Order Code RS21881
January 14, 2005
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)
Sharon Squassoni
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
President Bush announced the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) on May 31,
2003. Since then, 16 nations have pledged their cooperation in interdicting shipments
of weapons of mass destruction-related (WMD) materials. Some suggest that PSI marks
a more hardline counterproliferation strategy by the Bush Administration, but without
greater resources, legal authority, or technical tools for interdiction, the success of PSI
may rest simply on a “strengthened political commitment of like-minded states to follow
through.” The 9/11 Commission Report may bring greater attention to the PSI with its
recommendation that the initiative be expanded. This report describes the objectives
and methods of PSI and the kinds of cooperation that have taken place. It will be
updated as needed.
Background
In the December 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD) Proliferation, the Bush Administration highlighted a more activist approach to
countering proliferation. While noting that traditional nonproliferation measures such as
diplomacy, arms control, threat reduction assistance, and export controls should be
enhanced, the strategy placed increasing emphasis on counterproliferation and
consequence management of WMD use.
The United States and key allies have always been alert to the danger of illicit
WMD-trafficking, but interdiction of WMD-related goods gained more prominence under
the 2002 strategy as a counterproliferation tool. It became U.S. policy to “enhance the
capabilities of our military, intelligence, technical, and law enforcement communities to
prevent the movement of WMD materials, technology, and expertise to hostile states and
terrorist organizations.”1 The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), which Under
Secretary of State John Bolton called “foremost among President Bush’s efforts to stop
WMD proliferation,” was unveiled in Krakow, Poland, on May 31, 2003.2 PSI appears
1 December 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), p. 2.
2 John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, Testimony Before
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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to be a new channel for interdiction cooperation outside of treaties and multilateral export
control regimes.3
The 9/11 Commission Report, in expressing concern that terrorist organizations, and
particularly Al Qaeda, continue their interest in obtaining weapons of mass destruction,
stated that “preventing the proliferation of these weapons warrants a maximum effort”.
In connection with this, the Commission recommended the United States seek to expand
the PSI’s membership.4
Ten other nations initially joined the United States to improve cooperation to
interdict shipments (on land, sea, or in the air) of WMD, their delivery systems, and
related materials. Six other nations have joined since, although only 15 of the 17 nations
are considered “core members” (see Table 1 below). The Bush Administration has stated
that more than 60 nations support the initiative, although it is unclear what that support
entails. According to a State Department official, the one specific function of the core
group has been to expand support, but the future of the core group itself is in question.5
Table 1. PSI Founding Members
North America
Europe
Asia/Pacific
Canada
Denmark (not core)
Australia*
United States*
France*
Japan*
Germany*
Singapore
Italy*
Netherlands*
Norway
Poland*
Portugal*
Russia
Spain*
Turkey (not core)
United Kingdom*
Note: * Denotes member since 2003.
Source: U.S. Department of State.
Since its inception, there has been little by which to measure PSI’s success: it has
none of the standard attributes like an international secretariat, offices in federal agencies
established to support it, a database or reports of successes or failures, and no established
funding. Many consider the lack of formal mechanisms an advantage for the initiative.
Supporters point to the high-level meetings in Europe, Australia and the United States,
the agreement on a set of principles in September 2003 (see Appendix A), and
2 (...continued)
the House International Relations Committee, “The Bush Administration’s Nonproliferation
Policy: Successes and Future Challenges,” March 30, 2004.
3 See [http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/32725.htm] for a State Department fact sheet on PSI.
4 Report of the 9/11 Commission. p. 381.
5 Susan Burk, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation, June 18, 2004 briefing.

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cooperative exercises to test interdiction procedures.6 Others, however, question the
seriousness of the Administration’s effort as well as its sustainability, as long as no formal
mechanisms are created.7
PSI Objectives, Methods, and Targets
According to Under Secretary Bolton, President Bush’s long-term objective is to
“create a web of counterproliferation partnerships through which proliferators will have
difficulty carrying out their trade in WMD and missile-related technology.” The Bush
Administration has emphasized that PSI is an activity, not an organization. PSI seeks to
develop “new means to disrupt WMD trafficking at sea, in the air, and on land.”8
However, very few new means of disruption appear yet to have been developed, although
old means may be applied more rigorously to improve disruption. For example, key
WMD supplier states have cooperated for many years with the United States in
interdicting sensitive shipments of WMD-related items, whether through intelligence
sharing, or actual boarding of ships and airplanes.
Several approaches may help improve interdiction efforts. First, participating states
have agreed to review their own relevant national legal authorities to ensure that they can
take action. Second, participating states resolve to take action, and to “seriously consider
providing consent...to boarding and searching of its own flag vessels by other states.”9
Third, participating states seek to put in place agreements, such as ship-boarding
agreements, with other states in advance, so that no time is lost should interdiction be
required. So far, the United States has signed ship-boarding agreements with Liberia, the
Marshall Islands, and Panama. This arrangement would give Liberia, which currently
permits more than 2,000 vessels to sail under its registration around the world, two hours
to deny U.S. personnel the right to board a ship. The United States reportedly is
consulting with two dozen other countries on similar ship-boarding agreements.10 A
fourth approach is to conduct interdiction exercises. PSI participants reportedly have
trained for “maritime interdiction in the Mediterranean, Arabian Sea, and Western Pacific
Ocean, all areas that are particularly prone to proliferation trafficking.”11
As many have described it, PSI relies on the “broken tail-light scenario,” whereby
officials will look for all available options to stop a ship suspected of transporting WMD
6 See [http://www.state.gov/t/np/c12684.htm] for complete list of all PSI activities.
7 See transcript from Senate Government Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on Budget and
International Security hearing on WMD and counterproliferation, June 23, 2004.
8 Bolton, March 30, 2004 HIRC testimony.
9 See Appendix A for September 2003 interdiction principles.
10 Interview with State Department official, April 28, 2004. The following states are listed by the
International Transport Workers’ Federation as having flags of convenience: Antigua and
Barbuda, Aruba (NL), Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda (UK), Burma, Cambodia, Canary
Islands (Spain), Cayman Islands (UK), Cook Islands (NZ), Cyprus, German International Ship
Register (GIS), Gibraltar (UK), Honduras, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall
Islands (US), Mauritius, Netherlands Antilles, Panama, St. Vincent, Sri Lanka, Tuvalu, Vanuatu.
11 Bolton, March 30, 2004 HIRC testimony.

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or WMD-related items. In practice, cargos can be seized in ports if they violate the host
state’s laws, hence the focus on strengthening domestic laws. On the high seas, ships
have the rights of freedom of the seas and innocent passage under the Law of the Sea
Convention and customary international law. The boarding agreements may allow for
boarding, but not necessarily cargo seizure.12 According to State Department lawyer Todd
Buchwald, no authority has been worked out yet to legally seize cargo. In addition, a key
gap in the PSI framework is that it applies only to commercial, not government
transportation. Government vehicles (ships, planes, trucks, etc.) cannot legally be
interdicted. Thus, the missile shipments picked up by a Pakistani C-130 in the summer
of 2002 in North Korea, reported by the New York Times in November 2002, would not
fall under the purview of PSI.
The October 2003 interdiction of a shipment of uranium centrifuge enrichment parts
from Malaysia to Libya illustrates the need for multilateral cooperation. The Malaysian-
produced equipment was transported on a German-owned ship, BBC China, leaving
Dubai, passing through the Suez Canal. The ship was diverted into the Italian port of
Taranto, where it was searched. Passage through the highly-regulated Suez Canal may
give authorities an opportunity to delay ships and find a reason to board them.
In an interview in November 2003, Secretary Bolton suggested that WMD
interdiction would target shipments to rogue states and terrorists that pose the most
immediate threat.13 In the case of rogue states, it may be relatively easy to target
shipments to Iran and North Korea and their transhipment points, but targeting terrorist
acquisitions may place a serious strain on intelligence gathering.
On February 11, 2004, President Bush proposed expanding PSI to address more than
shipments and transfers, including “shutting down facilities, seizing materials, and
freezing assets.”14 Administration officials have not yet elaborated how they plan to
implement this expansion. Secretary Bolton has said that the President’s proposal will
require “greater cooperation not just among intelligence and military services but in law
enforcement as well.”15 To some observers, it is difficult to imagine how national
authorities could shut down facilities, seize materials, and freeze assets, particularly if the
material and equipment in question is dual-use (which would normally place the burden
on the export destination).
The PSI may be strengthened by the UN Security Council April 28, 2004 passage of
a U.S.-sponsored resolution requiring all states “to criminalize proliferation, enact strict
export controls and secure all sensitive materials within their borders.”16 UNSCR 1540
called on states to enforce effective domestic controls over WMD and WMD-related
12 See CRS Report RL32097, Weapons of Mass Destruction Counterproliferation: Legal Issues
for Ships and Aircraft.
13 “The Proliferation Security Initiative: An Interview with John Bolton,” Arms Control Today,
December 2003.
14 See [http://www.whitehouse.gov/response/index.html] for text of President’s speech and a fact
sheet.
15 Bolton, March 30, 2004 HIRC testimony.
16 See [http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions04.html] for text of UNSCR 1540.

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materials in production, use, storage, and transport; to maintain effective border controls;
and to develop national export and trans-shipment controls over such items, all of which
should help interdiction efforts. The resolution did not, however, provide any
enforcement authority, nor did it specifically mention interdiction.
Issues for Congress
PSI can be viewed, on the one hand, as a way of strengthening the enforcement of
existing export controls associated with nonproliferation treaties and agreements. It may
informally expand the number of cooperating countries without expanding membership
in export control groups (Nuclear Suppliers’ Group, Australia Group, and the Missile
Technology Control Regime). In the nuclear area, however, many observers are calling
for more legally binding export control arrangements, rather than less formal
arrangements. The current configuration holds nothing particularly to bind PSI adherents
to this cooperative endeavor. Moreover, key states in Asia like China, Malaysia, and
Indonesia are not yet participants.
PSI costs (for operational exercises and diplomatic meetings) so far have been
absorbed within federal agencies’ budgets.17 Nonetheless, there may be intelligence
resource issues of interest to the 109th Congress. For example, is intelligence good
enough for effective implementation and are there intelligence-sharing requirements with
non-NATO allies? Also, how is PSI coordinated with other federal interdiction-related
programs (e.g., export control assistance)? One further complication for congressional
oversight of PSI is the reticence of the Bush Administration to make public the successes
of PSI. While publicizing successes could reveal sensitive intelligence sources and
methods and point potential proliferators toward transit methods that are more difficult
to detect, this approach could also undermine both the deterrent effect on proliferators that
the Administration seeks for the PSI, as well as potentially fragile international support.
17 “Anti-Proliferation Effort Will Receive No Separate Funding, Personnel,” Government
Executive, March 15, 2004, [http://www.GovExec.com].

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Appendix A: Statement of Interdiction Principles
(abstracted from [http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/23764.htm])
1. Undertake effective measures, either alone or with other states, for state actors of
proliferation concern. (“States or non-state actors of proliferation concern” are those
countries or entities engaged in proliferation through: (1) efforts to develop or acquire
chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and their delivery systems; or (2) transfer
(selling, receiving, or facilitating) WMD, delivery systems, or related materials.)
2. Adopt streamlined procedures for rapid exchange of information on suspected
proliferation activity, protecting classified information provided by other states; dedicate
appropriate resources to interdiction operations and capabilities; and maximize
coordination among participants in interdiction efforts.
3. Review and strengthen their relevant national legal authorities where necessary to
accomplish these objectives, and strengthen when necessary relevant international law and
frameworks to support these commitments.
4. Support interdiction of cargoes of WMD, their delivery systems, or related materials,
to the extent their national legal authorities permit and consistent with their obligations
under international law and frameworks, to include
a. Not to transport or assist in the transport of any such cargoes to or from states or
non-state actors of proliferation concern, and not to allow any persons subject to their
jurisdiction to do so.
b. At their own initiative, or at the request and good cause shown by another state,
to board and search any vessel flying their flag in their internal waters or territorial seas,
or areas beyond the territorial seas of any other state, that is reasonably suspected of
transporting such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern,
and to seize such cargoes that are identified.
c. To seriously consider providing consent under the appropriate circumstances to
the boarding and searching of its own flag vessels by other states, and to the seizure of
such WMD-related cargoes in such vessels that may be identified by such states.
d. To take appropriate actions to (1) stop and/or search in their internal waters,
territorial seas, or contiguous zones (when declared) vessels that are reasonably suspected
of carrying such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern and
to seize such cargoes that are identified; and (2) to enforce conditions on vessels entering
or leaving their ports, internal waters or territorial seas that are reasonably suspected of
carrying such cargoes, such as requiring that such vessels be subject to boarding, search,
and seizure of such cargoes prior to entry.
e. At their own initiative or upon the request of another state, to (a) require aircraft
reasonably suspected of carrying such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of
proliferation concern and that are transiting their airspace to land for inspection and seize
any such cargoes that are identified; and/or (b) deny aircraft reasonably suspected of
carrying such cargoes transit rights through their airspace in advance of such flights.
f. If their ports, airfields, or other facilities are used as transshipment points for
shipment of such cargoes to or from states or non-state actors of proliferation concern, to
inspect vessels, aircraft, or other modes of transport reasonably suspected of carrying such
cargoes, and to seize such cargoes that are identified.

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