Order Code RL32294
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Haiti: Developments and U.S. Policy Since 1991
and Current Congressional Concerns
Updated January 19, 2005
Maureen Taft-Morales
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
Haiti: Developments and U.S. Policy Since 1991
and Current Congressional Concerns
Summary
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide first assumed office in February 1991,
following elections that were widely heralded as the first free and fair elections in
Haiti’s then-186-year history. He was overthrown by a military coup in September
1991. For over three years, the military regime resisted international demands that
Aristide be restored to office. U.S. policy under the Administrations of Presidents
George H. W. Bush and William J. Clinton consisted of pressuring the de facto
Haitian military regime to restore constitutional democracy. Measures included
cutting off aid to the government; imposing trade embargoes; supporting OAS and
U.N. diplomatic efforts, and ultimately, a military intervention to remove the regime.
On September 18, 1994, when it learned that a U.S. military intervention had
been launched, the military regime agreed to Aristide’s return, the immediate,
unopposed entry of U.S. troops, and the resignation of the military leadership.
President Aristide returned to Haiti on October 15, 1994, under the protection of
some 20,000 U.S. troops. Following his return, Aristide, with U.S. assistance,
disbanded the army and began to train a professional, civilian Haitian National Police
force. Elections held under Aristide and his successor, Rene Preval (1996-2000),
including the one in which Aristide was reelected in 2000, were marred by alleged
irregularities, low voter turnout, and opposition boycotts. Efforts to resolve the
electoral dispute frustrated the international community for years. The OAS tried to
mediate negotiations between the Aristide government and the civic opposition, and
set up a mission in Haiti. Tension and violence in Haiti continued throughout
Aristide’s second term, culminating in his departure from office on February 29,
2004, after the opposition had repeatedly refused to negotiate a political solution and
armed groups had taken control of over half the country.
An interim government was established with Gerard LaTortue as Prime
Minister. Some Members have called for investigations into Aristide’s claim that he
is still the democratically elected president and that the United States forced him
from office, a charge the Bush Administration denies. Haiti remains unstable as
security conditions continue to worsen and natural disasters wreak extensive damage,
having a cumulative effect on a nation that remains the poorest in the Western
Hemisphere.
Congressional concerns relating to Haiti include support for strengthening the
transition to democracy; the cost and effectiveness of U.S. assistance; protection of
human rights and improvement of security conditions; combating narcotics
trafficking; addressing Haitian migration; and addressing humanitarian needs.
Current law related to Haiti includes P.L. 108-25 (H.R. 1298/S. 1009), P.L. 108-
324 (H.R. 4837), and P.L. 108-447. Current legislation under consideration related
to Haiti includes H.R. 257. This report will be updated periodically.
Contents
Developments and U.S. Policy Since 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Most Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Aristide’s First Term in Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Restoration of Aristide to Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Completion of Aristide’s First Term, and the Preval Administration . . . . . . 4
The 2000 Haitian Elections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Aristide’s Second Term in Office . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
OAS/CARICOM Efforts to Resolve Haitian Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Aristide’s Departure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
The Interim Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
The U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Current Congressional Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Support of Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
U.S. Assistance to Haiti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Protection of Human Rights, and Security Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Narcotics Trafficking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Haitian Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Humanitarian Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Legislation in the 109th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Legislation in the 108th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
List of Tables
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Haiti, FY1990-FY2005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Table 2. DOD Incremental Costs of U.S. International Peace and
Security Commitments, FY1992-FY1996 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Haiti: Developments and U.S. Policy Since
1991 and Current Congressional Concerns
Developments and U.S. Policy Since 19911
Most Recent Developments
As security and stability continue to elude Haiti, Prime Minister Gerard Latortue
asked Washington to send U.S. troops back to Haiti, saying U.N. peacekeepers are
failing to establish security. The Defense Department is not offering more troops to
the U.N. mission than the six it currently has there, but will conduct a major
humanitarian exercise in Haiti as a show of support for Latortue. About 250 U.S.
military personnel will participate in a civic assistance program to help train U.S.
military units in construction and medical care services.2 On December 1, gunfire
was reportedly exchanged between government and pro-Aristide forces outside the
National Palace as Secretary of State Colin Powell was meeting with government
officials. The transition government, headed by LaTortue, was established after the
departure of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, who resigned under disputed
circumstances on February 29, 2004.
The Bush Administration expressed “deep concern” about the rule of law in
Haiti following the acquittal of former paramilitary leader Louis-Jodel Chamblain
and former police official Jackson Joanis on August 17, for their roles in the 1993
murder of businessman and Aristide supporter Antoine Izmery. The State
Department called on the interim Haitian government “to ensure that trials involving
accusations of gross human rights violations and other such crimes be conducted in
a credible manner.”3 Chamblain, a leader of the armed rebellion leading to Aristide’s
resignation and the alleged leader of death squads responsible for the murder of
thousands of civilians between 1987 and 1991, had been convicted in absentia.
Concerns over security have increased since then, with former Haitian soldiers
taking over towns, increasingly violent protests demanding Aristide’s return, and
rival gangs in open warfare in September and October. Halfway through its initial
six-month authorization, the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti has less than half the
1 Sources for historical background include CRS Report 95-602, Haiti: Efforts to Restore
President Aristide, 1991-1994; and CRS Report 93-931, Haiti: Background to the 1991
Overthrow of President Aristide, both by Maureen Taft-Morales.
2 Pablo Bachelet, “U.S. Giving Haiti Aid Through Military but no Troops for U.N. Security
Force,” Miami Herald, Nov. 5, 2004.
3 U.S. Dept. of State, “U.S. Deeply Concerned About Rule of Law in Haiti,” statement by
Adam Ereli, Deputy Spokesman, Aug. 17, 2004.
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troops it was authorized to have and is finding it difficult to establish law and order.
Two U.N. peacekeepers have been wounded. The Bush Administration condemned
the violent “systematic campaign to destabilize the interim government and disrupt
the efforts of the international community to assist the Haitian people” it says is
being carried out by pro-Aristide armed gangs.4
Natural disasters have contributed to Haiti’s ongoing instability. Following
devastating floods in May, Haiti was hit by Hurricane Jeanne and other tropical
storms that left thousands dead or homeless. The United States announced an
additional $120 million in assistance in July, for a total of about $230 million for
FY2004-FY2005. The Senate passed the Haiti Economic Recovery Opportunity Act
of 2004 (S. 2261), which would give Haiti additional preferential trade treatment if
it made certain democratic and economic reforms.
Since February 2004, Haiti has been faced with a series of crises, including a
civil conflict and the impact of a flood disaster and tropical storm. Each disaster has
been made worse in its cumulative effect on a nation that remains the poorest in the
Western Hemisphere.
Aristide’s First Term in Office
Jean-Bertrand Aristide was first elected President in December 1990, in
elections that were widely heralded as the first free and fair elections in Haiti’s then-
186-year history. A Roman Catholic priest of the radical left, Aristide’s fiery
sermons contributed to the collapse of the Duvalier dictatorship. The most
controversial of 11 presidential candidates, Aristide won a landslide victory with
67.5% of the vote. His inauguration took place in February 1991, on the fifth
anniversary of Jean-Claude Duvalier’s flight into exile.
President Aristide was faced with some of the most serious and persistent social,
economic, and political problems in the Western Hemisphere. After eight months
in office, Aristide had received mixed reviews. He was credited with curbing crime
in the capital, reducing the number of employees in bloated state enterprises, and
taking actions to bring the military under civilian control. But some observers
questioned his government’s commitment to democracy. Opposition leaders and
others criticized him for not establishing a cooperative relationship among the
democratic elements, failing to consult the legislature in appointments as required
by the Constitution, and for manipulating the judicial system in the prosecution of
Duvalierists. His record in the area of respect for human rights was also mixed. He
was criticized for appearing to condone mob violence, but was also credited with
significantly reducing human rights violations while he was in office.
Some observers believed that during his eight-month tenure, Aristide
contributed to political polarization within Haiti by refusing to condemn violent acts
of retribution, and holding out the threat of mob violence against those who disagreed
with him. On September 30, 1991, days after a speech in which some contend
4 U.S. Dept. of State, “Violence in Haiti,” statement by Richard Boucher, Spokesman, Oct.
12, 2004.
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Aristide threatened the bourgeoisie for not having helped his government enough,
Aristide was overthrown by the military. Some maintained that the bourgeoisie
financially supported the coup leaders.
Most human rights monitors credit Aristide’s first administration with being the
first Haitian government to address the need to improve respect for human rights, and
the needs of the poor majority. They also asserted that progress made during his term
was undone by the military regime that followed. Most sources credit Aristide with
creating a much greater sense of security in Haiti during his first term than there had
been in years. According to the State Department human rights reports for 1991 and
1992, there were no reports of disappearances during Aristide’s eight-month term and
dozens in the months following the coup. The State Department estimated coup-
related deaths at 300-500 at the time, while Amnesty International estimated them to
number over 1,500.
Restoration of Aristide to Office
The leaders of the military coup faced stronger international sanctions than did
previous coup leaders in Haiti, mainly because a democratic government had been
overthrown. For over three years, the military regime resisted international demands
that Aristide be restored to office. U.S. policy consisted of pressuring the de facto
Haitian government to restore constitutional democracy to Haiti. Under the
Administration of President George H. W. Bush, measures included cutting off
assistance to the Haitian government; imposing trade embargoes, as called for by the
Organization of American States and the United Nations; and supporting OAS and
U.N. diplomatic efforts. While some observers believed that the Administration of
President William J. Clinton intensified pressure on the Haitian regime and helped
advance negotiations to restore democracy to Haiti, others felt it did not apply enough
pressure. After the collapse of the Governors Island Accord, which called for the
military regime’s resignation and Aristide’s return by October 30, 1993,5 critics
increased pressure on the Clinton Administration to change its policy. The
Administration then took a tougher stance toward the military regime, imposing ever-
stiffer sanctions, and ultimately ordering a military intervention to remove it.
On September 18, 1994, when it learned that a U.S. military intervention had
been launched, the military regime signed an agreement with the United States
providing for Aristide’s return. It also called for the immediate, unopposed entry of
U.S. troops, a legislative amnesty for the military, and the resignation of the military
leadership. President Aristide returned to Haiti on October 15, 1994, under the
protection of some 20,000 U.S. troops. On March 31, 1995, having declared that a
“secure and stable environment” had been established, the United States transferred
responsibility for the mission to the United Nations.6
5 “The Situation of Democracy and Human Rights in Haiti, Report of the Secretary-
General,” U.N. General Assembly Security Council, A/47/975, S/26063, July 12, 1993.
6 “Remarks by President William Clinton...at U.N. Transition Ceremony,” The White
House, Office of the Press Secretary (Port-au-Prince, Haiti), Mar. 31, 1995.
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Completion of Aristide’s First Term,
and the Preval Administration
Following his return, President Aristide took steps to break with the pattern in
which a military-dominated police force was associated with human rights abuses.
Haiti, with U.S. assistance, demobilized the old military, established an interim
police force of selected ex-military personnel, and began to train a professional,
civilian Haitian National Police force. The level of reported violence, flight of
refugees, and alleged assassinations dropped markedly from very high levels during
the de facto military regime.
Also in 1995, President Aristide took steps to hold democratic elections, with
substantial assistance from the United States and the international community. Most
first-round parliamentary and municipal elections were held in June 1995. Although
the deadly violence which had marred past Haitian elections did not occur, election
observers alleged that there were numerous irregularities. Several re-run or runoff
elections were held from July to October. Pro-Aristide candidates won a large share
of the seats. Presidential elections were held December 17, 1995. The Haitian
constitution prevented Aristide from running for a second consecutive term. Rene
Preval, an Aristide supporter, won, with 89% of votes cast, but with a low voter
turnout of only 28%, and with many parties boycotting the election.
Preval assumed office in February 1996. He launched a program to privatize
government enterprise through joint ventures with private capital. Despite public
protests against the economic reforms, the Haitian Senate passed privatization and
administrative reform laws, allowing the release of millions of dollars in foreign aid
through the International Monetary Fund. Protests against the associated austerity
measures continued, however. One of the most vocal critics of the proposed
economic austerity program was former President Aristide. In January 1997 he
formed a new party, Lavalas Family, as a vehicle for his presidential bid in the year
2000.
The 2000 Haitian Elections
The Haitian parliamentary elections in 2000 were an attempt to resolve disputed
elections from 1997, which had triggered an electoral crisis at the time. Saying that
the 1997 elections were marred by fraud, Preval’s Prime Minister resigned. Haiti
was then without a prime minister for a year and a half, with four failed attempts to
name a new one, and no resolution to the 1997 elections controversy. In January
1999, President Preval declared that most of Parliament’s term had expired, although
elections had not been held to replace them. He then installed members of his
Cabinet and an electoral council by decree. He continued to rule by decree through
the end of his term in February 2001. In July 1999, President Rene Preval signed a
new electoral law that effectively annulled the disputed April 1997 elections and
provided for new elections.
The United States allotted $16 million over two fiscal years for elections
assistance for the 2000 Haitian vote. The aid supported the provisional electoral
council, whose tasks included the registration of almost 4 million eligible voters,
CRS-5
issuing voter identification cards for the first time, and organizing legislative and
municipal elections for some 10,000 posts in May 2000. Every elected position in
the country was on the ballot except for president and eight Senate seats.
Many observers hoped these elections would mean that, after two years of a
deadlocked government and more than a year of President Preval ruling by decree,
a new parliament could be installed and international aid released. Instead, the
elections brought Haiti into another crisis. Both domestic and international observers
noted irregularities in the tabulation of election results for some Senate seats.
Nonetheless, the electoral council affirmed those results, which favored former
President Aristide’s Lavalas party. In September 2000, thousands of protesters
shouting anti-Aristide and anti-Lavalas slogans called for the resignation of the
Lavalas-controlled legislature. The OAS tried to broker an agreement between
Lavalas and the opposition, to no avail.
Presidential elections were held on November 26, 2000. Because the Haitian
government refused to address the earlier contested election results, the United States
and other international donors withheld election assistance and refused to send
observers, and opposition parties boycotted them. Although Aristide won the
election with a reported 91.5% of the vote, turnout was very low, with estimates
ranging from 5% to 20% of eligible voters participating.
Aristide’s Second Term in Office
As President-elect, Aristide wrote a letter to outgoing U.S. President Clinton,
promising to make several political, judicial, and economic reforms, including
correcting the problems of the May 2000 elections. According to the White House
at the time, no new promises were made by the United States.7 The Administration
of George W. Bush, which took office on January 20, 2001, accepted the reforms set
forth in the letter as necessary steps for the Aristide government to make. Aristide
took office again on February 7, 2001. At his inauguration, the United States was
represented by its ambassador.
During President Aristide’s second term, increases in political violence renewed
concerns over security and police effectiveness. In 2001, President Aristide
announced a “zero tolerance” policy toward suspected criminals. According to
various human rights reports, this announcement was followed by numerous
extrajudicial killings by the Haitian National Police and lynchings by mobs. The
government’s respect for freedom of the press continued to deteriorate. According
to the State Department’s February 2004 Human Rights Practices Report, “The
[Haitian] government’s human rights record remained poor, with political and civil
officials implicated in serious abuses.”
7 Statement by the Press Secretary, The White House, Dec. 28, 2000.
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OAS/CARICOM Efforts to Resolve Haitian Conflict
Efforts to resolve the electoral dispute frustrated the international community
for years. At the third Summit of the Americas in April 2001, hemispheric leaders
singled out Haiti as a country whose democratic practices were in trouble and asked
the OAS to try again to help negotiate a solution to the crisis. The OAS had been
mediating on-again off-again talks between the Aristide government and the
opposition alliance Democratic Convergence. In OAS-mediated talks in July 2001,
the Aristide government and the opposition agreed to hold new elections for local
and most parliamentary seats, but could not agree on a schedule.
Tensions and violence in Haiti increased dramatically after Aristide assumed his
second term in office. Supporters of both President Aristide’s Lavalas Family party
and the opposition coalition Convergence reportedly engaged in the cycle of violent
revenge. In January 2002, the OAS Permanent Council passed Resolution 806
establishing an OAS Mission in Haiti and calling for the Haitian government to do
all it could to ensure a climate of security and confidence necessary to hold free and
fair elections. In July 2002, the OAS released a report stating that a December 2001
attack on the National Palace was not an attempted coup, as the Aristide
Administration had claimed, and that “[T]he political opposition did not participate
in the planning or in the execution of the attack.” It also said that the government
and Lavalas party officials gave arms to militants who plundered and burned the
homes and offices of opposition members after the palace attack.8
Also in July 2002, the opposition proposed that presidential elections be re-held
as well. All the OAS member states recognized Aristide as Haiti’s legitimate head
of state, however, and the OAS Secretary General said that the November 2000
elections “have never been the subject of an OAS or Summit of the Americas
mandate,” meaning that only the disputed May 2000 parliamentary elections were
within the OAS mandate to negotiate a solution.9
In September 2002, the OAS passed Resolution 822 that tried to break the
political impasse by recognizing the government’s “constitutional electoral
prerogatives.” In other words, it removed the obstacle of having to complete
negotiations with the opposition before elections could be held. A consensus
resolution, negotiated by member states and voted for by Haiti, stated that legislative
and local elections were to be held in 2003, on a date to be set by a new Provisional
Electoral Council (CEP). An “autonomous, independent, credible and neutral CEP”
was to be established by November 4, 2002. Haiti failed to meet that deadline, in
part because the Democratic Convergence refused to name a representative for the
council until the government dealt with security issues and made all reparations to
opposition forces for damage done by government supporters in December 2001.
Aristide named a partial CEP in February 2003. In June 2003, the OAS passed
Resolution 1959, regretting that neither the government nor the opposition had fully
8 “Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Events of December 17, 2001, in Haiti,”
OEA/Ser.G CP/INF.4702/02, July 1, 2002, part III.
9 “Report of the Secretary General in Response to CP/INF.4724/02,” OEA/Ser.G
CP/doc.3643/02 corr.1, Aug. 27, 2002, part I.
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implemented their obligations under the previous two resolutions, and urging the
government to create a safe environment for elections and the opposition to help
actively form a CEP. Those steps were not taken, and elections did not take place
in 2003.
In November 2003, the new U.S. Ambassador to Haiti, James Foley, described
the current state of Haiti as “very worrisome from all points of view: poverty,
insecurity, economic development, infrastructure, environment, health, etc.,” and said
that it was essential that Haiti resolve its political impasse so that Haiti and its
international donors “can work together to resolve all of these fundamental
problems.” A U.N.-appointed human rights expert said in November that the human
rights situation there had “again deteriorated,” criticizing the ongoing impunity of
human rights violators; the “persistent dysfunctions in the administration of justice,”
and the frequently violent suppression of freedom of expression and especially of
peaceful demonstrations. Saying he was “very disturbed” at the rising political
violence there, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell backed a proposal by the Roman
Catholic Bishops Conference of Haiti to set up a council of advisors to help Aristide
govern until new parliamentary elections were held. Aristide supported the initiative,
but the opposition, which accused Aristide of corruption and mismanagement,
rejected it. In January 2004, the CARICOM secured Aristide’s agreement to disarm
political gangs, appoint a new prime minister, and form an advisory council.
Opposition groups refused to negotiate a settlement or participate in elections unless
Aristide resigned. Two-thirds of Haitian legislators’ terms expired in January 2004
without elections having been held to replace them. President Aristide began ruling
by decree.
The conflict escalated when armed rebels seized Haiti’s fourth largest city,
Gonaives, on February 5, and the armed rebellion spread to other cities. Street battles
ensued when police forces tried to regain control, leaving dozens dead. CARICOM
continued trying to negotiate a solution to the crisis. Civil opposition groups
operating mainly in the capital denied any links to the armed rebellions. After being
criticized by some for statements appearing to indicate it might support the elected
President’s removal, Administration officials said the remarks were not intended to
signal support for Aristide’s resignation, and that the Bush Administration sought a
peaceful solution to the crisis. Secretary of State Colin Powell and other foreign
diplomats suggested the possibility of bringing in outside police forces, but only to
support the enforcement of a political agreement reached by the Haitian government
and the opposition, such as the one proposed by CARICOM. The opposition rejected
the agreement.
Aristide’s Departure
With rebel forces moving toward the capital of Port-au-Prince on February 28,
2004, the Bush Administration increased pressure on Aristide to resign, stating that
“His failure to adhere to democratic principles has contributed to the deep
polarization and violent unrest that we are witnessing in Haiti today.” Aristide
resigned the next day and flew into exile. He has since said he was kidnaped, a
charge the White House denies. Following succession protocol outlined in the
Haitian constitution, Supreme Court Chief Justice Boniface Alexandre was sworn in
as President on February 29. The United Nations unanimously passed a resolution
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authorizing an international force, initially comprising U.S. Marines, and French and
Canadian police and military forces, to help restore order.10 That force was replaced
by U.N. peacekeepers three months later, in June 2004. A tripartite commission,
based on an element of the CARICOM proposal, was formed to help run an interim
government. CARICOM said it was not prepared to hold discussions with Haiti’s
new leaders, however, and called for an investigation into Aristide’s “relinquishing
of the Presidency” by an independent international body such as the United Nations.
During a demonstration on March 7, 2004, in which protesters called for the
exiled Aristide to stand trial for alleged corruption and human rights violations, six
people were reportedly killed by suspected Aristide loyalists. U.S. Marines killed at
least six Haitians who they said were trying to attack them. Speaking from exile in
the capital of the Central African Republic on March 8, Aristide asserted, “I am the
elected president,” and appealed for “peaceful resistance” by his supporters to what
he called the “occupation” of Haiti.11 After Jamaica allowed Aristide to travel there
for a ten-week visit, Haiti’s acting prime minister withdrew its ambassador from
Kingston, saying Aristide was “disturbing Haiti’s fragile order” by visiting the island
only 125 miles away. The Jamaican government said Aristide agreed to their
condition that he not use his visit to launch a campaign to be reinstated as president.12
Aristide went into exile in South Africa on May 31, 2004.
The Interim Government
Following succession protocol outlined in the Haitian constitution, Supreme
Court Chief Justice Boniface Alexandre was sworn in as President on February 29,
2004. A tripartite commission, based on an element of the CARICOM proposal,
helped establish an interim government headed by Prime Minister Gerard LaTortue.
The Commission was composed of one representative each of Aristide’s Lavalas
Family party, the civil opposition, and the international community. LaTortue’s
cabinet consists of technocrats without strong party affiliations and does not include
either Lavalas or the Democratic Convergence. The new minister of Interior and
National Security is Herard Abraham, former head of the Haitian army during
Aristide’s first term, in 1991. Abraham retired about three months before the 1991
coup took place.
Showing his support for the interim government in Haiti, Secretary of State
Colin Powell visited Haiti on April 5, announcing several U.S. initiatives. These
included the immediate deployment of a seven-member team to advise the interim
government on security issues; a three-year employment generation program to
improve municipal infrastructure and provide tens of thousands of jobs; and a team
to assess the technical assistance needed by the Haitian Finance Ministry and to assist
Haitian authorities “in the recovery of assets that may have been illicitly diverted.”
The U.S. will provide an additional $9 million to the Organization of American
10 S/RES/1529 (2003), Feb. 29, 2004.
11 Paisley Dodds, Ian James, “U.S. Marines Say They Killed Haiti Gunman,” AP, Mar. 8,
2004.
12 “Haiti Decries Aristide ‘Meddling’,” BBC News, Mar. 16, 2004.
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States (OAS) Special Mission for Strengthening Democracy in Haiti, for elections
and democracy building activities; and $500,000 for a variety of elections-related
activities such as public education programs, public opinion polling, and training for
political parties to develop candidates. Powell also said that humanitarian
development programs would be expanded “to ensure that the medical and nutritional
needs of Haiti’s most disadvantaged people are met.”13 Relations between the U.S.
and other Caribbean governments remain strained as Caribbean Community
(CARICOM) nations continue to withhold recognition of the LaTortue government
and maintain that Aristide is still Haiti’s legitimate elected leader.14
On July 20, international donors pledged more than $1 billion over the next two
years to help Haiti rebuild its infrastructure, strengthen institutions, and improve
basic services. The United States committed to provide $230 million for FY2004-
FY2005. The interim government signed an agreement with the U.N. and the OAS
on August 23 to hold presidential, parliamentary, and local elections in 2005, with
a new president to take office on February 7, 2006. The U.N. established a trust fund
for the elections, started with $9 million in U.S. funds, which they hope will reach
$41 million. Members of former President Aristide’s Fanmi Lavalas party have
threatened to boycott the elections and claim to face political persecution by the
interim government.
Many observers express concern over the actions of former members of the
Haitian military since Aristide’s departure. Many former military personnel have
demanded reinstatement of the Haitian army, which was disbanded by President
Aristide in 1995 following a period of multiple military coups and gross violations
of human rights carried out under military rule. The U.S. government and human
rights organizations have objected to armed rebels being given any formal role in
Haitian security forces.
The interim government increased concerns in April when Prime Minister
LaTortue called the rebels “freedom fighters,” and Haiti’s top police official in the
northern region met with former paramilitary leader Louis Jodel Chamblain and Guy
Philippe to negotiate roles for their fighters in the police force.15 Chamberlain had
been convicted in absentia for killing a Justice Minister and chief financier of former
President Aristide; Guy Philippe was accused of leading a coup attempt against
former President Preval. In June, LaTortue assured U.S. officials that former soldiers
would be subject to the same criteria and human rights vetting procedures as other
applicants for joining the Haitian National Police. Nonetheless, some observers
remain concerned, noting that government discussions of disarmament have focused
more on former Aristide supporters than on armed rebels and former members of the
army. In addition, the government presided over a rushed re-trial of Chamblain, in
13 U.S. Dept. of State, Office of the Spokesman, “U.S. Support for Haiti,” Fact Sheet, Apr.
5, 2004.
14 Carol J. Williams, “Former Ruling Party Seeks to Keep Itself Afloat in Post-Aristide
Haiti...,” Los Angeles Times, Apr. 7, 2004.
15 “Haiti: Formal Role for Rebels Negotiated,” Latin American Weekly Report, Apr. 6, 2004.
CRS-10
which he was acquitted of the 1993 political assassination he had been convicted of
in absentia.
The U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti
The U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) assumed authority on
June 1, 2004, although few of the U.N. troops had arrived by then. The mission has
authorization for a force of about 8,000, made up of 6,700 military troops and 1,622
civilian police. As of September 30, only 3,000 U.N. peacekeeping troops were
stationed in Haiti. According to U.N. figures, the United States had a total of six
troops participating in the U.N. Stabilization Mission in Haiti as of August 31, 2004.
The MINUSTAH mandate includes helping to ensure a secure and stable
environment, fostering democratic governance, and supporting the promotion and
protection of human rights. The Brazilian commander of MINUSTAH has said that
without a full complement of troops it is difficult to maintain law and order.
Furthermore, the mandate was established in April 2004, prior to flooding and
hurricanes that have left over two thousand Haitians dead and thousands more
homeless. MINUSTAH has provided assistance in the provision of emergency
assistance following the natural disasters, stretching its resources even thinner.
Security conditions in Haiti continue to worsen. In September 2004, former
Haitian soldiers seized control of several towns, assumed security responsibilities
alongside local police, or expelled police officers in various parts of the country.
Marches begun on September 30 to commemorate the anniversary of the military
coup that forced former President Aristide from office in 1991 have continued into
October and grown increasingly violent. Both the Haitian government and
MINUSTAH have complained that the other is not doing enough to establish security
in Haiti. Nonetheless, on October 6, Haitian police officers and U.N. soldiers made
a joint show of force to try to quell the spate of violence, arresting suspected militants
and searching for weapons. Some of Aristide’s more militant supporters have
beheaded police officers and threatened to do the same to civilian officials if Aristide
is not restored to office (New York Times, October 7, 2004). Several Lavalas party
officials have been arrested; they denied inciting the violence and blamed the
government for not stopping the violence.
Current Congressional Concerns
Support of Democracy
Many in Congress have been concerned that Haiti continue to strengthen its
transition to democracy, in particular that it hold democratic elections in accordance
with Haiti’s 1987 constitution. In recent congressional hearings, the Bush
Administration reiterated that U.S. policy in Haiti is to support democracy and the
strengthening of democratic institutions. Assistant Secretary of State for Western
Hemisphere Affairs Roger Noriega defended the Administration’s decision not to
send in troops while Aristide was still in Haiti. He said that although Aristide voiced
support for the CARICOM agreement, he continued to foment violence through his
CRS-11
armed supporters, and that the Administration decided supporting his continued rule
was not a sustainable policy and not worth risking U.S. lives for.16
At the same hearings, several Members of Congress harshly criticized the
Administration, however, for its role in Aristide’s departure from Haiti, saying that
the Bush Administration refused to provide any assistance to stop the escalating
violence in Haiti until Aristide resigned. Some voiced concern that the
Administration’s actions set a dangerous precedent, that the ouster of a
democratically elected government by violent thugs would be tolerated if the
government was no longer popular or favored by the current U.S. administration.
Some Members have called for independent investigations into what they refer to
as the coup d’état that removed Aristide from office, and the role of the U.S. in his
departure. Some observers are also concerned about the effect Aristide’s claim, and
his call for his supporters to resist the international “occupation,” will have on efforts
to restore order and stability in Haiti, and on the safety of U.S. troops in Haiti.
Currently, the formation of a legitimate transitional government through a
constitutional process was made difficult by Aristide’s claim that he remains Haiti’s
democratically elected president, and by the lack of a legally-constituted legislature
to authorize a transitional government. When the office of the President becomes
vacant, the Haitian constitution calls for the President of the Haitian Supreme Court
to head an interim government. Accordingly, Boniface Alexandre has been named
interim President, although there is no functioning legislature to confirm his
appointment, as called for in the constitution. The constitution also calls for the
election of a new President to be held between 45 and 90 days after the vacancy
occurs. Many officials who have been involved in the technical process of holding
elections believe that a year is a more realistic time-frame in which to expect
elections to be held. On April 6, the interim government announced it had reached
agreement with opposition political groups to hold elections in 2005, with a new
president to take office on February 7, 2006. Observers voice concern that holding
elections will be extremely difficult as long as the violence continues.
A tripartite commission, consisting of one representative each from Aristide’s
Lavalas party, the civil opposition, and the international community, was formed to
help oversee the transition process. Creation of a tripartite commission, also known
as the “Council of Elders,” was part of a CARICOM proposal that was agreed to by
then-President Aristide, but rejected by the civil opposition. CARICOM says it is not
prepared to hold discussions with the new Haitian leaders. Some observers
questioned the validity of the tripartite commission as a legitimate part of an interim
government.
Concerns have also been raised about the civil opposition as represented by the
Democratic Platform in Haiti. Some observers question the right of the civil
opposition to participate in an interim government, given their rejection of political
solutions that did not involve Aristide’s resignation, including the one proposed by
16 Hearings before the House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on the
Western Hemisphere, March 3, 2004, and before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, and Narcotics Affairs, Mar. 10, 2004.
CRS-12
CARICOM and supported by the United States. Others wonder to what extent the
opposition had a unified agenda beyond the removal of Aristide from office. Some
have asked what, if any, relationship the opposition had with the armed rebels who
took over much of Haiti prior to Aristide’s departure. Both the opposition and the
Bush Administration state that there was no relationship between the armed and
unarmed opposition at the time.
On July 20, 2004, international donors pledged more than $1 billion over the
next two years to help Haiti rebuild its infrastructure, strengthen institutions, and
improve basic services. The interim government signed an agreement with the U.N.
and the OAS on August 23 to hold presidential, parliamentary, and local elections in
2005. The U.N. established a trust fund for the elections, started with $9 million in
U.S. funds, which they hope will reach $41 million. Members of former President
Aristide’s Fanmi Lavalas party have threatened to boycott the elections and claim to
face political persecution by the interim government. Several were arrested in
October; reportedly the charges have not been made public. The presumed dates for
the elections are November 6 for local positions and November 27 for the first round
and December 18 for the second round legislative and presidential elections.
U.S. Assistance to Haiti
From FY1996 to FY1999, the Clinton Administration provided approximately
$100 million annually in foreign assistance to Haiti, plus about $868 million in
Department of Defense costs for peacekeeping and security operations related to
embargo enforcement and the international intervention. Beginning in 2000, in
response to the unresolved elections dispute, the Clinton Administration redirected
U.S. humanitarian assistance through non-governmental organizations, rather than
through the Haitian government. The Bush Administration has continued this policy.
Aid began to decrease at the end of the Clinton Administration, and continued to do
so for the first two years of the Bush Administration, with $79 million in FY2000,
$73 million in FY2001, and $56 million in FY2002. The original request for
FY2003 was $47 million; the Administration later increased aid to $72 million. The
Bush Administration launched an initiative in 2003 to prevent the transmission of the
HIV/AIDS virus from mothers to children; Haiti was one of 14 countries included in
the program. According to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID),
between four and six thousand Haitian children are born with the virus each year.
Before the current unrest, Haiti was going to receive an estimated $55 million
in U.S. foreign aid in FY2004. An additional $0.54 million in humanitarian
assistance was made available when the Bush Administration declared Haiti a
disaster on February 18, 2004, and more costs were incurred with the U.S. military
forces in Haiti. The initial request for FY2005, made before U.S. forces were sent
to Haiti, was for $54 million.
Congress has monitored aid to Haiti closely, and has established a number of
conditions on this assistance over the years. The FY2000 foreign aid act (P.L. 106-
113) outlined congressional priorities for assistance to Haiti, including “aggressive
action to support the Haitian National Police;” ensuring that elections are free and
fair; developing indigenous human rights monitoring capacity; facilitating more
privatization of state-owned enterprises; a sustainable agricultural development
CRS-13
program; and establishing an economic development fund to encourage U.S.
investment in Haiti. The act also required the president to regularly report to
Congress on the Haitian government’s progress in areas of concern to Congress.
The Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for FY2001 (P.L. 106-429) shifted
conditions, prohibiting aid to the Haitian government until Haiti held free and fair
elections to seat a new parliament and was fully cooperating with U.S. efforts to
interdict illicit drug traffic through Haiti. The only condition in FY2002 foreign aid
appropriations law (P.L. 107-115) required notification to Congress prior to provision
of any aid to Haiti. The FY2003 foreign assistance appropriations act (P.L. 108-7)
provided for “not less than $52.5 million” in food assistance program funds to be
allocated to Haiti (Sec. 551), but contained no other conditions on aid to Haiti.
The FY2004 foreign aid appropriations (P.L. 108-199, Division D) continues
to allow Haiti to purchase defense articles and services for the Haitian Coast Guard,
prohibits the use of funds to issue a visa to any alien involved in extrajudicial and
political killings in Haiti, allocates $5 million to the OAS Special Mission in Haiti
and $19 million in Refugee and Entrant Assistance funds to communities with large
concentrations of Haitian (and Cuban) refugees of varying ages for healthcare and
education.
The FY2005 consolidated appropriations act (P.L. 108-447, Conference Report
H.Rept. 108-792) contains several provisions regarding Haiti. The act (1) makes
International Military Education and Training funds and Foreign Military Financing
available only through regular notification procedures; (2) appropriates $20 million
for child survival and health programs, $25 million for development assistance,
including agriculture, environment, and basic education programs; $40 million in
ESF for judicial reform, police training, and national elections; “sufficient funds” for
the OAS to help Haiti hold elections in 2005, and $2 million to Zanmi Lasante for
maternal and child health activities; (3) allows Haiti to purchase defense articles and
services for its Coast Guard; (4) notes disappointment on the Haitian government’s
role in the trial and acquittal of Louis Jodel Chamblain, and the deteriorating security
human rights situation; (5) requires a report within 90 days on a multi-year assistance
strategy; (6) and encourages the Administration to help Haitian and NGO officials
to devise a reforestation strategy and to provide a report on that strategy within 180
days. The conference report was agreed to in both houses on November 20 and
signed into law December 8, 2004. The earlier Senate version had made several
findings regarding improving security in Haiti, concluding that “the failure to
establish a secure and stable environment and to conduct credible and inclusive
elections will likely result in Haiti’s complete transition from a failed state to a
criminal state.”
The 108th Congress considered but did not pass a trade preferences bill for Haiti.
The Senate passed the Haiti Economic Recovery Opportunity (HERO) Act of 2004
(S. 2261)in July, which would have given Haiti additional preferential trade treatment
if it made certain democratic and economic reforms. The House Ways and Means
Trade subcommittee held a hearing on the issue September 22. Bill supporters,
including U.S. importers, urged passage of the bill before year’s end, warning that
when global textile quotas ended in January 2005, Haiti would not be able to
compete unless given the expanded benefits proposed under the HERO Act. The
CRS-14
bill’s sponsor, Senator Mike DeWine, said that the bill would have generated over
100,000 jobs and that the bill’s failure would lead what little industry remained in
Haiti to go elsewhere, leaving 30,000 more Haitians unemployed. U.S. textile
producers objected to the provision that would have allowed apparel items assembled
in Haiti duty-free entry into the United States regardless of the country of origin of
the garments’ components. They said it would have given an unfair advantage to
third country producers. Current benefits under the Caribbean Basin Trade
Partnership Act allow duty-free access for apparel made in the region from U.S.
components.17
The House Committee worked on an alternative bill, called the HOPE act, or the
“Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act of 2004.”
The draft bill reportedly had a more restrictive rule of origin, requiring components
to originate in the U.S. or countries with which the U.S. grants trade preferences,
with some exceptions allowed. U.S. importers criticized the alternative bill, saying
it did not provide enough benefits to attract new business to Haiti. 18 The House-
drafted bill was not considered in the Senate before the end of the session. Supporters
of trade preferences for Haiti have said they may bring them up for reconsideration
in the new Congress. (For further information, see CRS Report RS21839, Haitian
Textile Industry: Impact of Proposed Trade Assistance, by Bernard Gelb.)
In July 2004, the Bush Administration announced an additional $120 million in
assistance to Haiti, for a total of about $230 million for FY2004-FY2005. According
to USAID, the aid will be distributed as follows: $22 million for job creation; $45
million for government infrastructure support; $26 million for improved security
through improved administration of justice; $122 million for humanitarian aid,
including health care, nutrition, and education; and $15 million for elections support.
A portion of an additional $100 million appropriated by Congress in supplemental
disaster assistance for the Caribbean region (P.L. 108-324) will go to Haiti as well.
17 “Trade Subcommittee Considers Additional Textile Benefits for Haiti,” World Trade
Online, Sept. 24, 2004. Also, “Crane expresses Hope House Will Approve Haitian Textile
Benefits Before Adjourning,” International Trade Reporter, Sept. 30, 2004, p.1607.
18 “Haitian Trade Compromise Imperiled,” National Journal’s Congress Daily AM, Nov. 16,
2004. Also: “Letting Haiti Down,” New York Times editorial, Nov. 2, 2004.
CRS-15
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Haiti, FY1990-FY2005
(obligations of dollars in millions)
Devel.
Food Aid
Intl.
Economic
Foreign
Fiscal
Aid/Child
Grants
Peace
Military Ed
Support
Military
Totals
Year
Survival
(P.L. 480,
Corps
& Train
Fund
Financing
& Health
Title II)
(IMET)
1990
40.2
$1.5
16.0
0.7
0.0
0.1
58.5
1991
38.5
12.3
29.1
1.0
0.0
0.3
81.2
1992
26.6
4.5
19.6
0.3
0.0
0.0
51.0
1993
23.3
24.0
41.3
0.1
0.0
0.0
88.7
1994
26.0
36.7
42.7
0.0
0.0
0.0
105.4
1995
56.6
56.0
44.0
0.0
3.0
0.0
159.6
1996
14.1
45.3
39.2
0.5
0.0
0.2
99.3
1997
24.4
53.5
22.5
0.9
0.0
0.3
101.6
1998
0.9
65.1
34.9
1.1
0.0
0.3
102.3
1999
0.0
65.1
27.0
1.4
0.3
0.2
94.0
2000a
0.0
52.5
25.1
1.4
0.0
0.3
80.0
2001
0.0
46.9
25.1
1.3
0.0
0.3
73.6
2002
0.9
30.0
23.1
1.5
0.3
0.0
55.9
2003
33.2
0.0
36.6
1.7
0.4
0.1
71.9
2004b est.
27.8
0.0
24.7
1.6
0.3
0.2
54.6
2005 req.
24.5
0.0
27.0
2.1
0.3
0.2
54.1
2004-2005c
$120.0
Total
337.0
493.4
477.9
15.6
4.6
2.5
$1,451.7
Source: U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).
a. FY2000: additional USAID operating expenses totaling $174.6 million provided in Hurricane Supplemental.
b. An additional $537,000 in humanitarian assistance, through the office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance,
was made available for Haiti on February 18, 2004.
c. On July 20, 2004, the Bush Administration announced additional funds for Haiti as follows: $22m: job
creation; $45 m: infrastructure support; $26 m: administration of justice; $122 m: humanitarian aid; $15
m: elections support.
CRS-16
Table 2. DOD Incremental Costs of U.S. International Peace
and Security Commitments, FY1992-FY1996
(Budget authority in millions of current year dollars)
Operation
FY1992
FY1993
FY1994 FY1995 FY1996
Totals
Safe Harbor
9.3
—
—
—
—
9.3
Embargo/Interdiction/
—
2.8
65.8
—
—
68.6
Sanctions Enforcement
Uphold Democracy
—
—
198.2
448.8
—
647.0
UNMIH
—
—
—
56.5
86.9
143.4
Total Haiti
9.3
2.8
264.0
505.3
86.9
868.3
Source: Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
Notes: This chart consists of the DOD incremental costs involved in U.S. support for and participation in
peacekeeping and in related humanitarian and security operations, including U.S. unilateral operations, NATO
operations, U.N. operations, and ad hoc coalition operations. Incremental costs are amounts spent on operations
over that which would have been normally spent on regular salaries, and on routine training, equipment repairs
and replacements. Opinion as to which of them constitute “peacekeeping” or “peace operations” differ. U.N.
reimbursements are not deducted. Totals may not add due to rounding. The Haiti accounts do not include the
DOD processing of Haitian migrants, which totaled $108.1 million in FY1994 and $63.7 million in FY1995.
For further information on the U.S. military intervention in Haiti, see CRS Report RL30184, Military
Interventions by U.S. Forces from Vietnam to Bosnia: Background, Outcomes, and “Lessons Learned” for
Kosovo, by Nina M. Serafino, who prepared Table 2.
Protection of Human Rights, and Security Conditions
Congress has been concerned with the protection of human rights and with security
conditions within Haiti. During his first term, in 1995, President Aristide took steps to break
with the pattern in which a military-dominated police force was associated with human rights
abuses. Haiti, with U.S. assistance, demobilized the old military, established an interim
police force of selected ex-military personnel, and began to train a professional, civilian
Haitian National Police force. The level of reported violence, flight of refugees, and alleged
assassinations dropped markedly from very high levels during the de facto military regime.
Following the return to civilian rule in 1994, Haiti made progress in the protection of human
rights, but the gains made were fragile and threatened by political tensions and problems with
impunity.
During President Aristide’s second term, increases in political violence renewed
concerns over security and police effectiveness. In 2001, President Aristide announced a
“zero tolerance” policy toward suspected criminals. According to various human rights
reports, this announcement was followed by numerous extrajudicial killings by the Haitian
National Police and lynchings by mobs. The government’s respect for freedom of the press
continued to deteriorate. According to the State Department’s February 2004 Human Rights
Practices Report, “The [Haitian] government’s human rights record remained poor, with
political and civil officials implicated in serious abuses.”
CRS-17
New concerns over human rights violations are presented by the leaders of the armed
rebellion that contributed to Aristide’s resignation. Both Louis Jodel Chamblain and Guy
Philippe were members of the Haitian military. Chamblain is the alleged leader of death
squads responsible for a bloodbath that halted elections in 1987 and for killing thousands of
civilians after the 1991 military coup against former President Aristide. Chamblain was
acquitted in a rapidly held retrial in August 2004, after which the Bush Administration
expressed “deep concern” about the rule of law in Haiti.
Philippe, who was also a police commissioner in Cap Haitien, fled into exile after being
accused of involvement in a coup attempt against President Preval in 2000. Philippe says
he wants to reconstitute the Haitian army and declared himself its head on March 2. Both
men appear to have a high degree of popular support that might hamper the international
community’s ability to persuade them to disarm. The Haitian army, which had a long history
of human rights abuses, was disbanded in 1995. Former soldiers have staged protests
demanding the restoration of the army and 10 years of back pay.
Security conditions in Haiti continue to worsen. Former soldiers have seized control
of towns, assumed security responsibilities alongside local police, or expelled police officers
in various parts of the country. Supporters of Aristide, demanding his return to office, began
violent protests on September 30, the anniversary of the coup that removed Aristide from
office in 1991. These have left at least 55 dead, including police officers who were
decapitated. The Bush Administration condemned the “systematic campaign” of violence
and called on Lavalas leaders “to break with the party’s legacy of violence and criminality
... and to participate peacefully in the electoral process.”19 Gangs on both sides are heavily
armed. The Haitian National Police are understaffed and under-equipped to maintain order.
The U.N. Mission commissioned with ensuring a secure environment still only had half
of its promised forces as of September 30, 2004. Without a full complement of troops, the
Brazilian commander of MINUSTAH says it is difficult to maintain law and order. Two
U.N. peacekeepers have been wounded in the recent unrest. Only six U.S. troops are
stationed in Haiti as part of that international mission. Saying that U.N. peacekeepers have
failed to maintain security, Prime Minister reportedly asked the Bush Administration to send
U.S. troops to Haiti. The Department of Defense announced that, while it is not sending
troops to the U.N. Mission, it is organizing a major humanitarian exercise in Haiti as a show
of support for Latortue’s government.
19 U.S. Dept. of State, “Violence in Haiti,” statement by Richard Boucher, Spokesman, Oct.
12, 2004.
CRS-18
Narcotics Trafficking
Haiti is a major transshipment point for illegal narcotics, mostly cocaine, being
transported from South America to the United States, according to the State Department’s
March 2003 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. Several factors make Haiti
attractive to narcotics traffickers. Located between South America and the United States, its
coasts and border with the Dominican Republic are largely uncontrolled. Haiti’s nascent
democratic institutions and ineffectual infrastructure have been further weakened by the
political impasse that has characterized the country since 1997. Haiti’s current legal system
is antiquated. Haitian authorities charged with controlling drug trafficking are inexperienced,
lack sufficient resources, and, because of Haiti’s extreme poverty, are considered highly
susceptible to corruption. According to the State Department’s March 2004 report, “Serious
allegations persisted that high-level government and police officials are involved in drug
trafficking.” There are numerous allegations that former President Aristide was involved in
drug trafficking.
In 2001, 2002, and 2003, the Bush Administration said Haiti was not certified as having
fully cooperated, or had “failed demonstrably” to comply with U.S. drug-control efforts. All
three years President Bush determined, however, that it was in the national interest to
continue providing aid to Haiti despite its counter narcotics performance, and granted a
waiver so that aid to Haiti could continue. According to the Bush Administration, the Haitian
government took several important actions in 2002 and 2003, including putting into force a
bilateral maritime narcotics interdiction agreement with the United States, establishing a
financial intelligence unit, and extraditing four well-known traffickers to the United States.
It also said, however, that “Haitian drug trafficking organizations continue to operate with
relative impunity.” The Administration has said that “Haitian poverty and hopelessness”
were chief catalysts in Haitian involvement in the drug trade and in illegal migration to the
United States. Cutting off aid to Haiti, including programs aimed at attacking those catalysts,
“would aggravate an already bad situation.”
In September 2004, President Bush found that the interim government “has taken
substantive — if limited — counternarcotics actions....” The Administration added,
however, that it remained “deeply concerned” about the Haitian government’s ability to carry
out sustained counternarcotics efforts.20
Haitian Migration
The main elements of current immigration policy regarding Haitians are migrant
interdiction on the high seas and mandatory detentions of undocumented, interdicted
Haitians. Since 1981, it has been U.S. policy to have the U.S. Coast Guard stop and search
Haitian vessels on the high sea that are suspected of transporting undocumented Haitians.
Some of the congressional debate over the years has focused on whether interdicted Haitians
are economic migrants, and should therefore be returned to Haiti, or whether they are
refugees with a well-founded fear of persecution who should be allowed to stay in the United
States while applying for political asylum. Some Members and human rights advocates
express concern that Haitians are not given the same treatment as other aliens seeking asylum
20 “U.S. Releases Annual Narcotics Certification Report,” USInfo.State.Gov, Sept.16, 2004.
CRS-19
in the United States. President Bush has said that Haitian “refugees” interdicted at sea will
be returned to Haiti.21
Attorney General John Ashcroft issued a ruling in April 2003 that unauthorized Haitian
migrants can be detained indefinitely in response to national security concerns.22 The
Administration said the ruling was needed to discourage mass migration from Haiti and to
prevent the U.S. Coast Guard and other Department of Homeland Security agencies from
being diverted from more important border security priorities. The Attorney General further
warns that terrorists may pose as Haitian asylum seekers, a charge disputed by immigrant
advocates and some U.S. consular officials. So far there have been no significant population
movements, but the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees is working with
Caribbean states to set up contingency plans in the event of a mass exodus from Haiti.
Following the natural disasters of fall 2004,which killed almost 2,000 people and left
over 200,000 homeless, the Haitian government formally requested Temporary Protected
Status (TPS) for Haitians in October. That status would halt the deportation back to Haiti
of thousands of undocumented Haitians living in the United States. Immigration advocates
cited the precedent of Central Americans being granted TPS following Hurricane Mitch in
1998. A bill (H.R. 5316) that would make Haitians eligible for TPS was introduced in
Congress October 8. The Department of Homeland Security says it has not made a
recommendation at this time, but is continuing to monitor events in Haiti. (For more
information see CRS Report RS21349, U.S. Immigration Policy on Haitian Migrants, and
CRS Report RS20844, Temporary Protected Status: Current Immigration Policy and Issues,
by Ruth Ellen Wasem.)
Humanitarian Crisis
Since February 2004, Haiti has been faced with a series of crises, including a civil
conflict and the impact of a flood disaster and tropical storm. Each disaster has been made
worse in its cumulative effect on a nation that remains the poorest in the Western
Hemisphere. A humanitarian crisis is unfolding in Haiti and the conditions, particularly in
Gonaives, are of great concern. The U.S. has responded to each of the situations with relief
and recovery assistance. U.N. figures suggest that the flooding in May (primarily near the
southern border between Haiti and the Dominican Republic) resulted in tens of thousands
being displaced, 1,059 deaths, and several hundred injured. Approximately 1,600 people are
still missing and presumed dead. Thousands of homes were damaged or destroyed along
with crop and livestock losses. Hurricane Jeanne inflicted even more damage. Recent
figures indicate that 3,006 people were killed, with more than 2,800 from Gonaives.
Flooding devastated communities, and the storm affected more than 300,000 people.
With an ongoing lack of security, assessments of the humanitarian situation remain
fluid. Lack of road security and looting have impeded the delivery of aid, although with the
assistance of MINUSTAH, the conditions have seen sporadic improvement. Political
violence continues in Port-au-Prince, hampering the efforts of those trying to assist the
Haitian people and, in the first week of October, also blocking World Food Program (WFP)
21 “President Bush Welcomes Georgian President Saakashvili to White House,” The White
House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2/25/04.
22 23 I & N Dec.572 (A.G. 2003).
CRS-20
food deliveries. Road conditions have impeded access by truck convoys trying to reach
Gonaives.
According to USAID, in FY2004, the U.S. government provided about $180 million to
Haiti for the civil conflict, flood, and hurricane relief, with approximately $40 million for
humanitarian assistance. Congress approved $100 million in emergency assistance for
Caribbean countries affected by the recent natural disasters, including Haiti. The aid was
incorporated into the FY2005 Military Construction Appropriations and Emergency
Hurricane Supplemental Appropriations Act (H.R. 4837, P.L. 108-324). Some Members
have criticized the current level of aid as too small considering the amount of damage
wrought by the storms.
International humanitarian actors responding to the crisis include U.N. agencies,
international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and bilateral and multilateral
donors. Both the United Nations and International Federation of the Red Cross have
launched emergency appeals.
(Rhoda Margesson contributed to this section. For background information, see her CRS
Report RS21751, Humanitarian Crisis in Haiti: 2004, and CRS Report RL32160, Caribbean
Region: Issues in U.S. Relations, by Mark P. Sullivan.)
Legislation in the 109th Congress
H.R. 257 (Jackson-Lee). To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to reunify
families, permit earned access to permanent resident status, provide protection against unfair
immigration-related employment practices, reform the diversity visa program, provide
adjustment of status for Haitians and Liberian nationals, and for other purposes. Introduced
and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary January 6, 2005.
Legislation in the 108th Congress
The following list includes legislation from the 108th Congress that was approved and
become public law or was introduced in 2004. For the status of other legislation at the end
of the 108th, see the CRS online guide, Haiti: Legislation in the 108th Congress,
[http://www.crs.gov/products/browse/officialsources/haitileg.shtml], by Andy Mendelson.
P.L. 108-7 (H.J.Res. 2). Consolidated Appropriations for FY2003. The Commerce,
Justice and State appropriations bill makes available, in the “Federal Prison” section, an
amount “not to exceed” $20 million of contract confinement funds for the care and security
in the U.S. of Haitian (and Cuban) entrants. Under the Foreign Operations appropriations
(Division E), Sec. 551 a) allows the Haitian government to purchase defense articles and
services for the Coast Guard. Sec. 551 b) provides that “not less than” $52.5 million of funds
appropriated by Title II and to carry out AID food aid programs should be allocated for
Haiti. Signed into law February 20, 2003.
P.L. 108-25 (H.R. 1298/S. 1009). The U.S. Leadership Against HIV/AIDS,
Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003. Haiti is among 13 countries (Guyana and 12 African
countries) that the legislation expressly benefits, with an HIV/AIDS Coordinator in charge
of approving all U.S. activities (funding included) aimed at combating AIDS in these
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countries (Sec. 102 (a)). Appropriates $3 billion per year through FY2008 for bilateral and
multilateral efforts to combat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. Signed into law May 27,
2003.
P.L. 108-199 (H.R. 2673). Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for FY2004 (H.R.
2800/S. 1426), incorporated into consolidated appropriations act. The Commerce, Justice
and State appropriations act makes available until expended, in the “Federal Prison System”
section, an amount “not to exceed” $20 million of confinement funds for the care and
security in the U.S. of Haitian (and Cuban) entrants. Under the Foreign Operations
appropriations (Division D), Sec. 551 allows the Haitian government to purchase defense
articles and services for the Coast Guard. Sec. 567(b) makes $34 million available for family
planning, maternal, and reproductive health activities in 12 countries, including Haiti. Sec.
616 prohibits the use of funds to issue a visa to any alien involved in extrajudicial and
political killings in Haiti, including exemption and reporting requirements. Allocates $5
million to the OAS Special Mission in Haiti. Allocates $19 million in Refugee and Entrant
Assistance funds to communities with large concentrations of Haitian (and Cuban) refugees
of varying ages whose cultural differences make assimilation especially difficult, justifying
a more intense level and longer duration of federal assistance for health care and education.
Conference agreement for omnibus vehicle approved by House December 8, 2003, and by
Senate January 22, 2004. Signed into law January 23, 2004.
P.L. 108-324 (H.R. 4837). The FY2005 Military Construction Appropriations and
Emergency Hurricane Supplemental Appropriations Act includes $100 million in emergency
assistance for Caribbean countries affected by the recent natural disasters, including Haiti.
According to the supplemental budget requests from the Bush Administration that the bill
fulfills, the aid will support the temporary provision of electricity; housing rehabilitation and
reconstruction; agriculture sector reconstruction; water and sanitation systems reconstruction;
and the rehabilitation of rural infrastructure such as roads, schools, and health facilities.
P.L. 108-447 (H.R. 4818). The FY2005 consolidated appropriations act contains
several provisions regarding Haiti. The law (1) makes International Military Education and
Training funds and Foreign Military Financing available only through regular notification
procedures; (2) appropriates $20 million for child survival and health programs, $25 million
for development assistance, including agriculture, environment, and basic education
programs; $40 million in ESF for judicial reform, police training, and national elections;
“sufficient funds” for the OAS to help Haiti hold elections in 2005 and $2 million to Zanmi
Lasante for maternal and child health activities; (3) allows Haiti to purchase defense articles
and services for its Coast Guard; (4) notes disappointment on the Haitian government’s role
in the trial and acquittal of Louis Jodel Chamblain and the deteriorating security human
rights situation; (5) requires a report within 90 days on a multi-year assistance strategy; (6)
and encourages the Administration to help Haitian and NGO officials to devise a
reforestation strategy and to provide a report on that strategy within 180 days. The
conference report was agreed to in both houses on November 20. Signed into law December
8, 2004. The earlier Senate version had made several findings regarding improving security
in Haiti, concluding that “the failure to establish a secure and stable environment and to
conduct credible and inclusive elections will likely result in Haiti’s complete transition from
a failed state to a criminal state.”
H.R. 3867 (Deutsch). To require the Secretary of Homeland Security to designate Haiti
under Section 244(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act so that nationals of Haiti
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present in the United States may be granted temporary protected status. Introduced, referred
to Committee on Judiciary March 1, 2004. Referred to Subcommittee on Immigration,
Border Security, and Claims April 2.
H.R. 3918 (Jackson-Lee). To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to reunify
families, permit earned access to permanent resident status, provide protection against unfair
immigration-related employment practices, reform the diversity visa program, provide
adjustment of status for Haitians and Liberian nationals, and for other purposes. Introduced,
referred to Committee on Judiciary March 9, 2004. Referred to Subcommittee on
Immigration, Border Security, and Claims April 2.
H.R. 3919 (Lee). To establish the Independent Commission on the 2004 Coup d’État
in the Republic of Haiti. Introduced, referred to Committee on International Relations March
9, 2004.
H.R. 4754 (Wolf). Making appropriations for the Departments of Commerce, Justice,
and State, the Judiciary, and related agencies for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2005,
and for other purposes. Makes funds available under the Refugee Education Assistance Act
of 1980 for the care and security of Haitian (and Cuban) entrants. Passed House July 8,
2004, 397-18. Received in the Senate, referred to the Committee on Appropriations July 9.
H.R. 4818 (Kolbe)/S. 2812 (McConnell). A bill to make appropriations for foreign
operations, export financing, and related programs for the fiscal year ending September 30,
2005, and for other purposes. The conference version of the FY2005 foreign aid
appropriations act (H.R. 4818, Kolbe, Conference Report H. 108-792) contains several
provisions regarding Haiti. The act: (1) makes International Military Education and Training
funds and Foreign Military Financing available only through regular notification procedures;
(2) appropriates $20 million for child survival and health programs, $25 million for
development assistance, including agriculture, environment, and basic education programs;
$40 million in ESF for judicial reform, police training, and national elections; “sufficient
funds” for the OAS to help Haiti hold elections in 2005, and $2 million to Zanmi Lasante for
maternal and child health activities; (3) allows Haiti to purchase defense articles and services
for its Coast Guard; (4) notes disappointment on the Haitian government’s role in the trial
and acquittal of Louis Jodel Chamblain, and the deteriorating security human rights situation;
(5) requires a report within 90 days on a multi-year assistance strategy; (6) and encourages
the Administration to help Haitian and NGO officials to devise a reforestation strategy and
to provide a report on that strategy within 180 days. The conference report was agreed to in
both houses on November 20, 2004.
H.R. 5316 (Hastings). Would make nationals of Haiti, Grenada, and the Cayman
Islands eligible for temporary protected status under the Immigration and Nationality Act.
Introduced and referred to the Judiciary Committee on October 8, 2004.
H.Con.Res. 370 (Waters). Expresses the sense of Congress that the United States
should support the principles of democracy and constitutional rule in the Republic of Haiti,
and for other purposes. Introduced, referred to Committee on International Relations on
February 25, 2004.
H.Con.Res. 372 (Hastings). Expresses the sense of Congress with respect to the
urgency of cessation of hostilities in the Republic of Haiti. Introduced, referred to Committee
on International Relations February 26, 2004.
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H.Con.Res. 496 (Lee). Expresses the sense of Congress with regard to providing
humanitarian assistance to countries of the Caribbean devastated by Hurricanes Charley,
Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne. Introduced, referred to Committee on International Relations on
September 22, 2004. Agreed to, as amended, by voice vote in House October 4. Received
in the Senate October 5.
H.Res. 542 (Meek). Expresses the sense of the House that the Secretary of Homeland
Security should designate Haiti under Section 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
in order to make nationals of Haiti eligible for temporary protected status under such section.
Introduced, referred to Judiciary Committee February 26, 2004. Referred to Subcommittee
on the Constitution April 2.
H.Res. 810 (Owens). Expresses the sense of the House of Representatives that the
Secretary of Homeland Security should designate Haiti, Grenada, Jamaica, the Dominican
Republic, and the Bahamas under Section 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act to
make nationals of those countries eligible for temporary protected status under that section.
Introduced, referred to Judiciary Committee on September 30, 2004.
S. 2127 ( Lugar). A bill to build operational readiness in civilian agencies, and for
other purposes. Establishes mechanisms to coordinate assistance in stabilizing and
reconstructing a country or region that is in, or is in transition from, conflict or civil strife,
including new entities in the Department of State. Introduced February 25, 2004. Placed on
Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders March 18.
S. 2144 (Lugar). A bill to authorize appropriations for the Department of State and
international broadcasting activities for FY2005, for the Peace Corps for FY2005 through
2007, for foreign assistance programs for FY2005, and for other purposes. Requires a report
on United States policy toward Haiti. Makes Haiti eligible to purchase defense articles and
services under the Arms Export Control Act for the Coast Guard. Revises human rights
reporting requirements with respect to Haiti. Introduced February 27, 2004, Committee on
Foreign Relations ordered to be reported with amendments favorably. Placed on Senate
Legislative Calendar under General Orders March 18.
S. 2187 (Graham, Bob). A bill to amend the Haitian Refugee Immigration Fairness
Act of 1998. Introduced, referred to Committee on Judiciary March 10, 2004.
S. 2261 (DeWine)/H.R. 4889 (Shaw). Haiti Economic Recovery Opportunity Act of
2004 (HERO Act). Amends the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act to give additional
preferential trade treatment to Haiti if the President certifies to Congress that Haiti has
fulfilled certain requirements, including that Haiti “has established or is making continual
progress toward establishing”a market-based economy that “minimizes government
interference in the economy ... ;” the rule of law; elimination of barriers to U.S. trade and
investment; economic policies to reduce poverty and achieve other goals; a system to combat
corruption; protection of internationally recognized worker rights; and that Haiti does not
engage in activities that undermine U.S. national security or foreign policy interests; and does
not engage in gross violations of human rights or support acts of international terrorism, and
cooperates in international efforts to eliminate them. Introduced March 30, 2004. Senate
version passed with an amendment by Unanimous Consent July 16, held at Senate desk.
House version introduced, referred to Committee on Ways and Means July 21.