Order Code RL30349
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
GAO: Government Accountability Office and
General Accounting Office
Updated February 28, 2005
Frederick M. Kaiser
Specialist in American National Government
Government and Finance Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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GAO: Government Accountability Office and
General Accounting Office
Summary
On July 7, 2004, an old congressional support agency was given a new name —
while keeping same initials (GAO) — when the General Accounting Office,
established in 1921, was re-designated the Government Accountability Office (P.L.
108-271). The renaming, which came at the request of its head, the Comptroller
General (CG), is designed to reflect the agency’s evolution and additional duties
since its creation more than eight decades before. Importantly, the act also expands
the CG’s authority over pay and personnel matters.
The Government Accountability Office is the largest of three agencies that
provide staff support, research, review, and analysis for Congress. GAO operates
under the control and direction of the Comptroller General of the United States, who
is appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a 15-year
nonrenewable term. A unique arrangement begins the process with a special
bicameral commission of legislators from both parties making recommendations to
the President.
GAO was established in 1921 as an independent auditor of government agencies
and activities by the Budget and Accounting Act. The office was intended to be
“independent of the executive departments,” the entities it would audit and review.
Sometimes called “Congress’s watchdog” and its “investigative arm,” GAO now
provides a variety of services to Congress that extend beyond its original functions
and duties. Current activities include oversight, investigation, review, and evaluation
of executive programs, operations, and activities.
Throughout much of its history, the office has experienced growth in its powers,
duties, and resources. In the mid-1990s, however, it was the subject of congressional
hearings, studies, and proposals for change, connected with its mission, roles, and
capabilities; these reviews were generated in part by criticisms of its perceived
orientation. As a result, GAO’s budget and authorities were reduced. Certain of the
“executive powers” of the Comptroller General were abolished or transferred (to
executive branch agencies) in 1996. In addition, GAO’s budget was cut by 25% over
a two-year period (FY1996 and FY1997), resulting in a 39% reduction in its staff
over a seven-year period. In comparison to these reductions, however, the office’s
budget has since risen, from $358 million in FY1998 to $475 million in FY2005. Its
staff size, however, has remained lower than in earlier periods. The high watermark
of 4,324 FTEs in FY1995 is more than 1,000 positions or about 25% larger than the
current level of 3,215.

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Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Establishment and Evolution of GAO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1921 Establishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Expansion and Extension of Authority and Jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Additional Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Legislative Reorganization Act Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Other Duties Assigned to the Comptroller General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Recent Changes in Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
GAO Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Budget Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Personnel Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Personnel System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Antecedent Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Additional Authority in 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appointment and Removal of the Comptroller General and Deputy . . . . . . . . . 11
Appointment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Current Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Recent Nominations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Removal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Concluding Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
List of Tables
Table 1. GAO Resources, FY1995-FY2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Table 2. Comptrollers General, 1921-Present . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

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GAO: Government Accountability Office and
General Accounting Office
Introduction
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) is the largest of three agencies
that provide staff support, research, review, and analysis for Congress; and it is the
only one with a nationwide field structure.1 GAO, which had been titled the General
Accounting Office until 2004, operates under the control and direction of the
Comptroller General of the United States (CG). The head is appointed by the
President — after receiving recommendations from a special bicameral congressional
commission — by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, for a 15-year
nonrenewable term. The position, which had been vacant for two years, was filled
in late 1998, when David M. Walker was sworn in and became only the seventh
Comptroller General in GAO’s history, which began more than eight decades ago.
GAO was established as an independent auditor of government agencies and
activities by the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 (42 Stat. 23). That enactment
also created the Bureau of the Budget, the forerunner to the Office of Management
and Budget, and established presidential authority over the budget formulation
process. The basic authority for the office and its head is codified at 31 U.S.C. 701
et seq. and 3511 et seq. Numerous other statutory provisions affect the powers and
duties of both GAO and the CG.
The office was designed to be “independent of the executive departments,”
which were placed under its audit and review powers (31 U.S.C. 702(a)). Sometimes
characterized as “Congress’s watchdog” and the “investigative arm of Congress,” the
GAO provides a variety of services to Congress, largely connected to the oversight,
investigation, review, and evaluation of executive operations, activities, and
programs.
The evolution of the office’s authority, functions, and mandates over time, along
with new pay and personnel powers for the Comptroller General, prompted him to
request a change in its name: from the General Accounting Office to the Government
Accountability Office (P.L. 108-271). GAO’s current activities and services include:2
1 The other two are the Congressional Budget Office and the Congressional Research
Service. A former support agency, the Office of Technology Assessment, was abolished in
1995, and the Government Printing Office serves different types of functions.
2 Illustrations of products and services extend from identifying “high risk” areas in the
executive to conducting specialized investigations of criminal matters and from auditing a
narrow project to reviewing a broad program. A summary of GAO’s current activities and
(continued...)

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CRS-2
! auditing and evaluating federal programs and operations;
! conducting special investigations (through a small office) of alleged
violations of federal criminal law, particularly conflict of interest or
procurement and contract fraud;
! providing various legal services to Congress, including advice on
legal issues involving government programs and activities;
! resolving bid protests that challenge government contract awards;
! prescribing accounting principles and standards for the executive
branch, advising federal agencies on fiscal and other policies and
procedures, and setting standards for auditing government programs;
! assisting the professional audit/evaluation community in improving
and keeping abreast of ongoing developments in such matters as
audit methodology and approaches; and
! detailing GAO staff to work directly for congressional committees
(in these temporary transfers, the assigned staffs represent the
committees and not GAO itself).3
Over the past decade, GAO has been the subject of congressional hearings,
studies, and proposals for change connected with its mission, roles, capabilities, and
personnel system. After a lengthy period of growth — in its powers, duties, and
resources — the office experienced reductions in these areas in the mid-1990s. In
1996, for instance, certain of the “executive powers” of the Comptroller General
were abolished or transferred to executive branch agencies. In addition, GAO’s
budget was cut by 25% over a two-year period (FY1996 and FY1997), representing
the largest reduction in a seven-year downsizing (1992-1999). Since then, however,
its budget authority has increased, from a low of $358 million in FY1998 to a high
of $475 million in FY2005. In the past decade, however, full-time-equivalent
2 (...continued)
services is in CRS Report RL30240, Congressional Oversight Manual, pp. 96-97. For
elaboration, see U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Oversight of
GAO: What Lies Ahead for Congress’ Watchdog?, hearing, 108th Cong., 1st sess.
(Washington: GPO, 2003); David M. Walker, Comptroller General: “GAO: Serving the
Congress in the 21st Century,” NAPA Fall Meeting 1999, Washington, D.C., Nov. 18, 1999;
U.S. General Accounting Office, Fiscal Year 2005 Budget Request: U.S. General
Accounting Office, GAO-04-474T (Washington: GAO, 2004); GAO: Transformation,
Challenges, and Opportunities, GAO-03-116T (Washington: GAO, 2003); and GAO’s
Strategic Plan for Serving the Congress, 2004-2009 (Washington: GAO, 2003); and U.S.
General Accounting Office: The Role of GAO in Assisting Congressional Oversight,
statement by J. Christopher Mihm, GAO-02-816T.
3 The office’s criteria, standards, and procedures for responding to congressional requests
are contained in U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO’s Congressional Protocols, GAO-
04-310G (Washington: GAO, 2004). Its work with federal agencies is governed by GAO’s
Agency Protocols, GAO-03-232SP (Washington: GAO, 2002).

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CRS-3
employees are fewer than in previous years, with 3,215 currently compared to 4,324
in FY1995, the highest level. In fact, in the midst of the cutbacks in the 1990s, GAO
experienced an overall reduction of 39%.
Establishment and Evolution of GAO
1921 Establishment
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, which created the General Accounting
Office, built upon efforts over a considerable period of time to develop a new budget
process and involved trade-offs between the legislature and executive.4 The
legislation gave the President substantial responsibilities and authority over the
federal budget formulation process. To assist in this endeavor, the statute also
created the Bureau of the Budget in the Treasury Department. (The bureau was later
moved to the Executive Office of the President and is now known as the Office of
Management and Budget.) As a counterweight to these enhancements of executive
power in the budget process, Congress established the General Accounting Office in
the legislative branch, in large part through the transfer of comptroller and auditor
duties from the Treasury Department.
Congressional work on what was to become the 1921 act began two years earlier
with legislative proposals to transfer the duties and responsibilities of the
comptrollers and auditors from the Treasury Department to an entity independent of
the executive departments and, indeed, located in the legislative branch. This initial
legislation was vetoed by President Woodrow Wilson, who objected to a section
4 For background on the establishment and evolution of GAO and the Comptroller General,
see, among others: Darrell Hevenor Smith, The General Accounting Office: Its History,
Activities, and Organization (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1927); Harvey C.
Mansfield, The Comptroller General (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1939);
Thomas D. Morgan, “The General Accounting Office: One Hope for Congress to Regain
Parity of Power with the President,” North Carolina Law Review, vol. 51, Oct. 1973, pp.
1279-1368; Frederick C. Mosher, The GAO: The Quest for Accountability in American
Government (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979); Frederick C. Mosher, A Tale of Two
Agencies: A Comparative Analysis of the General Accounting Office and the Office of
Management and Budget (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1984);
Joseph Pois, Watchdog on the Potomac: A Study of the Comptroller General of the United
States (Washington: University Press of America, 1979); Roger R. Trask, GAO History,
1921-1991, GAO Report OP-3-HP (Washington: GAO, 1991), along with a series of
historical studies produced by GAO; U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on the Organization
of Congress, Support Agencies, hearing, 103rd Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: GPO, 1993),
pp. 5-27, 287-375; Frederick M. Kaiser, “The Comptroller General: History and
Independence,” in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Government Operations,
Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting, and Management, GAO Legislation, hearing, 94th
Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: GPO, 1975); U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs, The Roles, Mission and Operation of the U.S. General Accounting
Office: A Report by the National Academy of Public Administration, Senate Print 103-87,
103rd Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington: GPO, 1994); and Wallace E. Walker, Changing
Organizational Culture: Strategy, Structure, and Professionalism in the U.S. General
Accounting Office (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1986).

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CRS-4
allowing for the removal of the new Comptroller General by Congress alone, through
a concurrent resolution.5 This provision was later changed to allow for the removal
of the Comptroller General by adoption of a joint resolution. The joint resolution,
which must be signed by the President, is subject to presidential veto and the
possibility of a veto override.
The 1921 act abolished the post of Comptroller and Assistant Comptroller of the
Treasury, along with the six auditors in the department. Their personnel, records, and
resources were transferred to the new General Accounting Office. The establishing
authority also vested GAO with the powers and responsibilities of the auditors and
Comptroller of the Treasury, some of which dated to the Treasury Act of 1789.
Along with this, the originating legislation gave the Comptroller General broad
authority to “investigate, at the seat of government or elsewhere, all matters relating
to the receipt, disbursement, and application of public funds” (42 Stat. 25). To
augment this, the Comptroller General was given extensive access to information in
“all departments and establishments ... regarding the powers, duties, activities,
organization, financial transactions, and methods of business of their respective
office as he may from time to time require” (42 Stat. 26).
Adding to the new position, the law authorized the Comptroller General to
recommend legislation “to facilitate the prompt and accurate rendition and settlement
of accounts and concerning such other matters relating to the receipt, disbursement,
and application of public funds as he may think advisable” (42 Stat. 25-26). The
initial authority, moreover, established new requirements for reporting to Congress
and directed the Comptroller General to make special investigations and reports
when ordered by either House of Congress or by any committee with jurisdiction
over revenue, appropriations, and expenditures.
Expansion and Extension of Authority and Jurisdiction
Since 1921, the scope of GAO’s powers, mandates, and jurisdiction has been
expanded by public laws. Its current functions and duties have grown out of its
existing powers over finances and expenditures of the federal government, the two
major legislative branch reorganizations (in 1946 and 1970), and additions to the
Comptroller General’s specific responsibilities.6
5 For President Wilson’s veto message and the House action, which sustained the veto by
a vote of 178 to 103, see Congressional Record, vol. 59, June 4, 1920, pp. 8609-8613.
6 Two exceptions to GAO’s otherwise extensive jurisdiction over the executive branch and
independent agencies are (1) the Central Intelligence Agency, which views its own statutory
authority as exempting it from GAO audits and reviews (e.g., the Central Intelligence
Agency Act of 1949, 63 Stat. 213, and the General Accounting Office Act of 1980, 94 Stat.
311); and (2) foreign operations and money market policies of the Federal Reserve (31
U.S.C 714(b)). In addition, the President may proscribe GAO access to certain foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence information and prevent its auditing of unvouchered
funds involved in such areas (31 U.S.C. 716(b) and 3524(c)). For further discussion, see
U.S. General Accounting Office, Central Intelligence Agency: Observations on GAO Access
(continued...)

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CRS-5
Additional Responsibilities. The Government Corporation Control Act of
1945, for instance, granted GAO audit authority over mixed-ownership government
corporations (59 Stat. 600-601). And the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of
1950 directed the Comptroller General to prescribe principles and standards for
accounting in executive agencies (64 Stat. 835). Building on this, the Federal
Manager’s Financial Integrity Act of 1982 required each agency to establish internal
accounting and administrative controls in accordance with standards prescribed by
the Comptroller General (96 Stat. 814). In addition, the Chief Financial Officers Act
of 1990 gave the Comptroller General enhanced audit authority and the power to
review financial audits conducted by an inspector general or an external auditor (104
Stat. 2852-2854).
Along these same lines, GAO has a prominent role in monitoring and reviewing
the development and implementation of the Government Performance and Results
Act of 1993 (GPRA) (107 Stat. 285).7 GAO has been involved not only in the
training of executive personnel and congressional staff who are to implement and
oversee GPRA, but also in the evaluation of pilot programs, strategic plans, annual
performance plans and goals, and followup reports from the agencies.
In the 106th Congress, GAO was authorized to review federal agency rules and
regulations, under the Truth in Regulating Act of 2000. But the program was not
implemented because of a lack of funding.8
In order to fulfill its mission, the office has been given broad powers to gain
access to information and materials of government entities, based on its original
authority as well as later supplements (31 U.S.C. 712 and 716).9 These are designed
to provide access — fully and directly in most cases — or, barring that, provide an
6 (...continued)
to Information on CIA Programs and Activities, statement of Henry J. Hinton, GAO-01-
975T (Washington: GAO, 2001); and Frederick M. Kaiser, “GAO Versus the CIA: Uphill
Battles Against an Overpowering Force,” International Journal of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence, vol. 15, Summer 2003, pp. 330-389.
7 For an overview of and further citations to GPRA and GAO’s involvement, see U.S.
General Accounting Office, Executive Guide: Effectively Implementing the Government
Performance and Results Act, GAO Report GGD-96-118 (Washington: GAO, 1996);
Managing for Results: Using GPRA to Assist Congressional and Executive Branch
Decisionmaking, T-GGD-97-43 (Washington: GAO, 1997); and Mihm, The Role of GAO
in Assisting Congressional Oversight.
8 P.L. 106-312 established a three-year pilot program, whereby the Comptroller General
would review any “economically significant rule” (e.g., a rule having an annual impact of
$100 million on the economy or other specified economic effects), at the request of a
chairman or ranking member of any committee of jurisdiction, and report his findings to
Congress. Background information and debate on these proposals are included in: U.S.
Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Congressional Accountability for
Regulatory Information Act of 1999; Report to Accompany S. 1198, S.Rept. 106-225
(Washington: GPO, 1999); and Congressional Record, vol. 146, pp. S3782-S3785 and
H6851-H6855.
9 See note 6 above for citations to the few specific limitations.

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CRS-6
auxiliary means to compel recalcitrant offices to release information. To enforce
this, the Comptroller General has power, rarely used, to sue a noncomplying agency
for the production of requested records (31 U.S.C. 716). Under this authority, the CG
makes a written request to the agency head, who has 20 days to explain why the
records are not being made available. At that time, the Comptroller General may file
a report with the President, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget,
the head of the relevant agency, and Congress. Twenty days after this action, the CG
may file suit in the district court for the District of Columbia to require the agency
head to produce the requested records. GAO’s access, however, may be precluded
by the President, if it involves certain records such as foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence activities, or instances where the records are statutorily exempted
from disclosure (31 U.S.C. 716(d)).10
Legislative Reorganization Act Changes. Major legislative
reorganization efforts have also augmented GAO’s powers and independence. The
Legislative Reorganization Act (LRA) of 1946 specifically directed the Comptroller
General “to make an expenditure analysis of each agency in the executive branch of
Government (including Government corporations), which, in the opinion of the
Comptroller General, will enable Congress to determine whether public funds have
been economically and efficiently administered and expended” (60 Stat. 837). In the
1970 LRA, Congress significantly expanded GAO’s assistance to congressional
committees and strengthened its program evaluation responsibilities (84 Stat. 1167-
1171).
Other Duties Assigned to the Comptroller General. In addition to the
office’s assignments and powers, the Comptroller General himself has been given a
variety of specific responsibilities in public law, some of which are temporary while
others are permanent. Over the years, these have included the power to bring suit to
require the release of impounded funds (2 U.S.C. 687); a duty to impose civil
penalties under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975 (42 U.S.C. 6385(a));
10 An attempt to use this authority in 2001 resulted in a conflict with the executive. In this
case, the Comptroller General was denied access to records of an executive commission —
the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG), established by a presidential
memorandum and headed by the Vice President. Still denied access after issuing a demand
letter, the Comptroller General sued. In 2002, however, the District Court for the District
of Columbia held that GAO lacked standing to sue the Vice President to compel the release
of information pertaining to NEPDG. The decision has not been appealed. Walker v.
Cheney, 230 F.Supp.2nd 51 (D.D.C., 2002). For further coverage, see Louis Fisher,
“Congressional Access to Information: Using Legislative Will and Leverage,” Duke Law
Journal, vol. 52, 2002; CRS Report RL31397, Walker v. Cheney: Statutory and
Constitutional Issues Arising from the General Accounting Office’s Suit Against the Vice
President, by T. J. Halstead; and T. J. Halstead, “Walker v. Cheney: Legal Insulation of the
Vice President from GAO Investigations,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 33, Sept.
2003. Statements from the principals are available at [http://www.house.gov/reform/
min/inves_energy/energy_cheney.htm]: Richard Cheney, U.S. Vice President, “Letter to the
House of Representatives,” Aug, 2, 2001; and U.S. General Accounting Office, “Statement
on the NEPDG,” 2001, “Letter to Vice President Cheney,” July 18, 2001, and “Report to the
House of Representatives,” Aug. 17, 2001. Additional information appears in David M.
Walker, “Decisions of the Comptroller General Regarding NEPDG Litigation,” Jan. 30,
2003, available at [http://www.gao.gov/cgdecnepdg.pdf].

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CRS-7
the assignments to serve as a member of the Chrysler Corporation Loan Guarantee
Board (15 U.S.C. 1862) and of the Board of Directors of the United States Railway
Association (45 U.S.C. 711(d)); and the authority to consider bid protests under the
Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (31 U.S.C. 3551-3556).
The Comptroller General, along with the Secretary of the Treasury and Director
of OMB, serves as a principal on the Federal Accounting Standards Advisory Board.
It considers and recommends issuance of accounting standards and principles and
provides interpretations of existing ones. In the past, the CG had co-chaired the Cost
Accounting Standards Review Panel, consisting of public officials and defense
industry representatives. The panel had examined operations and activities of the
Cost Accounting Standards Board (CASB), an executive agency in OMB (41 U.S.C.
422).
The Comptroller General also chaired the Commercial Activities Panel (CAP),
a now-defunct interagency group consisting of representatives from executive
departments (i.e., the Office of Personnel Management and Department of Defense),
as well as from private organizations and public sector unions. The congressionally
mandated panel, which completed its mission in 2002, studied and made
recommendations for improving the policies and procedures governing the transfer
of commercial activities from the government to contractor personnel.11
In 1985, a constitutional conflict arose over powers delegated to the Comptroller
General, when Congress gave him specific budget-reduction authority under the
Balanced Budget and Deficit Control Act.12 The CG was to review recommendations
about such reductions and report his findings to the President, who, in turn, was to
issue a sequestration order mandating spending reductions specified by the CG.
Additional legislative mechanisms (or “fallback” provisions) to cut spending were
also included in the statute. The Supreme Court held, however, that the delegation
of authority to the CG was unconstitutional, concluding that “the powers vested in
the Comptroller General under section 251 violate the command of the Constitution
that the Congress play no direct role in the execution of the laws.”13
Recent Changes in Authority
In contrast to GAO’s long-term expansion, the mid-1990s witnessed a cutback
in its authority and, perhaps more importantly, in its resources (which are discussed
below). The General Accounting Office Act of 1996 abolished or transferred — to
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget or the head of an executive
department or agency — certain specific powers of the Comptroller General (110
Stat. 3826). These related to his authority to make certain determinations about
executive agency assistance and services, resolve disputes over certain purchases
11 David M. Walker, Commercial Activities Panel: Improving Sourcing Decisions of the
Federal Government, GAO-02-866T, June 26, 2002; and U.S. Commercial Activities Panel,
Improving Sourcing Decisions of the Government: Final Report (Washington: CAP, 2002).
12 Sec. 251, P.L. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1038 (1985).
13 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, at 734 (1986).

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CRS-8
made by executive agencies, conduct identified audits of executive accounts, or
prescribe regulations for specified executive operations (110 Stat. 3838-3840). Since
then, however, GAO has experienced a regrowth in its budget and staff and the CG
has received new authority over its internal pay and personnel matters.
GAO Resources
The Government Accountability Office, like the other congressional support
agencies, operates under a permanent authorization and an annual appropriation. A
1994 bill based on the recommendations of the Joint Committee on the Organization
of Congress would have mandated an eight-year authorization period for all
congressional support agencies to replace their permanent authorizations.14 No
action, however, was taken on the proposal.
Table 1 provides statistics on total new budget authority (gross) and on full-time
equivalent employees (FTEs) for the GAO from FY1995 through FY2006 (request).
Table 1. GAO Resources, FY1995-FY2006
Fiscal Year
Total New Budget Authority
(in millions of dollars)
FTEs
2006 (request)
493
3,215
2005 (est.)
475
3,215
2004
468
3,224
2003
458
3,269
2002
436
3,210
2001
405
3,110
2000
380
3,275
1999
368
3,275
1998
358
3,245
1997
359
3,341
1996
379
3,677
1995
448
4,342
14 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1994, S. 1824, 103rd Congress. The House and Senate
Members of the Joint Committee issued separate reports, but both agreed to the specific
recommendation of ending the permanent authorization status for congressional support
agencies. U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on the Organization of the Congress,
Organization of the Congress: Final Report of the House Members, H.Rept. 103-413, vol.
I, 103rd Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: GPO, 1993), p. 20; and Organization of the
Congress: Final Report of the Senate Members, S.Rept. 103-215, 103rd Cong., 1st sess.
(Washington: GPO, 1993), p. 17.

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CRS-9
Budget Levels
GAO’s budget authority and personnel levels have fluctuated over the past
decade. In the mid-1990s, the office experienced a substantial cut in its funding, with
a combined 25% reduction in total new budget authority for fiscal years 1996 and
1997 by comparison to its FY1995 total. This continued a downward trend that had
begun in FY1992 and ebbed in1998. Since then, GAO’s budget level has risen:
from $358 million in FY1998 to $475 million (including direct appropriations and
offsetting collections) in FY2005. The FY2006 submission requests $493 million,
for an increase of $18 million or 3.8% over FY2005.
Personnel Levels
In the mid-1990s, GAO also saw a reduction in its personnel levels, as a result
of the budget cuts. Because employee compensation constitutes about 80% of
GAO’s budget, its cost-saving actions resulted in a sizable staff downsizing at the
time. According to 1997 testimony by the Acting Comptroller General, the cutbacks
“have necessitated a loss of people. Today, as a result of those reductions, GAO
staffing is at its lowest level since before World War II.”15
In 1999, Comptroller General David Walker elaborated on the effects of the
seven-year downsizing of GAO (from FY1992 through FY1998). One result was a
39% reduction in its workforce during this span, from 5,325 in FY1992 to 3,245 in
FY1998. In 1999 testimony, the CG recounted that the office also
instituted a reduction-in-force; closed regional offices; imposed a 5-year hiring
freeze; eliminated performance rewards; curtailed technology investments; and
reduced travel, training, supplies, and other support costs to achieve the overall
mandated reduction in spending. GAO is now facing a number of critical human
capital, information technology, and work process challenges that it needs to
address.16
GAO’s budget and personnel requests dealt with some of these areas since then.
But the office has not seen its staff size exceed the 3,275 FTEs of FY1999 and
FY2000; and it witnessed smaller numbers in the two following years (with 3,110 in
FY2001 and 3,210 in FY2002). By comparison to these low figures, however,
personnel levels rose to 3,269 FTEs in FY2003.17 Since then, the number has
decreased to 3,224 in 2004 and 3,215 in 2005.
15 James F. Hinchman, Acting Comptroller General, U.S. General Accounting Office, Fiscal
Year 1998 Budget Estimates for the U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO T-OCG-97-01
(Washington: GAO, 1997), p. 4. See also GAO’s Downsizing Efforts, GAO T-OCG-96-4
(Washington: GAO, 1996).
16 U.S. Congress, House Subcommittee on Legislative Appropriations, Legislative Branch
Appropriations for 2000, hearings, 106th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: GPO, 1999), part
2, pp. 203-204. Also, see GAO testimonies on this matter: T-OCG-99-22 and T-OCG-99-24
(Washington: GAO, 1999), pp. 8-10 and 19.
17 For elaboration, see GAO, Fiscal Year 2005 Budget Request.

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Personnel System
Legislation enacted in 2004 granted the Comptroller General further personnel
flexibilities over the GAO workforce. This augmented authority from 1980, 1988,
and 2000, which provided the basis for GAO’s personnel system at GAO.
Antecedent Authority. The General Accounting Office Personnel Act of
1980 was designed to construct an “independent personnel system” (P.L. 96-191, 94
Stat. 27). The new structure replaced GAO’s reliance on requirements from several
executive branch entities, especially the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) and
the Merit System Protection Board. According to the Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs, which reported the proposal favorably, “this independence
from regulation by executive branch entities is the principal objective of the
legislation.”18 The change, requested by the Comptroller General, was seen as
necessary to remove even the appearance of a conflict of interest, as GAO had
increased oversight of these agencies and the federal personnel system.19 The act
gave the CG authority to “appoint, pay, assign, and direct such personnel as the
Comptroller General determines necessary to discharge the duties and functions of
the General Accounting Office” (94 Stat. 27). Accompanying this general grant were
requirements to meet specified provisions of Title 5 of the U.S. Code, which set merit
system principles and prohibit certain personnel practices, among other matters (94
Stat. 27).
Amendments to the personnel act were approved in 1988 (P.L. 100-426, 102
Stat. 1598-1602). These revised provisions concerned GAO’s personnel appeals
board membership and judicial review of its decisions. The amendments also
changed the retirement qualifications for the Comptroller General and Deputy,
allowing them to remain in office past the otherwise mandatory retirement age of 70;
and the statutory changes brought the CG’s survivor benefits into conformity with
those available to federal judges.
In 2000, the CG’s powers over personnel were enhanced through a three-year
pilot program allowing for specific personnel flexibilities (P.L. 106-303, 114 Stat.
1063-1070).20 This legislation gave qualified authority to the Comptroller General
to offer certain voluntary separation incentives, along with early retirements, and to
implement a reduction in force.
Additional Authority in 2004. The GAO Human Capital Reform Act (P.L.
108-271), among other things, grants the Comptroller General authority over pay and
personnel. It allows him to offer early retirement and buy-out incentives; establish
an exchange program with the private sector; and make employee relocation benefits
18 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, General Accounting Office
Personnel Act of 1979, S.Rept. 96-540, 96th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: GPO, 1979), p.
2.
19 Ibid.
20 An article on changes at GAO at the time is by Susannah Zak Figura, “The Human
Touch,” Government Executive, Sept. 2000, pp. 22-27.

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more flexible.21 Most far-reaching is a section that allows the CG to set annual pay
raises tied more closely with performance appraisal ratings (as opposed to granting
automatic yearly increases). In so doing, the CG could also use factors other than the
Consumer Price Index, Employment Cost Index, and locality pay surveys to
determine the amounts.22
Other provisions emerging after committee deliberations are designed to meet
several objectives: protect the merit principle of “equal pay for work of equal value,”
keep the pay rates of employees who have been demoted because of workforce
restructuring or job reclassification at their current levels, and set qualifications on
exchanges with the private sector.
As described by the Comptroller General, the overall transformation is intended
to “further GAO’s ability to enhance our performance, assure our accountability, and
ensure that we can attract, retain, motivate, and reward a quality and high-performing
workforce currently and in future years.”23 Changes in this realm and their source —
coming from Congress’s largest support agency and its chief examiner of executive
personnel systems — however, raised concerns over several matters. These include
whether the changes might have an adverse effect on employee morale, whether they
can be implemented fairly across-the-board, whether they can produce the desired
results, and whether they will prompt (or endorse) requests for similar authority in
other government entities.
Appointment and Removal of the
Comptroller General and Deputy
Since its inception in 1921 as the General Accounting Office, GAO has been
headed by only seven Comptrollers General, three of whom served the full 15-year
term.
21 For discussion, see U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, GAO
Human Capital Reform Act of 2003, S.Rept. 108-216, 108th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington:
GPO, 2003); U.S. Congress, House Committee on Government Reform, GAO Human
Capital Reform Act of 2003, H.Rept. 108-380 (Washington: GPO, 2003); U.S. Congress,
House Committee on Government Reform and Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs,
hearings on H.R. 2751 and S. 1522, 108th Cong., 1st sess., respectively; U.S. General
Accounting Office, GAO: Additional Human Capital Flexibilities Are Needed, Statement
by David M. Walker, Comptroller General, Report GAO-03-1024T (Washington: GAO,
2003); and U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO’s Proposed Human Capital Legislation:
View of the Employee Advisory Council, Statement by Christopher A. Keisling, Council
Member, Report GAO-03-1020T (Washington: GAO, 2003); and GAO, Fiscal Year 2004
Budget Request (2003).
22 GAO has contracted with Watson Wyatt to assist in developing a new market-based
compensation system for the agency’s employees. “Contract Awarded to Develop Market-
Based Pay Scales for Analysts, Attorneys, and Specialists,” GAO Management News, vol.
31, July 26-30, 2004.
23 Walker, GAO: Additional Human Capital Flexibilities Are Needed, p. 5.

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Table 2. Comptrollers General, 1921-Present
Comptroller General
Dates of Service
John Raymond McCarl
1921-1936
Fred Herbert Brown
1939-1940
Lindsay C. Warren
1940-1954
Joseph Campbell
1954-1965
Elmer B. Staats
1966-1981
Charles A. Bowsher
1981-1996
David M. Walker
1998-
Otherwise, GAO has been headed by an acting comptroller general. The longest
period without a confirmed Comptroller General was three years, 1936-1939. The
second longest hiatus was a two-year vacancy, beginning on September 30, 1996,
when Charles Bowsher completed his term, until November 9, 1998, when David
Walker began his.
Appointment
Under GAO’s current statutory charter, the Comptroller General and Deputy
Comptroller General are nominated by the President, following recommendations
from a special congressional commission, and are confirmed by the Senate. The
Comptroller General is limited to a single 15-year term, a statutory provision
designed to protect his or her independence, professional integrity, and objectivity.
Current Process. When a vacancy occurs in the office of the Comptroller
General or the Deputy, a special congressional commission, consisting of members
of both chambers and both parties, is established to recommend individuals to the
President for appointment. Added by the General Accounting Office Act of 1980 (94
Stat. 314-315), this process became operational the following year. Under the
arrangement, the recommending commission consists of the Speaker of the House,
the President pro tempore of the Senate, the majority and minority leaders of the
House and Senate, the chairmen and ranking minority members of the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs and the House Committee on Government
Reform, and, when the Deputy’s post is vacant, the Comptroller General. The
commission determines the criteria and standards for its nominees.
The current process includes examination of the backgrounds and future plans
of potential nominees, including, of course, their credentials, accomplishments, and
relevant work experience in the private sector and public office. These examinations
are conducted by the commission members and staff through interviews and meetings
with the candidates, as well as with interested and knowledgeable parties, and a
review of relevant materials and documents. Later examinations are held by the

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Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, which reports the nomination to the full
Senate.24
The commission must recommend at least three individuals but the President
may ask for additional names for consideration (or nominate someone else). The
original bill called for five names to be submitted. However, the number was
reduced, according to the report of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs,
because “three names is a more realistic figure. Considering the high qualifications
for the Office of Comptroller and Deputy Comptroller General, a requirement to
generate five names might be extremely difficult to satisfy.”25
The reporting panel also recognized that the President could still nominate an
individual not recommended by the commission, in light of “the President’s authority
under the Appointments Clause .... However, it is expected that the President would
give great weight to the Commission’s recommendations.”26 This expectation has
been met. On the two occasions since the 1980 enactment when a vacancy in the
office of Comptroller General arose, Presidents Reagan in 1981 and Clinton in 1998
each selected a nominee from the initial congressional list.
The provision for a bicameral commission gives both chambers of Congress a
formal and direct role in selecting the head of this legislative branch agency. The
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs endorsed the new arrangement:
In view of the relationship between the Comptroller General and the Congress,
the Committee believes it is appropriate that both Houses be given a role in the
selection process .... [The new provision] reflects the special interests of both
Houses in the choice of an individual whose primary function is to provide
assistance to Congress.27
Recent Nominations. This process went into effect in 1981, resulting in the
appointment of Charles A. Bowsher, whose 15-year term expired in September,
1996.28
24 For the most recent illustration, see U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs, Nominations of Edward J. Gleiman, Dana B. Covington, and David M. Walker,
hearings, 105th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington: GPO, 1998), pp. 17-18 and 70-130.
25 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, General Accounting Office
Act of 1980, S.Rept. 96-570, 96th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington: GPO, 1980), p. 10.
Despite the scaling back to three recommendations, eight names were submitted the first
time the new procedure was used, in 1981.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., p. 9.
28 U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Nomination of Charles A.
Bowsher, hearing, 97th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: GPO, 1981); “Nomination of Charles
A. Bowsher to Be Comptroller General of the United States,” Congressional Record, vol.
127, Sept. 29, 1981; and U.S. President Ronald Reagan, “Remarks Announcing Intention
to Nominate Charles A. Bowsher” (July 9, 1981), Public Papers of the Presidents: Ronald
Reagan, 1981 (Washington: GPO, 1982), pp. 612-614. Bowsher was one of eight persons
(continued...)

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A second congressional commission met afterwards, to recommend a successor.
On January 22, 1998, the commission sent the names of three individuals who “had
received majority support from the members of the Commission” to President
Clinton for his consideration, as provided in the 1980 statute.29 Independently, six
days later, Democratic members of the commission submitted four additional
names.30 On October 5, 1998, President Clinton nominated David M. Walker, one
of the three original recommendations of the commission majority. He was
confirmed by the Senate on October 21, following hearings by the Governmental
Affairs Committee on October 7, and its favorable report on October 9.31
The two-year interregnum marked the second longest period without a
confirmed Comptroller General. And the nearly 10 months before the President
submitted a nomination based on the congressional commission’s recommendation
prompted interest in making the Comptroller General position exclusively a
legislative branch officer. But this was not acted on.32 By so doing, Congress would
have made the appointment itself, as it does, for instance, with the Director of the
Congressional Budget Office.33 (By comparison, other legislative branch offices —
the Librarian of Congress, Architect of the Capitol, and Public Printer, who heads the
Government Printing Office — are filled by presidential nominees who are
confirmed by the Senate.)
The current unique nomination process has not been used for the post of Deputy
Comptroller General, which has remained vacant since the 1980 enactment. Instead
of a confirmed Deputy, the Comptroller General has relied upon his own appointee(s)
in one or two posts over the past several decades. In the past, a single special
28 (...continued)
recommended by the commission, which had an equal number of Democrats and
Republicans. See Trask, GAO History, p. 97; “Accountant Bowsher Named New GAO
Head,” Congressional Quarterly, July 18, 1981, p. 1301; and Greg Rushford, “Veteran of
Capital Hardball Chosen for Top GAO Post,” Federal Times, July 20, 1981, p. 6.
29 Letter from Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott and Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich,
to President William Clinton, Jan. 22, 1998, regarding recommendations for Comptroller
General. See also Stephen Barr, “GOP Leaders Offer Three to Head GAO,” Washington
Post, Jan. 27, 1998, p. A15.
30 “Democrats, Objecting to Republican Move, Send 7 Names to Clinton for GAO,”
Washington Post, Feb. 2, 1998, p. A17.
31 Congressional Record, vol. 144, Oct. 21, 1998, p. S12980. See also Robert Pear, “A
C.P.A. at Center Stage: David Michael Walker,” New York Times, Oct. 23, 1998, p. A14;
and Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Nomination of ... David M. Walker.
32 “GOP May Seek to Strip Clinton of Power to Name GAO Head,” CQ Daily Monitor, July
29, 1998, p. 5.
33 Earlier proposals along this line, incidentally, were raised in the mid-1970s, prior to the
change setting up the congressional commission to make recommendations to the President.
See Mosher, The GAO, p. 288. The bills introduced in 1975 were H.R. 8616, 94th Cong.,
1st sess., sponsored by Rep. Jack Brooks, and S. 2066, 94th Cong., 1st sess., sponsored by
Sen. Lee Metcalf, with hearings on the latter. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on
Government Operations, Subcommittee on Reports, Accounting, and Management, GAO
Legislation, hearing, part 1, 94th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: GPO, 1975).

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assistant to the comptroller general served as second in command. Currently, two
officials — the chief operating officer and the chief mission support officer — carry
out the appropriate duties and functions.
Removal
The Comptroller General or Deputy may be removed by impeachment or by
adoption of a joint resolution of Congress. Removal by joint resolution can occur
only after notice and an opportunity for a hearing and only for certain specified
reasons: permanent disability, inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance, felony
conviction, or conduct involving moral turpitude. No Comptroller General or Deputy
has been subject to either impeachment or removal by a joint resolution.
Concluding Summary
Created in 1921, the General Accounting Office, now the Government
Accountability Office, is Congress’s largest support agency, with a budget of $475
million and a staff of 3,215 in FY2005. The office, headed by the Comptroller
General, has broad jurisdiction over the executive, substantial independence from it,
and extensive authority to gain access to its records and investigate, audit, and
evaluate its operations.34 These attributes support a wide variety of services and
activities, most connected with congressional oversight of the executive, that GAO
can initiative on its own or, more usually, at the request of Congress, its members,
and panels.
In the mid-1990s, GAO underwent a substantial downsizing — in funding and
staffing — in part because of congressional criticism of its perceived orientation
towards the previous two administrations and concerns about its missions and roles.
Since then, questions have also arisen over other matters: the process (and resulting
delay) for selecting the Comptroller General; the absence of a confirmed Deputy for
more than two decades; the unsuccessful attempt to gain access to information from
34 GAO is one of a number of comparable organizations worldwide — collectively known
as Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) — that audit, investigate, and/or review government
activities, operations, and programs. These counterparts have similar but not identical
responsibilities, functions, powers, and degrees of independence (from the entities they audit
and investigate), which are reflected to a degree in their different titles: e.g., the Supreme
Chamber of Control (in Poland), Court of Audit (Belgium), Office of the Comptroller and
Auditor General (Ireland), National Audit Office and Northern Ireland Audit Office (United
Kingdom), Tribunal of Contras (Portugal), and Cour des Comptes (France). Among them,
GAO probably ranks highest across such key criteria as independence, authority,
jurisdiction, responsibilities, and resources. Although there is no current, systematic,
comprehensive comparison of SAIs internationally, descriptions of individual ones are
found in International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions, Survey and Description
of Selective National Audit Offices (loose-leaf collection) (Vienna: INTOSAI, 1996);
National Audit Office, State Audit in the European Union (London: NAO, 1996); and S. N.
Swaroop, Supreme Audit Institutions in Different Countries (New Delhi: Ashish Publishing
House, 1991).

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a presidentially-established panel, headed by the Vice President; and certain
personnel flexibilities granted to the CG.
Notwithstanding these developments, GAO has experienced a regular increase
in its annual budget over the past six years and has added staff in the past three. In
2004, moreover, the Comptroller General garnered new authority over pay and
personnel in the re-designated Government Accountability Office.

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