Order Code RL32776
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Navy Ship Procurement:
Alternative Funding Approaches — Background
and Options for Congress
Updated March 25, 2005
Ronald O’Rourke
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

---

Navy Ship Procurement: Alternative Funding
Approaches — Background and Options for Congress
Summary
Some observers have proposed procuring Navy ships using incremental funding
or advance appropriations rather than the traditional full funding approach that has
been used to procure most Navy ships. Supporters believe these alternative funding
approaches could increase stability in Navy shipbuilding plans and perhaps increase
the number of Navy ships that could be built for a given total amount of ship-
procurement funding. The issue for the 109th Congress is whether to maintain or
change current practices for funding Navy ship procurement. Congress’ decision
could be significant because the full funding policy relates to Congress’ power of the
purse and its responsibility for conducting oversight of defense programs.
For Department of Defense (DOD) procurement programs, the full funding
policy requires the entire procurement cost of a usable end item (such as a Navy ship)
to be funded in the year in which the item is procured. Congress imposed the full
funding policy on DOD in the 1950s to strengthen discipline in DOD budgeting and
improve Congress’ ability to control DOD spending and carry out its oversight of
DOD activities.
Under incremental funding, a weapon’s cost is divided into two or more annual
increments that Congress approves separately each year. Supporters could argue that
using it could avoid or mitigate budget spikes associated with procuring very
expensive ships such as aircraft carriers or “big-deck” amphibious assault ships.
Opponents could argue that using it could make total ship procurement costs less
visible and permit one Congress to budgetarily “tie the hands” of future Congresses.
Under advance appropriations, Congress makes a one-time decision to fund the
entire procurement cost of an end item. That cost can then be divided into two or
more annual increments that are assigned to (in budget terminology, “scored in”) two
or more fiscal years. Supporters could argue that using advance appropriations could
avoid or mitigate budget spikes without some of the potential disadvantages of
incremental funding. Opponents could argue that advance appropriations retains (or
even expands) a key potential disadvantage of incremental finding — that of tying
the hands of future Congresses.
Although budget spikes associated with fully funding very expensive ships can
contribute to instability in Navy ship-procurement planning, a more fundamental
cause of this instability may be the absence of a current, officially approved,
consensus plan for the future size and structure of the Navy. Using incremental
funding or advance appropriations could, under certain circumstances, marginally
reduce the cost of Navy ships. Under certain other circumstances, however, it could
increase costs. Options for Congress include maintaining current ship-procurement
funding practices; strengthening adherence to the full funding policy; increasing the
use of incremental funding; beginning to use advance appropriations; and transferring
lead-ship detailed design and nonrecurring engineering costs to the research and
development account. Arguments could be made in support of or against each of
these options. This report will be updated as events warrant.

---

Contents
Introduction and Issue for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Full Funding Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
General Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Advance Procurement (AP) Payments Under Full Funding . . . . . . . . . 3
“One Decision For One Pot Of Money” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Incremental Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
General Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Advantages and Disadvantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Navy Proposal For Funding Lead Ships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
“Multiple Decisions For Multiple Pots Of Money” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Advance Appropriations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
General Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Advantages and Disadvantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Navy Advocacy In 2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
“One Decision For Multiple Pots of Money” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Potential For Reducing Instability In Ship-Procurement Plans . . . . . . . . . . 12
Potential For Increasing Number Of Ships Procured . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Options for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Maintain Current Funding Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Strengthen Adherence To Full Funding Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Increase Use of Incremental Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Begin Using Advance Appropriations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Transfer Lead-Ship DD/NRE Costs To R&D Account . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Legislative Activity For FY2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
S.Amdt. 146 to S.Con.Res. 18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Appendix A. Recent Ships Procured With Incremental Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Appendix B. Funding For Lead DD(X) and Lead LCS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

---

Navy Ship Procurement:
Alternative Funding Approaches —
Background and Options for Congress
Introduction and Issue for Congress
Some observers, including the Chief of Naval Operations and shipbuilding
industry officials, have recently proposed procuring Navy ships using funding
approaches other than the traditional full funding approach that has been used to
procure most Navy ships since the 1950s.1 These alternative funding approaches
include incremental funding, which has been used to fund a few Navy ships in recent
years, and advance appropriations, which has not been used for Navy ship
procurement. Supporters of these alternative funding approaches believe they could
increase stability in Navy shipbuilding plans and perhaps increase the number of
Navy ships that could be built for a given total amount of ship-procurement funding.
The issue for the 109th Congress is whether to maintain current practices for
funding Navy ship procurement or change them by, for example, increasing the use
of incremental funding or starting to use advance appropriations. Congress’ decision
on this issue could be significant because the full funding policy relates to Congress’
power of the purse and its responsibility for conducting oversight of Department of
Defense (DOD) programs. Consequently, the issue can be alternately expressed as
how to procure Navy ships economically while maintaining key congressional
prerogatives. Congress’ decision on ship funding approaches could also affect future
Navy capabilities, annual Navy funding requirements, and the shipbuilding industrial
base.
1 For the Chief of Naval Operations, see Statement of Admiral Vernon Clark, USN, Chief
of Naval Operations, Before The Senate Armed Services Committee, February 10, 2005,
page 20, and Admiral Clark’s spoken testimony at both this hearing and a February 17, 2005
hearing before the House Armed Services Committee. See also Andrew Scutro, “Clark
Seeks Hearings On Shipbuilding Process,” NavyTimes.com, February 18, 2005; Dave
Ahearn, “Clark Urges Ships Funding Reforms, But Defends Shipbuilding Cuts,” Defense
Today, February 18, 2005; and Geoff Fein, “Federal Acquisition Regulations Should Be
Examined, CNO Says,” Defense Daily, February 18, 2005.
For industry officials, see Dave Ahearn, “Northrop Chief Says Payment Due For
Aircraft Carrier Delay,” Defense Today, February 16, 2005; Nathan Hodge, “Despite
Setbacks, Northrop Grumman Chief Confident On Missile Defense, Budget,” February 16,
2005; William Matthews, “Northrop Pitches Novel Ship Financing, Again,” Defense News,
December 6, 2004: 24; Christopher P. Cavas, “Northrop Chief Urges Spreading Ship
Payments,” Defense News, November 22, 2004; Christopher J. Castelli, “Shipbuilder
Northrop Pitches Financing Strategy For Ships To Navy,” Inside the Navy, November 1,
2004: 1.

---

CRS-2
The following section of this report provides background information on the full
funding policy, incremental funding, and advance appropriations. The section that
follows presents options for Congress that arise out of these three funding
approaches. Portions of this report are adapted from another CRS report that
discusses the full funding policy in DOD procurement generally.2
Background
Full Funding Policy
General Description. Most (but not all) Navy ships procured since the late
1950s have been funded in accordance with the full funding policy. Before then,
many Navy ships were procured with incremental funding, which is discussed in the
next section.
For DOD procurement programs, the full funding policy requires the entire
procurement cost of a usable end item (such as a Navy ship) to be funded in the year
in which the item is procured. The policy applies not just to Navy ships, but to all
weapons and equipment that DOD procures through the procurement title of the
annual DOD appropriations act.
In general, the full funding policy means that DOD cannot contract for the
construction of a new weapon or piece of equipment until funding for the entire cost
of that item has been approved by Congress. Sufficient funding must be available for
a complete, usable end item before a contract can be let for the construction of that
item. Under traditional full funding, no portion of a usable end item’s procurement
cost is funded in a year after the year in which the item is procured.
Congress imposed the full funding policy on DOD in the 1950s to make the total
procurement costs of DOD weapons and equipment more visible and thereby
enhance Congress’ ability to understand and track these costs. Congress’ intent in
imposing the policy was to strengthen discipline in DOD budgeting and improve
Congress’ ability to control DOD spending and carry out its oversight of DOD
activities. Understanding total costs and how previously appropriated funds are used
are key components of Congress’ oversight capability.
The full funding policy is consistent with two basic laws regarding government
expenditures — the Antideficiency Act of 1870, as amended, and the Adequacy of
Appropriations Act of 1861. Regulations governing the full funding policy are found
in Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-11 and DOD Directive
7000.14-R, which provide guidelines on budget formulation. OMB Circular A-11
states, among other things, that
Good budgeting requires that appropriations for the full costs of asset acquisition
be enacted in advance to help ensure that all costs and benefits are fully taken
2 CRS Report RL31404, Defense Procurement: Full Funding Policy — Background, Issues,
and Options for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke and Stephen Daggett.

---

CRS-3
into account at the time decisions are made to provide resources. Full funding
with regular appropriations in the budget year also leads to tradeoffs within the
budget year with spending for other capital assets and with spending for purposes
other than capital assets. Full funding increases the opportunity to use
performance-based fixed price contracts, allows for more efficient work planning
and management of the capital project (or investment), and increases the
accountability for the achievement of the baseline goals.
When full funding is not followed and capital projects (or investments) or useful
segments are funded in increments, without certainty if or when future funding
will be available, the result is sometimes poor planning, acquisition of assets not
fully justified, higher acquisition costs, cancellation of major investments, the
loss of sunk costs, or inadequate funding to maintain and operate the assets.3
Support for the full funding policy has been periodically reaffirmed over the
years by Congress, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and DOD.4
Advance Procurement (AP) Payments Under Full Funding. The
executive branch regulations that implement the full funding policy for DOD
procurement programs permit two circumstances under which advance procurement
(AP) “down payments” on a usable end item can be provided in one or more years
prior to the item’s year of procurement:5
! AP funding may be used to pay for “long-lead items” — components
of a usable end item that have long manufacturing lead times — if
needed to ensure that these items will be ready for installation into
the end item at the appropriate point in the end item’s construction
process.
! AP funding may also be used to pay for “economic order quantity”
(EOQ) procurement of a set of long-lead items for a set of weapons
being acquired under a multiyear procurement (MYP) arrangement.
Each of these is discussed below.
AP Payments For Long-Lead Items. Long-lead items are often
manufactured not at the end item’s final assembly facility (such as a shipyard) but at
separate supplier firms. In Navy shipbuilding, AP payments have most commonly
been used to pay for nuclear-propulsion components of nuclear-powered aircraft
carriers and submarines.
3 OMB Circular A-11 (July 2003), Appendix J, Section C, Principle 1 (of four principles for
financing capital assets).
4 For a detailed discussion of the origins, rationale, and governing regulations of the full
funding policy, as well as examples of where Congress, GAO, and DOD have affirmed their
support for the policy, see Appendix A of CRS Report RL31404, op cit.
5 Note that the funding discussed here is advance procurement funding, which is not to be
confused with the alternate funding approach called advance appropriations, discussed later.

---

CRS-4
Congress in recent years has occasionally approved AP funding for
conventionally powered Navy ships, such as destroyers and amphibious ships, for
which the Navy did not request any AP funding for long-lead items. Congress in
recent years has also occasionally approved AP funding for “advance construction”
work on certain ships, which apparently refers to early shipyard activities for building
the basic structure of a ship, as opposed to manufacturing long-lead components to
be installed into the ship. The use of AP funding for shipyard advance construction
activities is not recognized in executive branch budget regulations on the full funding
policy, at least not in the same way as these regulations recognize the use of AP
funding for long-lead components.
Congressional decisions to approve AP funding for ships for which the Navy did
not request such funding, or for shipyard advance construction activities, could be
aimed at one or more of the following goals:
! generating shipyard construction work (and thus shipyard revenues
and jobs) on a particular ship in a year prior to that ship’s year of
procurement;
! creating an early financial commitment to procuring a ship that is
planned for procurement in a future year, which can enhance job
security for construction workers at the yard that would build the
ship;
! reducing the total construction cost of a ship through improved
sequencing or year-to-year balancing of shipyard construction work;
and
! reducing the portion of a ship’s cost to be funded in the year of
procurement.
AP Payments For EOQ Under Multiyear Procurement. Most DOD
procurement programs use annual contracting, under which DOD lets one or more
contracts for each year’s worth of procurement of a given item. Multiyear
procurement is a special contracting authority, approved by Congress on a
program-by-program basis, that permits DOD to use a single contract to procure a set
of end items that are scheduled to be procured across a series of up to five fiscal years
(i.e., the budget year in question, plus up to four future years). An MYP arrangement
approved for the Navy’s F/A-18E/F strike-fighter program, for example, permitted
the Navy to procure, under a single contract, a total of 198 to 224 F/A-18E/Fs during
the five-year period FY2000-FY2004. Congress over the years has granted MYP
authority for a relatively small number of procurement programs.
The law governing MYP arrangements is set forth in 10 USC 2306b. This
provision permits AP funding to be used to finance, at the outset of an MYP
arrangement, the procurement of long-lead components for all of the end items to be
procured under the MYP arrangement. The MYP arrangement to procure a total of
five Virginia (SSN-774) class nuclear-powered attack submarines over the five-year
period FY2004-FY2008, for example permits the Navy to procure, in the first years
of the arrangement, five sets of long-lead nuclear-propulsion components. This up-

---

CRS-5
front procurement of long-lead items is called an “economic order quantity” (EOQ)
because it procures (i.e., places an order for) these items in the form of a group that
can be manufactured in an efficient (i.e., economic) manner.6
“One Decision For One Pot Of Money”. When Congress approves AP
funding for an item, it does so through a funding decision for that year that is separate
from the decision that Congress subsequently makes, in the item’s year of
procurement, to fund the remainder of the item’s procurement cost. Items procured
with AP funding thus involve two or more funding decisions from Congress — one
or more decisions to approve AP funding in one or more years prior to the year of
procurement, plus a final decision, in the item’s year of procurement, to fund the
remainder of the item’s procurement cost. A decision by Congress to approve AP
funding for an item does not create an obligation on the part of Congress to approve
the remainder of the item’s procurement cost in some future year, but it usually
indicates that Congress anticipates doing so.
Although some DOD weapons and equipment are procured with AP funding,
most DOD procurement items are funded through a single decision by Congress to
provide the entire cost of the item in the item’s year of procurement. For this reason,
the full funding policy for DOD procurement programs can be described in simplified
terms as “one decision for one pot of money.”
Incremental Funding
General Description. In spite of the existence of the full funding policy, a
few Navy and DOD ships have been procured in recent years (or are currently being
procured) with incremental funding. Examples include DOD sealift ships, the attack
submarine SSN-23, the amphibious assault ships LHD-6 and LHD-8, and the aircraft
carrier CVN-21. The DOD sealift ships were procured through the National Defense
Sealift Fund (NDSF), a DOD revolving and management fund that is outside the
procurement title of the DOD appropriations act and therefore not subject to the full
funding policy in the same way as DOD procurement programs funded through the
procurement title. LHD-8 is currently being incrementally funded by explicit
legislative direction. SSN-23, LHD-6 and CVN-21 amount to cases of de facto
incremental funding. (For detailed discussions of the funding of these ships, see
Appendix A of this report.) These ships constitute recent exceptions to the use of full
funding in the procurement of Navy ships. Prior to the imposition of the full funding
policy in the 1950s, however, much of DOD weapon procurement was accomplished
through incremental funding.
Under incremental funding, a weapon’s cost is divided into two or more annual
portions, or increments, that can reflect the need to make annual progress payments
6 10 USC 2306b(i)(4)(B) states: “The Secretary of Defense may obligate funds appropriated
for any fiscal year for advance procurement under a contract for the purchase of property
only for the procurement of those long-lead items necessary in order to meet a planned
delivery schedule for complete major end items that are programmed under the contract to
be acquired with funds appropriated for a subsequent fiscal year (including an economic
order quantity of such long-lead items when authorized by law).”

---

CRS-6
to the contractor as the weapon is built. Congress then approves each year’s
increment as part of its action on that year’s budget. Under incremental funding,
DOD can contract for the construction of a weapon after Congress approves only the
initial increment of its cost, and completion of the weapon is dependent on the
approval of the remaining increments in future years by that Congress or future
Congresses. A key feature of incremental funding is that a portion of the ship’s cost
is provided in one or more years beyond the item’s year of procurement.
One form of incremental funding, called split funding, involves dividing a
weapon’s procurement cost into two portions, one of which is funded in the item’s
year of procurement, the other the following year. Split funding, in other words, is
a two-year form of incremental funding.
Advantages and Disadvantages.
Potential Advantages. Supporters of incremental funding could argue that,
compared to full funding, using incremental funding in DOD procurement can be
advantageous because it can do one or more of the following:
! permit very expensive items, such as large Navy ships, to be
procured in a given year while avoiding or mitigating budget
“spikes” (i.e., lumps) that could require displacing other programs
from that year’s budget, which can increase the costs of the
displaced programs due to uneconomic program-disruption start-up
and start costs;
! avoid a potential bias against the procurement of very expensive
items that might result from use of full funding due to the item’s
large up-front procurement cost (which appears in the budget)
overshadowing the item’s long-term benefits (which do not appear
in the budget) or its lower life cycle operation and support (O&S)
costs compared to alternatives with lower up-front procurement
costs;
! permit construction to start on a larger number of items in a given
year within that year’s amount of funding, so as to achieve better
production economies of that item than would have been possible
under full funding;
! recognize that certain DOD procurement programs, particularly
those incorporating significant amounts of advanced technology,
bear some resemblance to research and development activities
(which can be funded in increments), even though they are intended
to produce usable end items;

---

CRS-7
! reduce the amount of unobligated balances associated with DOD
procurement programs;7
! implicitly recognize potential limits on DOD’s ability to accurately
predict the total procurement cost of items, such as ships, that take
several years to build; and
! preserve flexibility for future Congresses to stop “throwing good
money after bad” by halting funding for the procurement of an item
under construction that has become unnecessary or inappropriate due
to unanticipated shifts in U.S. strategy or the international security
environment.
Potential Disadvantages. In spite of its potential advantages, Congress
replaced incremental funding with the full funding policy in the 1950s, and has
periodically reaffirmed the full funding policy since then, on the grounds that
incremental funding did (or could do) one or more of the following:
! make the total procurement costs of weapons and equipment less
visible to Congress and more difficult for Congress to understand
and track;
! permit one Congress to “tie the hands” of one or more future
Congresses — a kind of action that Congress traditionally tries to
avoid — by providing initial procurement funding for a weapon
whose cost would have to be largely funded by one or more future
Congresses;
! create a potential for DOD to start procurement of an item without
necessarily understanding its total cost, stating that total cost to
Congress, or providing fully for that total cost in future DOD
budgets — the so-called “camel’s-nose-under-the-tent” issue; and
! increase weapon procurement costs by exposing weapons under
construction to potential uneconomic start-up and stop costs that can
occur when budget reductions or other unexpected developments
cause one or more of the planned increments to be reduced or
deferred.
Navy Proposal For Funding Lead Ships. As part of its proposed FY2005
budget and FY2005-FY2009 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP), the Navy in 2004
proposed funding the procurement of the lead DD(X) destroyer and the lead Littoral
Combat Ship (LCS) program in the Navy’s research and development (R&D)
account rather than the Navy’s ship-procurement account, which is known formally
as the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) account. Funding the procurement
7 For an explanation and discussion of unobligated balances, see CRS Report RL30002, A
Defense Budget Primer, by Mary T. Tyszkiewicz and Stephen Daggett.

---

CRS-8
of lead ships through the R&D account would permit them to be incrementally
funded without violating the full funding policy.
Congress, in acting on the Navy’s proposed FY2005 defense budget, rejected
the Navy’s proposal to procure the lead DD(X) through the Navy’s research and
development account, directed the Navy to fully fund the lead DD(X) in the Navy’s
ship-procurement account, and fully funded the lead LCS in the Navy’s research and
development account. For excepts from committee and conference report language,
see Appendix B.
Although Congress in 2004 rejected the Navy’s proposal to incrementally fund
the lead DD(X) and lead LCS, Navy officials testifying in early 2005 in support of
the Navy’s proposed FY2006 defense budget and FY2006-FY2011 FYDP have again
expressed support for the concept of funding the procurement of lead ships in the
R&D account, which would permit them to be funded incrementally.
“Multiple Decisions For Multiple Pots Of Money”. Since incremental
funding divides the procurement cost of an end item into two or more annual
increments, and since Congress typically approves one of these increments each year,
incremental funding can be described in simplified terms as “multiple decisions for
multiple pots of money.”
Advance Appropriations
General Description. Advance appropriations have not been used in Navy
ship procurement, but have been used by other executive branch agencies to fund
various programs.8
Advance appropriations is an alternate form of full funding that is permitted
under executive branch budget regulations. As a funding approach, it can be viewed
as lying somewhere between traditional full funding and incremental funding.9
Under advance appropriations, as under traditional full funding, Congress makes a
one-time decision to fund the entire procurement cost of an end item. That cost,
however, can then be divided into two or more annual increments, as under
incremental funding, that are assigned to (in budget terminology, “scored in”) two or
more fiscal years.10
8 Use of advance appropriations in the federal budget is summarized in the appendix volume
of each year’s U.S. government budget. For the FY2006 version, see U.S. Executive Office
of the President. Office of Management and Budget. Appendix [to the] Fiscal Year 2006
Budget of the U.S. Government. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.., 2005, p. 1241-1242.
9 As discussed in an earlier footnote, advance appropriations is not to be confused with
advance procurement (AP) funding that can occur under traditional full funding.
10 Advance appropriations can also be used to fund the entire cost of an item and have that
entire cost assigned to a single future fiscal year.
OMB Circular A-11 defines advance appropriations as appropriations that are:
— Enacted normally in the current year;
— Scored after the budget year (e.g., in each of one, two, or more later years,
(continued...)

---

CRS-9
In contrast to incremental funding, under which Congress must take a positive
action each year to approve each year’s funding increment, under advance
appropriations, Congress, following its initial decision to fund the item, would need
to take a positive action to cancel or modify an annual funding increment in a future-
year budget. In this sense, advance appropriations can be thought of as a legislatively
locked in form of incremental funding: the future-year funding increments will occur
unless Congress takes action to stop them.
OMB Circular A-11 allows for the use of advance appropriations to help finance
capital assets under certain circumstances:
Regular appropriations for the full funding of a capital project or a useful
segment (or investment) of a capital project in the budget year are preferred. If
this results in spikes that, in the judgment of OMB, cannot be accommodated by
the agency or the Congress, a combination of regular and advance appropriations
that together provide full funding for a capital project or a useful segment or an
investment should be proposed in the budget.
Explanation: Principle 1 (Full Funding) is met as long as a combination of
regular and advance appropriations provide budget authority sufficient to
complete the capital project or useful segment or investment. Full funding in the
budget year with regular appropriations alone is preferred because it leads to
tradeoffs within the budget year with spending for other capital assets and with
spending for purposes other than capital assets. In contrast, full funding for a
capital project (investment) over several years with regular appropriations for the
first year and advance appropriations for subsequent years may bias tradeoffs in
the budget year in favor of the proposed asset because with advance
appropriations the full cost of the asset is not included in the budget year.
Advance appropriations, because they are scored in the year they become
available for obligation, may constrain the budget authority and outlays available
for regular appropriations of that year.
If, however, the lumpiness caused by regular appropriations cannot be
accommodated within an agency or Appropriations Subcommittee, advance
appropriations can ameliorate that problem while still providing that all of the
budget authority is enacted in advance for the capital project (investment) or
useful segment. The latter helps ensure that agencies develop appropriate plans
and budgets and that all costs and benefits are identified prior to providing
resources. In addition, amounts of advance appropriations can be matched to
funding requirements for completing natural components of the useful segment.
Advance appropriations have the same benefits as regular appropriations for
improved planning, management, and accountability of the project
(investment).11
10 (...continued)
depending on the language); and
— Available for obligation in the year scored and subsequent years if specified in
the language.
(OMB Circular A-11 (July 2003 version), Appendix J (Principles Of Budgeting For
Capital Asset Acquisitions), Section E (Glossary).)
11 OMB Circular A-11 (July 2003), Appendix J, Section C, Principle 2 (of four principles
(continued...)

---

CRS-10
Advantages and Disadvantages. Supporters of advance appropriations
could argue that it offers many of the potential advantages of incremental funding
outlined earlier — including avoiding or mitigating budget spikes — while avoiding
some of its potential disadvantages, such as the risk of increasing weapon
procurement costs created by uneconomic start-up and stop costs that can occur when
budget reductions or other unexpected developments cause planned increments to be
reduced or deferred.
Opponents of advance appropriations could argue that it retains (or even
expands) one of the key potential disadvantages of incremental finding — that of
tying the hands of future Congresses — by committing a portion of one or more
future-year budgets to the financing of an item procured in a prior year and requiring
a positive action from future Congresses to undo those commitments. Opponents
could also argue that compared to full funding, advance appropriations under certain
circumstances could increase ship-construction costs by causing work on a ship to
stop and then be restarted. Specifically, they could argue, if a given increment of
construction work on the ship is completed before the end of a fiscal year and that
year’s funding increment is entirely expended, the Navy might have to halt work on
the ship and wait until the start of the next fiscal year to access the next increment of
funding and resume work. Under full funding, in contrast, the Navy would have
access to funding for the ship’s entire construction cost and consequently would not
have to halt work until the start of the next fiscal year, avoiding the additional costs
of halting and then resuming work.
Navy Advocacy In 2001. In 2001, some Navy officials advocated the use of
advance appropriations for Navy ship procurement, noting at that time that this
funding approach is used by several federal agencies other than DOD.12
11 (...continued)
for financing capital assets). Italics as in the original.
12 Source: Slides for May 3, 2001 Navy briefing to CRS, Advance Appropriations for Navy
Shipbuilding, pages 19-21. The Navy also argued that current law, contrary to some
assertions, does not prohibit the use of advance appropriations. Specifically, the Navy
argued that:
! 31 USC 1341, [the] “Anti-Deficiency Act,” prohibits writing a contract
which “involves the government in a contract or obligation for the
payment of money before an appropriation is made unless authorized by
law.”
! 10 USC 2306b [the provision covering multi-year procurement contracts]
allows [DOD and certain other federal agencies] to enter into multi-year
contracts for the purchase of weapon systems, as long as [there is] “a
reasonable expectation that throughout the contemplated contract period
the head of the agency will request funding for the contract at the level
required to avoid contract cancellation.”
! 31 USC 1105 [a provision relating to the contents of the federal budget
and its submission to Congress] requires that [the executive branch]
identify in advance of need future appropriations that will have to be
approved in order to complete the contract. These advance appropriations
have to be specifically approved by Congress to allow [the executive
(continued...)

---

CRS-11
Although use of advance appropriations for Navy ship procurement was
supported by some Navy officials and some Members of Congress,13 the Navy in
2001 apparently did not receive approval from the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) to use the approach for ship procurement, and did not officially propose its
use as part of its FY2002 budget submission to Congress.14 Congress in 2001 did not
adopt advance appropriations as a mechanism for funding Navy ships. The House
Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 107-298 of November 19, 2001) on
the FY2002 defense appropriations bill (H.R. 3338), stated that it was
dismayed that the Navy continues to advocate the use of alternative financing
mechanisms to artificially increase shipbuilding rates, such as advanced
appropriations, or incremental funding of ships, which only serve to decrease
cost visibility and accountability on these important programs. In attempting to
establish advanced appropriations as a legitimate budgeting technique, those
Navy advocates of such practices would actually decrease the flexibility of future
Administrations and Congresses to make rational capital budgeting decisions
with regard to shipbuilding programs. Accordingly, the Committee bill includes
a new general provision (section 8150) which prohibits the Defense Department
from budgeting for shipbuilding programs on the basis of advanced
appropriations.15
The general provision mentioned above (Section 8150) was not included in the final
version of the bill that was passed by Congress and signed into law (H.R. 3338/P.L.
107-117 of January 10, 2002).
“One Decision For Multiple Pots of Money”. Because advance
appropriations involves a one-time decision by Congress to approve the entire
procurement cost of the end item, which can then be divided into two or more
increments that are assigned to two or more fiscal years, advance appropriations can
be described in simplified terms as “one decision for multiple pots of money.”
12 (...continued)
branch] to obligate the government in advance of receipt of funds.
(Slides for May 3, 2001 Navy briefing to CRS, Advance Appropriations for Navy
Shipbuilding, page 16. Emphasis as on the briefing slide.)
13 Christian Bohmfalk, “O’Keefe: Advance Appropriations, If Used Correctly, Could Help
Navy,” Inside the Navy, Nov. 26, 2001; Christian Bohmfalk, “Stevens Promotes Advance
Appropriations To Boost Ship Production,” Inside the Navy, Sept. 10, 2001; Mike
McCarthy, “CNO Advocates Advance Funding of Ships,” Defense Week, July 16, 2001, p.
2; Christian Bohmfalk, “Senior Navy Leaders Describe Benefits of Advance
Appropriations,” Inside the Navy, Apr. 16, 2001; Christopher J. Castelli, “Congress Weighs
Using ‘Advance Appropriations’ For Shipbuilding,” Inside the Navy, Apr. 9, 2001; Dale
Eisman, “Plan Would Boost Navy Shipbuilding,” Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, Apr. 5, 2001.
14 Dale Eisman, “White House Rejects Proposal To Stretch Shipbuilding Funds,” Norfolk
Virginian-Pilot, Sept. 6, 2001; Christian Bohmfalk, “Advance Appropriations, Not Part of
FY-02 Request, May Resurface,” Inside the Navy, July 16, 2001.
15 H.Rept. 107-298, p. 119.

---

CRS-12
Potential For Reducing Instability In Ship-Procurement Plans
Could using incremental funding or advance appropriations reduce instability
in Navy ship-procurement plans?
Using incremental funding or advance appropriations could help reduce
instability in Navy ship-procurement plans by avoiding or mitigating budget spikes
that can occur when traditional full funding is used to procure ships that are very
expensive and are procured once every few years. The ships that best fit this
description are aircraft carriers and “big-deck” amphibious assault ships.16
Accommodating budget spikes for such ships within an overall ship-procurement or
Department of the Navy budget for a given fiscal year can require the Navy to move
to other fiscal years other ships that the Navy would have preferred to procure in the
spike year, or, conversely, require the Navy to move the carrier or amphibious assault
ship from a preferred year of procurement to a less-preferred year that happens to
have fewer other Navy ships in it. Such movements of planned ship procurements
can be a source of instability in Navy ship-procurement planning.
The FY2006-FY2011 Navy ship-procurement plan submitted to Congress in
February 2005 contains at least two potential examples of such ship movements:
! The Navy, as part of its proposed FY2005 budget and FY2005-
FY2009 FYDP submitted to Congress in February 2004, had
proposed funding the lead DD(X) destroyer through the Navy’s
research and development account, which would have permitted the
ship to be funded through a stream of incremental payments during
the seven-year period FY2005-FY2011. Congress, in acting on the
FY2005 budget request, directed the Navy to instead procure the
lead DD(X) through the Navy’s ship-procurement account and to use
full funding. In testifying on the Navy’s proposed FY2006 budget
and FY2006-FY2011 FYDP, Navy officials have stated that due to
an inability to fully fund the lead DD(X) in FY2006 while still
meeting other FY2006 spending needs, the Navy decided in its
FY2006-FY2011 budget submission to fund DD(X) in FY2007.
! The Navy, as part of its proposed FY2005 budget and FY2005-
FY2009 FYDP, had planned to procure its next aircraft carrier,
called CVN-21, in FY2007. Doing so, however, apparently would
have caused the Navy to displace one or more other ships from
FY2007 to a later year. Rather than doing this, the Navy decided in
its FY2006-FY2011 budget submission to defer the procurement of
CVN-21 by a year, to FY2008, which apparently can better
accommodate CVN-21 in budgetary terms but which, from a
16 “Big-deck” amphibious assault ships, which carry the designations LHA or LHD, are large
amphibious ships that are designed to embark and operate a total of about two dozen Marine
Corps helicopters and VSTOL (vertical-short takeoff and landing) airplanes. They have a
flight deck that runs the entire length of the ship and consequently look like medium-sized
aircraft carriers.

---

CRS-13
production standpoint, may be a less-preferred year to procure CVN-
21 than FY2007 because it lengthens an already-substantial gap in
the aircraft carrier production line between CVN-21 and the previous
carrier, CVN-77, which was procured in FY2001.
Although use of full funding can contribute to instability in Navy ship-
procurement plans by causing budget spikes that lead to the movement of planned
ship procurements from one year to another, a more fundamental cause of instability
in Navy ship-procurement programs in recent years may be the absence of a current,
officially approved, consensus plan for the future size and structure of the Navy.
This in turn may reflect evolution and uncertainty in Navy and DOD thinking about
desired Navy capabilities and the metrics for translating those desired capabilities
into required types and numbers of ships.17 If so, then the primary means for
improving stability in Navy ship-procurement programs would be to encourage the
Navy and DOD to better define their thinking regarding desired Navy capabilities and
the metrics for translating those desired capabilities into ship requirements.
Potential For Increasing Number Of Ships Procured
Could using incremental funding or advance appropriations increase the
number of Navy ships that can be built for a given total amount of ship-
procurement funding?
Using incremental funding or advance appropriations could marginally increase
the number of ships that could be built for a given total amount of ship-procurement
funding (or, conversely, marginally reduce the total cost to procure a given number
of ships). By avoiding instances in which budget spikes caused ships to be moved
from one year to another in ship-procurement plans, using incremental funding or
advance appropriations can avoid perturbations in the production schedules for these
ships. Such perturbations can increase the cost of a ship, reducing at the margin the
total number of ships that can be procured for a given total amount of ship-
procurement funding.
In addition, if a situation arises in which annual funding for ship procurement
limits ship-procurement in the near term to low rates with poor production economies
of sale, but is expected to rise in future years to levels that would be more than
adequate to support higher, economic rates of ship procurement, then using
incremental funding or advance appropriations could permit construction to begin on
additional ships in the near term, improving near-term production economies of sale,
while still permitting the Navy to procure ships in future years at economic rates of
production. Improving near-term production economies of scale while preserving
acceptable production economies of scale in later years might result in marginally
higher average economies of scale for the entire period in question and thereby
reduce, at the margin, the collective cost of all the ships procured in the near term and
the later years.
17 For more discussion of this point, see CRS Report RL32665, Potential Navy Force
Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald
O’Rourke.

---

CRS-14
This scenario, however, is dependent on realizing the expected increase in ship-
procurement funding in the later years. If this increase is not realized, then using
incremental funding or advance appropriations could simply trade poor production
economies of scale in the near term for poor production economies of scale in future
years. Put another way, it would simply trade an inability to afford something now
for an inability to afford something later.
In discussing the potential effects of using incremental funding or advance
appropriations, it is possible to construct presentations showing how a decision today
to begin using incremental funding or advance appropriations can increase, perhaps
dramatically, the number of ships on which construction can be started in the near
term. This is simply because using incremental funding or advance appropriations
would defer much of the procurement cost of the ships in question to future years.
In those future years, the remainder of the cost of these ships would still have to be
paid. As a result, other things held equal, the number of new ships that could be
procured in those future years for a given amount of ship-procurement funding will
be reduced because portions of those future-year budgets would now be needed to
pay for the ships on which construction had started in prior years.
Presentations that show a dramatic near-term increase in the number of ships on
which construction can begin by starting to use incremental funding or advance
appropriations — if not tempered by cautions that it would also reduce the number
of new ships that can be procured in future years for a given amount of shipbuilding
funding — can mislead audiences into concluding that using incremental funding or
advance appropriations can dramatically increase the total number of ships that can
be procured over the long run for a given total amount of ship-procurement funding.
Incremental funding or advance appropriations, by avoiding perturbations in ship
production schedules or improving average production economies of scale over a
period of several years, can marginally reduce ship-procurement costs and thereby
marginally (rather than dramatically) increase the total number of ships that can be
procured over the long run for a given amount of ship-procurement funding. The
reduction in ship-procurement costs might be sufficient, for example, to increase
from 20 to 21 the total number of ships that could be fully paid for with a certain total
amount of funding.
Under certain other circumstances, using incremental funding or advance
appropriations could increase rather than reduce ship-procurement costs. As
discussed earlier, using incremental funding can increase the procurement cost of a
ship if one of more of the ship’s funding increments is reduced or deferred and the
ship’s production schedule is consequently disrupted. In addition, if budget
circumstances require reducing the ship-procurement budget for a given year and
some portion of that year’s budget is already devoted to paying for ships started in
prior years with incremental funding or advance appropriations, then preserving that
portion of the budget so as to avoid disrupting the production schedule of those prior-
year ships would mean that the budget reduction would fall more heavily on the
remaining part of the ship-procurement budget. This could increase the chance that
the reduction would lead to a decision to defer to a future year the procurement of a
ship planned for that year, which could increase the procurement cost of that ship.

---

CRS-15
Lastly, if Congress decides to make more use of incremental funding or to start
using advance appropriations, and then decides at a later point to return to a more
exclusive reliance on full funding, it could temporarily reduce the number of new
ships that could be procured because the full costs of new ships being procured and
portions of the costs of ships started in prior years under incremental funding or
advance appropriations would need to be funded at the same time.
Options for Congress
Options for Congress that arise out of proposals to make greater use of
incremental funding or begin using advance appropriations for procuring Navy ships
include (but are not limited to) the following:
! maintain current ship-procurement funding practices;
! strengthen adherence to the full funding policy in ship procurement;
! increase the use of incremental funding in ship procurement;
! begin using advance appropriations in ship procurement; and
! shift lead-ship detailed design/nonrecurring engineering (DD/NRE)
costs to the Navy’s research and development (R&D account).
Each of these is discussed below.
Maintain Current Funding Practices
Current ship-procurement funding practices can be summarized as procuring
almost all ships with full funding, procuring a small number with de facto or explicit
incremental funding, and approving, for some ships being fully funded, advance
procurement (AP) funding that the Navy did not request, or for purposes of shipyard
advance construction activities rather than long-lead components.
Supporters of this option could argue that current funding practices give DOD
and the Congress the flexibility to use incremental funding on a limited basis for
aircraft carriers and selected amphibious assault ships while not formally abandoning
the full funding policy. They could similarly argue that current funding practices
provide Congress with flexibility for using AP funding for purposes other than
funding long-lead items requested by DOD. Such flexibility, they can argue, is
important for meeting policy goals such as preserving the shipbuilding industrial base
within available funding.
Opponents of this option could argue that current practices weaken adherence
to the full funding policy by making even limited use of incremental funding and by
using AP funding for purposes other than funding long-lead items requested by DOD.
Such practices, they could argue, increase the chance that supporters of other kinds

---

CRS-16
of procurement items, such as aircraft, could seek to have them funded using
incremental funding, and that such proposals have already been made.18
Strengthen Adherence To Full Funding Policy
This option would involve reducing or eliminating the use of incremental
funding in Navy ship procurement and reducing or eliminating the use, in ships being
fully funded, of AP funding for purposes other than funding the procurement of long-
lead items requested by DOD.
Supporters could argue that this option, by strengthening adherence to the full
funding policy, would reduce the chance that supporters of other kinds of DOD
procurement items, such as aircraft, would seek to have them funded using
incremental funding. Budget spikes associated with procuring aircraft carriers or big-
deck amphibious assault ships, they could argue, can be anticipated years in advance,
permitting their effects to be carefully managed. They could argue that stability in
Navy ship-procurement plans can be increased by encouraging the Navy and DOD
to better define their thinking regarding Navy requirements, and that ship-
procurement costs can be reduced through measures other than incremental funding
or advance appropriations, such as multiyear procurement, contracts that are
structured to provide incentives to shipbuilders to control costs, and investment in
improved shipyard production capabilities.
Opponents of this policy could argue that it would deprive Congress of the
flexibility it has under current funding practices to use incremental funding on a
limited basis when absolutely necessary and to use AP funding for purposes other
than funding long-lead items requested by DOD. Congress, they could argue, should
not deprive itself of tools that might help improve stability in Navy shipbuilding
plans, reduce ship-procurement costs, and preserve the shipbuilding industrial base
within available funding. Congress, they could argue, has recently taken steps to
discourage the spread of incremental funding to DOD procurement items other than
ships, and can continue doing this while preserving some flexibility for itself in
funding ship procurement.
Increase Use of Incremental Funding
This option could involve explicitly (rather than tacitly) using incremental
funding for aircraft carriers, using incremental funding to procure all (not just some)
big-deck amphibious assault ships, or both. It could also involve funding the
procurement of the lead ships of each new class of Navy ships in the Navy’s research
18 Opponents of this option could note that DOD, as part of its FY2003, FY2004, and
FY2005 defense budgets and its FY2003-FY2007, FY2004-FY2009, and FY2005-FY2009
FYDPs, proposed procuring 60 C-17 airlift aircraft under a follow-on multiyear procurement
(MYP) arrangement approved by Congress in FY2002 that would procure at least some of
the aircraft with funding profiles that resembled incremental funding rather than full
funding. Under this approach, the Air Force requested Congress to appropriate enough
money in a given year to make progress payments on the MYP contract rather than to fully
fund a specific number of aircraft. See CRS Report RL31404, op cit, pp. 7-8.

---

CRS-17
and development account rather than the ship-procurement account, as the Navy has
proposed.
Supporters of this option could argue that it would take maximum advantage of
opportunities for avoiding or mitigating budget spikes associated with the
procurement of these ships. They could also argue that it could strengthen the full
funding policy by making it clear to observers that only certain ships, and no other
DOD procurement items, may be procured with incremental funding. They could
argue that current funding practices — under which aircraft carriers can be funded
with de facto (rather than explicit) incremental funding and some (but not all)
amphibious ships are funded with incremental funding (either de facto or explicit)
— can send confusing signals regarding adherence to the full funding policy, and
that a clear, explicit policy of using incremental funding only for certain ships would
send a clear signal that these ships represent special exceptions to an otherwise strict
practice of adhering to the full funding policy.
Opponents of this option could argue that any use of incremental funding
weakens the full funding policy, increasing the likelihood of proposals to use it for
funding other DOD procurement items. Incremental funding, they could argue,
should be used to avoid or mitigate budget spikes only when doing so is necessary
to avoid disruptions in ship-procurement programs that would substantially increase
procurement costs. Depending on the composition of the ship-procurement plan,
they could argue, the budget spike associated with a carrier or big-deck amphibious
assault ship might or might not lead to a disruption that substantially increased
procurement costs, and that such increases in any event would have to be weighed
against the risk of an increase in cost of an incrementally funded ship due to a
decision in a future year to reduce or delay a funding increment.
Begin Using Advance Appropriations
This option could involve starting to use advance appropriations for ships such
as aircraft carriers or big-deck amphibious assault ships.
Supporters could argue that this option, like the previous one, would take
maximum advantage of opportunities for avoiding or mitigating budget spikes
associated with the procurement of these ships. Since advance appropriations is a
form of full funding, they could argue that this option would not weaken the full
funding policy. They could also argue that compared to the previous option, this
option would create less risk of an increase in the cost of an aircraft carrier or big-
deck amphibious assault ship due to a decision to reduce or defer a funding increment
because, under advance appropriations, funding increments occur automatically
unless Congress takes a positive actions to stop them.
Opponents of this option could argue that even though advance appropriations
is a form of full funding, introducing its use into Navy ship procurement would still
amount to a relaxation of the application of the full funding concept to DOD
procurement that could serve as a precedent for subsequent proposals to relax its
application still further. This option, they could argue, is unnecessary because a
budget spike associated with the procurement of an aircraft carrier or big-deck
amphibious assault ship can be accomplished through the currently accepted practice

---

CRS-18
of occasionally using incremental funding. Starting to use advance appropriations
for aircraft carriers or big-deck amphibious assault ships, they could argue, creates
a risk of increasing the procurement cost of other ships as a result of concentrating
potential reductions in future-year ship-procurement budgets on those ships.19
Transfer Lead-Ship DD/NRE Costs To R&D Account
In Navy ship-procurement programs, the detailed design and nonrecurring
engineering (DD/NRE) costs for each class of ship — the cost to create the detailed
plans for building the class — are included in the procurement cost of the lead ship
in the class. Since the DD/NRE costs for a complex combatant can be significant,
including them in the procurement cost of the lead ship can make that ship
significantly more expensive to procure than the second and subsequent ships in the
class.
In the case of the DD(X) destroyer program, for example, the lead ship’s total
procurement cost of roughly $2.8 billion includes about $1 billion in DD/NRE costs
for the class. The remaining $1.8 billion or so is the actual hands-on construction
cost for the lead ship. Including $1 billion of DD/NRE costs in the procurement cost
of the lead DD(X) increased the ship’s procurement cost by 56% and likely
contributed to the Navy’s decision that it could not afford to fully fund the ship in
FY2006 while meeting other FY2006 funding needs.
Including DD/NRE costs in the procurement cost of the lead unit is a practice
that is not followed by other DOD procurement programs, such as programs for
procuring aircraft, ground vehicles, and missiles. If it were, the lead units of these
other types of procurement programs would be significantly more expensive to
procure.
One response to the challenge of paying for lead ships whose procurement cost
includes significant DD/NRE costs, would be to fund the procurement of lead ships
through the Navy’s research and development (R&D) account rather than the Navy’s
ship-procurement account, as the Navy has proposed in 2004 and 2005. This
approach, which would permit both DD/NRE costs and the hands-on construction
costs of lead ships to be funded incrementally while not violating the full funding
policy, can be viewed as an example of the previously -discussed option of increasing
the use of incremental funding.
19 For additional discussion of the options of using incremental funding or advance
appropriations for procuring aircraft carriers or other Navy ships, see Irv Blickstein and
Giles Smith, A Preliminary Analysis of Advance Appropriations as a Budgeting Method for
Navy Ship Procurements, RAND, Santa Monica (CA), 2002. 45 pp. (RAND National
Defense Research Institute, MR-1527-Navy); and John Birkler et al., Options for Funding
Aircraft Carriers, RAND, Santa Monica (CA), 2002. 58 pp. (RAND National Defense
Research Institute, MR-1526-Navy). The second report also discusses a third option for
funding aircraft carriers called capital account funding. The report describes this as an
approach “in which Congress commits to a specific level of annual funding (adjustable from
time to time) sufficient to support all carrier-construction activities over the long term. The
account could serve as a source of either incremental funding or full funding.” (p. xi)

---

CRS-19
As discussed earlier, Congress, in acting on the Navy’s proposed FY2005
defense budget, rejected the Navy’s proposal to procure the lead DD(X) through the
Navy’s research and development account, directed the Navy to fully fund the lead
DD(X) in the Navy’s ship-procurement account, and fully funded the lead LCS in the
Navy’s research and development account.
An alternative approach to the challenge of paying for lead ships whose
procurement cost includes significant DD/NRE costs would be to treat DD/NRE
work as the final stage of the R&D process and transfer DD/NRE costs to the Navy’s
R&D account. Under this option, the DD/NRE costs for a ship class could be
incrementally funded without violating the full funding policy, while the actual
hands-on construction cost of the lead ship would be fully funded, in conformance
with the full funding policy.
This option can be viewed as an intermediate approach that is between the
current practice of fully funding both DD/NRE costs and the lead ship’s hands-on
construction costs, and incrementally funding both these costs in the R&D account,
as would occur under the Navy’s proposal.
In the case of the DD(X) program, this intermediate approach would permit the
Navy to incrementally fund roughly $1 billion in DD/NRE costs, potentially
increasing the Navy’s ability to fund the lead DD(X) in FY2006 while meeting other
FY2006 funding needs.
Supporters of this option could argue that DD/NRE work is best viewed as the
final stage of research and development and should be treated as such in the budget,
and that shifting these costs to the R&D account would make Navy ship-procurement
programs look more like DOD procurement programs for things such as aircraft,
ground vehicles, and missiles.
Opponents could argue that NN/NRE work is more closely related to production
than to research, and that the current practice of including DD/NRE costs in the
procurement cost of the lead ship makes these costs more visible to Congress, which
is important because detailed design costs for certain past Navy ships have
experienced significant cost growth.
Legislative Activity for FY2006
S.Amdt. 146 to S.Con.Res. 18
S.Con.Res. 18 is the budget resolution. S.Amdt. 146, sponsored by Senator
Warner, co-sponsored by several other members, and submitted on March 15, 2005,
would amend Section 401 of S.Con.Res. 18 — the section that restricts use of
advance appropriations — to increase the aggregate amount of advance
appropriations in FY2007 and FY2008 by $14 billion, to $37.393 billion. The
amendment would also insert a new provision (Section 409) that would include the
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) appropriation account on a list of
accounts identified for advance appropriations in the joint explanatory statement of

---

CRS-20
the managers to accompany S.Con.Res. 18. The amendment was ordered to lie on
the table. The Senate passed S.Con.Res. 18 on March 17, 2005.20
20 For additional discussion, see “Collins, Warner Team To Fund Shipbuilding,” Defense
Today, March 17, 2005; and Christopher J. Castelli, “Warner Amendment On Advance
Appropriations For Ships Is Withdrawn,” Inside the Navy, March 21, 2005.

---

CRS-21
Appendix A. Recent Ships Procured With
Incremental Funding
This appendix discusses Navy and DOD ships that have been procured in recent
years or are currently being procured using incremental funding.
DOD LMSR-Type Sealift Ships
As part of its action on the FY1993 defense budget, Congress created the
National Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF) — a revolving fund in the DOD budget for
the procurement, operation, and maintenance of DOD-owned sealift ships21 — and
transferred procurement of new military sealift ships and certain Navy auxiliary ships
from the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) appropriation account, where
they traditionally had been procured, to the NDSF.22 Since the NDSF is outside the
procurement title of the defense appropriation act, sealift ships procured since
FY1993, including DOD’s Large, Medium-Speed, Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) ships
(as well as Navy Lewis and Clark (TAKE-1) dry cargo ships procured since
FY200323) have not been subject to the full funding policy as traditionally applied to
DOD procurement programs.
As discussed in a 1996 CRS report,24 although individual LMSRs were
ostensibly fully funded each year by Congress, like ships procured in the SCN
account, DOD in some cases actually applied LMSR funding provided in a given
year to partially finance the construction of LMSRs authorized in various years. For
example, although Congress ostensibly approved $546.4 million in FY1995 for the
procurement of two LMSRs, the FY1995 funds were actually applied to help finance
21 Sealift ships are cargo ships that transport military equipment and supplies from one land
mass to another. Government-owned sealift ships are operated by the Military Sealift
Command using mostly civilian crews.
22 Congress created the NDSF through Section 1024 of the FY1993 defense authorization
act (H.R. 5006; see pages 178-181 of H.Rept. 102-966 of October 1, 1992, the conference
report on the act), as amended by Title V of the FY1993 defense appropriations act (H.R.
5504).
23 The first 3 ships in the Navy’s 12-ship Lewis and Clark (TAKE-1) class auxiliary ship
program were procured in the SCN account using full funding. DOD, starting with its
FY2003 defense budget and FY2003-FY2007 FYDP, proposed to fund the remaining 9
ships in the program during the years FY2003-FY2007 in the NDSF, where they would not
be subject to the full funding provision as traditionally applied to DOD procurement
programs. This proposal was consistent with congressional interest for this approach
expressed in action on the FY2001 defense budget. (See H.Rept. 106-616 of May 12, 2000,
the House Armed Services Committee report on the FY2001 defense authorization bill [H.R.
4205], page 89; S.Rept. 106-292, the Senate Armed Services Committee report on the
FY2001 defense authorization bill [S. 2549], page 93; and H.Rept. 106-945, the conference
report on the FY2001 defense authorization bill [H.R. 4205], p. 35 [Sec. 127].) TAKE-1
class ships since FY1993 have been funded by Congress in the NDSF.
24 CRS Report 96-257 F, Sealift (LMSR) Shipbuilding and Conversion Program:
Background and Status, by Valerie Bailey Grasso. (Archived report; copies available
directly from Ronald O’Rourke.)

---

CRS-22
portions of 16 LMSRs whose construction contracts were awarded between FY1993
and FY1997. In explaining its use of funds in the LMSR program, DOD stated:
The National Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF) is not a procurement appropriation
but a revolving fund. Dollars appropriated by Congress for the fund are not
appropriated to purchase specific hulls as in the case of, for example the Navy’s
DDG-51 program. Rather, dollars made available to the NDSF are executed on
an oldest money first basis. Therefore, full funding provisions as normally
understood for ship acquisition do not apply.25
SSN-23 Attack Submarine
The Jimmy Carter (SSN-23), the third and final Seawolf (SSN-21) class attack
submarine, was originally procured in the FY1992 defense budget, which Congress
passed in 1991. In early 1992, the George H. W. Bush Administration terminated
procurement of further Seawolf-class submarines and proposed rescinding funds for
both the second Seawolf-class boat (SSN-22, which had been procured in FY1991)
and SSN-23. In acting on this proposal, Congress rejected the request to rescind
funding for SSN-22 (i.e., Congress affirmed the procurement of SSN-22), effectively
suspended the procurement of SSN-23, and gave the Secretary of the Navy the choice
of whether to reinstate procurement of SSN-23. In 1993, as part of its Bottom-Up
Review (BUR) of U.S. defense policy and programs, the Clinton Administration
decided to reinstate procurement of SSN-23 in FY1995 or FY1996 (it later settled on
FY1996). By this point, $382.4 million had already been obligated and expended on
SSN-23. Congress’ action on the 1992 rescission proposal also made an additional
$540.2 million in funding available for obligation to SSN-23. As a consequence,
completing the approximate $2.4 billion cost of SSN-23 would require about $1.5
billion in additional funding.
The Administration requested $1,507.5 million in FY1996 to complete the cost
of SSN-23. Congress approved the procurement of SSN-23 in FY1996, but provided
only $700 million in procurement funding, leaving about $807.5 million to complete
the cost of the ship.
Rather than requesting all $807.5 million or so in FY1997, the Administration
requested $699.1 million in FY1997 for SSN-23 and deferred the final $105 million
or so needed to complete the cost of the ship (as adjusted) to FY1998. Congress, as
part of its action on the FY1996 defense budget, approved $649.1 million (rather than
$699.1 million) for SSN-23, leaving about $155 million to complete the cost of the
ship.
The Administration requested $153.4 million in FY1998 to complete the cost
of SSN-23 (as adjusted); Congress approved this amount. Thus, of the approximately
$2.4 billion cost of SSN-23 as then estimated,26 a total of $802.5 million — about
25 DOD information paper on strategic sealift acquisition program provided to CRS by U.S.
Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, Jan. 25, 1995, p. 1.
26 The Navy subsequently decided to build SSN-23 to a lengthened configuration that
(continued...)

---

CRS-23
one-third of the total estimated cost of the ship — was appropriated by Congress in
the two years (FY1997 and FY1998) following the year (FY1996) in which SSN-23
was (for a second time) procured.
LHD-6 Amphibious Assault Ship
Going into the conference on the FY1993 defense appropriation bill, the House
had recommended fully funding procurement of the Wasp (LHD-1) class amphibious
assault ship Bonhomme Richard (LHD-6) — a ship the Administration had not
requested for procurement — at a cost of $1.205 billion, while the Senate
recommended $1.050 billion. During the conference, however, competition among
various programs for defense funding resulted in an agreement in which LHD-6 was
approved for procurement in FY1993 but only $305 million in FY1993 funding was
provided. The conference report on the bill stated:
The conferees agree to provide $305,000,000 in funds to initiate the purchase of
one LHD-1 class amphibious assault ship. The conferees have provided
authority for the Navy Secretary to enter into a contract for this ship even though
full funding has not yet been provided to the Navy. The conferees request that
the Navy award a contract for the construction of this vessel and include the
additional funds required for this program in its fiscal year 1994 budget request.27
The $893.8 million needed to complete the funding of the ship (as adjusted) was
requested by the Administration in FY1994 and approved by Congress. Thus, LHD-
6 was split-funded, with about three-quarters of the cost of LHD-6 provided the year
after the ship’s year of procurement.
LHD-8 Amphibious Assault Ship
Congress included a provision in the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN)
sections of both the FY2000 and FY2001 defense appropriations acts stating “That
the Secretary of the Navy is hereby granted the authority to enter into a contract for
an LHD-1 [class] Amphibious Assault Ship which shall be funded on an incremental
basis.” The ship in question is LHD-8, which is now being funded on an incremental
basis, with the final increment scheduled for FY2006. DOD records the ship in its
budget presentations as having been procured in FY2002.
CVN-21 Aircraft Carrier
The Administration is proposing to procure CVN-21, the Navy’s next aircraft
carrier, using split funding in FY2008-FY2009. In addition, CVN-21 has received
AP funding since FY2001, and the total amount of AP funding to be provided during
26 (...continued)
included an approximately 100-foot additional mid-hull section. This section increased the
estimated cost of SSN-23 by roughly $900 million.
27 H.Rept. 102-1015 of October 5, 1992, p. 101.

---

CRS-24
the period FY2001-FY2007 equates to roughly one-third of the cost of the ship.28
Funding for CVN-21 is thus to be provided through a series of increments starting
in FY2001 and ending in FY2009, with roughly one-third of the cost of the ship to
be provided in years prior to the year of procurement, about one-third in the year of
procurement, and about one-third in the year following the year of procurement.
28 For more on the CVN-21 program, see CRS Report RS20643, Navy CVN-21 Aircraft
Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

---

CRS-25
Appendix B. Funding For Lead DD(X) and Lead LCS
Congress, in acting on the Navy’s proposed FY2005 defense budget, rejected
the Navy’s proposal to procure the lead DD(X) through the Navy’s research and
development account, directed the Navy to fully fund the lead DD(X) in the Navy’s
ship-procurement account, and fully funded the lead LCS in the Navy’s research and
development account. This appendix presents excerpts from committee and
conference report language on concerning the funding of the lead DD(X) and lead
LCS.
DD(X) Program
Authorization. The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept.
108-491 of May 14, 2004) on the FY2005 defense authorization bill (H.R. 4200),
stated:
The committee has observed the increasing use of funds designated for
research and development (R&D) purposes to acquire operational platforms.
The fiscal 2005 budget proposal would take the practice to unprecedented levels,
with three DD(X) and two LCS ships, three E-2C aircraft, and eleven VH-XX
helicopters proposed for acquisition with R&D funds.
The use of R&D funds for prototypes and truly developmental items is both
proper and prudent. This practice also makes sense when, following the
completion of testing, a test asset still has useful capability to bring to the
operational fleet. However, it is difficult to believe that nearly half of the
VH-XX fleet, for example, qualifies as prototypes or dedicated test assets. The
fact that the platforms may occasionally be used for some testing purposes does
not, in the committee’s view, qualify them as research craft. Indeed, the
committee would be surprised were the department actually proposing to
regularly carry the President on prototype aircraft.
While the committee recognizes the increased flexibility of R&D funds in
acquiring platforms, there is concern that placing acquisition programs in the
R&D budget, particularly at their early, least stable stage, threatens other
programs, particularly in science and technology. The R&D budget is a very
small pool from which to fund acquisitions of large items like ships, and as
procurements are must-pay bills, typical procurement cost-growth would put the
rest of the R&D budget at risk.
The committee’s action with regard to particular programs funded in R&D
should therefore be seen not only as a reflection of the merits of those items, but
also as an expression of concern over the rapidly expanding portion of the R&D
budget being used for purposes other than R&D. (Pages 248-249)
The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 108-260 of May
11, 2004) on the FY2005 defense authorization bill (S. 2400), stated:
The committee believes that if the flexibility provided by using RDTE,N funds
for the lead ship at the lead shipyard is justified, that same flexibility is necessary
for the follow ship at the second shipyard as well. (Pages 130-131)

---

CRS-26
Appropriation. The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept.
108-284 of June 24, 2004) on the FY2005 defense appropriations bill (S. 2559),
stated:
The Committee recommends supporting the President’s budget request for
the DD(X) Destroyer program but holds that construction of the ship should be
funded within the shipbuilding and conversion account in a manner consistent
with prior shipbuilding programs. The Committee is encouraged by the Navy’s
willingness to propose nontraditional means of overcoming the enormous
financial burden that ship cost overruns and prior year bills place upon the
shipbuilding budget, but finds that such costs would not be eliminated but rather
obscured by funding ship construction in the research and development account.
Therefore, the Committee recommends transferring $221,116,000 of research
and development funding to the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy account and
directs the Navy to fund future ship construction programs within the
shipbuilding and conversion account. In addition, the Committee recommends
providing $99,400,000 in advance procurement funding for the second DD(X)
ship to be constructed at a second source shipyard. (Page 83.)
The conference report (H.Rept. 108-622 of July 20, 2004) on H.R. 4613 (P.L.
108-287 of August 5, 2004) stated:
The conferees agree to provide a total of $305,516,000 for advance
procurement for the DD(X) class of ships instead of $320,516,000 as proposed
by the Senate and no appropriation as proposed by the House. The conferees
direct the Navy to include future funding requests for the DD(X) in the
Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy appropriation.
Within the funds provided, $221,116,000 is only for design and advance
procurement requirements associated with the first ship of the DD(X) class and
$84,400,000 is only for design and advance procurement requirements associated
with construction of the second ship at an alternative second source shipyard....
The conferees direct that full funding of the remaining financial
requirement for these ships, not including traditional advance procurement
requirements, shall be included in a future budget request. (Page 188.)
LCS Program
Appropriation. The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept.
108-553 of June 18, 2004) on the FY2005 defense appropriations bill (H.R. 4613),
stated:
The Committee remains impressed with the Navy’s initiative in pursuing
the LCS program, which promises to address significant operational gaps in
Navy capability while presaging new ways of developing and fielding technology
to the Fleet. The Committee has agreed to the Navy’s request to fund
construction of LCS in the research, development, test and evaluation
appropriation, recognizing the Navy’s desire to more readily accommodate
potential changes to the program. The Committee approves this request because
it views the Flight 0 ship as a prototype of a completely new class of ship. Once
the Navy has completed and tested the prototype, it should proceed with the
preliminary design and construction of the first Flight 1 ship.

---

CRS-27
The Committee recommendation includes increasing the budget request for the
construction of the first Flight 0 LCS by $107,000,000, fully funding this
construction effort at $214,000,000. The fiscal year 2005 request included only
$107,000,000 for the first increment of the LCS construction. Budget
documentation indicates the Navy plans to request an additional $107,000,000
for the second and final increment for the first ship in fiscal year 2006. The
Committee strongly opposes incremental funding of ship construction and
therefore has provided a total of $214,000,000 in 2005 for construction of the
first LCS, fully funding the construction requirement in one year. (Pages 288-
289.)
The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 108-284 of June
24, 2004) on the FY2005 defense appropriations bill (S. 2559), stated:
The Committee supports the budget request for the Littoral Combat Ship
and consents to the Navy’s request to fund construction of the first prototype ship
for each of two ship designs in the Research and Development, Navy account.
Approval for funding LCS in the research and development account is strictly
based on the acknowledgment of the prototypical nature and high level of
technical risk inherent in this program. The Committee finds LCS to be unique
and unlike any other shipbuilding program the Navy has previously pursued; and
therefore, grants the Navy’s request for the increased flexibility that funding
within the research and development account affords. However, the Committee
directs that all follow-on ships beyond one prototype for each LCS ship design
be fully funded in the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy account.... In addition,
the consent to build the LCS prototype ships with research and development
funding should in no way be interpreted as approval for other ship construction
programs to be funded within the Research and Development, Navy account.
(Pages 156-157)
The conference report (H.Rept. 108-622 of July 20, 2004) on H.R. 4613 (P.L.
108-287 of August 5, 2004) includes a provision (Section 8092) that states in part:
None of the funds provided in this Act may be obligated to prepare a fiscal year
2006 budget request for a third vessel under the Littoral Combat Ship program
in fiscal year 2006: Provided, That funds for the second vessel shall be for a
second source supplier: Provided further, That all subsequent ships shall be
purchased with “Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy” funds beginning in fiscal
year 2007.
The conference report stated:
The conferees agree with the Senate that all follow-on ships, beyond one of each
prototype design, should be fully funded in the Shipbuilding and Conversion,
Navy appropriation. (Pages 310.)

---