Order Code RL31957
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction
Assistance: U.S. Programs in the
Former Soviet Union
Updated January 12, 2005
Amy F. Woolf
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

---

Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance:
U.S. Programs in the Former Soviet Union
Summary
Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar amendment, authorizing U.S. threat reduction
assistance to the former Soviet Union, in November 1991, after a failed coup in
Moscow and the disintegration of the Soviet Union raised concerns about the safety
and security of Soviet nuclear weapons. The annual program has grown from $400
million in the DOD budget over $900 million across three agencies — DOD ($409.2
million) DOE ($472.6 million) and the State Department ($70 million). It has also
evolved from an emergency response to impending chaos in the Soviet Union, to a
more comprehensive threat reduction and nonproliferation effort, to a broader
program seeking to keep nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons from leaking out
of the former Soviet Union and into the hands of rogue nations or terrorist groups.
The Department of Defense manages the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
Program, which provides Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan with assistance
in transporting, storing, and dismantling nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.
U.S. assistance has helped these nations eliminate the delivery systems for nuclear
weapons under the START I Treaty, secure weapons storage areas, construct a
storage facility for nuclear materials removed from weapons, construct a destruction
facility for chemical weapons, and secure biological weapons materials.
The State Department manages the International Science and Technology
Centers in Moscow and Kiev. These centers provide research grants to scientists and
engineers so that they will not sell their knowledge to other nations or terrorist
groups. The State Department has also provided assistance with export and border
control programs in the former Soviet states. The Department of Energy manages
programs that seek to improve the security of nuclear materials at civilian, naval, and
nuclear weapons complex facilities. It also funds programs that help nuclear
scientists and engineers find employment in commercial enterprises. DOE is also
helping Russia dispose of plutonium removed from nuclear weapons and shut-down
its remaining plutonium-producing reactors by replacing them with fossil-fuel plants.
Analysts have debated numerous issues related to U.S. nonproliferation and
threat reduction assistance. These include questions about the coordination of and
priority given to these programs in the U.S. government, questions about Russia’s
willingness to provide the United States with access to its weapons facilities,
questions about the President’s ability to waive certification requirements so that the
programs can go forward, and questions about the need to expand the efforts into a
global program that receives funding from numerous nations and possibly extends
assistance to others outside the former Soviet Union.
This report complements CRS Report 97-1027 F, Nunn-Lugar Cooperative
Threat Reduction Programs: Issues for Congress and CRS Report RL31368,
Preventing Proliferation of Biological Weapons: U.S. Assistance to the Former
Soviet States. It will be updated as needed.

---

Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Nunn-Lugar Amendment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
A Slow Start . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
An Evolving Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Program Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
CTR Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
CTR Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Chain of Custody . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Destruction and Dismantlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Demilitarization Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
State Department . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Nonproliferation of WMD Expertise (Science and Technology Centers)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Department of Energy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . 25
MPC&A Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
MPC&A Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Russian Transition Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Fissile Materials Disposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Organization and Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Strategic Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Program Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Access and Transparency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Certifications and Waivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Funding and Focus of the Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Focus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Globalization and International Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
The G-8 Global Partnership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Extending CTR Beyond the former Soviet Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Global Recognition of National Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
List of Tables
Table 1. CTR Funding: Requests and Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Table 2: CTR Funding for Transportation Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

---

Table 3: CTR Funding for Fissile Materials Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Table 4: CTR Funding for Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination (SOAE) . . . . 15
Table 5: Appropriations for MPC&A and Related Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

---

Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction
Assistance: U.S. Programs in the Former
Soviet Union
Introduction
In the budget submitted for FY2005, President Bush requested and Congress
authorized nearly $1 billion for U.S. programs that provide nonproliferation and
threat reduction assistance to Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union.
This request includes $409.2 million for the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
Program at the Department of Defense (DOD), $472 million for nonproliferation
programs managed by the Department of Energy (DOE),1 and $70 million for
programs administered by the State Department. With these programs, the United
States seeks to help the recipient nations transport, store, and eliminate nuclear,
chemical and other weapons; secure and eliminate the materials used in nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons; and prevent proliferation of the knowledge needed
to produce these weapons to nations or groups outside the former Soviet Union.
Since FY1992, the United States has appropriated nearly $9 billion across these three
agencies for these programs.2
President Bush has often voiced support for these programs. In November 2001,
the White House noted that “The United States is committed to strong, effective
cooperation with Russia and the other states emerging from the former Soviet Union
to reduce weapons of mass destruction and prevent the proliferation of these weapons
or the material and expertise to develop them.”3 At the U.S-Russian summit in May
2002, the United States and Russia pledged to “continue cooperative threat reduction
programs and expand efforts to reduce weapons-usable fissile material.”4
Furthermore, in June 2002, the President joined with the leaders of the G-8 nations
1 Congress, through the Omnibus Appropriations Bill for FY2005 (P.L.108-447), added
$84,000 to the President’s request for DOE’s Material’s Protection, Control, and
Accounting program, increasing DOE’s portion of threat reduction funding to over $500
million.
2 The term “spent” in this statement refers to the amount of money appropriated for threat
reduction and nonproliferation programs. The amount of money actually paid to contractors
for the work covered by these programs is less than the appropriated amount because many
projects take years to complete, and payments may occur years after the money is
appropriated.
3 The White House. Office of the Press Secretary Fact Sheet. U.S. Government
Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance to the Russian Federation. November
13, 2001.
4 The White House. Office of the Press Secretary. Text of Joint Declaration. May 24,
2002.

---

CRS-2
to create the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials
of Mass Destruction. As is discussed in more detail later in this report, under this
partnership, the United States has committed to provide up to $10 billion over the
next 10 years to pursue nonproliferation and threat reduction programs in Russia and
the other former Soviet states. This amount of $1 billion per year equals current U.S.
expenditures on threat reduction and nonproliferation programs.
Congress has also offered its support to U.S. nonproliferation and threat
reduction programs in the former Soviet states. Although some Members have
questioned the value and effectiveness of some specific projects, Congress has
authorized most of the funds requested by the Executive Branch in the years since
these programs began. Congress has also helped shape the programs, prohibiting
funding for some types of projects and providing added funding for others.
Many analysts have questioned, however, whether the United States is doing all
that it can to prevent the leakage of knowledge, weapons, and materials from the
former Soviet states. They note that, in its first budget submission in early 2001, the
Bush Administration reduced funding for the DOD threat reduction programs by
nearly 10% and cut more than $100 million out of DOE’s defense nuclear
nonproliferation programs, a funding category that includes U.S. nonproliferation
assistance to Russia.5 The Administration increased funding for these programs in
FY2003 and FY2004, but its budget for FY2005 for the DOD threat reduction
programs again showed a 10% decrease. Even with increases in DOE budgets, some
analysts argue that the added funding falls short of what is needed to address the
continuing dangers of proliferation from the former Soviet states. Furthermore, they
argue, if the funding level does not grow, the United States will not be able to expand
and accelerate these programs to ensure that they effectively stop the proliferation of
Russia’s weapons, materials, and knowledge.
Many analysts cite, as further evidence of the Administration’s wavering
commitment, its failure to certify Russia for threat reduction funding in FY2002. The
Administration stated that it could not certify Russia’s compliance with its
obligations under the Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions. This finding
delayed several ongoing programs.6 The Administration asked Congress to allow it
to waive the certification requirements (this debate is discussed in more detail later
in this report) so that funding could continue. But, for many analysts, this episode
demonstrated that the Administration had not placed the highest priority on
nonproliferation and threat reduction programs, in spite of its declarations about
stopping proliferation to keep weapons of mass destruction away from terrorists.
At issue in the debate over U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation programs
is not only the total amount of funding that the United States might commit to these
programs in the former Soviet states, but also the priority and sense of urgency that
5 Congress eventually restored the funding for DOE’s Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation
programs and added $223 million more in the FY2002 Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations (P.L. 107-206) passed after the September 11, 2001 attacks.
6 The certification is only required for DOD programs and some State Department programs;
the absence of a certification did not affect DOE programs.

---

CRS-3
the United States assigns to them. Many recent studies on this issue have offered
recommendations for the size, shape, and operation of these programs that differ
from the approaches taken by the Clinton and Bush Administrations. This report
summarizes many issues raised in these reports and in Congressional debates on the
future of U.S. nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance. However, it first
reviews the history of these programs, describing their origins in 1991, their
expansion and evolution during the 1990s, and the changes in their direction during
the first two years of the Bush Administration. The report also provides a broad
summary of many of the program areas and projects supported by U.S. funding.
Background
The Nunn-Lugar Amendment
Congress initiated U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance to the
Soviet Union in November 1991. A failed coup in Moscow in August 1991 and the
subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union had raised concerns about the safety
and security of Soviet nuclear weapons. Consequently, Senators Nunn and Lugar
proposed an amendment to the implementing legislation for the Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty (P.L. 102-228). The Senate passed the legislation by
a vote of 86-8; the House adopted it through the Conference Report. This
amendment, titled the “Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991,” authorized the
use of $400 million in FY1992 Defense Department (DOD) funds to assist the Soviet
Union, and its “successor entities” with efforts to “1) destroy nuclear weapons,
chemical weapons, and other weapons, 2) transport, store, disable, and safeguard
weapons in connection with their destruction; and 3) establish verifiable safeguards
against the proliferation of such weapons.”7
Senators arguing in support of the program, including Senators Nunn, Lugar,
and Biden, emphasized the potential risks inherent in the Soviet collapse. They noted
that the disintegration of the Soviet Union created “the danger that the ultimate
disposition of nuclear weapons in the new political system will not be conducive to
their safety or international stability,” particularly if the weapons remained in several
of the former Soviet republics. These Senators also warned of “a danger of seizure,
theft, sale or use of nuclear weapons or components ... particularly if a widespread
disintegration in the custodial system should occur.” And third, they argued that “any
weakening of control over weapons and components could spill outside the territory
of the former Soviet Union, fueling nuclear proliferation worldwide.”8 Senator Nunn
further warned that “we are on the verge of either having the greatest destruction of
nuclear weapons in the history of the world or the greatest proliferation of nuclear
weapons, nuclear materials, and scientific know-how on how to make these weapons,
7 For more information on this legislation, see CRS Report 94-985, The Nunn-Lugar
Program for Soviet Weapons Dismantlement: Background and Implementation, By Theodor
Galdi. pp. 1-4. (Available from Amy F. Woolf, on request.)
8 See the comments of Senator Richard Lugar in the Congressional Record. November 25,
1991. p. S18005.

---

CRS-4
as well as chemical weapons, ballistic missiles, even biological weapons the world
has ever seen.”9
Senators who supported this legislation also emphasized that, by targeting “U.S.
defense resources at the prompt, safe dismantlement of nuclear and chemical
weapons in the Soviet arsenal,”10 this assistance would “embody a new approach to
enhancing our national security, an approach which fits a dramatically new national
security environment.”11 Senator Biden further stated that, through this legislation,
the United States would be “assisting ourselves,” not the Soviet Union. But others
questioned this characterization. They viewed the proposed assistance to the Soviet
Union as foreign aid, which they opposed, and argued that the United States should
instead use its defense resources to fund its own military and national security needs.
Furthermore, some argued that, in providing assistance to the Soviet Union, the
United States would allow the Soviet Union to divert its own resources away from
the protection and dismantlement of its older weapons and towards the development
and production of new weapons that could create new threats to the United States.12
Members have raised these themes on numerous occasions over the years, debating
whether U.S. nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance is a foreign aid program
that provides benefits primarily to the recipients or a security program that provides
benefits to both the United States and the former states of the Soviet Union.
Initially, Congress used the DOD budget to fund U.S. threat reduction assistance
to the former Soviet States. In 1993, DOD began to refer to this effort as the
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR). Experts from other agencies, such
as the State Department and Department of Energy, participated in the projects when
their expertise was required. In FY1997 these agencies each took budgetary and
management responsibility for the projects that relied on their expertise.
Consequently, although many analysts and observers still use the title “Cooperative
Threat Reduction Program” when referring to the full range of U.S. nonproliferation
programs, this is no longer accurate. This report only uses the term “CTR” when
referring to the threat reduction programs funded by the Department of Defense. It
uses the phrase “threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance” to refer to the full
range of programs in DOD, DOE, and State.
A Slow Start
When Congress created the CTR program, many Members and experts outside
government seemed to envision a relatively simple program where officials from the
United States would travel to the four former Soviet states with nuclear weapons on
their territories — Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan — to quickly safeguard
and help dismantle nuclear, chemical, and other weapons. But the program’s
implementation was far slower and more complex than many expected. First, the
9 Ibid. p. S18004.
10 Senator Joe Biden, Congressional Record November 25, 1991. p. S18002.
11 Senator Sam Nunn, Congressional Record, November 25, 1991. p. S18004.
12 See the comments of Senator Malcolm Wallop. Congressional Record, November 25,
1991. p. S18008.

---

CRS-5
need to develop and implement coordinated policies among several U.S. government
agencies (primarily DOD, DOE, and the State Department) and within several
organizations in the Pentagon slowed program implementation. Furthermore, the
United States had to negotiate “umbrella agreements” with each recipient nation —
setting out the privileges and immunities of U.S. personnel and to establishing the
legal and customs framework for the provision of aid — before it could spend any
money in the former Soviet states. Lingering mistrust between the parties, along with
the high level of secrecy surrounding Russia’s nuclear and chemical weapons
programs complicated this process in 1992 and 1993.
During its first few years in office, the Clinton Administration sought to resolve
the bureaucratic issues that had delayed the program. It offered broader political
support to a cooperative relationship with Russia through a high level commission
chaired by Vice President Gore and Russia’s Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. This
commission identified many efforts that later received funding through the CTR
program. The Clinton Administration also provided significant policy and financial
support to the CTR program, overcoming the reticence that had been expressed by
some officials in the first Bush Administration. Consequently, it succeeded in
sharply increasing the rate of expenditures on CTR projects by the mid-1990s. With
the Administration’s support, and with continuing congressional interest in the
program, U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance began to expand and
evolve. It expanded to several agencies, with DOE and the State Department each
funding nonproliferation efforts in the former Soviet Union. It also expanded to
include a broader range of programs. Where it had first focused on improving
transportation security and helping with the destruction of strategic offensive nuclear
weapons, it grew to include a wide range of efforts to secure and destroy nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons, the materials used in these weapons and the
knowledge needed to design and produce these weapons. It has also expanded
financially, from an initial level of approximately $400 million per year to a total of
nearly $1 billion per year across the three agencies.
An Evolving Program
Initially, many in Congress saw U.S. assistance under Nunn-Lugar as an
emergency response to impending chaos in the Soviet Union. Even after the sense
of immediate crisis passed in 1992 and 1993, many analysts and Members of
Congress remained concerned about the potential for diversion or a loss of control
of nuclear and other weapons. Russia’s economy was extremely weak and press
accounts reported that nuclear materials from Russia were appearing on the black
market in Western Europe. Consequently, many began to view CTR as a part of a
long-term threat reduction and nonproliferation effort. Former Secretary of Defense
William Perry referred to CTR as “defense by other means”13 as the program helped
eliminate Soviet weapons that had threatened the United States and contain weapons
and materials that could pose new threats in the hands of other nations.
13 See, for example, U.S. Department of Defense. Cooperative Threat Reduction. April
1995. Washington, D.C., p. 1.

---

CRS-6
By the mid-1990s, many observers also began to view U.S. assistance to the
former Soviet states as a part of the effort to keep weapons of mass destruction away
from terrorists. In 1996, experts testified to Congress that Russian nuclear and
chemical facilities, with their crumbling security and lack of accounting procedures,
could provide a source for terrorists seeking nuclear or chemical materials. In
response, Congress expanded the programs that provided security at facilities with
nuclear materials and suggested that more attention be paid to security at facilities
with materials that could be used in chemical or biological weapons.14 In January
2001, a task force sponsored by the Department of Energy stated that “the most
urgent unmet national security threat to the United States today is the danger that
weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable materials in Russia could be stolen
and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states and used against American troops abroad
or citizens at home.”15 Since September 11, 2001, virtually all analysts who follow
U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance have made the link between the
possible quest for weapons of mass destruction by terrorists and the potential for
thwarting them by helping Russia protect its weapons, materials, and knowledge.16
The Bush Administration has also linked U.S. threat reduction and
nonproliferation assistance to the former Soviet States to U.S. efforts to keep
weapons of mass destruction away from terrorists. In early 2003, it stated that it had
“expanded the strategic focus of the CTR program” to support the war on terrorism.17
In its budgets for FY2004 and FY2005, it increased funding for several export and
border control programs, for programs designed to stem the leakage of knowledge
out of the former Soviet Union, and for an effort to find and recover “radiological
sources” — a type of military device that could provide terrorists with nuclear
materials for use in a “dirty bomb.”18 All of these initiatives focus more on stemming
proliferation than on eliminating nuclear weapons in the former Soviet states.
14 The March 1995 nerve agent attack in the Tokyo subway system by the Aum Shinryo cult
raised the profile of this type of threat.
15 The report went on to state that “unless protected from theft of diversion, the former
Soviet arsenal of weapons of mass destruction threatens to become a goldmine for would-be
proliferators the world over.” Baker, Howard and Lloyd Cutler, Co-Chairs, Russia Task
Force. A Report Card on the Department of Energy’s Nonproliferation Programs with
Russia. The Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, United States Department of Energy.
January 10, 2001. p. 1.
16 Senator Sam Nunn has stated that “Preventing the spread and use of nuclear biological,
and chemical weapons and materials should be the central organizing principle on security
for the 21st century.” Remarks by Former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn, Chairman, Nuclear
Threat Initiative. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. International
Nonproliferation Conference. November 14 , 2002.
17 U.S. Department of Defense. Fiscal Year 2004/2005 Biennial Budget Estimates. Former
Soviet Union Threat Reduction Appropriation. February 2003. p. 1.
18 Many analysts believe that this type of weapon, which could disperse radioactive
materials across a wide area, might be particularly attractive to terrorists. For details see
U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service. Terrorist “Dirty Bombs:” A
Brief Primer CRS Report RS21528. By Jonathan Medalia. May 23, 2003.

---

CRS-7
Department of Defense Cooperative Threat
Reduction Program
Program Objectives
At its inception, the CTR program sought to provide Russia, Ukraine, Belarus,
and Kazakhstan with assistance in the safe and secure transportation, storage, and
dismantlement of nuclear weapons. During the first few years, the mandate for U.S.
assistance expanded to include efforts to secure materials that might be used in
nuclear or chemical weapons, to prevent the diversion of scientific expertise from the
former Soviet Union, to expand military-to-military contacts between officers in the
United States and the former Soviet Union, and to facilitate the demilitarization of
defense industries.19 In 1994, Congress also indicated that threat reduction funds
could be used to assist in environmental restoration at former military sites and to
provide housing for former military officers who had been demobilized as a result of
the dismantling of strategic offensive weapons. The 104th Congress reversed this
position, however, banning the use of CTR funds for environmental restoration or
housing for military officers. It also denied additional funding for the Defense
Enterprise Fund, which focused on demilitarizing former Soviet defense industries.
By the mid-1990s, Congress and the Clinton Administration had agreed on a
mandate for the CTR program that focused on the “core” objectives of securing and
dismantling nuclear and chemical weapons, along with protecting against the
proliferation of knowledge and materials that might be used in the production of
these weapons by other nations. The Clinton Administration outlined this mandate
in four key objectives for the CTR program:
! Destroy nuclear, chemical, and other weapons of mass destruction;
! Transport, store, disable, and safeguard these weapons in connection
with their destruction;
! Establish verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of these
weapons, their components, and weapons-usable materials; and
! Prevent the diversion of scientific expertise that could contribute to
weapons programs in other nations.20
In the late 1990s, Congress added funds to the CTR budget for biological
weapons proliferation prevention; this effort has expanded substantially in recent
years. Congress also expanded the CTR program to allow the use of CTR funds for
19 For a more detailed description of the changes in the legislative mandate for the CTR
program, see Congressional Research Service, Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction
Programs: Issues for Congress. CRS Report 97-1027F. Updated March 6, 2002. pp. 11-13.
20 U.S. Department of Defense. Cooperative Threat Reduction. April 1995. Washington,
D.C. p. 4.

---

CRS-8
emergency assistance to remove weapons of mass destruction or materials and
equipment related to these weapons from any of the former Soviet republics.21
Its first budget, in FY2002, the Bush Administration reduced CTR funding by
nearly ten percent from over $440 million to $403 million. It also began a review of
all U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance to Russia and the former
Soviet states, stating that it sought to “ensure that existing U.S. cooperative
nonproliferation programs with Russia are focused on priority threat reduction and
nonproliferation goals, and are conducted as efficiently and as effectively as
possible.”22 Some analysts welcomed the review, noting that it could provide an
opportunity to revise and expand some programs, but others feared the review would
lead to reductions in funding and the elimination of some programs.
When it announced the results of the review, the Administration stated that it
found that “most U.S. programs to assist Russia in threat reduction and
nonproliferation work well, are focused on priority tasks, and are well managed.23
But the review did signal a shift in the focus of U.S. nonproliferation and threat
reduction assistance. Instead of highlighting projects aimed at the elimination of
nuclear weapons, the Administration indicated that it would expand some projects
that focused on chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation, including
increasing funding for the construction of a controversial chemical weapons
destruction facility in Russia. For many, this change seemed to be a natural response,
in the post-September 11 environment, to growing concerns about the potential link
between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Others, however, saw it as a
retreat from the long-standing core objectives of the CTR program.
The Administration confirmed this shift in focus with the release of its FY2004
budget request for CTR. Where the Administration requested and received $50
million in FY2002 and around $133 million in FY2003 for the construction of the
chemical weapons destruction facility in Russia, it requested, and Congress
authorized, $200.3 million in FY2004. This is nearly 45% of the total CTR budget
request. The Administration also increased funding for biological weapons
proliferation prevention from $17 million in FY2002 to around $55 million in
FY2003 and $54.2 million for FY2004. In contrast, funding for strategic offensive
arms elimination in Russia declined from $133.4 million in FY2002 to $70.1 million
in FY2003 and $57.6 million in FY2004.24
21 DOD has used CTR funds for this purpose in several instances. For example, in
November 1997, the United States purchased 21 nuclear-capable MIG-29 aircraft from the
Republic of Moldova before Moldava could sell these aircraft to a nation seeking nuclear
delivery capabilities. In April 1998, using CTR funds, the United States and Great Britain
moved 8.8 pounds of highly enriched uranium and 17.6 pounds of highly radioactive spent
fuel from a nuclear reactor outside Tbilisi, Georgia to Dounreay, Scotland.
22 The White House. Fact Sheet. Administration Review of Nonproliferation and Threat
Reduction Assistance to the Russian Federation. December 11, 2001.
23 Ibid.
24 The reduced request for FY2004 reflects, in part, the presence of unexpended balances
from FY2003. The United States did not spend these funds because it could not initiate any
(continued...)

---

CRS-9
Furthermore, in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, J.D.
Crouch, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, stated
that the Administration had revised the four key objectives for CTR. The program
now seeks to:
! Dismantle FSU (former Soviet Union) WMD (weapons of mass
destruction) and associated infrastructure;
! Consolidate and secure FSU WMD and related technology and
materials;
! Increase transparency and encourage higher standards of conduct;
! Support defense and military cooperation with the objective of
preventing proliferation.25
Although most ongoing CTR projects are consistent with these objectives, the
absence of any specific reference to the destruction of nuclear weapons is notable.
In addition, by stating that the United States seeks to “encourage higher standards of
conduct,” the Bush Administration has indicated that it will place a higher priority
on Russian openness, cooperation, and compliance with arms control agreements.
This emphasis was evident in the Administration’s decision against certifying Russia
for CTR assistance in 2002. This also presents something of a departure from the
past, when the United States raised issues of transparency, openness, and compliance
with Russia during private meetings, but did not tie these issues directly to the goals
of the CTR program.
CTR Funding
When Congress first passed the Nunn-Lugar Amendment, it authorized the
transfer of $400 million in FY1992 funds from other DOD accounts for threat
reduction activities in the former Soviet Union. Few of these funds were spent in
FY1992, so Congress extended the transfer authority for FY1992 funds and
authorized the transfer of an additional $400 million from other DOD accounts in
FY1993. In subsequent years, the Clinton Administration requested, and Congress
authorized new appropriations for the CTR program. Table 1 summarizes the
amount of funding the Presidents requested for the CTR program and the amount
authorized by Congress in each of the fiscal years between 1992 and 2005. Congress
has authorized nearly than $5.7 billion for CTR since 1992.
Congress has approved the Administration’s request for CTR funding in all but
three years. In FY1996, the new Republican majority in the House questioned many
24 (...continued)
new contracts during the period after the President did not certify Russia for participation
in the CTR program and before Congress allowed the President to waive the certification
requirement. See Statement of Dr. J.D. Crouch, II. March 4, 2003. p. 4.
25 U.S. House. Committee on Armed Services Statement of Dr. J.D. Crouch II, Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy. March 4, 2003. p. 4.

---

CRS-10
elements of the CTR program and the House Armed Services Committee reduced
funding to $200 million. The Senate had approved the Administration’s request, and
the Conference Committee agreed on a compromise of $300 million. The House also
reduced the Administration’s request in FY1997, approving $302.9 million for CTR,
but the Senate added $37 million and the House eventually accepted the Senate’s
version in the Conference Committee.26
Table 1. CTR Funding: Requests and Authorization
($ millions)
Fiscal Year
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
Request
$400
$400
$400
$400
$371
$328
$382.2
Auth.
$400
$400
$400
$400
$300
$364.9 $382.2
Fiscal Year
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Request $440.4
$475.5
$458.4
$403
$416.7
$450.8
$409.2
Auth.
$440.4
$475.5
$443.4
$403
$416.7
$450.8
$409.2
Total Request FY1992-FY2005
$5,735
Total Auth. FY1992-FY2005
$5,686
In FY2001, the House reduced President Clinton’s request for CTR to $433
million. The Senate approved the full request and the Conference Committee settled
on $443 million. This reduction was part of a dispute between the House, on one
side, and the Senate and the Clinton Administration, on the other side, over funding
for the chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch’ye in Russia. The House
Armed Services Committee had reduced funding for that program in FY1998 and
FY1999; in each of these two years, the Senate and the Conference Committee
approved the Administration’s requests. In FY2000, the House again eliminated all
funding for the construction of Shchuch’ye and mandated, instead, that CTR fund
security improvements at Russia’s chemical weapons storage facilities. The
Conference Committee accepted the House position, but still approved the
Administration’s request for $475.5 million for CTR. In FY2001, the Senate again
accepted the House position banning funding for Shchuch’ye and, this time, accepted
a small reduction in total funding for CTR.
In FY1996, when the Clinton Administration’s request for CTR funding
declined from $400 million to $371 million, total U.S. spending on threat reduction
and nonproliferation assistance to Russia actually increased. In that year, the
Materials Protection Control and Accounting Program (MPC&A) moved from
DOD’s CTR budget to the Department of Energy; the Clinton Administration
26 This trend, with the House approving less than the President requested and the Senate
approving the President’s request, continued for several years. For details see Congressional
Research Service. Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs: Issues for
Congress. CRS Report 97-1027 F, by Amy F. Woolf. pp. 8-10.

---

CRS-11
requested and Congress authorized $70 million for DOE programs. In addition, $33
million in funding for the International Science and Technology Center in Moscow
moved from the DOD budget to the State Department budget. In subsequent years,
as is noted in more detail below, funding continued to grow for the DOE and State
Department programs.
CTR Projects
The Department of Defense divided the CTR program into three distinct project
areas — chain of custody, destruction and dismantlement, and demilitarization.27
Chain of Custody. Chain of custody activities are those designed to enhance
safety, security, and control over nuclear weapons and fissile materials. Many of
these were completed during the early years of CTR. These programs were created,
in part, in response to early concerns about the safety and security of weapons and
materials in transit. The United States and the recipient nations also found it easier
to agree on the implementation of projects that focused on transit and storage of
nuclear weapons and materials than to focus on destruction activities. The brief
descriptions that follow summarize some of the key chain of custody activities.28
Transportation Security. When the Soviet Union collapsed, thousands of
nuclear weapons were spread among four of the newly independent states (Russia,
Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan), and, within each state, the weapons were
dispersed among hundreds of deployment and storage areas. Soviet President
Gorbachev and Russia’s President Yeltsin had both committed to removing non-
strategic nuclear weapons (those with ranges less than 3,600 miles) from non-Russian
republics and storing them in a smaller number of facilities in Russia. In 1992, after
signing the Lisbon Protocol to the START I Treaty, Ukraine, Belarus, and
Kazakhstan also pledged to return all the warheads based on their territories to
Russia.29
The United States has helped Russia improve the safety and security of nuclear
weapons in transit. It has provided armored blankets to protect warheads in transit
from potential attacks, storage containers to hold the warheads during transit, and
assistance to enhance the safety and security of rail cars used to transport warheads
from deployment to storage or dismantlement facilities. Ongoing transportation
security projects also provide Russia with emergency response vehicles, training, and
support equipment that it might need to respond to a nuclear weapons transportation
accident. Requested increases in funding for FY2005 will support the procurement
27 This division, and the description in the next few paragraphs come from U.S. Department
of Defense. Cooperative Threat Reduction. April 1995. Washington, D.C. p. 5-6. The
fourth category, “Other,” includes administrative expenses and a special project on Arctic
nuclear waste.
28 The Defense Threat Reduction Agency [http://www.dtra.mil/toolbox/
directorates/ctr/programs/index.cfm].
29 For a description of the nuclear weapons based in non-Russian republics in 1991, see
Congressional Research Service. Nuclear Weapons in Russia: Safety, Security, and Control
Issues. CRS Report RL32202, by Amy F. Woolf.

---

CRS-12
and maintenance of specialized warhead transportation railcars.30 Table 2
summarizes the amount of money that the United States has appropriated for many
of these transportation security projects.
Table 2: CTR Funding for Transportation Security
($ millions)
Project
Fiscal Years
Total Appropriation
Armored Blankets
FY1992-FY1993
$3.1
Emergency Response
FY1992-FY1996
$29.2
Railcar security
FY1992-FY1994
$21.5
enhancements
Weapons Transportation
FY1995-FY2005
$152
Security
Source: Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan, by Matthew
Bunn, et al. Project on Managing the Atom. March 2003.
Weapons Storage Security. Several CTR projects seek to help Russia
improve security at storage facilities for strategic and tactical nuclear warheads.
Russia has three types of storage sites — operational sites, storage sites, and rail
transfer points. The United States does not provide assistance at operational sites.
The Department of Energy has addressed security needs at rail transfer points that
store warheads from the Russian Navy, and plans to do the same at one or more sites
for the Strategic Rocket forces. Under the CTR program, DOD is working to
enhance security at both large “national stockpile storage sites” and smaller storage
sites at Navy, Air Force, and Strategic Rocket Force bases.31 DOD plans to provide
perimeter fencing, as a “quick fix” for vulnerable sites, and more comprehensive
upgrades, including alarm systems and inventory control and management equipment
to keep track of warheads in storage.
According to the GAO, this effort has been slowed by Russia’s reluctance to
provide the United States with information about the precise number of sites in need
of security upgrades and its refusal to allow the United States access to sites to design
appropriate upgrades. For example, DOD purchased 123 kilometers of perimeter
fencing for weapons storage sites; the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) said it
30 Hoehn, William. Preliminary Analysis of U.S. Department of Defense’s Fiscal Year 2005
Cooperative Threat Reduction Budget Request. RANSAC. February 10, 2004.
31 The total number of sites remains classified. For details on DOD’s plans, see U.S.
General Accounting Office. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian Cooperation
Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites. GAO-02-482.
March 2003. p. 34.

---

CRS-13
would install the fences itself, but it has reportedly made little progress in doing so.32
Furthermore, the United States has purchased and tested equipment for
comprehensive upgrades, but it has not installed any of it because Russia’s MOD has
not allowed the United States access to the interior of any storage facilities. The
United States and Russia completed agreements in February 2003 that will provide
the United States with a degree of access to these sites.33 U.S. personnel can now
conduct site assessments and other activities that support the installation of physical
security upgrades at a number of weapons storage locations. This change is reflected
in an increase in funding for site security enhancements in the FY2005 budget
request for CTR. In a complementary effort, the United States has constructed a
Security Assessment and Training Center so that DOD and MOD personnel can test
and select security systems for weapons storage sites. The United States is also
helping Russia develop training programs for personnel with access to nuclear
weapons.
Between FY1995 and FY2004, DOD appropriated just around $450 million for
weapons storage security.34 Congress authorized and appropriated and additional
$48.7 million for FY2005.
Fissile Materials Storage. According to unclassified estimates, Russia
inherited more than 30,000 nuclear warheads from the Soviet Union, along with
enough plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) to produce thousands more
warheads. As it consolidates and reduces its arsenal, Russia has begun to dismantle
thousands of these warheads. Several CTR projects seek to improve the long-term
security of the fissile materials removed from these weapons. Table 3 summarizes
the amount of money that the United States has appropriated for projects related to
storage of fissile materials in Russia.
Table 3: CTR Funding for Fissile Materials Storage
($ millions)
Project
Fiscal Years
Total Appropriation
Fissile Material
FY1992-FY2000
$82.2
Containers
Storage Facility Design
FY1993
$15
Storage Facility
FY1994-FY2001
$387
Construction
Source: Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan, by Matthew
Bunn, et al. Project on Managing the Atom. March 2003.
32 Ibid. p. 36.
33 U.S. House. Committee on Armed Services. Statement of Dr. J.D. Crouch, Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy. March 4, 2003.
34 Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan, by
Matthew Bunn, et al. Project on Managing the Atom. March 2003.

---

CRS-14
The United States has provided Russia with more than 26,000 containers that
will hold the fissile materials; it has also helped Russia design and build a highly
secure storage facility at Mayak that will provide long-term safe and secure storage
for these materials. This facility will hold more than 25,000 storage containers, or
the equivalent of fissile material from 25,000 nuclear warheads. The first wing of
this building was completed and certified for use in December 2003; it is now ready
to receive nuclear materials for storage.35 The United States and Russia no longer
plan to construct an expected second wing.36 The United States and Russia are still
working, with little progress, to complete a “transparency agreement” that will allow
the United States to confirm that materials stored in the facility actually came from
dismantled warheads.
Destruction and Dismantlement. Destruction and dismantlement projects
help with the elimination of nuclear, chemical, and other weapons and their delivery
vehicles. To date, many of these projects have helped Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and
Kazakhstan remove warheads, deactivate missiles, and eliminate launch facilities for
the nuclear weapons covered by the START I treaty. The Clinton Administration,
and some analysts outside government, credited U.S. assistance in this area with
providing Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan with an incentive to relinquish the
nuclear weapons on their territories in the early 1990s.37 When the Soviet Union
collapsed in 1991, it had more than 11,000 warheads deployed on nearly 1,400
ICBMs, 940 SLBMs and 162 heavy bombers. According to the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency, as of July 2004, CTR has helped deactivate more than 6,300
warheads, 539 ICBMs, 496 SLBMs, and 130 heavy bombers.38 More than half of the
funds appropriated for CTR support projects in this category. Some of the key areas
of destruction and dismantlement projects are described below.
Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination. The United States has provided
Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan with assistance in eliminating the
launchers and infrastructure associated with strategic nuclear weapons deployed on
their territories. This effort is complete in Belarus and Kazakhstan; it continues in
Russia and Ukraine, although it is also nearing completion in Ukraine. The United
States has provided the recipient nations with the technology and expertise needed
to deactivate and dismantle missiles, launchers, submarines, and bombers. It has also
helped construct storage facilities for missiles removed from deployment and fuel
removed from deactivated missiles. In May 2003, the United States began destroying
35 U.S. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.
Testimony of Lisa Bronson, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Technology Security
Policy and Counterproliferation. March 10, 2004. (Herein after referred to as Bronson
Testimony.)
36 The absence of funding for the second wing of Mayak was responsible for a significant
portion of the decline in the Bush Administration request for CTR funding, from $443
million in FY2001 to $403 million, in FY2002.
37 U.S. Department of Defense. Cooperative Threat Reduction. April 1995. Washington,
D.C. p. 1.
38 For the full CTR scorecard, see Defense Threat Reduction Agency, [http://www.dtra.mil/
toolbox/directorates/ctr/scorecard.cfm].

---

CRS-15
rail-mobile ICBMs and their launchers in Russia. Table 4 summarizes the amount
of money that the United States has appropriated for several key strategic offensive
arms elimination projects.39
One project funded in this category, the construction of a plant to dispose of
liquid fuel removed from Soviet ICBMs, has recently raised concerns among some
in Congress. The United States constructed the facility at a cost of nearly $100
million. However, during construction, Russia used much of the fuel in rockets in
its space-launch program. Consequently, in 2002, Russia informed the United States
that it did not have any fuel for the facility.40 Representative Duncan Hunter has
sought further information about this episode, stating that it represents an example
of the potential for waste in the CTR program.41 Others, however, note that, although
unfortunate, this case is the exception in a program that has spent more than $4
billion on threat reduction projects.
Table 4: CTR Funding for Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination
(SOAE)
($ millions)
Nation
Fiscal Years
Total Appropriation
Russia
FY1993-FY2005
$1,228.8
Ukraine
FY1993-FY2004
$575.4(a)
Kazahkstan
FY1994-FY1996
$64.6
Belarus
FY1994-FY1996
$3.3
(a) The Administration did not request any additional funds for this effort in FY2005.
Source: Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan, by Matthew
Bunn, et al. Project on Managing the Atom. March 2003.
WMD Infrastructure Elimination. Through the CTR program, the United
States is helping Ukraine eliminate equipment and facilities that supported the
deployment and operation of nuclear weapons. These facilities include liquid missile
propellant storage facilities, nuclear weapons storage facilities, and infrastructure at
bomber bases. The United States is also helping Kazakhstan secure fissile materials,
as well as eliminate facilities at a nuclear weapons storage area and a former
39 For a more detailed breakdown of projects in this program area, see U.S. House.
Committee on Armed Services. Statement of Dr. J.D. Crouch, Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Policy. March 4, 2003. p. 4. See also U.S. Department
of Defense. Fiscal Year 2004/2005 Biennial Budget Estimates. Former Soviet Union
Threat Reduction Appropriation. February 2003. pp. 16-21.
40 U.S. House. Committee on Armed Services. Statement of David K. Steensma, Deputy
Assistant Inspector for Auditing, Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General.
March 4, 2003.
41 Hunter, Duncan. “Wasteful ‘Threat Reduction’ in Russia.” Washington Post. March 4,
2003. p. 23.

---

CRS-16
chemical weapons production facility.42 Between FY1994 and FY2003, DOD
appropriated $38.2 million for this program in Ukraine and $44.5 million in
Kazakhstan. It did not request any additional funds for FY2004 or FY2005.
Chemical Weapons Destruction. The Soviet Union had the largest
stockpile of chemical weapons in the world. Russia declared this stockpile to contain
40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons. The United States has questioned the
accuracy and completeness of this declaration, a factor that contributed to Russia’s
loss of certification for CTR programs in FY2002. Russia’s chemical weapons are
stored at seven sites in Russia; five sites contain nerve agents in bombs and artillery
shells, three of these sites and two additional sites house bulk stocks of blister
agents.43 Russia has committed, under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC),
to destroy these stocks by 2007 (it has requested an extension until 2012), but it
contends that it lacks the financial resources to meet this deadline. A European
consortium, led by Germany, has constructed a destruction facility at Gorny to
destroy the blister agent.44 The United States is assisting Russia with the design and
construction of a facility at Shchuch’ye to destroy all of Russia’s nerve agent. The
chemical weapons storage facility at Shchuch’ye contains nearly half of Russia’s
stockpile of artillery shells filled with nerve agent.45 The new facility is intended to
destroy these stocks and those stored at the other four storage sites. Construction on
this facility began in March 2003.
This project has been at the center of much debate during the past five years.
In FY1999, the House tried to reduce the amount of CTR funding requested for
Shchuch’ye by $53.4 million, arguing that Russia’s chemical weapons posed more
of an environmental problem for Russia than a threat to U.S. security.46 The Defense
Authorization Bills for FY2000 and FY2001 prohibited any additional funding for
Shchuch’ye. Congress resumed funding Shchuch’ye in FY2002, when the Bush
Administration requested $50 million for the project. However, in FY2003, when
the Bush Administration requested $133.6 million for Shchuch’ye, the House balked
again, and approved $50 million. The House Armed Services Committee argued that
the program could not absorb such a large increase in one year and, because Russia
did not yet appear committed to the elimination of its chemical weapons, the United
States should not accelerate its efforts. The Conference Report (107-772) also
42 U.S. Department of Defense. Fiscal Year 2004/2005 Biennial Budget Estimates. Former
Soviet Union Threat Reduction Appropriation. February 2003. p. 9.
43 U.S. General Accounting Office. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian
Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites. GAO-
02-482. March 2003. pp. 58-59.
44 For a description of this facility and program see Glasser, Susan B. “Cloud Over Russia’s
Poison Gas Disposal.” Washington Post. August 24, 2002. p. 1
45 The Department of Defense estimates this to be 5,460 metric tons of agent in nearly 2
million rocket and artillery warheads. See U.S. Department of Defense. Fiscal Year
2004/2005 Biennial Budget Estimates. Former Soviet Union Threat Reduction
Appropriation. February 2003. p. 4
46 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on National Security. National Defense Authorization
Act For Fiscal Year 1999. Report 105-532, Washington, D.C. May 12, 1998. p. 352.

---

CRS-17
limited funding for Shchuch’ye to $50 million, but it stated that the Administration
could use the remaining $83.6 for other projects related to the storage and elimination
of nuclear weapons, or for chemical weapons destruction if Russia provides a “full
and accurate” disclosure of its chemical weapons stockpile.
The Bush Administration requested $200 million for this project in FY2004.
The Senate approved this amount, but the House, in its version of the FY2004
Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 1588), reduced the funding to $171.5 million. It
also mandated that the United States could only release funds in excess of $71
million if Russia and other nations contributed to the project. Specifically, the U.S.
contribution could not exceed the other nations’ contribution by more than a factor
of two. These provisions reflect concerns expressed by some in the House about a
lack of financial commitment from Russia and other European nations to the
Shchuch’ye project. The Conference Committee rejected the House position,
approving the full $200 million for Shchuch’ye and eliminating the linkage of U.S.
funding to funding from other nations. Nevertheless, by December 2003, six other
countries had contributed $69 million to the project.47
The Bush Administration requested, and Congress authorized, $158.4 million
for Shchuch’ye in FY2005. The reduction in funding for this project represents most
of the reduction in the overall CTR budget between FY2004 and FY2005. This
reduction in funding does not derive from any significant policy debates about the
project; instead it occurred because the FY2004 budget included funding for a one-
time investment in capital-intensive construction equipment. The United States does
not need to repeat this investment in FY2005.48
Congress has also fenced funding for Shchuch’ye, subjecting it to a number of
certifications. For example, the legislation states that the President must certify that
Russia is committed to providing at least $25 million per year to help construct and
operate the facility; that Russia was committed to destroying all its remaining nerve
agent; that other nations were committed to contributing to the construction of this
facility; and that Russia is forthcoming with data about its chemical weapons
stockpile. The President has requested that Congress allow him to waive the
certification requirement, so that construction could continue, even if Russia has not
met all the conditions. Congress provided the President with waiver authority, but
only for one year, in the FY2003 Defense Authorization Bill (P.L. 107-248).49 It
extended this waiver authority by one more year in the FY2004 Defense
Authorization Bill (H.R. 1588); the Administration submitted this waiver in early
December 2003.50 For FY2005, the Senate approved unlimited waiver authority for
47 Bronson Testimony, March 10, 2004.
48 Ibid.
49 The waiver authority for the certification requirements from Shchuch’ye is different from
the waiver authority the President sought for the broader certification requirements included
in the CTR legislation. These are discussed in more detail below.
50 Memorandum for the Secretary of State, Presidential Determination No. 2004-10.
Presidential Determination on Waiver of Conditions on Obligation and Expenditure of
(continued...)

---

CRS-18
the President, but the House again limited this authority to one year. The House
prevailed in Conference, with an adjustment to allowing the waiver authority through
the end of the calendar year, rather than the fiscal year (see P.L. 108-375).
Between FY1992 and FY2004, DOD allocated $637 million for design and
construction at Shchuch’ye. Funding remained low during the first few years of the
CTR program, while the United States and Russia worked to develop destruction
technologies and to design the facility, but it increased sharply in FY1997-FY1999
before Congress suspended the project. Congress also appropriated $20 million, in
FY1999, to improve security at Russia’s chemical weapons facilities. Congress
mandated this program, after denying funds for chemical weapons destruction. DOD
complete security work at two sites in December 2003, and does not intend to expand
the program, as this would be a short term effort since Russia has committed to
destroy its stockpile.
Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention (BWPP). The Soviet
Union reportedly developed the world’s largest biological weapons program,
employing an estimated 60,000 people at more than 50 sites. This weapons complex
developed a broad range of biological pathogens for use against plants, animals, and
humans.51 Russia reportedly continued to pursue research and development of
biological agents in the 1990s, even as the security systems and supporting
infrastructure at its facilities began to deteriorate. The United State began to provide
Russia with CTR assistance to improve safety and security at its biological weapons
sites and to help employ biological weapons scientists during the late 1990s, even
though Russia has not provided a complete inventory of the sites or people involved
in biological weapons work.52
The CTR program supports three separate BWPP programs, working at 49 sites
that include many weapons facilities. Through the BWPP Dismantlement program,
the United States is helping Russia eliminate the infrastructure and equipment at
those Biological Research and Production Centers (BRPCs) that have the capability
to produce biological weapons. Through the Security Enhancements program, the
United States is helping to enhance safety and security at these centers to ensure the
safe and secure storage and handling of biological pathogens. Finally, through
Cooperative Biodefense Research, the United States and Russia are using cooperative
research projects to increase transparency and discourage the “leakage” of Russian
biological weapons knowledge to other nations. Each of these programs is
implemented through the International Science and Technology Centers, because
DOD has been unable to conclude implementing agreements with the relevant
50 (...continued)
Funds for Planning, Design, and Construction of a Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility
in Russia. The White House. December 9, 2003.
51 For a more details on the BWPP programs see Congressional Research Service.
Preventing Proliferation of Biological Weapons: U.S. Assistance to the Former Soviet
States. CRS Report RL31368, by Michelle Stem Cook and Amy F. Woolf.
52 U.S. General Accounting Office. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian
Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites. GAO-
02-482. March 2003. pp. 48-49.

---

CRS-19
ministries in Russia.53 In addition, CTR funding helped destroy the huge biological
weapons production facility in Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan.
The potential proliferation of biological weapons poses one of the key
challenges for U.S. nonproliferation assistance to Russia.54 According to the General
Accounting Office, progress in gaining Russia’s cooperation and implementing these
projects has been very slow. The United States has found it particularly difficult to
gain access to four key military facilities. The problem is further aggravated by the
fact that Russia is reducing the size of its complex, leaving many scientists
potentially unemployed or underemployed. In addition, biological pathogens are
small, and easily transported, further increasing the proliferation risk.55 The Bush
Administration has expressed its support for these efforts and plans to expand them
in the future. Between FY1997 and FY2003, DOD appropriated just under $110
million for these projects, with half of that amount, $55 million, appropriated in
FY2003 alone.
The Bush Administration requested an additional $54.2 million for BWPP in
FY2004. Congress approved this amount, but attached some restrictions to the
funding. In its version of the FY2004 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 1588), the
House had sought to prohibit funding cooperative research at any site in the Soviet
Union until the Secretary of Defense could certify that the site did not house any
prohibited biological weapons research, until the facility had conducted an
assessment of its vulnerability to the loss or theft of pathogens and until it had begun
to implement measures to reduce its vulnerability to the loss or theft of biological
agents. The Conference Committee modified this measure, stating that CTR could
not fund cooperative research at a facility until the Secretary of Defense determines
that no prohibited research occurs at the facility and until the facility plans to
implement appropriate security measures. It also permitted the use of up to 25% of
the funds authorized for the project to be expended on making these determinations.
The Bush Administration requested, and Congress authorized, a similar amount
— $55 million — for biological weapons proliferation prevention in FY2005.
However, within this total, the Administration has shifted funding away from
Cooperative Biodefense Research projects, reducing this area from $36.6 million in
FY2004 to $13.1 million in FY2005, towards bio-security and bio-safety efforts.
This shift reflects, in part, the Congressional concerns with possible U.S. support for
ongoing Russian biological weapons programs. It also derives from the
53 Ibid. p. 54.
54 “The security of existing pathogen libraries, the past scope of work, the current
whereabouts of BW and BW-related experts, and the future disposition of the FSU
biological weapons capability are all critical concerns within the threat reduction agenda.”
Reshaping U.S.-Russian Threat Reduction: New Approaches for the Second Decade.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Russian American Nuclear Security
Advisory Council. November 2002. p. 2.
55 U.S. General Accounting Office. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Additional Russian
Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites. GAO-
02-482. March 2003. pp. 44-46.

---

CRS-20
Administration’s plans to expand U.S. bio-safety and bio-security assistance into
facilities in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and Georgia.56

Demilitarization Programs. Demilitarization programs include projects that
are encouraging Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to convert military efforts
to peaceful purposes. The International Science and Technology Center, which
provides grants to Russian weapons scientists and supports cooperative research
with biological weapons scientists, began with funding in this category. Funds for
demilitarization also support Defense and Military contacts between officers in the
United States and those in the former Soviet republics. According to DOD, these
contacts between the defense establishments help “promote counter-proliferation,
demilitarization, and democratic reforms.”57 This program includes representatives
from Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.
DOD has appropriated just over $100 million for Defense and Military contacts over
the life of the CTR program; the Bush Administration requested an additional $11
million for FY2004 and $8 million for FY2005.
The Bush Administration added a new demilitarization program in FY2003.
Through the WMD Proliferation Prevention Program, the United States is
cooperating with the military establishments, internal security forces, border guards,
and custom forces in Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan to improve
their border controls. This is intended to help them to deter, detect, and interrupt the
unauthorized movement of weapons or related materials across their borders.58
Congress appropriated $40 million for this program in FY2003; the Bush
Administration requested $39.4 million in FY2004, but only received $29 million.
It requested, and Congress authorized, an additional $40 million for FY2005.
State Department
The State Department has played an integral role in U.S. nonproliferation and
threat reduction programs since their inception. It has taken the lead in negotiating
the broad agreements needed before recipient nations can receive U.S. assistance and
in providing for broad policy coordination among the U.S. agencies and between the
United States and recipient nations. The State Department also manages the
Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF), which it can use to help nations
address problems with proliferation-prone weapons located on their territories.
Congress has appropriated approximately $15 million for this fund each year since
1993. The Bush Administration has requested $35 million for NDF in FY2004. It
plans to expand U.S. efforts to help countries establish better accounting and control
56 Hoehn, William. Preliminary Analysis of U.S. Department of Defense’s Fiscal Year 2005
Cooperative Threat Reduction Budget Request. RANSAC. February 10, 2004.
57 U.S. Department of Defense. Fiscal Year 2004/2005 Biennial Budget Estimates. Former
Soviet Union Threat Reduction Appropriation. February 2003. p. 6.
58 Ibid. p. 10.

---

CRS-21
mechanisms for nuclear, chemical, and biological materials.59 According to John
Wolf, the Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation, the State Department also
plans to use these funds to “focus on unanticipated opportunities to eliminate missile
systems, chemical agents, and to secure orphaned radiological sources.”60 The State
Department spent a total of around $38.5 million from this fund between FY1996
and FY2002 in the former Soviet Union.61
The State Department also manages and funds the International Science and
Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow, and its companion Science and Technology
Center (STCU) in Kiev, Ukraine. In the FY2005 budget request, it has combined
these centers and the biological weapons redirect program into a new category, called
Nonproliferation of WMD expertise. The State Department also manages the Export
Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) Program. The following
discussion provides more detail about these two program areas.62
Nonproliferation of WMD Expertise
(Science and Technology Centers)
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, many experts feared that
scientists from Russia’s nuclear weapons complex might sell their knowledge to
other nations seeking nuclear weapons. Many of these scientists had worked in the
Soviet Union’s “closed” nuclear cities where they had enjoyed relatively high salaries
and prestige, but their jobs evaporated during Russia’s economic and political crises
in the early 1990s. Even those scientists who retained their jobs saw their incomes
decline sharply as Russia was unable to pay their salaries for months at a time.
In late 1992, the United States, Japan, the European Union, and Russia
established the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC) in Moscow.
Several other former Soviet states joined the center during the 1990s, and other
nations, including Norway and South Korea, added their financial support. In late
1993, the United States, Canada, Sweden, and Ukraine established the Science and
Technology Center in Ukraine (STCU). Several former Soviet states have also
joined this center, and Japan has joined to provide financial support. In its review of
U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance, the Bush Administration cited
these centers for their achievements and indicated that it planned to expand them.
59 U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Testimony of John S. Wolf. Assistant
Secretary of State for Nonproliferation. March 19, 2003.
60 U.S. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittees on Europe and
International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights of the House Committee on
International Relations Hearing on U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction and Nonproliferation
Programs. May 8, 2003.
61 Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan, by
Matthew Bunn, et al. Project on Managing the Atom. March 2003
62 For a more details see Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and
Action Plan, by Matthew Bunn, et al. Project on Managing the Atom. March 2003.

---

CRS-22
The State Department has stated that, between 1994 and late 2002, about 50,000
scientists and engineers participated in research funded by these centers. The
Moscow Center funded nearly 1,700 projects that engaged about 41,000 scientists.
In 2001, the ISTC in Moscow supported more than 22,000 scientists with more than
$29 million in direct grants.63 The centers fund scientists who have worked on
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, but they have, historically, focused on
nuclear scientists, with many projects going to those who work at institutes in the
closed nuclear cities. The State Department estimates that about half of the
participants are senior scientists, which means the programs may have reached a
significant portion of the estimated 30,000 to 70,000 senior scientists and engineers
in the Soviet nuclear complex. However, most of these scientists spend fewer than
50 days per year on projects funded by the science centers. In the remainder of the
time, most continue to work at their primary jobs. In addition, some of the grants go
to research institutes in Russia, rather than directly to scientists, and some of these
funds may be used for administrative or management purposes. Nevertheless, the
income earned from even short-term research projects may undermine incentives
these individuals might otherwise encounter to sell their knowledge to potential
proliferant nations.
The Science Centers also sponsor a Partners Program, through which private
industry, universities, and other government agencies can provide funding for and
establish contacts with former Soviet scientists. The program started small, with
about 30 partners and $5 million in projects in 1997; it had grown to 166 partners
supporting over 100 projects worth $31 million in 2002. This represented one
quarter of the grant funding provided by the science centers in 2002.64
As of early November, 2002, the ISTC in Moscow had received $481 million
from its participating nations, with the United States providing about $171 million
of this total. The STCU in Kiev had received about $60.5 million, with the United
States providing about $45 million of this total. The United States has also provided
around $70 million to the ISTC since FY1998 to support the Biological Weapons
Redirection Program.65 This program provides research grants to Russian
biotechnology institutes to redirect scientists to commercial, agricultural, and public
health projects. The State Department collaborates with several other U.S. agencies
in this program.66 In recent years, it has begun to shift grant funding away from
Russia’s nuclear scientists to biological and chemical weapons scientists, thus re-
naming the program the Bio-Chem Redirection program, and to scientists from other
former Soviet states. Further, it expects this decline in funding to force the ISTC to
focus more on “graduating scientists” from U.S. assistance to projects with more
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
66 For more details see Congressional Research Service. Preventing Proliferation of
Biological Weapons: U.S. Assistance to the Former Soviet States. CRS Report RL31368,
by Michelle Stem Cook and Amy F. Woolf.

---

CRS-23
commercial viability.67 The State Department operates a third program within this
category, known as the Bio Industry Initiative (BII). This initiative, which began in
2002, seeks to help Russia reconfigure its large-scale former BW-related facilities so
that they can perform peaceful research issues such as infectious diseases.
For FY2004, the Bush Administration requested $59 million for the science
centers and BW redirection programs, and received about 50.2 million. It did not
identify the precise funding for either of the two. In its FY2005 budget, it has
requested $50.5 million, with about $30.5 million going to the science centers, $17
million going to the Bio-Chem Redirect program, and $3 million going to the BII.68
Analysts have raised numerous questions about the science center programs.
One of the first critiques came from the General Accounting Office, in a study
published in 1995. GAO found that some scientists who received grants from the
ISTC “may also continue to be employed by institutes engaged in weapons work.”69
GAO interpreted this finding to mean that the centers had not succeeded in
redirecting weapons scientists to peaceful endeavors. Other critics of the CTR
program claimed that GAO’s findings indicated that, by supporting Russian weapons
scientists, U.S. funds were supporting Russian weapons programs. The State
Department disputed both of these conclusions, noting that the grants from the ISTC
were intended to supplement, not replace the scientists’ income from work in other
institutes. And, in the years since this report, the State Department has enhanced its
auditing procedures to ensure that ISTC grants support the assigned projects and do
not support work on Russian weapons.
Analysts have also noted that the ISTC and STCU do not have enough money
to support full pay for a significant number of scientists. Consequently, some have
questioned whether the centers achieve their objective of keeping these scientists
away from nations or groups seeking weapons of mass destruction. Others, however,
note that, even if the financial support is less than complete, the cooperation with
Russian institutes, and the promise of a fairly steady stream of funding, helps build
relationships and draw these institutes into the “western orbit.”70 To address this
problem, some have suggested that, instead of providing short term grants, the
centers should focus on projects that will lead to the long-term redirection of
scientists out of weapons work. The State Department seems to agree with this
approach with its growing reliance on the Partners Program and its acknowledged
need to transition Russia’s nuclear scientists to more commercially viable projects.
67 U.S. Department of State. FY2004 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign
Operations. p. 370.
68 U.S. Department of State. FY2005 Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign
Operations. p. 135.
69 U.S. General Accounting Office. Weapons of Mass Destruction, Reducing the Threat
From the Former Soviet Union: An Update. GAO/NSIAD-95-165, June 1995. Washington,
D.C. p. 27.
70 Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan, by
Matthew Bunn, et al. Project on Managing the Atom. March 2003.

---

CRS-24
Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance
Many view the potential for smuggling or illegal exports of materials and
technology from the former Soviet Union as a key proliferation concern. The
collapse of political control along the Soviet borders, along with incentives created
by the weakness in the economies of the newly independent states, contribute to this
growing concern. The State Department’s Export Control and Related Border
Security Assistance (EXBS) program helps the former Soviet states and other nations
improve their ability to interdict nuclear smuggling and their ability to stop the illicit
trafficking of all materials for weapons of mass destruction, along with dual use
goods and technologies. The EXBS program currently has projects underway in
more than 30 nations, and is expanding its reach around the globe.71
When designing a nation-specific plan for border control assistance, the United
States seeks to address four key areas. First, if needed, it helps the recipient nation
establish the legal and regulatory basis for effective export controls. It then helps the
nation develop appropriate export licensing procedures and practices. Third, the
United States helps the recipient establish and enhance effective enforcement
capabilities. When needed, it provides the recipient with detection and interdiction
equipment and training. Finally, the United States helps establish procedures that
promote effective interaction between government and industry so that business
entities in the recipient nation will abide by the laws and regulations of the new
export control regime.
The State Department also provides support to border control efforts in DOD’s
CTR program and the DOE’s nonproliferation program. It seeks to coordinate these
and other U.S. efforts to identify and stop the smuggling of nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons or materials. Analysts inside and outside the government have
questioned, however, whether the coordination has been effective. Consequently, the
National Security Council is leading an effort to develop a government-wide strategic
plan for interdiction assistance, which includes but is not limited to export assistance,
that might help stop the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction.
Between FY1998 and FY2002, the State Department allocated $146 million to
the EXBS program for nations in and around the former Soviet Union.
Approximately $100 million of this amount was allocated to Georgia for its border
security program. Funding for border security in the rest of the former Soviet states
was around $5-$7 million per year, until the State Department added $24.7 million
from the FY2002 supplemental appropriations. In FY2003, the State Department
requested around $17 million for the EXBS program, with an additional $15 million
allocated to the Georgia Border Security Program. Funding may decline in FY2004;
the Bush Administration requested $13.9 million for EXBS and an additional $15
million for the Georgia Border Security program. In FY2005, the Bush
Administration requested a total of $38 million for EXBS, although only around $19
million is allocated to projects in nations in and around the former Soviet Union. An
71 U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Testimony of John S. Wolf. Assistant
Secretary of State for Nonproliferation. March 19, 2003.

---

CRS-25
additional $11.5 million is allocated “global” efforts, with the remaining $7 million
allocated to projects in other nations around the world.
Department of Energy
The Department of Energy has contributed to U.S. threat reduction and
nonproliferation assistance to the former Soviet states from the start, when CTR
included a small amount of funding for materials control and protection. Officials
from DOE participated, along with their counterparts at DOD, in early efforts to
outline projects and reach agreement with Russian officials on assistance to secure
nuclear materials. But these government-to-government negotiations proceeded
slowly, in part because Russia’s nuclear energy ministry — Minatom — was less
open to cooperation than the Ministry of Defense. Consequently, projects at facilities
that housed nuclear materials did not begin until 1994. In a parallel effort that sought
to reduce these delays, experts from the U.S. nuclear laboratories, which are a part
of DOE, also began less formal contacts with their counterparts in Russia to identify
and solve safety and security problems at Russian facilities. Together, these
government-to-government and lab-to-lab projects evolved into an effort to apply
Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) techniques to Russian
facilities.
The MPC&A program began with less than $3 million in FY1993. This amount
grew to $73 million in FY1995. In FY1996, DOE assumed budgetary and
management responsibility for the program. DOE also initiated a second program,
the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention, which sought to provide employment
opportunities for scientists and engineers from Russia’s nuclear weapons complex.
In the latter half of the 1990s, DOE expanded these efforts and added several other
programs to its nonproliferation assistance. These programs are now managed by
DOE’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). The discussion below
summarizes the objectives and achievements of many of these efforts.72
International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation
The International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation program seeks
to “secure nuclear weapons, weapons-usable nuclear materials, and radiological
sources by upgrading security at nuclear sites, consolidating these materials to sites
where installation of enhanced security systems have already been completed, and
improving nuclear smuggling detection capabilities at international borders.”73 The
72 As was the case with the summaries of DOD and State Department programs, these
descriptions do not cover all DOE programs. A complete description of the programs
funded under DOE’s Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Budget can be found in DOE’s
budget documents. See U.S. Department of Energy. FY2004 Congressional Budget
Request. Detailed Budget Justifications. February 2003. pp. 623-766.
73 U.S. Department of Energy. FY2004 Congressional Budget Request. Detailed Budget
Justifications. February 2003. p. 623.

---

CRS-26
MPC&A program and Radiological Dispersion Devices74 program address the first
of these three objectives; the Materials Consolidation and Conversion Program
addresses the second; and the Second Line of Defense program addresses the third.
Each of these is discussed below.
MPC&A Funding. The budget for MPC&A grew rapidly during the 1990s,
reaching $169 million in FY2001, the last year of the Clinton Administration. The
Bush Administration, in its budget request for FY2002, reduced funding for the
MPC&A program to $138.8 million, in part because it believed that the program had
enough unexpended funds from prior years to carry on with less funding. Its first
budget also shifted money from Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Programs to U.S.
nuclear weapons programs. Congress objected to this reduction, and both the Senate
and House Appropriations Committees, in the Energy and Water Appropriations bills
for FY2002, restored funding to the FY2001 level. Furthermore, Congress added
$150 million in a supplemental appropriations bill passed at the end of 2001, after the
September 11 attacks had raised new concerns about the potential threat that
terrorists might seek to acquire nuclear materials from insecure facilities in Russia.
The Bush Administration allocated much of this new funding to the Second Line of
Defense and Radiological Dispersion Devices. But the Bush Administration did
increase its budget request for MPC&A in FY2003, to $223 million, so that it could
accelerate the installation of comprehensive upgrades and material consolidation and
conversion efforts.75 The Bush Administration requested $227 million for these
efforts for FY2004; Congress approved $260 million, adding $5 million for “high
priority” activities and $28 million for an initiative under the Second Line of Defense
Program (described below).
The Bush Administration requested $238 million for MPC&A in FY2005. The
reduction from FY2004 to FY2005 reflects, in part, the completion of physical
security upgrades at Russian Navy warhead storage sites.76 In the Conference report
on the FY2005 Defense Authorization Bill (H.Rept. 108-767; P.L. 108-375),
Congress authorized the full amount requested by the President. The House had
reduced that amount by around $10 million, citing delays in the program caused by
Russia’s refusal to allow the United States access to some facilities, but the Senate
prevailed in conference. The Appropriations Committee added $84 million to the
MPC&A program, for a total of $322 million. The Conference report accompanying
the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005 (H.Rept. 108-792; P.L. 108-447), notes
74 In the FY2005 budget request, this initiative is combined with two others in a single
initiative known as “International Nuclear and Radiological Cleanout.” See 2005 DOE
Budget Rollout. Remarks by Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham. February 2, 2004,
Washington, D.C.
75 U.S. House. Committee on Appropriations. Statement of Spencer Abraham, Secretary
of Energy. March 6, 2002.
76 Hoehn, William. Preliminary Analysis of U.S. Department of Energy’s Fiscal Year 2005
Nonproliferation Budget Request. RANSAC. February 4. 2004.

---

CRS-27
that this added funding should be used to accelerate efforts to secure nuclear weapons
sites and nuclear materials production sites in Russia.77
Between FY1993 and FY2005, Congress appropriated nearly $1.8 billion for the
MPC&A program. With the exception of approximately $100 for the Second Line
of Defense Program, all of these funds were allocated to efforts to improve security
at nuclear warhead and nuclear material storage facilities in Russia. NNSA has
identified 105 of these nuclear sites, with 243 buildings, that may need assistance in
improving their security systems. According to NNSA, these sites contain
approximately 600 metric tons of nuclear materials, enough for around 41,000
nuclear warheads. Within this total, 63 sites belong to the Ministry of Defense, (52
warhead storage site and 11 Navy fuel storage sites), 11 are a part of the Minatom
weapons complex, and 31 are civilian sites. More than 80% of these materials are
located at the Minatom sites.78
MPC&A Projects. DOE provides MPC&A assistance at Russian facilities in
two phases. First, it installs rapid upgrades that are designed to delay unauthorized
access to the storage facilities. These may include the installation of hardened doors
and windows, locks and keys to control access, perimeter fences, and moveable
barriers at entry points. The second phase provides comprehensive upgrades that are
tailored to meet the security needs at each individual facility. These may include
monitoring and detection systems, the relocation of guard forces, the consolidation
of materials, central alarm systems, and electronic access control systems. DOE has
helped improve security at sites that house about 46% of the former Soviet Union’s
600 metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear materials.79 By the end of 2004, DOE had
completed rapid upgrades at facilities housing about 60% of this material and
comprehensive upgrades at facilities that house about 26% of this material. It stated
that continuing progress would allow it to complete comprehensive upgrades at sites
housing 37% of this material by the end of 2005.80 When the upgrades are complete,
DOE plans to continue “sustainability efforts” to ensure that the upgrades remain
effective in the long term. This program, titled National Programs and Sustainability,
seeks to create regulations, reporting requirements, training and maintenance
facilities, and other infrastructure components to ensure that Russia can continue to
operate its new security systems.81 However, in the FY2005 budget request, DOE
77 Congressional Record. November 19, 2004. H10558.
78 Ibid. p. 625.
79 U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Statement of Ambassador Linton Brooks.
Administrator, NNSA. June 15, 2004. See also, U.S. General Accounting Office. Weapons
of Mass Destruction. Additional Russian Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to
Improve Security at Russian Sites. GA)-03-482. Washington, March 2003. p. 4. See also,
U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services. Statement of Paul M. Longsworth. Deputy
Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. March 10, 2004. (Herein after referred
to as Longsworth Testimony.)
80 2005 DOE Budget Rollout. Remarks by Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham. February
2, 2004, Washington, D.C.
81 For more details see U.S. Department of Energy. FY2004 Congressional Budget Request.
(continued...)

---

CRS-28
has reduced funding for this initiative from $28 million to $27 million, continuing
a trend of recent years. DOE noted, in its budget materials, funding in this area has
declined because DOE has altered it priorities to support increased funding for
MPC&A activities in countries outside the former Soviet Union.82
Navy Complex. DOE has provided assistance to Russia’s Navy by improving
security at 39 naval nuclear warhead storage sites and 11 nuclear fuel storage sites.
These sites house approximately 60 metric tons of weapons-useable nuclear materials
and 4,000 nuclear warheads. According to DOE, it had completed rapid upgrades at
all naval nuclear fuel storage sites, and planned to complete the comprehensive
upgrades in FY2003. It also plans to complete upgrades at 90% of the warhead sites
by the end of FY2004. The FY2005 budget request includes $15 million for this
program area.
Strategic Rocket Forces. DOE has recently initiated security upgrades at
two warhead storage sites for Russia’s strategic rocket forces. It estimates that this
effort may eventually expand to include 10 sites, out of an estimated 25 sites that
store nuclear warheads. This effort is in addition to DOD’s work at more than 90
nuclear warhead storage sites under the control of Russia’s 12th Main Directorate, the
branch of Russia’s Ministry of Defense that is responsible for warhead security and
maintenance. DOE has requested $45 million to continue these activities in FY2005.

Minatom Weapons Complex. Russia’s nuclear weapons complex, managed
by Minatom, consists of seven sites and four “Enterprises of the Nuclear Weapons
Complex” in Russia’s closed nuclear cities. The buildings in this complex house
around 500 metric tons of “highly attractive” weapons-useable materials.83 DOE has
completed rapid upgrades on buildings that house 20-30% of these materials, and
comprehensive upgrades on buildings that house less than 5% of these materials.
It plans to secure about 37% of these materials by the end of 2005. NNSA has
completed work at only 14 of 133 buildings in need of upgrades in the nuclear
weapons complex.84 It hopes to install security upgrades at all these facilities by
2008. The General Accounting Office, however, has questioned DOE’s ability to
meet this deadline, noting that Russia has not yet provided the United States with
access to many of the Minatom sites. But DOE has stated that an access agreement
signed in 2001 has “allowed significant access and acceleration of physical protection
systems ... at these large facilities.”85 In addition, Secretary of Energy Spencer
Abraham reports that, in numerous meetings with Russia’s Minister of Atomic
81 (...continued)
Detailed Budget Justifications. February 2003. p. 655.
82 Hoehn, William. Preliminary Analysis of U.S. Department of Energy’s Fiscal Year 2005
Nonproliferation Budget Request. RANSAC. February 4. 2004
83 Ibid. p. 639.
84 U.S. General Accounting Office. Weapons of Mass Destruction. Additional Russian
Cooperation Needed to Facilitate U.S. Efforts to Improve Security at Russian Sites. GAO-
03-482. Washington, March 2003, p. 26.
85 U.S. Department of Energy. FY2004 Congressional Budget Request. Detailed Budget
Justifications. February 2003. p. 639.

---

CRS-29
Energy, Alexander Rumyantsev, he worked “to accelerate and expand our programs”
and to “clear away the bureaucratic obstacles.”86 The FY2005 budget request
increases funding in this area from $32.5 million in FY2004 to $43 million in
FY2005.
Civilian Nuclear Sites. DOE has also provided assistance with the
installation of security upgrades at 31 civilian nuclear sites throughout the former
Soviet Union. These are mainly research facilities that operate nuclear reactors.
According to DOE, these sites contain around 40 metric tons of weapons-useable
materials. DOE has already completed rapid upgrades at sites housing around 98%
of these materials and comprehensive upgrades at sites housing around half of these
materials. It hopes to complete this effort over the next couple of years.
Material Consolidation and Conversion. In addition to securing sites that
house nuclear materials, the MPC&A program is providing Russia and the other
former Soviet states with assistance in consolidating these materials in fewer
facilities and converting them to forms that might be less attractive to nations seeking
materials for nuclear weapons. By the end of FY2003, DOE plans to remove nuclear
materials from about 40% of the 55 buildings that will eventually be cleared of this
material. It also plans to convert about 15% of the 29 metric tons of highly enriched
uranium and low enriched uranium covered by this effort. It hopes to complete the
effort by 2009.
Radiological Dispersion Devices. In the wake of the September 11
attacks, many analysts have expressed growing concerns about the possibility that
terrorists might acquire nuclear materials that could be used in a “dirty bomb.”
Although such a device would not explode with a nuclear yield, it could, nonetheless
spread radiological debris across a wide area. Many nations, around the world, have
nuclear materials at research facilities, hospitals, or power plants that could be used
in a dirty bomb. But most analysts agree that the states of the former Soviet Union
pose a greater threat in this regard, particularly since the Soviet Union left devices
with radioactive materials scattered across its territory. According to Spencer
Abraham, the Secretary of Energy, “more attention is being paid to the risks
associated with the misuse of radiological materials” because they are much “more
abundant and much less secure” than weapons-grade materials.87 Consequently, DOE
has initiated a new program to identify these sites, set priorities, and begin security
upgrades. This program received its initial funding in FY2002, with $20 million
allocated from the $150 million Congress added to the MPC&A program in the
Supplemental Appropriations (P.L. 107-206) passed after the September 11 attacks.
DOE identified 35 nuclear waste sites in Russia and the other former Soviet
states that posed a threat for the theft or sale of nuclear materials. These states also
have radiological sources at agricultural research institutes, research reactors, medical
86 “The FY2004 Nonproliferation Budget: Supporting the Ten Principles for Nuclear and
Radiological Materials Security.” Remarks by Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham. Center
for Strategic and International Studies. Washington, D.C. February 10, 2003.
87 Remarks by Spencer Abraham, Secretary of Energy. Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace. International Nonproliferation Conference. November 14 , 2002

---

CRS-30
facilities, intelligence sites, and defense facilities.88 DOE is also working with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to identify and secure facilities that may
house these materials in other nations. In the FY2005 budget, DOE has requested an
increase in its funding, to $40 million for this effort , and to help it consolidate and,
when possible, return to Russia, nuclear materials in nuclear reactors in other
countries.
Second Line of Defense. Through its Second Line of Defense Program,
DOE contributes to U.S. efforts to help the former Soviet states detect and intercept
attempts to smuggle nuclear materials out of the country. DOE has begun to install
radiation detection equipment systems at strategic “transit and border sites.” By the
end of FY2003, DOE had installed this equipment at 39 sites, out of an estimated 393
sites that may need the equipment. DOE also plans to provide training and
communications equipment to border control agents to help them implement the
plan. This program began in FY1998, and received less than $3 million per year for
several years. However, the budget increased to $46 million and the effort expanded
significantly with funding provided under the FY2002 supplemental appropriations
(P.L. 107-206). Congress also added $28 million to this program area in FY2004,
for a project known as the Megaports initiative. This project is developing and
deploying radiation detectors for use at the largest foreign seaports that handle about
70% of the container traffic headed for the United States.89
DOE has also initiated a new project, known as Megaports, which is designed
“to detect the trafficking of nuclear or radioactive materials in the world’s busiest
seaports.” According to Secretary of Energy Abraham, DOE hopes to install
detection equipment at seaports around the globe. The Administration has requested
$15 million for this program in FY2005. This funding included in International
Nuclear Materials and Protection portion of the budget, even though it is not intended
for use in the former Soviet Union. The Administration expects to complete work
at ports in Greece and the Netherlands by the end of 2004.90
Table 5 displays the recent funding history for many of these International
Nuclear Materials and Cooperation programs. It begins with the appropriation for
FY2002, which includes the $150 million added in the supplemental appropriations
bills. It then demonstrates how the budgets evolved through the appropriations for
FY2003 and FY2004. The table demonstrates that, with the near completion of
upgrades at Russia’s naval nuclear facilities and civilian nuclear sites, MPC&A
funding is shifting into efforts to secure Strategic Rocket Force warheads and
Radiological Dispersion Devices. At the same time, although DOE has reached only
a small portion of the nuclear materials at Minatom sites in the nuclear weapons
complex, funding for these efforts has declined. This reflects, in part, the continuing
problems that the United States has had in gaining access to these sites.
88 U.S. Department of Energy. FY2004 Congressional Budget Request. Detailed Budget
Justifications. February 2003. p. 649.
89 Hoehn, William. Update on Legislation Affecting U.S-Former Soviet Union
Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction. RANSAC. November 17, 2003.
90 Longsworth testimony. March 10, 2004.

---

CRS-31
Table 5: Appropriations for MPC&A and Related Programs
(in $ thousands)
Program
FY2002
FY2003
FY2004
Navy Complex
$87,780
$55,800
$38,000
Strategic Rocket Forces
$0
$0
$24,000
Minatom Weapons Complex
$31,173
$48,000
$39,000
Civilian Nuclear Sites
$34,617
$21,707
$11,000
Material Consolidation and
$21,000
$27,000
$31,000
Conversion
Radiological Dispersion Devices
$20,285
$16,293
$36,000
National Programs and
$73,552
$34,227
$28,000
Sustainability
Second Line of Defense
$46,185
$24,000
$52,000
Total
$314,592
$227,077
$280,000
Source: U.S. Department of Energy. FY2004 Congressional Budget Request. Detailed Budget
Justifications. February 2003.
Russian Transition Initiative
The Russian Transition Initiative combines two DOE programs that seek to stop
the leakage of knowledge out of Russia’s nuclear weapons complex to states or
groups seeking their own nuclear weapons. According to DOE, these programs seek
to help Russia reduce the size of its nuclear weapons complex, by removing functions
and equipment, and to create “sustainable non-weapons-related work” for scientists
through technology projects that have “commercially-viable market opportunities.”91
The Bush Administration has stated that it hopes to expand the program from
engaging only nuclear scientists to also engaging biological and chemical weapons
scientists. It requested funding to expand the program to two chemical weapons
institutes in FY2004.
Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention. The Initiatives for Proliferation
Prevention (IPP) Program began in 1994. IPP has matched U.S. weapons labs and
U.S. industry with Russian scientists and engineers in cooperative research projects
with “high commercial potential.” DOE claims that this focus on commercialization
will help make the projects self-sustaining in the long-term. The IPP program
received $35 million in the FY1994 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, before
its funding moved to the Department of Energy. This initial funding helped establish
nearly 200 research projects by1995. Between FY1996 and FY2003, IPP received
an additional $194 million. In FY2004, the Bush Administration requested around
91 U.S. Department of Energy. FY2004 Congressional Budget Request. Detailed Budget
Justifications. February 2003. p. 663.

---

CRS-32
$23 million for projects funded through IPP, as a part of the overall request of $39.3
million for the Russian Transition Initiative. Congress approved this request.
The IPP program was the subject of review and criticism in a GAO study
released in February 1999. The report noted that nearly half of the funds
appropriated for the IPP program had been spent at the U.S. nuclear weapons labs
and, after subtracting the taxes, fees and other charges removed by Russian officials,
the Russian institutes had received only around one-third of the funds. The report
also questioned DOE’s oversight of the programs, noting that program officials did
not always know how many scientists were receiving IPP funding. The report noted
that the projects had not yet produced any commercial successes. DOE responded
by stating that IPP had temporarily employed thousands of scientists in around 170
institutes. DOE also stated that the program did not subsidize scientists who were
performing weapons-related work. Nevertheless, in FY2000, Congress reduced the
Clinton Administration’s request for funding for the IPP program from $30 million
to $25 million and specified that no more than 35% of the funds be spent at the U.S.
labs. It also mandated that the United States negotiate agreements with Russia to
ensure that funds provided under this program are not subject to taxes in Russia.
Furthermore, it requested that the Secretary of Energy review IPP programs for their
commercialization potential.
DOE reports that the IPP program engaged 13,000 scientists, engineers, and
technicians between FY1994 and FY2002, with 6,700 of them working on projects
in 2002. At the end of 2002, IPP had 176 projects ongoing at 56 institutes in Russia,
with 64 of these projects at facilities in the closed nuclear cities. IPP also had 14
projects at 6 institutes in Kazakhstan, and 13 projects at 9 institutes in Ukraine. It
has also reported that 13 projects have become commercial ventures, and the program
has created 850 high tech jobs in Russia. Furthermore, the IPP program has received
around $125 million in private sector matching funds.92
Nuclear Cities Initiative (NCI). In August 1998, Vice President Gore and
then-Prime Minister Kiriyenko signed an agreement establishing the Nuclear Cities
Initiative. This program is designed to bring commercial enterprises to Russia’s
closed nuclear cities, so that Russia can reduce the size of its weapons complex and
so that the scientists and engineers will not be tempted to sell their knowledge to
nations seeking nuclear weapons. The United States and Russia signed an
implementing agreement in September 1998 and the program received its first
funding of $15 million in FY1999. The NCI program received a total of nearly $87
million between FY1999 and FY2003; the Bush Administration has requested, and
received, an additional $17 million for it within the funding for the Russian
Transition Initiative.
Some Members of Congress and others, including GAO, have also raised
questions about the value and effectiveness of the NCI program. In its first budget
for FY2002, the Bush Administration sought to reduce funding from $26 million in
FY2001 to $6.6 million, limiting the program to 3 of Russia’s ten closed nuclear
92 Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan, by
Matthew Bunn, et al. Project on Managing the Atom. March 2003.

---

CRS-33
cities. It also indicated that it might seek to eliminate the program, merging its
functions with the IPP program. Congress accepted this latter proposal, creating the
Russian Transition Initiative, and it initially accepted the reduction in funding for the
program. However, in the supplemental appropriations bill passed after the
September 11 attacks, Congress added $15 million to the NCI program.
Nevertheless, with limited funding and uncertain political support, the NCI program
has reportedly made limited progress in addressing the employment problems at
Russia’s closed nuclear cities. Some say that the merger with the IPP will bring
stability and progress to the program’s efforts.
However, in late July 2003, the Bush Administration announced that the NCI
program would cease to operate by the end of 2003. The United States and Russia
have been unable to agree on the liability provisions in an implementing agreement
for the program. Ongoing projects will continue through the end of the year, but the
program will not receive new funding or begin new projects. Congress has expressed
its concern about this impasse, and has encouraged the Administration to “work
aggressively” with Russia to resolve it. In its FY2005 budget request, the
Administration has allocated $41 million to the Russian Transition Initiative. Some
of this funding could support NCI projects if the liability issue is resolved.
Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production
In the early 1990s, the United States and Russia both pledged to end the
production of plutonium for nuclear weapons. Russia, however, balked at
suggestions that it shut its three remaining plutonium production reactors because it
used the same reactors to produce light and heat in the cities of Tomsk and
Krasnoyarsk. In an agreement signed in 1994, under the auspices of the high level
commission chaired by Vice President Gore and Russia’s Prime Minister
Chernomyrdin, the two sides agreed that they would work together to provide
alternative energy sources for these Russian cities. This program began as a part of
the DOD CTR program, and moved to DOE in FY2002.
In the original 1994 agreement, Russia stated that it would shut the reactors by
2000, if the alternative energy facilities were developed in the same time frame.
Initially, the two nations planned to replace the reactors with fossil-fueled power
plants, but early studies concluded that the construction of these plants could cost up
to $1 billion. Consequently, the two sides began to explore the possibility of
converting the plutonium production reactors to a type whose spent fuel did not
require reprocessing. These new reactors would no longer produce weapons-grade
plutonium. Each side planned to pay half of the expected $160 million for this
conversion project. However, over the next few years the expected cost of the core
conversion more than doubled. After its financial crisis in 1998, Russia concluded
that it could not pay its half. If the project had continued, the United States might
have had to pay more than $300 million. At the same time, questions about the
reactors’ safety raised the possibility that they might need to be closed shortly after
the core conversion was complete.
In late 1999, Minatom proposed that the two sides again pursue the replacement
of the nuclear reactors with fossil fuel plants. After reducing the estimate for the
necessary size of the plants, it estimated that the new project would cost about the

---

CRS-34
same as the core conversion project. In late 2000 and early 2001, the two nations
agreed to replace the reactors with fossil fuel plants. However, in FY2000 and
FY2001, Congress prohibited the expenditure of any CTR funds for the construction
of fossil fuel plants. When it completed its review of U.S. nonproliferation and threat
reduction assistance to Russia, the Bush Administration endorsed the reactor shut-
down program and transferred the effort from DOD to DOE.
DOD, DOE, and the State Department have all contributed to this project. The
State Department contributed nearly $4.5 million in FY1995 and FY1999 to
feasibility studies. DOD’s budget included $10 million in FY1995 and $16 million
in FY1996. It also included $32 million in FY2000, but these funds were rescinded
after Congress prohibited their expenditure on fossil fuel plants. Congress
transferred $32 million in FY2001 funds and $56 million in FY2002 funds from
DOD to DOE, and appropriated $49 million in the DOE budget for FY2003. The
Bush Administration requested and received $50 million for this effort in FY2004.93
It has requested a similar amount, $50.1 million, to continue this project in FY2005.
The United States and Russia concluded a new agreement to implement the
reactor shut-down program in early 2003. According to NNSA, the new fossil fuel
plants will be completed, and the old nuclear reactors shut down, in 2008 and 2011,
assuming there are no further delays in the implementation of the agreement. The
United States and Russia are also implementing efforts to improve safety at the
reactors in the interim.94
Fissile Materials Disposition
In September 1998, the United States and Russia agreed to convert surplus
weapons-grade plutonium to a form that could not be returned to nuclear weapons.
In the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement, signed in September
2000, each side agreed to dispose of 34 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium, and
to do so at roughly the same time. This agreement was designed to ease concerns
about the possible theft or diversion of weapons-grade plutonium by nations or others
seeking to develop their own nuclear weapons.
According to the agreement, the parties could use two methods for disposing of
the plutonium — they could either convert it to mixed oxide fuel (MOX) for nuclear
power reactors or immobilize it and dispose of it in a way that would preclude its use
in nuclear weapons. Some analysts have criticized the MOX option, on the principle
of opposing any use of plutonium in power generation. From this point of view,
nations that do not possess nuclear weapons could use a plutonium-base power fuel
cycle as a cover for developing nuclear weapons. If weapons states such as Russia
and the United States used plutonium for power generation, according to this
argument, it would be more difficult to persuade non-weapons states not to do so.
93 Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan, by
Matthew Bunn, et al. Project on Managing the Atom. March 2003.
94 For details on components of the reactor shut-down program see U.S. Department of
Energy. FY2004 Congressional Budget Request. Detailed Budget Justifications. February
2003. p. 722-726.

---

CRS-35
However, Russia has expressed little interest in the permanent disposal of plutonium,
noting that the material could have great value for its civilian power program. The
United States initially intended to pursue both options. However, after reviewing
U.S. nonproliferation policies in 2001, the Bush Administration concluded that this
approach would be too costly. The United States now plans to convert almost all its
surplus plutonium to MOX fuel. Congress appropriated $152 million for FY2003 to
begin construction of three facilities in Savannah River, SC, to pursue the MOX
option, and the FY2004 request is $416 million for construction and $194 million for
operation and maintenance for the U.S. surplus plutonium disposal program. The
FY2005 budget request reduces funding for the U.S. program by about $50 million.
The United States and international community have agreed to pay a large
portion of the cost for Russia’s plutonium disposition program when it is undertaken.
According to the State Department, U.S. allies, including Great Britain, France, and
Japan, have already pledged to provide $700 million.95 Congress appropriated $200
million for this program for FY1999, but most of these funds have not been spent.
The Bush Administration’s FY2004 budget justification requests $47 million for
Russian Fissile Materials Disposition “Operations and Maintenance” and it and prior
balances totaling $151 million will be spent in the Russian Federation “in accordance
with a new detailed program execution plan to be provided to Congress.”96
However, in late July, 2003, the Bush Administration announced that the
plutonium disposition program would not pursue additional contracts in 2004
because the United States and Russia have been unable to agree on the liability
provisions for a new implementing agreement for the program. The FY2005 budget
does include $64 million funding for U.S. assistance to Russia on plutonium
disposition, under the assumption that the nations will resolve their differences and
the program will resume. As a result of this dispute, however, the projected date for
beginning construction on the plutonium disposition facilities has slipped by 10
months, from July 2004 to May 2005. Congress authorized and appropriated the
requested amount for FY2005, but questioned the Administration’s ability to begin
construction in May 2005.
Issues for Congress
Congress has addressed a number of issues during the years since it passed the
Nunn-Lugar amendment and DOD established the Cooperative Threat Reduction
Program. Many of these are discussed in detail in CRS Report 97-1027F, Nunn-
Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs: Issues for Congress. Some of these
issues have grown out of concerns with specific projects, as has been the case with
the dispute over the chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch’ye. Others
have derived from broader concerns about whether threat reduction assistance to
95 U.S. Department of State. Fiscal Year 2002 Performance and Accountability Report. p.
62.
96 U.S. Department of Energy. FY2004 Congressional Budget Request. Detailed Budget
Justifications. DOE/ME-0016. February 2003. Vol. 1, p. 548.

---

CRS-36
Russia and the other former Soviet states serves broader U.S. national security goals.
The question of whether U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance
represents “defense by other means” — as former Secretary of Defense William
Perry used to argue — or foreign aid — as some in Congress often assert —
continues to echo in debates about these programs. Some program critics and some
Members of Congress also continue to question whether U.S. assistance allows
Russia to divert its own resources to the development and production of new
weapons that could threaten the United States. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld raised
this question during his nomination hearing in January 2001.
On the other hand, as U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance to
Russia enters its second decade, many of the issues discussed during the debates over
the programs reflect new concerns raised during assessments of how the programs
performed in their first decade and how they might improve in the second. Many of
these issues also reflect the growing focus of the programs on the potential link
between weapons of mass destruction that might leak out of Russia and terrorist
organizations that might seek these weapons to attack the United States and its allies.
The discussion below reviews many of these issues, describing concerns raised by
those who support and those who criticize the programs. The discussion draws
heavily on the findings and proposals outlined by several recent reports on U.S. threat
reduction and nonproliferation assistance. These provide a more detailed description
of the status of the programs and proposals for the future.97
Organization and Coordination
As was noted above, CTR implementation was slow during the program’s early
years. The need to negotiate umbrella agreements with Russia, and establish a
“culture of cooperation” was a key reason for the early delays. But some analysts
also cite the need to coordinate project planning among several U.S government
agencies as a problem. Many analysts contend that coordination problems remain
today, even though each of the three key agencies — DOD, DOE and State — funds
and manages its own projects. These agencies still need to coordinate their efforts
to avoid duplication and, in some cases to share resources and expertise. In addition,
with the programs spread among three agencies, no one in the U.S. government takes
the lead in setting policies and priorities for U.S. threat reduction and
nonproliferation assistance, or in serving as an advocate for these programs in
interagency debates. Some Members of Congress and analysts outside government
97 See, for example, Reshaping U.S.-Russian Threat Reduction: New Approaches for the
Second Decade. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Russian American
Nuclear Security Advisory Council. November 2002. [http://www.ceip.org/files
/pdf/Reshaping.Threat.Reduction.pdf]; U.S. Department of Energy. The Secretary of
Energy Advisory Board. A Report Card on the Department of Energy’s Nonproliferation
Programs With Russia. Howard Baker and Lloyd Cutler. Russia Task Force. January 10,
2001. [http://www.seab.energy.gov/publications/rusrpt.pdf]; Controlling Nuclear Warheads
and Materials: A Report Card and Action Plan, by Matthew Bunn, et al. Project on
Managing the Atom. March 2003, [http://www.nti.org/e_research/cnwm/cnwm.pdf] and
Einhorn, Robert J. and Michelle A. Flournoy, Protecting Against the Spread of Nuclear,
Biological, and Chemical Weapons. An Action Agenda for Global Partnership. CSIS
Report. January 2003. [http://www.sgpproject.org/publications/publications_index.html].

---

CRS-37
have proposed two specific solutions that they believe will improve implementation
of U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance — the creation of a strategic
plan and the designation of an overall program coordinator.
Strategic Plan. Many analysts, both inside and outside the U.S. government,
believe that U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation programs would benefit from
the development of a government-wide strategic plan. Some officials and analysts
expected the Bush Administration to develop a more comprehensive strategic plan
for these programs during its review of U.S. nonproliferation assistance to Russia in
2001.98 That review just identified those programs that would receive greater
resources and expanded mandates. But, according to Senator Pete Domenici, “these
programs frequently are intertwined and interrelated in various complex and difficult
ways.”99 According to one analyst who has participated in both DOD and DOE
programs, the growth in U.S. programs “has been by and large, organic, with each
agency pursuing its own contacts and relationships in recipient countries, assembling
and justifying its own budget, implementing programs based on its own culture and
approaches, and interacting with its own Congressional oversight committees.”100
Most analysts agree that a comprehensive strategic plan would allow for the
development of an overall set of goals for U.S. assistance, better coordination among
programs, a more consistent method to set priorities and measure progress, and a
coordinated way to determine when and how the United States had achieved its goals
and could complete a program.
Program Coordination. Many analysts have also called for the creation of
a high-level program coordinator or a high level interagency committee chaired by
a representative of the National Security Council. This program coordinator would
set a consistent direction by setting priorities, resolving competing demands for
budgetary resources, eliminating overlap and redundancy, and coordinating
implementation across agencies. This individual would also raise the political profile
of the programs, bringing consistent political leadership that many analysts believe
is lacking. They argue that continued, coordinated success for the programs requires
“active political engagement at the White House, cabinet, and sub-cabinet political
appointee levels in the U.S. government.”101
98 “I would hope that the real result of the review would lead to a more comprehensive
approach, a more integrated approach, to nonproliferation and threat reduction, so that the
individual program can be seen and measured in light of an overall approach and clear goals,
and so the individual programs can support each other more synergistically.” U.S. House.
Committee on Armed Services. Hearing. Department of Energy Budget Request for
FY2002. p. 9. Statement of Gen. John A. Gordon, Administrator, National Nuclear Security
Administration. June 27, 2001.
99 U.S. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on International
Security, Proliferation and Federal Services. Hearing. Combating Proliferation of Weapons
of Mass Destruction (WMD) with Non-proliferation Programs: Non-proliferation Assistance
Coordination Act of 2001. November 14, 2001
100 Ibid. Statement of Laura Holgate, Vice President of the Russian Newly Independent
States Program, Nuclear Threat Initiative.
101 Options for Increased U.S. Russian Nuclear Nonproliferation Cooperation and Projected
(continued...)

---

CRS-38
Neither the Clinton nor the Bush Administrations accepted proposals for a
single, high-level program coordinator, arguing that interagency coordination already
occurs. According to an official from the Bush Administration, “U.S. policy
implementation and oversight of nonproliferation assistance to the states of the
former Soviet Union is coordinated at senior levels by the Proliferation Strategy
Policy Coordinating Committee, or PCC, chaired by a National Security Council
senior director, with assistant secretary-level representatives from State, Defense,
Energy and other concerned agencies.”102 Others have argued that a new interagency
committee would complicate the existing interagency coordinating process.103
A White House-based nonproliferation “czar” may be able to communicate
high-level interest and political commitment to the programs. However, unless this
individual could control the budgets of the programs involved, to ensure that funding
levels matched stated priorities, and unless the individual could implement corrective
actions to ensure that programs achieved their objectives, it seems unlikely that he
or she would be able to establish priorities and enforce them across government
agencies. A high level committee might have greater success creating a consensus
about priorities, because each agency would have a representative at the table. But
it might still find it difficult to match funding levels to these priorities because each
agency’s budget would still reflect the overall priorities and missions of the agency.
Access and Transparency
Many analysts and government officials note that the primary barrier to
successful implementation remains the need to gain access and transparency from
officials in the recipient nations, particularly Russia. As was noted above, Russia has
not provided the United States with access to nuclear weapons storage areas, leaving
security improvements incomplete at these facilities. It has not provided complete
information about or access to facilities in its biological weapons complex, and, in
spite of more than five years of negotiations, the United States and Russia still have
not completed a transparency agreement for the facility in Mayak that will store
fissile materials removed from weapons. Furthermore, Russia has not provided the
United States with access to most of the facilities in Russia’s nuclear weapons
complex, leaving large holes in the U.S. ability to improve security for the nuclear
materials at those facilities.
Although many analysts note that Russia’s interest in protecting secret details
about its nuclear weapons programs is understandable, most also argue that this
secrecy, and the resulting delays in program implementation, serve to undermine
101 (...continued)
Costs. RANSAC, October 2001.
102 U.S. Senate. Committee on Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on International
Security, Proliferation and Federal Services. Hearing. Combating Proliferation of Weapons
of Mass Destruction (WMD) with Non-proliferation Programs: Non-proliferation Assistance
Coordination Act of 2001. Statement of Vann Van Diepen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Nonproliferation. November 29, 2001.
103 Ibid. Statement of Marshall Billingslea, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Negotiations.

---

CRS-39
support in the United States for threat reduction and nonproliferation programs.
While most agree that Russia must step forward to solve this problem,104 they also
note that the United States does not have a “systematic approach to identifying and
addressing these problems.”105 Each agency has developed its own solutions. For
example, in some cases, DOE has used photographs and diagrams, instead of on-site
visits, to identify security weaknesses and design security improvements at nuclear
complex sites. Analysts have identified this “ad hoc” process as one further incentive
for better coordination among threat reduction programs; a single program
coordinator could help agencies identify problems and share solutions.
Certifications and Waivers
The Nunn-Lugar amendment contained six “exclusions” that set out conditions
the recipients had to meet before receiving U.S. threat reduction assistance. The
United States could not provide assistance until the President certified to Congress
that each recipient nation was “committed to:”
(1) making a substantial investment of its resources for dismantling or destroying
such weapons;
(2) forgoing any military modernization program that exceeds legitimate defense
requirements and forgoing the replacement of destroyed weapons of mass
destruction;
(3) forgoing any use of fissionable and other components of destroyed nuclear
weapons in new nuclear weapons;
(4) facilitating United States verification of weapons destruction carried out
under section 212;
(5) complying with all relevant arms control agreements; and
(6) observing internationally recognized human rights, including the protection
of minorities.”106
Congress expected the President to exercise his judgement when deciding
whether to issue the certifications. For example, the legislation states that the
104 The Baker-Cutler report notes that Russian official point out that “transparency and
access matters are far from routine in Russian bureaucracy.” Russia does not have
procedures for foreigners to have routine access to facilities in the nuclear weapons
complex, so requests are treated on a case-by-case basis. They need a high-level
government decision to lead to routine access, rather than having it treated on a case-by-case
basis. U.S. Department of Energy. The Secretary of Energy Advisory Board. A Report Card
on the Department of Energy’s Nonproliferation Programs With Russia. Howard Baker and
Lloyd Cutler. Russia Task Force. January 10, 2001. p. 22.
105 Reshaping U.S.-Russian Threat Reduction: New Approaches for the Second Decade.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Russian American Nuclear Security
Advisory Council. November 2002. p. 4.
106 PL 102-228, Sec 211, paragraph (b).

---

CRS-40
recipient nations must be “committed to” the policies listed in the six exclusions, a
standard which can be less demanding than one that requires precise behavior. The
Clinton Administration certified Russia for several years, even though the United
States had questions about Russia’s compliance with chemical and biological
weapons agreements, because Russia’s President Yeltsin had offered verbal
assurances of his commitment to resolve the outstanding questions. Using the same
information, the Bush Administration withheld Russia’s certification. In addition,
the exclusions do not define many of their terms. For example, they state that a
recipient must make “a substantial investment” of its own resources, but it does not
define a level of investment that would be necessary. They also state that the
recipients must forgo military modernization programs that exceed legitimate defense
requirements, but it does not ban all military modernization or indicate how much
would be too much.
Congress has debated adding new or modified exclusions to the CTR legislation
several times over the life of the CTR program. In some years, some Members have
sought to provide more precise standards of behavior for the recipient nations; in
others, they have sought to add new requirements linking receipt of assistance to a
greater number of policy areas. Congress has rejected many of these efforts,
particularly if they appeared certain to cut-off U.S. threat reduction assistance to
Russia. Instead, it has usually crafted requirements with language that provides the
President with the flexibility to balance U.S. concerns about the recipients’ policies
against the U.S. interest in continuing efforts to contain and eliminate weapons of
mass destruction.107
Congress did add new certification requirements related to the construction of
the chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuch’ye in FY1998 and FY1999.
These stated that “no funds authorized to be appropriated under this or any other Act
for FY1998 for Cooperative Threat Reduction programs may be obligated or
expended for chemical weapons destruction activities ... until the President submits
to Congress a written certification” that:
(A) Russia is making reasonable progress toward the implementation of the
Bilateral Destruction Agreement;
(B) the United States and Russia have made substantial progress toward the
resolution, to the satisfaction of the United States, of outstanding compliance
issues under the Wyoming Memorandum of Understanding and the Bilateral
Destruction Agreement; and
(C) Russia has fully and accurately declared all information regarding its unitary
and binary chemical weapons, chemical weapons facilities, and other facilities
associated with chemical weapons.
However, Congress permitted the President to submit an alternative
certification, which stated that “the national security interests of the United States
107 For a detailed review of the history of the CTR certification requirements, see CRS
Memorandum for Congress. Certification Requirements Affecting the Nunn-Lugar
Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. By Amy F. Woolf. December 23, 2002.

---

CRS-41
could be undermined by a United States policy not to carry out chemical weapons
destruction activities under the Cooperative Threat Reduction programs.” But, when
Congress resumed funding for Shchuch’ye in FY2002, after a two year prohibition,
it restored the certification requirements without the alternative provision. The
United States could not provide funding for chemical weapons destruction activities
in Russia until the Secretary of Defense certified that there has been:
(1) information provided by Russia, that the United States assesses to be full and
accurate, regarding the size of the chemical weapons stockpile of Russia;
(2) a demonstrated annual commitment by Russia to allocate at least $25,000,000
to chemical weapons elimination;
(3) development by Russia of a practical plan for destroying its stockpile of nerve
agents;
(4) enactment of a law by Russia that provides for the elimination of all nerve
agents at a single site;
(5) an agreement by Russia to destroy or convert its chemical weapons
production facilities at Volgograd and Novocheboksark; and
(6) a demonstrated commitment from the international community to fund and
build infrastructure needed to support and operate the facility.’

The Bush Administration announced, in April 2002, that it could not certify that
Russia was committed to its arms control obligations under the Chemical Weapons
and Biological Weapons Conventions. This decision stalled many ongoing CTR
projects by precluding the signing and implementation of new contracts.
Furthermore, in an effort to balance its stated support for CTR with this decision, the
Administration asked Congress to provide it with the authority to waive the
certification requirements so that it could continue to fund CTR programs in Russia.
Most Members of Congress agreed with the Administration’s view that the CTR
programs continued to serve U.S. national security interests and the House and
Senate each included a waiver authority in its version of the Defense Authorization
Bill. The Senate provided the President with permanent waiver authority; once
passed, the authority would remain available to the President in all future fiscal years.
The House sought a less generous provision, providing the President with the
authority to waive the certification requirements only in FY2003. The Conference
Committee, in Section 1306 (H.Rept. 107-436), provided the President with the
authority to waive the certification requirements for three years. But this waiver only
applied to the original six exclusions, not the separate certification for Shchuch’ye.
Congress included one year of waiver authority for that project in the FY2003
Defense Appropriations Bill (P.L.107-248)
The Bush Administration has indicated that it believes that the combination of
certification requirements and Presidential waivers is an essential part of its effort to
use the CTR program to encourage greater openness in Russia and to transform
Russian behavior. They allow the United States to signal to Russia that it will hold
it to a high standard, and, although the President can waive the certifications, he does
not have to if Russian behavior does not meet U.S. standards. Some in Congress

---

CRS-42
support this approach. They agree that the CTR program should be afforded a high
priority, but they note that it cannot proceed in a vacuum, without consideration for
Russian behavior in other policy areas. Some, however, disagree with this approach.
They believe that U.S. threat reduction assistance to Russia should be of the highest
priority, and although Russian policies in other areas are important, they should not
interfere with the elimination and containment of weapons of mass destruction.
Some of these Members have proposed that Congress amend the CTR legislation to
remove the certification requirements altogether. Others believe that Congress
should provide the President with permanent waiver authority so that this debate does
not stop the program, as it did in 2002, again in the future.
Some in Congress, however, believe that Russian policies in other areas — such
as Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran, Russian military modernization, and the
lack of Russian compliance with arms control — can create new threats to U.S.
security, and therefore, are of higher priority than threat reduction assistance. They
argue that the President should only have a limited ability to waive the certification
requirements. This issue is likely to remain high on the Congressional agenda in
debates over the CTR program for the next few years.
Funding and Focus of the Programs
Funding. The Bush Administration has indicated, through the U.S.
commitment to the G-8 Global Partnership (described below), that it plans to request
around $1 billion per year for U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation programs
in Russia and the other former Soviet states. These programs have expanded sharply
since the middle of the 1990s, when the CTR program received less than half of that
amount each year. Yet many analysts argue that the United States should commit a
far greater sum to these efforts. The Baker-Cutler report, for example, released in
January 2001, argued that the United States should spend up to $30 billion over the
next 10 years on DOE’s programs to secure nuclear materials.108 This amount did not
include funding for DOD or State Department programs, which could total another
$5 billion over the next ten years if spending continues at the current level.
Most analysts agree that added funding will not necessarily accelerate all U.S.
programs. They acknowledge that implementation problems, such as the absence of
access to many facilities and the U.S. failure to certify Russia for receipt of CTR
assistance for most of 2002, slowed progress and left significant amounts of money
unspent. On the other hand, they have identified numerous programs that might
achieve greater results with increased funding. These include the science centers in
Moscow and Kiev, where the United States and its partners have had to limit the
number of scientists who receive research grants because of limits on the available
funds. This list also includes the program to dispose of plutonium in Russia, where
added funding might speed construction of the MOX facility and hasten the
elimination of weapons grade plutonium, and the program to eliminate Russia’s
plutonium producing reactors, where greater funding might lead to the earlier
108 U.S. Department of Energy. The Secretary of Energy Advisory Board. A Report Card
on the Department of Energy’s Nonproliferation Programs With Russia. Howard Baker and
Lloyd Cutler. Russia Task Force. January 10, 2001. p. 20.

---

CRS-43
completion of replacement energy plants. Export and border control programs might
also accelerate their progress with added funding, leading to the installation of
improved equipment and procedures at a greater number of border crossing points.
The Bush Administration generally agrees with the need to add funding to some
programs to accelerate their progress, and it has stated that it intends to pursue this
goal with the science centers and the export and border control programs. It has also
called for added international funding to help accelerate the shut-down of Russia’s
plutonium-producing reactors. However, analysts note that, with a fixed budget of
around $1 billion per year, the United States will only be able to expand these
programs and introduce new programs if it reduces funding for other programs. Some
current programs may finish their missions in the coming years, allowing increased
funding for other programs. But other programs, such as the effort to help Russia
convert its weapons-grade plutonium to mixed-oxide reactor fuel, could consume
rapidly increasing sums in the future. Consequently, the Administration’s plans for
a fixed budget could force trade-offs between projects. For example, in its budget
request for FY2004, DOE has sought to add funding to accelerate the blend-down of
highly enriched uranium and to fund the new program to identify and secure
radiological sources. At the same time, it has reduced funding for MPC&A projects
in Russia’s nuclear weapons complex.
Focus. U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation programs have pursued a
number of different types of projects, trying different solutions to different problems.
However, most have followed one theme — these projects have sought to
consolidate, contain, and destroy weapons and materials, and to consolidate and
contain weapons knowledge, so that they would not leak out of the former Soviet
Union. In essence, the United States has sought to identify materials and knowledge
that might leak out of Russia and to contain them at their source. Several of the new
projects identified by the Bush Administration, such as the WMD Proliferation
Prevention Project at DOD and DOE Second Line of Defense, take a different
approach. Instead of improving security at the source, they seek set up barriers
outside the nuclear weapons complex to prevent these resources from leaving the
territory of the former Soviet Union.
These two approaches can be complementary and provide a “layered defense”
against the leakage of weapons, materials, and knowhow. However, in an era of
constrained budgets, they might also compete for funding and political support.
Furthermore, many analysts believe that the most effective approach to keeping
nuclear materials away from terrorists is to protect them at their source, at facilities
in Russia’s nuclear complex.109 The Bush Administration’s budget request reduces
or holds steady funding for MPC&A programs, while increasing funding for other
types of projects. Consequently, Congress may address the issue of focus and
priorities in its debate over U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance.
109 “The most effective approach to reducing the risk is a multi-layered defense designed to
block each step on the terrorist pathway to the a bomb. But securing nuclear weapons and
materials at their source is the single most critical layer of this defense, where actions that
can be taken now will do the most to reduce the risk of terrorist acquiring nuclear weapons
and materials, at least cost.” Controlling Nuclear Warheads and Materials: A Report Card
and Action Plan, by Matthew Bunn, et al. Project on Managing the Atom. March 2003.

---

CRS-44
Globalization and International Cooperation
There is near-universal agreement, both within the Bush Administration and
among analysts outside the U.S. government, that the potential proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction to rogue nations or terrorist groups presents a global
problem that requires an international response. While the legacy of the Soviet
Union’s weapons programs may create the most immediate and largest threat, other
nations also possess materials, weapons, or knowledge that could leak out beyond
their borders to those seeking their own nuclear, chemical or biological weapons.110
In addition, although the United States has spent more than a decade trying to help
Russia and the other former Soviet states secure their weapons, materials, and
knowledge, other nations can contribute to this effort with funding and cooperative
programs. The following section addresses three characteristics of the proposals for
the “globalization” of threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance. The first, the
G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass
Destruction, is an initiative to expand the list of countries contributing to threat
reduction and nonproliferation programs in Russia. The second is an initiative,
supported by some in Congress and the Bush Administration, to extend U.S. threat
reduction assistance to nations outside the former Soviet Union. The third is a more
general approach to encourage all nations to better account for and secure their
weapons of mass destruction and materials that might become attractive targets for
terrorists seeking their own weapons of mass destruction.
The G-8 Global Partnership. During the G-8 summit in Kananaskis,
Canada, in July 2002, the United States, Russia, and other G-8 leaders agreed to
establish a long term program — the G-8 Global Partnership Against Weapons of
Mass Destruction — to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction and related
materials and technology. Under this program, known as 10+10 over 10, the United
States has pledged to provide $10 billion over 10 years to sustain ongoing threat
reduction programs in Russia; this amount of $1 billion per year is equal to current
U.S. spending on threat reduction and nonproliferation programs in Russia so the
U.S. commitment would not necessarily signal an increase in the U.S. commitment.
The other G-7 nations have also agreed that they will provide, together, up to $10
billion over 10 years. Russia has agreed to contribute $2 billion of its own money.
It has also agreed to adopt a set of guidelines that will allow it to receive assistance.
Specifically it has agreed that it will provide for “effective monitoring, auditing, and
transparency measures” and that it will “provide for adequate access for donor
representatives at work sites.” It has also agreed that the assistance will be free from
taxes and other charges and that it will ensure adequate liability protections for donor
countries and their personnel.111 Each of these issues continue to hinder
110 According to former Senator Sam Nunn, “some 20 tons of civilian HEU (highly enriched
uranium) exists at 345 civilian research facilities in 58 countries, yet there are no
international standards for securing these nuclear materials within a country.” Sam Nunn,
Co-Chairman of the Nuclear Threat Initiative. Reducing the Threats from Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Building a Global Coalition Against Catastrophic Terrorism. Moscow,
Russia. May 27, 2002.
111 “The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass
(continued...)

---

CRS-45
nonproliferation assistance to Russia, and all potential donors have emphasized the
need for their resolution before they provide additional assistance.
The G-8 leaders agreed that this new program would initially focus on threat
reduction and nonproliferation programs in Russia, but could eventually extend to
other nations if they adopt the Partnership’s guidelines. The United States considers
its assistance to the other former Soviet states to be a part of its commitment under
the Global Partnership. Ukraine has also expressed an interest in receiving assistance
under this program. The United States would also like the Global Partnership to
contribute to programs designed to redirect scientists in Iraq and Libya. During their
2004 meeting at Sea Island, Georgia, the participants agreed to consider this
proposal.
The G-8 leaders also invited other nations or organizations, such as the
European Union, to contribute to the program. Norway, and others in Europe, have
already outlined cooperative programs with Russia. At the G-8 summit in Evian,
France, in 2003, six other nations in Europe (Sweden, Finland, Norway, Poland,
Switzerland, and the Netherlands) joined the partnership. Seven additional nations
(Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland and the Czech
Republic) joined during the 2004 summit in Sea Island, Georgia. President Bush, in
a speech on February 11, specifically emphasized that the G-8 Global Partnership
should expand its list of both donors and recipient nations.112
Some analysts have questioned how successful the Global Partnership will be
in providing significant new funding for threat reduction and nonproliferation
programs. The Partnership had received pledges for more nearly $17 billion
(including the $10 billion from the United States) by May 2004. However, pledges
of support received since Kananaskis may not necessarily extend into sustained
funding over the next ten years. As Senator Richard Lugar has noted, “many of our
international partners will find it difficult to establish nonproliferation programs
during a period of stagnating domestic economic growth.”113
Some have also questioned how the allies will set priorities and divide up
responsibilities over different types of nonproliferation projects. In the statement
released after the Kananaskis summit, they listed several projects, including the
destruction of chemical weapons, dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear
submarines, disposition of fissile materials, and employment of former weapons
scientists as high priority projects.114 Most analysts agree that added funding would
111 (...continued)
Destruction.” Statement by the Group of Eight Leaders. Kananaskis, Canada. June 27,
2002.
112 The White House. “President announces New Measures to Counter the Threat of
WMD.” Fort Lesley J. McNair. February 11, 2004.
113 Senator Richard Lugar has noted that “The G-8 initiative is not assured. “ See Lugar,
Richard G. “The Next Steps in U.S. Nonproliferation Policy.” Arms Control Today.
December 2002.
114 “The G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass
(continued...)

---

CRS-46
help to expand and accelerate each of these project areas. At the same time though,
the Global Partnership will not rely on a single coordinating body to either identify
new projects or set priorities among competing projects. Each nation will allocate
its own funds to those programs that it views as high priority endeavors. With no
central authority, this process could leave some programs with too little funding and
others with too much funding.
Debt Exchange. The G-8 Global Partnership allows for the possibility that
funding for new nonproliferation projects could come from Russia’s debt servicing
budget if the United States and its allies agree to exchange Russia’s debt for
nonproliferation funding. Congress has provided the President with the authority to
pursue this funding mechanism. However, since about 90% of Russia’s Soviet-era
Paris Club debt is held by U.S. allies in Europe, with about 50% held by Germany,
this mechanism will only provide substantial additional funding if the allies
participate, as well. At the present time, none of the participants has indicated that
they intend to use debt exchange as a mechanism to raise added funds for
nonproliferation assistance to Russia.
Extending CTR Beyond the former Soviet Union. In the debate over the
FY2003 Defense Authorization Bill, the Senate approved an amendment, proposed
by Senator Richard Lugar, that would have allowed DOD to use up to $50 million
in FY2003 CTR funds “outside the states of the former Soviet Union” to resolve
“critical emerging proliferation threats and to take advantage of opportunities to
achieve long-standing United States nonproliferation goals.”115 Senator Lugar argued
that this type of effort could provide assistance to nations “seeking help in securing
or destroying weapons or dangerous materials” and could also “create international
standards of accountability for protecting and handling nuclear material and deadly
pathogens.” This legislation would also allow the United States to “undertake
missions to secure dangerous materials or weapons that were at risk of falling into
the wrong hands.”116
The Senate, and the Bush Administration, supported Senator Lugar’s proposal.
The House, however, objected to this expansion of CTR and the language was
removed in Conference. The Bush Administration requested a similar authorization
in its Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Bill for FY2003. The Senate again
approved the request and the House again rejected it; it was removed from the final
version of the Bill.
The Bush Administration again requested the authorization to spend up to $50
million in CTR funds outside the former Soviet Union in the FY2004 Defense
Authorization Bill. The Senate again offered its unqualified support for this measure.
The House, in contrast, argued that these types of programs would be better managed
114 (...continued)
Destruction.” Statement by the Group of Eight Leaders. Kananaskis, Canada. June 27,
2002.
115 S. 2026, H.R. 4546, Sec. 1203.
116 Lugar, Richard G. “The Next Steps in U.S. Nonproliferation Policy.” Arms Control
Today. December 2002.

---

CRS-47
by the State Department than the Defense Department. It authorized the transfer of
up to $78 million in CTR funds to the State Department Nonproliferation and
Disarmament fund for use in threat reduction efforts outside the former Soviet Union.
The Conference Committee, in its report on the FY2004 Defense Authorization Bill
(H.R. 1588), approved the President’s request and permits the use of up to $50
million in CTR funds outside the former Soviet Union. However, in deference to the
House concerns, the committee language indicates that this funding should be used
only for short-term projects; it also states that the President should determine whether
DOD is the agency that is most capable of implementing the planned project. The
conferees stated that they would expect the President to assign the project to the most
appropriate agency. The Bush Administration exercised this authority for the first
time in mid-2004, when it provided assistance to Albania for the elimination of
chemical weapons.117
Those who support the expansion of CTR beyond the former Soviet Union
argue that the United States could apply the model of threat reduction assistance that
it has developed during the past 12 years to help other nations secure and eliminate
weapons or materials that might be attractive to terrorists. They point to nations such
as Pakistan, where insecure nuclear materials might be at risk of theft or diversion
by government officials or representatives of terrorist organizations.118 Others,
however, question whether a program like CTR can be applied successfully to
nations outside the former Soviet Union. They note that these nations might not be
willing to allow the United States access to facilities that house nuclear materials or
weapons, that they might prefer to enhance, rather than reduce the threat posed by
their weapons of mass destruction, and that U.S. assistance in securing weapons
might actually make it easier for the recipient nations to deploy and use the weapons.
Some have also questioned whether the United States can legally provide assistance,
under U.S. and international law, to nations that are not parties to the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty.119
Global Recognition of National Responsibility. One of the key themes
in recent reviews of the proliferation threat and the potential link to terrorism is the
recognition that nuclear, chemical, and biological materials reside in many nations
around the world. Nations with research facilities for these materials often lack the
basic accounting, security, export, and border control systems that the United States
has spent more than 10 years trying to bring to Russia. Although few of these
materials would be useful to those seeking to build nuclear weapons, they could be
of use to those seeking a radiological dispersal device (dirty bomb) or a chemical or
biological weapon. There is a growing consensus that the international community,
117 Warrick, Joby. Albania’s Chemical Cache Raises Fears About Others. Washington Post.
January 10, 2005. p. A1.
118 See, for example, Gottemoeller, Rose and Rebecca Longsworth. Enhancing Nuclear
Security in the Counter-terrorism Struggle: India and Pakistan as a New Region for
Cooperation. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Working Papers. Number 29.
August 2002.
119 See U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service. Nuclear Threat
Reduction Measures for India and Pakistan. CRS Report RL31589. By Sharon Squassoni.
May 5, 2003.

---

CRS-48
and individual nations, should take steps to address problems with these materials,
beyond those already in place under the International Atomic Energy Agency.120
The United States would not necessarily need to adopt new programs and
appropriate new funds to address this problem. Some believe, as was noted above,
that efforts to expand CTR programs beyond the former Soviet Union could help
address the problem. But many believe that the IAEA, with the support of the
United States, could take steps in this direction through its existing programs that
help countries secure and account for radiological materials. The Chemical Weapons
Convention also provides a mechanism that might help nations secure and account
for chemical agents and materials. Consequently, at least initially, the effort to
address this global problem could be more diplomatic and political than technical,
with the United States and others using the “bully pulpit” to encourage other nations
to recognize the problem and take steps within their own systems to address their
own vulnerabilities.
In essence, this new global focus may serve to shape the second decade of U.S.
threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance. During the first decade the problem
was dominated by concerns over the potential for the loss of control over nuclear
materials and weapons in the former Soviet Union, and the solutions were dominated
by U.S. programs to bring technical assistance to the former Soviet states. In the
second decade, the problem is likely to be dominated by concerns about the potential
acquisition of nuclear, chemical, and biological materials by terrorist organizations.
The solutions may be dominated by a growing sense of global cooperation in
identifying and addressing weaknesses in a greater number of countries. U.S.
funding and technical assistance may still play a dominant role, but other nations may
also step in to offer their experience, expertise, and financial resources.
120 Senator Sam Nunn, in outlining his proposal for a Global Coalition Against Catastrophic
Terrorism, has stated that “our goal must be to see that all nations come under a system of
international standards and inspection for the protection of dangerous nuclear materials.”
Remarks by Former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn, Chairman, Nuclear Threat Initiative. Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace. International Nonproliferation Conference. November
14 , 2002.

---