hackers to successfully penetrate systems 199 times in FY2004,
affecting approximately 3,531 unclassified networked systems.85 A report by the
DOE inspector general stated that the Department continues to have difficulty
finding, tracking and fixing previously reported cybersecurity weaknesses quickly.
The report identified a number of other security weaknesses, and recommended that
all major applications and general support systems become certified and accredited,
according to DOE computer security policy.86
Issues for Congress
Growing Technical Capabilities of Terrorists
Is it likely that the threat will increase in the future for a coordinated
cyberattack, or other type of attack against computers that operate the U.S.
infrastructure? As computer-literate youth increasingly join the ranks of terrorist
groups, will cyberterrorism become increasingly more mainstream in the future?
Will a computer-literate leader bring increased awareness of the advantages of an
attack on information systems, or be more receptive to suggestions from other, newer
computer-literate members? Once a new tactic has won widespread media attention,
will it likely motivate other rival terrorist groups to follow along the new pathway.87
83 [http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/].
84 Based on 2002 data submitted by federal agencies to the White House Office of
Management and Budget, GAO noted, in testimony before the House Committee on
Government Reform (GAO-03-564T, April 8, 2003), that all 24 agencies continue to have
â€œsignificant information security weaknesses that place a broad array of federal operations
and assets at risk of fraud, misuse, and disruption.â€, Christopher Lee, â€œAgencies Fail Cyber
Test: Report Notes â€˜Significant Weaknessesâ€™ in Computer Security,â€ November 20, 2002
[http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A12321-2002Nov19?language=printer].
85 Wilson Dizard, â€œDOE Hacked 199 Times Last Year,â€ GCN.com, September 30, 2004,
[http://www.gcn.com/vol1_no1/daily-updates/27489-1.html], and U.S. Department of
Energy Office of Inspector General, Office of Audit Operations Evaluation Report,
DOE/IG-0662, September, 2004, [http://www.ig.doe.gov/pdf/ig-0662.pdf].
86 Evaluation Report: The Departmentâ€™s Unclassified Cyber Security Program - 2004,
DOE/IG-0662, September 2004, [http://www.ig.doe.gov/pdf/ig-0662.pdf].
87 Jerrold M. Post, Kevin G. Ruby, and Eric D. Shaw, â€œFrom Car Bombs to Logic Bombs:
The Growing Threat From Information Terrorism,â€ Terrorism and Political Violence,
Summer 2000, vol.12, no.2, pp. 97-122.

CRS-23
Several experts have asserted that terrorist organizations may soon begin to use
computer technology to more actively support terrorist objectives. For example,
seized computers belonging to Al Qaeda indicate its members are now becoming
familiar with hacker tools that are freely available over the Internet. 88 Potentially
severe cyberattack tools may be first developed and then secretly tested by dispersed
terrorist groups using small, isolated laboratory networks, thus avoiding detection of
any preparation before launching a widespread attack on the Internet.89
How Best to Measure Cyberattack Trends?
Congress may wish to encourage security and technology experts to study ways
to collect data that will enable more effective analysis of trends of ongoing
cyberattacks on the Internet. Currently, there is no published data to either support
or deny terrorist involvement in the increasing number of cyberattacks that plague the
Internet. Congress may wish to encourage researchers to find better ways to
determine the initiators of cyberattacks.
What effects are new cyberattack tools, such as automated â€œbotâ€ systems, having
on the stability of the Internet infrastructure, and the security of the U.S. critical
infrastructure?
Is there a need for a more statistically reliable analysis of trends in computer
security vulnerabilities to more accurately show the costs and benefits for improving
national cybersecurity? Currently, several annual studies are published by several
security companies, analyzing what they have observed from customer monitoring
or surveys. These reported statistics are relied upon for measuring financial losses
to U.S. industry due to computer attacks. However, it is believed by some observers
that some studies may be limited in scope and may possibly contain statistical bias.90
88 Richard Clarke, â€œVulnerability: What Are Al Qaedaâ€™s Capabilities?â€ PBS Frontline:
Cyberwar, April 2003, [http://www.pbs.org].
89 Networking technologies, such as the Internet, are advantageous for attackers who are
geographically dispersed. Networking supports redundancy within an organization, and it
suggests the use of swarming tactics, new weapons, and other new strategies for conducting
conflict that show advantages over traditional government hierarchies. Inflexibility is a
major disadvantage when a hierarchy confronts a networked organization. Networks blend
offensive and defensive functions, while hierarchies struggle with allocating responsibility
for either. John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, 2001, Networks and Netwars, (Santa Monica:
Rand, 2001), p. 285.
90 A well known source of information about the costs of cyberattacks is the annual
computer security survey published by the Computer Security Institute (CSI), which utilizes
data collected by the FBI. However, respondents to the CSI/FBI survey of computer
security issues are generally limited only to CSI members, which may create statistical bias
that affects the survey findings. Recently, CSI has also conceded weaknesses in its
analytical approach and has suggested that its survey of computer security vulnerabilities
and incidents may be more illustrative than systematic. However, the CSI/FBI survey
remains useful despite its imperfect methodology. Bruce Berkowitz and Robert W. Hahn,
â€œCybersecurity: Whoâ€™s Watching the Store?,â€ Issues in Science and Technology, Spring
2003.

CRS-24
As technology evolves, will new and more innovative self-directed high
technology products change the nature of our vulnerability to cyberattack? Currently,
the degree and immediacy of human oversight of infrastructure computers will likely
help prevent the effects of a possible cyberattack from cascading unpredictably.
However, as more high technology products are designed to communicate directly
with each other without human involvement, will the immediate oversight of human
experts diminish, and would this also reduce our protection against a potentially
severe cyberattack in the future?
DOD and Cyberterrorism
In February 2003, the Administration published a report titled â€œNational
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace,â€ making clear that the U.S. government reserves the
right to respond â€œin an appropriate mannerâ€ if the United States comes under
computer attack. The response could involve the use of U.S. cyberweapons, or
malicious code designed to attack and disrupt the targeted computer systems of an
adversary.
The Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC), which is under the U.S.
Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), has responsibility for managing information
warfare and electronic warfare activities. Within the JIOC, the Joint Task
Force-Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO), coordinates and directs the defense
of DOD computer systems and networks, and, when directed, conducts computer
network attack in support of combatant commandersâ€™ and national objectives.
Existing Guidance. The Bush Administration announced plans in February
2003 to develop national-level guidance for determining when and how the United
States would launch computer network attacks against foreign adversary computer
systems.91 However, any U.S. response to a computer attack by an adversary must
be carefully weighed to avoid mistakes in retaliation, or other possible unintended
outcomes. Options for a cyberresponse from the United States may be limited
because there will likely be difficulty in determining, with a high degree of certainty,
if a terrorist group is actually responsible for an attack against computers in the
United States. For example, a terrorist group might possibly subvert the computers
of a third party, in an attempt to provoke a retaliatory strike by the United States
against the wrong group or nation.
Retaliation. If it is determined that the United States has been the target of
a successful coordinated cyberattack by a terrorist group, what is the appropriate
response? There are many questions that can be raised regarding the military use of
cyberweapons. For instance, should those decisions be made by the President, or by
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or by other military commanders? What oversight role
should Congress have? Would the resulting effects of offensive cyberweapons for
information warfare operations be difficult to limit or control? If the United States
should use DOD cyberweapons to retaliate against a terrorist group, would that
91 The guidance, known as National Security Presidential Directive 16, was signed in July
2002 and is intended to clarify circumstances under which an information warfare attack by
DOD would be justified, and who has authority to launch a computer attack.

CRS-25
possibly encourage others to start launching cyberattacks against the United States?
Similarly, will any U.S. attempt to suddenly increase surveillance via use of
cyberespionage programs be labeled as an unprovoked attack, even if directed against
a terrorist group? If a terrorist group should subsequently copy, or reverse-engineer
a destructive U.S. military computer attack program, would it be used against other
countries that are U.S. allies, or even turned back to attack civilian computer systems
in the United States?92 Would the use of cyberweapons, if the effects are widespread
and severe, exceed the customary rules of military conflict, or international laws.93
In a meeting held in January 2003 at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
White House officials sought input from experts outside government on guidelines
for U.S. use of cyberweapons. Officials have stated they are proceeding cautiously,
because a U.S. cyberattack against terrorist groups or other adversaries could have
serious cascading effects, perhaps causing major disruption to civilian systems in
addition to the intended computer targets.94
Military Vulnerability and Reliance on Commercial Products.
Commercial electronics and communications equipment are now used extensively
to support complex U.S. weapons systems, leaving operations for those systems
possibly vulnerable to cyberattack, and this situation is known to our potential
adversaries.95 To what degree are military forces and national security threatened by
vulnerabilities of commercial systems, and how can the computer industry be
encouraged to create new COTS products that are less vulnerable to cyberattack?
Privacy
What is the proper balance between the need to detect and remain aware of
terrorism activities and the need to protect individual privacy? Cyberterrorists would
likely use tactics that are similar to those used by computer hacker groups. Pre-
operative surveillance characterizes the early stages of many cyberattacks, and secret
92 See CRS Report RL31787, Information Warfare and Cyberwar: Capabilities and Related
Policy Issues, by Clay Wilson.
93 The laws of war are international rules that have evolved to resolve practical problems
relating to military conflict, such as restraints to prevent misbehavior or atrocities, and have
not been legislated by an overarching central authority. The United States is party to various
limiting treaties. For example, innocent civilians are protected during war under the
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons
Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects.
Sometimes the introduction of new technology tends to force changes in the understanding
of the laws of war. Gary Anderson and Adam Gifford, â€œOrder Out of Anarchy: The
International Law of War,â€ The Cato Journal, vol. 15, no. 1, p. 25-36.
94 Bradley Graham, â€œBush Orders Guidelines for Cyber-Warfare,â€ Washington Post, Feb.
7, 2003, p. 1.
95 Stanley Jakubiak and Lowell Wood, â€œDOD Uses Commercial Software and Equipment
in Tactical Weapons ,â€ Statements before the House Military Research and Development
Subcommittee, Hearing on EMP Threats to the U.S. Military and Civilian Infrastructure,
October 7, 1999. House Armed Services Committee, Commission to Assess the Threat to
the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse Attack, hearing,July 22, 2004.

CRS-26
planning may be conducted in Internet chat areas, where hackers meet anonymously
to exchange information about computer vulnerabilities, or new cyberattack tools.
These covert communications could also be encrypted and difficult to detect or
decode.
A limiting factor for either preventing a cyberattack or identifying the attackers
is a lack of data revealing evidence of pre-operative surveillance and on-line planning
activity that is traceable back to terrorist groups. Should intelligence agencies
monitor computer chat rooms frequented by terrorists and develop other ways to help
uncover their communications and planning? Data Mining search technologies may
offer ways to help the intelligence community uncover these linkages.
Terrorism Information Awareness Program. The Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has conducted research and development for
systems such as the former Terrorism Information Awareness Program (TIA)96 that
are intended to help investigators discover covert linkages among people, places,
things, and events related to possible terrorist activity (see below for privacy issues).
Funding ended for the TIA program in 2004 and the Information Awareness Office,
a branch of DARPA, is now disbanded.97 The TIA data mining program was
intended to sift through vast quantities of citizensâ€™ personal data, such as credit card
transactions and travel bookings, to identify possible terrorist activity to provide
better advance information about terrorist planning and preparation activities to
prevent future international terrorist attacks against the United States at home or
abroad. However, the TIA program and other similar proposals for domestic
surveillance raised privacy concerns from lawmakers, advocacy groups, and the
media. Some privacy advocates have objected to the possibility that information
gathered through domestic surveillance may be viewed by unauthorized users, or
even misused by authorized users. Congress has moved to restrict or eliminate
funding for the TIA program under S. 1382 and H.R. 2658.
P.L. 108-87, titled the Defense Appropriations Act of 2004, enacted on
September 30, 2003, restricts funding and deployment of the TIA Program.
Specifically, section 8131 part (a) limits use of funds for research and development
of the TIA Program, except for â€œProcessing, analysis, and collaboration tools for
counterterrorism foreign intelligenceâ€ for military operations outside the United
States.
96 Funding for the controversial Terrorism Information Awareness program ended in 2004.
The prototype system was formerly housed within the DARPA Information Awareness
Office. Several related data mining research and development programs, now managed by
different agencies, are designed to provide better advance information about terrorist
planning and preparation activities to prevent future international terrorist attacks against
the United States at home or abroad. A goal of data mining is to treat worldwide distributed
database information as if it were housed within one centralized database. Report to
Congress Regarding the Terrorism Information Awareness Program, Executive Summary,
May 20 2003, p. 1.
97 House and Senate conferees voted on September 24 to end funding for TIA through 2004.
Steven M. Cherry, â€œControversial Pentagon Program Scuttled, But Its Work Will Live On,â€
IEEE Spectrum Online, Sept. 29, 2003, [http://www.spectrum.ieee.org].

CRS-27
Other Data Mining Search Technologies. Should more research be
encouraged into newer database search technologies that provide more protection for
individual privacy while helping to detect terrorist activities? The Department of
Defense is currently reviewing the capabilities of other data mining products using
technology that may reduce domestic privacy concerns raised by TIA. For example,
Systems Research and Development, a technology firm based in Las Vegas, has been
tasked by the CIA and other agencies to develop a new database search product
called â€œAnonymous Entity Resolution.â€ The technology used in this product can
help investigators determine whether a terrorist suspect appears in two separate
databases, without revealing any private individual information. The product uses
encryption to ensure that even if the scrambled records are intercepted, no private
information can be extracted. Thus, terrorism watch lists and corporate databases
could be securely compared online, without revealing private information.98
Also, the Florida police department has, since 2001, operated a counter
terrorism system called the Multistate Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange
(MATRIX) that helps investigators find patterns among people and events by
combining police records with commercially available information about most U.S.
adults. MATRIX includes information that has always been available to
investigators, but adds extraordinary processing speed. The Justice Department has
provided $4 million to expand the MATRIX program nationally. DHS has pledged
$8 million to assist with the national expansion, and has also announced plans to
launch a pilot data-sharing network that will include Virginia, Maryland,
Pennsylvania, and New York.99
For more information about TIA, data mining technology, and other privacy
issues, see related CRS Reports.100
98 Pentagon sources familiar with the â€œAnonymous Entity Resolutionâ€ technology have
indicated that it may alleviate some of the issues associated with privacy protection. The
product uses â€œentity-resolution techniquesâ€ to scramble data for security reasons. The
software sifts through data such as names, phone numbers, addresses and information from
employers to identify individuals listed under different names in separate databases. The
software can find information by comparing records in multiple databases, however the
information is scrambled using a â€œone-way hash function,â€ which converts a record to a
character string that serves as a unique identifier like a fingerprint. Persons being
investigated remain anonymous, and agents can isolate particular records without examining
any other personal information. A record that has been one-way hashed cannot be â€œun-
hashedâ€ to reveal information contained in the original record. Steve Mollman, â€œBetting on
Private Data Search,â€ Wired.com, Mar. 11, 2003.
99 Robert Oâ€™Harrow, â€œU.S. Backs Floridaâ€™s New Counterterrorism Database,â€ Washington
Post, Aug. 6, 2003, p. A01.
100 CRS Report RL31786, Total Information Awareness Programs: Funding, Composition,
and Oversight Issues, CRS Report RL31730, Privacy: Total Information Awareness
Programs and Related Information Access, Collection, and Protection Laws, CRS Report
RL31798, Data Mining: An Overview, and CRS Report RL31846, Science and Technology
Policy: Issues for the 108th Congress, 2nd Session .

CRS-28
National Director for Cybersecurity
Each of the three top officials involved in the governmentâ€™s cybersecurity effort
has resigned since the beginning of 2003. In January 2003, Richard Clarke resigned
from his position as cybersecurity adviser to the President, ending a 30-year
government career. Clarke had been the cybersecurity adviser since October 2001.
Three months later, in April 2003, Howard Schmidt, Clarkeâ€™s successor as adviser,
resigned, ending a 31-year government career. Before becoming the adviser in
January 2003, Schmidt had served as Clarkeâ€™s deputy.
In September 2003, DHS formally announced the appointment of Amit Yoran
as new director of its cybersecurity division.101 However, the new directorâ€™s position
was placed three levels beneath DHS Secretary Tom Ridge, in contrast to Yoranâ€™s
predecessors, Howard Schmidt and Richard Clarke, both of whom were positioned
in the White House and had a direct line of contact with the President. In September
2004, Amit Yoran, resigned, citing the end of his one-year commitment to DHS.
However, to some observers Yoranâ€™s resignation was unexpected.
Potential questions for Congress arising out of these resignations include the
following: Were any of their resignations motivated in part by job-related concerns?
If the latter, are these concerns indicative of any problems in the governmentâ€™s
cybersecurity effort that need to be addressed? Why is the executive branch having
difficulty holding onto senior cybersecurity officials? What effect has these
resignations had on the governmentâ€™s efforts in cybersecurity? Are the governmentâ€™s
efforts in this area suffering due to insufficient continuity of leadership?
The level of influence for the director of cybersecurity position has become a
subject of recent debate, where several observers have proposed strengthening the
directorâ€™s position by moving it out of DHS and into the White House, possibly
under the Office of Management and Budget. However, some security industry
leaders have favored elevating the position to the assistant secretary level within
DHS, and have objected to moving the position to another department, saying that
relocating the office now would possibly be disruptive to the government-industry
relationships that are newly formed at DHS.102 DHS officials have reportedly resisted
elevating the position, arguing that separating concerns for cybersecurity from
physical security is inefficient and expensive because common problems threaten
both.103 P.L. 108-458, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act,
101 The deputy director of the cybersecurity division, Andrew Purdy, has since been
appointed interim director of U.S. cybersecurity.
102 Dan Verton, â€œUpdate: Cybersecurity Overhaul Legislation DOA in Congress,â€
ComputerWorld, Sept. 23, 2004, [http://www.computerworld.com/securitytopics
/security/story/0,10801,96126,00.html].
103 The DHS cybersecurity center has five primary roles: conducting cybersecurity research;
developing performance standards; fostering public-private sector communication;
supporting the DHS information analysis and infrastructure protection directorate; and
working with the National Science Foundation on educational programs, Congress Daily
AM, May 15, 2003.

CRS-29
enacted on December 17, 2004, does not describe a new Assistant Secretary position
for Cybersecurity.
H.R. 285 was introduced on January 6, 2005 by Representative Mac
Thornberry, with Representative Zoe Lofgren and Representative Bennie Thompson
as co-sponsors. This bill proposes to create a National Cybersecurity Office headed
by an Assistant Secretary for Cybersecurity within the DHS Directorate for
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection, with authority for all
cybersecurity-related critical infrastructure protection programs. On February 18,
2005, the bill was referred to the House subcommittee on Economic Security,
infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity.
Should Physical and Cybersecurity Issues Remain
Combined?
According to news sources, in the 1980s during the Cold War, the United States
CIA deliberately created faulty SCADA software and then planted it in locations
where agents from the Soviet Union would steal it. Unknown to the Soviets, the
SCADA software, which was supposedly designed to automate controls for gas
pipelines, was also infected with a secret Trojan Horse programmed to reset pump
speeds and valve settings that would create pressures far beyond what was acceptable
to pipeline joints and welds. The result, in June 1982, was a monumental non-
nuclear explosion on the trans-Siberian gas pipeline, equivalent to 3 kilotons of TNT.
However, the event remained secret because the explosion took place in the Siberian
wilderness, and there were no known casualties.104
DHS officials maintain that an attack against computers could possibly result
in disastrous effects in physical facilities. Because of the this, the new DHS
National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) is tasked to protect cyberassets in order
to also provide the best protection for U.S. critical infrastructure assets. DHS
officials have asserted that cybersecurity cuts across all aspects of critical
infrastructure protection, and that cyberoperations cannot be separated from the
physical aspects of businesses because they operate interdependently.105 Therefore,
the NCSD employs a threat-independent strategy of protecting the Internet and
critical infrastructures from all types of attacks. DHS officials have stated, â€œIf we
attempt to â€œstovepipeâ€ our protection efforts to focus on the different types of
attackers who may use the cyberinfrastructure, we risk the possibility of limiting our
understanding of the entire threat environment.â€106
104 NORAD monitors first suspected that the explosion was a nuclear explosion, but
satellites did not pick up an electromagnetic pulse that would have accompanied a nuclear
detonation. William Safire, â€œThe Farewell Dossier,â€ New York Times, Feb. 4, 2004,
[http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/02/opinion/02SAFI.html?ex=1099022400&en=7029c
a0373f5d4d0&ei=5070&oref=login].
105 DHS press release, â€œRidge Creates New Division to Combat Cyber Threats,â€ June 6,
2003, [http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=916].
106 Statement by Amit Yoran, Director National Cyber Security Division Department of
Homeland Security before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on
(continued...)

CRS-30
However, officials of five business groups â€” the Cyber Security Industry
Alliance, the Business Software Alliance, TechNet, the IT Association of America,
and the Financial Services Roundtable â€” have urged the administration to create
separate physical and cybersecurity reporting structures within the DHS. The industry
groups maintain that the challenges of protection in a globally networked cyberworld
are sufficiently different from requirements for protection in the physical world that
DHS needs a separate structure; one that is focused on cyberissues, and headed by a
Senate-confirmed public official.107
National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace
Does the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace present clear incentives for
achieving security objectives? Suggestions to increase incentives may include
requiring that all software procured for federal agencies be certified under the
â€œCommon Criteriaâ€ testing program, which is now the requirement for the
procurement of military software. However, industry observers point out that the
software certification process is lengthy and may interfere with innovation and
competitiveness in the global software market.108
Should the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace rely on voluntary action on
the part of private firms, home users, universities, and government agencies to keep
their networks secure, or is there a need for possible regulation to ensure best security
practices? Has public response to improve computer security been slow partly
because there are no regulations currently imposed?109 Would regulation to improve
106 (...continued)
Terrorism, Technology, and Homeland Security, February 24, 2004, [http://www.us-cert.
gov/policy/testimony_yoran_feb2404.html#nature].
107 Patience Wait, â€œIndustry asks Congress for help on DHS cybersecurity roleâ€,
Washington Technology, October 15, 2004, [http://www.washingtontechnology.
com/news/1_1/homeland/24745-1.html].
108 Agencies operating national security systems are required to purchase software products
from a list of lab-tested and evaluated products in a program run by the National Information
Assurance Partnership (NIAP), a joint partnership between the National Security Agency
and the National Institute of Standards and Technology. The NIAP is the U.S. government
program that works with organizations in a dozen other countries around the world which
have endorsed the international security-evaluation regimen known as the â€œCommon
Criteria.â€ The program requires vendors to submit software for review in an accredited lab,
a process that often takes a year and costs several thousand dollars. The review previously
was limited to military national security software and equipment, however, the
Administration has stated that the government will undertake a review of the program to
â€œpossibly extendâ€ this software certification requirement to civilian agencies. Ellen
Messmer,, White House issue â€œNational Strategy to Secure Cyberspace,â€ Network World
Fusion, February 14, 2003[http://www.nwfusion.com/news/2003/0214ntlstrategy.html].
109 Business executives may be cautious about spending for large new technology projects,
such as placing new emphasis on computer security. Results from a February 2003 survey
of business executives indicated that 45 percent of respondents believed that many large
Information Technology (IT) projects are often too expensive to justify. Managers in the
survey pointed to the estimated $125.9 billion dollars spent on IT projects between 1977 and
(continued...)

CRS-31
computer security interfere with innovation and possibly harm U.S. competitiveness
in technology markets? Two of the former cybersecurity advisers to the president
have differing views: Howard Schmidt has stated that market forces, rather than the
government, should determine how product technology should evolve for better
cybersecurity; however, Richard Clarke has stated that the IT industry has done little
on its own to improve security of its own systems and products.110
Commercial Software Vulnerabilities
Should software product vendors be required to create higher quality software
products that are more secure and that need fewer patches? Software vendors may
increase the level of security for their products by rethinking the design, or by adding
more test procedures during product development. However, some vendors
reportedly have said that their commercial customers may not be willing to pay the
increased costs for additional security features.111
Awareness and Education
Should computer security training be made available to all computer users to
keep them aware of constantly changing computer security threats, and to encourage
them to follow proper security procedures? A 2004 survey done by the National
Cyber Security Alliance and AOL showed that home PC users had a low level of
awareness about best practices for computer security. The survey showed that most
home users do not have adequate protection against hackers, do not have updated
antivirus software protection, and are confused about the protections they are
supposed to use and how to use them.112
109 (...continued)
2000 in preparation for the year 2000 (Y2K) changeover, now viewed by some as a non-
event. Sources reported that some board-level executives stated that the Y2K problem was
overblown and over funded then, and as a result, they are now much more cautious about
future spending for any new, massive IT initiatives. Gary H. Anthes and Thomas Hoffman,
â€œTarnished Image,â€ Computerworld, May 12, 2003, vol. 37, no. 19, p. 37.
110 Howard Schmidt points out that major technology firms now promote anti-virus software
and encourage better cybersecurity practices. He stresses that market forces are causing
private industry to improve security of products. Martin Kady, â€œCybersecurity a Weak Link
in Homelandâ€™s Armor,â€ CQ Weekly, Feb. 14, 2005. Meanwhile, Richard Clarke, who
initially opposed regulation during his tenure in the Clinton and Bush administrations, now
states that the IT industry only reponds to improve security of its products when regulation
is threatened. William Jackson, â€œTo Regulate or Not to Regulate? That Is the Question,â€
Government Computer News, Feb. 26, 2005.
111 Building in more security adds to the cost of a software product. Now that software
features are similar across brands, software vendors have indicated that their customers,
including federal government agencies, often make purchases based largely on product
price. Conference on Software Product Security Features, Information Assurance Technical
Information Framework Forum, Laurel, Maryland, NSA, 2001.
112 A 2004 survey of 329 PC users revealed that most computer users think they are safe but
lack basic protections against viruses, spyware, hackers, and other online threats. In
addition, large majorities of home computer users have been infected with viruses and
(continued...)

CRS-32
Will incentives, education programs, or public awareness messages about
computer security encourage home PC users to follow the best security practices?
Many computers taken over by Internet hackers belong to small businesses or
individual home users who have not had training in best computer security practices
and who may not feel motivated to voluntarily participate in a training program.
Vulnerabilities that require government and corporate systems administrators to
install software patches also affect computers belonging to millions of home PC
users.113
Coordination to Protect Against Cyberterrorism
What can be done to improve sharing of information between federal
government, local governments, and the private sector to improve computer security?
Effective cybersecurity requires sharing of relevant information about threats,
vulnerabilities, and exploits. A recent GAO survey of local government officials
recommended that DHS strengthen information sharing by incorporating states and
cities into its federal â€œenterprise architectureâ€ planning process.114 How can the
private sector obtain useful information from the government on specific threats
which the government considers classified, and how can the government obtain
specific information from private industry about vulnerabilities and incidents which
companies say they want to protect to avoid publicity and to guard trade secrets?115
Information Sharing. Should information voluntarily shared with the federal
government about security vulnerabilities be shielded from disclosure through
Freedom of Information Act requests? Many firms are reluctant to share important
computer security information with government agencies because of the possibility
of having competitors become aware of a companyâ€™s security vulnerabilities through
FOIA.
International Cooperation Against Cyberattack. How can the United
States better coordinate security policies and international law to gain the cooperation
of other nations to better protect against a computer attack? Pursuit of hackers may
involve a trace back through networks requiring the cooperation of many Internet
112 (...continued)
spyware and remain highly vulnerable to future infections. AOL and the National Cyber
Security Alliance, â€œLargest In-home Study of Home Computer Users Shows Major Online
Threats, Perception Gap,â€ Oct. 2004, [http://www.staysafeonline.info/news/NCSA-AOLIn-
HomeStudyRelease.pdf].
113 A spokesperson for the Computer Emergency Response Team at Carnegie Mellon has
reportedly stated that most people may not yet realize that anti-virus software and a firewall
are no longer enough to protect computers anymore. Charles Duhigg, â€œFight Against Viruses
May Move to Servers,â€ Washington Post, Aug. 28, 2003, p. E01.
114 Government Accountability Office, Homeland Security: Efforts To Improve Information
Sharing Need to Be Strengthened, GAO-03-760, August 2003.
115 CRS Report RL30153, Critical Infrastructures: Background, Policy and Implementation,
by John Moteff,

CRS-33
Service Providers located in several different nations.116 Pursuit is made increasingly
complex if one or more of the nations involved has a legal policy or political
ideology that conflicts with that of the United States.117
Methods for improving international cooperation in dealing with cybercrime and
terrorism were the subject of a conference sponsored by the Hoover Institution, the
Consortium for Research on Information Security and Policy (CRISP) and the Center
for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University in 1999.
Members of government, industry, NGOs, and academia from many nations met at
Stanford to discuss the growing problem, and a clear consensus emerged that greater
international cooperation is required.118
Currently, thirty-eight countries, including the United States, have signed the
Council of Europeâ€™s Convention on Cybercrime, published in November 2001. The
Convention seeks to better combat cybercrime by harmonizing national laws,
improving investigative abilities, and boosting international cooperation. Supporters
argue that the Convention will enhance deterrence, while critics counter it will have
little effect without participation by countries in which cybercriminals operate freely.
(see CRS Report RS21208, Cybercrime: The Council of Europe Convention).
Offshore Development of Software. Is U.S. national security threatened
by using commercial software products developed in foreign countries.119 A recent
study by Gartner Inc., a technology research organization, predicts that for 2004 and
beyond, more than 80 percent of U.S. companies will consider outsourcing critical
IT services, including software development. Terrorist networks are known to exist
in several countries such as Malaysia and Indonesia, where IT contract work has been
outsourced. Other possible recipients of outsourced projects are Israel, India,
116 Trace back to identify a cyberattacker at the granular level remains problematic. Dorothy
Denning, Information Warfare and Security, (Addison-Wesley, 1999), p. 217.
117 In Argentina, a group calling themselves the X-Team, hacked into the website of that
countryâ€™s Supreme Court in April 2002. The trial judge stated that the law in his country
covers crime against people, things, and animals but not websites. The group on trial was
declared not guilty of breaking into the website. Paul Hillbeck, â€œArgentine Judge Rules in
Favor of Computer Hackers, Feb. 5, 2002,[http://www.siliconvalley.com/ mld/siliconvalley/
news/editorial/3070194.htm].
118 Abraham D. Sofaer, et.al., The Hoover Institution, The Consortium for Research on
Information Security and Policy (CRISP), and The Center for International Security and
Cooperation (CISAC) Stanford University, â€œA Proposal for an International Convention
on Cyber Crime and Terrorism,â€ August 2000, [http://www.iwar.org.uk
/law/resources/cybercrime/stanford/cisac-draft.htm].
119 In 2000, news sources reported that the Defense Agency of Japan halted the introduction
of a new computer system after discovering that some of the software had been developed
by members of the Aum Shinrikyo cult, which was responsible for the fatal 1995 Tokyo
subway gas attack. The Defense Agency was one of 90 government agencies and industry
firms that had ordered software produced by the cult. Richard Power, Current & Future
Danger: A CSI Primer on Computer Crime and Information Warfare, Computer Security
Institute, 2000.

CRS-34
Pakistan, Russia and China.120 Corporations justify their actions by explaining that
global economic competition makes offshore outsourcing a business necessity. Other
observers point out that restricting offshore development may not be effective for
improving national security because many foreign workers are also currently
employed by domestic firms to develop computer software within the United States.
Legislative Activity
The Cybersecurity Research and Development Act (P.L. 107-305), authorized
$903 million over five years for new research and training programs by the National
Science Foundation (NSF) and the National Institute for Standards and Technology
(NIST) to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks on private and government
computers.
Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Federal Information Security
Management Act (FISMA) of 2002 was enacted giving responsibility for setting
security standards for civilian federal agency computer systems to the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB).121 Responsibility for security standards for
national defense systems remains primarily with DOD and NSA.
The following bills identify recent legislative activity that is related to
prevention of cyberterrorism, or related to collection of information on possible
terrorist activities.
! P.L. 108-195: On December 19, 2003, the Defense Production Act
of 2003 amended the Defense Production Act of 1950 to extend its
expiration date and authorization of appropriations through FY2008.
Sponsored by Senator Shelby Richard, this law corrects industrial
resource shortfalls for radiation-hardened electronics, and defines
â€œcritical infrastructureâ€ to include physical and cyberbased assets.
! S. 140: Known as the Domestic Defense Fund Act of 2005, this bill
proposes to authorize DHS to award grants to states and local
governments to improve cyber and infrastructure security.
Introduced by Senator Hillary Clinton on January 24, 2005, the bill
was referred to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs.
120 Dan Verton, â€œOffshore Coding Work Raises Security Concerns,â€ Computerworld, May
5, 2003, vol. 37, no. 18, p. 1.
121 Under FISMA, the Director of OMB: oversees the implementation of information
security policies for civilian federal agencies, requires agencies to identify and provide
information security protection appropriate for the level of risk and magnitude of harm
resulting from possible destruction of information or systems, and coordinates the
development of security standards and guidelines developed between NIST, NSA, and other
agencies to assure they are complementary with standards and guidelines developed for
national security systems. See 44 U.S.C., Section 3543 (a).

CRS-36
Appendix A. Planning for a Cyberattack
A cyberattack is sometimes also called a Computer Network Attack (CNA),
because a network connection enables this type of attack. Computer hackers
traditionally use five basic steps to gain unauthorized access, and subsequently take
over computer systems. These five steps can also be employed by terrorist groups.
The steps are frequently automated through use of special hacker tools freely
available to anyone via the Internet.122 Highly-skilled hackers use automated tools
that are also very sophisticated, and their effects are initially much more difficult for
computer security staff and security technology products to detect. These
sophisticated hacker tools are usually shared only among an exclusive group of other
highly-skilled hacker associates. The hacker tactics described in this report are also
explained in detail in many sources that list possible defenses against computer
attack.123
! Step 1. Reconnaissance and Pre-operative Surveillance
In this first step, hackers employ extensive pre-operative
surveillance to find out detailed information about an organization
that will help them later gain unauthorized access to computer
systems. The most common method is social engineering, or tricking
an employee into revealing sensitive information (such as a
telephone number or a password). Other methods include dumpster
diving, or rifling through an organizationâ€™s trash to find sensitive
information (such as floppy disks or important documents that have
not been shredded). This step can be automated if the attacker
installs on an office computer a virus, worm, or â€œSpywareâ€ program
that performs surveillance and then transmits useful information,
such as passwords, back to the attacker. â€œSpywareâ€ is a form of
malicious code that is quietly installed on a computer without user
knowledge when a user visits a malicious website. It may remain
undetected by firewalls or current anti-virus security products while
monitoring keystrokes to record web activity or collect snapshots of
screen displays and other restricted information for transmission
back to an unknown third party.124
! Step 2. Scanning
Once in possession of special restricted information, or a few critical
phone numbers, an attacker performs additional surveillance by
scanning an organizationâ€™s computer software and network
122 Using these five basic steps, often supplemented with automated intrusion tools, attackers
have successfully taken over computer systems and remained undetected for long periods
of time. Ed Skoudis, Counter Hack, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2002).
123 These include Ed Skoudis, Counter Hack: A Step-By-Step Guide to Computer Attacks
and Effective Defenses, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2002); Winn Schwartau, Information
Warfare Cyberterrorism: Protecting Your Personal Security in the Electronic Age,
(Publishers Group West, 1996); and Jeff Crume, Inside Internet Security: What Hackers
Donâ€™t Want You To Know, (Pearson Education Limited, 2000).
124 For more about Spyware, see Spywareinfo at [http://www.spywareinfo.com/].

CRS-37
configuration to find possible entry points. This process goes
slowly, sometimes lasting months, as the attacker looks for several
vulnerable openings into a system.125
! Step 3: Gaining Access
Once the attacker has developed an inventory of software and
configuration vulnerabilities on a target network, he or she may
quietly take over a system and network by using a stolen password
to create a phony account, or by exploiting a vulnerability that
allows them to install a malicious Trojan Horse, or automatic â€œbotâ€
that will await further commands sent through the Internet.
! Step 4: Maintaining Access
Once an attacker has gained unauthorized access, he or she may
secretly install extra malicious programs that allow them to return as
often as they wish. These programs, known as â€œRoot Kitsâ€ or â€œBack
Doorsâ€, run unnoticed and can allow an attacker to secretly access
a network at will. If the attacker can gain all the special privileges
of a system administrator, then the computer or network has been
completely taken over, and is â€œownedâ€ by the attacker. Sometimes
the attacker will reconfigure a computer system, or install software
patches to close the previous security vulnerabilities just to keep
other hackers out.
! Step 5: Covering Tracks
Sophisticated attackers desire quiet, unimpeded access to the
computer systems and data they take over. They must stay hidden
to maintain control and gather more intelligence, or to refine
preparations to maximize damage. The â€œRoot Kitâ€ or â€œTrojan
Horseâ€ programs often allow the attacker to modify the log files of
the computer system, or to create hidden files to help avoid detection
by the legitimate system administrator. Security systems may not
detect the unauthorized activities of a careful intruder for a long
period of time.126
125 An attacker may use an automatic â€œWar Dialingâ€ tool that dials thousands of telephone
numbers, looking for modems connected to a computer. If a computer modem answers
when the War Dialer calls, the attacker may have located a way to enter an organizationâ€™s
network and bypass firewall security. A newer way of scanning for vulnerabilities is called
â€œWar Drivingâ€, where hackers drive randomly through a neighborhood trying to detect
signals from business or home wireless networks. Once a network is detected, the hacker
may park nearby and attempt to log on to gain free, unauthorized access. Kevin Poulsen,
â€œWar Driving by the Bay,â€ Secur i t yf ocus.com, April 12, 2001,
[http://www.securityfocus.com/news/192].
126 New â€œantiforensics toolsâ€ are now available on the Internet that allow hackers to more
effectively hide their actions, and thus defeat more investigators who search for technical
evidence of computer intrusions. Anne Saita, â€œAntiforensics: The Looming Arms Race,â€
Information Security, May 2003, vol. 6, no. 5, p.13.

CRS-38
As technology has evolved, more of the above tasks are now aided by the use
of automated programs, or â€œbots,â€ that are increasingly autonomous, rapid, and
difficult to detect. These â€œbotsâ€ can be remotely controlled by commands sent
through the Internet and can be activated to operate in a coordinated manner on
thousands of computers in different locations around the world. Thousands of such
computers under remote control may be programmed by a hacker to simultaneously
launch an attack through the Internet that can be described as a â€œswarm.â€

CRS-39
Appendix B. Characteristics of Malicious Code
Technology constantly evolves, and new security vulnerabilities are discovered
regularly by software vendors, by security organizations, by individual researchers,
and often by computer hacker groups.127 Security organizations, such as the
Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT/CC) located at Carnegie Mellon,
publish security advisories, including information about new software patches,
usually before computer hacker groups can take advantage of newly discovered
computer security vulnerabilities for purposes of cybercrime or cyberespionage.
However, the number of reported unauthorized computer intrusions has increased
every year, with a 56 percent increase reported between 2001 and 2002.128
Currently, many cyberattacks are enabled by â€œinfectingâ€ a computer with a
malicious payload program that corrupts data, performs surveillance, or that receives
commands through the Internet to paralyze or deny service to a targeted computer.
A computer may become â€œinfectedâ€ if a computer user mistakenly downloads and
installs a malicious program, or mistakenly opens an infected email attachment.
Other malicious programs, known as â€œworms,â€ may actively and rapidly seek out
other computers on the Internet having a specific non-patched vulnerability and
automatically install themselves without any action required on the part of the
victim.129
127 In September 2003, DHS warned U.S. industry and the federal government to expect
potentially significant attacks to emerge against Internet operations, similar to the recent
Blaster worm exploit, because of newly discovered critical flaws in Windows software that
were announced by Microsoft Corporation. Jaikumar Vijayan, â€œAttacks on New Windows
Flaws Expected Soon,â€ Computerworld, Sept. 15, 2003, vol. 37, no. 37, p. 1.
128 A single reported computer security incident may involve one site or hundreds (or even
thousands) of sites. Also, some incidents may involve ongoing activity for long periods of
time. CERT estimates that as much as 80 percent of actual security incidents goes
unreported, in most cases because the organization was unable to recognize that its systems
had been penetrated or there were no indications of penetration or attack; or the organization
was reluctant to publicly admit to being a victim of a computer security breach. CERT,
2003, â€œCERT/CC Statistics 1988-2002,â€ April 15, 2003, [http://www.cert.org/
stats/cert_stats.html#incidents.] â€œCERT/CC Statistics, 2003,â€ [http://www.cert.org/
stats/cert_stats.html].
129 MARC Commuter and CSX freight rail service experienced cancellations and delays on
August 21, 2003, because of a virus that disabled the computer systems at the CSX railway
Jacksonville, Florida headquarters. The â€œBlasterâ€ computer worm attacked more than
500,000 computers worldwide within one week. The â€œBlasterâ€ attack was quickly followed
the next week by another worm that spread worldwide, called â€œWelchia,â€ which installed
itself on computers by taking advantage of the same vulnerability used by Blaster. Brian
Krebs, â€œâ€˜Goodâ€™ Worm Fixes Infected Computers,â€ Washingtonpost.com, Aug. 18, 2003.
The â€œWelchiaâ€ worm also disrupted the highly secure Navy Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI)
during the week of August 11, by flooding it with unwanted traffic. This was the first time
that military network was disrupted by an outside cyberattack. Diane Frank, â€œAttack of the
Worms: Feds Get Wake-Up Call,â€ Federal Computer Week, Aug. 25, 2003, vol. 17, no. 29,
p. 8.

CRS-40
A virus is one form of malicious program that often immediately corrupts data
or causes a malfunction. A Trojan Horse is another form of malicious program that
quietly and secretly corrupts the functions of an existing trusted program on the
computer. An attack program, once installed, may quietly â€œlistenâ€ for a special
command sent through the Internet from a remote source, instructing it to begin
activation of malicious program instructions. Another type of malicious program,
known as â€œspyware,â€ has a surveillance or espionage capability that enables it to
secretly record and automatically transmit keystrokes and other information
(including passwords) back to a remote attacker.130 Other types of malicious code
may combine some or all of the characteristics of viruses, worms, Trojan Horses, or
spyware along with the ability to randomly change the electronic appearance
(polymorphism) of the resulting attack code. This ability to change makes many of
the newer viruses, worms, and Trojan Horses very difficult for most anti-virus
security products to detect.131
Malicious programs attack by disrupting normal computer functions or by
opening a back door for a remote attacker to take control of the computer.
Sometimes an attacker can quietly take full control of a computer with the owner
remaining unaware that his or her machine is compromised. An attack can either
immediately disable a computer or incorporate a time delay, after which a remote
command will direct the infected computer to transmit harmful signals that disrupt
other computers. An attack can trigger the automatic transmission of huge volumes
of harmful signals that can very rapidly disrupt or paralyze many thousands of other
computers throughout the Internet or severely clog transmission lines with an
abundance of bogus messages, causing portions of the Internet to become slow and
unresponsive.
130 The FBI is investigating what private security experts believe to be the first Internet
attack aimed primarily at a single economic sector. The malicious code, discovered in June
2003, contains a list of roughly 1,200 Web addresses for many of the worldâ€™s largest
financial institutions, including J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., American Express Co., Wachovia
Corp., Bank of America Corp. and Citibank N.A. â€œBugbearâ€ is a polymorphic worm/virus
that has keystroke-logging and mass-mailing capabilities, and attempts to terminate various
antivirus and firewall programs. Though most major banks do not put sensitive information
on the Internet, the worm will attempt to use information captured from a desktop PC to
break into restricted computers that do contain financial data. For example, experts found
that the Bugbear software is programmed to determine whether a victim used an e-mail
address that belonged to any of the 1,300 financial institutions listed in its blueprints. If a
match is made, it tries to steal passwords and other information that would make it easier
for hackers to break into a bankâ€™s networks. The software then transmits stolen passwords
to 10 e-mail addresses, which also are included in the blueprints. But experts said that on
the Internet anyone can easily open a free e-mail account using a false name, and so
knowing those addresses might not lead detectives to the culprit. A.P., â€œFeds Warn Banks
About Internet Attack,â€ CNN.Com, June 10, 2003, [http://www.cnn.com/2003/
TECH/internet/06/10/virus.banks.ap/index.html].
131 The Naval Postgraduate School is developing a new network security tool called
â€œTherminatorâ€ that is designed to detect possible computer attacks by carefully monitoring
network traffic. Jason Ma, â€œNPS Touts Therminator As Early-Warning Tool for Computer
Attacks,â€ Inside the Navy, Navy-16-40-12, Oct. 6, 2003.

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Preparation for a cybercrime or computer attack may sometimes proceed slowly
or in several phases before a final attack is initiated. Some compromised computers
become part of an automatic â€œbot network,â€ quietly performing espionage by
transmitting data or intermediate preparatory instructions back and forth between
compromised computers while awaiting a special final activation signal originating
from the attacker. The final activation phase may direct all compromised computers
to inundate a targeted computer with bogus messages or insert phony data into
critical computer systems, causing them to malfunction at a crucial point or affect
other computers downstream. Some recent computer attacks have focused on only
a single new computer vulnerability and have been seen to spread worldwide through
the Internet with astonishing speed.132
132 The â€œSlammerâ€ worm attacked Microsoftâ€™s database software and spread through the
Internet over one weekend in January 2003. According to a preliminary study coordinated
by the Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA), on January 25, 2003,
the SQL Slammer worm (also known as â€œSapphireâ€) infected more than 90 percent of
vulnerable computers worldwide within 10 minutes of its release on the Internet, making it
the fastest computer worm in history. As the study reports, exploiting a known vulnerability
for which a patch has been available since July 2002, Slammer doubled in size every 8.5
seconds and achieved its full scanning rate (55 million scans per second) after about 3
minutes. It caused considerable harm through network outages and such unforeseen
consequences as canceled airline flights and automated teller machine (ATM) failures.
Further, the study emphasizes that the effects would likely have been more severe had
Slammer carried a malicious payload, attacked a more widespread vulnerability, or targeted
a more popular service. The malicious code disrupted more than 13,000 Bank of America
automated teller machines, causing some machines to stop issuing money, and took most of
South Korea Internet users offline. As many as five of the 13 Internet root name servers
were also slowed or disabled, according to Anti-virus firm F-Secure. Robert F. Dacey,
â€œINFORMATION SECURITY: Progress Made, But Challenges Remain to Protect Federal
Systems and the Nationâ€™s Critical Infrastructures,â€ 2003; Matt Loney, â€œSlammer attacks may
become way of life for Net ,â€ Cnet.News.com, Feb. 6, 2003, [http://news.com.com/
Damage+control/2009-1001_3-983540.html]; Robert Lemos, â€œWorm exposes apathy,
Microsoft flaws,â€ Cnet.News.com, Jan. 26, 2003 [http://news.com.com/2102-1001-
982135.html].

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Appendix C. Similarities in Tactics Used for
Cyberattacks and Conventional Terrorist Attacks
Similarities exist in characteristics of tactics used by hackers to prepare for and
execute a cybercrime or cyberespionage computer attack, and the tactics used by
terrorists to prepare for and execute some recent physical terrorist operations. For
example, both sets of tactics involve (1) network meetings in cyberspace, (2)
extensive pre-attack surveillance, (3) exploits of soft and vulnerable targets, and (4)
swarming methods. Knowing that these similarities exist may help investigators as
they explore different methods to detect and prevent a possible cyberattack by
terrorist groups:
! The organizational structures of many terrorist groups are not well
understood and are usually intended to conceal the interconnections
and relationships.133 A network organization structure (as opposed
to a hierarchical structure) favors smaller units, giving the group the
ability to attack and quickly overwhelm defenders, and then just as
quickly disperse or disappear. Terrorist groups using a network
structure to plan and execute an attack can place government
hierarchies at a disadvantage because a terrorist attack often blurs
the traditional lines of authority between agencies such as police, the
military, and other responders. Similarly, computer hackers are
often composed of small groups or individuals who meet
anonymously in network chat rooms to exchange information about
computer vulnerabilities, and plan ways to exploit them for
cybercrime or cyberespionage. By meeting only in cyberspace,
hackers can quickly disappear whenever government authorities try
to locate them.
! Terrorists use pre-attack surveillance over extended periods to gather
information on a targetâ€™s current patterns. According to news
reports, Al Qaeda terrorists are now operating through â€œsleeper
cellsâ€ scattered throughout the United States that are currently
conducting pre-attack surveillance and relaying messages from
terrorist leaders and planners.134 Recent terrorist attacks on
Westerners in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in 2004 were reported to have
involved extensive planning and preparation and were likely
preceded by pre-attack surveillance.135 Appendix A of this report
describes how hackers engage in similar pre-operative surveillance
activities before launching a cyberattack.
133 â€œReport to Congress Regarding the Terrorism Information Awareness Program,â€
Executive Summary, May 20, 2003, p.3.
134 Jerry Seper, â€œâ€˜Sleeper Cellsâ€™ of Al Qaeda Active in U.S. Despite War,â€ Washington
Times, Feb. 11, 2004, [http://www.washingtontimes.com/national/20040210-105654-
8823r.htm].
135 U.S. Citizen Services, â€œTravel Warnings and Warden Messages,â€ June 16, 2004,
[http://riyadh.usembassy.gov/saudi-arabia/w1504.html].

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! Terrorist groups are described by DHS as opportunistic, choosing to
exploit soft vulnerabilities that are left exposed. Similarly, an
increasingly popular trend for computer hackers engaged in
computer crime or computer espionage is to use a malicious program
called a worm, that pro-actively spreads copies of itself through the
Internet, rapidly finding as many computers as possible with the
same non-patched vulnerability, and then automatically installing
itself to quietly await further instructions from the attacker.
! Hackers have also designed recent computer exploits that launch
anonymously from thousands of infected computers to produce
waves of disruption that can quickly overwhelm a targeted
organization, or multiple organizations such as a list of banking
institutions. In a similar manner, terrorist groups may also strike in
waves from multiple dispersed directions against multiple targets, in
swarming campaigns. An example of swarming may be the May 11,
2003 attack in Riyadh, where terrorists (possibly Al Qaeda), staged
simultaneous assaults at three compounds in different locations, with
each assault involving a rapid strike with multiple vehicles, some
carrying explosives and others carrying gunmen. Another example
may be the simultaneous attacks of 9/11 which were directed against
the towers of the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a possible
third target.