# **CRS Report for Congress**

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## The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress

February 16, 2005

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#### Summary

The Administration developed the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) as a multilateral, five-year program with U.S. contributions of some \$660 million from FY2005 through FY2009. Its primary purpose is to train and equip 75,000 military troops, a majority of them African, for peacekeeping operations by 2010. GPOI is supporting an Italian training center for gendarme (constabulary police) forces in Vicenza, Italy, scheduled to open in the fall of 2005. GPOI will also promote the development of an international transportation and logistics support system for peacekeepers, and is encouraging an information exchange to improve international coordination of peace operations training and exercises in Africa. In June 2004, G8 leaders pledged to support the goals of the initiative.

GPOI incorporates previous capabilities-building programs. From FY1997-FY2005, the United States spent just over \$121 million on GPOI's predecessor program that was funded through the State Department Peacekeeping (PKO) account (the Clinton Administration's African Crisis Response Initiative, i.e., ACRI and its successor, the Bush Administrations's African Crisis Operations Training i.e., ACOTA). Through ACRI/ACOTA, the United States trained some 16,000 troops (and is currently training another 1,000) from nine African nations - Benin, Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique and Senegal. Another \$33 million was provided from FY1998-FY2005 to support classroom training of 31 foreign militaries through the Foreign Military Financing account's Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities program (EIPC).

In its last days, the 108<sup>th</sup> Congress appropriated just over \$100 million in FY2005 funding the GPOI programs. The bulk of this funding was contained in Section 117 of Division J ("Other Matters") of the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2005 (H.R. 4818/P.L. 108-447). This section provided authority, notwithstanding any other provision of law except the Leahy Amendment, for the transfer of up to \$80 million from the Department of Defense budget to the State Department PKO account. Division D of the bill (Foreign Operations appropriations) contained almost \$22 million more in the ACOTA and EIPC accounts that are now subsumed under GPOI.

For FY2006, the Bush Administration is requesting \$114 million in State Department PKO funds for GPOI. Over the next year, the Administration is expected to expand the geographical scope of GPOI. The State Department and DOD are consulting to select new participants. Training for South African troops, which had already been decided upon, is expected to begin later in 2005

Three possible issues for the 109<sup>th</sup> Congress are: (1) Is the current level of GPOI funding appropriate; (2) Will the Administration's choice of FY2006 recipient countries reflect Congressional perceptions of U.S. foreign policy interests; and (3) Can the State Department exercise sufficient control and oversight of private contractors? This report will be updated as events warrant.

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## The Global Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress

President Bush's FY2006 budget request of February 8, 2005, seeks \$114.4 million for the second year of the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). The Administration launched the five-year (FY2005-FY2009) \$660 million initiative in mid-2004 as a means to alleviate the perceived shortage worldwide of trained peacekeepers and "gendarmes" (police with military skills, a.k.a. constabulary police), as well as to increase available resources to transport and sustain them. While the United States has provided considerable support to implement several peace processes and to support peacekeepers in the field from a variety of budget accounts for well over a decade, it has provided relatively little funding to build up foreign military capabilities to perform peacekeeping operations.<sup>1</sup>

The United States has previously provided peacekeeping capacity-building assistance to foreign militaries primarily under two programs, the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program (ACOTA) and its predecessor program, and the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities program (EIPC). Both ACOTA and EPIC have been subsumed under the GPOI budget line.

The GPOI budget is (as ACOTA was) part of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Peacekeeping (PKO) account, also known as the "voluntary" Peacekeeping account, under the Military Assistance rubric. The PKO account funds activities carried out under Section 551 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA).<sup>2</sup> Section 551 authorizes the President to provide assistance for peacekeeping operations and other programs to further U.S. national security interests "on such terms and conditions as he may determine." (This provides some flexibility to the President, but is not tantamount to the discretion that he can exercise when funding is provided "notwithstanding any other provision of law.")

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The term "peacekeeping" is used generically here. It covers the range of activities referred to elsewhere as peace operations and stability (or stabilization) operations.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The State Department's Peacekeeping Operations account (i.e., PKO, also known as the "voluntary" peacekeeping account) funds U.S. contributions to peacekeeping efforts other than assessed contributions to U.N. peacekeeping operations. U.N. assessed contributions are funded through the State Department's Contributions to International Peacekeeping Account (CIPA).

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### Background

Since 1996, the United States has provided field and staff training to develop military capabilities for peacekeeping through the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) and its successor program, ACOTA. Under ACRI/ACOTA, the United States has trained some 16,000 troops and is currently training another 1,000 from nine African nations — Benin, Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, and Senegal.<sup>3</sup> (The number of those trained include a limited number of gendarmes who received the same training as the others.) Training for South African troops is expected to begin later in 2005. Both programs have also provided non-lethal equipment.<sup>4</sup> ACRI provided training in traditional peacekeeping skills where there is an existing cease-fire or peace accord. The more muscular ACOTA, initiated in 2002, has also provided training in the skills needed for African troops to perform peacekeeping tasks in more hostile environments, including force protection, light-infantry operations and small-unit tactics.<sup>5</sup> ACOTA also put greater emphasis on the "train the trainer" aspect.<sup>6</sup> Initially, under ACRI, U.S. soldiers provided field training and oversaw classroom training provided by private contractors.<sup>7</sup> Because of the demand for U.S. soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan, private contractors also began to conduct field training.

Funding for ACRI, which like ACOTA was provided under the State Department's Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) account, totaled \$83.6 million during its six fiscal years (FY1997 - FY2002). (Additional support for ACRI was provided through the Foreign Military Financing program.) ACOTA was funded at \$8 million in FY2003, \$15 million in FY2004, and \$14.88 million for FY2005.

Other support for classroom training of foreign militaries is provided through the EIPC, a "train the trainer" program which began in FY1998. EIPC provides assistance to selected countries — some 31 to date — by designing and implementing a comprehensive, country-specific peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance training and education program to enhance a nation's institutional structure to train and deploy peacekeepers. EIPC funding, which is provided under the Foreign Military

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Ugandan troops were trained briefly under ACRI. That training was halted because of Ugandan involvement in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> This includes communications packages, uniforms, boots, generators, mine detectors, Global Positioning Systems (GPS), and medical and water purification equipment.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Information from a State Department official and Col. Russell J. Handy, USAF, *Africa Contingency Operations Training Assistance: Developing Training Partnerships for the Future of Africa.* Air and Space Power Journal, Fall 2003, as posted at [http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj03/fal03/handy.html].

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Current training packages include Command and Staff Operations Skills, Command Post Exercises (i.e., exercises, often computer-bases, of headquarters commanders and staff) and Peace Support Operations Soldier Skills field training, according to a State Department fact sheet.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> MPRI and Northrup Grummon Information Technology (NGIT) are both qualified to bid for State Department contracts. According to a State Department official, many of the trainers provided by the private contractors are military retirees or reservists.

Financing Program, has totaled about \$33.3 million, including an estimated \$1.79 million in spending in FY2005.

## **GPOI Purposes and Activities**

In his September 21, 2004 address to the opening meeting of the 59<sup>th</sup> session of the U.N. General Assembly, President Bush asserted that the world "must create permanent capabilities to respond to future crises." In particular, he pointed to a need for "more effective means to stabilize regions in turmoil, and to halt religious violence and ethnic cleansing." A similar rationale prompted the Clinton Administration to formulate the ACRI training program in 1996 and underlies the current search for new strategies and mechanisms to prevent and control conflicts.<sup>8</sup>

To accomplish these ends, GPOI, has three major goals:

- Train some 75,000 troops worldwide, with an emphasis on Africa, in peacekeeping skills by 2010. (The number is the total to be trained by all participating countries, according to a State Department official.) The State Department is working with DOD to extend the training to nations from Asia, Europe, and Latin America.
- Support Italy in establishing a center to train international gendarme (constabulary) forces to participate in peacekeeping operations (see section below); and
- Foster an international deployment and logistics support system to transport peacekeepers to the field and maintain them there.

Through GPOI, the State Department also is promoting the exchange of information among donors on peace operations training and exercises in Africa. This is to be accomplished through donors meetings which will serve as a "clearinghouse" to facilitate coordination. The first of these State Department meetings was held in Washington, D.C. on October 7-8, 2004.<sup>9</sup>

For many analysts, continued efforts to improve the peacekeeping skills of African and other military forces is an important step towards controlling the continent's devastating conflicts. In the mid-1990s, several developed nations provided most of the peacekeepers. The perception that developed nations would not be able to sustain the burden indefinitely, as well as the perception that the interests of those nations in Africa were not sufficient to ensure needed troop commitments there, led international capacity-building efforts to focus on Africa.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> For more information on this topic, see CRS Report RS22031, *Peacekeeping and Post-Conflict Capabilities: The State Department's Office for Reconstruction and Stabilization.* 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> The United States European Command (EUCOM) held two previous "clearinghouse" meetings in May and December 2004.

Impetus for GPOI came from the Department of Defense (DOD), where officials in the Office of Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) worked with the State Department for over a year and a half to develop the proposal. Officials in SO/LIC's section on peacekeeping developed the plan as a means to expand and improve the ACOTA program - with more and better exercises and more equipment - as well as to extend the program beyond Africa to other parts of the world. The availability of peacekeeping training may encourage more countries to participate in peacekeeping operations, enable current donors to provide a greater number of troops, and increase the number of countries which potentially could serve as lead nations, according to some analysts.

As of the end of December 2004, almost 25,000 of the nearly 58,000 military personnel who were participating in the current 17 U.N. peacekeeping operations were from the 22 African troop-contributing nations. (African nations provided over half of the military personnel — roughly 24,000 of 47,000 — in the seven U.N. peacekeeping operations in Africa.) Africa's military contribution to UN peacekeeping at the end of 2004 was over double that at the end of 2000; five of the top ten African contributors, who provided some 98% of the military contribution, received training under the ACRI/ACOTA program. African contributions to the U.N. international civilian police pool (CIVPOL) remained just about the same over those four years: 1,213 in December 2004 (of a total of 6,765 from all nations) compared to 1,088 in December 2000.

African militaries also participate in regional peacekeeping operations under the auspices of the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union (AU). (The first ECOWAS peacekeeping mission was deployed to Liberia in 1990. Subsequent missions were deployed to Liberia once again, Guinea Bissau, Sierra Leone, and most recently the Côte d'Ivoire. The AU deployed its first peacekeepers to Burundi in 2003 and Sudan in 2004. All missions but Sudan eventually became U.N. operations.) Both organizations are trying to develop an African stand-by peacekeeping force, comprised of contributions from five regional organizations, by 2010. Under GPOI, the United States will work to enhance and support the command structures and multilateral staff of ECOWAS and the AU.

In addition, attention has recently been focused on the need to develop more "gendarme" capabilities, i.e., specialized units of police with military skills to handle temporary hostile situations such as unruly crowds.<sup>10</sup> Several countries have such

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Gendarme/constabulary forces are trained in both military and policing skills, but are less heavily armed than soldiers. According to the Clinton Administration's Presidential Decision Directive 71 (PDD-71), constabulary tasks include the regulation of peoples' movements when necessary to ensure safety; interventions "to stop civil violence, such as vigilante lynchings or other violent public crimes" and to "stop and deter widespread or organized looting, vandalism, riots or other mob-type action;"and the dispersal of "unruly or violent public demonstrations and civil disturbances." (*Text: The Clinton Administration White Paper on Peace Operations*, February 24, 2000, pp 9-10.) Constabulary forces often can deploy more rapidly than other international civilian police because they usually deploy as "formed units" (i.e., in previously formed working groups) instead of as individuals. They also are often equipped with their own communication and logistical support. See CRS (continued...)

forces, i.e., the Italian *carabinieri*, the French *gendarmerie*, and the Spanish *Guardia Civil*, among others, which in the United States are referred to as constabulary forces.

### **Foreign Response and Contributions**

G8 leaders<sup>11</sup> endorsed the GPOI goals (above) at their June 2004 summit meeting at Sea Island, GA, adopting an "Action Plan on Expanding Global Capability for Peace Support Operations."<sup>12</sup> (This was actually the third G8 Action Plan concerning peacekeeping in Africa. In June 2002, the G8 Summit at Kananaskis, Canada, adopted a broad Africa Action Plan that contained sections on conflict resolution and peace-building efforts. The more specific Joint Africa /G8 Plan to Enhance African Capabilities to Undertake Peace Support Operations was developed over the next year and presented at the June 2003 Summit at Evian-lesbaines, France.<sup>13</sup>) As indicated by the GPOI "clearinghouse" concept, several G8 countries already have significant programs in Africa. In addition to the United States, France and the United Kingdom (UK) conduct bilateral training programs with African militaries. Germany and the UK provided the assistance necessary to launch the regional Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center in Ghana, which opened in 2004; the European Union and other countries, most prominently Canada, Italy, France and the Netherlands, have also assisted the Center.

In his September 2004 speech to the United Nations, President Bush referred to Italy as a joint sponsor of GPOI, because it co-sponsored with the United States the Sea Island G8 peacekeeping action plan. Italy also had moved to establish a school for training gendarme forces even before the United States Congress had provided funding for U.S. support for the school. Italian *carabinieri*, which are widely viewed as a leading model and have played a prominent role in providing constabulary forces to peacekeeping and stabilization operations,<sup>14</sup> have established the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU) at Vicenza. Italy is providing not only the facility, but also most of the staff for the "train the trainer" program, and hopes to begin classes in the fall of 2005.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> (...continued)

Report RL32321, *Policing in Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Problems and Proposed Solutions.* p 34.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> G8 refers to the "Group of 8" major industrialized democracies: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. G8 heads of state, plus representatives from the European Union, meet at annual summits.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Text available at [http://www.g8usa.gov/d\_061004c.htm].

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Texts available at [http://www.g8.gc.ca/2002Kananaskis/kananaskis/afraction-en.pdf] and [http://www.g8.gc.ca/AFRIQUE-01june-en.asp].

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> According to *Carabinieri* officials interviewed by the author, as of mid-November 2004, some 1,300 *carabinieri* were deployed in missions to Iraq, Afghanistan, Eritrea, Albania, and Palestine.

## Action in the 108<sup>th</sup> Congress

Although the initiative had long been in the works, President Bush approved GPOI in April 2004, two months after the FY2005 budget request was submitted to Congress in February. To fund the \$100 million initiative, the Administration proposed that 80% be taken from the DOD budget; the remaining 20% was the ACOTA request in the State Department budget. The Armed Services committees did not back GPOI; its strongest support seemed to come from Senate foreign affairs authorizers and appropriators. The House version of the FY2005 DOD authorization bill, H.R. 4200, as passed May 20, 2004, did not authorize GPOI funding, but Section 1213 requested a Presidential report on it. The accompanying House Armed Services Committee report (H.Rept. 108-491) expressed concern that GPOI would divert funds from U.S. troops.

The Senate initially took no action on, but then supported, GPOI funding. The Senate Armed Services Committee version of the FY2005 DOD authorization bill, S. 2400, contained no funding authorization. An amendment (S.Amdt. 3200), submitted by Senator Inhofe, sought to authorize \$100 million for GPOI, but was not acted upon during floor action in June 2004. However, in September action on its version of the FY2005 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill (S. 2812, S.Rept. 108-346), the Senate provided authority for DOD to transfer funds to the State Department PKO account. No amount or purpose was specified, although the provision was intended for GPOI.

At the end of 2004, Congress provided GPOI funding in action on the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2005 (H.R. 4818/P.L. 108-447). Section 117 of Division J ("Other Matters") provided that "\$80 million may be transferred with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense" to the Department of State Peacekeeping Operations account. The authority is provided notwithstanding any other provision of law, except section 551<sup>15</sup> of Division D (the Foreign Operations appropriations section of the bill), i.e., the "Leahy Amendment" which prohibits the training of military units credibly accused of gross violations of human rights. (A State Department official said that the "notwithstanding" language was requested to provide an exemption from FAA Section 660, which limits U.S. assistance for the training of foreign police.)

Division D of H.R. 4818/P.L. 108-447 contains the \$20 million in State Department PKO funding for ACOTA and the nearly \$1.8 million in EPIC funding that are now subsumed under GPOI. This brings total GPOI fund to a little over \$100 million if the Secretary of Defense concurs with the transfer of the entire \$80 million.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> By coincidence, the section number for the "Leahy Amendment" in P.L. 108-447, Division D, is 551, the same as the number of the FAA section that provides the presidential authority governing the foreign operations PKO account.

## Issues for the 109<sup>th</sup> Congress

The Bush Administration's request for \$114.4 million for GPOI in its FY2006 foreign operations budget request raises three possible major issues for Congressional consideration of this request. These are:

Is the Current Level of GPOI Funding Appropriate? The Administration's FY2006 request constitutes an increase of \$18.2 million in the PKO account funding. However, the request for the overall budget account of which PKO is a part, i.e., Military Assistance, is \$130.7 million less than FY2005 estimated spending. (Military Assistance also contains Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds.) While there seems widespread agreement that the increased participation of African and other militaries in peacekeeping is desirable, some Members may question whether a significantly increased U.S. contribution to train and equip them is essential, given European assistance for these same purposes. Cuts in FMF and IMET may be of concern to some members. Others may wish for greater funding, especially for gendarme training, which may receive only a small part of GPOI funding.

Will the Administration's Choice of FY2006 Recipient Countries Reflect Congressional Perceptions of U.S. Foreign Policy Interests? Given the expectation that several new countries will be selected for military training in FY2006, some Members may desire to influence the choice of new participants. Members may also wish at least to be apprised of the countries from which gendarme units will be trained, in part by U.S. trainers, at the Italian gendarme center at Vicenza, Italy. If GPOI is funded in FY2006 through the State Department PKO account, as requested, its activities would be subject to all provisions of law, unlike the FY2005 activities, which can be conducted "notwithstanding any other provision of law" save the Leahy amendment human rights requirements.

Members may wish to consider whether new limitations, on the one hand, or exceptions or waivers on the other, tailored for GPOI, may be warranted. The State Department is expected to request some form of legislative mechanism to allow funding for the Italian gendarme school, according to a State Department official, as FAA Section 660 prohibits assistance to train or support police forces.<sup>16</sup>

Can the State Department Exercise Sufficient Control and Oversight of Private Contractors? Because of the need for a large number of U.S. soldiers to train Iraqi and Afghani national armies, private contractors are likely to provide the bulk of military training to GPOI participants. Although private contractors can offer advantages, such as specialized local knowledge, in training

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, Section 660 provides that, with certain exceptions, "none of the funds made available to carry out this Act, and none of the local currencies generated under this Act, shall be used to provide training or advice, or provide any financial support, for police, prisons, or other law enforcement forces for any foreign government or any program of internal intelligence or surveillance on behalf of any foreign government within the United States or abroad... ." None of the exceptions apply in this case, according to the State Department official.

situations, occasional problems have arisen with the use of military and police contractors abroad. Members may wish to consider whether the State Department can enforce appropriate professional standards and a code of conduct.