Order Code RL32520
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Emergency Management
Preparedness Standards:
Overview and Options for Congress
Updated February 4, 2005
Keith Bea
Specialist in American National Government
Government and Finance Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Emergency Management Preparedness Standards:
Overview and Options for Congress
Summary
The report issued by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States (also referred to as the “9/11 Commission”) identifies emergency
response gaps evident after the attacks of September 11, 2001. While heroic actions
that day saved thousands of people, many lives were lost, in part because standard
procedures were not in place, or were not followed, and standardized technologies
were not used by participating agencies. To correct these deficiencies, the 9/11
Commission report includes recommendations that emergency response standards be
adopted nationwide.
The report includes three recommendations that focus on emergency response
standards: (1) the adoption and use of emergency response standards for incident
command; (2) mutual aid provisions concerning liability and indemnification of
responders; and (3) private sector preparedness. Through enactment of the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) Congress
addressed these recommendations. In addition, the Department of Homeland
Security has taken action to establish standards to improve emergency response
capabilities.
General agreement appears to exist on the intent of the 9/11 Commission’s
recommendations in this policy area — improvement of the nation’s emergency
response capabilities. During the 109th Congress the policy debate might be extended
to include discussion of the implications and consequences of adopting the 9/11
Commission’s recommendations and implementing federal standards. Questions that
might be raised include the following: Would federally imposed or endorsed
standards diminish the authority and ability of the states, and their local governments,
to establish operational procedures that best fit the needs of their communities?
Would the imposition of standards through legislation raise unfunded mandate
concerns? What effect might the adoption of such standards have upon the
intergovernmental partnership in homeland security and emergency management
response efforts? This report presents background information on the commission’s
findings, on emergency response standards, and on options Congress might consider
to address issues related to emergency preparedness standards. This report will be
updated as legislative developments and administrative actions warrant.

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Contents
9/11 Commission Findings and Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Summary of Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Other Options Related to Emergency Response Standards . . . . . . . . . . 6
Overview of Existing Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Organizations that Establish Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Use of Standards in Accreditation Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Issues and Options for Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Nationwide Adoption of ICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Federal Mutual Aid Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
ANSI Standards for Private Sector Emergency Preparedness . . . . . . . 20
Additional Issue Areas and Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
List of Tables
Table 1. Emergency Management Preparedness Recommendations on
Standards and Related Congressional Action, 9/11 Commission . . . . . . . . . 3
Table 2. Components of NFPA 1600 Standards and Selected Explanatory
Material . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

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Emergency Management
Preparedness Standards:
Overview and Options for Congress
9/11 Commission Findings and Recommendations
The majority of the recommendations issued by the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (“the 9/11 Commission” or “the
commission”) focus on the need to reform the intelligence community of the United
States.1 Based upon two days of public hearings and subsequent evaluation by
commission staff on the responses at the sites of the attacks in New York City and
Virginia, the report recommended improvements in emergency response procedures
and capabilities through the adoption and use of standard modes of organization and
planning.2
The 9/11 Commission concluded that the responses of civilians, public safety
officers, and administrators were heroic and sustained throughout those horrific
events. The commission also concluded that lapses and procedural deficiencies
added to the tragic events of that day. As summarized by the commission, confusion
and tragedy resulted not only from the immense scale of the attacks (particularly in
New York City), but also from inadequate planning, lack of coordination, and
inadequate technology. Of concern to the commission, these deficiencies considered
systemic, were presumed to exist elsewhere in the nation, and accordingly require
attention at the federal level. Summary findings reported by the commission that
bear on these findings include the following:
It is a fair inference, given the differing situations in New York City and
Northern Virginia, that the problems in command, control, and communications
that occurred at both sites will likely recur in any emergency of similar scale.
The task looking forward is to enable first responders to respond in a coordinated
manner with the greatest possible awareness of the situation.3
If New York and other major cities are to be prepared for future terrorist attacks,
different first responder agencies within each city must be fully coordinated, just
as different branches of the U.S. military are. Coordination entails a unified
1 U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11
Commission Report (Washington: GPO, 2004). The report is available online at
[http://www.9-11commission.gov/], visited Feb. 4, 2005.
2 On May 18 and 19, 2004, commission members received testimony from witnesses
familiar with the details of, or were active in the responses to, the sites of the attacks. See
[http://www.9-11commission.gov/hearings/hearing11.htm], visited Feb. 4, 2005.
3 Ibid, p. 315.

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CRS-2
command that comprehensively deploys all dispatched police, fire, and other first
responder resources.4
The attacks on 9/11 demonstrated that even the most robust emergency response
capabilities can be overwhelmed if an attack is large enough. Teamwork,
collaboration, and cooperation at an incident site are critical to a successful
response .... Preparedness in the private sector and public sector for rescue,
restart, and recovery of operations should include (1) a plan for evacuation, (2)
adequate communications capabilities, and (3) a plan for continuity of operations
.... [T]he lack of a widely embraced private-sector preparedness standard was a
principal contributing factor to this lack of preparedness.5
On the basis of these and other findings, the commission issued
recommendations to improve the emergency response capabilities of the federal and
state and local governments, as well as individuals and the private sector.6 The text
of these recommendations is presented in Table 1, below.
4 Ibid, p. 321-322.
5 Ibid, p. 397-398.
6 Other recommendations pertaining to improving emergency response capabilities address
the issues of communications connectivity and federal funding for state and local
governments. These issues are explored in Congressional Research Service reports
available at [http://www.congress.gov/erp/legissues/html/isdhs6.html], visited Feb. 4, 2005.

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CRS-3
Table 1. Emergency Management Preparedness
Recommendations on Standards and
Related Congressional Action, 9/11 Commission
Text of recommendation
Summary statements of
congressional options
“Emergency response agencies
(A) Condition federal homeland
nationwide should adopt the Incident
security funding upon accreditation
Command System (ICS). When
of units of governments;
multiple agencies or multiple
(B) urge or require DHS to evaluate
jurisdictions are involved, they should
the capability of units of government
adopt a unified command. Both are
in terms of ICS attainment;
proven frameworks for emergency
(C) require that funds be
response. We strongly support the
conditioned based on criteria or
decision that federal homeland security
indicators of need;
funding will be contingent, as of
(D) monitor use of ICS through new
October 1, 2004, upon the adoption and
planning mechanisms in process in
regular use of ICS and unified command
DHS;
procedures. In the future, the
(E) mandate that DHS assess
Department of Homeland Security
conditions under which ICS is best
should consider making funding
used; or,
contingent on aggressive and realistic
(F) take no action and allow
training in accordance with ICS and
administrators to decide.
unified command procedures.”
“Congress should pass legislation to
(A) Enact the recommended
remedy the long-standing
legislation;
indemnification and liability
(B) assess the necessary scope of
impediments to the provision of public
such legislation;
safety mutual aid in the National Capital
(C) evaluate the impact of federal
Region and where applicable throughout
legislation on the Emergency
the nation.”A
Management Assistance Compact
(EMAC); or
(D) evaluate the deficienies of
EMAC or other mutual aid
agreements.

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CRS-4
Text of recommendation
Summary statements of
congressional options
“We endorse the American National
(A) Enact legislation requiring that
Standards Institute’s recommended
companies receiving federal
standard for private preparedness. We
contracts adopt the standards
were encouraged by Secretary Tom
through the Federal Acquisition
Ridge’s praise of the standard, and urge
Regulation (FAR);
the Department of Homeland Security to
(B) authorize funds to extend the
promote its adoption. We also
existing accreditation processes to
encourage the insurance and
private companies;
credit-rating industries to look closely at
(C) approve incentives for
a company’s compliance with the ANSI
companies to adopt the ANSI
standard in assessing its insurability and
preparedness standards; or,
creditworthiness. We believe that
(D) take no action unless a mandate
compliance with the standard should
imposing the standard on the private
define the standard of care owed by a
sector is funded.
company to its employees and the
public for legal purposes. Private-sector
preparedness is not a luxury; it is a cost
of doing business in the post-9/11
world. It is ignored at a tremendous
potential cost in lives, money, and
national security.”
Source: The 9/11 Commission Report, pp. 397-398.
A The second recommendation (concerning mutual aid agreements) is not highlighted as a
recommendation, but is included in the discussion of findings on page 397 of the report. It is included
here as a recommendation for Congress as the phrase “Congress should pass legislation ...” serves as
such.
Summary of Issues
The recommendations of the 9/11 Commission in Table 1 share a common
attribute — the assumption that the adoption of standard procedures and guidelines
will improve the capabilities of individuals, businesses, and public agencies to
respond to catastrophes and enhance the safety of individuals and communities after
a disaster occurs. Some may view the recommendations to be the tip of an iceberg
that indicates the need for congressional action on a wide range of matters. Many
other emergency response issues became apparent on September 11th and could be
the subject of congressional examination and action.
This report provides background information on the emergency preparedness
and response topics raised in the commission’s report. It also explores other options
that Congress may choose to consider with regard to those recommendations.
Summary information on the issues that underlie the recommendations follows.

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CRS-5
Adoption of the Incident Command System.
! “Emergency response agencies throughout the nation should adopt
the Incident Command System (ICS).” The ICS has been applied for
decades to minimize operational difficulties as multiple agencies
respond to disaster sites. The Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) incorporated the ICS in the National Incident Management
System (NIMS). State and local governments must adopt NIMS and
ICS protocol in order to receive federal preparedness financial
assistance in FY2006.7 Terrorist attacks pose a particular danger to
responders, as secondary explosions, small arms fire, or chemical
weapons may be used specifically to kill officials or impair rescue
efforts. One issue is whether past principles that have guided ICS
operations might endanger the lives or welfare of first responders
and recovery specialists, and whether ICS has limitations for certain
types of public agencies limited by size, finances, or geographic
characteristics. An attendant concern is the degree to which unified
command structures would accommodate, or might fail to
accommodate, the range of needs and capabilities of responding
agencies. For example, if a terrorist attack suddenly shifts the need
for resources, local agencies and concerned citizens might be
concerned that they would lack sufficient authority to set priorities
and respond as needed under a unified command structure.
Mutual Aid.
! “Congress should pass legislation to remedy indemnification and
liability impediments to mutual aid in the National Capital Region
and other areas.” The 108th Congress enacted legislation pertinent
to this recommendation in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458).8 In addition, almost all of
the states (including Virginia, Maryland, and the District of
Columbia) have incorporated provisions of the Emergency
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) into their statutory
codes. EMAC establishes a framework under which standard
procedures and operational policies are agreed upon by the states to
facilitate the provision of mutual aid when emergencies occur,
including a provision which ensures that when officers or employees
of one state render aid in another in emergency situations, they are
treated as agents of the requesting state for tort and immunity
purposes. [EMAC does not address indemnification.] In addition,
many states have adopted mutual aid compacts that address liability
7 See the NIMS text at U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “National Incident
Management System,” [http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/NIMS-90-web.pdf],
visited Feb. 4, 2005.
8 For more information see page 19 of this report.

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CRS-6
concerns.9 Given the liability protection that EMAC provides to
signatory states, including those in the National Capital Region, if
Congress considers such legislation, it might examine its impact on
EMAC-based agreements among the states, and whether increased
federal action in this area is warranted.
ANSI Emergency Preparedness Standards.
! “The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should promote
adoption of ANSI standards for emergency preparedness by the
private sector.” Like other ANSI standards, the emergency
preparedness standards recommended for adoption are voluntary;
that is, they are not mandated to be adopted. The commission report
urges DHS to take action to promote the adoption of these standards
by the private sector. The appropriate federal role for Congress or
DHS in encouraging the private sector to adopt such standards is an
issue.
Other Options Related to Emergency Response Standards. In
addition to the recommendations of the 9/11 commission, Congress might consider
taking action on the following issues.
! Review of existing federal authorities for emergency response.
Federal statutes provide authority for executive branch actions in the
event of emergencies. Congress might evaluate whether the
authorities should be revised.
! Emergency responder and civilian health. Civilians and first
responders in New York City reportedly have experienced severe
health problems since September 11, 2001.10 Congress might
consider options related to monitoring the health of such responders.
9 State emergency management mutual aid agreements that have been enacted into law by
the states, as well as liability protection provisions for those rendering emergency aid, have
been identified for the states. For a summary see the “Mutual Aid” and “Other” categories
of information in: CRS Report RL32287, Emergency Management and Homeland Security
Statutory Authorities in the States, District of Columbia, and Insular Areas: A Summary, by
Keith Bea, L. Cheryl Runyon, and Kae M. Warnock. For summaries of and citations to the
mutual aid agreements and liability provisions enacted by each state see the individual
profile reports cited in Table 1 of RL32287.
10 The Centers for Disease Control and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health of the Department of Health and Human Services are conducting a baseline screening
study to establish a database of health problems encountered by individuals who worked at
the site of the World Trade Center collapse in the aftermath of the attack. See
[http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/rfa-files/RFA-OH-04-004.html], visited Feb. 4, 2005.

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CRS-7
Overview of Existing Standards
Public safety organizations, analysts, and professional associations have
collaborated for years to develop emergency response standards to improve the
efficiency of response agencies, eliminate obstacles that might impede or prevent the
delivery of assistance after a disaster, and satisfy public and fiduciary agent concerns.
This section of the report introduces, and provides references to, standards and
related processes directly relevant to the two commission recommendations presented
in Table 1, above.
Organizations that Establish Standards. Two non-federal organizations
have developed or endorsed emergency preparedness standards. The activities of
both entities are described first. In addition, at least one federal authority, the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), has established standards
for emergency response actions. A summary of these organizations’ activities
follows.
American National Standards Institute. The American National
Standards Institute (ANSI) is a private, non-profit organization “that administers and
coordinates the U.S. voluntary standardization and conformity assessment system.”11
A “Homeland Security Standards Panel” (ANSI-HSSP) has been established to
facilitate the development of standards related to homeland security needs. The task
before the panel has been summarized as follows.
Established by ANSI in February 2003, the ANSI-HSSP has as its scope to
catalog, promote, accelerate and coordinate the timely development of consensus
standards within the national and international voluntary standards systems
intended to meet identified homeland security needs, and communicate the
existence of such standards appropriately to governmental units and the private
sector. The Panel will initially focus its activities on responding to the most
immediate standards needs of DHS.12
According to information distributed by ANSI in a letter dated January 23, 2004,
the 9/11 Commission asked ANSI to “develop a consensus on a ‘National Standard
for Preparedness’ for the private sector.13 In workshops held in the early months of
2004, ANSI-HSSP served as the forum for discussions among private and public
sector representatives on the improvement of private sector emergency preparedness
11 For information see [http://www.ansi.org/about_ansi/overview/overview.aspx?menuid=1],
visited Feb. 4, 2005.
12 For information on the panel, including meeting schedules and areas of interest, see
[http://www.ansi.org/standards_activities/standards_boards_panels/hssp/overview.aspx?
menuid=3#overview], visited Feb. 4, 2005.
13 This information based on a telephone conversation with Matthew Deane, Secretary for
ANSI-HSSP, and the text of the document titled “Recommendation to the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,” transmitted to CRS. For
information on the standard and the process used in establishing the standard, see
[http://www.ansi.org/news_publications/news_story.aspx?menuid=7&articleid=729], visited
Feb. 4, 2005.

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CRS-8
and business continuity plans. Participants “concluded that a high-level, voluntary
standard applicable to all businesses regardless of industry, size, or location, [was]
needed to establish a common framework for emergency preparedness.”14
Discussions in the workshop focused on the 2004 edition of the
Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs standard acted
upon by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) in late 2003 and made
effective February 5, 2004.15 ANSI subsequently proposed to the 9/11 Commission
that NFPA 1600 “be accepted as the common framework for private-sector national
preparedness;” the 9/11 Commission endorsed the proposal. ANSI-HSSP also
developed recommendations for enhancements to NFPA 1600 that have been
submitted to its technical committee for consideration and has recommended that a
“national implementation strategy” be developed that involves the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and other agencies to support use of the standard.
In addition to the effort conducted thus far by ANSI-HSSP for the 9/11
Commission, ANSI has received a contract from DHS to conduct a large scale effort
to build a database of standards for “products, processes, systems, services and
training programs that relate to homeland security.”16
National Fire Protection Association. The National Fire Protection
Association (NFPA) is a voluntary professional association that, for over 100 years,
has developed standards related to fire prevention and firefighting.17 The NFPA 1600
standard recommended by ANSI that is the subject of the 9/11 Commission’s
endorsement is based upon work that has been conducted for over a decade. The
NFPA Technical Committee on Disaster Management developed NFPA 1600,
Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs
on the basis of work completed on the antecedent document, Recommended Practice
for Disaster Management, initially produced in 1995. The 2000 edition of NFPA
1600 expanded the “recommended practice” to a standard by incorporating
provisions related to emergency management and business continuity programs to
ease the consequences of a disaster. The 2004 edition retains the basic features of the
2000 standard.18
14 Ibid.
15 For background on the development of NFPA 1600, see National Fire Protection
Association, NFPA 1600 Standard on Disaster/Emergency Management and Business
Continuity Programs 2004 Edition, available at [http://www.nfpa.org/PDF/nfpa1600.
pdf?src=nfpa], p.1600-1, visited Feb. 4, 2005.
16 For more information on the standards database project, see [http://www.ansi.org/
news_publications/news_story.aspx?menuid=7&articleid=718], visited Feb. 4, 2005.
17 For background and information on NFPA, see the organization’s website available online
at [http://www.nfpa.org/index.asp?cookie%5Ftest=1], visited Feb. 4, 2005.
18 Information taken from “Origin and Development of NFPA 1600" in NFPA 1600
Standard on Disaster/Emergency management and Business Continuity Programs 2004
Edition, p. 1600-1.

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CRS-9
NFPA 1600 sets out criteria that enable administrators to evaluate existing
programs to improve disaster and emergency management and business continuity
programs. The standard includes five sub-categories — administration, a reserved
section, definitions, program management, and program elements. Table 2 of this
report presents summary information on the components of standards within these
sub-categories. The complete text of the standard should be referred to for further
information.
Table 2. Components of NFPA 1600 Standards and
Selected Explanatory Material
Component or element
Explanatory descriptions
1. Administration
1.1 — Scope of the standard
1.1 — Private and public entities have unique
establishes common criteria for
needs and capabilities; programs designed
disaster/emergency programs.
accordingly.
2. Reserved for Referenced
not applicable
Publications
3. Definitions
See NFPA for details.
See NFPA for details.
4. Program management:
4.1 — Documentation of goals,
4.1 — Policy should include mission statement,
objectives, plans, procedures.
enabling authority.
4.2 — Identification of program
4.2 — Position description for coordinator
coordinator with authority.
should be written.
4.3 — Establishment of advisory
4.3 — Characteristics and authority of advisory
committee.
committee members are identified.
4.4 — Establishment of
4.4 — Evaluation based on program
performance objectives for
management components and program elements
program evaluation.
and periodic review of objectives.

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CRS-10
Component or element
Explanatory descriptions
5. Program elements:
5.1 — Program should address all
5.1 — Management phases include mitigation,
phases of disaster management.
preparedness, response, and recovery.
5.2 — Compliance with legal
5.2 — Include periodic review of authorities and
authorities.
suggested revisions.
5.3 — Identification of hazards
5.3 — Use suggested means for identifying
and vulnerabilities.
hazards and conducting risk assessments.
5.4 — Development of hazard
5.4 — Components of such strategies are
mitigation strategy.
identified.
5.5 — Identification of means to
5.5 — The categories of resources are identified,
allocate resources.
along with organizations.
5.6 — Composition of mutual aid
5.6 — Identifies the types of such agreements
agreements.
and some characteristics and components.
5.7 — Development of plans and
5.7 — Attributes of plans and the processes to
identification of elements.
be followed are identified.
5.8 — Development of means to
5.8 — Incident management system that
control response and recovery
includes procedures to facilitate control of
operations.
disaster area should be developed.
5.9 — Establishment of warning
5.9 — Protocols should be tested and include
procedures.
interoperability testing.
5.10 — Development and
5.10 — Procedures are to be established to
implementation of operational
minimize property damage, assess damages, and
procedures.
provide for continuity of operations.
5.11 — Identification of logistical
5.11 — The capabilities of facilities and
resources and facilities to support
associated resources should meet expected
response efforts.
needs.
5.12 — Assessment of training
5.12 — Training and curriculum should comply
needs and development of
with applicable regulations and records
curriculum.
maintained.
5.13 — Evaluation of procedures
5.13 — Corrective actions should be taken to
and exercises.
address deficiencies.
5.14 — Development of
5.14 — Public information capabilities should
procedures to provide information.
identify communication modes.
5.15 — Development of finance
5.15 — Framework should allow for flexibility
and administration procedures.
and means of expediting requests.
The entire NFPA 1600 document comprises 40 pages. However, a relatively
small portion of NFPA 1600 identifies standards; most of the document contains
references to organizations and related information sources, including other NFPA
standards for specific activities.19
19 For brief statements of required program components see Ibid, pp. 1600-4 through 1600-7.
Explanatory information on some, but not all components is presented in Annex A, pp.
1600-7 through 1600-12. The remainder of the document comprises lists of organizations
(pp. 1600-12 through 1600-25 and pp. 1600-26 through 1600-36) and references to
supporting documents (pp. 1600-25, 26 and pp. 1600-36 through 1600-38).

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Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).20 The
Hazardous Waste Operations and Emergency Response standard (HAZWOPER) is
a federal regulation issued by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) that specifies standards for employees responding to a hazardous materials
incident, including public safety personnel.21 Congress directed OSHA to develop
the regulation in 1986, after finding OSHA’s actions on hazardous material response
to a 1980 authorization deficient.22
The HAZWOPER regulation took effect in March 1990 and addresses several
elements of hazardous materials response. It identifies the types of organizations and
operational activities that must comply with the standards, precautionary actions to
be taken when hazardous materials are removed from a site, training requirements,
elements of an emergency response plan (lines of authority, site security, and
evacuation), and medical evaluations of responders, among other matters.
Appendices to the regulation provide specifications on test methods for personal
equipment, types and levels of protective gear, compliance and training curriculum
guidelines, and reference sources. The regulation specifies the levels of knowledge,
skills, and abilities that emergency responders must possess at specified competency
levels.
A number of HAZWOPER provisions were based on NFPA standards for
hazardous materials response. The HAZWOPER standard has served as the basis of
some federal agencies’ response practices, including those of the Environmental
Protection Agency and the U.S. Coast Guard.
Use of Standards in Accreditation Processes. Two systems are in use
to assess the capabilities of agencies and the quality of emergency preparedness
programs. The Emergency Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) consists of
a tool that may be used to evaluate emergency management programs. The National
Emergency Management Baseline Capability Assurance Program (NEMB-CAP),
administered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within the
Department of Homeland Security, is used to assess the emergency response
capabilities of state and local governments and tribal organizations.
20 Summary of HAZWOPER standard primarily derived from: CRS Report RL31680,
Homeland Security: Standards for State and Local Preparedness, by Ben Canada.
21 29 CFR 1910.120. Implementation guides have been developed pursuant to the
HAZWOPER regulations. See, for example: David M. Einolf, HAZWOPER Incident
Command; A Manual for Emergency Responders (Rockville, MD: Government Institutes,
1998) and Incident Command (Alsip, IL: North Central Environmental and Industrial Safety
Training Center, 1995).
22 The 1986 directive is found in Title I of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act of 1986 (SARA, P.L. 99-499), 42 U.S.C. 9601-9675. The 1980 authorization is found
in Title I of the Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation Liability and
Recovery Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-510).

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Emergency Management Accreditation Program. The Emergency
Management Accreditation Program (EMAP) is an incorporated, nonprofit
organization administered through the Council of State Governments and jointly
sponsored by national organizations concerned with the improvement of state and
local emergency management capabilities.23 The EMAP process enables state and
local emergency management agencies to conduct evaluations of their emergency
response capabilities. As summarized by EMAP administrators:
By offering consistent standards and a process through which emergency
management programs can demonstrate compliance, EMAP will strengthen
communities’ capabilities in responding to all types of hazards, from tornadoes
and earthquakes to school violence and bioterrorism. Accreditation is voluntary
and is not tied to any type of funding. Its intent is to encourage examination of
strengths and weaknesses, pursuit of corrective measures, and communication
and planning among different sectors of government and the community.24
The standards used in the EMAP process are derived from NFPA 1600 and “are
essentially the same as those listed in NFPA 1600 — training based upon an
assessment of need, focus on building awareness and skills, identification of
frequency and scope of training, incident management training, and record
keeping.”25 As part of the process, evaluators examine the components of a
jurisdiction’s emergency management program against the EMAP standard. As an
example of the type of information sought in EMAP evaluations, crisis
communications and public information components should include procedures for
communication with the public before and after a disaster, the support of joint
information centers, and protocols for communicating with the media, legislators,
and others.26 Broad areas covered by EMAP include program structure, legal
authorities, risk assessment capabilities, hazard mitigation strategies, resource
management, planning, logistics, communications, finance, and training. As of
September 2004, three jurisdictions (Arizona, Florida, and the District of Columbia)
had attained EMAP accreditation. In addition to states, units of local government are
involved in the accreditation process.
23 Organizations involved in the EMAP process include the National Emergency
Management Association (NEMA, comprised of state officials), the International
Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM, comprised of local officials), the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and others. Staff support for EMAP is provided
by NEMA and funded primarily from FEMA. For details on EMAP, see
[http://www.emaponline.org/What/Background/Description_Full.cfm], visited Feb. 4, 2005.
24 Ibid.
25 Email of July 23, 2004, with William Waugh, Department of Public Administration and
Urban Studies, Georgia State University, 2004 member of the EMAP commission.
26 See the deconstructed standards for component 3-13.1, “Crisis Communication, Public
Education, and Information,” presented in an Excel spreadsheet program at
[http://www.emaponline.org/EMAP/Registered/Awareness/EMAP%20Devolve_Revised
_1003.xls], visited Feb. 4, 2005.

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National Capability Assurance. The Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security administers the
National Emergency Management Baseline Capability Assurance Program (NEMB-
CAP) “to establish a baseline measurement of the nation’s emergency management
capabilities and to help the emergency management community at all levels to
improve its ability to prepare for and respond to emergencies and disasters of all
kinds.”27 NEMB-CAP uses the EMAP process and “associated assessment
processes” in evaluating the emergency management capabilities of state and local
governments and tribal organizations. According to one news report, 30 states
completed baseline assessments by mid-September 2004.28
Issues and Options for Congressional Action
The findings and recommendations of the 9/11 Commission concerning
emergency preparedness standards include several facets that might be considered
appropriate for congressional action. These include the three presented in Table 1
of this report, as follows:
! adoption of the Incident Command System (ICS) nationwide and
encouragement of training in ICS procedures by conditioning federal
funding on such actions;
! congressional approval of legislation to remedy indemnification and
liability impediments to mutual aid agreements;
! promotion of the ANSI standards for private preparedness by the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Nationwide Adoption of ICS. The 9/11 Commission report found that a
unified command structure on September 11, 2001, could have resolved some of the
problems encountered in New York City that day.29 Failures identified by
commission staff (e.g., the difficulty fire commanders experienced communicating
with their units, the lack of knowledge about the availability of “self-dispatched”
responders, the failure to integrate the work of 911 operators and fire dispatchers, and
the lack of coordination with dispatched units at the site of the attack) are capable of
being addressed through ICS and associated training.
The ICS framework was developed in the 1970s after a series of California
wildfires led some to observe recurring problems when more than one agency
responded to the fires. These problems included inconsistent terminology and plans,
inflexibility in responding to the shifting demands posed by a moving disaster, and
a dearth of adequate facilities. ICS is generally recognized to be an appropriate
framework to address these and other problems as the classification level of the
27 See [http://www.fema.gov/preparedness/baseline.shtm], visited Feb. 4, 2005.
28 Alice Lipowicz, “A National Emergency Preparedness Standard is on the Way,” CQ
Homeland Security CQ.Com, visited Sept. 17, 2004.
29 See The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 321

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CRS-14
disaster may fluctuate, requirements of responders adjusted, functions added or
subtracted, and units assigned as needed.30 Five components comprise ICS:
command, planning, operations, logistics, and finance/administration.
For decades, many emergency management officials have debated, refined, and
adopted ICS. The reach and complexity of the attacks of September 11, 2001,
stimulated renewed interest in ICS, and related systems, even before 9/11
Commission examined the issue. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 mandated that
the Secretary of DHS build a “national incident management system” (NIMS) to
respond to disasters and attacks.31 Subsequently, President Bush issued a presidential
directive that required that the Secretary prepare a NIMS that must include, among
other features, “a core set of concepts, principles, terminology, and technologies
covering the incident command system.”32
During the course of its investigation the commission concluded that the
confusion and losses of September 11, 2001, indicated the need for widespread
adoption of a unified command system. The report also noted, however, that the
conditions of the tragedy in New York City differed in important respects from those
that occurred at the Pentagon.33 Since the National Response Plan (NRP) and NIMS
will incorporate the ICS approach, it is likely that DHS and state and local
governments will become increasingly adept at using and participating in an ICS
controlled response.
While the level of awareness and acceptance of the ICS standard appears greater
than in years past, few appear to disagree with the conclusion of the 9/11
Commission that action should be taken to ensure that it is adopted throughout the
nation. In considering the recommendation Congress might elect to review several
issues, including the following.
! The appropriate role of Congress, or an executive branch agency
such as DHS, in encouraging or mandating the method by which
state and local governments train and manage emergency response
operations. Most of the disasters that occur throughout the United
States are managed by local government officials, notably fire and
law enforcement units. Some might contend that the imposition of
the ICS system, as set out in the National Incident Management
30 Under HAZWOPER regulations, for example, the incident commander assesses the need
for resources under the following four levels: Level A, the highest degree of skin and
respiratory protection of responders; Level B, the highest level of respiratory protection and
a lower degree of skin protection; Level C, a lower level of respiratory protection but a
comparable level of skin protection; and Level D, the lowest level of protection required.
See Incident Command (Alsip, IL: North Central Environmental and Industrial Safety
Training Center, 1995), p. 4-6.
31 Sec. 502(5) of P.L. 107-296, 6 U.S.C. 312(5).
32 U.S. President (George W. Bush), “Management of Domestic Incidents,” Homeland
Security Presidential Directive-5, Sec. 15, Feb. 28, 2003, available at [http://www.fas.org/
irp/offdocs/nspd/hspd-5.html], visited Feb. 4, 2005.
33 See The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 315.

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CRS-15
System (NIMS), signals federal involvement in an arena traditionally
administered by state or local governments. Such individuals might
argue that such an approach could lead to practices and decisions
that may result in inefficiencies, more bureaucracy, or an erosion of
state authority guaranteed under the Tenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution.34 Others might argue that the national threat posed by
catastrophic terrorist attacks, or other disasters, requires a more
integrated response capability that can only be built with federal
involvement.35
! ICS might be a challenge for small jurisdictions with few resources
that can be allocated to prepare for a multi-agency response. Small
or lower-income communities would likely be overwhelmed by a
significant terrorist attack, and often find their resources stretched to
respond to lesser events. If such communities are required to adopt
ICS principles as a condition of receiving federal funds, some may
contend that they are ill-equipped to spend time and effort meeting
the federal requirement, particularly if federal funding terminates
and the community is faced with funding the enhanced capabilities
on its own. The caution developed by one source appears
applicable:
A caveat should be entered here: ICS approaches incident control from the task,
tactical, and strategic perspectives of the fire service and appears to assume a
large, well-organized, and probably urban fire department. The system may not
be appropriate for local governments with small or mid-sized fire departments
and may require considerable refitting for nonfire emergency activities.
Regardless of the size of the community, the ICS application should be flexible
enough to allow for local differences in organization, politics, and needs. ICS
should therefore be reviewed for applicability before it is adopted.36
! The ICS framework may help as well as hinder spontaneous and
creative responses by volunteers. Following the attacks in New
York City on September 11, 2001, thousands of volunteers arrived
at the site to provide any assistance possible. Many arrived without
skills or without a connection to one of the many voluntary
organizations that traditionally provide disaster assistance. The
surge of people to a disaster scene adds to the complexity of the
34 For example, see William C. Nicholson, “The New (?) Federal Approach to
Emergencies,” Homeland Protection Professional, vol. 2, Aug. 2003, p. 8.
35 One summary of the application of ICS to the wildfires that burned thousands of acres
noted that both local and out-of-state firefighters were not familiar with ICS protocol and
procedures. See Sandra Sutphen, “California Wildfires: How Integrated Emergency
Management Succeeds and Fails,” in Richard T. Sylves and William L. Waugh, Jr., Disaster
Management in the U.S. and Canada (Springfield, IL.: Charles C. Thomas, Pub., 1996), p.
182.
36 Thomas E. Drabek and Gerard J. Hoetmer, eds., Emergency Management: Principles and
Practice for Local Government (Washington: International City Management Association,
1991), p. 277.

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CRS-16
event and creates additional demands on professional responders.
Conversely, the positive effect volunteers have in helping victims as
well as responders is well documented. The positive and negative
impacts of ICS on spontaneous volunteer responses, both those
initiated on impulse and those associated with some training could
be investigated.37 In addition, formal volunteer efforts could be part
of that analysis. Community Emergency Response Teams (CERTs)
represent one method by which the efforts of volunteers can be
systematically brought into the response process.38
! Nationwide implementation of ICS is a challenge for certain types
of first responders. At a recent hearing before Congress a DHS
official noted that administration officials have spoken of
“compliance with the ICS as being possible in the short term.” Such
a claim, however, is being challenged. Representatives of the law
enforcement, fire fighting, and emergency medical response
communities testified that some agencies need more time to adopt
NIMS and work under an ICS framework. Also, the witnesses spoke
of the need to further develop the NIMS document to address
specific concerns of their sector.39
In light of these concerns and cautions, Congress may explore the following
options:
! fully endorse the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission regarding
the ICS system by enacting legislation that would require the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to condition homeland
security funding for all state and local governments on adoption of
and training associated with ICS procedures;
! endorse the recommendation, in part, by enacting legislation that
would require DHS to condition homeland security funding for state
and local governments that adopt the ICS framework and attain
minimum accreditation status through EMAP or NEMB-CAP;
37 For related research see James Kendra and Tricia Wachtendorf, “Creativity in Emergency
Response to the World Trade Center Disaster,” and Seana Lowe and Alice Fothergill, “A
Need to Help: Emergent Volunteer Behavior after September 11th,” both in: Beyond
September 11th: An Account of Post-Disaster Research, available at [http://www.colorado.
edu/hazards/sp/sp39/], visited Feb. 4, 2005.
38 For example, see Colin A. Campbell, “CERT’s Growth Spurt,” Homeland Protection
Professional, vol. 3, July 2004: pp. 30-38.
39 U.S. Congress, House, Select Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on
Emergency Preparedness and Response, Hearing on the National Incident Management
System: Enhancing Response to Terrorist Attacks, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., hearing, Sept. 29,
2004, unpublished.

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CRS-17
! consider the recommendation as guidance to be given to DHS in
evaluating the emergency response capabilities of state, local, and
tribal governments under NEMB-CAP;
! mandate that federal funds be conditioned upon adoption and
implementation of ICS, so long as applicants meet specified criteria
or indicators of need, such as population size, history of disasters
and a track record of management problems, or vulnerability to
terrorist attack;
! through its oversight mechanisms, monitor the application of ICS as
the new procedures set out in NIMS and the NRP are implemented;
! through legislation or report language, mandate that DHS evaluate
the advantages and disadvantages of nationwide adoption of ICS,
and report to Congress by a specified date; or,
! take no action and allow DHS, state emergency management
officials, and local officials to design the approach most appropriate
to the nation’s and local areas’ safety.
Federal Mutual Aid Legislation. The 9/11 Commission report includes the
finding that “a serious obstacle to multi-jurisdictional response has been the lack of
indemnification for mutual-aid responders in areas such as the National Capital
Region.”40 The report continues that federal and state emergency management
officials should develop “a regional focus” and promote mutual aid agreements, and
that federal legislation is needed to address “long-standing indemnification and
liability impediments” to mutual aid emergency response in the Washington, D.C.
area “and where applicable throughout the nation.”41
Relatively little support is offered by the commission for the recommendation
that Congress enact legislation to rectify indemnification and liability impediments.42
Some may contend that this statement is given a lower status than the formal
recommendations as it is presented as a statement in a paragraph, not a bolded
40 The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 397.
41 Ibid.
42 To the extent found, references in the report and the pertinent staff statement evoked
positive aspects of mutual aid at the Pentagon. For example, Staff Statement #14 noted that
“Local, regional, state and federal agencies immediately responded to the Pentagon attack
.... Regional mutual aid, as in Northern Virginia, could become a formal joint response plan
with neighboring jurisdictions working together ....” See pp. 5,6. By comparison, the report
noted that a lack of coordination hampered the response in New York City. However no
references could be found in the report or staff statements indicating that indemnification
and liability impediments obstructed the response in New York City. It is appropriate to
note, however, that New York and five other states were not EMAC participants until after
September 11, 2001. It is possible that the commission staff found that the absence of the
liability protection offered through EMAC impeded response efforts from other states, but
failed to include that finding in the report.

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CRS-18
recommendation.43 To assist Congress in more fully evaluating the 9/11 Commission
report, this statement is examined as a commission recommendation in this report.
Emergency management mutual aid agreements have been negotiated and
approved by the states for years.44 Of greatest significance, the Emergency
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), approved by Congress in 1996, is the
primary mutual aid agreement that facilitates the provision of emergency response
aid among signatory states.45 Also of note, proposed model mutual aid legislation has
been developed by state emergency response organizations.46
EMAC establishes a framework under which standard procedures and
operational policies are agreed upon by the states to facilitate the provision of mutual
aid when emergencies occur. Article VI of EMAC includes a provision which
ensures that when officers or employees of one state render aid in another in
emergency situations, they are treated as agents of the requesting state for tort and
immunity purposes. The text of the article follows.
Officers or employees of a party state rendering aid in another state pursuant to
this compact shall be considered agents of the requesting state for tort liability
and immunity purposes. No party state or its officers or employees rendering aid
in another state pursuant to this compact shall be liable on account of any act or
omission in good faith on the part of such forces while so engaged or on account
of the maintenance or use of any equipment or supplies in connection therewith.
Good faith in this article shall not include willful misconduct, gross negligence,
or recklessness.47
EMAC does not provide for indemnification of officers or employees held liable for
acts or omissions not accomplished in good faith.48
Through EMAC or specific provisions enacted into law many states have
adopted mutual aid compacts that address liability concerns. For example,
43 This statement is considered a recommendation in this CRS report as the 9/11 commission
report uses the phrase “Congress should ....”
44 For a summary of state emergency management mutual aid agreements see CRS Report
RL32287 Emergency Management and Homeland Security Statutory Authorities in the
States, District of Columbia, and Insular Areas: A Summary, by Keith Bea, L. Cheryl
Runyon and Kae M. Warnock. For citations to emergency management mutual aid
agreements adopted by each state see the “Mutual Aid” section of each state profile listed
in Table 1 of CRS Report RL32287.
45 For information on EMAC, see CRS Report RS21227, The Emergency Management
Assistance Compact (EMAC): An Overview, by Keith Bea.
46 See “Proposed Model Intrastate Mutual Aid Legislation,” at [http://emacweb.org/docs/
NEMA%20Proposed%20Intrastate%20Model-Final.pdf], visited Feb. 4, 2005.
47 P.L. 104-321, 110 Stat. 3880.
48 Liability protection statutes ensure that individuals or organizations that take certain
action cannot be sued. Indemnification statutes, by comparison, provide for government
reimbursement of individuals and organizations for payments for which they are held liable.

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CRS-19
Washington, D.C., Virginia, and Maryland, the sovereign entities within the National
Capital Region (NCR), have incorporated EMAC into their statutory codes, in
addition to other mutual aid provisions.49
Through enactment of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
of 2004 (P.L. 108-458) the 108th Congress acted to resolve concerns that the existing
provisions did not provide sufficient protection. The statute authorizes NCR state
and local officials to enter into mutual aid agreements for emergency response and
training purposes. The statute also specifies that EMAC provisions are not affected
by this provision. This provision, limited to the NCR, was adopted in conference
committee negotiations instead of the broader provision adopted by the House in its
version of the legislation.50
During the 109th Congress Members may elect to revisit the issue by considering
the following options:
! enact legislation, comparable to that passed by the House in 2004 in
H.R. 10, that specifically protects all emergency responders from
liability concerns and provides indemnification;
! assess the scope of the problem and determine whether legislation
should: reach beyond the provisions of Article VI of EMAC, solely
address the issue of indemnification or extend other protections, or
authorize the use of disaster relief funds to reimburse states and
municipalities for costs associated with providing mutual aid;51
! assess the impact of such legislation on EMAC-based agreements
among the states, and the consequences of increased federal action
in an area that has historically been addressed among the states; or,
! evaluate the areas in which existing mutual aid agreements,
including EMAC, have proven deficient and could benefit from
federal action.
49 See D.C. Code Ann. §7-2332, §7-2206; Virginia Code §44-146.28:1, §44-146.14(b);
Maryland Criminal Procedure Code §2-105(e).
50 Section 5101 et. seq. of H.R. 10, as approved by the House, (“Mutual Aid and Litigation
Management Authorization Act of 2004”) would have limited liability of responders,
throughout the nation, to the extent permitted by law of the source state of the responding
party.
51 Congress appropriates disaster relief funds to DHS to pay for the costs associated with the
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. 5121 et seq.
For background see CRS Report RL32242, Emergency Management Funding for the
Department of Homeland Security: Information and Issues for FY2005, by Keith Bea,
Shawn Reese, Wayne Morrissey, Frank Gottron, and C. Stephen Redhead.

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ANSI Standards for Private Sector Emergency Preparedness. The
9/11 Commission report endorsed the emergency management standards
recommended by ANSI; those standards are based upon NFPA 1600. According to
the commission, the adoption of such standards is essential, since the private sector
owns and manages the majority of the critical infrastructure in the United States.
Private civilians at their places of employment may be the first responders to the
scene of an attack.52
ANSI has traditionally operated on the basis that the standards adopted by the
organization are voluntary. If the recommendation is adopted, consumers and
government officials recognize that a company or product in compliance with ANSI
standards meets specified levels of quality and safety.
Witnesses at a hearing held in November 2003 reportedly testified that “the
private sector remains largely unprepared for a terrorist attack,” and “the lack of a
widely embraced private sector preparedness standards was a principal contributing
factor to this lack of preparedness.” The 9/11 Commission concluded that private
preparedness plans should consist of three components — evacuation plans,
communications capabilities, and continuity of operations plans.
The Commission report does not recommend legislative action on this issue;
instead, the report urges DHS to promote adoption of the standard and encourages
private sector action through insurance and credit-rating actions. Members of the
Commission may have concluded that congressional action might not be appropriate
because legislation might involve a discussion of whether the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act (UMRA) provisions would be at issue.53 UMRA established
mechanisms to limit federal imposition of unfunded mandates on other levels of
government (called “intergovernmental mandates”) and on the private sector. The
statute allows points of order to be raised if committees do not include a report on
mandates projected to cost the private sector $117 million or more.54
Options that might be considered by Congress in this area include:
! require that private companies adopt ANSI standards in order to be
certified as a “responsible source” under the Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR);55
52 The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 398.
53 P.L. 104-4, 2 U.S.C. 658(5), (7).
54 For background on UMRA see CRS Report RS20058, Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
Summarized, by Keith Bea and Richard S. Beth. See provisions at 2 U.S.C. 658b(c), 2
U.S.C. 658c, 2 U.S.C. 658d.
55 Under FAR, such companies must meet certain compliance requirements. For example,
pursuant to the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-690), companies must agree to
provide a drug-free workplace to employees. Congress could enact legislation that similarly
required that companies meet the ANSI emergency preparedness standard. For the FAR
regulation, see Subpart 23.5, “Drug-Free Workplace,” at [http://www.arnet.gov/far/current/
pdf/FAR.book.pdf], visited Feb. 4, 2005.

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! enact legislation authorizing funds that would extend existing
accreditation processes, either or both EMAP and NEMB-CAP, to
the private sector, bringing to the companies the resources necessary
to fully assess their emergency preparedness capabilities;
! approve incentives for the private sector to adopt the ANSI
standards, perhaps through the use of business tax write-offs,
extension of tax credits, tax deduction of accelerated depreciation,
or conditioning the receipt of federal assistance such as Small
Business Administration loans;56 or
! take no action.
On September 23, 2004, DHS released an Internet-based campaign that provides
instructions to businesses on preparedness for and response to attacks and other
disasters. Continuity of business plans, physical security, cost estimates of certain
preparedness activities, and emergency plans are components of the program.57
Businesses can also obtain information on preparedness activities by calling a toll-
free number established by DHS (1-800-237-3239).
Additional Issue Areas and Options
The 9/11 Commission focused on broad policy areas, notably the intelligence
failures related to the attacks. The emergency management issues considered by the
commission were limited to those observed during the immediate response to the
attacks. While the work of the commission has raised awareness of emergency
response issues, it arguably has identified only the tip of the iceberg of a vast area of
public policy. The devastation of September 11 made evident a number of issues,
deficiencies, and problems that might be explored by Congress. These include the
following.
! Authorities and triggers for federal action. Both the attack on the
Pentagon and in New York City resulted in explosions. The Stafford
Act authorizes the President to issue a major disaster declaration,
and therefore dedicate the full range of federal resources, in the
event of fires or explosions “regardless of cause.”58 Some terrorist
attacks, however, may involve the dispersal of chemical weapons,
prolonged small arms fire in different locations, cyber-attacks, or
other causal agents that are not covered by existing law. To a certain
extent, the President may use the authority under the National
Emergencies Act to expedite federal assistance and coordinate
56 For a brief summary of the impact of tax incentives on the economy see David L.
Brumbaugh, “An Economic Framework for Evaluating Taxes,” at [http://www.congress.gov/
brbk/html/ebtxr30.html], visited Feb. 4, 2005.
57 “Ready Business,” at [http://www.ready.gov/business/index.html], visited Feb. 4, 2005.
58 42 U.S.C. 5122(2).

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CRS-22
response. At issue may be the adequacy of existing emergency
response authorities and triggers and whether there is a need to
establish legislative standards for presidential or other executive
actions.59
! Emergency responder and civilian health. Some have contended
that the air was so full of pollutants in downtown Manhattan on
September 11, 201, that it could have been declared a site for federal
assistance under major environmental laws. The adequacy of
existing laws, and the need for standards for measuring threats to
responders and civilians might be considered by Congress.60
! Emergent or spontaneous actions. Disaster research indicates that
the behavior of responders and civilians at the scene of a catastrophe
does not resemble the horrified mass of people running away and
trampling each other (as often represented in movies) but concerned
and committed individuals willing to sacrifice to help others. The
effect of federal policy on informal emergency response activities
might be examined. As summarized by one team of researchers,
“Creative action as exhibited by emergency response personnel and
groups after the attacks yielded not only positive results but also
conflicts and challenges, not unlike those documented in prior
studies of the convergence phenomenon after disasters, in which
volunteers, opportunists, and others converge on the scene, adding
an element of uncontrollability that can complicate emergency
operations, safety, and security.”61
Conclusion
The report by the 9/11 Commission has stimulated discussion throughout the
nation on a range of issues, primarily concerned with intelligence reform, associated
with the attacks of 2001. Recommendations in the report section “Protect Against
and Prepare for Terrorist Attacks” concern the capabilities of the public and private
sectors to adequately prepare for and respond to further attacks. Those
recommendations pertinent to the adoption or use of emergency management
standards have been discussed in this report.
59 For background on the National Emergencies Act see CRS Report RS21017, Terrorist
Attacks and National Emergencies Declarations, by Harold C. Relyea.
60 See sections on public health studies and environmental hazard assessment in: CRS
Report RL31464 Federal Disaster Policies After Terrorists Strike: Issues and Options for
Congress, coordinated by Keith Bea.
61 Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center, Public Entity Risk
Institute, and Institute for Civil Infrastructure Systems, Beyond September 11th: An Account
of Post-Disaster Research (Boulder, CO: University of Colorado, 2003), p. 6, available at
[http://www.colorado.edu/hazards/sp/sp39/], visited Feb. 4, 2005.

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While most observers believe some of the recommendations have merit and may
lead to improved protection and response capabilities, it may also be argued that
adoption of the recommendations may impact long-standing practices, impose new
obligations, and possibly affect constitutional protections for the states.
It appears that the federal role in emergency management will continue to grow
in certain areas, presaging a more activist federal government and a greater span of
federal control. It is also possible that the actions taken by Congress will stimulate
and maintain a commitment of non-federal resources and capabilities by funding
programs, encouraging DHS and the states to incorporate standards in their
operational procedures, and more fully engage in emergency management activities.
On the other hand, Congress might take no action on some or all of the
recommendations, allowing the private sector and the state and local governments to
develop mechanisms for improving emergency response capabilities.

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