Order Code RL32721
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Greenhouse Gas Emissions:
Conflicting Situations, Conflicting Perspectives
January 7, 2005
Larry Parker
Specialist in Energy Policy
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
John Blodgett
Deputy Assistant Director
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

---

Greenhouse Gas Emissions:
Conflicting Situations, Conflicting Perspectives
Summary
The World Resources Institute (WRI) has compiled greenhouse gas emissions
and related data from a variety of sources into a database that is available publically
for analysis. This report analyzes those data to examine two issues. The first issue
is the separate treatment of developed and developing nations under the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto
Protocol. This distinction has been a pivotal issue affecting U.S. climate change
policy. The second issue is the continuing difficulty of the current approach designed
to address climate change through limiting greenhouse gas emissions to a specified
percentage of baseline emissions (typically 1990). The data permit examination of
alternative approaches, such as focusing on per capita emissions or the greenhouse
gas emission intensity (measured as emissions per unit of economic activity). Key
findings include:
! A few countries account for most greenhouse gas emissions: in
2000, the United States led by emitting 21% of the world total,
followed by China with 15%; no other country reached 6%; the top
nine emitters accounted for 60% of the 186 nations’ emissions.
! Land-use effects (e.g., deforestation) on emissions are negligible for
most nations, but emissions rise sharply for certain developing
nations, for example, Brazil and Indonesia.
! While oil- and gas-producing Gulf States have the highest per capita
greenhouse gas emissions, in general developed nations rank high in
per capita emissions (Australia, the United States, and Canada rank
5, 6, and 7 respectively in the world), while developing nations tend
to rank low (China, India, and Indonesia rank 96, 139, and 121).
! The greenhouse intensity of the economy — the metric by which the
Bush Administration is proposing to address climate change —
varies substantially among developed countries (the Ukraine emits
724 tons/million$GDP, while France emits 99 tons/million$GDP,
with the United States at 195 tons/ million$GDP; developing nations
show less variance unless land use is taken into account.
! The time frame adopted for defining the climate change issue and for
taking actions to address greenhouse gas emissions has differential
impacts on individual nations, as a result of individual resource
endowments (e.g., coal versus natural gas and hydropower) and
stage of economic development (e.g., conversion of forest land to
agriculture occurring before or after the baseline).
Differentiating responsibilities between developed and developing nations —
as the UNFCCC does — fails to focus efforts on some of the largest emitters.
Moreover, many countries have not achieved stabilization of their emissions despite
the UNFCCC. Given the wide range of situations illustrated by the data, a flexible
strategy that allows each country to play to its strengths may be appropriate if diverse
countries like the United States and China are ever to reach agreement. This report
will not be updated.

---

Contents
A Look at the Historic Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Current (2000) and Baseline (1990) Emissions Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Longer-Term Historical Data (1950-2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Impact of Land Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Implications of Focusing on Emissions Levels for International Actions . . . 6
Alternative Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Per Capita Emissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Greenhouse Gas Intensity of Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
List of Tables
Table 1. Relative Emissions of the Industrialized, Developing,
and Top-20 Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Appendix A. Relative Ranking of Twenty Top Emitters of Greenhouse Gases
Based on Estimated 2000 Emissions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Appendix B. Emissions and Other Climate Change-Related Indicators for
20 Largest Emitters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

---

Greenhouse Gas Emissions:
Conflicting Situations,
Conflicting Perspectives
Climate change is a global issue; however, greenhouse gas emissions data on
a global basis are incomplete. Some developing countries have no institutions for
monitoring greenhouse gas emissions and have never reported such emissions to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).1 In a
similar vein, data on individual greenhouse gases, sources, and land-use patterns vary
greatly in quality. Despite shortcomings in the data, the emerging picture of
emissions has implications for considering alternative policies for controlling
emissions. First, the picture outlines the estimated contributions of individual
countries. Second, evaluating those emissions in terms of socio-economic
characteristics (e.g., population and economic activity) provides insights on the
potentially divergent interests of differing groups of nations — especially concerning
developed nations versus developing ones.2
The World Resources Institute (WRI) has compiled greenhouse gas emissions
and related data from a variety of sources into a database that is available for
analysis.3 Data are available for 19504 through 2000 for 186 nations (with a separate
entry combining the members of the European Union).5 The database includes
national ranks on total emissions, per capita emissions, and greenhouse gas (or
carbon) intensity,6 among other indicators.
1 For the most recent developments on submissions to the UNFCCC by non-Annex 1
countries, see [http://unfccc.int/national_reports/non-annex_i_natcom/items/2818.php].
2 The UNFCCC divides nations into two groups, nations listed in Annex I (which under the
Kyoto Protocol would have specified reduction targets), encompassing “developed” nations
including Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union; and non-Annex I nations (which do
not have specified reduction targets), including the rest of the world.
3 Called the Climate Analysis Indicators Tool (CAIT), the database uses a variety of data
sources to provide information on greenhouse gas emissions, sinks, and other relevant
indicators. Full documentation, along with caveats, is provided on the WRI website at
[http://cait.wri.org/].
4 CAIT provides emissions data back to 1850, but land use data is only available from 1950.
5 Both the individual countries of the European Union and the EU as an entity are
signatories of the Kyoto Protocol. Within the EU, the differing situations of each constituent
nation have resulted in differing emissions targets and policies for each country. As this
analysis is focusing on the implications of individual nations’ situations, we have not
examined the EU as a separate entity. If one does, the 25-nation EU would be the third-
largest emitter of greenhouse gases, after the United States and China.
6 Carbon intensity is the ratio of a country’s emissions to its gross domestic product (GDP);
(continued...)

---

CRS-2
This report uses the data compiled by WRI to examine a pivotal and long-
running issue surrounding U.S. climate change policy: the appropriate roles of
developed and developing countries in addressing climate change.
The UNFCCC states as its first principle in Article 3:
The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future
generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.
Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating
climate change and the adverse effects thereof.7
The United States has struggled with the “common but differentiated responsibilities”
of developing countries and with the pledge for the developed countries to “take the
lead in combating climate change....” The resulting debate concerns what actions to
address greenhouse emissions should be “common” responsibilities (i.e., undertaken
by all nations) and what actions should be “differentiated” (i.e., undertaken only by
developed ones). Under the UNFCCC and the subsequent Kyoto Protocol, common
actions include the responsibility to monitor and report emissions; differentiated
actions include the commitment to reduce emissions to a 1990 baseline for
designated developed nations, listed on Annex I to the UNFCCC (and hence known
as Annex I nations).
Thus the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and much of the current debate about
actions to control greenhouse gas emissions focus on individual nations’ amounts of
emissions. As a result, primary attention falls on current greenhouse gas emissions,
past greenhouse gas emissions, and projected greenhouse gas emissions. In this
context, addressing global climate change has in effect meant reducing greenhouse
gas emissions — for Annex I countries. (A complicating factor is that land use
activities can affect net emissions, and the Kyoto Protocol provides methods for
taking land use effects into account.) For the UNFCCC, the differentiated control
action was for Annex I countries to take voluntary actions to ensure that their
greenhouse gas emissions in 2000 did not exceed 1990 levels.8 For the Kyoto
Protocol, the differentiated control action was for Annex I countries to control
emissions to individually specified percentages of baseline emissions for the period
2008-2012.9 Under both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, non-Annex I nations
would be exempt from these specified control requirements — although they could
voluntarily join in. This split in responsibilities has played a key role in the United
States’ refusal to agree to the Kyoto Protocol.
6 (...continued)
GDP is measured in units of “purchasing power parity” (PPP).
7 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Article 3.1.
8 The United States and many other countries failed to meet this voluntary goal. It was this
general failure that gave impetus to the Kyoto Protocol to mandate reductions.
9 Generally the baseline was 1990; the individual Annex I commitments were negotiated,
with the U. S. commitment — if the United States had agreed to the Kyoto Protocol — being
a 7% reduction.

---

CRS-3
The justification for the differential treatment of the developed, Annex I nations
compared to the developing nations is the presumption that the economic growth
being pursued by the developing nations depends importantly on expanded use of
fossil fuels, which are the main source of carbon dioxide, the dominant greenhouse
gas. The effective logic of the differing treatment of the two groups is, then, that the
developed, Annex I countries can afford to control emissions because they have
achieved a relatively high standard of living, while the developing nations have the
right and opportunity to expand energy use as necessary for their economic
development. This generates crucial and interrelated tensions:
! First, this approach means that Annex I nations pay an economic
price for addressing global climate change;
! Second, non-Annex I nations retain the opportunity to develop their
economies using least-cost energy regardless of greenhouse gas
emissions; this in turn means that from the perspective of the Annex
I nations, developing nations — which may be competing in certain
economic sectors — appear to be getting a free ride;
! And third, despite investments in controls and resulting tensions
between competing economies, actual global emissions will continue
to rise if the increase in emissions from non-Annex I nations exceeds
the decrease in emissions achieved by Annex I ones.
The intensity of these tensions that arise from focusing on emissions levels is
clear when one examines emissions data. To frame this discussion, CRS focuses on
the 20 largest emitters of greenhouse gases in 2000.10 The largest 20 were chosen
because they represent about three-quarters of the estimated greenhouse gas
emissions in the year 2000 (latest available data from CAIT). The data are presented
in two tables appended to this report.11
A Look at the Historic Data
Current (2000) and Baseline (1990) Emissions Data. A compelling fact
to emerge from the database is that a few countries account for most of the emissions.
Appendixes A and B present data concerning the top 20 greenhouse gas-emitting
nations in 2000. They accounted for approximately 75% of global emissions. The
United States led in emitting greenhouse gases (1,892 million metric tons of carbon
equivalent, MMTCE),12 at 21% of the total, followed by China (1,356 MMTCE), at
about 15%. No other country reached 6% of total emissions; overall, only nine
10 For a more general discussion of the top 25 emitters, see Kevin Baumert and Jonathan
Pershing, Climate Data: Insights and Observations (Pew Center on Climate Change,
December 2004).
11 Emissions forecasts were not included because individual country forecasts for all top 20
countries are not available.
12 The UNFCCC provides a methodology for calculating the greenhouse gas contributions
of nations and converting them to equivalent units — Million Metric Tons of Carbon
Equivalents (MMTCE).

---

CRS-4
countries emit 2% or more. These top nine emitters accounted for 60% of global
emissions and the next 11 top emitters accounted for another 15% of emissions.
Thus one implication of these data is that greenhouse gas control in the short
term depends mainly on the actions of a relatively few nations; if the top 20 emitters
(or even the top 10) all acted effectively, the actions of the remaining 160-plus
nations would be of little import, at least for years.
A second compelling fact about those top emitters is that they represent very
differing types or situations. The top 20 nations include:
! Developed (Annex I) nations whose emissions grew between 1990
and 2000: the United States, Japan, Canada, Italy, Australia, and
Spain (ranked 1, 5, 8, 10, 16, and 19, respectively). These nations
accounted for 30.8% of global greenhouse gas emissions in 2000.
! Developed (Annex I) nations whose emissions declined between
1990 and 2000, largely as a result of the collapse of the Eastern
European and USSR socialist economies during the decade: Russian
Federation, Germany,13 Ukraine, and Poland (ranked 3, 6, 12, and
20, respectively).14 These nations accounted for 11.3% of global
greenhouse gas emissions in 2000.
! Developed (Annex I) nations with free-market economies whose
emissions declined between 1990 and 2000, largely because of a
combination of slow economic growth and the displacement of high-
emitting fuels (coal) with alternatives: the United Kingdom and
France (ranked 9 and 14, respectively). These nations accounted for
3.5% of global greenhouse gas emissions in 2000.
! Developing (non-Annex I) nations, all of whose emissions rose
during the decade: China, India, Brazil, South Korea, Mexico,
Indonesia, Iran, and South Africa (ranked 2, 4, 7, 11, 13, 15, 17, and
18, respectively). These nations accounted for 29.9% of global
greenhouse gas emissions in 2000.
For the year 2000, then, 12 of the 20 countries are Annex I countries, including
7 of the top 10 emitters. Overall, the Annex I countries account for about two-thirds
of the top-20 group’s greenhouse emissions, compared with one-third for the
developing, non-Annex I countries. Highlighting the tension between Annex I and
non-Annex I perspectives, the number-one emitters of each group are the top two
emitters overall: At the top is the leading developed, free-market economy, the
United States; in the number-two position is the leading developing, non-Annex I
13 Germany falls into this category as a result of its incorporation of East Germany. The pre-
merger West Germany was of course not a centrally planned economy.
14 The only change in the top 20 between 1990 and 2000 was the dropping out of
Kazakhstan, whose coal-based industries collapsed; it was replaced by Iran.

---

CRS-5
country, China. Combined, these two countries account for over one-third of total
global emissions.
Longer-Term Historical Data (1950-2000). The impact of emissions on
climate change is believed to be cumulative over decades and even centuries. Thus
a longer-term examination of data provides an important perspective, and implicitly
is one reason for the differing treatments of the Annex I and non-Annex I nations.
Available data (see Tables 2 and 3) give emissions estimates of energy-related
greenhouse gas emissions back to 1950.15 The period 1950-2000 represents the re-
industrialization of developed countries after World War II and the emergence of
some major third-world countries.
This longer-term view of emissions underscores the contribution of the Annex
I nations:
! Annex I countries’ share of energy-related emission over the half-
century is estimated at about four-fifths of the top-20 total. The
energy and materials needed to power industrialization after World
War II put Russia ahead of China as the second-largest emitter over
the time period.
! The relative rankings of several developing countries, including
Brazil, South Korea, Indonesia, and Iran, drop substantially using a
longer historical baseline for emissions: from the 2000 rank to the
1950-2000 cumulative rank, from 7th to 18th, 11th to 19th, 15th to 28th,
17th to 24th, respectively.
Greenhouse gas emissions, particularly energy-related emissions, are closely tied
to industrialization. As “developed” is considered by many to be synonymous with
“industrialized,” it is not surprising that those countries entering the 1950-2000
period with an industrial base (even a war-damaged one) would have higher
cumulative emissions than those countries that only began to industrialize during this
period.
Impact of Land Use. Changes in land use can significantly affect net levels
of emissions. In general, deforestation increases emissions and afforestation
decreases them. However, data on land-use changes and their conversion into
equivalent units of greenhouse gas emissions are even more uncertain than the
emissions data. Therefore, this discussion (see Appendices A and B) is at best
illustrative.
Unlike the cumulative energy-related emissions data, including land use in the
calculations turns the focus of the discussion on developing countries.
! Land-use practices in certain developing countries, notably Brazil
and Indonesia, are having the effect of substantially upping their
15 As noted earlier, CAIT has data back to 1850; however, the earlier the data, the more
uncertain the quality; and land-use data are only available back to 1950.

---

CRS-6
relative emissions ranks: Their cumulative net emissions from 1950
to 2000 rise from 18th to 5th, and 28th to 4th, respectively, when land
use is taken into account.
! For Annex I nations and many non-Annex I nations, including land
use has little effect on their relative emissions rankings: among the
top 20 emitters in 2000, the impact of accounting for land use on
emissions is negligible for Western European and North American
nations, Russia, China, and India. The United States’ relative rank
does not change when land use is taken into account, although its net
emissions drop by an estimated 100 MMTCE (about 5%).
What the land-use data reflect are the relatively stable land-use patterns of
countries where most land-clearing and agricultural development occurred before
1950. The Western developed nations and China and India, for example, have long-
established agricultural practices; in contrast, Brazil and Indonesia have over the past
few decades been clearing large regions of forest and jungle for timber and/or
conversion to agriculture, releasing greenhouse gases (or removing sinks). In terms
of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, including land use in the equation for
controlling emissions disadvantages certain countries whose exploitation of resources
and development of agriculture are occurring at a particular moment in history.
Implications of Focusing on Emissions Levels
for International Actions
The data on greenhouse gas emissions highlight issues of both effectiveness and
fairness in the effort to address global climate change. Differentiating responsibilities
between Annex I and non-Annex I nations, as the UNFCCC has, does not focus
efforts on all of the largest emitters. As Table 1 shows, Annex I nations currently
account for only about half of current emissions, so their reductions could ultimately
be offset by increases from non-Annex I nations.
Moreover, contradictory issues of fairness arise. For Annex I countries, the
present scheme of controlling greenhouse gases requires them to bear essentially all
the direct economic costs. For non-Annex I countries, to the extent that development
is linked to increasing greenhouse gas emissions, imposing controls on them could
slow their development and hold down their standards of living vis-a-vis the
developed nations.
Finally, the focus on emissions levels at specific times — e.g., a baseline of
1990 — has differential and arbitrary impacts on individual nations.
! Looking at the industrialization process, to the extent that fossil fuel
use is a necessary ingredient of economic development, the
emergence of the global climate change issue at this time effectively
determines the distinction between the developed, Annex I nations
and the developing, non-Annex I nations. For Annex I nations, that
energy exploitation has been incorporated into their economies and
is part of their baseline for considering any controls on greenhouse

---

CRS-7
gases. For developing, non-Annex I nations, however, economic
development will require expanded energy use, of which fossil fuels
can be the least costly. Thus imposing limits on fossil energy use at
this time could result in developing countries being relegated to a
lower standard of living than those nations that developed earlier.
Table 1. Relative Emissions of the Industrialized, Developing,
and Top-20 Countries
Industrialized
Developing
Top-20
Indicator
Countries
Countries
Countries
1990 GHG Emissions
59.2%
40.1%
76%
2000 GHG Emissions
51.9%
47.3%
75.4%
Cumulative Energy-Related GHG
Emissions 1950-2000
72%
26.6%
81%
2000 GHG Emissions with Land
Use
41.7%
57.7%
70.4%
Cumulative Energy-Related GHG
Emissions with Land Use
51.7%
47%
74.1%
Source: WRI CAIT.
! Similarly, certain land-use activities, such as clearing land for
agriculture and exploiting timber, affect net greenhouse gas
emissions. Nations that are currently exploiting their resource
endowments, such as Brazil and Indonesia, could find themselves
singled out as targets for controls. Yet developed nations, like the
United States and most European countries, who exploited such
resources in the past, have those greenhouse gas implications now
firmly embedded in their baselines.
! Specifically, the focus on 1990 as a baseline means that the Eastern
European and former Soviet Union nations have the advantage of
reductions in emissions from their economic contractions, which
will allow them room for growth. Likewise, the discovery and
exploitation of North Sea gas has allowed Great Britain to back out
coal and thereby reduce emissions since the baseline.
In all these cases, the time frame adopted for defining the climate change issue and
for taking actions to address greenhouse gas emissions has differential impacts on
individual nations, as a result of their individual resource endowments16 and stage of
economic development. The differential impacts give rise to perceived inequities.
Thus the effort to find a metric for addressing greenhouse gas emissions baselines
and targets that will be perceived as equitable is challenging.
16 E.g., the availability of natural gas and/or coal, and when each has been or is being
exploited; or the extent of deforestation and/or afforestation, and when either has occurred.

---

CRS-8
Alternative Perspectives
The problems raised above prompt the question: What alternatives to controls
derived from historically based emissions levels are available? Alternative metrics
for taking into account greenhouse gas emissions and economic development include
per capita emissions and economic intensity of emissions.
Per Capita Emissions. The socioeconomic differences between the
developed, Annex I nations and the developing nations lead to considerations about
emissions other than simply their absolute amounts. One alternative is to consider
per capita emissions: All else equal, populous nations would emit more greenhouse
gases than less populated ones. On this basis, the difference between developed,
Annex I countries and non-Annex I ones is apparent.
In terms of tonnage, Appendix B shows that the top three ranked by per capita
carbon (only) emissions17 are developed countries (Australia, United States, and
Canada). Their per capita emissions (6.8, 6.6, and 6.3 tons carbon per person,
respectively) are double the emissions of the highest-ranked developing country in
the top 20 (South Korea, at 3.1), and six times that of China (1.1). From among the
186 nations, the ranks for the non-Annex I countries in the top 20 emitters range from
32 (South Korea) to 139 (India), with China at 96. In contrast, Annex I countries
range from 5 (Australia) to 49 (Italy), with the United States at 6. Reasons the United
States, Australia, and Canada are so high on this measure include their dependence
on energy-intensive transport to move people and goods around countries of large
size and relatively low population density, the use of coal for power generation, and
the energy requirements for resource extraction industries.
Thus, if one were considering how to control greenhouse gas emissions, one
way of trying to bridge the different interests of the developed, Annex I nations and
the developing ones would be to focus on per capita emissions as a way of giving
each nation an equitable share of energy use. For the United States compared to the
developing world, this metric could imply constraints, depending on the compliance
time frame and future technological advancements. Likewise, this approach could
permit most less-developed countries to increase their emissions to accommodate
expanding economies.
Greenhouse Gas Intensity of Economy. Another alternative for
evaluating a nation’s contribution to greenhouse gas emissions is to consider how
efficiently that nation uses energy (and conducts other greenhouse gas-emitting
activities) in producing goods and services. This concept is captured by the
greenhouse gas intensity — or carbon intensity18 — measured as the amount of
17 CAIT provides per capita ranks based on carbon only, not total greenhouse gases; the top
four by this measure are oil- and gas-producing Gulf States.
18 While the term “greenhouse gas intensity” encompasses all six greenhouse gases, the
term “carbon intensity” is sometimes used identically and implicitly means “carbon
equivalents intensity” and other times is used more narrowly to refer only to carbon
emissions. The discussion in this analysis focuses on “greenhouse gas intensity.”
(continued...)

---

CRS-9
greenhouse gases emitted per million dollars of gross domestic product (see
Appendices A and B). Carbon intensity as a greenhouse gas indicator has been
receiving considerable attention since President Bush decided to use it as a
benchmark for his voluntary climate change program.19 Also, the World Resources
Institute has advocated its use as an appropriate index for developing, non-Annex I
nations.20
A nation’s greenhouse gas intensity reflects both its resource endowment and
the energy-intensiveness of its economy. In terms of energy resources, countries with
rich resources in coal would tend to be higher emitters, while countries with rich
resources in hydropower or natural gas would tend to be lower emitters. In terms of
economic activity, countries with major heavy industry, major extractive industries,
and extensive transportation systems tend to be higher emitters, while countries
without these and/or dominated by service industries would tend to be lower emitters.
As noted in terms of emissions, taking into account land use sharply increases the
greenhouse gas intensity of Brazil and Indonesia.
These variables do not differentiate nations simply; overall, the top 20 emitters
(see Appendices A and B) range widely in greenhouse gas intensity: from 724 tons
per million dollars GDP (Ukraine, representing a very inefficient use of energy) to
99 tons/million$GDP (France, representing a much higher efficiency — in large part
because of its predominant use of nuclear power for generating electricity). These
are both Annex I nations; non-Annex I nations have a narrower range, from 183
tons/million$GDP (India) to 329 tons/million$GDP (Iran). But taking into account
land use jumps Brazil to 490 tons/million$GDP (+ 163%) and Indonesia to 1,360
tons/million$GDP (+ 518%), respectively (the next largest increase from land use is
Canada, at 8%).
As a metric for considering how to control greenhouse gas emissions, intensity
focuses attention on the efficient use of energy and on the use of alternatives to fossil
fuels. Thus, a greenhouse gas intensity metric would reward the use of renewables,
hydropower, and nuclear power in place of fossil fuels; and among fossil fuels it
would reward natural gas use and penalize coal use (with oil use falling in between).
For carbon (only) intensity, the United States ranks number 50 in the world,
making this a much more favorable metric than absolute emissions (the United States
ranks number 1 in the world) and per capita emissions (the United States ranks
number 6). Of the indicators examined here, the United States gets the most
favorable results from this one. Nevertheless, in absolute terms, the United States
18 (...continued)
(Appendix A ranks nations on carbon emissions only, but Appendix B provides total
greenhouse gas emissions. Appendix B also includes data on intensity that incorporate the
effects of land use.)
19 Papers outlining the Administration’s climate change initiative are available on the White
House website: [http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/climatechange.html].
20 See Kevin A. Baumert, Ruchi Bhandari, and Nancy Kete, What Might A Developing
Country Climate Commitment Look Like? World Resources Institute Climate Notes, May
1999.

---

CRS-10
is relatively inefficient with respect to intensity compared with Western European
countries and Japan. In addition, the United States is less efficient than several major
non-Annex I emitters, including India, South Africa, and Mexico, but it is more
efficient than China, Indonesia, and South Korea.
Discussion
As stated above, the data on greenhouse gas emissions highlight issues of both
effectiveness and fairness with respect to current efforts to address global climate
change. Differentiating responsibilities between Annex I and non-Annex I countries
fails to focus efforts on all the largest emitters. In addition, contradictory issues of
fairness arise, as Annex I countries bear essentially all the direct economic costs of
reducing emissions, and non-Annex I countries are granted the right to increase
emissions to meet developmental needs. Finally, the focus on historical emissions
as a baseline for regulation has differential and arbitrary impacts on individual
nations.
The result of the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol’s setting emissions targets for
only developed nations and focusing on returning their emissions to a specific
baseline is twofold: (1) the current regime has had little effect on global emissions,
and will have little effect in the near future; and (2) the largest emitters, the United
States and China, have not found it in their interests to join in the international effort
to a significant degree. Indeed, the United States has pulled completely out of the
Kyoto process. Proponents of the Kyoto Protocol may assert that although it is only
a first step, it is one that must be taken. However, without serious efforts with
respect to compliance and developing world participation (along with some more
developed world participation), it may suffer the same fate as the UNFCCC.
This history of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol raises serious questions
about how to develop greenhouse gas targets, time frames, and implementation
strategies. With respect to targets, the UNFCCC recognized the right of developing
countries to develop and the responsibility of all countries to protect the global
climate. These goals of the UNFCCC suggest that if there is to be any permanent
response to climate change that involves controlling greenhouse gases, then a regime
that combines some measure reflecting the right of developing countries to develop,
such as per capita emissions, and some measure reflecting the need to be efficient,
such as carbon intensity, may be necessary to move the world toward a workable and
effective climate change framework.
As shown above, globally, a target focused on per capita emissions generally
rewards developing nations,21 providing them room for economic growth, with the
target’s balance between limiting emissions and permitting growth determining the
individual winners and losers. For example, based on Appendix B, a target of 3 tons
carbon per person would allow all the developing nations in the top 20 emitters
except South Korea growth room, while six developed nations (United States,
Russian Federation, Germany, United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia) would have
21 An exception is several Gulf States that are high emitters due to exploitation of their oil
reserves.

---

CRS-11
to make cuts. In contrast, a target focused on greenhouse gas intensity would have
more diverse implications for developing nations. Several major developing nations
produce considerably higher greenhouse gas emissions per million dollars of GDP
than some developed nations. For example, China’s carbon intensity is over twice
that of Japan’s (287 tons/million$GDP versus 114). Thus a greenhouse gas intensity
goal could be a counterforce to the economic development process for some
countries, meaning that the winners and losers of a regime combining per capita and
carbon intensity measures could be highly dynamic and contentious. Adding land-
use implications would further complicate the regime, and selectively affect certain
nations, especially those just now at the point of exploiting forests (notably Indonesia
and Brazil).
For the United States, a regime containing some mix of per capita and
greenhouse gas intensity measures would likely imply a need to constrain emissions
over some time frame. The U.S. greenhouse gas intensity is declining, as is the case
with most nations, but the decrease currently does not completely offset increased
emissions resulting from economic growth. The extent to which targets could
translate into economic costs would depend on the other two features of the
regulatory scheme: (1) time frame (specifically, whether it would accommodate
technological advances in less-carbon-intensive technology or accelerated
commercialization of existing technologies such as nuclear power); (2)
implementation strategy (specifically, whether it encourages least-cost solutions and
development of advanced technologies).
With respect to time frame, the data indicate two things: (1) most countries that
achieved a significant reduction during the 1990s did so as a result of either an
economic downturn or a substantial realignment in energy policy; (2) many countries
have not been able to stabilize their emissions despite the UNFCCC, much less
reduce them. As the UNFCCC protects the right of countries to development, using
economic contraction as an emission reduction strategy can scarcely be considered
an option. Instead, the substantial development and/or deployment of less-carbon-
intensive technology, improved land-management strategies, and other actions would
be necessary to achieve stabilized emissions. As noted above, greenhouse gas
emissions are closely tied to industrialization — a synonym for “developed.” With
few exceptions, improvement in efficiency has been gradual. A permanent
transformation of the global economy necessary to ensure a long-term stabilization
of greenhouse gas emissions may involve a multi-stage, long-term time frame.
The difficulty in implementing the UNFCCC suggests implementation and
compliance are still an open issue. The United States submitted climate action plans
during the 1990s indicating it would achieve the UNFCCC goal of returning
emissions to 1990 levels. It did not. There were no sanctions. Likewise, many
Kyoto signatories may not achieve their reduction targets in 2008-2012. The
sanctions are unclear. Given the wide range of situations illustrated by the data, a
flexible strategy that permits each country to play to its strengths may make it easier
for diverse countries like the United States and China to reach some acceptable
agreement.
The extent of flexibility would depend on the balance between emission
reductions and economic cost designed into the targets, time frame, and

---

CRS-12
implementation strategy. Market-based mechanisms to reduce emissions focus on
specifying either the acceptable emissions level (quantity), or compliance costs
(price), and allowing the marketplace to determine the economically efficient
solution for the other variable. For example, a tradeable permit program sets the
amount of emissions allowable under the program (i.e., the number of permits
available caps allowable emissions), while permitting the marketplace to determine
what each permit will be worth. Conversely, a carbon tax sets the maximum unit
(per ton of CO ) cost that one should pay for reducing emissions, while the
2
marketplace determines how much actually gets reduced.
Hence, a major implementation question is whether one is more concerned
about the possible economic cost of the program and therefore willing to accept some
uncertainty about the amount of reduction received (i.e., carbon taxes), or one is more
concerned about achieving a specific emission reduction level with costs handled
efficiently, but not capped (i.e., tradeable permits). Of course, combinations of these
approaches are possible, depending on the flexibility desired.22 The data presented
here portray a very wide range of situations and conditions among the 20 top
countries that represent 75% of total emissions. Significant flexibility may not only
be desirable but necessary for them to reach any significant agreement.
22 See CRS Report RS21067, Global Climate Change: Controlling CO2 Emissions — Cost-
Limiting Safety Valves, by Larry Parker.

---

CRS-13
Appendix A. Relative Ranking of Twenty Top Emitters of Greenhouse Gases
Based on Estimated 2000 Emissions
2000
1950-2000
1950-2000
2000
2000
Emissions
Cumulative Cumulative
2000
1990
Per
Carbon
with
Energy
Energy w/
Country
Annex 1
Emissions
Emissions
Capita
Intensity
Land-use
Emissions
Land-use
United States of America
Yes
1
1
6
50
1
1
1
China
No
2
2
96
38
2
3
2
Russian Federation
Yes
3
3
20
10
5
2
3
India
No
4
4
139
95
6
9
13
Japan
Yes
5
6
37
88
7
5
7
Germany
Yes
6
5
27
81
8
4
6
Brazil
No
7
9
84
119
4
18
5
Canada
Yes
8
10
7
45
10
10
9
United Kingdom
Yes
9
8
31
82
11
6
8
Italy
Yes
10
12
49
106
13
12
15
Korea (South)
No
11
19
32
42
14
19
24
Ukraine
Yes
12
7
35
6
15
7
11
Mexico
No
13
14
79
71
12
14
16
France
Yes
14
11
53
120
17
8
12
Indonesia
No
15
17
121
70
3
28
4
Australia
Yes
16
15
5
40
18
15
19
Iran
No
17
21
63
32
19
24
32
South Africa
No
18
16
44
39
20
13
20
Spain
Yes
19
20
47
89
24
17
25
Poland
Yes
20
13
43
29
23
11
14
Source: World Resources Institute CAIT.

---

CRS-14
Appendix B. Emissions and Other Climate Change-Related Indicators for 20 Largest Emitters
2000
2000
1990-2000
Per Capita
2000
2000
% of
1990
Difference
Difference
GHG Emissions
Rank
Country
Annex 1 MMTCE
world
MMTCE
MMTCE
%
(Tons C/person)
1 United States of America
Yes
1,892
20.6%
1,643
249
15.1%
6.6
2 China
No
1,356
14.8%
1,011
345
34.1%
1.1
3 Russian Federation
Yes
520
5.7%
799
-279
-34.9%
3.6
4 India
No
506
5.5%
359
147
40.9%
0.5
5 Japan
Yes
364
4.0%
322
42
13.1%
2.9
6 Germany
Yes
265
2.9%
327
-62
-18.8%
3.2
7 Brazil
No
230
2.5%
186
44
23.5%
1.3
8 Canada
Yes
195
2.1%
155
40
25.6%
6.3
9 United Kingdom
Yes
181
2.0%
199
-18
-9.0%
3.1
10 Italy
Yes
146
1.6%
138
8
6.0%
2.5
11 Korea (South)
No
143
1.6%
80
64
80.0%
3.1
12 Ukraine
Yes
143
1.6%
236
-93
-39.5%
2.9
13 Mexico
No
139
1.5%
118
22
18.4%
1.4
14 France
Yes
137
1.5%
147
-10
-6.9%
2.3
15 Indonesia
No
135
1.5%
90
45
50.0%
0.7
16 Australia
Yes
130
1.4%
110
21
18.9%
6.8
17 Iran
No
120
1.3%
77
42
54.7%
1.9
18 South Africa
No
113
1.2%
97
15
15.8%
2.6
19 Spain
Yes
104
1.1%
79
25
31.1%
2.6
20 Poland
Yes
102
1.1%
123
-20
-16.5%
2.7
Total
6,921
75.4%
6,295
626
9.9%
2.9

---

CRS-15
Appendix B. Emissions and Other Climate Change-Related Indicators for 20 Largest Emitters
(continued)
2000
1950-2000
1950-2000
Emissions
Cumulative
Cumulative
2000 GHG
2000
with Land-
Energy
Energy with
2000 GHG
Intensity with
Rank
Country
use
Emissions
Land-use GDP
Intensity
Land-use
(MMTCE) (MMTCE)
(MMTCE)
(millions of
(tons/million
(tons/million
international $)
GDP)
GDP)
1 United States of America
1,782
57,874
50,724
$9,680,850
195
184
2 China
1,343
19,558
30,178
$4,724,163
287
284
3 Russian Federation
535
20,940
24,716
$983,864
528
544
4 India
495
4,966
4,641
$2,772,730
183
179
5 Japan
365
10,140
11,507
$3,207,344
114
114
6 Germany
265
12,828
12,879
$2,063,536
129
128
7 Brazil
604
1,998
18,632
$1,233,633
186
490
8 Canada
212
4,715
6,132
$825,745
236
257
9 United Kingdom
180
8,131
8,125
$1,384,896
130
130
10 Italy
145
3,992
3,990
$1,400,835
104
104
11 Korea (South)
144
1,903
2,139
$691,772
207
208
12 Ukraine
143
5,744
5,744
$197,005
724
726
13 Mexico
166
2,521
3,695
$839,150
166
198
14 France
135
5,082
5,096
$1,383,340
99
98
15 Indonesia
834
1,150
21,821
$613,299
220
1360
16 Australia
132
2,506
2,867
$470,916
277
280
17 Iran
122
1,509
1,663
$364,399
329
335
18 South Africa
113
2,774
2,788
$470,467
240
240
19 Spain
102
2,091
2,060
$799,397
130
128
20 Poland
102
4,332
4,346
$360,114
284
283
Total
7,919
174,754
223,743
$34,467,455
201
230
Source: World Resources Institute CAIT.

---