Order Code RS21721
Updated January 27, 2005
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Kosovo’s Future Status and U.S. Policy
Steven Woehrel
Specialist in European Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
The future status of Kosovo is perhaps the most sensitive and potentially
destabilizing political question in the Balkans. The Administration views “getting
Kosovo right” as key to integrating the Balkans into Euro-Atlantic institutions. This
report discusses the issue of Kosovo’s future status; that is, whether it should become
an independent country, or have some form of autonomy within Serbia. The United
States and its partners in the international Contact Group proposed in November 2003
that Kosovo’s status could be reviewed in mid-2005, if Kosovo makes “sufficient”
progress in meeting certain standards. However, widespread anti-Serb riots in Kosovo
in March 2004 exposed serious weaknesses in Kosovar and international institutions and
raised questions about U.S. and international strategy in Kosovo. The 109th Congress
may consider legislation on Kosovo’s status. This report will be updated as events
warrant. For more on the current situation in Kosovo, see CRS Report RL31053,
Kosovo and U.S. Policy.
Background
The current status of Kosovo is governed by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244,
passed in June 1999 at the end of the Kosovo conflict. The resolution authorizes an
international military and civilian presence in Kosovo, the duration of which is at the
discretion of the Security Council. The NATO-led peacekeeping force KFOR is charged
with maintaining a secure environment, while the U.N. Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) is
given the chief role in administering Kosovo on a provisional basis. The resolution
provides for an interim period of autonomy for Kosovo of undefined length, until
negotiations on the future status of the province take place. UNMIK is tasked with
gradually transferring its administrative responsibilities to elected, interim autonomous
government institutions, while retaining an oversight role. In a future stage, UNMIK will
oversee the transfer of authority from the interim autonomous institutions to permanent
ones, after Kosovo’s future status is determined. UNSC Resolution 1244 provides little
insight into how the status issue should be resolved, saying only that it should be
determined by an unspecified “political process.” However, the resolution explicitly
confirms the territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (consisting of
Serbia and neighboring Montenegro) and calls for “substantial autonomy” for Kosovo
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

---

CRS-2
“within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.” The FRY was dissolved in February 2003,
replaced with a looser “state union” entitled “Serbia and Montenegro.” Kosovars believe
that the dissolution of the FRY invalidates this portion of UNSC Resolution 1244, while
the international community views Kosovo as part of Serbia.
In May 2001, after consultation with local leaders, UNMIK issued a Constitutional
Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo. The Constitutional Framework
called for a Kosovo parliament and government, which was formed in March 2002 after
parliamentary elections. UNMIK has oversight or control of policy in many “reserved
competencies,” including law enforcement, the judiciary, protection of the rights of
communities, monetary and budget policy, customs, state property and enterprises, and
external relations. UNMIK can invalidate legislation passed by the parliament if it judges
it to be in conflict with UNSC Resolution 1244. KFOR remains in charge of Kosovo’s
security. The Constitutional Framework does not address the question of Kosovo’s future
status, saying only that it would be determined through a process “which shall...take into
account all relevant factors, including the will of the people.”
“Standards Before Status”
In 2002, UNMIK chief Michael Steiner outlined a series of standards of international
expectations for Kosovo’s institutions and society, and said that they should be achieved
before the issue of Kosovo’s future status is discussed. This policy has been dubbed
“standards before status,” and it forms the basis of U.S. and international policy in
Kosovo. The standards are (1) the existence of effective, representative and functioning
democratic institutions; (2) enforcement of the rule of law; (3) freedom of movement; (4)
sustainable returns of refugees and displaced persons, and respect for the rights of
communities; (5) creation of a sound basis for a market economy; (6) fair enforcement of
property rights; (7) normalized dialogue with Belgrade; and (8) transformation of the
Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) in line with its mandate. UNMIK released a highly
detailed “Standards Implementation Plan” on March 31, 2004.1
In November 2003, U.S. Under Secretary of State Marc Grossman announced, with
the support of the other members of the international Contact Group (Britain, France,
Germany, Italy, and Russia), a formal review in mid-2005 on Kosovo’s progress toward
meeting the standards. If in the judgement of the Contact Group, the U.N. Security
Council and other interested parties, this progress is “sufficient,” a process to determine
the province’s status may begin.
March 2004 Violence and Kosovo’s Status
The international community’s nearly five years of efforts to bring stability to
Kosovo suffered a serious blow in March 2004. The death of two ethnic Albanian boys
near the divided city of Mitrovica sparked two days of rioting throughout Kosovo on
March 17-18, in the worst inter-ethnic violence since the end of the 1999 Kosovo war.
Ethnic Albanian crowds attacked several ethnic Serb enclaves as well as international
security forces trying to control the rioters. In the course of two days, 19 civilians were
1 For a copy of the Standards Implementation Plan, see the UNMIK website, available online at
[http://www.unmikonline.org], accessed on June 9, 2004.

---

CRS-3
killed, more than 900 persons were injured, and over 4,000 forced from their homes by
the violence.
The March 2004 riots in Kosovo have called into question the performance of
UNMIK and KFOR, as well as Kosovo’s government institutions and media. While some
of the rioters appeared to be acting spontaneously, observers reported that hard-core
groups of extremists, bent on expelling as many Serbs from Kosovo as possible, led many
of the most violent actions. Kosovo’s media played a key role in touching off the
violence by providing highly emotional coverage of the drowning of two Kosovar
children in Mitrovica. Kosovo’s government did not move quickly to discourage the
violence, perhaps preferring to ride the wave of ethnic Albanian outrage than to risk
getting in its way. With notable exceptions, the Kosovo Police Service did not perform
very well, sometimes melting away in the face of the rioters and in a few cases joining
them. The performance of international forces reportedly was little better. CIVPOL, the
U.N. police contingent in Kosovo, was hampered by a lack of cohesion and leadership.
There were many reports of KFOR troops, outnumbered by the rioters and unwilling to
fire on them, failing to intervene to stop the destruction and looting of property. Some
KFOR units reportedly failed to even to protect Serb civilians and U.N. police from
violence.2
In the wake of the March 2004 events, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan asked
Norwegian diplomat Kai Eide to submit recommendation for future U.N. policy in
Kosovo. Eide’s report, submitted to the Security Council in August 2004, said that the
standards before status policy “lack credibility” in the wake of the March events. He
called for a “dynamic priority-based standards policy.” The new policy would focus on
making rapid progress in a few key areas (mainly dealing with ensuring minority rights)
with a view toward opening early negotiations on Kosovo’s status. Eide claimed such
negotiations could not be put off much longer, given ethnic Albanian frustration over their
current poverty and lack of clarity on their future. While he did not give a date for
possible status negotiations, he called for “serious exploratory discussion” of the status
issue as early as fall 2004. Eide also noted UNMIK’s plummeting credibility, as a result
of the March violence, and called for a more rapid shift of responsibilities from UNMIK
to the Kosovo government. He called for UNMIK to be rapidly downsized, with
remaining functions to be transferred to regional organizations such as the European
Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in 2005.
Perhaps reflecting some concerns among many countries in the Security Council
about moving too rapidly on the status issue, Secretary General Annan said the U.N.
would continue to support the “standards before status” policy. However, Annan did call
for focus on priority areas within the standards and for giving greater powers to the
Kosovo government, as the Eide report suggested.3 UNMIK and the Kosovo government
are working closely to accelerate implementation of the most important standards, while
2 For a detailed account of the riots and the response of UNMIK and KFOR to them, see
International Crisis Group, “Collapse in Kosovo,” April 22, 2004, on the ICG website, available
at [http://www.crisisweb.org].
3 For a text of the Eide report and Secretary General Kofi Annan’s recommendations to the
Security Council, see U.N. document S/2004/932, November 30, 2004, on the U.N. website,
available at [http://www.un.org/Docs/sc].

---

CRS-4
the Contact Group and the Security Council will provide interim evaluations in early
2005, of the success of that implementation before the formal review occurs in the middle
of the year. If the formal review is positive, final status discussions may begin soon
thereafter. Observers believe that a negative evaluation at the formal review, or a lengthy
delay in opening final status discussions for any other reason, could lead to a deterioration
of relations between the international community and the Kosovo Albanians, perhaps
even to a resumption of violence.
Options for Kosovo’s Status
Although it is too early to say what Kosovo’s future status will be, direct rule of the
entire province from Belgrade is unlikely, since it could only be accomplished by violent
actions similar to those taken by Milosevic in 1998 and 1999, which triggered
international intervention in the first place. Another possible outcome, currently opposed
by the international community, is independence. Between these two poles lie some form
of complete or near-complete self-government for Kosovo, while retaining some degree
of Serbian sovereignty, the exact contours of which would be subject to negotiation
between Belgrade, the Kosovo government, and the international community. These
outcomes could stand on their own or be accompanied by cantonization or partition of
Kosovo into a small, Serbian-controlled area in northern Kosovo and an ethnic Albanian-
controlled south. Each of these possibilities could have positive or negative consequences
for Kosovo and the region.
Independence for Kosovo would respond to the political preferences of the
overwhelming majority of the province’s inhabitants. However, some observers fear that
an independent Kosovo could destabilize the region by encouraging separatist ethnic
Albanian forces in Macedonia, as well as Serbia’s Presevo Valley, where many ethnic
Albanians live. Some also fear international support for Kosovar independence could
undermine the democratic leadership in Belgrade and strengthen extreme nationalists
there. There are also questions about the ability of the Kosovars to effectively run their
own affairs in the near future, due to the country’s poverty and the immaturity of ethnic
Albanian political and social institutions. An effective Kosovo government is particularly
important for the issue of dealing with powerful organized crime groups and political
extremists in the province.
Some have suggested that Kosovo should receive independence in exchange for
pledges from Kosovo to rule out the establishment of a greater Albania and to provide
security guarantees to the Serb minority.4 Some call for a Kosovo constitution to be
drawn up as part of the status talks that would provide for oversight by international
bodies and the continued participation of international judges in Kosovo’s legal system.5
Those who favor dividing Kosovo believe it would be a more realistic alternative
than trying to impose multi-ethnicity. In April 2004, the Serbian government unveiled a
decentralization plan for Kosovo. The plan would set up autonomous Serb regions in
northern Kosovo, similar in some ways to the current division of Bosnia into “entities”
4 Discussions with Balkan officials and U.S. Balkans experts, January 2004.
5 See Kosovo: Toward Final Status, International Crisis Group, January 24, 2005, at
[http://www.crisisweb.org].

---

CRS-5
under weak central control. Under the proposal, Serbian-majority areas in Kosovo would
be controlled by local Serb authorities, with their own police. Ethnic Albanian authorities
would control the rest of the province, although the whole province would remain at least
nominally within Serbia. Such a plan would have the benefit, from Belgrade’s point of
view, of consolidating its control over northern Kosovo, where most Serbs in the province
now live, and where important economic assets, such as the Trepca mining complex, are
found. Ethnic Albanian leaders strongly oppose the idea for these very reasons.
International officials fear that partition of the province along ethnic lines could
spark renewed violence over disputed areas. They also believe it could set a bad example
for the region, resulting in renewed calls to partition Bosnia, southern Serbia, and
Macedonia. To a certain extent, the Serbian plan seeks to strengthen and ratify the
existing situation in northern Kosovo. Since 1999, international officials and ethnic
Albanians have criticized Serbia for supporting “parallel structures” that cement its
control over Serb-majority areas at the expense of UNMIK’s authority. UNMIK is
working on plans for local government reform that would devolve more powers to the
local level, but not to the extent advocated by the Serbian government proposal.
One important question is the mechanism for resolving the status question. Talks
between Belgrade, Pristina, and representatives of the U.N. and the Contact Group would
likely be the first step, probably capped by a new U.N. Security Council resolution to
endorse the result. However, given Belgrade’s antipathy toward any discussion of final
status, it may be difficult to reach a consensus. Moreover, a requirement for a UNSC
resolution could pose an additional barrier, given the fact that Russia could veto such a
resolution, if it chose to back possible Serbian opposition to a proposed settlement. The
EU could have the strongest leverage over Serbia, if it decided to condition Belgrade’s
EU integration on its acceptance of an EU-supported settlement of the status question.
However, it is unclear whether the EU would support such a linkage. A move by the
United States or other countries to endorse a proposed settlement without the support of
Serbia, Russia, and the Security Council could provoke recriminations from Russia and
some U.S. allies, such as those that bedeviled international policy in the Balkans in the
early 1990s.
Congressional Concerns
The issue of Kosovo’s future status has been of significant interest to Members of
Congress. Some Members favor independence for Kosovo as soon as possible, a view not
shared by the Administration. They say Kosovars should enjoy the same right of self-
determination enjoyed by other peoples in the region and throughout the world. On the
other hand, other Members are more skeptical about pushing strongly for Kosovo
independence in the near future. They say that moving too quickly could destabilize the
situation in the Balkans. They favor continuing to press the people of Kosovo to
implement the standards.
In the 108th Congress, three resolutions were introduced that advocate U.S. support
for Kosovo’s independence. H.Res. 11 and H.Res. 28 express the sense of the House that
the United States should declare support for Kosovo’s independence. H.Res. 11
conditions this support on Kosovo’s progress toward democracy, while H.Res. 28
supports independence without prior conditions. S.Res. 144 expresses the sense of the
Senate that the United States should support the right of the people of Kosovo to

---

CRS-6
determine their political future once “requisite progress” is made in achieving U.N.
standards in developing democratic institutions and human rights protections. H.Res. 28
was discussed at a House International Relations Committee hearing on Kosovo’s future
in May 2003 and at a markup session on the resolution in October 2004, but was not
voted on by the Committee and did not receive floor consideration in the 108th Congress.
In the wake of the March 2004 violence in Kosovo, several resolutions were
introduced to condemn the attacks, as well as subsequent attacks on Islamic sites in
Serbia. These included H.Res. 587 (Christopher Smith) and H.Res. 596 (Burton). On
April 8, the Senate agreed by unanimous consent to S.Res. 326 (Voinovich). The
resolution, a slightly modified companion version of H.Res. 596, strongly condemned the
violence, recognized the commitment of Kosovo and Serbian leaders to rebuild what had
been destroyed and encourage the return of refugees, called on leaders in Kosovo to
renounce violence and build a multi-ethnic society based on the standards for Kosovo,
recommended the restructuring of UNMIK, and urged the reinvigoration of dialogue
between Kosovo and Belgrade. The resolutions note U.S. and international support for
the “standards before status” policy.
The 109th Congress may take up the issue of Kosovo’s status. On January 4, 2005,
Representative Tom Lantos introduced H.Res. 24, which expresses the sense of the House
that the United States should support Kosovo’s independence.

---