Order Code IB93017
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Space Stations
Updated March 16, 2005
Marcia S. Smith
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Introduction
The Space Station Program: 1984-1993
Space Station Freedom
1993 Redesign — the Clinton Administration Restructuring
The International Space Station (ISS): 1993-Present
ISS Design, Cost, Schedule, and Lifetime
September 1993-January 2001: the Clinton Administration
2001-Present: the George W. Bush Administration
Reviews of NASA’s Cost Estimates and Adding Funds for ISS
Congressional Action
FY2005
FY2006
International Partners
The Original Partners: Europe, Canada, and Japan
Russia
Risks and Benefits of Russian Participation
ISS and U.S. Nonproliferation Objectives
Key Issues For Congress
Maintaining ISS Operations While the Shuttle is Grounded
Ensuring U.S. Astronaut Participation in Long-Duration Missions
Impact of President Bush’s Vision for Space Exploration, Including the “4-year Gap”
LEGISLATION


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Space Stations
SUMMARY
Congress continues to debate NASA’s
joined in 1993. Except for money paid to
International Space Station (ISS), a perma-
Russia, there is no exchange of funds among
nently occupied facility in Earth orbit where
the partners. Europe, Canada, and Japan
astronauts live and conduct research.
collectively expect to spend about $11 billion
Congress appropriated approximately $35
of their own money. A reliable figure for
billion for the program from FY1985-2005.
Russian expenditures is not available.
The FY2006 ISS request is $2.180 billion:
$1.857 billion for construction and operations
In 1993, when the current space station
and $324 million for research.
design was adopted, NASA said it would cost
$17.4 billion for construction (not including
The space station is being assembled in
launch or other costs). That estimate grew to
Earth orbit. Almost 90 launches of the U.S.
$24.1-$26.4 billion, leading Congress to
space shuttle and Russian launch vehicles
legislate spending caps on part of the program
were originally planned to take the various
in 2000. The estimate then grew by almost
segments, crews, and cargo into orbit; more
another $5 billion, leading NASA (at White
than two dozen have taken place already. ISS
House direction) to cancel or indefinitely defer
has been permanently occupied by successive
some hardware to stay within the cap. NASA
“Expedition” crews rotating on 4-6 month
alerted Congress in its FY2006 budget request
shifts since November 2000. “Expedition 10”
that it may exceed the cap, however.
is now aboard. Cost growth and schedule
delays have characterized the program since
Controversial since the program began in
its inception. The grounding of the space
1984, the space station has been repeatedly
shuttle fleet since the February 2003 Colum-
redesigned and rescheduled, often for cost-
bia tragedy is further affecting schedule,
growth reasons. Congress has been concerned
operations, and cost. Most of the remaining
about the space station for that and other
ISS segments are designed to be launched by
reasons. Twenty-two attempts to terminate the
the shuttle and construction therefore is sus-
program in NASA funding bills, however,
pended. A new exploration initiative an-
were defeated (3 in the 106th Congress, 4 in
nounced by President Bush in January 2004
the 105th Congress, 5 in the 104th, 5 in the
also is affecting the ISS program. He called
103rd, and 5 in the 102nd). Three other at-
for curtailing the shuttle program in 2010, and
tempts in broader legislation in the 103rd
changing the focus of U.S. research aboard
Congress also failed.
ISS to only that which supports his
“Moon/Mars” human space exploration goals
Current congressional debate focuses on
instead of the broadly-based scientific
the impact of the space shuttle Columbia
experiments that were planned.
tragedy, how and whether to ensure that U.S.
astronauts can be part of long duration ISS
Canada, Japan, and several European
crews, and the future of ISS in light of Presi-
countries became partners with NASA in
dent Bush’s new exploration initiative.
building the space station in 1988; Russia
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The “Expedition 10” crew (American Leroy Chiao and Russian Salizhan Sharipov)
continues its work aboard the International Space Station (ISS). While the U.S. space
shuttle fleet is grounded, Russian Soyuz spacecraft are being used to ferry crews to and from
ISS, and Russian Progress spacecraft deliver cargo. NASA hopes to return the shuttle to
flight between May 15 and June 3, 2005. If two test flights are successful, ISS construction
can resume. NASA’s ability to have its astronauts included in long duration “Expedition”
crews, however, may end with a Soyuz launch scheduled for October 2005, which will return
to Earth in April 2006. That is the last Soyuz Russia is obligated to use for crew rotation and
return of U.S. crew members under a 1996 “balance agreement” between the two countries.
NASA hopes to have the shuttle back in service by then, but the shuttle remains at ISS for
only 1-2 weeks. In order to leave U.S. astronauts on the ISS after the shuttle departs, the
astronauts must have access to a “lifeboat” (or “crew return” capability). The Bush
Administration terminated plans to build a U.S. crew return vehicle, so Russian Soyuz
spacecraft are the only option. NASA has not negotiated an agreement to buy Soyuz services
from Russia after April 2006 because it is prohibited from paying Russia for ISS-related
activities unless Russia complies with the Iran Nonproliferation Act (see CRS Report
RS22072). NASA officials report that an interagency process is underway to develop an
approach that would allow NASA to procure certain space goods and services from Russia.
The FY2006 request for the ISS is $2.180 billion: $1.857 billion for construction and
operations and $324 million for research. NASA is still developing a new research agenda
in the wake of last year’s announcement of the Vision for Space Exploration (see CRS
Report RS21720), under which the only U.S. research on the ISS will be that related to
supporting human trips to the Moon and Mars. In its FY2006 budget justification (p. EC 2-
4), NASA alerted Congress that, during FY2005, it may exceed the $25 billion cap for ISS
development costs legislated in the FY2000-2002 NASA Authorization Act (P.L. 106-391).
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Introduction
NASA launched its first space station, Skylab, in 1973. Three crews were sent to live
and work there in 1973-74. It remained in orbit, unoccupied, until it reentered Earth’s
atmosphere in July 1979, disintegrating over Australia and the Indian Ocean. Skylab was
never intended to be permanently occupied. The goal of a permanently occupied space
station with crews rotating on a regular basis was high on NASA’s list for the post-Apollo
years. In 1969, Vice President Agnew’s Space Task Group recommended a permanent space
station and a reusable space transportation system (the space shuttle) to service it as the core
of NASA’s program in the 1970s and 1980s. Budget constraints forced NASA to choose to
build the space shuttle first. When NASA declared the shuttle “operational” in 1982, it was
ready to initiate the space station program.
In his January 25, 1984 State of the Union address, President Reagan directed NASA
to develop a permanently occupied space station within a decade, and to invite other
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countries to join. On July 20, 1989, the 20th anniversary of the first Apollo landing on the
Moon, President George H. W. Bush gave a major space policy address in which he voiced
his support for the space station as the cornerstone of a long-range civilian space program
eventually leading to bases on the Moon and Mars. That “Moon/Mars” program, the Space
Exploration Initiative, was not greeted with enthusiasm in Congress, primarily due to budget
concerns, and ended in FY1993, although the space station program continued.
President Clinton dramatically changed the character of the space station program in
1993 by adding Russia as a partner to this already international endeavor. That decision
made the space station part of the U.S. foreign policy agenda to encourage Russia to abide
by agreements to stop the proliferation of ballistic missile technology, and to support Russia
economically and politically as it transitioned from the Soviet era. The Clinton
Administration strongly supported the space station within certain budget limits.
President George W. Bush, prompted in part by the February 2003 space shuttle
Columbia tragedy, made a major space policy address on January 14, 2004, directing NASA
to focus its activities on returning humans to the Moon and someday sending them to Mars
and “worlds beyond.” Included in this “Vision for Space Exploration” is a plan to retire the
space shuttle after construction of the space station is completed (now anticipated in 2010).
The President said the United States would fulfill its commitments to its space station
partners, but the details of how that will be accomplished without the space shuttle have not
been announced. The shuttle was supposed to be available throughout the space station’s
operational years to transport crews, equipment, and scientific experiments.
The Space Station Program: 1984-1993
NASA began the current program to build a space station in 1984 (FY1985). In 1988,
the space station was named Freedom. Following a major redesign in 1993, NASA
announced that the Freedom program had ended and a new program begun, though NASA
asserts that 75% of the design of the “new” station is from Freedom. The new program is
simply referred to as the International Space Station (ISS). Individual ISS modules have
various names. (Some space station crews refer to the facility as “Space Station Alpha,” but
that is not its formal name). ISS is a laboratory in space for conducting experiments in near-
zero gravity (“microgravity”). A broadly based research program had been planned for ISS,
but President Bush’s January 2004 “Vision for Space Exploration” would limit U.S. research
on ISS to that which is needed to support the goal of returning human to the Moon and
someday sending them to Mars and “worlds beyond.” From FY1985 through FY2005,
Congress appropriated approximately $35 billion for the space station program (see table
later in this report).
Space Station Freedom
When NASA began the space station program in 1984, it said the program would cost
$8 billion (FY1984 dollars) for research and development (R&D — essentially the cost for
building the station without launch costs) through completion of assembly. From FY1985-
1993, Congress appropriated $11.4 billion to NASA for the Freedom program. Most of the
funding went for designing and redesigning the station over those years. Little hardware was
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built and none was launched. Several major redesigns were made. A 1991 redesign evoked
concerns about the amount of science that could be conducted on the scaled-down space
station. Both the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) and the
Space Studies Board (SSB) of the National Research Council concluded that materials
science research could not justify building the space station, and questioned how much life
sciences research could be supported. They criticized the lack of firm plans for flying a
centrifuge, considered essential to this research. NASA subsequently agreed to launch a
centrifuge (although it reportedly is again reconsidering that now, see below).
Cost estimates for Freedom varied widely depending on when they were made and what
was included. Freedom was designed to be operated for 30 years. As the program ended
in 1993, NASA’s estimate was $90 billion (current dollars): $30 billion through the end of
construction, plus $60 billion to operate it for 30 years. The General Accounting Office
(GAO) estimated the total cost at $118 billion, including 30 years of operations.
In 1988, after three years of negotiations, Japan, Canada and nine European countries
under the aegis of the European Space Agency (ESA) agreed to be partners in the space
station program. A government-to-government Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) was
signed in September, and Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) between NASA and its
counterpart agencies were signed then or in 1989. The partners agreed to provide hardware
for the space station at their own expense, a total of $8 billion at the time.
1993 Redesign — the Clinton Administration Restructuring
In early 1993, as President Clinton took office, NASA revealed $1 billion in cost growth
on the Freedom program. The President gave NASA 90 days to develop a new, less costly,
design with a reduced operational period of 10 years. A new design, Alpha, emerged on
September 7, 1993, which NASA estimated would cost $19.4 billion. It would have used
some hardware bought from Russia, but Russia was not envisioned as a partner. Five days
earlier, however, the White House announced it had reached preliminary agreement with
Russia to build a joint space station. Now called the International Space Station (ISS), it
superseded the September 7 Alpha design. NASA asserted it would be a more capable space
station and be ready sooner at less cost to the United States. Compared with the September
7 Alpha design, ISS was to be completed one year earlier, have 25% more usable volume,
42.5 kilowatts more electrical power, and accommodate six instead of four crew members.
In 1993, President Clinton pledged to request $10.5 billion ($2.1 billion a year) for
FY1994-1998. NASA said the new station would cost $17.4 billion to build, not including
money already expended on the Freedom program. That estimate was derived from the
$19.4 billion estimate for the September 7 Alpha design minus $2 billion that NASA said
would be saved by having Russia in the program. The $2.1 billion and $17.4 billion figures
became known as “caps,” though they were not set in law. (See Cost Caps below).
The International Space Station (ISS): 1993-Present
The International Space Station program thus began in 1993, with Russia joining the
United States, Europe, Japan, and Canada. The 1993 and subsequent agreements with Russia
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established three phases of space station cooperation and the payment to Russia of $400
million, which grew to $473 million. (NASA transferred about $800 million to Russia for
space station cooperation through this and other contracts.)
During Phase I (1995-1998), seven U.S. astronauts remained on Russia’s space station
Mir for long duration (several month) missions with Russian cosmonauts, Russian
cosmonauts flew on the U.S. space shuttle seven times, and nine space shuttle missions
docked with Mir to exchange crews and deliver supplies. Repeated system failures and two
life-threatening emergencies on Mir in 1997 raised questions about whether NASA should
leave more astronauts on Mir, but NASA decided Mir was sufficiently safe to continue the
program. (As discussed below, Mir was deorbited in 2001.) Phases II and III involve
construction of the International Space Station itself, and blend into each other. Phase II
began in 1998 and was completed in July 2001; Phase III is underway.
ISS Design, Cost, Schedule, and Lifetime
ISS is being built by a partnership among the United States, Russia, Europe, Japan, and
Canada. The 1988 Intergovernmental Agreement was renegotiated after Russia joined the
program. The new version was signed in 1998. The IGA is a treaty in all the countries
except the United States, where it is an Executive Agreement. The IGA is implemented
through Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) between NASA and its counterpart agencies.
Brazil is not a partner in ISS, but agreed to participate through a bilateral agreement with
NASA. Boeing is the U.S. prime contractor.
NASA originally stated that ISS would be operated for 10 years after assembly was
completed, with a possibility for 5 additional years if the research was considered
worthwhile. Using the original schedule, assembly would have been completed in 2002,
with operations at least through 2012. The completion of assembly slipped to 2006, but
President Bush restructured the space station program in 2001, and it was not clear when
assembly would be “completed.” NASA briefing charts in March 2003 showed space station
operations possibly continuing until 2022. Under President Bush’s January 2004 “Vision
for Space Exploration,” NASA is to redirect its human space flight program towards
returning humans to the Moon and going to Mars. A NASA budget chart released in
connection with the Vision shows NASA ending its space station activities in FY2017.
ISS segments are launched into space on U.S. or Russian launch vehicles and assembled
in orbit. The space station is composed of a multitude of modules, solar arrays to generate
electricity, remote manipulator systems, and other elements that are too numerous to describe
here. Details can be found at [http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/home/index.html]. Six major
modules are now in orbit. The first two were launched in 1998: Zarya (“Sunrise,” a Russian-
built, U.S.-owned, module with guidance, navigation, and control systems) and Unity (a U.S.
“node” connecting other modules). Next was Zvezda (“Star,” a Russian module that serves
as the crew’s living quarters) in 2000. Destiny (a U.S. laboratory), Quest (a U.S. airlock),
and Pirs (“Pier,” a Russian docking compartment) arrived in 2001. Among the other
modules that will be added are laboratory modules built by Russia, Europe, and Japan, and
two more “nodes” built by Europe. (Zarya counts as a U.S. module because NASA paid
Russia to build it. Some of the European- and Japanese-built hardware counts as U.S.
because they are built under barter agreements where Europe and Japan produce hardware
NASA needs instead of paying cash to NASA for launch and other ISS-related services.)
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Ordinarily, the U.S. space shuttle takes crews and cargo back and forth to ISS. The shuttle
system is currently grounded because of the February 2003 space shuttle Columbia tragedy
(see CRS Report RS21408). Russian Soyuz spacecraft are also used to take crews to and
from ISS, and Russian Progress spacecraft deliver cargo, but cannot return anything to Earth
(Progress is not designed to survive reentry into the Earth’s atmosphere). A Soyuz is always
attached to the station as a lifeboat in case of an emergency.
The schedule for launching segments and crews is called the “assembly sequence” and
has been revised many times. At the end of the Clinton Administration, the assembly
sequence showed completion of assembly (“assembly complete”) in April 2006. The most
recent assembly sequence was released after a January 2005 “Heads of Agency” meeting in
Montreal, but it does not include launch dates, only the order in which the launches will go.
It does list “Establishment of a Permanent Crew of Six (January 2009),” followed by nine
shuttle launches to assembly complete. NASA has been instructed to complete ISS
construction by 2010, so presumably that is target for assembly complete.
“Expedition” crews have occupied ISS on a 4-6 month rotating basis since November
2000. Originally the crews had three members (two Russians and one American, or two
Americans and one Russian), with an expectation that crew size would grow to six or seven
once assembly was completed. Crew size is temporarily reduced to two (one American, one
Russian) while the U.S. shuttle is grounded in order to reduce resupply requirements. The
number of astronauts who can live on the space station is limited in part by how many can
be returned to Earth in an emergency by lifeboats docked to the station. Only Russian Soyuz
spacecraft are available as lifeboats. Each Soyuz can hold three people, limiting crew size
to three if only one Soyuz is attached. NASA planned to build a U.S. Crew Return Vehicle
(CRV) to provide lifeboat capabilities for at least four more crew, but the Bush
Administration canceled those plans due to cost growth in the ISS program (see Key Issues
for Congress
below).
Each Soyuz must be replaced every six months. The replacement missions are called
“taxi” flights since the crews bring a new Soyuz up to ISS and bring the old one back to
Earth. Therefore, under normal conditions, the long duration Expedition crews are regularly
visited by taxi crews, and by the space shuttle bringing up additional ISS segments or
exchanging Expedition crews. During the current period of no shuttle flights, Expedition
crews are taken back and forth on the “taxi” flights.
September 1993-January 2001: the Clinton Administration.
Cost Growth. From FY1994-FY2001, the cost estimate for building ISS grew from
$17.4 billion to $24.1-26.4 billion. The $17.4 billion estimate (called its “development cost,”
“construction cost,” or “R&D cost”) covered FY1994 through completion of assembly, then
scheduled for June 2002. It did not include launch costs, operational costs after completion
of assembly, civil service costs, or other costs. NASA estimated the program’s life-cycle
cost (all costs, including funding spent prior to 1993) from FY1985 through FY2012 at $72.3
billion. In 1998, GAO estimated the life-cycle cost at $95.6 billion (GAO/NSIAD-98-147).
More recent, comparable, life-cycle estimates are not available from NASA or GAO.
Cost growth first emerged publicly in March 1996 when then-NASA Administrator
Daniel Goldin gave the space station program manager control of money allocated for (and
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previously overseen by) the science offices at NASA for research intended to be conducted
aboard the space station. Congress gave NASA approval to transfer $177 million from those
science accounts to space station construction in the FY1997 VA-HUD-IA appropriations
act (P.L. 104-204). A similar transfer was approved for FY1996 ($50 million). NASA
changed its accounting methods so future transfers would not require congressional action,
and transferred $235 million from space station science into construction in FY1998. (“Space
station science” funding is for scientific activities aboard the space station. It is separate
from NASA’s other “space science” funding, such as Mars exploration.)
One factor in the cost growth was schedule slippage related to Russia’s Zvezda module.
As insurance against further Zvezda delays, or a launch or docking failure, NASA decided
to build an “Interim Control Module” (ICM). To cover cost growth associated with the
schedule delay and ICM, NASA requested permission to move $200 million in FY1997 from
the space shuttle and payload utilization and operations accounts to the space station
program, and to transfer $100 million in FY1998 from unidentified NASA programs to the
space station program. The appropriations committees approved transferring the $200
million in FY1997, but not the FY1998 funding.

In March 1998, NASA announced that the estimate for building the space station had
grown from $17.4 billion to $21.3 billion. In April 1998, an independent task force
concluded that the space station’s cost through assembly complete could be $24.7 billion.
Mr. Goldin initially refused to endorse the $24.7 billion estimate, but by 2000, NASA’s own
estimate had grown to $24.1-$26.4 billion.
Cost Caps. The $2.1 billion per year figure the Clinton White House and Congress
agreed to spend on the space station, and NASA’s $17.4 billion estimate to build the station,
became known as “caps,” although they were not set in law. Both were exceeded in 1997-
1998. As costs continued to rise, Congress voted to legislate caps on certain parts of the ISS
program in the FY2000-2002 NASA authorization act (P.L. 106-391). The caps are $25
billion for development, plus $17.7 billion for associated shuttle launches. The act also
authorizes an additional $5 billion for development and $3.5 billion for associated shuttle
launches in case of specified contingencies. The caps do not apply to operations, research,
or crew return activities after the space station is “substantially” complete, defined as when
development costs consume 5% or less of the annual space station budget. GAO reported
in April 2004 that it could not verify whether NASA is complying with the caps because
NASA cannot provide the data GAO requires, and NASA did not comply with the law’s
reporting requirements in its FY2005 budget request documentation (GAO-04-648R). In its
FY2006 budget justification (p. EC 2-4), NASA alerted Congress that it may exceed the $25
billion cap for ISS development during FY2005, attributing the increased costs to delays
resulting from the Columbia tragedy.
2001-Present: the George W. Bush Administration.
Cost Growth. As President Bush took office, NASA revealed substantial additional
cost growth. In 2000, NASA’s estimate of the remaining cost to build ISS was $8 billion
(FY2002 to FY2006). In January 2001, however, it announced that an additional $4.02
billion was needed. That figure grew to $4.8 billion by June, and the IMCE task force
(discussed below) said another $366 million in growth was discovered between August and
October. Those increases would have raised the cost to over $30 billion, 72% above the
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1993 estimate, and $5 billion above the legislated cap. NASA explained that program
managers had underestimated the complexity of building and operating the station. The Bush
Administration signaled it supported the legislated cap, would not provide additional funds,
and NASA would have to find what it needed from within its Human Space Flight account.
“Core Complete” Configuration. In February 2001, the Bush Administration
announced it would cancel or defer some ISS hardware to stay within the cap and control
space station costs. It canceled the Propulsion Module, and “indefinitely deferred” the
Habitation Module, Node 3, and the Crew Return Vehicle (CRV). The decision truncates
construction of the space station at a stage the Administration called “core complete.” The
Administration said that “enhancements” to the station might be possible if NASA
demonstrated improved cost estimating and program management. In 2001, the space
station program office at Johnson Space Center (JSC) estimated that it would cost $8.3
billion from FY2002-2006 to build the core complete configuration, described at that time
as all the U.S. hardware planned for launch through Node 2, plus the launch of laboratories
being built by Europe and Japan. NASA subsequently began distinguishing between “U.S.
Core Complete” (the launches through Node 2, which, prior to the Columbia tragedy, was
scheduled for February 2004) and “International Partner (IP) Core Complete” which includes
the addition of European and Japanese laboratory modules (then anticipated in 2008).
The non-U.S. partners, and U.S. scientists who planned to conduct research on ISS,
expressed deep concern with the core complete configuration (see CRS Report RL31216).
Concerns focused on the decision to indefinitely defer the CRV (which subsequently was
canceled), which limits the space station to three permanent crew members, not seven as
planned, reducing the number of crew available to conduct scientific research. For U.S.
researchers, another issue was that NASA also reduced the space station research budget by
37.5% over the FY2002-2006 period, necessitating a reassessment of U.S. research priorities
on ISS. A July 2002 report of the “Research Maximization and Prioritization” (ReMaP) task
force, and a September 2002 National Research Council report, made recommendations on
research priorities. (Both were superseded by the January 2004 “Vision for Space
Exploration,” which directs that U.S. research on ISS be restricted only to that which
supports the Vision, discussed elsewhere in this report.) For Europe, Canada, and Japan, the
lack of a U.S. crew return capability also poses problems because the additional crew
member slots were to be allocated, in part, to their astronauts. Without those positions, their
astronauts might be limited to working aboard ISS only for short durations as part of crews
on the U.S. space shuttle or Russian Soyuz “taxi” missions. Europe is negotiating
arrangements with Russia, however, for its astronauts to be part of Expedition crews. As
discussed elsewhere in this report, there are questions as to whether U.S. astronauts will be
able to continue to be part of Expedition crews (see Key Issues for Congress below).
Reviews of NASA’s Cost Estimates and Adding Funds for ISS. NASA
created the ISS Management and Cost Evaluation (IMCE) Task Force in July 2001 to review
the space station program office’s $8.3 billion cost estimate for finishing the core complete
configuration. Chaired by former Lockheed Martin executive Tom Young, IMCE
determined that the cost estimate was not credible, and NASA should make significant
management and cost estimating changes (see CRS Report RL31216). NASA Headquarters
directed the space station program office to reassess its estimate, and had two independent
groups conduct their own estimates. A July 2002 GAO report (GAO-02-735) concluded that
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NASA’s focus on managing annual budgets
Table 1. U.S. Space Station Funding
resulted in NASA’s failure to heed indicators
(in $ millions)
of future program cost growth.
Fiscal Year
Request
Appropriated
In November 2002, the Bush
1985
150
150
Administration submitted an amended
FY2003 budget request that shifted $706
1986
230
205
million into the ISS program for FY2004-
1987
410
410
2007: $660 million to boost program
reserves, and $46 million in FY2004 for
1988
767
425
“long-lead” items to preserve the option of
1989
967
900
increasing crew size beyond three. (Congress
cut $200 million from ISS in FY2004,
1990
2,050
1,750
however.) The latter included a proposal to
1991
2,430
1,900
build an Orbital Space Plane (OSP) to takes
1992
2,029
2,029
crews back and forth to ISS as a complement
to the space shuttle.
1993
2,250
2,100
1994
2,106
2,106
At a December 2002 “Heads of
Agency” meeting in Japan, the ISS partners
1995
2,113
2,113
agreed on a process for selecting a final ISS
1996
2,115
2,144
configuration by December 2003. The
February 2003 space shuttle Columbia
1997
2,149
2,149
tragedy delayed the process, and President
1998
2,121
2,441A
Bush’s January 2004 announcement of the
Vision for Space Exploration, changed
1999
2,270
2,270
NASA’s own plans for construction and use
2000
2,483
2,323
of ISS. Included in the changes is
2001
2,115
2, 115
cancellation of the Orbital Space Plane, and
termination of the space shuttle program
2002
2,114 2,093
after ISS construction is completed. At a
2003
1,839
1,810 B
January 2005 Heads of Agency meeting, the
partners endorsed a final configuration of
2004 C
2,285
2,085
ISS, but NASA is continuing to assess what
2005
2,412
2,058 D
modules it needs. For example, NASA
officials indicate that the centrifuge and its
2006
2,180
accommodation module may not be needed
The numbers here reflect NASA’s figures for “the
now that the U.S. research program is limited
space station program.” Over the years, what is
to research in support of the Vision. A
included in that definition has changed.
A NASA’s FY1999 budget documents showed $2.501
decision is expected in the spring of 2005.
billion in the expectation Congress would approve
additional transfer requests, but it did not.
B Adjusted for 0.65% rescission.
C Reflects shift to full cost accounting.
D
Congressional Action
Congress did not specify an appropriations level.
This figure is from FY2006 NASA budget charts.
FY2005
The FY2005 request for the ISS program was $2.412 billion: $1.863 billion for
construction and operations, including $140 million in a new “ISS Crew/Cargo Services” line
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to pay for alternatives to the shuttle for taking crew and cargo to and from ISS; and $549
million for research. Congress did not specify a funding level for the ISS in the final version
of the FY2005 VA-HUD-IA appropriations act, which was incorporated in the FY2005
Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 4818, P.L. 108-447). Instead, it gave NASA
“unrestrained transfer authority” to shift money between budget accounts. In its December
23, 2004 Initial Operating Plan, NASA showed that it plans to spend $1.676 billion on ISS
construction and operations, including $98 million for ISS Crew/Cargo Services. A FY2006
NASA budget charts shows $382 million for space station research in FY2005.
FY2006
For FY2006, NASA is requesting $2.180 billion for the ISS program: $1.857 billion for
construction and operations (including $160 million for ISS Crew/Cargo Services), and $324
million for ISS research.
International Partners
The Original Partners: Europe, Canada, and Japan
Canada, Japan, and most of the 15 members of the European Space Agency (ESA) have
been participating in the space station program since it began. Formal agreements were
signed in 1988, but had to be revised following Russia’s entry into the program, and two
more European countries joined in the interim. The revised agreements were signed on
January 29, 1998, among the partners in the ISS program: United States, Russia, Japan,
Canada, and 11 European countries — Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
Representatives of the various governments signed the government-to-government level
Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) that governs the program. (The United Kingdom signed
the IGA, but is not financially participating in the program so the number of European
countries participating in the program is variously listed as 10 or 11.) NASA also signed
Memoranda of Understanding for implementing the program with its counterpart agencies:
the European Space Agency (ESA), the Canadian Space Agency (CSA), the Russian space
agency (Rosaviakosmos at that time, now the Federal Space Agency), and the Japanese
Science and Technology Agency. The IGA is a treaty in all the countries except the United
States (where it is an Executive Agreement).
Canada is contributing the Mobile Servicing System (MSS) for assembling and
maintaining the space station. In February 1994, the new prime minister of Canada had
decided to terminate Canada’s role in the program, but later agreed to reformulate Canada’s
participation instead. The first part of the MSS (the “arm” or Canadarm 2) was launched in
April 2001; development of another part, the Special Purpose Dextrous Manipulator (referred
to as the Canada Hand), is complete and awaiting launch.
ESA is building a laboratory module called Columbus, and an Automated Transfer
Vehicle (ATV) to take cargo to ISS. The ATV will be launched on Europe’s Ariane launch
vehicle. The first ATV launch is expected in 2005. The major contributors to Columbus are
Germany, France, and Italy. Budgetary difficulties over the years led ESA to cancel other
hardware it was planning. ESA also is building a cupola (a windowed dome) and two of the
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three “nodes” (Node 2 and Node 3) for NASA in exchange for NASA launches of Europe’s
module and other services. Node 2, Columbus, and the cupola are completed. NASA had
canceled plans for Node 3, but now has revived them. NASA also has a bilateral agreement
with Italy under which Italy built three “mini-pressurized logistics modules” (MPLMs).
Already in use, they are launched via the shuttle, attached to ISS while cargo is transferred
to the station, filled with refuse or other unwanted material, placed back into the shuttle’s
cargo bay, and returned to Earth.
Japan is building the Japanese Experiment Module, named Kibo (Hope). One part is
pressurized and the other is not (called the “back porch,” it will be exposed to space for
experiments requiring those conditions). The pressurized section is completed and awaiting
launch; the unpressurized section is in development. Japan also is building a centrifuge and
a Centrifuge Accommodation Module (“CAM”) for NASA in exchange for shuttle flights
to launch Kibo. CAM was scheduled for launch in 2007, but is experiencing delays in its
development. NASA now is reconsidering whether it needs the centrifuge, since NASA will
be conducting only research related to accomplishing the Vision for Space Exploration.
CSA reported in February 2004 that Canada’s total ISS spending is expected to be $1.4
billion (Canadian), of which $1.3 billion (Canadian) was spent by that time. ESA reported
in March 2004 that its estimated funding for ISS is 5.1 billion Euros, of which 4.1 billion
Euros were spent as of the end of 2003. (In March 2004, 1 Canadian dollar = 0.75 U.S.
dollar and 1 Euro = 1.2 U.S. dollars.) In February 2004, the Japanese space agency reported
that Japan expects to spend $4.8 billion on ISS, of which $4 billion was spent by the end of
March 2003. (A bilateral agreement was signed with Brazil in October 1997 for Brazil to
provide payload and logistics hardware. Brazil is restructuring its agreement in light of
financial constraints, however. The level of its funding contribution is unclear.)
Russia
Issues associated with Russia’s participation in ISS are discussed elsewhere. This
section explains Russian space station activities from 1971 to the present. The Soviet Union
launched the world’s first space station, Salyut 1, in 1971 followed by five more Salyuts and
then Mir. At least two other Salyuts failed before they could be occupied. The Soviets
accumulated a great deal of data from the many missions flown to these stations on human
adaptation to weightlessness. The data were often shared with NASA. They also performed
microgravity materials processing research, and astronomical and Earth remote sensing
observations. Importantly, they gained considerable experience in operating space stations.
Russia’s most recent space station, Mir, was a modular space station built and operated
between 1986 and 2001. Crews were ferried back and forth to Mir using Soyuz spacecraft.

Crews occupied Mir from 1986-2000. For almost ten of those years (1989-1999), Mir
was continuously occupied by crews on a rotating basis. Although occasionally crews
stayed for very long periods of time to study human reaction to long duration spaceflight,
typically they remained for 5-6 months and then were replaced by a new crew. From 1995-
1998, seven Americans participated in long duration (up to six month) missions aboard Mir,
and nine space shuttle missions docked with the space station. Individuals from Japan,
Britain, Austria, Germany, France, and the Slovak Republic also paid for visits to Mir.
Russia deorbited Mir into the Pacific Ocean on March 23, 2001.
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Risks and Benefits of Russian Participation
For many years, controversy over the ISS program focused on Russia’s participation in
the program. Among the issues were the extent to which successful completion of ISS is
dependent on Russia, Russia’s financial ability to meet its commitments, and whether the
United States should provide funding to Russia if it proliferates missile technology to certain
countries. While there is no exchange of funds among the other ISS partners, the United
States (and other partners) have provided funding to Russia. By 1998, the United States had
paid approximately $800 million to Russia for space station cooperation.
Following the Clinton Administration’s decision to bring Russia into the program,
Congress stated that Russian participation “should enhance and not enable” the space station
(H.Rept. 103-273, to accompany H.R. 2491, the FY1994 VA-HUD-IA appropriations act,
P.L. 103-124). The current design, however, can only be viewed as being “enabled” by
Russian participation. It is dependent on Russian Progress vehicles for reboost (to keep the
station from reentering Earth’s atmosphere), on Russian Soyuz spacecraft for emergency
crew return, and on Russia’s Zvezda module for crew quarters (which allows ISS to be
permanently occupied). Since the Columbia accident, access to ISS has been completely
dependent on Russia, which ferries crews back and forth on the Soyuz spacecraft and takes
cargo to ISS on Progress spacecraft. President Bush’s exploration initiative would increase
U.S. dependence on Russia vis a vis the space station (see Key Issues for Congress below).
Russia’s financial ability to meet its commitments is an ongoing issue. The launch of
Zvezda, the first module Russia had to pay for itself, was more than two years late. (Zarya
was built by Russia, but NASA paid for it.) Since Zvezda’s launch in 2000, Russia has met
its commitments to launch Soyuz and Progress spacecraft, but is reassessing what other
modules and hardware it will build at its own expense. Russian space agency officials have
repeatedly expressed concern about whether they can provide the needed number of Soyuz
and Progress spacecraft because of budget constraints.
Clinton Administration and NASA officials asserted repeatedly that Russian
participation in the space station program would accelerate the schedule by two years and
reduce U.S. costs by $4 billion. That was later modified to one year and $2 billion, and an
April 1, 1994 letter to Congress from NASA said 15 months and $1.5 billion. NASA
officials continued to use the $2 billion figure thereafter, however. GAO concluded
(GAO/NSIAD 94-248) that Russian participation would cost NASA $1.8 billion, essentially
negating the $2 billion in expected savings. In 1998, a NASA official conceded that having
Russia as a partner added $1 billion to the cost. Other benefits cited by the Clinton
Administration were providing U.S. financial assistance to Russia as it moves to a market
economy, keeping Russian aerospace workers employed in non-threatening activities, and
the emotional impact, historic symbolism, and potential long term significance of the two
former Cold War adversaries working together in space.
One benefit is that the space station can be serviced with Russian as well as American
spacecraft, providing redundancy if either side must ground its fleet due to an accident, for
example. This is an important advantage while the U.S. space shuttle is grounded. Russia
is providing both crew and cargo flights to the space station, enabling it to continue operation
without the shuttle.
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ISS and U.S. Nonproliferation Objectives
The overall relationship between the United States and Russia is another factor in the
ISS equation, including Russian adherence to U.S. nonproliferation objectives. Getting
Russia to adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), designed to stem
proliferation of ballistic missile technology, appears to have been a primary motivation
behind the Clinton Administration’s decision to add Russia as a partner. The United States
wanted Russia to restructure a contract with India that would have given India advanced
rocket engines and associated technology and know-how. The United States did not object
to giving India the engines, but to the technology and know-how. Russia claimed that
restructuring the contract would cost $400 million. The 1993 agreement to bring Russia into
the space station program included the United States paying Russia $400 million for space
station cooperation. At the same time, Russia agreed to adhere to the MTCR. The question
is what the United States will do if Russia violates the MTCR. Some Members of Congress
believe Russia already has done so. The Clinton Administration sanctioned 10 Russian
entities for providing technology to Iran. Neither the Russian space agency nor any major
Russian ISS contractors or subcontractors were among those sanctioned.
On March 14, 2000, President Clinton signed into law the Iran Nonproliferation Act
(INA), P.L. 106-178. The law, inter alia, prohibits NASA from making payments related
to ISS after January 1, 1999, in cash or in kind, to Russia unless Russia takes the necessary
steps to prevent the transfer of weapons of mass destruction and missile systems to Iran, and
the President makes a determination that neither the Russian space agency nor any entity
reporting to it has made such transfers for at least one year prior to such determination.
Exceptions are made for payments needed to prevent imminent loss of life by or grievous
injury to individuals aboard ISS (the “crew safety” exception); for payments to construct,
test, prepare, deliver, launch, or maintain Zvezda as long as the funds do not go to an entity
that may have proliferated to Iran and the United States receives goods or services of
commensurate value; and hardware needed to dock the U.S. Interim Control Module (ICM,
discussed earlier). Certain notifications are required if the exceptions are utilized. NASA
was seeking permission to spend $35 million on Russia goods and services, of which $14
million was for the ICM docking hardware. President Clinton provided Congress with a
required notification with regard to that $14 million on June 29, 2000. Ultimately, only $11
million was needed for the ICM hardware, leaving $24 million that NASA wanted to spend.
No determination as required by the act was forthcoming from the President. NASA
considered using the crew safety exception, but at a House International Relations
Committee hearing on October 12, 2000, some committee Members sharply criticized
NASA’s legal interpretation of that exception, particularly NASA”s broad interpretation of
the word “imminent.” Thus, the INA has important ramifications for whether NASA can
keep its astronauts on ISS for long duration missions after April 2006, or at all after 2010
when the shuttle is expected to be terminated. (see Key Issues for Congress, below). For
more information on the INA and the ISS, see CRS Report RS22072.
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Key Issues For Congress
Maintaining ISS Operations While the Shuttle is Grounded
The grounding of the space shuttle system following the Columbia accident has
suspended assembly of ISS, temporarily reduced the size of Expedition crews from three to
two, and complicated efforts to keep the crews supplied with consumables, scientific
experiments, and spare parts for equipment that needs repair. Crews are being taken to and
from ISS using Russian Soyuz spacecraft on the same six-month schedule already planned,
and Russian Progress spacecraft are used to resupply the crew. Russia is obligated to provide
crew return for three people throughout the lifetime of ISS. Currently, they accomplish that
with two Soyuzes per year (each lasts only six months once docked to ISS). Russia also is
obligated to provide a certain number of Progress spacecraft, but has cautioned that funding
for Soyuz and Progress is not assured. Under the Iran Nonproliferation Act (INA), NASA
is prohibited from paying Russia for ISS-related activities unless the President certifies that
Russia is not proliferating certain technologies to Iran. The other ISS partners to date have
not volunteered to pay for additional Soyuz or Progress spacecraft.
The Russians operated seven of their own space stations (see above) using only Soyuz
and Progress spacecraft, so it is possible to keep ISS operating without the shuttle as long as
Russia is willing to provide them. However, operation of ISS was premised on the
availability of the cargo-carrying capacity of the space shuttle. Many observers point out
that the longer the shuttle remains grounded, the more difficult it is to keep ISS operating.
For example, the current crew (Expedition 10) was required to reduce its food intake because
of shortages aboard the station in late 2004. Stocks were resupplied by a Progress that
reached ISS late that December, but U.S. and Russian space station personnel made clear that
if the Progress had failed to dock, the crew would have had to return home prematurely
because of the food situation. ISS crews also need to repair faulty equipment, but
replacement parts may not fit aboard Progress or Soyuz. NASA hopes to return the shuttle
to flight status in May or June 2005. If that date slips, the ISS partners may need to reassess
whether to keep a crew aboard ISS. In addition to questions about keeping the crews well
supplied, with a two-person crew, less time may be available for scientific experiments. If
little science can be accomplished, some may question the wisdom of asking astronauts and
cosmonauts to accept the risks inherent in human spaceflight simply to maintain ISS systems.
Conversely, how long ISS could continue to function with no one aboard is unknown.
Progress spacecraft could dock with ISS automatically to reboost it and keep it at the proper
altitude, but a major system malfunction that could not be remedied by ground-based
controllers could imperil the station.
Another issue is that, in the wake of Columbia, ISS has been designated as a “safe
haven” for shuttle astronauts on the first two “Return to Flight” shuttle launches. If a
problem is detected with the shuttle that would prevent its safe return to Earth, the shuttle
crew would remain on ISS awaiting a rescue shuttle mission. Ensuring sufficient supplies
of food, water, air and other consumables for the additional astronauts is problematic.
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Ensuring U.S. Astronaut Participation in Long-Duration Missions
As noted, ISS crew size is limited in part by the number of occupants that can be
accommodated in a lifeboat, or “crew return vehicle” (CRV), in an emergency. Without its
own CRV, NASA is facing two deadlines in terms of assuring access to ISS for long duration
missions by U.S. astronauts. First is spring 2006, when Russia will have fulfilled its
commitment to provide lifeboat services for U.S. astronauts. Second is 2010, when the
shuttle is expected to be retired in accordance with President Bush’s Vision for Space
Exploration. The 2010 deadline is discussed separately (see next issue).
Regarding the spring 2006 deadline, the international agreements that govern the ISS
program obligate Russia to provide crew return services for three crew members throughout
the lifetime of the ISS, and the United States to provide such services for at least four people
beginning when assembly of ISS is completed. Prior to the Columbia tragedy, that milestone
was expected to occur in 2006. By that time, a U.S. CRV, accommodating at least four
people, was expected to be available. It would not only provide lifeboat capabilities for U.S.
crew members, but allow the ISS crew size to grow to seven (three could return on a Soyuz,
and four on the CRV), including representatives from the other partners. However, the Bush
Administration terminated the CRV, and its successor, the Orbital Space Plane. Therefore,
only Russian Soyuz spacecraft are available for lifeboat services.
Under a 1996 “balance agreement” between NASA and the Russian space agency,
Russia is obligated to use 11 Soyuz spacecraft to provide crew return for U.S. crews. The
first of the 11 was launched in November 2000. The last is scheduled for launch in October
2005, returning to Earth in April 2006. After that, Russia no longer must allocate any of the
seats on its Soyuzes for U.S. astronauts. It can sell those flight opportunities to whomever
it wishes, with no guarantee that Americans would be included. Russia is interested in
selling flight opportunities to help finance its space program, so might choose to limit those
opportunities to paying customers. As noted, the Iran Nonproliferation Act prevents NASA
from paying Russia for ISS-related activities unless Russia does not proliferate certain
technologies to Iran.
The impending situation where Russia’s obligation will be fulfilled, and there is no U.S.
CRV to ensure that American astronauts can be part of Expedition missions, has been
recognized for several years. As that deadline approaches, attention to the issue is increasing.
To date, the Bush Administration has not been willing to make the certification required by
the INA to allow NASA to pay Russia. NASA officials have repeatedly stated that there is
no intention to request a waiver from the INA. Without a presidential certification, a waiver,
or a decision by Russia to continue providing such services without payment, the options
appear somewhat limited. They include amending the law, concluding that one of the
exceptions in the law applies in this instance, accepting the risk of allowing astronauts to
remain on ISS without a lifeboat, or deciding that U.S. astronauts no longer need to be part
of Expedition crews.
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Impact of President Bush’s Vision for Space Exploration, Including
the “4-year Gap”

President Bush’s January 2004 Vision for Space Exploration directs NASA to focus its
activities on returning humans to the Moon by 2020, and someday sending them to Mars and
“world beyond.” If adopted, it would affect the ISS program in several ways. First, the
President directed that the shuttle be retired in 2010 after construction of ISS is completed.
A NASA budget chart that accompanied announcement of the Vision shows NASA
completing its utilization of ISS by FY2017. By terminating the shuttle and NASA
utilization of the ISS, that funding (approximately $6 billion per year) could be reallocated
to achieving the Vision. (Then-NASA Administrator O’Keefe stated at a February 12, 2004,
House Science Committee hearing, however, that NASA might continue using the station
after that, and there is no plan to “turn out the lights.” If that statement is correct, it is not
clear how the Vision can be achieved on the announced schedule.) The President also
directed that the U.S. research on ISS be restricted to the life sciences research needed to
support the Vision, instead of the broadly-based research program that was planned.
The extent to which ISS can be utilized without the space shuttle is not clear. Soyuz
spacecraft can take crews back and forth, but the shuttle’s cargo capacity — both for taking
cargo to ISS, and back to Earth (e.g. the results of scientific experiments, or hardware that
needs repair) — could be expensive to replicate. No other partner has a spacecraft able to
bring material back to Earth today. Europe reportedly is considering adding a return capsule
to its Automated Transfer Vehicle (a robotic cargo spacecraft expected to make its first flight
in 2005). NASA is exploring the possibility of U.S. commercial companies developing a
return capability. None of those plans is firm, though, and the size and mass of what could
be returned is likely to be less than what can be carried in the shuttle’s cargo bay.
Another issue is how U.S. crews would be able to access ISS once the shuttle is retired
in 2010. As already discussed, NASA is facing an April 2006 deadline regarding Russian
support for U.S. astronauts. If those arrangements cannot be negotiated, U.S. astronauts will
still be able to visit ISS using the shuttle, which typically docks for 1-2 weeks. That option
obviously would not be available if the shuttle is retired. NASA would be completely
dependent on Russia for access to ISS until NASA’s new Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV),
which is being developed as part of the Vision, is available. Under the current schedule,
CEV will be available to take astronauts to Earth orbit by 2014. The 2010-2014 period,
when the United States would not be able to launch humans into space, is sometimes referred
to as the “4-year gap.”
Today, NASA is dependent on Russia for taking astronauts to and from the space
station, and delivering cargo, because the space shuttle is grounded. While some view the
2010-2014 gap as similar to the situation today, it would, in fact, be quite different. Today,
there is an agreement in place where Russia is launching U.S. crews and cargo to ISS at no
cost to NASA. As noted above, that obligation will be fulfilled in April 2006. No agreement
has been negotiated for 2010-2014. Russia could charge whatever price it wanted for those
services. If the INA is still in effect, it is not clear if NASA could pay. Russia also would
be able to make operational decisions with which NASA might disagree. Russia could
decide, for example, to rotate crews at longer intervals. Russia proposed increasing
Expedition durations to a year instead of six months, but NASA replied that it is not ready
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to do so. If Russia is providing all the crew transport services, NASA’s influence on
decisions like that may be reduced.
There also is a difference between the emergency situation today, necessitated by the
Columbia tragedy, and an intentional decision to terminate NASA’s ability to launch
astronauts into space and hope that the political relationship with Russia remains stable and
a mutually beneficial agreement can be negotiated. To the extent the decision could create
a situation where U.S. astronauts might not be able to work aboard ISS, a facility being built
largely at U.S. taxpayer expense, Congress may choose to explore its implications.
If U.S. astronauts will not be part of Expedition missions, it might be useful to
investigate whether ground-based alternatives are available for conducting the life sciences
research needed to accomplish the Vision. If ground-based alternatives are available, though,
some may question why the United States is continuing to spend such a large amount of
money on ISS. Others may argue that fulfilling commitments to the other ISS partners is a
sufficient justification for continued U.S. participation in the ISS program.
LEGISLATION
108th Congress, 2nd Session
P.L. 108-447, H.R. 4818. FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act. Incorporates
VA-HUD-IA appropriations (including NASA) as Division I. H.R. 5051, FY2005 VA-
HUD-IA appropriations, was reported from House Appropriations Committee September
9, 2004 (H.Rept. 108-674). No floor action. Companion bill, S. 2825, reported from Senate
Appropriations Committee September 21, 2004 (S.Rept. 108-353). No floor action.
Conference agreement on VA-HUD-IA included in conference report on H.R. 4818 (H.Rept.
108-792), which passed House and Senate November 20, 2004. Signed into law December
8, 2004.
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