Order Code IB91141
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
North Korea’s
Nuclear Weapons Program
Updated January 27, 2005
Larry A. Niksch
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
The Second Bush Administration and the Six Party Talks
Background to the Six Party Talks
The Six Party Talks
Bush Administration Policy
North Korea’s Counter-Strategy
North Korea’s Nuclear Program
International Assistance
North Korea’s Delivery Systems
State of Nuclear Weapons Development
Diplomatic Background to the Agreed Framework and Amending Agreements
The Agreed Framework: Provisions, Implementation, Costs, Future Issues
U.S. Objectives: Primacy to the Freeze of North Korea’s Nuclear Program
Benefits to North Korea
Light Water Nuclear Reactors
Oil at No Cost
Diplomatic Representation
Lifting the U.S. Economic Embargo
U.S. Nuclear Security Guarantee
North Korean Obligations Beyond the Freeze of the Nuclear Program
Inspections and Broader Nuclear Obligations
Disposition of Fuel Rods from the Five Megawatt Reactor
Dismantlement of Nuclear Installations
Role of Congress
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North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program
SUMMARY
North Korea’s decisions to restart nuclear
any U.S. reciprocal measures until North
installations at Yongbyon that were shut down
Korea takes visible steps to dismantle its
under the U.S.-North Korean Agreed Frame-
nuclear programs and makes concessions on
work of 1994 and withdraw from the Nuclear
other military issues; (3) assembling an inter-
Non-Proliferation Treaty create an acute
national coalition to apply diplomatic and
foreign policy problem for the United States.
economic pressure on North Korea; and (4)
Re-starting the Yongbyon facilities opens up
planning for future economic sanctions and
a possible North Korean intent to stage a
military interdiction of North Korea shipping
“nuclear breakout” of its nuclear program and
and air traffic through a Proliferation Security
openly produce nuclear weapons. North Ko-
Initiative. China, South Korea, and Russia
rea’s actions follow the reported disclosure in
have criticized the Bush Administration for
October 2002 that North Korea is operating a
not negotiating directly with North Korea, and
secret nuclear program based on uranium
they voice opposition to economic sanctions
enrichment and the decision by the Korean
and to the use of force against Pyongyang.
Peninsula Energy Development Organization
China, Russia, and even South Korea increas-
(KEDO) in November 2002 to suspend ship-
ingly have expressed support for North Ko-
ments of heavy oil to North Korea. North
rea’s position in six party talks. China has
Korea claims that it has nuclear weapons and
facilitated six party talks, but the talks have
that it has completed reprocessing of 8,000
made little progress.
nuclear fuel rods. U.S. officials in 2004 stated
that North Korea probably had reprocessed
The crisis is the culmination of eight
most or all of the fuel rods and may have
years of implementation of the 1994 Agreed
produced 6-8 atomic bombs from them.
Framework, which provides for the shutdown
of North Korea’s nuclear facilities in return
The main objective of the Bush Adminis-
for the annual delivery to North Korea of
tration is to secure the dismantling of North
500,000 tons of heavy oil and the construction
Korea’s plutonium and uranium-based nuclear
in North Korea of two light water nuclear
programs. Its strategy has been: (1) terminat-
reactors.
ing the Agreed Framework; (2) withholding
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
North Korea entered 2005 by continuing to refuse to agree to another meeting of the
six party talks on the nuclear issue. U.S. Members of Congress who visited North Korea in
January 2005 said that North Korean officials stated that Pyongyang would agree to meet;
but they gave no timetable. North Korea has demanded preconditions for attending another
meeting, including an end to U.S. “hostile policies,” U.S. acceptance of North Korea’s
“reward for [nuclear] freeze proposal,” and agreement of the six parties to take up the
recently revealed nuclear activities of South Korean scientists. North Korean media
commentary throughout November and December 2004 boasted of Pyongyang’s strong
position in the six party talks and the weakness and isolation of the Bush Administration.
These boasts received some support by open Chinese and South Korean criticisms of the
Bush Administration’s position in the talks. South Korean President Roh Moo-hyun gave
major policy speeches in Los Angeles and Europe in November 2004, sharply criticizing the
Bush Administration, rejecting any pressure on North Korea, defending North Korea’s
assertion that it needed a “nuclear deterrent” in view of its perception of a threat from the
United States, and describing North Korea’s “reward for freeze” proposal as “a considerably
positive proposal.” Bush Administration officials asserted that the six party talks needed to
make progress in 2005. However, they gave no indication of a strategy to change the
complexion of the talks, and they remained silent toward the Chinese and South Korean
criticisms. Japan remained supportive of the U.S. position, but Tokyo threatened to impose
sanctions against North Korea after North Korea turned over alleged remains of two
kidnapped Japanese that turned out to be bogus on DNA examination. The Bush
Administration reportedly counseled Japan to refrain from sanctions because of possible
damage to the six party talks.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
The Second Bush Administration and the Six Party Talks
The Bush Administration faces a difficult situation in the six party talks over the North
Korean nuclear issue. North Korea has established a dominant position in the talks, and the
U.S. position has weakened despite the Bush Administration’s settlement proposal of June
23, 2004. North Korea has secured support from other participants in the talks for its core
“reward for freeze” proposal and for its repeated denials that it has a secret uranium
enrichment nuclear program. North Korea has been able to obstruct the talks since July 24,
2004, when the North Korean Foreign Ministry denounced the U.S. June 23 proposal as a
“sham proposal.” Since then, North Korea has refused to attend another meeting, has
demanded that the United States accept its proposals and cease its “hostile policies,” and has
demanded that the six party talks take up recently disclosed South Korean nuclear activities.
There appear to be several reasons why the Administration’s June 23 proposal did not
weaken North Korea’s position in the talks and strengthen the U.S. position. The positions
of the other governments in the talks (China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia) appear to have
encouraged North Korea to adopt negative tactics in response to the June 23 proposal. Since
the proposal was issued, the other governments have not endorsed it or spoken favorably of
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it. The statements of the Chinese and South Korean foreign ministers during Secretary
Powell’s visit in late October 2004 were implied criticisms of the proposal, which Powell
tried to defend in response. The other governments, too, have not criticized North Korea’s
“reward for freeze” proposal. China and Russia have expressed support for some elements
of it; and they have voiced skepticism toward the Bush Administration’s claim that North
Korea has a secret uranium enrichment program. The other governments also have not
criticized the negative tactics that North Korea adopted in late July through the U.S.
presidential election. China has continued to make payoffs to North Korea (money, food,
and oil) to get North Korea to agree just to attend six party meetings; such payoffs probably
encourage North Korea to believe that it can receive such benefits without having to adopt
positive positions at the meetings themselves.
The Bush Administration did not have an effective post-June 23 follow-up strategy to
promote its proposal into a position of a basis for negotiations in the talks. U.S. officials
visiting East Asia said little of the proposal publicly until the Chinese and South Korean
rebuffs to Secretary Powell, and they apparently did not pressure officials of the other
participating governments to endorse it.
The Administration faces five key issues regarding the future of the talks and policy
toward North Korea. One is whether North Korea will agree to another meeting. But equally
important is the issue of the price of getting North Korea to attend another meeting; i.e., will
North Korea received another round of payoffs from China? A third key issue is North
Korean behavior at any future meetings; will North Korea persist in denying a uranium
enrichment program and in demanding acceptance of its “reward for freeze” proposal?
Fourth, the Bush Administration will have to decide how to treat North Korea’s demand that
the six party talks take up the South Korean nuclear activities, which the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is investigating. A fifth potentially crucial issue is U.S.
policy decisions if there no further six party meetings or if future meetings produce no
movement toward a satisfactory settlement. There reportedly is sentiment in the Bush
Administration that the United States should adopt coercive measures, including the
interdiction of North Korean sea and air traffic in accordance with the Proliferation Security
Initiative, which the United States and a number of other countries adopted in 2003.
However, the Administration gives priority to Iraq and the Middle East over North Korea;
this could influence it to take no active measures in 2005 to bring the nuclear to a point of
decision.
Background to the Six Party Talks
The Bush Administration asserted on October 16, 2002, that North Korea had revealed
to U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly in Pyongyang on October 5, 2002, that it had
a secret nuclear weapons program based on uranium enrichment. The program is based on
the process of uranium enrichment, in contrast to North Korea’s pre-1995 nuclear program
based on plutonium reprocessing. North Korea reportedly began a secret uranium
enrichment program in the early 1990s with the assistance of Pakistan. North Korea
provided Pakistan with intermediate-range ballistic missiles in the late 1990s, apparently as
part of the deal.
The initial U.S. response was to secure a decision by the Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization (KEDO) in November 2002 to end shipments of heavy oil to
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North Korea, which had been carried out under the U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework
of 1994. By their own admission, Bush Administration officials were surprised by the
intensity of North Korea’s moves in late December 2002 to re-start plutonium-based nuclear
facilities at Yongbyon and expel officials of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
placed there under the Agreed Framework to monitor the shutdown. North Korea re-started
the five megawatt nuclear reactor shut down under the Agreed Framework. North Korea
also announced that it would re-start the plutonium reprocessing plant that operated up to
1994, and it later asserted that it had reprocessed 8,000 nuclear fuel rods, which had been in
storage since 1994, into nuclear weapons grade plutonium (U.S. intelligence reportedly has
been unable to verify the exact state of reprocessing but U.S. officials stated in late 2004 that
North Korea probably had reprocessed most or all of the 8,000 fuel rods and might have
produced four to six atomic bombs). North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in January 2003. It justified its action by citing the U.S.-initiated
cutoff of heavy oil shipments in December 2002 and by charging that the Bush
Administration planned a “pre-emptive nuclear attack” on North Korea.
After October 2002 North Korea issued several threats including a resumption of long-
range missile tests, the proliferation of nuclear materials to other countries, and the testing
of a nuclear weapon. Re-starting the Yongbyon facilities opens up a possible North Korean
intent or option to stage a “breakout” of its nuclear program by openly producing nuclear
weapons through reprocessing the 8,000 fuel rods. According to estimates by nuclear experts
and reportedly by U.S. intelligence agencies, if North Korea reprocessed the fuel rods, as it
claims, it could produce four to six atomic bombs. Such a nuclear breakout would diminish
considerably any prospect of ending North Korea’s nuclear program diplomatically.
Production of weapons-grade plutonium also would add substance to North Korea’s threat
to export nuclear materials. (See CRS Report RS21391, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons:
How Soon an Arsenal?)
The Six Party Talks
Bush Administration Policy. The Administration’s policy since October 2002 is
based on two views within the Administration. First, President Bush has voiced profound
distrust of North Korea and its leader, Kim Jong-il. Second, there are divisions over policy
toward North Korea among factions within the Bush Administration. An influential coalition
has consisted of Pentagon officials and advisers around Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld,
officials of Vice President Cheney’s office, and proliferation experts in the State Department
and White House led by Undersecretary of State John Bolton. They reportedly oppose
negotiations with North Korea, favor the issuance of demands for unilateral North Korean
concessions on nuclear and other military issues, and advocate an overall U.S. strategy of
isolating North Korea diplomatically and through economic sanctions and bringing about a
collapse of the North Korean regime. A second faction, mainly in the State Department, has
been led by Secretary of State Powell and is composed of officials with experience on East
Asian and Korean issues. This faction believes that the Administration should attempt
negotiations before adopting more coercive measures, and they reportedly doubt the
effectiveness of a strategy to bring about a North Korean collapse.
The Administration’s proposal of June 23, 2004 at the six party plenary meeting was
the first U.S. proposal since the talks began in April 2003. The proposal called for a quick
dismantlement of North Korea’s plutonium and uranium enrichments programs following
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a three month “preparatory period.” During the preparatory period, North Korea would
declare its nuclear facilities and materials, freeze their operation, allow effective international
inspections, including a return of the IAEA, and negotiate the steps to be taken in
dismantlement. In return, South Korea and Japan would supply North Korea with heavy oil.
North Korea would receive a “provisional multilateral security assurance” from the United
States and the other participants in the six party talks. The United States and North Korea
would begin talks over U.S. economic sanctions and North Korea’s inclusion on the U.S. list
of terrorist-supporting countries. The participants in the talks also would begin a study of
North Korea’s energy needs. After North Korea completed dismantlement, it would receive
a permanent security guarantee, and permanent solutions to its energy problems would be
undertaken. The Administration’s policy on the nuclear issue has contained three elements:
(1) a demand for an immediate North Korean commitment to dismantlement, (2) the
avoidance of direct negotiations with North Korea until North Korea accepts dismantlement,
and (3) the isolation of North Korea internationally. The Administration called on North
Korea to commit to and take concrete measures to realize the “complete, verifiable,
irreversible dismantlement” of its nuclear programs, both the plutonium program and the
secret uranium enrichment program. This demand has become known as “CVID.” The
Administration also asserts that North Korea must follow procedures similar to those being
implemented by Libya, which has revealed details of its weapons of mass destruction and has
turned over the weapons and related materials to the United States, other governments, and
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Bush Administration eschewed
substantive bilateral negotiations with North Korea. The Administration stated that it would
discuss ways to improve U.S.-North Korean relations only after North Korea accepts CVID
and takes concrete measures to implement it.
Administration officials have spoken often since early 2003 about the objective of
“isolating” North Korea. There are two components of the Administration’s isolation goal.
One is to isolate North Korea from any diplomatic support from other governments over the
nuclear issue and create a bloc of governments demanding that North Korea accept CVID.
The second component is the creation of a broad coalition of governments willing to impose
economic sanctions on North Korea if North Korea rejects CVID. In May 2003, President
Bush proposed a Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) aimed at interdicting exports of
weapons of mass destruction and illegal drugs by proliferator countries. The United States
and over ten other countries are planning measures to interdict North Korean sea and air
traffic. The Administration reportedly has drafted plans for economic sanctions, including
cutting off financial flows to North Korea from Japan and other sources and interdicting
North Korean shipments of missiles and other weapons to the Middle East and South Asia.
The aim of the PSI would be to constrict sharply North Korean foreign exchange earnings,
which are a major source of sustenance to the North Korean political elite and the North
Korean military. Advocates of the PSI believe that such financial pressure could produce
internal pressures within the regime that would result in either a North Korean capitulation
to U.S. demands or the collapse of the Pyongyang regime. The Administration is pressuring
several countries to cease purchases of North Korean missiles.
In early 2003, the Administration proposed multilateral talks as the diplomatic focus.
After a U.S.-North Korea-China meeting in April 2003, an agreement was reached for six
party talks, including China, South Korea, Russia, and Japan. Three plenary sessions of six
party talks were held in August 2003, February 2004, and June 2004; a six party working
group meeting was held in May 2004. The Administration has viewed several roles for the
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six party talks. The talks help the Administration avoid bilateral negotiations with North
Korea. At the six party meetings, the Administration limited direct contact with North
Korean delegates, stressing that it would not discuss substantive issues until North Korea
commits to CVID. U.S. negotiators at the six party talks were constrained to speaking from
a limited script stressing CVID. They refused to answer questions from North Korean
delegates concerning the U.S. position on the nuclear issue. This changed slightly at the June
2004 meeting. U.S. delegates met with North Korean counterparts reportedly for nearly two
hours.
The Administration also views the six party talks as giving it a vehicle to secure support
from China, South Korea, Japan, and Russia — North Korea’s immediate neighbors — for
the U.S. demand that North Korea agree to total dismantlement of its nuclear programs. U.S.
officials have spoken of creating a five versus one situation in the six party talks, thus
isolating North Korea. This in turn would lay the groundwork for the participation of China,
South Korea, Japan, and Russia in sanctions against North Korea if North Korea rejected
CVID — sanctions through the United Nations Security Council and/or the Proliferation
Security Initiative. Throughout 2003, Administration officials expressed a view that North
Korea would isolate itself through its provocative actions in reopening its plutonium nuclear
program and its threats to proliferate nuclear materials and test nuclear weapons and missiles.
The Far Eastern Economic Review of September 11, 2003, cited two U.S. officials as
asserting that “it’s worse now for North Korea than it has been — this isolation” and that
“we’re letting them dig their own grave.” U.S. officials were “convinced that Pyongyang’s
[provocative] statements [at the August six party meeting] were pushing its opponents closer
together.”
The Administration has placed special emphasis on China’s role in the six party talks.
U.S. officials praise China’s role in hosting the meetings in Beijing. They state that China
should exert diplomatic pressure on North Korea to accept CVID. Some Administration
officials express the view that China can be persuaded to join the United States in sanctions
against North Korea even to the extent of creating an internal crisis within the North Korean
regime. The importance of China is pointed up by the mutual defense treaty China has with
North Korea and China’s role in supplying North Korea with an estimated 90 % of its oil and
40% of its food.
However, from the start of multilateral talks, the other participants have voiced
criticisms of the Administration’s positions. China, Russia, and South Korea have criticized
the Administration for not negotiating directly with North Korea, and they have urged the
Administration to propose detailed settlement proposals on the nuclear issue. They have
asserted that the Administration should spell out the reciprocal measures it would take if
North Korea agreed to dismantle its nuclear programs. China, Russia, and South Korea
issued no positive pronouncements toward the U.S. June 23, 2004, proposal. The Chinese
and South Korean foreign ministers told Secretary of State Colin Powell in October 2004 that
the Administration needed to formulate new, “creative” proposals. They also have expressed
opposition to economic sanctions, and only Japan has joined the PSI. Moreover, by the
beginning of 2004, the Administration faced a sophisticated North Korean diplomatic
strategy, which changed the atmosphere of the six party talks to one more favorable to North
Korea.
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North Korea’s Counter-Strategy. In the summer of 2003, in the wake of the
perceived U.S. military victory in Iraq and negative international reactions to North Korea’s
restarting of the plutonium program and threats, the North Korean leadership appeared
worried that they faced international isolation and much heavier U.S. pressure. From that
point, there has emerged a multifaceted North Korean diplomatic strategy backed by a
concerted propaganda campaign aimed primarily at strengthening Pyongyang’s position in
the six party talks and weakening the U.S. position. A lead component of North Korea’s
strategy has been to threaten that it would abandon the six party talks, thus playing on the
psychological fears of the other parties. After each of the Beijing meetings, North Korea
criticized the meetings, criticized the U.S. position, and warned that it saw no usefulness in
the meetings and likely would not participate further. North Korea also apparently has
employed this threat to demand that China, the host of the talks, provide it with financial
subsidies and increased shipments of food and oil as “payment” for North Korean agreement
to attend future sessions of the six parties in Beijing.
But with these repeated threats, North Korea has made a series of proposals: first, a
formal U.S.-North Korean non-aggression pact, later modified to a formal U.S. guarantee
that the United States would not attack North Korea; second, a long-term “freeze” of North
Korea’s plutonium program; and third, retention by North Korea of a “peaceful” nuclear
program. North Korean proposals also have called for extensive concessions by the United
States and Japan, including removal of North Korea from the U.S. list of terrorist-supporting
states, supply of electricity, several billion dollars in “compensation” from Japan, restoration
of shipments of heavy oil and construction of the two light water nuclear reactors under the
1994 Agreed Framework, and an end to U.S. economic sanctions and U.S. interference in
North Korea’s economic relations with other countries. North Korea also has demanded that
the U.S. end its “hostile policy,” a pronouncement that Pyongyang uses to change the content
and scope of its demands.
While purposefully keeping its proposals vague regarding content and its own
obligations, North Korea has engaged in a concerted propaganda campaign to promote its
proposals. Propaganda, aimed especially at South Korea, Russia, and China has asserted that
a U.S. guarantee of non-aggression is necessary to prevent the Bush Administration from
carrying out a plot to stage an “Iraq-like” unilateral attack. Pyongyang’s propaganda organs
have contended that a “freeze”of plutonium facilities is a logical “first stage” in a settlement
process. The propaganda organs have employed enticing captions, such as “simultaneous
actions,” “action versus action,” “simultaneous package deal,” “bold concessions,” and “non-
interference in our economic development.” Russian and Chinese doubts toward the U.S.
claim indicates a success of North Korea’s denial strategy.
Another element in North Korea’s counter-strategy has been a campaign to deny that
it has a uranium enrichment (HEU) program. From the summer of 2003, North Korean
propaganda organs have escalated steadily denials of an HEU program and denials that North
Korean officials admitted to an HEU program to Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly in
October 2002. North Korean officials have stressed this denial to visiting foreign
delegations. North Korean propaganda organs have compared U.S. claims of an HEU
program to the perceived erroneous U.S. claims of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, and
they have demanded that the United States provide evidence of its claim.
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North Korea’s Nuclear Program
Most of North Korea’s plutonium-based nuclear installations are located at Yongbyon,
60 miles of the North Korean capital of Pyongyang. They are the facilities covered by the
1994 U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework The key installations are:
! An atomic reactor, with a capacity of about 5 megawatts that began
operating by 1987: it is capable of expending enough uranium fuel to
produce about 7 kilograms of plutonium annually — enough for the
manufacture of a single atomic bomb annually. North Korea in 1989 shut
down the reactor for about 70 days; U.S. intelligence agencies believe that
North Korea removed fuel rods from the reactor at that time for reprocessing
into plutonium suitable for nuclear weapons. In May 1994, North Korea
shut down the reactor and removed about 8,000 fuel rods, which could be
reprocessed into enough plutonium for 4-6 nuclear weapons. North Korea
started operating the reactor again in February 2003. Experts believe that
the reactor can produce enough material for six kilograms of weapons-grade
plutonium annually.
! Two larger (estimated 50 megawatts and 200 electrical megawatts)
atomic reactors under construction at Yongbyon and Taechon since
1984: According to U.S. Ambassador Robert Gallucci, these plants, if
completed, would be capable of producing enough spent fuel annually for
200 kilograms of plutonium, sufficient to manufacture nearly 30 atomic
bombs per year. However, since North Korea re-opened the plutonium
program in early 2003, reports indicate that construction on the larger
reactors has not been resumed.
! A plutonium reprocessing plant about 600 feet long and several stories
high: The plant would separate weapons grade Plutonium-239 from spent
nuclear fuel rods for insertion into the structure of atomic bombs or
warheads. U.S. intelligence agencies reportedly detected North Korean
preparations to restart the plutonium reprocessing plant in February and
March 2003. According to press reports, the CIA estimated in late 2003 that
North Korea had reprocessed some of the 8,000 fuel rods. In January 2004,
North Korean officials showed a U.S. nuclear expert substances, which he
concluded was reprocessed weapons-grade plutonium.
Satellite photographs reportedly also show that the atomic reactors have no attached
power lines, which they would have if used for electric power generation.
Persons interviewed for this study believe that North Korea developed the two reactors
and the apparent reprocessing plant with its own resources and technology. It is believed that
Kim Jong-il, the son and successor of President Kim Il-sung who died in July 1994, directs
the program, and that the military and the Ministry of Public Security (North Korea’s version
of the KGB) implement it. North Korea reportedly has about 3,000 scientists and research
personnel devoted to the Yongbyon program. Many have studied nuclear technology (though
not necessarily nuclear weapons production) in the Soviet Union and China and reportedly
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Pakistan. North Korea has uranium deposits, estimated at 26 million tons. North Korea is
believed to have one uranium producing mine.
North Korea’s secret uranium enrichment program appears to date from at least 1996.
Hwang Jang-yop, a Communist Party secretary who defected in 1997, has testified that North
Korea and Pakistan agreed in the summer of 1996 to trade North Korean long-range missile
technology for Pakistani uranium enrichment technology. Other information date North
Korea-Pakistan cooperation to 1993. The Clinton Administration reportedly learned of it in
1998 or 1999, and a Department of Energy report of 1999 cited evidence of the program. In
March 2000, President Clinton notified Congress that he was waiving certification that
“North Korea is not seeking to develop or acquire the capability to enrich uranium.” The
Japanese newspaper Sankei Shimbun reported on June 9, 2000, the contents of a “detailed
report” from Chinese government sources on a secret North Korean uranium enrichment
facility inside North Korea’s Mount Chonma. Reportedly, according to a CIA report to
Congress, North Korea attempted in late 2001 to acquire “centrifuge-related materials in
large quantities to support a uranium enrichment program.” The CIA estimated publicly in
December 2002 that North Korea could produce two atomic bombs annually through
uranium enrichment beginning in 2005; other intelligence estimates reportedly project a
bomb producing capability between 2005 and 2007. Administration officials have stated that
they do not know the locations of North Korea’s uranium enrichment program, but U.S.
intelligence agencies reportedly have extensive information on North Korea’s accelerated
overseas purchases of equipment and materials for the uranium enrichment program since
early 1999.
International Assistance
Knowledgeable individuals believe that the Soviet Union did not assist directly in the
development of Yongbyon in the 1980s. The U.S.S.R. provided North Korea with a small
research reactor in the 1960s, which also is at Yongbyon. However, North Korean nuclear
scientists continued to receive training in the U.S.S.R. up to the demise of the Soviet Union
in December 1991. East German and Russian nuclear and missile scientists reportedly were
in North Korea throughout the 1990s. Since 1999, reports have appeared that U.S.
intelligence agencies had information that Chinese enterprises were supplying important
components and raw materials for North Korea’s missile program.
North Korea’s Delivery Systems
North Korea succeeded by 1998 in developing a “Nodong” missile with a range
estimated at up to 900 miles, capable of covering South Korea and most of Japan. North
Korea reportedly deployed nearly 100 Nodong missiles by 2003. On August 31, 1998,
North Korea test fired a three stage rocket, apparently the prototype of the Taepo Dong-1
missile; the third stage apparently was an attempt to launch a satellite. U.S. intelligence
estimates reportedly concluded that such a missile would have the range to reach Alaska,
Guam, and the Northern Marianas Commonwealth. Media reports in early 2000 cited U.S.
intelligence findings that, without further flight tests, North Korea could deploy an
intercontinental ballistic missile that would be capable of striking Alaska, Hawaii, and the
U.S. west coast. Japan’s Sankei Shimbun newspaper reported on August 6, 2003, that North
Korea and Iran were negotiating a deal for the export of the long-range Taepodong-2 missile
to Iran and the joint development of nuclear warheads. U.S. officials reportedly told
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Japanese counterparts in July 2003 that North Korea was close to developing nuclear
warheads for its missiles. They claimed in September 2003 that North Korea had developed
a more accurate, longer-range intermediate ballistic missile that could reach Okinawa and
Guam (site of major U.S. military bases) and that there was evidence that North Korea had
produced the Taepo-dong 2 that could reach Alaska, Hawaii, and the U.S. west coast.
Reports in mid-1994 indicated that North Korea was close to completing underground
missile bases for the advanced intermediate range missiles.
These projections led the Clinton Administration to press North Korea for new talks
over North Korea’s missile program. In talks held in 1999 and 2000, North Korea demanded
$1 billion annually in exchange for a promise not to export missiles. U.S. negotiators
rejected North Korea’s demand for $1 billion but offered a lifting of U.S. economic
sanctions. This laid the ground for the Berlin agreement of September 1999 in which North
Korea agreed to defer further missile tests in return for the lifting of major U.S. economic
sanctions. President Clinton formalized the lifting of key economic sanctions against North
Korea in June 2000. North Korea continued the moratorium, but it appears to have used
Pakistan and Iran as surrogates in testing intermediate range missiles based on North Korean
technology. (See CRS Report RS21473, North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United
States.)
State of Nuclear Weapons Development
A CIA statement of August 18, 2003, estimated “that North Korea has produced one or
two simple fission-type nuclear weapons and has validated the designs without conducting
yield-producing nuclear tests.” The initial estimate of one or two nuclear weapons is derived
primarily from North Korea’s approximately 70 day shutdown of the five megawatt reactor
in 1989 gave it the opportunity to remove nuclear fuel rods, from which plutonium is
reprocessed. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency
reportedly estimated in late 1993 that North Korea extracted enough fuel rods for about 12
kilograms of plutonium — sufficient for one or two atomic bombs. The CIA and DIA
apparently based their estimate on the 1989 shutdown of the five megawatt reactor.
South Korean and Japanese intelligence estimates reportedly were higher: 16-24
kilograms (Japan) and 7-22 kilograms (South Korea). These estimates reportedly are based
on the view that North Korea could have acquired a higher volume of plutonium from the
1989 reactor shutdown and the view of a higher possibility that North Korea removed fuel
rods during the 1990 and 1991 reactor slowdowns. Russian Defense Ministry analyses of
late 1993 reportedly came to a similar estimate of about 20 kilograms of plutonium, enough
for two or three atomic bombs.
Russian intelligence agencies also reportedly have learned of significant technological
advances by North Korea towards nuclear weapons production. On March 10, 1992, the
Russian newspaper Argumenty I Fakty (Arguments and Facts) published the text of a 1990
Soviet KGB report to the Soviet Central Committee on North Korea’s nuclear program. It
was published again by Izvestiya on June 24, 1994. The KGB report asserted that
“According to available data, development of the first nuclear device has been completed at
the DPRK nuclear research center in Yongbyon.” The North Korean Government, the report
stated, had decided not to test the device in order to avoid international detection.
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Additionally, there are a number of reports and evidence that point to at least a middle
range likelihood that North Korea may have smuggled plutonium from Russia. In June 1994,
the head of Russia’s Counterintelligence Service (successor to the KGB) said at a press
conference that North Korea’s attempts to smuggle “components of nuclear arms production”
from Russia caused his agency “special anxiety.” U.S. executive branch officials have
expressed concern in background briefings over the possibility that North Korea has
smuggled plutonium from Russia. One U.S. official, quoted in the Washington Times, July
5, 1994, asserted that “There is the possibility that things having gotten over the
[Russia-North Korea] border without anybody being aware of it.” The most specific claim
came in the German news magazine Stern in March 1993, which cited Russian
Counterintelligence Service reports that North Korea had smuggled 56 kilograms of
plutonium (enough for 7-9 atomic bombs) from Russia.
According to press reports in late 2002, the CIA concluded that North Korea
accelerated its uranium enrichment program in the 1999, 2000, and 2001. According to U.S.
News and World Report, September 1, 2003, the CIA estimated that North Korea could
produce a uranium-based atomic weapon by the second half of 2004.
Diplomatic Background to the Agreed Framework and
Amending Agreements
North Korea signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985. In a
denuclearization agreement signed in December 1991, North Korea and South Korea pledged
not to possess nuclear weapons, not to possess plutonium reprocessing or uranium
enrichment facilities, and to negotiate a mutual nuclear inspection system. In January 1992,
North Korea signed a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA), which requires North Korea to report all nuclear programs to the IAEA and gives
the IAEA the right to conduct a range of inspections of North Korean nuclear installations
and programs. In 1992, North Korea rebuffed South Korea regarding implementation of the
denuclearization agreement, but it did allow the IAEA to conduct six inspections during June
1992-February 1993.
In late 1992, the IAEA found evidence that North Korea had reprocessed more
plutonium than the 80 grams it had disclosed to the Agency. In February 1993, the IAEA
invoked a provision in the safeguards agreement and called for a “special inspection” of two
concealed but apparent nuclear waste sites at Yongbyon. The IAEA believed that a special
inspection would uncover information on the amount of plutonium which North Korea had
produced since 1989. North Korea rejected the IAEA request and announced on March 12,
1993, an intention to withdraw from the NPT.
The NPT withdrawal threat led to low- and higher-level diplomatic talks between North
Korea and the Clinton Administration. North Korea “suspended” its withdrawal from the
NPT when the Clinton Administration agreed to a high-level meeting in June 1993.
However, North Korea continued to refuse both special inspections and IAEA regular
inspections of facilities designated under the safeguards agreement. In May 1994, North
Korea refused to allow the IAEA to inspect the 8,000 fuel rods that it had removed from the
five-megawatt reactor. In June 1994, North Korea’s President Kim Il-sung reactivated a
longstanding invitation to former U.S. President Jimmy Carter to visit Pyongyang. Kim
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offered Carter a freeze of North Korea’s nuclear facilities and operations. Kim took this
initiative after China reportedly informed him that it would not veto a first round of
economic sanctions, which the Clinton Administration had proposed to members of the U.N.
Security Council. According to former Defense Secretary William Perry, the Pentagon also
developed a contingency plan to bomb the Yongbyon nuclear facilities if North Korea began
to reprocess the 8,000 fuel rods into weapons-grade plutonium. The Clinton Administration
reacted to Kim’s proposal by dropping its sanctions proposal and entering into a new round
of high-level negotiations with North. This negotiation led to the Agreed Framework of
October 21, 1994.

The Agreed Framework:
Provisions, Implementation, Costs, Future Issues
U.S. Objectives: Primacy to the Freeze of North Korea’s Nuclear Program
The heart of the Agreed Framework was a U.S. commitment to provide North Korea with a package
of nuclear, energy, economic, and diplomatic benefits; in return North Korea would halt the operations and
infrastructure development of its nuclear program. The Agreed Framework committed North Korea to
“freeze its graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities” with the freeze monitored by the IAEA.
Ambassador Robert Gallucci, who negotiated for the United States, stated that “related facilities” include
the plutonium reprocessing plant and stored fuel rods. According to Gallucci, the freeze includes a halt
to construction of the 50 and 200 megawatt reactors and a North Korean promise not to refuel the five
megawatt reactor. The Agreed Framework also committed North Korea to store the 8,000 fuel rods
removed from the five megawatt reactor in May 1994 “in a safe manner that does not involve reprocessing
in the DPRK [North Korea].” Clinton Administration officials reportedly said that a secret “confidential
minute” to the Agreed Framework prohibits North Korea from construction of new nuclear facilities
elsewhere in North Korea.
Gallucci and other officials emphasized that the key policy objective of the Clinton Administration
was to secure a freeze of North Korea’s nuclear program in order to prevent North Korea from producing
large quantities of nuclear weapons grade plutonium through the operations of the 50 and 200 megawatt
reactors and the plutonium reprocessing plant at Yongbyon. Gallucci referred to the prospect of North
Korea producing enough plutonium annually for nearly 30 nuclear weapons if the 50 and 200 megawatt
reactors went into operation. The Administration’s fear was that North Korea would have the means to
export atomic bombs to other states and possess a nuclear missile capability that would threaten Japan and
U.S. territories in the Pacific Ocean.
Benefits to North Korea
Light Water Nuclear Reactors. North Korea was to receive two light water reactors (LWRs)
with a generating capacity of approximately 2,000 megawatts. The Agreed Framework set a “target date”
of 2003. The United States was obligated to organize an international consortium arrangement for the
acquisition and financing of the reactors. The Clinton Administration and the governments of South
Korea, Japan, and other countries established in March 1995 the Korean Peninsula Energy Development
Organization (KEDO) to coordinate the provision of the LWRs. After the groundbreaking at the reactor
site in August 1997, KEDO officials changed the estimated completion date from 2003 to 2007; other
experts predicted a much later date. North Korean obstructionism and provocative military acts toward
South Korea and bureaucratic problems resulted in some of the delay; but U.S. officials have
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acknowledged off the record that the Clinton Administration was in no hurry to move the project along.
The laying of the foundation for the LWRs occurred in August 2002.
Oil at No Cost. Prior to the construction of light water reactors, the Agreed Framework committed
the United States to provide North Korea 500,000 metric tons of heavy oil to North Korea annually until
the first of the two light water reactors becomes operational. The oil shipments continued until KEDO’s
decision in November 2002 to cancel future shipments because of North Korea’s secret uranium
enrichment program.
Diplomatic Representation. The United States and North Korea announced in the Agreed
Framework an intention to open liaison offices in each other’s capital and establish full diplomatic relations
if the two governments make progress “on issues of concern to each side.” By April 1995, most technical
arrangements for liaison offices were completed. However, North Korea displayed reluctance to finalize
arrangements, and talks over liaison offices waned. Ambassador Gallucci asserted that a full normalization
of diplomatic relations would depend on a successful resolution of non-nuclear military issues, especially
the heavy deployment of North Korean conventional military forces along the demilitarized zone
separating North and South Korea and North Korea’s program to develop and sell to other governments
longer range missiles. In October 1999, William Perry, the Administration’s Special Adviser on North
Korea, cited normalization of diplomatic relations as one of the benefits which the United States could
offer North Korea for new agreements on nuclear and missile issues.
Lifting the U.S. Economic Embargo. The Agreed Framework specifies that within three
months from October 21, 1994, the two sides will reduce barriers to trade and investment, including
restrictions on telecommunications services and financial transactions. This required the Clinton
Administration to relax the U.S. economic embargo on North Korea, which the Truman Administration
and Congress put in place during the Korean War. On January 20, 1995, the Administration announced
initial measures, including permission for telecommunications links with North Korea, permission for U.S.
citizens to use credit cards in North Korea, permission for American media organizations to open offices
in North Korea, permission for North Korea to use U.S. banks in financial transactions with third
countries, and permission for U.S. steel companies to import magnesite from North Korea. North Korea
pressed the Clinton Administration to end all economic sanctions. North Korea complained loudly that
these measures failed to meet the commitment stated in the Agreed Framework. In U.S.-North Korean
talks in September 1999, the United States agreed to end a broader range of economic sanctions in
exchange for a North Korean moratorium on future missile testing. President Clinton ordered the end of
most economic sanctions in June 2000. Since then, North Korea has not met with any American firms
to talk about trade and/or investment opportunities and has rejected an offer from the American Chamber
of Commerce in Seoul to send a business delegation to Pyongyang.
U.S. Nuclear Security Guarantee. Article III of the Agreed Framework states that “Both sides
will work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free Korean peninsula.” Under that heading, it
states, “The U.S. will provide formal assurances to the DPRK against the threat or use of nuclear weapons
by the U.S.” While the language is not totally clear on the timing of the U.S. delivery of a formal nuclear
security guarantee, it seems to imply that this would come when North Korea had dismantled its nuclear
program or at least had advanced dismantlement to a considerable degree.
North Korean Obligations Beyond the Freeze of the Nuclear Program
North Korea’s immediate obligation was to freeze its existing nuclear installations. The Agreed
Framework alluded to certain other obligations for Pyongyang. Ambassador Gallucci and other Clinton
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Administration officials were more specific in describing these. They disclosed the existence of a secret
minute that the Administration and North Korea concluded in conjunction with completion of the Agreed
Framework. North Korea, however, has not acknowledged such a secret minute.
Inspections and Broader Nuclear Obligations. The Agreed Framework contained a clause
which the Administration claims constitutes a North Korean obligation to allow the IAEA to conduct the
special inspection of the two suspected nuclear waste sites at Yongbyon in conjunction with the delivery
of equipment for the light water reactors. The Agreed Framework stated: “When a significant portion of
the LWR [light water reactor] project is completed, but before delivery of key nuclear components, the
DPRK will come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA, including taking all
steps that may be deemed necessary by the IAEA, following consultations with the Agency, with regard
to verifying the accuracy and completeness of the DPRK’s initial report on all nuclear material in the
DPRK.” Ambassador Gallucci contended that North Korea must accept a special inspection before the
key nuclear components of the first light water reactor are delivered to North Korea, if the IAEA still
wishes to conduct a special inspection. However, North Korean descriptions of its obligations omitted
reference to special inspections.
The Agreed Framework stated, “The DPRK will remain a party to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and will allow implementation of its [1992] safeguards
agreement under the Treaty.” Gallucci stated in congressional testimony that the Agreed Framework did
not restrict the right of the IAEA to invoke special inspections if it discovered any new North Korean
nuclear activities. Gallucci said that the Agreed Framework only restricted the IAEA with respect to the
two suspected nuclear waste sites and the nuclear installations and the stored fuel rods at Yongbyon and
Taechon. He stressed that any new North Korean nuclear program would fall immediately under the
IAEA-North Korea safeguards agreement and that North Korea must place it under IAEA safeguards.
Failure to do so, he said, would constitute a violation of the Agreed Framework. Thus, North Korea’s
secret uranium enrichment program violated this clause of the Agreed Framework.
In the Agreed Framework, North Korea pledged to “consistently take steps to implement the [1991]
North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” North Korea thus
extended its obligations to South Korea in the North-South denuclearization agreement to the United
States. This clause of the Agreed Framework also is relevant to North Korea’s secret uranium enrichment
program, since the North-South denuclearization agreement specifically prohibits uranium enrichment.
Disposition of Fuel Rods from the Five Megawatt Reactor. Following Kim Il-sung’s offer
of a nuclear freeze to former President Carter, Administration officials stressed the importance of securing
North Korean agreement to the removal to a third country of the 8,000 fuel rods which North Korea
removed from the five megawatt reactor in May 1994. However, the Administration abandoned the
objective of securing an immediate removal of the rods after the negotiations started in September 1994.
It also gave up support for the IAEA’s attempts to inspect the fuel rods in order to gain information on
the amount of weapons grade plutonium that North Korea secured from the five megawatt reactor prior
to 1994. The Agreed Framework provided for the storage of the rods in North Korea under IAEA
monitoring and a North Korean promise not to reprocess plutonium from the rods. It also provided for
subsequent talks on the “ultimate disposition” of the rods.
Dismantlement of Nuclear Installations. The Agreed Framework states that “Dismantlement
of the DPRK’s graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities will be completed when the LWR project
is completed.” North Korea’s proposal at the 2003 Beijing talks in effect would continue the linkage
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between dismantlement and completion of the light water reactors. The Bush Administration wants
dismantlement much earlier in a settlement process.
Role of Congress
Congress voiced skepticism regarding the Agreed Framework, but its actions have given the
Administration flexibility in implementing U.S. obligations. Congress has played three roles. First, there
have been numerous oversight hearings. Second, Congress included in the Omnibus Appropriations bill
for FY1999 (H.R. 4328) the requirement that the President certify progress in negotiations with North
Korea over the nuclear, missile, and other issues before the Administration could allocate money to KEDO
operations. President Clinton issued two such certifications in 1999 and 2000; in 2000, he said that he
could not certify that North Korea was not engaged in uranium enrichment. President Bush notified
Congress in March 2002 that he could not certify that North Korea was abiding by the Agreed
Framework, but he waived restricting money for KEDO. H.R. 4328 also called on the President to name
“a very senior presidential envoy” as “North Korea Policy Coordinator” to conduct a review of U.S. policy
and direct negotiations with North Korea. This resulted in President Clinton’s appointment of William
Perry as a special adviser and the issuance of the Perry report in October 1999. The Bush Administration,
however, terminated the senior envoy position. Third, Congress considered and approved
Administration requests for funds to finance implementation, including the heavy oil shipments.
On October 20, 1994, President Clinton sent a letter to North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, stating that
he “will use the full powers of my office” to carry out U.S. obligations related to light water reactors and
alternative energy (oil). President Clinton added that if contemplated arrangements for light water reactors
and alternative energy were not completed, he would use the powers of his office to provide light water
reactors and alternative energy from the United States “subject to the approval of the U.S. Congress.”
In early 2003, Congress accepted the Bush Administration’s proposal to continue funding the
administrative costs of KEDO. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2003 (H.J.Res. 2) appropriated $5
million for KEDO. The Administration did request funding for KEDO in FY2004 and FY2005.
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
CRS Issue Brief IB98045. Korea: U.S.-South Korean Relations — Issues for Congress.
CRS Report RS21391. North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: How Soon an Arsenal?
CRS Report RS21473. North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States.
CRS Report RL31696. North Korea: Economic Sanctions.
CRS Report RL31785. U.S. Assistance to North Korea.
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