Order Code 98-594
Updated March 9, 2005
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Tajikistan: Recent Developments
and U.S. Interests
Jim Nichol
Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
This report outlines the transformational challenges faced by Tajikistan since its
five-year civil war ended in 1997. It discusses U.S. policy and assistance. Basic facts
and biographical information are provided. This report may be updated. Related
products include CRS Issue Brief IB93108, Central Asia, updated regularly.
U.S. Policy1
According to the Administration, “a stable, peaceful Tajikistan, secure within its own
borders, will help prevent the spread of radical groups and terrorists, and increase the
potential for development in the region.” U.S. assistance aims to enhance Tajikistan’s
territorial integrity and security; prevent the flow of narcotics, illicit weapons, and persons
of concern; foster democratic and economic reforms; and address dire humanitarian
needs. U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds requested for
FY2006 will help Tajikistan “support U.S. security interests and objectives.” Such aid
will enable Tajikistan to secure its territory “against narco-traffickers and terrorist
infiltrators, and will be provided in direct support of U.S. interests and force protection
for U.S. forces operating in Uzbekistan and Afghanistan” (State Department,
Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, FY2006).
State Department officials served as observers at the U.N.-sponsored intra-Tajikistan
peace talks and pledged rebuilding aid, an example of U.S. diplomatic efforts to head off
or ease ethnic and civil tensions in the Eurasian states. The United States also supported
the presence of U.N. military observers in Tajikistan during the 1992-1997 civil war.
The United States has been the major humanitarian and developmental aid donor to
facilitate implementation of the Tajik peace accord and for resettlement of displaced
1 Sources include Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: Central Eurasia;
RFE/RL Newsline; Eurasia Insight; Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU); the State Department’s
Washington File; and Reuters and Associated Press (AP) newswires.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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persons. Over the period FY1992-FY2004, the United States was the largest bilateral
donor, budgeting $612.6 million of aid for Tajikistan (FREEDOM Support Act and
agency budgets), mainly for food and other
humanitarian needs (by comparison,
European Union members provided about
$470 million in grants and loans). The
United States also facilitated the delivery of
privately donated commodities. Estimated
spending in FY2005 was $43.6 million
(FREEDOM Support Act and other foreign
aid, excluding Defense and Energy
Department funds), and the Administration
has requested $37.1 million for FY2006
(FREEDOM Support Act and other foreign
aid). Much of the aid requested for FY2006
is planned for food ($10.4 million), teacher training and other educational support, and
healthcare needs, including to combat infectious diseases and to create a primary
healthcare system. The Administration also plans to focus on strengthening law
enforcement, including aid for the government’s Drug Control Agency, training and
equipment for border guards for counter-drug and counter-terrorism efforts, and advice
on combating terrorist financing and money laundering. Associated aid increases are
planned for Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) programs to assist Tajik
border forces as they replace Russian border troops, in order to improve their ability to
interdict the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction and related technologies. A new,
more secure, U.S. Embassy building is being built.
Contributions to the Campaign Against Terrorism
The Administration has stated that Tajikistan has supported the Global War on
Terrorism (GWOT), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and Operation Iraqi Freedom
(OIF) “unreservedly from the beginning” by granting overflight and basing rights
(Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations). Tajikistan, host to the second
largest Russian military presence abroad (the first is the Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine),
seemed after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States to be willing
to cooperate with the United States, but hesitant to do so without permission from
Moscow. However, since Tajikistan had long supported the Afghan Northern Alliance’s
combat against the Taliban, it was predisposed to welcome U.S.-led backing for the
Northern Alliance. On September 25, 2001, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov
stated that the United States could use bases in Tajikistan to attack targets in Afghanistan
“if the need arises,” and that same day, the Tajik Defense Ministry offered use of Tajik
airspace to U.S. forces. Some coalition forces began to transit through Tajik airspace and
airfields. U.S., French, and British personnel have used the Dushanbe airport to a limited
degree for refueling (the French maintain a presence of 100-200 personnel), but the poor
condition of facilities has precluded wide-scale use by the coalition.
On March 13, 2003, President Rakhmanov reportedly refused Russia’s request to
denounce coalition actions in Iraq. Tajik analyst Suhrob Sharipov argued that Tajikistan
had taken a neutral stance because it had benefitted from U.S. aid to rebuild the country
and from U.S.-led actions against terrorism in Afghanistan that improved its security.
This stance may have changed somewhat during 2004, after Rakhmanov and Russian

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President Vladimir Putin signed several
Basic Facts
cooperation accords. Tajik state-owned
Area and Population: Land area is 55,800 sq. mi.,
radio in late 2004 denounced an Iraqi
slightly smaller than Wisconsin. Population is 7.0
“puppet government” installed to
million (CIA World Factbook, 2004 est.). The
facilitate U.S. control over oil resources,
Gorno Badakhshan Autonomous Region has called
warned that living conditions in Iraq
for greater autonomy, which is opposed by the Tajik
government.
were worsening, and argued that the
Ethnicity: 64.9% of the population is Tajik, 25%
“occupation” was fomenting anti-
Uzbek, and less than 3.5% Russian (CIA World
Americanism and extremism all over the
Factbook). Clan and regional identities include the
Islamic world.
Khojenti, Kulyabi, Garmi, and Pamiri groups. More
than a million Tajiks reside in Uzbekistan and 7
million in Afghanistan.
Foreign Policy and Defense
Gross Domestic Product: $2.1 billion; per capita
GDP is about $300 (Tajik State Statistics
The top priorities of Tajik foreign
Committee, 2004, current prices).
Political Leaders: President: Emomali
policy, Rakhmanov stated in April 2004,
Rakhmanov; Prime Minister: Oqil Oqilov; Speaker
are ensuring beneficial trade and
of the National Assembly (upper legislative
investment to support economic growth,
chamber): Mohammad Sayed Ubaydulloyev;
protecting territorial integrity, boosting
Speaker of the Assembly of Representatives (lower
security, and furthering Tajikistan’s
legislative chamber): Saydullo Khayrulloyev;
Foreign Minister: Talbak Nazarov; Defense
prestige in the world. Tajikistan follows
Minister: Col. Gen. Sherali Khayrulloyev.
an “open door” policy of pursuing
Biography: Rakhmanov was born in 1952 and
amicable relations with all countries, he
trained as an economist. In 1988, he became a state
stated. He hailed increased ties with
farm director in Kulyab region. He quickly rose to
European countries and the European
power, boosted by his links to the paramilitary
leader and ex-convict Sangak Safarov. He became
Union, the United States, Japan, China,
chair of the Kulyab regional government in late
Iran, India, Turkey and Pakistan. He
1992, and weeks later was elected chair of the
proclaimed that Russia was “one of our
Supreme Soviet and proclaimed head of state. In
closest strategic partners.” Relations
1994 and 1999, he won presidential races deemed
unfair by the Organization for Security and
with other Central Asian states face
Cooperation in Europe and others.
challenges. In 2000, Uzbekistan
responded to incursions by terrorists
traversing Tajikistan from Afghanistan
by tightening its borders with Tajikistan, including by introducing a visa regime and
mining border areas, constraining regional travel and trade and leading to Tajik civilian
casualties. Following the actions of the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan that disrupted
the actions of the terrorist Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), Uzbekistan eased
some cross-border trade and travel restrictions on Tajikistan, but tightened them again in
2003 to combat unapproved small-scale trade. In his 2004 speech, Rakhmanov stressed
that Tajikistan’s security depended on the world’s success in stabilizing Afghanistan.
Tajikistan presses for political and human rights for the approximately seven million
Tajiks residing in Afghanistan (25% of the population).
According to The Military Balance 2004-2005, the Tajik armed forces consist of
7,600 ground and air troops. The armed forces are underfunded and riven by regional
clan loyalties that compromise their effectiveness. In 1999-2000, some 2,000 UTO
fighters were incorporated into the Tajik armed forces. Many Tajik officers and
technicians receive training at Russian military schools, and the Tajik military is reliant
on a Russian officer corps. There are about 5,300 Tajik Interior Ministry border guards.
The Russian Border Troops (reportedly less than 12,000) in Tajikistan have consisted
predominantly of ethnic Tajik conscripts under Russian commanders. In addition,

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Russia’s 201st Motorized Rifle Division has consisted of about 7,800 Russian contract and
Tajik troops. Efforts to finalize a post-Soviet basing agreement with Tajikistan dragged
on for years, as Tajikistan endeavored to maximize rents and assert its sovereignty. After
the expiration of a Tajik-Russia border control cooperation agreement, Tajikistan in 2004
demanded full control over its borders. In a volte face during a June 2004 visit to
Moscow, however, Rakhmanov announced that Russia would have additional time to
finish handing over border control (the handover is planned for completion in 2005).
Reasons for the volte face probably include Tajikistan’s dependence on receipts from
Tajik guest workers in Russia and Rakhmanov’s desire for Russia’s political support
during upcoming elections. Finally, in October 2004 the Tajik-Russian basing agreement
was signed, which provides for troops to be based at myriad facilities throughout the
country. Reportedly, Russia is forgiving about $240 million in Tajik debt in exchange for
assets, and Tajikistan is charging less than $1 in annual rent for basing.
Tajikistan is a signatory of the Collective Security Treaty (CST) of the CIS (led by
Russia). CST members in 2001 approved the creation of a regional Anti-Terrorist Center
(composed of intelligence agencies) and regional rapid-deployment military forces that
include a Tajik battalion, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001 also
approved the creation of an anti-terrorist center. Tajikistan decided to join NATO’s
Partnership for Peace before 9/11, and signed accords on admission in February 2002.
At the signing, a NATO press release hailed Tajikistan’s support to the coalition as “of
key importance” to combating international terrorism.
The Tajik Civil War. Tajikistan was among the Central Asian republics least
prepared and inclined toward independence when the Soviet Union broke up. In
September 1992, a loose coalition of nationalist, Islamic, and democratic parties and
groups tried to take over. Kulyabi and Khojenti regional elites, assisted by Uzbekistan
and Russia, launched a successful counteroffensive that by the end of 1992 had resulted
in 20,000-40,000 casualties and up to 800,000 refugees or displaced persons. In 1993, the
CIS authorized “peacekeeping” in Tajikistan, consisting of Russian and token Kazakh,
Kyrgyz, and Uzbek troops. After the two sides agreed to a cease-fire, the U.N. Security
Council established a small U.N. Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) in
December 1994. In June 1997, Tajik President Emomali Rakhmanov and rebel leader
Sayed Abdullo Nuri signed a comprehensive peace agreement. Benchmarks of the peace
process were largely met, and UNMOT pulled out in May 2000, replaced by a small U.N.
aid contingent, but Russian troops have remained. Stability in Tajikistan is fragile.
Observers remain concerned about secessionist tendencies in the northern Soghd
(formerly Leninabad) region and tensions between ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks within
Tajikistan. Some opposition leaders have alleged that former rebel leaders are being
arrested in contravention of the peace accords.
Political and Economic Developments
Since the signing of the peace accords in 1997, Rakhmanov has steadily increased
his authoritarian rule and marginalized the opposition. His ambit remains limited,
however, by several local warlords. As set forth by the 1994 constitution, the Oliy Majlis
(legislature) enacts laws, interprets the constitution, determines basic directions of
domestic and foreign policy, sets dates for referenda and elections, and approves key
ministerial and other appointments. The legislature also approves the state budget,
determines tax policy, ratifies treaties, and approves a state of war or emergency as

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decreed by the president. The constitution calls for creation of a presidium to “organize
work,” to be elected by the legislators and to be headed by the speaker. Laws are required
to be passed by a two-thirds majority of the total number of deputies, and a presidential
veto may be overridden by the same margin. The main Tajik opposition groups boycotted
the 1994 presidential election and constitutional referendum because they had no say in
drawing up the draft constitution and would not be allowed to field their own candidates.
The Tajik legislature in mid-1999 rubber-stamped constitutional changes proposed
by Rakhmanov calling for a seven year presidential term, a two-house Supreme Assembly
(legislature), and the legalization of religious parties. A popular referendum approved the
changes, and a presidential election was set for November 1999. Tajik opposition
candidates alleged that government harassment prevented them from registering, so that
Rakhmanov emerged as the only approved candidate. This prompted opposition calls for
an electoral boycott. Rakhmanov won with 96.9% of 2.85 million votes. The OSCE
refused to monitor the election. Seeking to avert renewed war, Nuri agreed to respect the
outcome of the election in return for pledges by Rakhmanov to allow fair legislative
elections scheduled for 2000.
A legislative electoral law was approved with input from the UTO in late 1999
calling for an upper legislative chamber, the National Assembly (representing regional
interests), to consist of 33 members, and a lower chamber, the Assembly of
Representatives, to consist of 63 members (22 elected by party list and 41 in single
member districts). In the National Assembly, 25 members are selected by indirect voting
by local council assemblies and eight members are appointed by Rakhmanov. U.N. and
OSCE observers who monitored elections to the Assembly of Representatives in February
2000 concluded that voters were presented with a range of candidates of alternative
parties, but they raised questions about freedom of the media, the independence of
electoral commissions, turnout figures, and the transparency of vote tabulation.
Another referendum on changes to the constitution was held in June 2003.
Opposition criticism included the possibility that one of the changes — that a president
is limited to two seven-year terms — would permit Rakhmanov to claim two more terms
in office under the “new” amendment. Perhaps indicating that he plans to take advantage
of this amendment to run for re-election in 2006, Rakhmanov stated in March 2005 that
he was “still young and energetic” and did not plan to leave the political arena.
The four opposition parties are the IRP, Democratic Party (DP), Social Democratic
Party (SDP), and Communist Party (CP). The CP sometimes has allied itself with the
ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP). In August 2004, government officials led a so-
called split within another opposition party, the Socialists, and this group was quickly
certified by the government as the “legitimate” leadership of the party. Amendments to
the electoral law approved in June 2004 might have heralded free and fair elections,
although concerns remained about the law’s failure to guarantee the impartiality of
electoral commissions and its requirements that prospective candidates possess higher
educations and pay a relatively large registration fee. OSCE monitors reported that the
law was implemented in an “inadequate or arbitrary” fashion during the February 27,
2005, elections to the Assembly of Representatives. About 160 candidates (mostly PDP
members) ran for the district seats. The OSCE reported “large-scale irregularities,”
including the presence of government officials on many electoral commissions, close
government control of campaigning, ballot box stuffing, doubtful ballot counting, and the

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questionable disqualification of two prominent opposition figures from running. The
arrest of Democratic Party head Mahmadruzi Iskandarov, resulting in his disqualification
as a candidate, and actions against the Socialist Party “effectively neutralized” these
parties in the run-up to the election, according to the OSCE. Also, several campaign
officials from opposition parties were detained just before the election, forcing several
independent candidates to drop out. In the party list voting, three seats were won by the
CP, two seats by the IRP, and the rest by the PDP. In district voting, most seats were won
by PDP members. The opposition parties termed the election fraudulent, with an IRP
official terming it “the worst ... in Tajikistan’s history.” The head of the Tajik Central
Electoral Commission dismissed outright many of the complaints of alleged violations.
According to the State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices
for 2004, the government’s human rights record remained poor during 2004, and the
country made little progress in its transition from a Soviet-style system. Security forces
tortured, beat, and abused detainees with impunity and were also responsible for threats,
extortion, and abuse of civilians. Authorities made politically motivated arrests. Several
international democracy NGOs faced registration problems and increased scrutiny, which
made it difficult for them to operate. The government reversed moves to relax pressure
on the media. According to some international observers, the reversal was part of the
government’s effort to gain greater control over media in advance of legislative elections.
Journalists on occasion were subjected to government harassment, and some opposition
or independent newspapers were prevented from appearing through government pressure
on or control of printing facilities. However, the number of independent and local
newspapers continued to increase, several of which were affiliated with political parties.
International media generally operated freely. Trafficking in women and children was a
serious problem, which the government took significant steps to address.
In late 1997, Tajikistan’s economic decline reversed as the peace accord took hold.
GDP grew about 10.6% and inflation was 5.7% in 2004, according to Tajikistan’s State
Statistics Committee. Tajikistan has depended heavily on foreign loans and aid to cover
its budget and trade deficits and external debt servicing. Repatriated funds from migrant
workers in Russia and elsewhere may account for up to 20% of GDP. By 2000, most
small enterprises had been privatized, but land and major enterprises remain state-owned.
Tajikistan’s major industrial export is aluminum from its smelter in Tursunzade, one of
the world’s largest. Cotton and hydro-electricity are other major exports, and silk
production and sheep herding are significant sources of livelihood. The agricultural sector
employs nearly three-quarters of the labor force. There is close state control over land use
for cotton-growing, farmers and pickers are underpaid for their work, and school children
are a major source of forced labor, according to the non-governmental International Crisis
Group. Economic reforms face the challenges of the lowest educational level and the
highest infant mortality and poverty rates of the former Soviet republics. According to
the State Department, over one-half of the population lives in poverty. Tajikistan is a
major transit state for heroin produced in Afghanistan and the drug trade has deeply
corrupted the elite. Despite these challenges, Tajikistan has considerable development
potential, according to the World Bank. Foreign direct investment (FDI) reached $160
million in 2004 but is still inadequate to finance an increasing trade deficit, to foster
private sector development, and to reduce poverty. FDI remains constrained by a poor
legal climate, trade tariffs, and corruption.

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