Order Code RS21148
Updated March 17, 2005
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Military Space Programs: Issues Concerning
DOD’s SBIRS and STSS Programs
Marcia S. Smith
Specialist in Aerospace and Telecommunications Policy
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Summary
The Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) programs to develop new satellites to alert
U.S. military commanders to foreign missile launches, and to support missile defense
objectives, are controversial because of cost growth and schedule slippage. SBIRS-
High, managed by the Air Force, would replace existing Defense Support Program
“early warning” satellites. The Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS,
formerly SBIRS-Low), managed by the Missile Defense Agency, would perform missile
tracking and target discrimination for missile defense objectives. Despite a restructuring
in 2002, the SBIRS-High program is encountering additional delays and cost increases.
This report will be updated.
Satellite Early Warning Systems
The United States began developing early warning satellite systems in the 1950s to
alert the National Command Authority to foreign missile launches. The current series is
called the Defense Support Program (DSP). The first DSP was launched in November
1970; 22 have been launched to date. The final DSP is already built and is scheduled for
launch in 2005. Each DSP can operate for up to 10 years.1 Four satellites reportedly are
needed for a full operational capability. Six satellites reportedly were operating as of
January 2001.2 The most recent DSP was launched in February 2004.
DSP satellites (built by TRW Space and Electronics, which is now Northrop
Grumman Space Technology) use infrared sensors to detect the heat of fuel exhausts
associated with missile launches. Sensors on the satellites also can detect nuclear bursts
associated with the detonation of nuclear weapons. A 2001 General Accounting Office
1 Space News (January 7, 2002, p. 14)
2 Space & Missile Defense Report, Jan. 18, 2001, p. 8. More recent data could not be obtained
in the open literature.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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(GAO) report3 recounts DOD’s attempts to build a replacement for DSP over more than
two decades. None of the proposed replacement programs — the Advanced Warning
System in the early 1980s, the Boost Surveillance and Tracking System in the late 1980s,
the Follow-On Early Warning System in the early 1990s, and the Alert, Locate and Report
Missiles System in the mid-1990s — reached fruition “due to immature technology, high
cost, and affordability issues,” according to GAO. Instead, enhancements were made to
the DSP series. For example, DSP was designed to detect launches of strategic long range
missiles (such as Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles). However, the need to detect short
range tactical missiles, such as Scud, was highlighted during the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf
War. In 1995, DOD added the ALERT (Attack and Launch Early Reporting to Theater)
system to DSP satellites to augment their theater missile warning capabilities.

DSP-type satellites are intrinsically part of any effort to develop a missile defense
system because they provide the first warning that a foreign missile has been launched
(during the missile’s “boost” phase), but DSP also serves other objectives. Since the
1980s, there has been interest in developing a system explicitly to support missile defense
— one that can track missiles as they progress along their flight path (the “mid-course”
phase), detect and track warheads once they are deployed from the missile, and cue
weapon systems to attack the missiles or warheads. A concept for a constellation of many
satellites in low Earth orbit, called Brilliant Eyes, was developed during the 1980s under
the auspices of the Strategic Defense Initiative Office (SDIO). Following a 1994 DOD
study on how best to meet the nation’s early warning needs, Brilliant Eyes was transferred
to the Air Force, which was given responsibility to build an integrated Space-Based
InfraRed System (SBIRS) with satellites in several orbits. Brilliant Eyes was renamed the
Space and Missile Tracking System and became the low Earth orbit component of SBIRS.
Later it was renamed SBIRS-Low. The system to replace DSP was named SBIRS-High,
consisting of satellites in geostationary orbit (GEO, where DSP satellites are placed) and
sensors on other DOD satellites in highly elliptical orbits (HEO).4 In 2001, SBIRS-Low
was shifted back to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), which was
SDIO’s successor and is now the Missile Defense Agency. That action was taken to stress
that SBIRS-Low’s main purpose is to support ballistic missile defense. The satellite
program has since been renamed again, and is now the Space Tracking and Surveillance
System (STSS).
3 U.S. General Accounting Office. Defense Acquisitions: Space-Based Infrared System-low at
Risk of Missing Initial Deployment Date. GAO-01-6. Washington, U.S. GAO, Feb. 2001. For
more detail on the history of U.S. early warning satellite systems, see Richelson, Jeffrey.
America’s Space Sentinels. Lawrence, Kansas, University Press of Kansas, 1999.
4 Geostationary orbit (GEO) exists 35,800 kilometers above the equator. A satellite in GEO
maintains a fixed position relative to a point on Earth. Three or four properly spaced GEO
satellites can view the entire globe, except for the polar regions. HEO orbits can provide
coverage of the polar regions. A classic HEO orbit (called a Molniya orbit after the Soviet
communications satellite system that first utilized it), has an apogee (the highest point of the
orbit) of approximately 40,000 kilometers, and a perigee (the lowest point) of about 500
kilometers, giving the orbit an elliptical shape. With an inclination of about 63 degrees (the angle
at which it intersects the equator), such an orbit allows a satellite to linger or “dwell” over the
northern hemisphere for several hours per orbit, viewing parts of the globe not observable from
GEO. DOD reportedly uses this type of orbit for classified satellites.

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SBIRS-High
Purpose, Design, and Cost Estimate. SBIRS-High is intended to perform four
missions: missile warning, missile defense, technical intelligence, and battlespace
characterization (observing and reporting on military activities on a battlefield). It will
consist of four operational GEO satellites (plus a ground spare), sensors on two classified
DOD satellites in HEO, a ground-based Mission Control Station (MCS), and ground-
based relay stations. MCS achieved initial operational capability in January 2002 using
the existing DSP satellites.
In 1996, Aviation Week & Space Technology described the technical capabilities of
SBIRS-High (November 18, 1996, p. 23) that were expected at that time. Reportedly it
would have high speed scanning sensors and staring sensors. After the scanning sensor
detected a launch, it would cue the staring sensor to observe the event and provide more
detailed data. DSP satellites, by contrast, reportedly have only scanning sensors. DSP
takes 40-50 seconds to detect a missile launch and determine its course, while SBIRS-
High was being designed to make those determinations and relay warnings to ground
forces in 10-20 seconds. The extent to which these technical design characteristics are
still planned is unclear.
A Lockheed Martin-Northrop Grumman team won a $2.16 billion contract to build
SBIRS-High in 1996. In September 2002, DOD increased the contract to $4.18 billion,
which does not include the cost of three of the five GEO satellites. In the FY2006 budget
request, the estimate for SBIRS-High engineering and manufacturing development (EMD)
is $7.7 billion, $1.9 billion (33%) more than the $5.8 billion estimate in the FY2003
budget (excluding those three GEO satellites and certain other costs). In October 2004,
conferees on the FY2005 DOD authorization bill noted that the cost had grown to $10
billion, from a 1996 estimate of $3.6 billion (H.Rept. 108-767, p. 559).
Issues. The SBIRS-High program is controversial because of cost growth and
schedule slippage caused by technical challenges that have been encountered in
developing the sensors and satellites. In the FY2002 DOD appropriations act, Congress
denied all procurement funding ($94 million had been requested) because it felt more
research and development (R&D) was required. It added $40 million to the $395 million
requested for R&D. The House Appropriations Committee’s report on the FY2002 DOD
appropriations act (H.Rept. 107-298, p. 140) cited findings by GAO that the program was
facing serious hardware and software design problems including sensor jitter, inadequate
infrared sensitivity, and stray sunlight. (The GAO report is classified). Space News
reported on January 7, 2002 (p. 14) that the program’s cost estimate had grown from $1.9
billion to $4.5 billion, and the first launch slipped from 2002 to 2006. Space News
attributed the cost increase to technical problems, including software development; faulty
cost estimates; budget erosion; and schedule slippage.
In December 2001, SBIRS-High breached the “Nunn-McCurdy” 25% program
acquisition unit cost (PAUC) growth limit, which requires certification that the program
meets certain criteria to continue. DOD issued the certification on May 2, 2002, and the
Air Force restructured the program. DOD decided to pay for the first two GEO satellites
(scheduled for launch in FY2006 and FY2007) using research, development, test, and
evaluation (RDT&E) funds. The plan was to purchase the remaining three satellites with
procurement funds, with a two-year gap between the first two and the last three. Some

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questioned whether that decision could increase total program costs because the
contractor would have to rebuild its team for the later satellites. DOD argued that the
two-year break will provide time to learn from the earlier satellites and make
improvements. In 2003, the Senate Armed Services Committee called the two-year gap
“unwise” (S.Rept. 108-46, p.244).
A May 2003 report of the Defense Science Board and Air Force Scientific Advisory
Board [http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/space.pdf] criticized early program
management of SBIRS-High, and took a cautious attitude concerning whether the
restructured program would succeed. An October 2003 GAO report (GAO-04-48)
concluded the program remained at “substantial risk of cost and schedule increases.” In
March 2004, statements by DOD officials indicated that the program was experiencing
further setbacks. Delivery of the first SBIRS-High sensor, for launch on one of the HEO
satellites, slipped from summer 2003 to August 2004 because of electromagnetic
interference between the sensor and other spacecraft equipment. Launch of the first GEO
satellite slipped by one year, and then another (first launch is now expected in 2008).
DOD is examining whether to proceed with all of the last three GEO satellites.5 In June
2004, DOD notified Congress that the program had breached a different Nunn-McCurdy
threshold, a 15% PAUC cost increase, which requires notification to Congress, but not
a certification. According to Reuters (March 15, 2005, 18:10, via Factiva), Acting Air
Force Secretary Peter Teets informed Congress on March 11, 2005 that the cost for the
third through fifth satellites is expected to rise more than 15% in FY2006, and possibly
as much as 25%. Mr. Teets also reportedly said that he was not confident of the accuracy
of those estimates and has ordered an independent assessment of program costs.
FY2006 Request. According to DOD FY2006 budget documents, DOD is
requesting $756 million, compared with $594 million estimated for FY2005.
Space Tracking and Surveillance System (formerly SBIRS-Low)
Purpose, Design, and Cost Estimates. The Space Tracking and Surveillance
System (STSS, previously named SBIRS-Low) is designed specifically to support missile
defense. Management of the program was transferred from the Air Force back to the
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO, the successor to SDIO — see earlier
discussion of Brilliant Eyes), to emphasize that missile defense is its primary objective.
BMDO is now the Missile Defense Agency (MDA). For more on missile defense, see
CRS Report RL31111, Missile Defense: The Current Debate.
The missile defense system is envisioned as a “layered” defense that can attack
missiles or warheads in three different phases of flight: boost (launch), mid-course
(enroute to a target, when warheads are deployed from the missile), and terminal (after
reentry). The goal of an operational STSS is to track missiles through all three phases;
discriminate between warheads and decoys; transmit data to other systems that will be
used to cue radars and provide intercept handovers; and provide data for intercept hit/kill
assessments. Tracking missiles during the mid-course phase is more difficult than during
5 For example, see (1) U.S. Air Force Studies Alternatives to Last 3 SBIRS Satellites. Space
News, April 5, 2004, p. 9 and (2) April 20 SBIRS Review to Focus on Three Satellites.
Aerospace Daily, April 1, 2004, p. 1-2.

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boost, because the missile is no longer firing its engines and hence does not have a strong
infrared (heat) signature, making it necessary to track a cold object against the cold
background of space. Similarly, tracking warheads after they have been deployed, and
discriminating between warheads and decoys, is a technically challenging task.
Cost estimates are problematic because there is no final system architecture and the
schedule is in flux. In its February 2001 report, GAO reported that DOD had estimated
the life-cycle cost for STSS (then SBIRS-Low) through FY2022 at $11.8 billion. The
House Appropriations Committee reported in late 2001 (H.Rept. 107-298, p. 250) that the
program’s life cycle cost had grown from $10 billion to over $23 billion. In January
2002, the Congressional Budget Office estimated the cost through 2015 at $14-17 billion.
Two industry teams were chosen in 1999 for program definition and risk reduction
(PDRR): Spectrum Astro/ Northrop Grumman, and TRW/ Raytheon. DOD was expected
to select one of the teams for the next phase in mid-2002 and the satellites were to have
been launched between 2006 and 2010.6 In the April 2002 restructuring (see below),
DOD decided to merge the teams. Northrop Grumman Space Technology (formerly
TRW Space & Electronics) is the prime contractor, and Spectrum Astro (now being
acquired by General Dynamics) a major subcontractor, for building the satellites.
Competition between Raytheon and Northrop Grumman to build the sensors was to
continue, but a May 2003 GAO report (see below) reports that MDA plans to fund the
design, but not the production, of a competitive sensor.
Issues. This program has gone through several name changes, making it difficult
to track. Congress began expressing concern about it in 1996, when it was known as the
Space and Missile Tracking System, particularly in terms of program management.7
Indications of technical and funding problems emerged in 1999 when DOD cancelled
contracts with TRW and Boeing to build and launch three prototype demonstration
satellites because of significant cost growth.8 In the early 2000s, when its name was
SBIRS-Low, questions arose as to whether it was vital to a missile defense system. Views
vary. Some assert that missile defense cannot be achieved without such a system, while
others argue that there are alternatives, such as ground-based radars.
To some extent, the answer may depend on the nature of the threat the missile
defense system is expected to defeat (e.g., number of incoming warheads, or
sophistication of countermeasures). Radars have been used for early warning of missile
launches for decades, and already are envisioned as part of the missile defense system. To
provide effective coverage, the radars must be based not only in the United States, but in
other countries — radars in England and Greenland are part of the early warning system
on which the United States relies today. The question is whether ground-based radars can
substitute for a space-based system, especially now that the United States is no longer
bound by numerical and geographic limitations imposed on radars that are part of an anti-
6 The first launch was scheduled for 2006, but Congress directed DOD to accelerate the schedule
to 2002. The Defense Science Board concluded that 2002 was technically feasible, but 2004
would represent a more efficient approach. (Aerospace Daily, Oct. 3, 1996, p. 18; Space News,
Sept. 16-22, 1996, p. 10.) The date then slipped back to 2006 primarily due to funding issues.
7 Authorizers Blast DOD for SMTS Management. Aerospace Daily, Aug. 8, 1996, p. 207.
8 Ferster, Warren. SBIRS Demonstration Projects Terminated. Space News, Feb. 15, 1999, p. 1.

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ballistic missile (ABM) system by the 1972 ABM treaty. Ground-based radars may be
less costly to build and maintain than a multi-satellite constellation, but the need to locate
them in other countries could be a disadvantage if the countries with suitable geographic
locations decline to accommodate them. Without an extensive network, there might be
gaps in coverage. Thus, trade-offs must be made between the cost and availability of
space-based versus ground-based systems, and the capabilities each offers. Sea-based
radars may be another alternative. In its November 19, 2001, report on the FY2002 DOD
appropriations bill (H.R. 3338, H.Rept. 107-298, p. 250), the House Appropriations
Committee cited an internal DOD study that indicated ground-based radars are a viable,
lower cost, and lower risk, alternative.
Technical challenges have continued. In its February 2001 report (cited earlier),
GAO found that five of six critical satellite technologies were too immature to ensure they
would be ready when needed. The House Appropriations Committee, in its November
2001 report (cited above), expressed concern that the program’s life cycle cost had grown
from $10 billion to over $23 billion. Consequently, the committee zeroed funding ($385
million was requested) and instead created a Satellite Sensor Technology program ($250
million) and a Ground Sensor Technology program ($75 million) as an alternative.
Conferees approved the $250 million for Satellite Sensor Technology, but allowed the
Secretary of Defense to spend it either on SBIRS-Low or new technology. (It was spent
on SBIRS-Low.) The ground sensor technology program was not approved in conference.
A restructuring plan was submitted to Congress on April 15, 2002. Previously, a
system consisting of 20-30 satellites was envisioned, with the first launch in 2006. The
restructuring plan called for completing two “legacy” demonstration satellites that had
been partially built as part of the 1999 plan, and launching them in 2006 and 2007. New
technologies would be introduced in future satellites, and two new demonstration
satellites would be launched beginning in 2010. In August 2002, DOD awarded Northrop
Grumman Space Technologies (formerly TRW) an $869 million contract to complete the
two legacy satellites, develop a ground system, and conduct preliminary engineering
analysis of the new demonstration satellites, with options for building eight operational
satellites. The program’s name was changed to Space Tracking and Surveillance System
(STSS). In May 2003, GAO reviewed (GAO-03-597) changes made to the restructuring
plan by MDA in late 2002 because MDA decided to reduce STSS funding. Under this
plan, both legacy demonstration satellites will be launched in 2007. Work on one (rather
than two) new demonstration satellite would begin in 2003, with launch delayed from
2010 to 2011. GAO criticized MDA’s decisions because MDA does not understand the
status of the legacy hardware and therefore the schedule risks associated with the 2007
launch date. It also criticized the decision to delay development and launch of new
demonstrators because, GAO says, MDA already knows that it wants to pursue different
designs and different technologies than in the legacy satellites. Further, GAO reports that
MDA decided to forego production of sensors from a competing contractors, thereby
losing the potential benefits of competition.
FY2006 Request. According to an MDA official, for FY2006, $232 million is
being requested for STSS in the unclassified budget. Additional funding is in the
classified budget, but the amount cannot be publicly disclosed. The unclassified FY2005
budget is $304 million.

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