Order Code 97-690 F
Updated March 23, 2005
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Kyrgyzstan: Recent Developments
and U.S. Interests
Jim Nichol
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
This report examines faltering reforms and other challenges to Kyrgyzstan’s
independence that have raised U.S. concerns. It discusses U.S. policy and assistance for
democratization and other programs. Basic facts and biographical information are
provided. This report may be updated. Related products include CRS Issue Brief
IB93108, Central Asia, updated regularly.
U.S. Policy1
According to the Bush Administration, the United
States seeks to help Kyrgyzstan enhance its sovereignty
and territorial integrity, increase democratic
participation and civil society, support economic
reform and development, improve observance of
human rights protections, prevent weapons
proliferation, and more effectively combat transnational
terrorism and criminal activities including trafficking in
persons and narcotics (State Department,
Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign
Operations for FY2006
).
Cumulative U.S. humanitarian and technical budgeted assistance to Kyrgyzstan for
FY1992-FY2004 was $749.0 million (FREEDOM Support Act and other agency funds),
with Kyrgyzstan ranking third in such aid per capita among the new independent states
of the former Soviet Union (by comparison, EU grants and loans amounted to about $250
million). Estimated aid for FY2005 (FREEDOM Support Act and other foreign aid,
excluding Defense and Energy Department aid) was $36.4 million. The Bush Administra-
1 Sources include Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Central Eurasia;
RFE/RL Newsline; Eurasia Insight; International Monetary Fund (IMF); the State Department’s
Washington File; and Reuters and Associated Press (AP) newswires.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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tion’s FY2006 request for $35.7 million in
Kyrgyzstan: Basic Facts
foreign aid for Kyrgyzstan is planned
Area and Population: Land area is 77,415 sq. mi.;
primarily for local and national democrati-
about the size of South Dakota. Population is 5.1
zation, judicial reform, and law enforce-
million (Commonwealth of Independent States
ment equipment and training to combat
Statistics Committee, 2004 est.).
Ethnicity: 65.7% Kyrgyz; 11.7% Russians; 13.9%
drug trafficking, organized crime, and
Uzbeks, 1% Uighurs; 0.4% Germans, and others
terrorist financing. Funding will be pro-
(Kyrgyz Statistics Committee, 2001 est.). Ethnic
vided to assist a newly established Kyrgyz
Uzbeks are a majority in southern Kyrgyzstan.
Drug Control Agency. Since Akayev has
About 420,000 ethnic Kyrgyz reside elsewhere in
stated that he will abide by constitutional
the former Soviet Union and 170,000 in China.
Gross Domestic Product: $2.2 billion; per capita
term limits and not run for re-election, the
GDP is about $431 (Kyrgyz Statistics Committee,
Administration hopes that the 2005 presi-
2004 est., current prices).
dential race will become “a model for
Political Leaders: President: Askar Akayev; Prime
peaceful, democratic transfer of executive
Minister: Nikolay Tanayev; Foreign Minister:
Askar Aytmatov; Defense Minister: Col. Gen. Esen
power in the region” (Congressional
Topoyev.
Budget Justification).
Biography: Akayev was born in 1944 and trained as
a physicist. In 1987, he was elected vice president
C o n t r i b u t i o n s t o t h e
of the Kyrgyz Academy of Sciences, later becoming
its president. In 1990, he became a member of the
Campaign Against Terrorism
Soviet Communist Party Central Committee. In
1990, ethnic riots in Osh region led to demands for
The Kyrgyz government declared its
the ouster of the Kyrgyz Communist Party (KCP)
support for the war on terrorism almost
head. When the Kyrgyz Supreme Soviet met in
October 1990, it rebuffed the KCP head’s bid to
immediately after the September 11, 2001
become president and elected Akayev. In October
attacks on the United States. President
1991, Akayev was reaffirmed as president in an
Akayev in late September announced that
uncontested popular vote, and was re-elected in
he had approved a U.S. request to use
1995 and 2000.
Kyrgyz airspace for counter-terrorist
operations in Afghanistan, in part because
the terrorist threat to Central Asia emanating from that country had intensified. In
November 2001, it was reported that U.S. combat aircraft were to be deployed in
Kyrgyzstan. Reportedly, Uzbekistan’s restrictions on flights from its airbases were a
major spur to this U.S. decision. The U.S. military repaired and upgraded the air field at
the Manas international airport (the U.S. facilities were named after the late New York
firefighter Peter J. Ganci), and war support to Afghanistan began in March 2002. The
Defense Department reported in late 2003 that the airbase at that time was the “primary
hub” for trans-shipping personnel, equipment, and supplies to Afghanistan. In early 2005,
the airbase hosted about 1,200 troops from the United States and Spain, as well as local
support personnel. New troop barracks are being built to replace tents. According to a
March 2005 report by Kyrgyzstan’s Foreign Ministry, the government had received
requests from the United States and NATO regarding the possibility of deploying airborne
warning and control systems planes (AWACS) at Ganci. It denied the requests, however,
because of Kyrgyzstan’s commitments to the Collective Security Treaty Organization (see
below) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (composed of China, Russia, and the
Central Asian states).
Just after U.S.-led coalition forces began ground operations in Iraq in March 2003,
Kyrgyzstan’s Legislative Assembly (lower chamber) issued a statement calling for the
United States to cease “gross violations” of international law. Although Kyrgyz Foreign
Minister Aytmatov told Vice President Cheney during a June 2003 U.S. visit that

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Kyrgyzstan was ready to send peacekeepers to Iraq and Afghanistan, in April 2004 the
presidential spokesman and the defense minister announced that Kyrgyzstan had no plans
to send peacekeepers to either country.
Foreign Policy and Defense
Akayev’s 1999 foreign policy concept called for close relations with ancient “silk
road” route countries, including China, former Soviet republics, and Turkey, Iran, India,
and Pakistan, including because landlocked Kyrgyzstan must rely on its neighbors for
access to world markets. Kyrgyzstan has also pursued good relations with Western states
in its search for aid. Cultivating good ties with China, Akayev joined leaders from
Russia, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan in 1996 and 1997 in signing agreements with China
on demarcating and demilitarizing the former Soviet-Chinese border. Kyrgyzstan’s
cession to China of a small mountainous border area fueled violent protests in Kyrgyzstan
and calls that the government not make the same “mistake” in border talks with
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Many in Kyrgyzstan are concerned that China’s economic
and population growth in bordering areas threatens the country. Kyrgyzstan’s relations
with Uzbekistan have been marked by trade, border, and other disputes.
Akayev has stressed close relations with Russia. Reasons include hoped-for
economic and trade benefits and security ties to alleviate concerns about Chinese and
Uzbek intentions. While relying on security ties with Russia, Kyrgyzstan has pursued
ancillary (and perhaps partly countervailing) security ties with the United States, NATO,
and China that Akayev in December 2003 hailed as creating “comprehensive” security.
Kyrgyzstan and Russia concluded a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty in 1992, and
Kyrgyzstan signed the Commonwealth of Independent States’ (CIS) Collective Security
Treaty (CST) in 1992 and 1999. These and other agreements call for cooperation with
Russia in training and defense.
Several hundred Russian border troops (most reportedly were Kyrgyz citizens)
guarded the Chinese border until 1999, when Russia handed over control to Kyrgyzstan,
citing costs and other reasons. However, Russia ramped up its security presence in
September 2003 with the signing of a 15-year military basing accord with Kyrgyzstan for
use of the Soviet-era Kant airfield near Kyrgyzstan’s capital of Bishkek. Russian media
report that the base hosts about 20 aircraft and 500 troops. These components ostensibly
also form part of a CST rapid deployment force. The Kant airbase is a scant 20 miles
from the Ganci airbase. Although the purpose of the base ostensibly is to combat regional
terrorism and defend southern CIS borders, Putin stressed that the base “enshrines our
military presence in Kyrgyzstan,” appearing to underline that the base also counters U.S.
and NATO security influence. In February 2005, Russia announced intentions to
“double” its deployments at the base. The CIS Anti-Terrorist Center (ATC) — a body
created largely at Putin’s urging to facilitate cooperation between Russia’s Federal
Security Service and other CIS intelligence bodies — set up a regional branch in Bishkek
after September 11, 2001.
Kyrgyzstan’s armed forces numbered about 12,500 ground, air force, and air defense
troops. There are also about 5,000 border guards (The Military Balance 2004-2005).
Most of the troops are ethnic Kyrgyz conscripts, though some officers are Russians. A
defense development plan approved in 2002 called for creating a small and mobile army
trained in mountain warfare to combat terrorists. Kyrgyzstan joined NATO’s Partnership

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for Peace (PFP) in 1994 and has participated in many PFP exercises in the United States,
Central Asia, and elsewhere.
A reported 800 guerrillas belonging to the terrorist Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
(IMU) and to rogue groups from Tajikistan invaded Kyrgyzstan in July-August 1999,
taking Japanese geologists and others as hostages and occupying several Kyrgyz villages.
They allegedly aimed to create an Islamic state in south Kyrgyzstan as a springboard for
jihad in Uzbekistan. Kyrgyzstan received urgent air support from Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan and expelled the invaders in October 1999. The incursion illustrated ties
between terrorists in Central Asia, Russia (Chechnya), and Afghanistan, and the need for
Kyrgyzstan to bolster its defenses. A reported 500 IMU and other insurgents again
invaded southern Kyrgyzstan (others invaded Uzbekistan) in August 2000, taking U.S.
tourists as hostages and causing thousands of Kyrgyz to flee. Uzbekistan provided air and
other support, but Kyrgyz forces were largely responsible for defeating the insurgents by
late October 2000.
The State Department designated the IMU as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in
September 2000. According to the State Department, the IMU did not invade Central
Asia in 2001, in part because Al Qaeda had secured IMU aid for Taliban fighting against
the Afghan Northern Alliance. Although much of the IMU was decimated by U.S.-led
coalition operations in Afghanistan, the IMU has restored some of its presence in
Kyrgyzstan. In 2002 and 2003, the IMU set off bombs in Bishkek and Osh. Kyrgyzstan
arrested the bombers in May 2003, allegedly before they were able to carry out a plan to
bomb the U.S. Embassy. Kyrgyzstan reportedly has arrested others who allegedly have
targeted U.S. interests (Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003). Kyrgyzstan has jailed
dozens of members of the Hizb ut-Tahrir Islamic extremist group and of the Eastern
Turkestan Liberation Organization, which calls for independence for China’s Xinjiang
region.
Political and Economic Developments
President Akayev has orchestrated frequent constitutional changes to preserve and
enhance his powers. A new constitution approved in 1993 established a presidential
system with separation of powers and expansive human rights guarantees. Akayev held
an October 1994 referendum (an illegitimate process under the constitution) to approve
constitutional amendments to weaken the legislature. He argued that the constitution was
too “idealistic” since “people are not prepared for democracy,” and that a “transitional
period” was needed. The amendments created a bicameral legislature called the Jogorku
Kenesh (Supreme Assembly), consisting of a Legislative Assembly that served
continuously and represented “all people,” and an Assembly of People’s Representatives
that met in regular sessions and represented regional interests. Only after the referendum
were detailed constitutional provisions published.
Akayev spearheaded another constitutional referendum in February 1996 to give him
greater powers to veto legislation, dissolve the legislature, and appoint all but the prime
minister without legislative confirmation, while making impeachment more difficult,
along the lines of Russia’s Constitution. According to the State Department, the
referendum was marked by fraudulent voting. Despite these restrictions on its powers,
the legislature increasingly asserted itself in law-making and oversight. Moving to further
weaken it, Akayev held a referendum in October 1998 to restrict its influence over bills

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involving the budget or other expenditures, limit a legislator’s immunity from removal
and prosecution, increase the size of the Legislative Assembly to 60, and decrease the size
of the Assembly of People’s Representatives to 45. Despite these successive limitations
on its powers, the legislature continued to display a degree of independence by overriding
presidential vetoes, criticizing government policies, and voting on confidence in the prime
minister and cabinet.
Akayev in 2002 formed a Constitutional Council composed of government and civil
society representatives to propose amendments, which were then passed on to an Expert
Group of officials and scholars to finalize. As occurred in Kazakhstan, the government-
led group axed many Council suggestions and added many others without public input,
according to the State Department. The February 2003 referendum on the amendments
was deemed “highly flawed” by the State Department, because of multiple voting,
manipulated ballot counting, and forged results. The amended constitution boosts
presidential powers at the expense of legislative powers. Also as in Kazakhstan, former
presidents now have immunity from prosecution and cannot be detained, searched, or
interrogated. The amendments create a 75-member unicameral legislature (Jogorku
Kenesh) after its next election in 2005 and eliminate party list voting, a provision many
of the 43 registered parties feared would threaten their ability to gain seats and hence to
survive politically. Also of potential harm to democratization, a new election code was
signed into law in January 2004 that the OSCE assessed as not ensuring that electoral
commissions are impartial, that monitoring is permitted at all stages of the electoral
process, and that voting and tabulation are transparent.
The February 27, 2005, legislative election in Kyrgyzstan resulted in wins in 32
districts with run-offs held on March 13 in most of the remaining districts where no one
candidate received over 50% of the votes cast (in three districts, voters rejected all the
candidates approved to run). On March 22, the Central Electoral Commission announced
that results for 71 districts were valid. Less than 10% of seats were won by opposition
candidates, although there reportedly were many close races where they “lost” only by a
few votes. Opening the new legislative session that same day, Akayev condemned
religious and other extremists he blamed for the demonstrations in the south. His
spokesman was more specific, alleging that the unrest marked efforts by drug lords and
terrorists to take over.
In the wake of the election, the U.S. State Department stated that the race marked
some progress from previous elections but still fell seriously short of democratic
standards. According to the OSCE, serious irregularities included the questionable
exclusion of several opposition candidates from running, biased state-controlled media,
and heavy government use of other administrative resources and even alleged vote-
buying. Opposition party-led demonstrations in support of holding a new election and
calling for Akayev’s resignation took place throughout the country in March 2005, with
protestors occupying several regional or district government buildings, including in the
southern city of Osh, and blocking the main highway linking the northern and southern
regions. Some counter-demonstrations in support of the government also were reported.
The U.S. Administration has called on Akayev to abide by a constitutional provision
permitting only two presidential terms and to step down and facilitate a democratic
presidential election scheduled for October 30, 2005.

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Kyrgyzstan’s human rights record was poor, although there were some
improvements during 2004, according to the State Department’s Country Reports on
Human Rights Practices for 2004.
However, compared to other Central Asian states,
Kyrgyzstan has a less objectionable record, some observers argue. Security personnel at
times beat or otherwise mistreated persons with impunity, and prison conditions remained
poor. There were cases of arbitrary arrest or detention. There were several independent
newspapers and television and radio stations. Government control over publishing and
distribution at times was used to harass print media. Reporters suffered fewer instances
of physical harassment or libel suits for violating the “honor and dignity” of officials (a
criminal offense). The government permitted a private printing press supported by the
U.S. Administration and Congress to begin operating in November 2003 (however, the
government cut off its electrical power in the run-up to February 2005 legislative
election). Human rights groups were generally allowed to work freely, and a government
Ombudsman’s Office advocated for individual rights. The government sometimes
harassed Christian groups or Islamic groups viewed as extremist. Kyrgyzstan continued
to have problems with trafficking for prostitution and labor, but the government took
some moves to discourage such trafficking, such as legislating criminal penalties and
setting up an anti-trafficking police unit in May 2004.
Foreign assistance has been a significant factor in Kyrgyzstan’s budget, contributing
by 2004 to public foreign debts of $1.77 billion. The Paris Club of government lenders
eased Kyrgyzstan’s debt payment burden in 2002 and may do so again in 2005. The IMF
in early 2005 praised Kyrgyzstan for solid economic growth in recent years, low inflation,
accumulating foreign reserves, and a significant decline in poverty levels from about one-
half of the population to about one-third. It called on the government to reduce foreign
debts and continue to constrain budget expenditures. Kyrgyz GDP stopped declining in
1995 and grew 5.5% in 2004, led by gains in mining (particularly coal and oil extraction),
agriculture (cotton growing and animal husbandry), and forestry. Inflation in 2004 was
4.5%. Gold production still is the most significant industrial source of GDP and export
earnings. Production at the Kumtor gold mine is declining, but others are being
developed. In March 2005, Akayev stressed the need to boost stagnating industrial
production, particularly the need to establish and modernize small- and medium-sized
firms. Agriculture accounts for the largest portion of GDP and employs much of the
workforce. Crime and endemic corruption stifle economic growth and private foreign
investment. Kyrgyzstan leads Central Asia in the privatization of most farms, industries,
housing, and retail outlets. Kyrgyzstan has surplus hydroelectric energy, rare earth mineral
reserves, and tourism potential that could aid its development and is a major wool
producer. U.S. technical assistance contributed to Kyrgyzstan’s admission into the World
Trade Organization in late 1998.