Order Code IB91141
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
North Korea’s
Nuclear Weapons Program
Updated March 25, 2005
Larry A. Niksch
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
The Second Bush Administration and the Six-Party Talks
Background to the Six-Party Talks
The Six-Party Talks
Bush Administration Policy
North Korea’s Counter-Strategy
North Korea’s Nuclear Program
International Assistance
North Korea’s Delivery Systems
State of Nuclear Weapons Development
Diplomatic Background to the Agreed Framework and Amending Agreements
The Agreed Framework: Provisions, Implementation, Costs, Future Issues
U.S. Objectives: Primacy to the Freeze of North Korea’s Nuclear Program
Benefits to North Korea
Light Water Nuclear Reactors
Oil at No Cost
Diplomatic Representation
Lifting the U.S. Economic Embargo
U.S. Nuclear Security Guarantee
North Korean Obligations Beyond the Freeze of the Nuclear Program
Inspections and Broader Nuclear Obligations
Disposition of Fuel Rods from the Five Megawatt Reactor
Dismantlement of Nuclear Installations
Role of Congress
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North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program
SUMMARY
North Korea’s decisions to restart nuclear
Korea takes visible steps to dismantle its
installations at Yongbyon that were shut down
nuclear programs and makes concessions on
under the U.S.-North Korean Agreed Frame-
other military issues; (3) assembling an inter-
work of 1994 and to withdraw from the Nu-
national coalition to apply diplomatic and
clear Non-Proliferation Treaty create an acute
economic pressure on North Korea; and (4)
foreign policy problem for the United States.
planning for future economic sanctions and
Restarting the Yongbyon facilities opens up a
military interdiction of North Korea shipping
possible North Korean intent to stage a “nu-
and air traffic through a Proliferation Security
clear breakout” of its nuclear program and
Initiative. China, South Korea, and Russia
openly produce nuclear weapons. North Ko-
have criticized the Bush Administration for
rea’s actions follow the reported disclosure in
not negotiating directly with North Korea, and
October 2002 that North Korea is operating a
they voice opposition to economic sanctions
secret nuclear program based on uranium
and to the use of force against Pyongyang.
enrichment and the decision by the Korean
China, Russia, and even South Korea increas-
Peninsula Energy Development Organization
ingly have expressed support for North Ko-
(KEDO) in November 2002 to suspend ship-
rea’s position in six-party talks facilitated by
ments of heavy oil to North Korea. North
China, but the talks have made little progress.
Korea claims that it has nuclear weapons and
North Korea’s announcement of February 10,
that it has completed reprocessing of 8,000
2005, suspending its participation in the talks,
nuclear fuel rods. U.S. officials in 2004 stated
appears aimed at creating a long-term diplo-
that North Korea probably had reprocessed
matic stalemate on the nuclear issue.
most or all of the fuel rods and may have
produced 4-6 atomic bombs from them.
The crisis is the culmination of eight
years of implementation of the 1994 Agreed
The main objective of the Bush Adminis-
Framework, which provides for the shutdown
tration is to secure the dismantling of North
of North Korea’s nuclear facilities in return
Korea’s plutonium and uranium-based nuclear
for the annual delivery to North Korea of
programs. Its strategy has been: (1) terminat-
500,000 tons of heavy oil and the construction
ing the Agreed Framework; (2) withholding
in North Korea of two light water nuclear
any U.S. reciprocal measures until North
reactors.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
North Korea’s statement of February 10, 2005, reiterated Pyongyang’s claims since
early 2003 that it has nuclear weapons. The statement also suspended North Korean
participation in the six-party nuclear talks, and a statement of February 19, 2005, rejected
bilateral talks with the United States. The statements formalized North Korean policy since
late July 2004. Since then, North Korea refused to agree to another meeting of the six-party
talks on the nuclear issue. North Korea has demanded preconditions for attending another
meeting under an umbrella demand that the Bush Administration end the U.S. “hostile
policy,” North Korean media commentary throughout November and December 2004
boasted of Pyongyang’s strong position in the six-party talks and the weakness and isolation
of the Bush Administration. These boasts received some support by open Chinese and South
Korean criticisms of the Bush Administration’s position in the talks. South Korean President
Roh Moo-hyun gave major policy speeches in Los Angeles and Europe in November 2004,
sharply criticizing the Bush Administration, rejecting any pressure on North Korea,
defending North Korea’s assertion that it needed a “nuclear deterrent” in view of its
perception of a threat from the United States, and describing North Korea’s “reward for
freeze” proposal as “a considerably positive proposal.” The Administration reacted to North
Korea’s February 2005 statements by reaffirming U.S. support for the six-party talks and
expressing the hope that China would persuade Pyongyang to agree to another six-party
meeting. During her trip to East Asia in March 2005, Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice
called on China to increase pressure on North Korea to return to the talks.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
The Second Bush Administration and the Six-Party Talks
The Bush Administration faces a difficult situation in the six-party talks over the North
Korean nuclear issue. North Korea has established a dominant position in the talks, and the
U.S. position has weakened despite the Bush Administration’s settlement proposal of June
23, 2004. North Korea has secured support from other participants in the talks for its core
“reward for freeze” proposal and for its repeated denials that it has a secret uranium
enrichment nuclear program. North Korea has been able to obstruct the talks since July 24,
2004, when the North Korean Foreign Ministry denounced the U.S. June 23 proposal as a
“sham proposal.” Since then, North Korea has refused to attend another meeting, has
demanded that the United States accept its proposals and cease its “hostile policies,” and has
demanded that the six-party talks take up recently disclosed South Korean nuclear activities.
North Korea’s announcements of February 2005, suspending participation in the talks and
rejecting bilateral talks with the United States, appeared to reflect mounting North Korean
self-confidence in its diplomatic position and more assertive moves to create a protracted,
long-term diplomatic stalemate over the nuclear issue.
There appear to be several reasons why the Administration’s June 23 proposal did not
weaken North Korea’s position in the talks and strengthen the U.S. position. The positions
of the other governments in the talks (China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia) appear to have
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encouraged North Korea to adopt negative tactics in response to the June 23 proposal. Since
the proposal was issued, the other governments have not endorsed it or spoken favorably of
it. The statements of the Chinese and South Korean foreign ministers during Secretary
Powell’s visit in late October 2004 were implied criticisms of the proposal, which Powell
tried to defend in response. The other governments, too, have not criticized North Korea’s
“reward for freeze” proposal. China and Russia have expressed support for some elements
of it; and they have voiced skepticism toward the Bush Administration’s claim that North
Korea has a secret uranium enrichment program. The other governments also have not
criticized the negative tactics that North Korea adopted in late July through the U.S.
presidential election. China has continued to make payoffs to North Korea (money, food,
and oil) to get North Korea to agree simply to attend the six-party meetings; such payoffs
probably encourage North Korea to believe that it can receive such benefits without having
to adopt positive positions at the meetings themselves.
The Bush Administration did not have an effective post-June 23 follow-up strategy to
promote its proposal into a position of a basis for negotiations in the talks. U.S. officials
visiting East Asia said little of the proposal publicly until the Chinese and South Korean
rebuffs to Secretary Powell, and they apparently did not pressure officials of the other
participating governments to endorse it.
Background to the Six-Party Talks
The Bush Administration asserted on October 16, 2002, that North Korea had revealed
to U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly in Pyongyang on October 5, 2002, that it had
a secret nuclear weapons program based on uranium enrichment. The program is based on
the process of uranium enrichment, in contrast to North Korea’s pre-1995 nuclear program
based on plutonium reprocessing. North Korea reportedly began a secret uranium
enrichment program in the early 1990s with the assistance of Pakistan. North Korea
provided Pakistan with intermediate-range ballistic missiles in the late 1990s, apparently as
part of the deal.
The initial U.S. response was to secure a decision by the Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization (KEDO) in November 2002 to end shipments of heavy oil to
North Korea, which had been carried out under the U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework
of 1994. By their own admission, Bush Administration officials were surprised by the
intensity of North Korea’s moves in late December 2002 to re-start plutonium-based nuclear
facilities at Yongbyon and expel officials of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
placed there under the Agreed Framework to monitor the shutdown. North Korea restarted
the five megawatt nuclear reactor shut down under the Agreed Framework. North Korea
also announced that it would restart the plutonium reprocessing plant that operated up to
1994, and it later asserted that it had reprocessed 8,000 nuclear fuel rods, which had been in
storage since 1994, into nuclear weapons-grade plutonium (U.S. intelligence reportedly has
been unable to verify the exact state of reprocessing, but U.S. officials stated in late 2004 that
North Korea probably had reprocessed most or all of the 8,000 fuel rods and might have
produced four to six atomic bombs). North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in January 2003. It justified its action by citing the U.S.-initiated
cutoff of heavy oil shipments in December 2002 and by charging that the Bush
Administration planned a “pre-emptive nuclear attack” on North Korea.
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After October 2002, North Korea issued several threats, including a resumption of
long-range missile tests, the proliferation of nuclear materials to other countries, and the
testing of a nuclear weapon. Retarting the Yongbyon facilities opens up a possible North
Korean intent or option to stage a “breakout” of its nuclear program by openly producing
nuclear weapons through reprocessing the 8,000 fuel rods. According to estimates by nuclear
experts and reportedly by U.S. intelligence agencies, if North Korea reprocessed the fuel
rods, as it claims, it could produce four to six atomic bombs. Such a nuclear breakout would
diminish considerably any prospect of ending North Korea’s nuclear program diplomatically.
Production of weapons-grade plutonium also would add substance to North Korea’s threat
to export nuclear materials.
The Six-Party Talks
Bush Administration Policy. The Administration’s policy since October 2002 is
based on two views within the Administration. First, President Bush has voiced profound
distrust of North Korea and its leader, Kim Jong-il. Second, there are divisions over policy
toward North Korea within the Bush Administration. An influential coalition has consisted
of Pentagon officials and advisers around Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, officials of Vice
President Cheney’s office, and proliferation experts in the State Department and White
House led by Undersecretary of State John Bolton. They reportedly oppose negotiations with
North Korea, favor the issuance of demands for unilateral North Korean concessions on
nuclear and other military issues, and advocate an overall U.S. strategy of isolating North
Korea diplomatically and through economic sanctions and bringing about a collapse of the
North Korean regime. A second coalition, mainly in the State Department, is composed of
officials with experience on East Asian and Korean issues. This coalition maintains that the
Administration should attempt negotiations before adopting more coercive measures, and
they reportedly doubt the effectiveness of a strategy to bring about a North Korean collapse.
The Administration’s proposal of June 23, 2004 at the six-party plenary meeting was
the first U.S. proposal since the talks began in April 2003. The proposal called for a quick
dismantlement of North Korea’s plutonium and uranium enrichments programs following
a three month “preparatory period.” During the preparatory period, North Korea would
declare its nuclear facilities and materials, freeze their operation, allow effective international
inspections, including a return of the IAEA, and negotiate the steps of dismantlement. In
return, South Korea and Japan would supply North Korea with heavy oil. North Korea
would receive a “provisional multilateral security assurance” from the United States and the
other participants in the six-party talks. The United States and North Korea would begin
talks over U.S. economic sanctions and North Korea’s inclusion on the U.S. list of terrorist-
supporting countries. The participants in the talks also would begin a study of North Korea’s
energy needs. After North Korea completed dismantlement, it would receive a permanent
security guarantee, and permanent solutions to its energy problems would be undertaken.
The Administration’s policy on the nuclear issue has contained three elements: (1) a
demand for an immediate North Korean commitment to dismantlement, (2) the avoidance
of direct negotiations with North Korea until North Korea accepts dismantlement, and (3)
the isolation of North Korea internationally. The Administration called on North Korea to
commit to and take concrete measures to realize the “complete, verifiable, irreversible
dismantlement” of its nuclear programs, both the plutonium program and the secret uranium
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enrichment program. This demand has become known as “CVID.” The Administration also
asserts that North Korea must follow procedures similar to those being implemented by
Libya, which has revealed details of its weapons of mass destruction and has turned over the
weapons and related materials to the United States, other governments, and the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Bush Administration eschewed substantive bilateral
negotiations with North Korea. The Administration stated that it would discuss ways to
improve U.S.-North Korean relations only after North Korea accepts CVID and takes
concrete measures to implement it.
Administration officials have spoken often since early 2003 about the objective of
“isolating” North Korea. There are two components of the Administration’s isolation goal.
One is to isolate North Korea from any diplomatic support from other governments over the
nuclear issue and create a bloc of governments demanding that North Korea accept CVID.
The second component is the creation of a broad coalition of governments willing to impose
economic sanctions on North Korea if North Korea rejects CVID. In May 2003, President
Bush proposed a Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) aimed at interdicting exports of
weapons of mass destruction and illegal drugs by proliferator countries. The Administration
reportedly has drafted plans for economic sanctions, including cutting off financial flows to
North Korea from Japan and other sources and interdicting North Korean shipments of
missiles and other weapons to the Middle East and South Asia. The aim of the PSI would
be to constrict sharply North Korean foreign exchange earnings, which are a major source
of sustenance to the North Korean political elite and the North Korean military. Advocates
of the PSI believe that such financial pressure could produce internal pressures within the
regime that would result in either a North Korean capitulation to U.S. demands or the
collapse of the Pyongyang regime. The Administration is pressuring several countries to
cease purchases of North Korean missiles.
In early 2003, the Administration proposed multilateral talks as the diplomatic focus.
After a U.S.-North Korea-China meeting in April 2003, an agreement was reached for six-
party talks, including China, South Korea, Russia, and Japan. Three plenary sessions of six-
party talks were held in August 2003, February 2004, and June 2004.. The Administration
has viewed several roles for the six-party talks. The talks help the Administration avoid
bilateral negotiations with North Korea. At the six-party meetings, the Administration
limited direct contact with North Korean delegates, stressing that it would not discuss
substantive issues until North Korea commits to CVID. U.S. negotiators at the six-party
talks were constrained to speaking from a limited script stressing CVID. They refused to
answer questions from North Korean delegates concerning the U.S. position on the nuclear
issue. This changed slightly at the June 2004 meeting. U.S. delegates met with North
Korean counterparts reportedly for nearly two hours.
The Administration also views the six-party talks as giving it a vehicle to secure support
from China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia — North Korea’s immediate neighbors — for
the U.S. demand that North Korea agree to total dismantlement of its nuclear programs. U.S.
officials have spoken of creating a five versus one situation in the six-party talks, thus
isolating North Korea. This in turn would lay the groundwork for the participation of China,
South Korea, Japan, and Russia in sanctions against North Korea if North Korea rejected
CVID — sanctions through the United Nations Security Council and/or the Proliferation
Security Initiative. Throughout 2003, Administration officials expressed a view that North
Korea would isolate itself through its provocative actions in reopening its plutonium nuclear
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program and its threats to proliferate nuclear materials and test nuclear weapons and missiles.
The Far Eastern Economic Review of September 11, 2003, cited two U.S. officials as
asserting that “it’s worse now for North Korea than it has been — this isolation” and that
“we’re letting them dig their own grave.” U.S. officials were “convinced that Pyongyang’s
[provocative] statements [at the August six-party meeting] were pushing its opponents closer
together.” After North Korea’s announcements of February 2005, Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice contended that North Korea was “isolating” itself further.
The Administration has placed special emphasis on China’s role in the six-party talks.
U.S. officials praise China’s role in hosting the meetings in Beijing. They state that China
should exert diplomatic pressure on North Korea to accept CVID. Some Administration
officials express the view that China can be persuaded to join the United States in sanctions
against North Korea even to the extent of creating an internal crisis within the North Korean
regime. The importance of China is pointed up by the mutual defense treaty China has with
North Korea and China’s role in supplying North Korea with an estimated 90 % of its oil and
40% of its food.
However, from the start of multilateral talks, the other participants have voiced
criticisms of the Administration’s positions. China, Russia, and South Korea have criticized
the Administration for not negotiating directly with North Korea, and they have urged the
Administration to propose detailed settlement proposals on the nuclear issue. They have
asserted that the Administration should spell out the reciprocal measures it would take if
North Korea agreed to dismantle its nuclear programs. China, Russia, and South Korea
issued no positive pronouncements toward the U.S. June 23, 2004, proposal. The Chinese
and South Korean foreign ministers told Secretary of State Colin Powell in October 2004 that
the Administration needed to formulate new, “creative” proposals. As stated previously,
Russia, China, and South Korea also have voiced support for several of North Korea’s key
positions in the six-party talks, including Pyongyang’s “reward for freeze” proposal and its
denials that it has a secret HEU program. They also have expressed opposition to economic
sanctions, and only Japan has joined the PSI. Russia, South Korea, and China did not
criticize North Korea’s boycott of the six-party talks after June 24, and their reactions to the
North Korean announcements of February 2005 avoided direct criticism of North Korea.
North Korea’s Counter-Strategy. In the summer of 2003, in the wake of the
perceived U.S. military victory in Iraq and negative international reactions to North Korea’s
restarting of the plutonium program and threats, the North Korean leadership appeared
worried that they faced international isolation and much heavier U.S. pressure. From that
point, there has emerged a multifaceted North Korean diplomatic strategy backed by a
concerted propaganda campaign aimed primarily at strengthening Pyongyang’s position in
the six-party talks and weakening the U.S. position. A lead component of North Korea’s
strategy has been to threaten that it would abandon the six-party talks, thus playing on the
psychological fears of the other parties. After each of the Beijing meetings, North Korea
criticized the meetings, criticized the U.S. position, and warned that it saw no usefulness in
the meetings and likely would not participate further. North Korea also apparently has
employed this threat to demand that China, the host of the talks, provide it with financial
subsidies and increased shipments of food and oil as “payment” for North Korean agreement
to attend future sessions of the six parties in Beijing. North Korea also began to claim that
it has nuclear weapons, reportedly first in private at the April 2003 Beijing talks and then
publicly after the August 2003 Beijing meeting. Pyongyang publicly referred to possessing
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a “nuclear deterrent” but became more explicit in claiming nuclear “weapons” from
September 2004 onwards.
But with these repeated threats, North Korea has made a series of proposals: first, a
formal U.S.-North Korean non-aggression pact, later modified to a formal U.S. guarantee
that the United States would not attack North Korea; second, a long-term “freeze” of North
Korea’s plutonium program; and third, retention by North Korea of a “peaceful” nuclear
program. North Korean proposals also have called for extensive concessions by the United
States and Japan, including removal of North Korea from the U.S. list of terrorist-supporting
states, supply of electricity, several billion dollars in “compensation” from Japan, restoration
of shipments of heavy oil and construction of the two light water nuclear reactors under the
1994 Agreed Framework, and an end to U.S. economic sanctions and U.S. interference in
North Korea’s economic relations with other countries. North Korea also has demanded that
the U.S. end its “hostile policy,” a pronouncement that Pyongyang uses to change the content
and scope of its demands.
While purposefully keeping its proposals vague regarding content and its own
obligations, North Korea has engaged in a concerted propaganda campaign to promote its
proposals. Propaganda, aimed especially at South Korea, Russia, and China has asserted that
a U.S. guarantee of non-aggression is necessary to prevent the Bush Administration from
carrying out a plot to stage an “Iraq-like” unilateral attack. Pyongyang’s propaganda organs
have contended that a “freeze”of plutonium facilities is a logical “first stage” in a settlement
process. The propaganda organs have employed enticing captions, such as “simultaneous
actions,” “action versus action,” “simultaneous package deal,” “bold concessions,” and “non-
interference in our economic development.” Russian and Chinese doubts toward the U.S.
claim indicates a success of North Korea’s denial strategy.
Another element in North Korea’s counter-strategy has been a campaign to deny that
it has a uranium enrichment (HEU) program. From the summer of 2003, North Korean
propaganda organs have escalated steadily denials of an HEU program and denials that North
Korean officials admitted to an HEU program to Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly in
October 2002. North Korean officials have stressed this denial to visiting foreign
delegations. North Korean propaganda organs have compared U.S. claims of an HEU
program to the perceived erroneous U.S. claims of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and
they have demanded that the United States provide evidence of its claim.
After the U.S. proposal of June 23, 2004, North Korean strategy appears to have had
three objectives: (1) “kill” the U.S. June 23 proposal as a basis of future negotiations; (2)
further neuter the reactions of Russia, China, and South Korea to North Korean policy and
influence them to escalate further their criticisms of U.S. positions and proposals; and (3)
create a protracted, long-term diplomatic stalemate over the nuclear that will last throughout
the second Bush Administration and possibly beyond. North Korea’s announcements in
February 2005 formalized the post-June 2004 strategy and signified the objective of a
protracted diplomatic stalemate.
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North Korea’s Nuclear Program
Most of North Korea’s plutonium-based nuclear installations are located at Yongbyon,
60 miles of the North Korean capital of Pyongyang. They are the facilities covered by the
1994 U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework The key installations are:
! An atomic reactor, with a capacity of about 5 electrical megawatts that
began operating by 1987: it is capable of expending enough reactor fuel
to produce about 6 kilograms of plutonium annually — enough for the
manufacture of a single atomic bomb annually. North Korea in 1989 shut
down the reactor for about 70 days; U.S. intelligence agencies believe that
North Korea removed fuel rods from the reactor at that time for reprocessing
into plutonium suitable for nuclear weapons. In May 1994, North Korea
shut down the reactor and removed about 8,000 fuel rods, which could be
reprocessed into enough plutonium (25-30 kilograms) for 4-6 nuclear
weapons. North Korea started operating the reactor again in February 2003.
Experts believe that the reactor can produce enough material for six
kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium annually, which would be close to
enough plutonium for one atomic bomb per year. Thus, after 4-5 years of
operation, North Korea could shut down the reactor and unload
approximately another 8,000 spent fuel rods for reprocessing.
! Two larger (estimated 50 megawatts and 200 electrical megawatts)
atomic reactors under construction at Yongbyon and Taechon since
1984: According to U.S. Ambassador Robert Gallucci, these plants, if
completed, would be capable of producing enough spent fuel annually for
200 kilograms of plutonium, sufficient to manufacture nearly 30 atomic
bombs per year. However, since North Korea re-opened the plutonium
program in early 2003, reports indicate that construction on the larger
reactors has not been resumed.
! A plutonium reprocessing plant about 600 feet long and several stories
high: The plant would separate weapons grade Plutonium-239 from spent
nuclear fuel rods for insertion into the structure of atomic bombs or
warheads. U.S. intelligence agencies reportedly detected North Korean
preparations to restart the plutonium reprocessing plant in February and
March 2003. According to press reports, the CIA estimated in late 2003 that
North Korea had reprocessed some of the 8,000 fuel rods. In January 2004,
North Korean officials showed a U.S. nuclear expert, Dr. Sigfried Hecker,
samples of what they claimed were plutonium oxalate powder and
plutonium metal. Dr. Hecker later said in testimony before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee (January 21, 2004) that, without testing, he
could not confirm whether the sample was metallic plutonium “but all
observations I was able to make are consistent with the sample being
plutonium metal.”
Satellite photographs reportedly also show that the atomic reactors have no attached
power lines, which they would have if used for electric power generation.
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Persons interviewed for this study believe that North Korea developed the two reactors
and the apparent reprocessing plant with its own resources and technology. It is believed that
Kim Jong-il, the son and successor of President Kim Il-sung who died in July 1994, directs
the program, and that the military and the Ministry of Public Security (North Korea’s version
of the KGB) implement it. North Korea reportedly has about 3,000 scientists and research
personnel devoted to the Yongbyon program. Many have studied nuclear technology (though
not necessarily nuclear weapons production) in the Soviet Union and China and reportedly
Pakistan. North Korea has uranium deposits, estimated at 26 million tons. North Korea is
believed to have one uranium producing mine.
North Korea’s secret highly enriched uranium (HEU) program appears to date from at
least 1996. Hwang Jang-yop, a Communist Party secretary who defected in 1997, has
testified that North Korea and Pakistan agreed in the summer of 1996 to trade North Korean
long-range missile technology for Pakistani HEU technology. Other information date North
Korea-Pakistan cooperation to 1993. The Clinton Administration reportedly learned of it in
1998 or 1999, and a Department of Energy report of 1999 cited evidence of the program. In
March 2000, President Clinton notified Congress that he was waiving certification that
“North Korea is not seeking to develop or acquire the capability to enrich uranium.” The
Japanese newspaper Sankei Shimbun reported on June 9, 2000, the contents of a “detailed
report” from Chinese government sources on a secret North Korean uranium enrichment
facility inside North Korea’s Mount Chonma. Reportedly, according to a CIA report to
Congress, North Korea attempted in late 2001 to acquire “centrifuge-related materials in
large quantities to support a uranium enrichment program.” The CIA estimated publicly in
December 2002 that North Korea could produce two atomic bombs annually through HEU
beginning in 2005; other intelligence estimates reportedly project a bomb producing
capability between 2005 and 2007. Ambassador Robert Galucci, who negotiated the 1994
U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework, and Mitchell Reiss, head of the State Department’s
Policy Planning Bureau until 2004, have stated that a functioning North Korean HEU
infrastructure could produce enough HEU for “two or more nuclear weapons per year.” The
Washington Post of April 28, 2004, quoted a U.S. intelligence official saying that a North
Korean HEU infrastructure could produce as many as six atomic bombs annually.
Administration officials have stated that they do not know the locations of North Korea’s
uranium enrichment program or whether North Korea has assembled the infrastructure to
produce uranium-based atomic bombs; but U.S. intelligence agencies reportedly have
extensive information on North Korea’s accelerated overseas purchases of equipment and
materials for the uranium enrichment program since early 1999.
International Assistance
Knowledgeable individuals believe that the Soviet Union did not assist directly in the
development of Yongbyon in the 1980s. The U.S.S.R. provided North Korea with a small
research reactor in the 1960s, which also is at Yongbyon. However, North Korean nuclear
scientists continued to receive training in the U.S.S.R. up to the demise of the Soviet Union
in December 1991. East German and Russian nuclear and missile scientists reportedly were
in North Korea throughout the 1990s. Since 1999, reports have appeared that U.S.
intelligence agencies had information that Chinese enterprises were supplying important
components and raw materials for North Korea’s missile program.
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North Korea’s Delivery Systems
North Korea succeeded by 1998 in developing a “Nodong” missile with a range
estimated at up to 900 miles, capable of covering South Korea and most of Japan. North
Korea reportedly deployed nearly 100 Nodong missiles by 2003. On August 31, 1998,
North Korea test fired a three-stage rocket, apparently the prototype of the Taepo Dong-1
missile; the third stage apparently was an attempt to launch a satellite. U.S. intelligence
estimates reportedly concluded that such a missile would have the range to reach Alaska,
Guam, and the Northern Marianas Commonwealth. Media reports in early 2000 cited U.S.
intelligence findings that without further flight tests, North Korea could deploy an
intercontinental ballistic missile that would be capable of striking Alaska, Hawaii, and the
U.S. west coast. Japan’s Sankei Shimbun newspaper reported on August 6, 2003, that North
Korea and Iran were negotiating a deal for the export of the long-range Taepodong-2 missile
to Iran and the joint development of nuclear warheads. U.S. officials reportedly told
Japanese counterparts in July 2003 that North Korea was close to developing nuclear
warheads for its missiles. They claimed in September 2003 that North Korea had developed
a more accurate, longer-range intermediate ballistic missile that could reach Okinawa and
Guam (site of major U.S. military bases) and that there was evidence that North Korea had
produced the Taepo-dong 2, which could reach Alaska, Hawaii, and the U.S. west coast.
Reports in mid-1994 indicated that North Korea was close to completing underground
missile bases for the advanced intermediate-range missiles.
These projections led the Clinton Administration to press North Korea for new talks
over North Korea’s missile program. In talks held in 1999 and 2000, North Korea demanded
$1 billion annually in exchange for a promise not to export missiles. U.S. negotiators
rejected North Korea’s demand for $1 billion but offered a lifting of U.S. economic
sanctions. This laid the ground for the Berlin agreement of September 1999, in which North
Korea agreed to defer further missile tests in return for the lifting of major U.S. economic
sanctions. President Clinton formalized the lifting of key economic sanctions against North
Korea in June 2000. North Korea continued the moratorium, but it appears to have used
Pakistan and Iran as surrogates in testing intermediate-range missiles based on North Korean
technology. (See CRS Report RS21473, North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the
United States.)
State of Nuclear Weapons Development
A CIA statement of August 18, 2003, estimated “that North Korea has produced one or
two simple fission-type nuclear weapons and has validated the designs without conducting
yield-producing nuclear tests.” The initial estimate of one or two nuclear weapons is derived
primarily from North Korea’s approximately 70-day shutdown of the five megawatt reactor
in 1989, which would have given it the opportunity to remove nuclear fuel rods, from which
plutonium is reprocessed. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Defense
Intelligence Agency (DIA) reportedly estimated in late 1993 that North Korea extracted
enough fuel rods for about 12 kilograms of plutonium — sufficient for one or two atomic
bombs. The CIA and DIA apparently based their estimate on the 1989 shutdown of the five
megawatt reactor.
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South Korean and Japanese intelligence estimates reportedly were higher: 16-24
kilograms (Japan) and 7-22 kilograms (South Korea). These estimates reportedly are based
on the view that North Korea could have acquired a higher volume of plutonium from the
1989 reactor shutdown and the view of a higher possibility that North Korea removed fuel
rods during the 1990 and 1991 reactor slowdowns. Russian Defense Ministry analyses of
late 1993 reportedly came to a similar estimate of about 20 kilograms of plutonium, enough
for two or three atomic bombs. If, as it claims, North Korea reprocessed the 8,000 nuclear
fuel rods in 2003 that it had moved from storage at the beginning of that year, North Korea
gained an additional 25-30 kilograms of plutonium, according to Dr. Sigfried Hecker in his
testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 21, 2004. Dr. Hecker,
former director of the Los Alamos laboratories, had visited North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear
complex in early January 2004. U.S. officials and nuclear experts have stated that this
amount of plutonium would give North Korea the potential to produce between four and six
atomic bombs. These estimates appear to be based on projections that a country like North
Korea would need 6-8 kilograms of plutonium to produce one atomic bomb. The IAEA has
had a standard that a non-nuclear state would need about eight kilograms of plutonium to
produce an atomic bomb.
Russian intelligence agencies also reportedly have learned of significant technological
advances by North Korea toward nuclear weapons production. On March 10, 1992, the
Russian newspaper Argumenty I Fakty (Arguments and Facts) published the text of a 1990
Soviet KGB report to the Soviet Central Committee on North Korea’s nuclear program. It
was published again by Izvestiya on June 24, 1994. The KGB report asserted that
“According to available data, development of the first nuclear device has been completed at
the DPRK nuclear research center in Yongbyon.” The North Korean government, the report
stated, had decided not to test the device in order to avoid international detection.
Additionally, a number of reports and evidence point to at least a middle-range
likelihood that North Korea may have smuggled plutonium from Russia. In June 1994, the
head of Russia’s Counterintelligence Service (successor to the KGB) said at a press
conference that North Korea’s attempts to smuggle “components of nuclear arms production”
from Russia caused his agency “special anxiety.” U.S. executive branch officials have
expressed concern in background briefings over the possibility that North Korea has
smuggled plutonium from Russia. One U.S. official, quoted in the Washington Times, July
5, 1994, asserted that “There is the possibility that things having gotten over the
[Russia-North Korea] border without anybody being aware of it.” The most specific claim
came in the German news magazine Stern in March 1993, which cited Russian
Counterintelligence Service reports that North Korea had smuggled 56 kilograms of
plutonium (enough for 7-9 atomic bombs) from Russia.
According to press reports in late 2002, the CIA concluded that North Korea
accelerated its uranium enrichment program in the 1999, 2000, and 2001. According to U.S.
News and World Report, September 1, 2003, the CIA estimated that North Korea could
produce a uranium-based atomic weapon by the second half of 2004.
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Diplomatic Background to the Agreed Framework and
Amending Agreements
North Korea signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985. In a
denuclearization agreement signed in December 1991, North Korea and South Korea pledged
not to possess nuclear weapons, not to possess plutonium reprocessing or uranium
enrichment facilities, and to negotiate a mutual nuclear inspection system. In January 1992,
North Korea signed a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), which requires North Korea to report all nuclear programs to the IAEA and gives
the IAEA the right to conduct a range of inspections of North Korean nuclear installations
and programs. In 1992, North Korea rebuffed South Korea regarding implementation of the
denuclearization agreement, but it did allow the IAEA to conduct six inspections during the
period June 1992-February 1993.
In late 1992, the IAEA found evidence that North Korea had reprocessed more
plutonium than the 80 grams it had disclosed to the agency. In February 1993, the IAEA
invoked a provision in the safeguards agreement and called for a “special inspection” of two
concealed but apparent nuclear waste sites at Yongbyon. The IAEA believed that a special
inspection would uncover information on the amount of plutonium which North Korea had
produced since 1989. North Korea rejected the IAEA request and announced on March 12,
1993, an intention to withdraw from the NPT.
The NPT withdrawal threat led to low- and higher-level diplomatic talks between North
Korea and the Clinton Administration. North Korea “suspended” its withdrawal from the
NPT when the Clinton Administration agreed to a high-level meeting in June 1993.
However, North Korea continued to refuse both special inspections and IAEA regular
inspections of facilities designated under the safeguards agreement. In May 1994, North
Korea refused to allow the IAEA to inspect the 8,000 fuel rods that it had removed from the
five-megawatt reactor. In June 1994, North Korea’s President Kim Il-sung reactivated a
longstanding invitation to former U.S. President Jimmy Carter to visit Pyongyang. Kim
offered Carter a freeze of North Korea’s nuclear facilities and operations. Kim took this
initiative after China reportedly informed him that it would not veto a first round of
economic sanctions, which the Clinton Administration had proposed to members of the U.N.
Security Council. According to former Defense Secretary William Perry, the Pentagon also
developed a contingency plan to bomb the Yongbyon nuclear facilities if North Korea began
to reprocess the 8,000 fuel rods into weapons-grade plutonium. The Clinton Administration
reacted to Kim’s proposal by dropping its sanctions proposal and entering into a new round
of high-level negotiations with North Korea. This negotiation led to the Agreed Framework
of October 21, 1994.

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The Agreed Framework:
Provisions, Implementation, Costs, Future Issues
U.S. Objectives: Primacy to the Freeze of North Korea’s Nuclear
Program
The heart of the Agreed Framework was a U.S. commitment to provide North Korea
with a package of nuclear, energy, economic, and diplomatic benefits; in return North Korea
would halt the operations and infrastructure development of its nuclear program. The Agreed
Framework committed North Korea to “freeze its graphite-moderated reactors and related
facilities” with the freeze monitored by the IAEA. Ambassador Robert Gallucci, who
negotiated for the United States, stated that “related facilities” include the plutonium
reprocessing plant and stored fuel rods. According to Gallucci, the freeze includes a halt to
construction of the 50 and 200 megawatt reactors and a North Korean promise not to refuel
the five megawatt reactor. The Agreed Framework also committed North Korea to store the
8,000 fuel rods removed from the five megawatt reactor in May 1994 “in a safe manner that
does not involve reprocessing in the DPRK [North Korea].” Clinton Administration
officials reportedly said that a secret “confidential minute” to the Agreed Framework
prohibits North Korea from construction of new nuclear facilities elsewhere in North Korea.
Gallucci and other officials emphasized that the key policy objective of the Clinton
Administration was to secure a freeze of North Korea’s nuclear program in order to prevent
North Korea from producing large quantities of nuclear weapons grade plutonium through
the operations of the 50 and 200 megawatt reactors and the plutonium reprocessing plant at
Yongbyon. Gallucci referred to the prospect of North Korea producing enough plutonium
annually for nearly 30 nuclear weapons if the 50 and 200 megawatt reactors went into
operation. The Administration’s fear was that North Korea would have the means to export
atomic bombs to other states and possess a nuclear missile capability that would threaten
Japan and U.S. territories in the Pacific Ocean.
Benefits to North Korea
Light Water Nuclear Reactors. North Korea was to receive two light water
reactors (LWRs) with a generating capacity of approximately 2,000 megawatts. The Agreed
Framework set a “target date” of 2003. The United States was obligated to organize an
international consortium arrangement for the acquisition and financing of the reactors. The
Clinton Administration and the governments of South Korea, Japan, and other countries
established in March 1995 the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO)
to coordinate the provision of the LWRs. After the groundbreaking at the reactor site in
August 1997, KEDO officials changed the estimated completion date from 2003 to 2007;
other experts predicted a much later date. North Korean obstructionism and provocative
military acts toward South Korea and bureaucratic problems resulted in some of the delay;
but U.S. officials have acknowledged off the record that the Clinton Administration was in
no hurry to move the project along. The laying of the foundation for the LWRs occurred in
August 2002.
Oil at No Cost. Prior to the construction of light water reactors, the Agreed
Framework committed the United States to provide North Korea 500,000 metric tons of
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heavy oil to North Korea annually until the first of the two light water reactors becomes
operational. The oil shipments continued until KEDO’s decision in November 2002 to
cancel future shipments because of North Korea’s secret uranium enrichment program.
Diplomatic Representation. The United States and North Korea announced in the
Agreed Framework an intention to open liaison offices in each other’s capitals and establish
full diplomatic relations if the two governments make progress “on issues of concern to each
side.” By April 1995, most technical arrangements for liaison offices were completed.
However, North Korea displayed reluctance to finalize arrangements, and talks over liaison
offices waned. Ambassador Gallucci asserted that a full normalization of diplomatic
relations would depend on a successful resolution of non-nuclear military issues, especially
the heavy deployment of North Korean conventional military forces along the demilitarized
zone separating North and South Korea and North Korea’s program to develop and sell
longer-range missiles to other governments. In October 1999, William Perry, the
Administration’s Special Adviser on North Korea, cited normalization of diplomatic
relations as one of the benefits which the United States could offer North Korea for new
agreements on nuclear and missile issues.
Lifting the U.S. Economic Embargo. The Agreed Framework specifies that within
three months from October 21, 1994, the two sides will reduce barriers to trade and
investment, including restrictions on telecommunications services and financial transactions.
This required the Clinton Administration to relax the U.S. economic embargo on North
Korea, which the Truman Administration and Congress put in place during the Korean War.
On January 20, 1995, the Administration announced initial measures, including permission
for telecommunications links with North Korea, permission for U.S. citizens to use credit
cards in North Korea, permission for American media organizations to open offices in North
Korea, permission for North Korea to use U.S. banks in financial transactions with third
countries, and permission for U.S. steel companies to import magnesite from North Korea.
North Korea pressed the Clinton Administration to end all economic sanctions. North Korea
complained loudly that these measures failed to meet the commitment stated in the Agreed
Framework. In U.S.-North Korean talks in September 1999, the United States agreed to end
a broader range of economic sanctions in exchange for a North Korean moratorium on future
missile testing. President Clinton ordered the end of most economic sanctions in June 2000.
Since then, North Korea has not met with any American firms to talk about trade and/or
investment opportunities and has rejected an offer from the American Chamber of
Commerce in Seoul to send a business delegation to Pyongyang.
U.S. Nuclear Security Guarantee. Article III of the Agreed Framework states that
“Both sides will work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.”
Under that heading, it states, “The U.S. will provide formal assurances to the DPRK against
the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S.” While the language is not totally clear on
the timing of the U.S. delivery of a formal nuclear security guarantee, it seems to imply that
this would come when North Korea had dismantled its nuclear program or at least had
advanced dismantlement to a considerable degree.
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North Korean Obligations Beyond the Freeze of the Nuclear
Program
North Korea’s immediate obligation was to freeze its existing nuclear installations. The
Agreed Framework alluded to certain other obligations for Pyongyang. Ambassador Gallucci
and other Clinton Administration officials were more specific in describing these. They
disclosed the existence of a secret minute that the Administration and North Korea concluded
in conjunction with completion of the Agreed Framework. North Korea, however, has not
acknowledged such a secret minute.
Inspections and Broader Nuclear Obligations. The Agreed Framework
contained a clause that the Administration claims constitutes a North Korean obligation to
allow the IAEA to conduct the special inspection of the two suspected nuclear waste sites at
Yongbyon in conjunction with the delivery of equipment for the light water reactors. The
Agreed Framework stated: “When a significant portion of the LWR [light water reactor]
project is completed, but before delivery of key nuclear components, the DPRK will come
into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, including taking all steps
that may be deemed necessary by the IAEA, following consultations with the Agency, with
regard to verifying the accuracy and completeness of the DPRK’s initial report on all nuclear
material in the DPRK.” Ambassador Gallucci contended that North Korea must accept a
special inspection before the key nuclear components of the first light water reactor are
delivered to North Korea, if the IAEA still wishes to conduct a special inspection. However,
North Korean descriptions of its obligations omitted reference to special inspections.
The Agreed Framework stated, “The DPRK will remain a party to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and will allow implementation of its [1992]
safeguards agreement under the Treaty.” Gallucci stated in congressional testimony that the
Agreed Framework did not restrict the right of the IAEA to invoke special inspections if it
discovered any new North Korean nuclear activities. Gallucci said that the Agreed
Framework only restricted the IAEA with respect to the two suspected nuclear waste sites
and the nuclear installations and the stored fuel rods at Yongbyon and Taechon. He stressed
that any new North Korean nuclear program would fall immediately under the IAEA-North
Korea safeguards agreement and that North Korea must place it under IAEA safeguards.
Failure to do so, he said, would constitute a violation of the Agreed Framework. Thus, North
Korea’s secret uranium enrichment program violated this clause of the Agreed Framework.
In the Agreed Framework, North Korea pledged to “consistently take steps to implement
the [1991] North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”
North Korea thus extended its obligations to South Korea in the North-South
denuclearization agreement to the United States. This clause of the Agreed Framework also
is relevant to North Korea’s secret uranium enrichment program, since the North-South
denuclearization agreement specifically prohibits uranium enrichment.
Disposition of Fuel Rods from the Five Megawatt Reactor. Following Kim
Il-sung’s offer of a nuclear freeze to former President Carter, Administration officials
stressed the importance of securing North Korean agreement to the removal to a third country
of the 8,000 fuel rods that North Korea removed from the five megawatt reactor in May
1994. However, the Administration abandoned the objective of securing an immediate
removal of the rods after the negotiations started in September 1994. It also gave up support
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for the IAEA’s attempts to inspect the fuel rods in order to gain information on the amount
of weapons grade plutonium that North Korea secured from the five megawatt reactor prior
to 1994. The Agreed Framework provided for the storage of the rods in North Korea under
IAEA monitoring and a North Korean promise not to reprocess plutonium from the rods. It
also provided for subsequent talks on the “ultimate disposition” of the rods.
Dismantlement of Nuclear Installations. The Agreed Framework states that
“Dismantlement of the DPRK’s graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities will be
completed when the LWR project is completed.” North Korea’s proposal at the 2003 Beijing
talks in effect would continue the linkage between dismantlement and completion of the light
water reactors. The Bush Administration wants dismantlement much earlier in a settlement
process.
Role of Congress
Congress voiced skepticism regarding the Agreed Framework, but its actions have
given the Administration flexibility in implementing U.S. obligations. Congress has played
three roles. First, there have been numerous oversight hearings. Second, Congress included
in the Omnibus Appropriations bill for FY1999 (H.R. 4328) the requirement that the
President certify progress in negotiations with North Korea over the nuclear, missile, and
other issues before the Administration could allocate money to KEDO operations. President
Clinton issued two such certifications in 1999 and 2000; in 2000, he said that he could not
certify that North Korea was not engaged in uranium enrichment. President Bush notified
Congress in March 2002 that he could not certify that North Korea was abiding by the
Agreed Framework, but he waived restricting money for KEDO. H.R. 4328 also called on
the President to name “a very senior presidential envoy” as “North Korea Policy
Coordinator” to conduct a review of U.S. policy and direct negotiations with North Korea.
This resulted in President Clinton’s appointment of William Perry as a special adviser and
the issuance of the Perry report in October 1999. The Bush Administration, however,
terminated the senior envoy position. Third, Congress considered and approved
Administration requests for funds to finance implementation, including the heavy oil
shipments.
On October 20, 1994, President Clinton sent a letter to North Korean leader Kim
Jong-il, stating that he “will use the full powers of my office” to carry out U.S. obligations
related to light water reactors and alternative energy [oil]. President Clinton added that if
contemplated arrangements for light water reactors and alternative energy were not
completed, he would use the powers of his office to provide light water reactors and
alternative energy from the United States “subject to the approval of the U.S. Congress.”
In early 2003, Congress accepted the Bush Administration’s proposal to continue
funding the administrative costs of KEDO. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2003
(H.J.Res. 2) appropriated $5 million for KEDO. The Administration did request funding for
KEDO in FY2004 and FY2005.
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FOR ADDITIONAL READING
CRS Issue Brief IB98045, Korea: U.S.-South Korean Relations — Issues for Congress.
CRS Report RS21391, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: How Soon an Arsenal?
CRS Report RS21473, North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States.
CRS Report RL31696, North Korea: Economic Sanctions.
CRS Report RL31785, U.S. Assistance to North Korea.
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