Order Code 98-928 E
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
The World Trade Organization:
Background and Issues
Updated February 18, 2005
Lenore Sek
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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The World Trade Organization: Background and Issues
Summary
The World Trade Organization (WTO) was established on January 1, 1995,
under an agreement reached during the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade
negotiations. The Uruguay Round was the last of a series of periodic trade
negotiations held under the auspices of the WTO’s predecessor, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
The WTO is the most important international organization that governs world
trade. Decisions are made by the member countries. The WTO has 148 members
and 31 observer governments (most of which have applied for membership), and
members represent over 95% of world trade. The highest-level decisions are made
at the Ministerial Conference, which is the meeting of trade ministers from member
countries. The Ministerial Conference must meet at least every two years. The
General Council is the body of national representatives that oversees the day-to-day
operations of the WTO. The General Council meets approximately monthly. It also
meets in two other capacities: it reviews national trade policies, and it oversees the
dispute settlement process. Under the General Council are numerous committees,
working groups, and other bodies.
Assisting the members is a WTO Secretariat that numbers about 600 and is
located in Geneva, Switzerland. The top official of the Secretariat is Director-
General Supachai Panitchpakdi of Thailand, whose three-year term began on
September 1, 2002. Currently, there are four candidates for the position of Director-
General, and a final candidate might be presented for confirmation by late May 2005.
Trade agreements administered by the WTO cover a broad range of goods and
services trade and apply to virtually all government practices that directly relate to
trade, for example tariffs, subsidies, government procurement, and trade-related
intellectual property rights. The WTO agreements are based on the principle of non-
discriminatory treatment among countries. Some exceptions however, such as
preferential treatment for developing countries, are allowed. Other basic principles
of the WTO are open information on rules and regulations, negotiated limits on trade
barriers, and settlement of disputes under specific procedures.
Among the questions asked during debate on U.S. trade policy and the WTO
are: To what extent are U.S. trade goals achieved through the WTO’s multilateral
forum, compared to other means such as bilateral or regional trade agreements or
unilateral actions? Can the United States maintain its sovereignty as a member of the
WTO? Are U.S. interests served through the WTO dispute process? Should the
United States seek broader WTO rules to include nontraditional issues such as labor
and the environment? What is the role of Congress in U.S. participation in the
WTO?

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Contents
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The World Trade Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Policy Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Appendix 1. WTO Members (as of February 8, 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Appendix 2. WTO Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

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The World Trade Organization:
Background and Issues
Background
Following World War II, nations throughout the world, led by the United States
and several other developed countries, sought to establish an open and
nondiscriminatory trading system with the goal of raising the economic well-being
of all countries. Aware of the role of trade barriers in contributing to the economic
depression in the 1930s, and the military aggression that rose following the
depression, the countries that met to discuss the new trading system saw open trade
as essential for economic stability and peace.
The intent of these negotiators was to establish an International Trade
Organization (ITO), which would address not only trade barriers but other issues
indirectly related to trade, including employment, investment, restrictive business
practices, and commodity agreements. The ITO was to be a United Nations
specialized agency, but the ITO treaty was not approved by the United States and a
few other signatories and never went into effect. Instead, a provisional agreement on
tariffs and trade rules, called the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
was reached and went into effect in 1948. This provisional GATT became the
principal set of rules governing international trade for the next 47 years.
The GATT document established trade principles that continue to be applied
today. Among the most important of these principles was nondiscrimination with
regard to the treatment of trade in goods among countries. The most-favored-nation
principle, which was Article I of the GATT, states that any advantage given by a
contracting party to a product of another country must be extended unconditionally
to a like product of all other contracting parties. A second rule of nondiscrimination
was national treatment, which said that imported and domestic goods should be
treated equally. Although nondiscrimination was a cornerstone of the GATT, some
exceptions were allowed. For example customs unions, free-trade areas, and special
treatment for developing countries were permitted.
Another principle was the open and fair application of any trade barriers. Tariffs
were the most common and visible form of trade barrier at the time the GATT was
established. Tariffs were to be “bound,” or set at maximum levels, and not increased
above the negotiated level. In general, quantitative restrictions such as quotas were
not allowed, since tariffs were much easier to identify and to eventually reduce.
The GATT also included a forum and process for countries to follow in trying
to resolve disputes. The dispute process allowed countries to consult with each other

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CRS-2
and if that was not successful, a country could ask that a panel hear the complaint.
Although the panel’s decision was not enforceable, the panel report carried some
force of opinion and encouraged countries to work toward an agreeable resolution.
One of the GATT’s chief purposes was the reduction of barriers to trade. With
this goal in mind, GATT contracting parties met periodically to negotiate further
reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers and changes to GATT rules. These
negotiations were called “rounds.” Early rounds dealt only with tariff reductions, but
later rounds also included nontariff barriers to trade. The most recent round, the
Uruguay Round, lasted from 1986 to 1994 and included the most encompassing set
of negotiations in the history of the GATT. On the agenda was reform of the existing
GATT system, as well as expansion of rules to cover new areas such as services trade
and the trade aspects of intellectual property rights (copyrights, trademarks, and
patents). The agreements that resulted from the Uruguay Round also contained a
built-in agenda requiring that further negotiations on agriculture, services, intellectual
property rights, and government procurement begin by the year 2000.
One of the most important changes that came about from the Uruguay Round
was the establishment of a new trade structure, the World Trade Organization
(WTO), which incorporated the many changes reached during the Uruguay Round:
the former GATT with its newly negotiated reforms, bodies to oversee the new trade
issues, a stronger dispute resolution procedure, a regular review of members’ trade
policies, and many other committees and councils. In contrast to the GATT, the
WTO was created as a permanent structure, with “members” instead of “contracting
parties.” The WTO went into effect on January 1, 1995.
The World Trade Organization
There are 148 members of the WTO, representing over 95% of world trade, 31
observer governments (most of which have applied for membership in the WTO),
and seven international organization observers. Members and observers are listed in
Appendix 1. All decisions are made by member countries, and decisions are usually
by consensus.
The WTO is located in Geneva, Switzerland. The WTO Secretariat assists
member countries and numbers about 600. The total WTO budget for the year 2004
is 161.8 million Swiss Francs, or about $128.1 million (1.2632 Swiss Francs = $1).1
Countries contribute according to their share of world trade, based on trade in goods,
services and intellectual property rights.2
1 The total WTO budget includes 157.1 million Swiss Francs for the WTO Secretariat and
4.7 million Swiss Francs for the Appellate Body and its Secretariat. See the WTO web page
at [http://www.wto.org].
2 In 2004, the U.S. share was 15.7% of total contributions to the WTO budget. The U.S.
contribution is part of the Department of State budget and was $18.6 million in FY2004.
The FY2005 estimate is $22.2 million, and the FY2006 request is $21.5 million (see United
States Department of State. The Budget in Brief; Fiscal Year 2006. P. 90).

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The WTO’s top official is Director-General Supachai Panitchpakdi of Thailand,
whose three-year term began on September 1, 2002.3 A new Director-General,
whose term will be four years and will begin September 1, 2005, must be selected.
According to the Procedures for the Appointment of Directors-General,4 which WTO
members adopted in 2002, the appointment process starts nine months before the end
of a Director-General’s term. Members nominate candidates, and the candidates
make themselves known and engage in discussions on issues. The field is narrowed
as the candidates with the least likelihood of achieving a consensus of support drop
out. The current candidates for Director-General: Carlos Perez del Castillo of
Uruguay, Jayakrishna Cuttaree of Mauritius, Luiz Felipe de Seixas Correa of Brazil,
and Pascal Lamy of France. According to the WTO procedures, a final candidate
should be presented for confirmation by WTO members by the end of May 2005.
Decisions within the WTO are made by members, not staff, and they are made
by consensus, not by formal vote. The highest level body in the WTO is the
Ministerial Conference, which is the body of political representatives (trade
ministers) from each member country. (See the WTO structure in Appendix 2.) The
Ministerial Conference examines current programs and sets the agenda for future
work. It must meet at least every two years.
The first meeting of the Ministerial Conference was held in Singapore on
December 9-13, 1996. At that meeting, trade ministers reviewed the work of the
WTO, since its establishment and agreed on a work schedule for the next few years.
They also approved an action plan for least-developed countries, and many members
entered into an agreement to eliminate tariffs on information technology products by
the year 2000. The second meeting of the Ministerial Conference was held in
Geneva on May 18 and 20, 1998. Again, it reviewed the work of the WTO and
approved a future work program. It called for an examination of issues related to
global electronic commerce and started preparations for the next meeting. The third
Ministerial Conference was held in Seattle on November 29-December 3, 1999. That
meeting was intended to review an agenda for a new round of trade negotiations, but
trade ministers could not reach agreement and suspended their work. The WTO
Director-General was directed to consult with delegations and discuss ways in which
countries might bridge remaining differences. The fourth Ministerial Conference was
held in Doha, Qatar on November 9-14, 2001. At that meeting, trade ministers
agreed to launch a new round of multilateral trade negotiations, called the Doha
Development Agenda, and set a deadline for final agreements of January 1, 2005.
They established a work program for the new round and agreed to consider numerous
developing-country issues.5 The fifth Ministerial Conference was held September 10-
14, 2003, in Cancun, Mexico. According to the Ministerial Declaration released two
3 The institution of the WTO is examined in a 2004 report by leading experts to Director-
General Supachai Panitchpakdi. See, Consultative Board, Peter Sutherland (Chair). The
Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium. World
Trade Organization, 2004. 86 p. Available at the WTO website [http://www.wto.org].
4 WTO document WT/L/509.
5 For more information on results of the Doha Ministerial Conference, see CRS Report
RL31206, The WTO Doha Ministerial: Results and Agenda for a New Round of
Negotiations, coordinated by William H. Cooper.

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CRS-4
years earlier in Doha, Qatar, the fifth Ministerial Conference was intended to “...take
stock of progress in the negotiations, provide any necessary political guidance, and
take decisions as necessary.” Many trade ministers at the Cancun Ministerial
attempted to reach a framework to guide the remaining negotiations of the new
round, but they could not resolve major differences, and the negotiations stalled. The
sixth Ministerial Conference will be held in Hong Kong on December 13-18,2005.
The body that oversees the day-to-day operations of the WTO is the General
Council, which consists of a representative from each member country. The Council
generally meets monthly and provides a forum for countries to discuss a range of
trade matters. The U.S. delegate to the General Council is the Deputy U.S. Trade
Representative in Geneva.
The General Council also meets in two other, unique capacities. One is the
Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM). The TPRM was established under the
Uruguay Round agreements to allow closer monitoring of national trade policies of
member countries. The four countries with the largest shares of world trade are
reviewed every two years, the next 16 largest traders are reviewed every four years,
and other countries are reviewed every six years, although least-developed countries
might be reviewed less frequently. The trade reviews provide information on a
country’s trade policies and comment on whether a country is pursuing market-
opening or market-restrictive policies. This public examination is a mild form of
pressure for a country to avoid practices that discourage trade.
The General Council also meets in the capacity of the Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB). The Uruguay Round agreements greatly strengthened the process for
settlement of disputes. The first stage of the process is consultation between the
governments involved. If consultation is not successful, the complainant may ask the
DSB to establish a dispute panel. The dispute panel hears the case and reports back
to the DSB. If the complaint is upheld, the respondent must either change its practice
or negotiate an agreeable resolution. Otherwise, the complainant may request that
the DSB authorize suspension of obligations, thereby giving permission for the
complainant to retaliate. For example, a complainant may receive permission to
increase tariffs against a respondent country that disregards a decision by the DSB.
Permission is automatic unless unanimously disapproved. Procedures are clearly set
out with specific timetables at each stage.
More specialized work is done in three major bodies under the General Council.
One of these is the Council for Trade in Goods, under which committees work on
a number of trade areas. One committee works on trade in agriculture. Another
committee oversees the related topic of sanitary and phytosanitary measures, which
are measures that pertain respectively to animal and plant health and safety. Some
committees monitor practices that are considered “unfair” if not implemented in
accordance with WTO rules (antidumping, subsidies and countervailing measures).
Other committees examine practices that are not necessarily “unfair” but could be
trade-distorting nonetheless (rules of origin, safeguards, technical barriers, customs
valuation, and import licensing). One committee works on the relatively new area
of trade-related investment measures, and another addresses market access issues
(tariffs and nontariff measures). Also under the Council for Trade in Goods is the
Information Technology Agreement Committee.

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A second major body under the General Council is the Council for Trade in
Services, which oversees the Uruguay Round agreement on trade in services. The
Uruguay Round services agreement has three parts. The first part lists basic
principles that countries agree to observe, including national treatment, most-favored-
nation treatment, and transparency (open information about relevant laws and
regulations). The second part contains four annexes with rules on: (1) the movement
of persons who provide services, (2) financial services, (3) telecommunications, and
(4) air transport services. The third part is a schedule of country commitments.
These commitments are bound and cannot be reduced in scope, much like the tariff
levels on goods, which cannot be increased once they are bound. The service
commitments may include exceptions to the national treatment and most-favored-
nation principles, if countries included these exceptions when they originally
negotiated the commitments.
The Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) is the third major body under the General Council. The TRIPS Council
monitors the agreement on intellectual property rights that was reached during the
Uruguay Round and supervises members’ compliance. The TRIPS agreement has
three parts. The first part outlines basic principles that countries must observe,
including national treatment and most-favored-nation treatment. The second part
establishes standards for the different types of intellectual property rights. For
example, it ensures copyright protection for computer programs, sets rules for rental
rights, protects integrated circuit designs and geographical indications (e.g.,
“champagne” indicates a wine from a specific region), and ensures minimum lengths
of time for protections. The third part of the agreement establishes enforcement
processes. Developing, transition, and least-developed countries are allowed
additional time to implement the changes.
In addition to the bodies discussed above, there are many other committees and
working groups under the General Council. For example, there are working groups
on trade, debt, and finance and on trade and transfer of technology. There are
committees on plurilateral agreements, which are not signed by all WTO members,
on civil aircraft and on government procurement. The Committee on Trade and
Development often works with other international institutions on special concerns
of countries in development. Working parties on accession meet with applicant
countries to identify changes that are necessary to bring the applicant’s trade regime
into line with WTO rules and principles. The Uruguay Round also established a
committee on trade and environment.
Policy Issues
Congressional debate involving the WTO has focused on several major issues.
These concern: (1) achievement of U.S. trade goals through a multilateral forum; (2)
assurance of U.S. sovereignty in trade decisions; (3) the WTO dispute process and
U.S. interests; (4) traditional and nontraditional topics in the WTO; and (5) the
congressional role in U.S. participation in the WTO

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1. To what extent are U.S. trade goals achieved through the WTO’s
multilateral forum, compared to other means such as bilateral or regional trade
agreements or unilateral action? The WTO has many benefits for the United
States: it provides the only multilateral dispute mechanism for international trade,
administers rules to discourage discrimination, and ensures greater security on how
trade will be conducted. However, critics of the WTO charge that the WTO is slow-
moving, because there are so many members with such varied national interests and
decisions are by consensus. One option is to pursue U.S. goals through another
multilateral body. For example, the United States and other (mostly developed)
countries have pursued negotiations on shipbuilding and investment in the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, but with mixed success.
Another option is to pursue trade benefits through regional or bilateral agreements.
Some trade experts say that these agreements offer substantial benefits to U.S.
exporters and are easier to negotiate. Others, however, assert that regional and
bilateral agreements may distract the United States and other countries from the
possibly greater benefits from a worldwide approach.
During the first half of 2005, the 109th Congress might vote on whether or not
the United States should continue as a member of the World Trade Organization
(WTO). The provisions on such a vote are found in the 1994 legislation that
implemented the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade agreements (P.L. 103-465).
By March 1, 2005, the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) must submit to the
Congress a comprehensive report that includes a broad analysis of the costs and
benefits of continued U.S. participation in the WTO. Once Congress receives this
report, any Member of Congress may introduce a joint resolution withdrawing
congressional approval of the WTO Agreement. Such a resolution must be
introduced within 90 days after Congress receives the USTR’s report. Debate on the
resolution will offer Congress an opportunity to debate the costs and benefits of U.S.
participation in the WTO.
2. Can the United States maintain its sovereignty as a member of the
WTO? Some critics of the WTO have raised the question of whether the United
States will lose its sovereignty as a member of the WTO. As a member, the United
States does commit to act in accordance with the rules of the multilateral body.
Article XVI(4) of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Agreement, states,
“Each Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative
procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements.” Those
annexed Agreements are the agreements reached during the Uruguay Round covering
trade in goods, trade in services, intellectual property rights, dispute settlement, and
other trade areas. The WTO, however, cannot force members to adhere to their
obligations. The United States and any other WTO member may act in its own
national interest. The WTO recognizes certain allowable exceptions such as national
security. However, any multilateral institution is only as strong as its members’
adherence to the institution’s rules. If the United States or another member country
chooses to take unilateral action contrary to WTO rules, that action may weaken the
institution. It is a decision for U.S. policymakers whether the discipline imposed by
the WTO is an acceptable cost for the benefits of more open trade.
3. Are U.S. interests served through the WTO dispute process? The United
States realizes several benefits from the existence of a multilateral forum for trade

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disputes. Such a forum in general allows countries to peacefully resolve disputes
without having to resort to more drastic measures. The WTO dispute process
presents a clear, understandable set of rules to be followed, and the process is
nondiscriminatory among countries.6 The United States has been relatively
successful in using the process as a complainant. As of January 14, 2005, the U.S.
Trade Representative reports that 22 cases were resolved to U.S. satisfaction without
litigation; 22 cases were won by the United States on core issues; in 4 cases the
United States did not prevail on core issues; and 25 other cases were in panel stage,
in consultation, or monitoring progress or otherwise inactive.7
There are many complaints, however, about the WTO dispute process. In some
cases, countries have not adhered to dispute panels’ findings. An example is the U.S.
complaint against European Union (EU) trade restrictions on imports of beef
produced with hormones. Critics say that some cases are filed for political, not
economic, reasons. For example, some analysts say that the EU took no action for
years against a U.S. tax benefit for exports, but then filed a challenge after a U.S. win
in another case. Finally, the United States as defendant has lost several cases
involving trade remedies, and this has led some Members to charge that the WTO
dispute panels are assuming too much authority in interpreting trade agreements. The
United States has not done well as respondent. As of January 14, 2005, the United
States won 10 cases on core issues but did not prevail in 24 cases, while 14 cases
were resolved without completing litigation, 10 cases were in the litigation stage, and
22 cases were either in the pre-litigation consultation stage or then inactive.8
4. Should the WTO cover traditional trade issues only, or should it be
broadened to include nontraditional issues such as labor and the environment?
The GATT agreement first established rules only on border measures (tariffs and
quotas) and later added rules on certain internal practices that clearly had direct
effects on trade in goods (e.g., subsidies, government procurement). The WTO-
administered agreements further expanded trade rules to cover new areas such as
trade in services, but did not include rules that reached into areas not deemed directly
related to trade practices. U.S. businesses generally want the WTO to refrain from
extending beyond these traditionally trade-related issues, because they argue that the
greatest export opportunities will be achieved only if negotiators focus on trade
barriers and do not include social factors.
Many groups, however, argue that the WTO should be expanded to include
nontraditional topics. Two topics that have been at the center of current trade debate
are labor and the environment. Labor groups argue that many countries exploit
workers, including children, to produce low-cost products for foreign markets.
Environmental groups want more consideration of the environmental effects of the
production of goods for trade included under WTO rules. There is strong
6 For information on the WTO dispute process, see CRS Report RS20088, Dispute
Settlement in the World Trade Organization: An Overview, by Jeanne J. Grimmett.
7 See the U.S. Trade Representative website at [http://www.ustr.gov], under Trade
Agreements, Monitoring and Enforcement.
8 Ibid.

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CRS-8
disagreement domestically on traditional and nontraditional topics in trade
negotiations. Internationally, countries hold a wide range of positions on this
question.
5. What is the role of Congress in how the United States participates in the
WTO? Although the executive branch maintains a staff in Geneva and conducts
trade negotiations in the WTO, Congress has an important role in how the United
States participates in the WTO through its constitutional authority over the conduct
of foreign commerce. In legislation (P.L. 107-210) that approved expedited
procedures for legislation to implement trade agreements (“trade promotion
authority”), Congress prescribed trade objectives for U.S. negotiators and required
the executive branch to consult with it. During negotiations, Congress maintains
oversight, and the Congressional Oversight Group, which was established under P.L.
107-210, has an active advisory role. Once an implementing bill has been
introduced, Congress decides whether or not to approve those legislative changes
necessary to implement the trade agreement.
The congressional role described above has evolved to help coordinate and
streamline activities of the executive and legislative branches on trade matters, but
this role is continually debated and reevaluated. Many of those involved in the
debate question whether this executive-legislative relationship is still useful or
appropriate. The Administration has called for greater authority in trade negotiations,
saying that the need for repeated reauthorization of trade promotion authority
interrupts U.S. trade policy and keeps the United States from participating in trade
negotiations. However, many Members assert that Congress has given up too much
of its constitutional role and should have a stronger hand in trade policy formulation
and in oversight of trade negotiations.

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Appendix 1. WTO Members (as of February 8, 2005)
Members (148)
Albania
Djibouti
Korea, Republic of
Philippines
Angola
Dominica
Kuwait
Poland
Antigua & Barbuda
Dominican Republic Kyrgyz Republic
Portugal
Argentina
Ecuador
Latvia
Qatar
Armenia
Egypt
Lesotho
Romania
Australia
El Salvador
Liechtenstein
Rwanda
Austria
Estonia
Lithuania
Saint Kitts and
Nevis
Bahrain
European
Luxembourg
Saint Lucia
Communities
Bangladesh
Fiji
Macao, China
Saint Vincent and
the Grenadines
Barbados
Finland
Madagascar
Senegal
Belgium
Former Yugoslav
Malawi
Sierra Leone
Republic of
Macedonia
(FYROM)
Belize
France
Malaysia
Singapore
Benin
Gabon
Maldives
Slovak Republic
Bolivia
The Gambia
Mali
Slovenia
Botswana
Georgia
Malta
Solomon Islands
Brazil
Germany
Mauritania
South Africa
Brunei Darussalam
Ghana
Mauritius
Spain
Bulgaria
Greece
Mexico
Sri Lanka
Burkina Faso
Grenada
Moldova
Suriname
Burundi
Guatemala
Mongolia
Swaziland
Cambodia
Guinea
Morocco
Sweden
Cameroon
Guinea Bissau
Mozambique
Switzerland
Canada
Guyana
Myanmar
Chinese Taipei
Central Africa
Haiti
Namibia
Tanzania
Republic
Chad Honduras
Nepal
Thailand

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CRS-10
Chile
Hong Kong, China
Netherlands, for the
Togo
Kingdom in Europe
and for the
Netherlands Antilles
China
Hungary
New Zealand
Trinidad and
Tobago
Colombia
Iceland
Nicaragua
Tunisia
Congo
India
Niger
Turkey
Costa Rica
Indonesia
Nigeria
Uganda
Cote d’Ivoire
Ireland
Norway
United Arab
Emirates
Croatia
Israel
Oman
United Kingdom
Cuba
Italy
Pakistan
United States
Cyprus
Jamaica
Panama
Uruguay
Czech Republic
Japan
Papua New Guinea
Venezuela
Democratic
Jordan
Paraguay
Zambia
Republic of the
Congo
Denmark
Kenya Peru
Zimbabwe
Observer Governments (31)
Afghanistan
Holy See (Vatican)
Seychelles
Algeria
Iraq
Sudan
Andorra
Kazakhstan
Tajikistan
Azerbaijan
Lao People’s Democratic
Tonga
Republic
Bahamas
Lebanese Republic
Ukraine
Belarus
Libya
Uzbekistan
Bhutan
Russian Federation
Vanuatu
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Samoa
Vietnam
Cape Verde
Sao Tome and Principe
Yemen
Equatorial Guinea
Saudi Arabia

Ethiopia
Serbia and Montenegro

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International Organization Observers to General Council (8)
Food and Agricultural Organization
United Nations (UN)
(FAO)
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD)
International Trade Centre (ITC)
World Bank
Organization for Economic Co-operation
World Intellectual Property Organization
and Development (OECD)
(WIPO)
Source: World Trade Organization web page [http://www.wto.org/]

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Appendix 2. WTO Structure
All WTO members may participate in all councils, committees, etc., except Appellate
Body, Dispute Settlement panels, Textiles Monitoring Body, and plurilateral
committees. The negotiations mandated by the Doha Declaration take place in the
Trade Negotiations Committee and its subsidiaries.
Source: World Trade Organization web page at [http://www.wto.org/].

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