Order Code RS21579
Updated January 11, 2005
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Morocco: Current Issues
Carol Migdalovitz
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
The Bush Administration views Morocco as a moderate Arab regime, an ally
against terrorism, and a free trade partner. Morocco has made democratic advances, but
King Mohammed VI retains ultimate power. Since 9/11, Moroccan expatriates have
been implicated in international terrorism, and Morocco has suffered terror attacks.
Counter terror measures may be setting back progress in human rights. Morocco’s
foreign policy focuses largely on Europe, particularly France and Spain, yet its ties to
the United States are getting closer. This report will be updated as developments
warrant. See also CRS Report RS21464, Morocco-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, and
CRS Report RS20962, Western Sahara: The United Nations Shifts Course.
Government and Politics
King Mohammed VI ascended to the throne in 1999 upon the death of his father and
is the ultimate authority in Morocco. On May 8, 2003, his son, Hassan, was born and
immediately became crown prince and first in line of succession. Mohammed VI says
that he is committed to building a democratic state, yet he retains significant power, such
as that to appoint the prime minister and ministers of foreign affairs, interior, defense, and
justice — the key portfolios in the government.
The September 2002 election for the 325-seat Chamber of Representatives, the
lower house chosen by universal suffrage, was deemed the first free, fair, and transparent
election ever held in Morocco. An unprecedented 35 women were elected deputies (30
to reserved seats); the prior legislature had only two women members.
The King appointed Driss Jettou, an unaffiliated technocrat, to be Prime Minister.
The political spectrum is highly fragmented. Jettou formed a six-party coalition
government out of 22 parties in parliament. The Popular Union of Socialist Forces
(USFP) is the largest party with 50 seats in parliament. The traditionalist Istiqlal or
Independence Party is second with 48 seats. They each hold eight cabinet portfolios. The
Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD) has 43 seats and is the third largest party.
Another political actor is an Islamist grassroots organization popular in the slums and on
university campuses led by Shaikh Abdessalem Yassine, Al-Adl wal-Ihsan (Justice and
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Charity), which is recognized as a charity and not as a political party and cannot compete
in elections. PJD and Al-Adl wal-Ihsan condemn terrorism.
Terrorism
The Moroccan monarchy often asserted that its claimed descent from the Prophet
Mohammed was a shield against Islamist militancy. This belief has been shattered since
September 11, 2001, as expatriate Moroccans have been implicated in terrorism abroad
and Morocco has suffered terrorism at home. Abroad, a Moroccan was convicted in
Germany for aiding the 9/11 terrorists but released due to lack of U.S. evidence, and
another was acquitted of similar charges. Germany is trying to deport them to Morocco.
A Moroccan imam has been called “the spiritual father of the Hamburg cell,” extremists
who helped execute and support the 9/11 attacks, and identified as the founder of the
Salafiya Jihadiya (Reformist Holy War/”Jihadists”) movement.1 A French-Moroccan,
Zacarias Moussaoui, is the only person charged in the United States in connection with
9/11 as the alleged 20th hijacker. A Dutch-Moroccan murdered a Dutch film maker in
November 2004. Five Moroccans reportedly linked to Al Qaeda and detained at the U.S.
Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba were released and are on trial in Morocco.
Although domestic terrorism is unusual in Morocco, in 2002, Jihadists and members
of the Casablanca slum-based As-Sirat al-Mustaqim (The Straight Path) murdered locals
who had committed “impure acts” such as drinking alcohol.2 In 2003, a Jihadist spiritual
leader, who had fought in Afghanistan, had praised the 9/11 attacks, and had acclaimed
Bin Laden, was convicted of inciting violence against Westerners.3 In February 2003, Al
Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden listed Morocco among the “oppressive, unjust, apostate
ruling governments” “enslaved by America” and therefore “most eligible for liberation.”4
This fatwa or edict appeared to trigger attacks in Morocco. On May 16, 2003, 14 suicide
bombers attacked five Western and Jewish targets in Casablanca, killing 45 and injuring
more than 100. Seven of the dead were European; most were Moroccan. The bombers
were identified as Salafiya Jihadiya adherents with connections to the Moroccan Islamic
Combatant Group (GICM) and Al Qaeda.5 Over 2,000 people suspected of terrorist links
have been arrested since the bombings. GICM is listed in the U.S. State Department’s
annual Patterns of Global Terrorism report and operates in Europe. Spanish officials
later blamed it for the March 2004 Madrid train bombings, tying a suspect to GICM and
to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the pro-Al-Qaeda, Jordanian-born, terror leader now based in
Iraq.6 Moroccans working with Zarqawi have been captured in Iraq.
1 “An Islamic Cleric Becomes the Focus of Madrid Inquiry,” Asian Wall Street Journal, March
18, 2004.
2 “‘Local Hands’ Accused in Morocco Blast,” Los Angeles Times, May 19, 2003.
3 “Moroccan Islamists Suspected of Suicide Bombings,” Reuters, May 18, 2003.
4 “Moroccans Say Al Qaeda Masterminded and Financed Casablanca Suicide Bombings,” New
York Times
, May 23, 2003.
5 U.S. State Departments, Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2003.
6 “Spain Confirms Inquiry Focuses on Moroccans,” New York Times, March 31, 2004.

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Morocco is cooperating with U.S. and European agencies to counter terrorism at
home and abroad. In 2002, authorities arrested three Saudis, who allegedly had fled
Afghanistan and were an Al Qaeda cell, on suspicion of planning to use an explosives-
laden dinghy to attack the U.S. and British ships in the Straits of Gibraltar.7 The attack
would have been similar to the assault on the USS Cole in Yemen in 2000. In 2003, the
Saudis were sentenced to 10 years in prison for criminal conspiracy and minor crimes.
Six Moroccan accomplices were convicted of lesser crimes. Morocco also has taken steps
to exert greater control over religious leaders and councils, retrain and rehabilitate some
of those convicted of terror-related crimes to correct their understanding of Islam, and has
launched a radio station to broadcast “Moroccan religious values” of tolerance.
Human Rights
Prior to the Casablanca attacks, Morocco’s human rights record was improving,
although the security forces continued to be implicated in abuses.8 Parliament ended the
state monopoly on the media in January 2003, yet freedom of the press remains restricted.
In May 2003, a prominent editor was convicted of defaming the King; he was pardoned
in January 2004. Domestic violence, discrimination against women, and child labor are
common. At the King’s initiative, parliament enacted revolutionary changes to the family
law in January 2004, making polygamy rare by requiring permission of a judge and the
man’s first wife, raising the legal age for marriage for girls to 18, and simplifying divorce
procedures for women, among other amendments to improve the status of women. The
King also has created an Equity and Reconciliation Commission to provide a historical
record of abuses from 1956 to 1999, to account for “disappeared,” and to compensate
victims. In 2001, he had launched a dialogue on Berber culture, and the government has
since authorized the teaching of Berber dialects and issued a textbook in Berber.9
After the May 2003 attacks in Casablanca, parliament passed antiterrorism laws to
define terrorist crimes and establish procedures for tracking terrorist finances. Human
rights activists expressed concern about new restrictions on the press, detention without
charge to 12 days, and reduced requirements for the death penalty. Journalists were
arrested for publishing interviews with bombing suspects. Human Right Watch has
charged that the anti-terror crackdown “is eroding the substantial advances made on
human rights over the last decade.”10
7 “Arrests Reveal Al Qaeda Plans,” Washington Post, June 16, 2002.
8 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Country Reports
on Human Rights Practices - 2002, Morocco
, March 31, 2003.
9 The Berbers are the original inhabitants of North Africa before the Arabs invaded in the 8th
century.
10 “Powell Embarks on Arab Democracy Trip,” Washington Times, December 2, 2004.

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Economy and Social Issues
Although governments have
attempted to diversify the economy
Basic Facts
in recent years, large portions of
Morocco’s gross domestic product
Population
32.2 million (2004)
Gross Domestic Product growth rate 6% (2003)
(15%) and labor force (50%)
Gross Domestic Product per capita $4000 (2003)
continue to depend on agriculture
Inflation


1.2% (2003)
and are vulnerable to weather. Good
Unemployment
19% (2003)
weather in the past few years has
Exports
clothing, fish, inorganic chemicals, transistors,
resulted in positive growth. Services
crude minerals, fertilizers (including
and tourism are growth sectors, with
phosphates), petroleum products, fruit, and
tourism and remittances from abroad
vegetables
providing foreign exchange. The
Imports
c r u d e p e t r o l e u m, t e x t i l e f a b r i c ,
public sector remains large. A
telecommunications equipment, wheat, gas
successful, if erratic, privatization
and electricity
program began with the national
Major Trading Partners
telephone company and continued
France, Spain, United Kingdom, Italy,
with the sale of 80% of the state
Germany
tobacco monopoly to a French-
Source: CIA, The World Factbook 2004.
Spanish group, netting US$1.5
billion. However, excessive red tape
and corruption remain impediments
to foreign investment.11
Foreign Policy
Western Sahara. The dispute between Morocco and the independence-seeking
Popular Front for the Liberation of Saqiat al-Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario) over the
former Spanish colony south of Morocco remains unresolved. In July 2003, the Polisario
accepted a U.N. plan to resolve the issue temporarily by granting the region semi-
autonomous status as part of Morocco for four to five years before the U.N. holds a
referendum to decide whether it would gain independence, autonomy, or be part of
Morocco. Morocco, which controls 80% of the Western Sahara and considers the region
its three southern provinces, rejected the plan and will only accept a solution that
guarantees it “sovereignty and territorial integrity over the whole of its territories.” The
process is stalemated. In October 2001, Morocco authorized French and U.S. companies
to explore for oil off the Western Saharan coast, and the prospect of oil discoveries may
have hardened Morocco’s resolve to retain the region.
Algeria. Morocco and Algeria have long engaged in a regional rivalry. The Western
Sahara is the main impediment to improving bilateral relations and to the resuscitation of
the regional Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), a loose organization of Morocco, Tunisia,
Algeria, Mauritania, and Libya. Morocco argues that the Sahara is a bilateral issue to be
discussed by Algeria and Morocco and refuses to compromise for the sake of bilateral
relations or the UMA. Algeria backs the Polisario, which analysts view as an Algerian
surrogate, and the U.N. peace plan. It wants bilateral relations to be separated from the
11 “Morocco Must Curb Graft to Boost Financial Success,” Reuters, July 11, 2003.


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Sahara issue and to be mended, and to have the common border, closed since September
1994, reopened. Despite these disagreements, the King met Algerian President Bouteflika
at the U.N. in September 2003, ministers exchange visits, and the two governments
agreed to cooperate against terrorism, illegal immigration, and on other issues. In July
2004, Mohammed VI abolished visa requirements for Algerians entering Morocco.
Europe. Morocco’s Association
Agreement with the European Union
(EU) came into force on March 1,
2000, and is supposed to lead to a free
trade agreement by 2012. Morocco
participates in the EU’s Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership to improve
cooperation among countries of the
Mediterranean littoral, and has
received considerable EU aid as a
result. Illegal immigration and drug
(cannabis)-trafficking have caused
friction in Moroccan-European
relations. High unemployment drives
Moroccan youths to Europe, and
Morocco also is a transit route for
Africans going north. EU-funded
efforts to shift farmers in Morocco’s
underdeveloped Rif Mountains from
cannabis cultivation to alternative crops have not been successful.
Morocco traditionally has had good relations with France and Spain, its former
colonizers. Relations with France are particularly close. France is Morocco’s largest
trading partner. It officially supports U.N. efforts to resolve the Western Sahara dispute,
but blocks Security Council initiatives that Morocco rejects. Morocco’s relations with
Spain have been tense but are improving. Spain holds and refuses to discuss Ceuta and
Melilla, two enclaves on Morocco’s Mediterranean coast that are vestiges of the colonial
era and are claimed by Morocco. Spain and Morocco further disagree over EU quotas for
Morocco’s agricultural products that compete with Spain’s and over Spanish demands for
fishing rights off Morocco’s coast. In October 2001, Morocco recalled its ambassador
from Madrid without official explanation after several pro-Saharan groups in Spain
conducted a mock referendum on the fate of the region. In July 2002, Spanish troops
ejected Moroccan soldiers from the uninhabited Perejel/Parsley or Leila Island off the
Moroccan coast that Spain says that it has controlled for centuries. Diplomatic ties were
not restored until January 2003. That July, Morocco again complained about what it
viewed as Spain’s lack of neutrality on the Sahara issue as chair of the Security Council,
and in October, Spain suspended arms sales to Morocco due to the Perejel crisis. After
Moroccans were implicated in the March 2004 bombings in Madrid, however, Morocco
immediately assisted Spanish investigators. New Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis
Rodriguez Zapatero visited Morocco in April 2004, and a joint statement called for a
political solution to be negotiated by all parties to the Sahara issue — the Moroccan
position. In October 2004, 120 Moroccan soldiers deployed under Spanish command in
the U.N. stabilization mission in Haiti. Moroccan gendarmes have joined Spanish patrols
against illegal immigration in the Strait of Gibraltar.

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Middle East. Morocco supports international efforts to achieve a negotiated
settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and seeks the activation of the Roadmap to
a two-state solution developed by the United States, EU, U.N., and Russia. The King and
other officials maintain a dialogue with both Israeli and Palestinian leaders.
Relations with the United States
The United States and Morocco have long-standing, good relations. The United
States views Morocco as a moderate Arab state that supports the Arab-Israeli peace
process. Bilateral ties have been strengthened by the fight against terrorism and
improving trade relations. An FBI team helped investigate the Casablanca bombings. In
July 2003, a Moroccan Caucus was formed in the House of Representatives. Congress
approved a free trade agreement (FTA) with Morocco, P.L. 108-302, August 17, 2004.
In 2003, the United States exported $465 million in goods to Morocco and imported
$385.2 million in goods.
U.S. aid to Morocco has increased to assist it in fighting terrorism, democratization,
and the FTA. In FY2004, Morocco received an estimated $45.4 million in Development
Assistance (DA), $9.940 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF), $1.750 million for
International Military Education and Training (IMET), and $2.732 million for the Peace
Corps. For FY2005, the Administration requested $6 million in DA, $20 million in
Economic Support Funds (ESF), $20 million in FMF, $1.875 million for IMET, $6
million in International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds, and $3.488
million for the Peace Corps. Morocco is part of NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue on
regional security issues and has hosted and participated in NATO military exercises. In
June 2004, President Bush designated Morocco a major non-NATO ally, and in
November, Morocco became eligible to compete for Millennium Challenge Account
funds. In December, Morocco hosted the “Forum for the Future,” a meeting of regional
countries and the G-8 group of industrial powers for the U.S.-initiated Broader Middle
East and North African reform initiative. Morocco has refused to send forces to Iraq but
expressed willingness to host training for Iraqi security forces.

The Moroccan government’s desire for closer relations with the United States may
not be shared by the Moroccan people. A Pew Research Center poll released in June 2003
revealed that only 27% of Moroccans viewed the United States favorably, down from
77% in 2000, 93% were disappointed in the lack of Iraqi military resistance to the U.S.
invasion, and 91% believed that the United States had not done enough to avoid civilian
casualties. A Pew poll released in March 2004 found 66% of Moroccans agreeing that
suicide bombings against Americans and Westerners in Iraq were justifiable and 72% that
the U.S. was overreacting to terrorism.12 Moroccans criticize U.S. support for Israel and
for the U.N. peace plan for the Western Sahara developed by former U.S. Secretary of
State James Baker. After the Casablanca bombings, some Moroccan analysts suggested
that the country was paying a price for being a friend of the United States. A Zogby
International survey conducted in June 2004 revealed that 88% of those surveyed had a
negative attitude toward the United States due to “unfair foreign policy.”13
12 Both Pew polls cited accessible at [http://people-press.org].
13 “Polls Shows Growing Arab Rancor at U.S.,” Washington Post, July 23, 2004.