Order Code RS21922
Updated March 10, 2005
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Afghanistan: Presidential and
Parliamentary Elections
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
Presidential elections in Afghanistan were held on October 9, 2004, with heavy
turnout and minimal violence. Karzai was declared the winner on November 3, 2004
with about 55% of the vote, and he subsequently named a cabinet incorporating most
major factions but stressing qualifications. Parliamentary, provincial, and district
elections were to be held in April-May 2005, but they are now almost certain to be
postponed until at least September 2005. See CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-
War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy.
The “Bonn Conference” and Political Reconstruction
Afghanistan has not previously had a fully elected government, although there were
some parliamentary elections during the 1960s. For the first time since the December
1979 Soviet invasion, the country is beginning to stabilize, with the help of U.S. forces
and the international community. Presidential and parliamentary elections, when held,
would represent completion of the political transition roadmap outlined during the U.S.-
led war to oust the Taliban regime of Afghanistan, as stipulated in an agreement signed
at a United Nations-sponsored conference of major Afghan factions held in Bonn,
Germany in late November 2001, after the Taliban had vacated Kabul. Under the Bonn
agreement1 (signed December 5, 2001) the factions formed a 30-member interim
administration to govern until the holding in June 2002 of an “emergency loya jirga” —
a traditional Afghan assembly — that would choose a new government until a new
constitution was approved (by December 31, 2003) and national elections held (by June
2004). According to Bonn, the government would operate under the constitution of 1964
until a new constitution was adopted.
At the Bonn conference, Hamid Karzai, an ethnic Pashtun leader who had worked
with U.S. forces to defeat the Taliban, was selected interim leader. He presided over a
1 For text, see [http://www.uno.de/frieden/afghanistan/talks/agreement.htm].
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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cabinet in which a slight majority of the positions were held by the so-called “Northern
Alliance” faction, composed mostly of ethnic minorities, particularly ethnic Tajiks.
New Constitution and Elections
After the emergency loya jirga, Afghan officials began drafting a permanent
constitution. It was debated by 502 delegates, selected in U.N.-run caucuses, at a
“constitutional loya jirga (CLJ)” held during December 13, 2003 - January 4, 2004. The
constitution set up a strong elected presidency. A proposal to set up a prime minister-ship
as a check on the presidency, a plan pushed by the Northern Alliance faction, was not
included in the original draft because of broad concerns that a prime minister might
emerge as a rival to the presidency.2 As an alternative, the draft enhanced the powers of
an elected parliament relative to the president, giving it, for example, veto power over
senior official nominees. The CLJ approved a final constitution with only minor changes
from the original draft. The new constitution,3 as adopted, sets up a two-chamber
parliament and local councils.
! The lower house (Wolesi Jirga, House of People), to consist of 249 seats,
is to be fully elected at the same time, if possible, as presidential
elections.
! The 102 seat upper chamber (Meshrano Jirga, House of Elders) is
selected as follows: one-third of the seats (34) are appointed by the
President; another one third (34, one per province) are selected by
provincial councils (to be elected the same day as the parliamentary
elections); and a final 34 are selected by the nearly 400 district councils
to be elected. The constitution does not stipulate other roles for these
councils, although some believe they will ultimately acquire some power
to impose local taxes and provide local services.4
! In the elected lower house, at least 68 of those elected (two per province
x 34 provinces) “should” be women. That would give women about 25%
of the seats in that body. The goal is to be met through election rules that
would give the top two women vote-getters in each province a seat. In
the upper house, 50% of the president’s appointments are to be women -
giving women at least 17 seats (half of the president’s 34 nominees).
! Two vice presidents run on the same election ticket as the president, and
one succeeds him in the event of the president’s death. They serve a five-
year term, and presidents are limited to two terms. If no presidential
candidate receives at least 50%, a run-off is to be held within two weeks.
The constitution gives parliament the ability to impeach a president.
2 Constable, Pamela. “Afghan Constitution Seeks Balance.” Washington Post, Sept. 28, 2003.
3 From text of the constitution of Afghanistan.
4 Aizenman, N.C. Afghans Face a Rocky Road to Next Vote. Washington Post, February 19,
2005.

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! The constitution allows political parties to be established so long as their
charters “do not contradict the principles of Islam,” and they do not have
affiliations with other countries.
Election Organization and Registration
Following the adoption of the constitution, the U.S. and Afghan focus turned to the
holding of the presidential and parliamentary (lower house) elections. Karzai sought to
hold timely national elections to parry any charges that he sought to monopolize power.
Northern Alliance leaders sought simultaneous parliamentary elections so that a
parliament could check presidential authority, but there was widespread recognition that
parliamentary, provincial and district elections are more complicated than presidential
elections and that the two sets of elections might be held separately.
In July 2003, a joint Afghan-U.N. committee (with U.N. Assistance Mission in
Afghanistan, UNAMA), called the Joint Election Management Body (JEMB), was set up
to register voters and organize the elections. Even though a population census has never
been taken, it was estimated that 10.5 million Afghans would be eligible to vote. The
voting age is 18. Registration was slowed by violence against election workers and
overall security concerns, and in March 2004, with only 1.5 million voters registered,
Afghan officials postponed the voting to at least September 2004. In late May 2004, a
firm date for the presidential elections was set for October 9, 2004. The more complex
parliamentary elections were postponed until April-May 2005, with the provincial and
district council elections to be held the same day. Despite the parliamentary elections
postponement, political parties have been registering with the Ministry of Justice; about
70 parties were registered as of September 30, 2004, the latest available figures.

At the close of the registration process in early September 2004, UNAMA reported
that 10.5 million voters had registered,5 a number equal to the original assessments of the
number of eligible voters. About 42% of those registered were women. The large
registration total raised concerns, fueled by anecdotal reports, that some Afghans had
registered more than once. Afghan and U.N. officials said that voter fingers would be
marked with indelible ink on election day to prevent multiple voting.6 By May 2004, and
in the face of continuing Taliban attacks on election workers, UNAMA was operating
more than 1,600 registration centers; registration rates increased to more than 120,000
voters per day from about 40,000 per day in early May.
On May 25, 2004, Karzai signed the major election law that governed the elections.7
Among other provisions, the election law provides for the parliamentary elections to be
district-based (voting for specific candidates) rather than proportional representation
(voting for party slates), the system used in the January 2005 Iraqi elections. The law also
5 The International Organization of Migration, on behalf of the JEMB, conducted registration of
Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan, who were eligible to vote.
6 Harrington, Carol and Jared Ferrie. “Afghan Vote Threatens Bush’s Credibility.” Toronto Star,
August 17, 2004.
7 New Afghan Election Law Endorsed. Kabul Radio in Foreign Broadcast Information Service,
May 27, 2004.

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established an Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) to run the elections, and required
sitting government officials who were candidates, except the president, to resign from
their official positions 75 days before the elections. Presidential candidates needed to
demonstrate support of at least 10,000 eligible voters to be allowed to run.
Presidential Candidate Field and the Vote
Karzai engaged in substantial political bargaining, hoping to reduce the number and
strength of his opponents. According to a variety of press reports, Defense
Minister/Northern Alliance military leader Mohammad Fahim, former President
Burhannuddin Rabbani (the political leader of the Northern Alliance), and other Northern
Alliance figures sought to trade support for Karzai for a role in a coalition cabinet after
the elections.8 However, as the July 26, 2004 deadline for filing candidacies approached,
a potential deal evaporated. The de-facto leader of the Uzbek areas of Afghanistan, Abdul
Rashid Dostam, who has been part of the Northern Alliance, filed his candidacy. Karzai
then dropped Fahim as his vice presidential running mate when Fahim balked at the
requirement that he first resign as Defense Minister. The Northern Alliance subsequently
fielded a candidate, Education Minister Yunis Qanooni. Karzai selected as his principal
running mate Ahmad Zia Masud, a brother of slain Northern Alliance legendary
commander Ahmad Shah Masud, hoping to attract Tajik support. He chose as his second
running mate a leader of the Hazara community (Hazaras are Shiite Muslims), Karim
Khalili, a vice president. Aside from Karzai, Qanooni, and Dostam, 15 other candidates
were certified by the JEMB to run, but Qanooni, who campaigned actively, remained the
most serious challenger. Other candidates who campaigned actively were Hazara leader
Mohammad Mohaqiq and Dr. Masooda Jalal, the only woman who ran. During the
campaign period, there were consistent concerns of potential factional unrest, but there
was no violence. There were a few assassination attempts against some candidates,
including Karzai and a running mate.
The Vote and Results. The October 9, 2004, vote was conducted under tight
security and observed by about 400 international monitors from the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and other groups. There were only a few
minor insurgent attacks during the voting — far less violence than was expected. Turnout
was heavy (about 8 million votes cast, roughly 80% of those registered) and the voting
was orderly. Fears of widespread intimidation of voters by factional militiamen were not
realized, although there were some reports of such activity on election day. The major
threat to the election was an announcement on election day by 15 challenging candidates
that they would boycott the results due to widespread fraud, primarily an alleged failure
of indelible ink to prevent multiple voting. After a day of discussions and refutations by
some of the international observers, most of the challengers — including Qanooni —
agreed to allow an independent commission to investigate the alleged irregularities.
After the independent investigators determined that the election irregularities did not
materially affect the outcome, Karzai was officially declared the winner on November 3,
2004. With all the votes counted, he received about 4.4 million votes, or 55.4% of the
total, more than the 50% needed to avoid a runoff. Qanooni finished second with 1.3
8 Constable, Pamela. “Karzai’s Talks Raise Some Fears About Afghan Vote.” Washington Post,
May 30, 2004.

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million votes, or 16.3%; Mohaqiq received 935,000 votes, or 11.7%; and Dostam received
about 800,000 votes, about 10% of the vote. With the exception of Karzai, who received
significant numbers of Tajik votes, most candidates received few votes outside their
ethnic bases. The female candidate, Masooda Jalal, finished sixth with 91,000 votes or
1.1%. Karzai was sworn into a five-year term on December 7, 2004.
New Cabinet. On December 23, 2004, after the outcome of an internal debate that
determined that ministers must have higher education and relinquish any dual
citizenships, Karzai announced a post-election cabinet. Broadly, the cabinet retained the
factional balance (among Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, and others) that previously
existed, but Pashtuns now hold the security ministries (Defense and Interior) in a cabinet
that generally emphasizes technocratic qualifications (nine have Ph.D’s) over factional
allegiances. The most prominent Northern Alliance minister, Fahim, has been replaced
as Defense Minister by his Pashtun deputy, Abdul Rahim Wardak, and Qanooni was not
given a cabinet seat. Qanooni has since announced the formation of “New Afghanistan”
opposition party that will compete in the parliamentary elections. One prominent
Northern Alliance leader, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, was retained as Foreign Minister, and
eight other Tajiks are in the 27-seat cabinet. Interior Minister Ali Jalali, a Pashtun, was
retained. The prominent Finance Minister, Ashraf Ghani, a Pashtun unpopular with the
Northern Alliance, was dropped in favor of another Pashtun, Karzai ally and reformist
Central Bank governor Anwar ul-Haq Ahady. Female election opponent Masooda Jalal
was made Minister of Women’s Affairs, and another woman, Seqida Balkhi, was made
Minister for Martyrs and the Disabled.
Karzai appeared to try, with mixed success, to marginalize regional strongmen. He
removed Pashtun regional leader Ghul Agha Sherzai as Minister of Public Works and of
Urban Development, but then returned him to his prior post as governor of Qandahar.
The Tajik regional strongman Ismail Khan was appointed Minister of Water and Energy;
he had been removed by Karzai as governor of Herat Province in September 2004. To
emphasize his stated commitment to end the narcotics trafficking problem, Karzai created
a new Ministry of Counter-Narcotics, headed by Habibullah Qadari.
Election Security and Funding
To secure the voting process, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the
37-nation NATO-led coalition that now performs peacekeeping in Kabul and Konduz,
was reinforced for the election period. An additional 2,500 troops arrived in Afghanistan
from Spain and Italy to augment the 6,500 personnel already in ISAF, and a few countries
sent additional combat aircraft to Afghanistan as well. In addition, the U.S.-trained
Afghan National Army (ANA), which had 15,000 at election time and now has over
20,000 troops, performed election security missions, supported by the Afghan national
police force (about 48,000 nationwide). Approximately 18,000 U.S. forces performing
anti-insurgency missions under Operation Enduring Freedom also participated in some
election security missions; an extra several hundred U.S. troops were deployed to
Afghanistan in September for this duty. Similar security enhancements are planned for
the parliamentary elections.
To address the potential for election interference by factional militias, the U.N.-run
program to disarm and reintegrate (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, DDR)
local militias was accelerated. Of the 60,000 total to be demobilized, about 25,000 had

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been disarmed by the time of the presidential election; that number has now grown to
about 40,000. International donors, including the United States, provided more than $90
million in aid for the elections. The FY2004 supplemental appropriation (H.Rept. 108-
337, P.L. 108-106) provided $69 million for “elections and governance.”
The Parliamentary, Provincial, and District Elections
No date has been set for the parliamentary, provincial, and district elections. The key
difficulty appears to be the setting of district boundaries, which is a sensitive issue
because the drawing of boundaries is likely to determine the outcome of each district’s
vote. According to the May 2004 election law, boundaries must be set 120 days before
the election, and boundaries have still not been determined. U.N. observers say that the
elections are not likely until at least September 2005.9 Some experts fear that the
potential for local militia leaders and narcotics traffickers is great in the upcoming
parliamentary elections because of the small size of the election districts in those
elections, and some outside experts reportedly are urging that the parliamentary election
system be changed to proportional representation, in which all voters have the same exact
ballots and there is less potential for local manipulation. However, that system might
empower political parties, and many Afghans are averse to strong parties because of the
mujahedin parties’ association with foreign governments during the anti-Soviet war.
Another major problem is funding. It is estimated the parliamentary and local
elections will cost about $130 million, much of which will likely be required of
international donors. The February 2005 Administration request for supplemental
funding includes $60 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) to assist the
parliamentary and local elections and candidate and voter education. Out of the FY2005
regular foreign aid appropriation (P.L. 108-447), the Administration allocated $7 million
for these Afghan elections.
Possible Implications for U.S. Policy
The presidential elections were considered a major milestone for U.S. efforts to
stabilize Afghanistan, a key goal mentioned in the report of the 9/11 Commission.
Legislation that enacted the Commission recommendations (P.L. 108-458) recommended
steps to accelerate Afghanistan’s political and economic reconstruction. The apparent
success of the elections — both the relatively peaceful vote and the perception that
Afghans eagerly demonstrated their democratic rights — appear to have given the Afghan
government the additional strength it needs to disarm local militias and combat the
burgeoning narcotics trafficking problem. Karzai’s removal from his government of some
powerful figures, such as Fahim, appear to demonstrate that he is gaining confidence and
authority. The Taliban insurgency appears to be further losing momentum; there have
been several recent reports that some in the Taliban movement now favor joining the
political process. These trends are likely to be reinforced if and when parliamentary and
local elections are held and proceed well.
9 CRS conversation with U.N. election assistance head Carina Perelli. March 2005.

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