Order Code RL32724
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Mexico-U.S. Relations:
Issues for the 109th Congress
January 6, 2005
K. Larry Storrs
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for the 109th Congress
Summary
The United States and Mexico have a special relationship as neighbors and
partners under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The friendly
relationship has been strengthened by President Bush’s meetings with President Fox.
This report covering trade, migration/border, drug trafficking, and political issues
will be updated on a regular basis.
Trade Issues. Since 1994, NAFTA institutions have been functioning, trade
between the countries has tripled, and allegations of violations of labor and
environmental laws have been considered under the trilateral institutions. The Bush
Administration argues that NAFTA has had modest positive impacts on all three
member countries, but Mexican farmers have strongly criticized the effects of
NAFTA. Notable trade disputes with Mexico relate to trucking, telecommunications,
tuna, and sweeteners.
Migration/Border Issues. In February 2001, Presidents Bush and Fox agreed
to establish high-level talks to ensure safe, legal, and orderly migration flows
between the countries, but the talks stalled after the September 2001 terrorist attacks,
and border controls were later strengthened under the new Department of Homeland
Security. In January 2004, President Bush proposed a major immigration reform “to
match willing foreign workers with willing U.S. employers when no Americans can
be found to fill the jobs.” In December 2004, Congress passed the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (S. 2845/P.L. 108-458), with
provisions to increase immigration law enforcement personnel and to adopt more
stringent border control and identity document standards.
Drug Trafficking Issues. Bush Administration officials have regularly praised
Mexico’s counter-narcotics efforts under Fox, especially action against major
traffickers, and have characterized the bilateral cooperation in this area as
unprecedented. The State Department reported in April 2004, however, that
marijuana and opium poppy cultivation increased significantly in Mexico in 2003.
In recent law enforcement actions, on October 19, 2004, U.S. officials announced the
dismantling, through Operation Money Clip, of a major Mexican money-laundering
and drug trafficking organization operating in the United States.
Political and Human Rights Issues. In nation-wide elections to renew the
Chamber of Deputies in July 2003, President Fox’s PAN fared poorly, while the
previously dominant PRI and the leftist PRD increased representation, making
congressional approval of President Fox’s reform measures less likely. Local
elections are being held in an environment in which the parties are positioning
themselves for the July 2006 presidential elections. On human rights issues,
President Fox has designated special prosecutors to try those responsible for human
rights abuses in the 1970s and 1980s, but little progress has been made. On
December 10, 2004, President Fox, responding to an analysis by the U.N. High
Commission for Human Rights, presented a series of proposed reforms to discourage
torture and to strengthen the rights of defendants in Mexico.

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Contents
Most Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
U.S.-Mexico Relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Major Bilateral Linkages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Fox Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Economic and Social Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Political and Security Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Foreign Policy Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Bilateral Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Trade Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Functioning of NAFTA Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Recent Trade Disputes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Migration\Border Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Nature of the Immigration Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Bush Administration Initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Drug Trafficking Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Nature of the Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Executive-Legislative Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Political and Human Rights Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Concerns over Elections and Political Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Allegations of Human Rights Abuses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
For Additional Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
CRS Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

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Mexico-U.S. Relations:
Issues for the 109th Congress
Most Recent Developments
On December 7, 2004, Mexico put forward Foreign Minister Ernesto Derbez as
a candidate to be the Secretary General of the Organization of American States. On
December 10, 2004, President Fox, responding to an analysis by the UN High
Commission for Human Rights, presented a series of proposed human rights reforms
to strengthen the rights of defendants in Mexico. On December 10, 2004, the U.S.
Supreme Court agreed to hear the case of a Mexican inmate on Texas’ death row who
claims that the state violated international law by failing to notify Mexican consular
officials before his trial for murder. On December 17, 2004, President Bush signed
into law the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (S. 2845/P.L.
108-458), with provisions to increase immigration law enforcement personnel and
to adopt more stringent border control and identity document standards. On
December 22, 2004, a judge cleared the way for the implementation of voter
approved Proposition 200 in Arizona that requires proof of immigration status to
obtain certain government benefits and proof of citizenship to register to vote.
U.S.-Mexico Relationship1
Major Bilateral Linkages
Mexico surpassed Japan in 1999 to become the United States’ second most
important trading partner following Canada. It is also the leading country in Latin
America in terms of U.S. investment, with the total stock of U.S. investment being
about $61 billion in 2003. In addition, cooperation with Mexico is vital in dealing
with illegal immigration, the flow of illicit drugs, and a host of border issues.
The United States is Mexico’s most important customer by far, receiving about
87% of Mexico’s exports, including petroleum, automobiles, auto parts, and winter
vegetables, and providing about 77% of Mexico’s imports. The United States is the
source of over 60% of foreign investment in Mexico, and the primary source of
important tourism earnings.
Until the early 1980s, Mexico had a closed and statist economy and its
independent foreign policy was often at odds with the United States. Beginning
1 This report draws heavily from CRS Report RL31876, Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for
the 108th Congress. That report summarizes legislation passed by the 108th Congress.

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CRS-2
under President Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988), and continuing more dramatically
under President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-1994) and President Ernesto Zedillo
(1994-2000), Mexico adopted a series of economic, political, and foreign policy
reforms. It opened its economy to trade and investment, adopted electoral reforms
that leveled the playing field, and increased cooperation with the United States on
drug control, border issues, and trade matters. Cooperation under the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the annual cabinet-level meetings of
the Binational Commission are the clearest indications of the close and increasing
relationships between the countries.
Fox Administration
Vicente Fox of the conservative Alliance for Change coalition was inaugurated
as President on December 1, 2000, for a six-year term, promising to promote free
market policies, to strengthen democracy and the rule of law, to fight corruption and
crime, and to end the conflictive situation in the state of Chiapas. Fox’s inauguration
ended 71 years of presidential control by the long dominant party.
Fox was elected with 42.52% of the vote in the July 2, 2000 elections, with
support from the conservative National Action Party (PAN) and the Green Ecological
Party of Mexico (PVEM), which formed the Alliance for Change. Francisco
Labastida from the long-ruling and centrist Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI)
came in second with 36.10% of the vote. Cuauhtemoc Cardenas from the leftist
Alliance for Mexico came in third with 16.64% of the vote, with support from the
center-left Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) and four minor leftist parties.
Results from the July 2000 legislative elections produced a pluralistic legislature
where none of the major parties had a majority in either chamber. In the 128-member
Senate, the PRI has 60 senators, the PAN has 46, and the PRD has 15.2 Following
the July 2003 elections to renew the Chamber of Deputies, the PAN dropped from
206 deputies to 153 deputies (31% of the total), putting it in a weaker position to
support Fox’s program, while the PRI’s delegation increased from 211 to 224 (45%
of the total) and the PRD’s delegation increased from 50 to 95 (19% of the total).3
Economic and Social Challenges. With nearly 90% of the country’s
exports going to the United States, Mexico’s economy was strongly affected by the
slowdown in the United States following the terrorist attacks. Mexico’s economy
contracted 0.8% in 2001, grew only 0.9% in 2002, and grew about 1.3% in 2003. It
is projected to grow nearly 4% in 2004. These meager growth results under Fox
contrast with economic growth averaging over 5% in the previous six years.
Moreover, President Fox has been forced to operate under austere budgets in 2001,
2002, 2003, and 2004, reducing the funding for promised health and education
programs. Lacking majority support in Congress, Fox has been unable to obtain
approval of major legislation, including a proposed tax reform and a proposed energy
2 For more detail on the 2000 elections, see CRS Report RS20611, Mexico’s Presidential,
Legislative, and Local Elections of July 2, 2000, by K. Larry Storrs.
3 For more detail on the 2003 elections, see CRS Report RS21561, Mexico’s Congress and
July 2003 Elections, by K. Larry Storrs.

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CRS-3
reform that would permit greater private participation in the hydrocarbon and
electricity sectors, although Congress did pass a social security reform in July 2004.
In December 2004, President Fox appealed parts of the congressionally approved
spending package to the Supreme Court which will determine if he has the
constitutional authority to modify a congressionally approved budget.
Political and Security Challenges. President Fox has promised to end
corruption, to operate a more transparent and open government, to strengthen the
government’s commitment to human rights, and to end the uncertainties relating to
the state of Chiapas. He encouraged congressional passage of indigenous rights
legislation in 2001, but the rebellious Zapatistas denounced the legislation as
inadequate. He has attempted to professionalize the police under a new public
security ministry to deal with widespread public concerns with security and police
corruption, and he has undertaken vigorous efforts against illicit drug traffickers. In
late March 2004, he proposed a judicial reform that would make the criminal justice
system more efficient, transparent, and public, but the Mexican Congress did not
complete action on the proposal. In December 2004, President Fox followed up with
a series of proposed human rights reforms to discourage torture and to strengthen the
rights of defendants in Mexico.
Foreign Policy Challenges. President Fox has indicated that Mexico will
pursue a more activist and diversified foreign policy, with greater involvement in
UN activities, and stronger ties to Latin America and Europe. He has promoted the
so-called Puebla-Panama Plan, which promotes cooperative development efforts
among the Central American countries and the southeastern states of Mexico. He is
reviving the G-3 group (Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico), and is seeking better
ties with the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) countries in South America. He
has sought to expand trade with the European Union under the EU-Mexico free trade
agreement that went into effect in July 2000, and with Japan under the Mexico-Japan
free trade agreement that will enter into force in April 2005. Mexico held a
temporary seat on the U.N. Security Council in 2002 and 2003 and expressed support
for continuing diplomatic efforts under United Nations auspices to achieve the
disarmament of Iraq, leading to expressions of disappointment from the Bush
Administration.
President Fox has encouraged warm and friendly relations with the United
States, and he has called for greater cooperation under NAFTA and for a bilateral
migration agreement that would regularize the status of undocumented Mexicans in
the United States. (See Migration/Border Issues below for more detail.) In 2001,
Presidents Fox and Bush met in mid-February in Mexico, in mid-April in Canada,
in early May in the United States, in early September in the United States on an
official state visit, and in early October in the United States when President Fox
expressed solidarity with the United States following the terrorist attacks. In 2002,
the Presidents met in March in Monterrey, Mexico, following the U.N. conference
on development, and in October in Los Cabos, Mexico, at the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) summit. Relations seemed to be especially warm in 2001 when
hopes were high for some sort of migration agreement, but the relationship cooled
to some extent when the migration talks stalled following the terrorist attacks on the
United States and when Mexico was reluctant to support U.S. action in Iraq in the
UN Security Council. In 2003, the Presidents met in October, in Bangkok, Thailand,

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at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit, where they reaffirmed
the desire to discuss bilateral immigration issues. In 2004, the Presidents met in
January, in Monterrey, Mexico, for the Special Summit of the Americas, in March
at President Bush’s ranch in Crawford, Texas, and in November at the APEC summit
in Santiago, Chile, with all three occasions providing opportunities to discuss
President Bush’s new immigration proposal.
Bilateral Issues for Congress
Trade Issues
Trade between Mexico and the United States has grown dramatically in recent
years, under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between the
United States, Mexico, and Canada. Total U.S. trade with Mexico increased from
$81.5 billion in 1993 to a high of $247.2 billion in 2000, but declined slightly in
recent years to $220.3 billion in 2003. However, the balance of U.S. trade with
Mexico has shifted from a surplus of $1.3 billion in 1994 to a generally growing
deficit of $54.1 billion in 2003 (exports of $83.1 billion; imports of $137.2 billion),
in part because of the late 1994 devaluation of the peso which made Mexican
products cheaper. This change in the trade balance has caused some Members of
Congress to question the benefits of NAFTA. Despite the deficit, Mexico is one of
the fastest growing export markets for the United States in recent years, and it
became the second most important trading partner after Canada in 1999.
The NAFTA agreement was negotiated in 1991 and 1992, and side agreements
on labor and environmental matters were completed in 1993. The agreements were
approved by the respective legislatures in late 1993 and went into force on January
1, 1994. Under the agreements, trade and investment restrictions are being
eliminated over a 15-year period, with most restrictions eliminated in the early years
of the agreement. Over the years, Clinton Administration and Bush Administration
spokesmen have argued that NAFTA has been successful in increasing U.S. exports
to Mexico, particularly in heavily protected areas such as agricultural products, and
in promoting job creation and investment in both countries.
Functioning of NAFTA Institutions. Several NAFTA institutions
mandated by the agreements have been functioning since 1994. The tripartite
Commission on Environmental Cooperation (CEC) was established in Montreal,
Canada; and the Commission for Labor Cooperation (CLC) was established in
Dallas, Texas. In addition, the bilateral Border Environment Cooperation
Commission (BECC), located in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico; and the North American
Development Bank (NADBank), headquartered in San Antonio, Texas, were created
to promote and finance border environment projects along the U.S.-Mexico border.
Following up on a March 2002 agreement by Presidents Bush and Fox in Monterrey,
Mexico, to broaden the mandate of the NADBank, Congress agreed in March 2004
to permit the NADBank to make grants and nonmarket rate loans for environmental
infrastructure along the border, and the measure (H.R. 254) was signed into law (P.L.
108-215) on April 5, 2004.

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The NAFTA institutions have operated to encourage cooperation on trade,
environmental and labor issues, and to consider nongovernmental petitions under the
labor and environmental side agreements.
Under the labor side agreement, 28 petitions have been submitted alleging
noncompliance by one of the NAFTA countries with existing labor legislation, and
15 of these have been against Mexico, although some of the cases against the United
States involve working conditions and compensation for migrant workers.
Seven submissions against Mexico were advanced to the next stage of
ministerial consultations, and the others were dropped or rejected on procedural
grounds. In one case advanced to ministerial consultation, involving the dismissal
of workers for union organizing activities at a SONY electronics plant in Nuevo
Laredo, Mexico, the labor ministers agreed to a plan of action including meetings
with the affected workers, public seminars, and studies of union registration
procedures. In the case of alleged discrimination against pregnant Mexican workers
in border assembly (“maquiladora”) plants, ministerial consultations led to an
implementation agreement and a conference on the rights of working women. In the
case of the union association and health and safety issues in the Han Young
maquiladora plant in Tijuana and the Itapsa maquiladora plant in the state of Mexico,
ministerial consultations were held and led to trilateral seminars on the relevant
issues. In the case of occupational safety and health issues in the Auto Trim/Custom
Trim in Tamaulipas, Mexico, ministerial consultations were held that led to the
establishment of a bilateral working group of experts on the relevant issues. The
most recent cases, filed in the United States and Canada in late September and early
October 2003, allege violations of workers’ rights in garment factories in Puebla,
Mexico.
Under the trilateral CLC, the countries are cooperating in many areas, especially
occupational safety and rights of working women and children. Some argue that the
provisions have encouraged Mexico to enforce its own labor legislation. Others
argue that the provisions have been extremely weak and that numerous abuses
persist.4
Under the environmental side agreement, 26 petitions have been submitted
alleging non-compliance with environmental legislation, but only 9 of these have
involved Mexico. In a major case involving the environmental impact of the
construction of a cruise boat port in Cozumel, Mexico, the Council requested a
response from the Mexican government and after evaluation directed the CEC
Secretariat to prepare a full factual record on the case to highlight deficiencies. In
two cases involving pollution of the Magdalena River and Lake Chapala the Council
is reviewing the response from the Mexican government. In three recent cases, the
Council has requested responses from the Mexican government; in another case the
complaint is still being reviewed; and another case was rejected on grounds that it did
not allege a violation of environmental law. The CEC is cooperating on many
4 For more information on the functioning of this institution, see CRS Report 97-861,
NAFTA Labor Side Agreement: Lessons for the Worker Rights and Fast-Track Debate, by
Mary Jane Bolle.

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CRS-6
environmental projects, including the North American Bird Conservation Initiative
to protect birds and conserve bird habitats; the Upper San Pedro River Initiative to
protect this Sonora-Arizona eco-system that is an important corridor for millions of
migratory birds; and the Sound Management of Chemicals Project to dramatically
reduce the use of PCBs, DDT, chlordane, mercury, and other pollutants.5
Recent Trade Disputes. Major trade disputes between the countries
involve: the access of Mexican trucks to the United States; opening the Mexican
telecommunications sector to international long distance competition; the access of
Mexican sugar and tuna to the U.S. market; the access of U.S. sweeteners to the
Mexican market; and Mexico’s recently removed ban on U.S. beef products
following the discovery of mad cow disease.
With respect to trucking issues, the Mexican government objected to the Clinton
Administration’s refusal, on safety grounds, to allow Mexican trucks to have access
to U.S. highways under the terms of the NAFTA pact. A NAFTA dispute resolution
panel supported Mexico’s position in February 2001. President Bush indicated a
willingness to implement the provision, but the U.S. Congress required additional
safety provisions in the FY2002 Department of Transportation Appropriations Act
(P.L. 107-87). On November 27, 2002, with safety inspectors and procedures in
place, the Administration announced that it would begin the process that will open
U.S. highways to Mexican truckers and buses, but environmental and labor groups
went to court in early December to block the action. On January 16, 2003, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that full environmental impact
statements were required before Mexican trucks would be allowed to operate on U.S.
highways, but the U.S. Supreme Court reversed that decision on June 7, 2004. On
September 22, 2004, the House approved 339-70 an amendment to the
Transportation-Treasury Appropriations (H.R. 5025) that would prohibit
implementation of a rule allowing Mexican and Canadian truck operators an
additional two years to bring their trucks into compliance with U.S. safety provisions,
and this was eventually incorporated into the Consolidated Appropriations Act for
FY2005 (H.R. 4818/P.L. 108-447) that was approved by the Congress and the
President in November-December 2004.
Regarding telecommunications issues, the United States filed a complaint with
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in August 2000, following previous warnings,
over Mexico’s failure to reduce Telmex’s continuing dominant position in the
telecommunications industry. Despite efforts to reach a negotiated solution, the
USTR’s April 2001 report on telecommunication trade barriers cited Mexico for
continued failure to open its long-distance market to competition, and in mid-
February 2002, it requested a WTO dispute resolution panel to rule on the U.S.
complaint. On March 12, 2004, the dispute panel issued its final report, generally
upholding U.S. claims and finding that Telmex interconnection fees were above what
cost-oriented rates should be. On June 1, 2004, Mexico and the United States agreed
to settle their dispute by adopting the recommendations of the WTO panel.
5 For more information, see CRS Report 97-291, NAFTA: Related Environmental Issues and
Initiatives, by Mary Tiemann.

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CRS-7
With regard to sugar/sweetener issues, Mexico argues that it is entitled to ship
its net sugar surplus to the United States duty free under NAFTA, while the United
States argues that a sugar side letter negotiated along with NAFTA limits Mexican
shipments of sugar. Mexico also complains that imports of high fructose corn syrup
(HFCS) sweeteners from the United States constitute dumping, and it imposed anti-
dumping duties for some time, even though NAFTA and WTO dispute resolution
panels upheld U.S. claims that the Mexican government colluded with the Mexican
sugar and sweetener industries to restrict HFCS imports from the United States. In
the last days of 2001, the Mexican Congress imposed a 20% tax on soft drinks made
with corn syrup sweeteners to aid the ailing domestic cane sugar industry. President
Fox suspended the duties until September 30, 2002, in part because of U.S. objection
to the tax and the devastating impact on HFCS and corn sales from the United States,
but Mexico’s Supreme Court overturned his action. In late 2002, the Mexican
Congress extended the 20% tax on soft drinks made with HFCS.
During 2003, there were various efforts to achieve a compromise that would
increase Mexican exporters’ access to the U.S. sugar market and U.S. exporters’
access to the Mexican HFCS market, but no agreement was reached, and in late 2003
the Mexican Congress extended the 20% tax on soft drinks made with HFCS. In
October 2003, Corn Products International, Inc., based in Illinois, announced that it
was filing a claim for $325 million under NAFTA’s investment provisions against
Mexico for losses caused by the tax on HFCS-sweetened drinks, and Archer Daniels
Midlands (ADM) said that it was planning similar action for over $100 million in
damages. In November 2003, Senate Finance Committee Chairman Charles Grassley
introduced a bill (S. 1952) that would impose retaliatory tariffs on Mexican tequila
and other agricultural products unless Mexico rescinded the tax on HFCS products,
and in January 2004 he urged USTR to initiate WTO dispute settlement proceedings
against Mexico’s HFCS tax. On March 16, 2004, USTR announced that it was
initiating WTO dispute settlement proceedings against Mexico’s HFCS tax, and on
June 22, 2004, the United States formally requested that the WTO establish a dispute
settlement panel to consider the U.S. claims. In September 2004, the United States
and Mexico selected the panelists for the dispute settlement panel, although producer
groups are still hoping to achieve a negotiated settlement.
On tuna issues, the Clinton Administration lifted the embargo on Mexican tuna
in April 2000 under relaxed standards for a dolphin-safe label in accordance with
internationally agreed procedures and U.S. legislation passed in 1997 that encouraged
the unharmed release of dolphins from nets. However, a federal judge in San
Francisco ruled that the standards of the law had not been met, and the Federal
Appeals Court in San Francisco sustained the ruling in July 2001. Under the Bush
Administration, the Commerce Department ruled on December 31, 2002, that the
dolphin-safe label may be applied if qualified observers certify that no dolphins were
killed or seriously injured in the netting process, but Earth Island Institute and other
environmental groups filed suit to block the modification. On April 10, 2003, the
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California enjoined the Commerce
Department from modifying the standards for the dolphin-safe label. On August 9,
2004, the federal district court ruled against the Bush Administration’s modification
of the dolphin-safe standards, and reinstated the original standards in the 1990
Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act.

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On other issues, in early October 2002, the U.S.-Mexico working group on
agriculture dealt with major agricultural issues, including Mexico’s recent anti-
dumping decisions on apples, rice, swine, and beef, and safeguard actions on
potatoes. In January 2003, the countries agreed to permit Mexican safeguard
measures against U.S. imports of chicken legs and thighs, and in July 2003, these
safeguard measures were extended until 2008, with tariffs declining each year. In
October 2003, Mexico demanded further consultations on a U.S. request for a WTO
dispute panel to rule on Mexico’s imposition of anti-dumping duties on U.S. beef and
rice imports, but a panel was formed in February 2004 and after a requested delay is
expected to make a ruling in March 2005. Mexico banned beef imports from the
United States in December 2003 following the discovery of one cow infected with
mad cow disease in Washington state. In early March 2004, following the
announcement of new U.S. procedures that would exclude unhealthy or downer cattle
from the food chain, Mexico announced that it was resuming beef trade with the
United States, with some restrictions, and it expanded the list of eligible beef
products in early April 2004.
Migration\Border Issues
Nature of the Immigration Problem. Widely cited demographers at the
Urban Institute estimated in January 2004 that there were 5.3 million undocumented
Mexican migrants residing in the United States in 2002, accounting for 57% of the
total estimated illegal alien population of 9.3 million.6 Mexico takes the view that
the migrants are “undocumented workers,” making the point that since the U.S.
market attracts and provides employment for the migrants, it bears some
responsibility. Mexico regularly voices concern about alleged abuses suffered by
Mexican workers in the United States, and for the loss of life and hardships suffered
by Mexican migrants as they utilize increasingly dangerous routes and methods to
circumvent tighter border controls. Mexico benefits from illegal migration in at least
two ways: (1) it is a “safety valve” that dissipates the political discontent that could
arise from higher unemployment in Mexico; and (2) it is a source of remittances by
workers in the United States to families in Mexico, estimated to be about $10 billion
per year.
Congress has passed two major sets of mechanisms for controlling illegal
immigration within the last two decades. One set was the Immigration Reform and
Control Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-603). Main provisions of the act included civil and
criminal penalties for U.S. employers who knowingly hire undocumented workers;
increased border control and enforcement measures; anti-discrimination safeguards;
provision for legalization of illegal aliens who resided continuously in the United
States before 1982; and a special legalization for farm workers previously employed
on American farms. The other set was the Illegal Immigration Reform and
6 Urban Institute, Undocumented Immigrants: Facts and Figures, by Jeffrey Passel, Randy
Capps, and Michael Fix, January 12, 2004, using the March 2002 data from the Current
Population Survey (CPS) conducted by the U.S. Bureau of the Census and the Bureau of
Labor Statistics. For more detail and comparisons with earlier years, see CRS Report
RS21938, Unauthorized Aliens in the United States: Estimates Since 1986, by Ruth Ellen
Wasem.

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Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-208) and the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-193). The first measure
sought to control illegal immigration by adding 1,000 Border Patrol agents per year
for five years (FY1997-FY2001), along with additional personnel, equipment, and
procedures. Both measures reduced the attractiveness of immigration by restricting
the eligibility of aliens for federal programs.7
Congress also increased funding for the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
including the Border Patrol, through the regular Commerce, Justice, State, and
Judiciary Appropriations Acts, more than tripling INS’s budget from $1.5 billion in
FY1993 to $6.2 billion in FY2002.8 With various groups, including the AFL-CIO
in February 2000, calling for amnesty for illegal immigrants in the United States and
a more lenient immigration policy, Congress considered measures to increase the
number of H-2A agricultural workers and to legalize the status of undocumented
aliens through registry and various forms of amnesty.9
Bush Administration Initiatives. When President Bush met with President
Fox in mid-February 2001, migration issues were among the main topics, with
Mexican officials expressing concern about the number of migrants who die each
year while seeking entry into the United States. President Fox has been pressing
proposals for legalizing undocumented Mexican workers in the United States through
amnesty or guest worker arrangements as a way of protecting their human rights. In
the Joint Communique following the Bush-Fox meeting, the two presidents agreed
to hold cabinet-level negotiations to address migration and labor issues between the
countries.
During the opening day of President Fox’s official visit to Washington, D.C. in
early September 2001, he called for the two governments to reach agreement on
migration proposals by the end of the year. The Joint Communique issued at the end
of the meeting called for the countries to reach agreement as soon as possible on a
range of issues, including border safety, a temporary worker program, and the status
of undocumented Mexicans in the United States. However, following the September
2001 terrorist attacks, many policymakers called for tighter border controls.
During the Bush-Fox meeting in Monterrey, Mexico, on March 22, 2002, the
Presidents noted that important progress had been made to enhance migrant safety,
and they agreed to continue the cabinet-level talks to achieve safe, legal, and orderly
migration flows between the countries. In the press conference, President Bush
called for passage of legislation to extend the period for adjustment to legal status of
undocumented persons under Section 245(i) of the immigration act. The Presidents
also announced a U.S.-Mexico Border Partnership Action Plan with greater
7 See CRS Report 95-881, Immigration Legislation in the 104th Congress, by Joyce Vialet.
8 For more details, see CRS Report RS20908, Immigration and Naturalization Service’s
FY2002 Budget.
9 See the following CRS reports by Ruth Ellen Wasem: CRS Report RL30780, Immigration
Legalization and Status Adjustment Legislation, and CRS Report RL30852, Immigration of
Agricultural Guest Workers: Policy, Trends, and Legislative Issues.

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CRS-10
cooperation and technological enhancements at the border and a “Partnership for
Prosperity” Action Plan with public-private initiatives to promote domestic and
foreign investment in less developed areas of Mexico with high migration rates.
During the cabinet-level Binational Commission meetings in Mexico City, on
November 25-26, 2002, Secretary of State Powell and Foreign Secretary Castaneda
reaffirmed the intention to continue talks toward a migration agreement.
Even so, in 2001 and 2002, most congressional action focused on strengthening
border security and alien admission and tracking procedures through the USA Patriot
Act of 2001 (P.L. 107-56), and the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform
Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-173). With a similar security focus, the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) incorporated the INS/Border Patrol, Customs, and other
agencies into the new Department of Homeland Security, which officially began
operations on March 1, 2003.
In mid-May 2003, 19 migrants from Mexico and Central America died from
asphyxiation and heatstroke near Victoria, Texas, after being crammed into an
insulated trailer truck, and this incident prompted President Fox to appeal again for
U.S. action on an immigration accord. On June 3, 2003, U.S. and Mexican officials
announced a joint effort to save the lives of migrants by deploying more resources
in the desert regions and by taking more forceful measures against smugglers.
In early 2004, President Bush seeking to revive the immigration discussion,
proposed an overhaul of the U.S. immigration system on January 7, 2004, to permit
the matching of willing foreign workers with willing U.S. employers when no
Americans can be found to fill the jobs. Under the President’s proposal, temporary
legal status would be available to new foreign workers who have work offers in the
United States and to undocumented workers already employed in the United States
for a term of three years that could be renewed but would end at some point. The
proposal includes some incentives to encourage workers to return to their home
countries, such as credit in the worker’s national retirement system and tax-deferred
savings accounts that could be collected upon return.10 A few days after his proposal,
President Bush met with President Fox in Monterrey, Mexico, for a Special Summit
of the Americas, and President Fox welcomed the Bush proposal as a very important
step forward. On January 20, 2004, President Bush called for passage of his
immigration reform proposal in the State of the Union address.
In the 108th Congress, legislative initiatives in this area included S. 1387
(Cornyn) that would establish new temporary foreign worker programs under
agreements with foreign countries; and S. 1645 (Craig)/H.R. 3142 (Cannon), the
“AgJobs” Bill, that would streamline the H-2A agricultural worker program, with
provision for adjusting to legal permanent resident (LPR) status. More
comprehensive proposals that would grant temporary legal status to foreign workers
and to undocumented workers already employed in the United States, with provision
10 For information on the President’s proposal and the congressional initiatives, see CRS
Report RL32044, Immigration: Policy Considerations Related To Guest Worker Programs,
by Andorra Bruno.

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CRS-11
for adjusting to LPR status, included S. 1461 (McCain)/H.R. 2899 (Kolbe), S. 2010
(Hagel and Daschle); and S. 2381 (Kennedy)/H.R. 4262 (Gutierrez).
On February 19-20, 2004, Department of Homeland Security Secretary Tom
Ridge met with Mexican Government Secretary Santiago Creel in Mexico City to
review progress under the U.S.-Mexico Border Partnership. The two leaders signed
the U.S.-Mexico Action Plan for Cooperation and Border Safety for 2004, as well as
a Memorandum of Understanding on the Safe, Orderly, Dignified and Humane
Repatriation of Mexican Nationals. They also committed to develop six new Secure
Electronic Network for Traveler’s Rapid Inspection (SENTRI) lanes for pre-
screened, low-risk individuals, and to develop five new Free and Secure Trade
(FAST) lanes for pre-cleared cargo.
On March 5-6, 2004, President Fox visited President Bush at his ranch in
Crawford, Texas, and it was announced that Mexicans with border crossing cards
would be exempted from the end-of-the-year requirement to be photographed and
finger-scanned upon entry into the United States under the US-VISIT program. On
a related matter, on June 29, 2004, Mexico and the United States signed a social
security totalization agreement, subject to congressional approval, that would
eliminate dual social security taxation and fill gaps in benefit protection for affected
employees who work in both countries.11
On July 22, 2004, the 9/11 Commission issued its final report, calling in one of
its recommendations for the United States to undertake major efforts to collaborate
with other governments in counter-terrorism efforts and to raise border security
standards. The separate House and Senate versions of S. 2845, passed in October
2004, to implement the 9/11 Commission recommendations, contained differing
measures to increase immigration law enforcement personnel and to adopt more
stringent border control and identity document standards.12 Some of the differing
provisions were among the most difficult to resolve in conference, however.
Eventually, after lengthy negotiations and an agreement to consider the left out
matters early in the 109th Congress, the conferees agreed upon a report (H.Rept. 108-
796) that was filed on December 7, 2004.13 The conference report was approved by
the House and the Senate on December 7 and 8, respectively, and was signed into law
(P.L. 108-458) as the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 by
the President on December 17, 2004. The enacted legislation contains provisions
requiring more law enforcement personnel for enforcing immigration laws, closer
monitoring of the entry and exit of aliens, and standards for identification documents
and drivers’ licenses. Under a leadership agreement with certain Representatives, it
was agreed that three issues in the House bill that were dropped in the conference
11 For information on the totalization agreement and social security payments for non-
citizens, see CRS Report RL32004, Social Security Benefits for Noncitizens: Current Policy
and Legislation, by Dawn Nuschler and Alison Siskin.
12 For more information, see CRS Report RL32616, 9/11 Commission: Implications for U.S.
Immigration Law and Policy, by Michael John Garcia and Ruth Ellen Wasem.
13 See Cleared Intelligence Rewrite is Big Finish for the 108th, CQ Weekly, Dec. 11, 2004,
p. 2937.

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CRS-12
report would be addressed early in the 109th Congress, namely, provisions that would
have banned the acceptance of Mexican consular ID cards by Federal officials, that
would have prohibited the issuance of drivers’ licenses to undocumented aliens, and
that would have required the completion of a section of a wall along the border with
Mexico in California.
Drug Trafficking Issues
Nature of the Problem. Mexico remains a major supplier of heroin,
methamphetamine, and marijuana, and the major transit point for cocaine sold in the
United States. Although U.S.-Mexico counter-narcotics efforts have been marked
by distrust at times in the past, with criticisms mounting in March of each year when
the President was required to certify that drug producing and drug transit countries
were cooperating fully with the United States, relations have been improving in
recent years. In the late 1990s, Congress acted to strengthen Border Patrol and
international interdiction efforts along the Southwest Border, and it passed the
Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act (P.L. 106-120), which strengthened the
President’s authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA) to block the assets in the United States of designated international drug
traffickers. Following the July 2000 election of Vicente Fox as President of Mexico,
bills were introduced but not enacted to exempt Mexico from the drug certification
requirements or to modify the requirements.14
Executive-Legislative Actions. President Bush certified, on March 1,
2001, as previous presidents had done, that Mexico had been a fully cooperative
country in efforts to control drug trafficking. He cited the arrest of two key members
of the Tijuana-based Arellano Felix Organization, aggressive eradication programs,
and growing cooperation with the United States by the new Fox Administration. In
presidential meetings in 2001, Presidents Bush and Fox agreed to enhance law
enforcement and counter-narcotics cooperation, and President Fox called for reform
of the U.S. drug certification process. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee
reported out S. 219 and S. 1401 in 2001 to modify the drug certification process, but
no final action was taken. Instead, the certification requirements were temporarily
modified in late 2001 by enactment of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for
FY2002 (H.R. 2506/P.L. 107-115). This measure waived the drug certification
requirements for FY2002 and required the President to designate only countries that
had demonstrably failed to meet international counter-narcotics obligations.15
The Bush Administration’s overall drug control policy, as articulated in
February 2002, seeks to prevent drug use before it starts through education and
community action, to provide adequate treatment resources for drug users, and to
disrupt the marketplace for drugs at home and abroad through eradication,
interdiction, and anti-money-laundering activities. The State Department’s March
2002 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report noted that Mexico’s efforts had
14 See CRS Report 98-174, Mexican Drug Certification Issues: U.S. Congressional Action,
1986-2002.
15 See CRS Report RL30892, Drug Certification Requirements and Congressional
Modifications in 2001-2002, by K. Larry Storrs.

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CRS-13
resulted in tangible successes against the three major drug cartels in the country —
the Arellano Felix Organization (AFO), the Carrillo Fuentes Organization (CFO),
and the Gulf Cartel. It also noted that the Fox Administration sustained the
aggressive eradication program carried out by past administrations and increased the
quantities of drugs seized. Later that month, Mexican authorities announced the
arrest of drug lord Benjamin Arellano-Felix, the killing of his brother Ramon
Arellano Felix, and the arrest of Manuel Herrera Barraza, another key figure in the
Arellano Felix organization.16
In September 2002, Congress passed and the President signed the Foreign
Relations Authorization for FY2003 (P.L. 107-228), with Section 706 of the act
dealing with International Drug Control Certification Procedures. The new
procedures require the President to make a report, not later than September 15 of
each year, identifying the major drug transit or major illicit drug producing countries.
At the same time, he is required to designate any of the named countries that has
“failed demonstrably,” during the previous 12 months, to make substantial efforts to
adhere to international counter-narcotics agreements (defined in the legislation) and
to take other counter-narcotics measures.17
In November 2002, President Fox presented a tougher, more comprehensive,
multi-year National Drug Control Plan, which recognized Mexico’s growing drug
problem and the need for greater cooperation among agencies, while noting Mexican
successes against major drug traffickers. U.S. officials praised Mexico’s counter-
narcotics efforts when President Bush’s drug certification determinations were made
in late January 2003, under new procedures, and when the State Department issued
the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report in early March 2003. In mid-
March 2003, Mexican law enforcement authorities captured alleged drug kingpin
Osiel Cardenas-Guillen, reputed head of the Gulf Cartel.
On July 31, 2003, Mexican and U.S. officials announced the dismantlement of
the Zambada Garcia drug cartel after a 19-month investigation that led to the arrest
of 240 people in Mexico and the United States and the seizure of significant
quantities of illicit drugs. On September 15, 2003, when President Bush designated
the worst offending countries in counter-narcotics efforts under the new certification
and designation procedures, there was no mention of Mexico. In a troubling
development, in late January 2004, a number of Mexican state police officers were
being held in the border state of Chihuahua on suspicion of involvement with drug
traffickers in the killing of 11 men from rival drug gangs.
16 See CRS Report RL31412, Mexico’s Counter-Narcotics Efforts under Fox, December
2000 to April 2002, by K. Larry Storrs.
17 U.S. assistance would be withheld from any designated countries unless the President
determines that the provision of assistance to that country is vital to the national interest of
the United States or that the designated country subsequently made substantial counter-
narcotics efforts. Notwithstanding the general suspension of the previous drug certification
and sanctions procedures, subsection 706(5)(B) provides that the President may apply those
procedures at his discretion. A transition rule provides that for FY2003, the required report
was to be submitted at least 15 days before foreign assistance funds are obligated or
expended.

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CRS-14
According to the State Department’s March 2004 International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Mexico is the transit point for about 70% of the
cocaine entering the United States, the leading foreign source of marijuana, one of
two major suppliers of heroin, and a major producing and transit country for
methamphetamine and other synthetic drugs. Despite Mexico’s major role as a
producing and transit country, the Fox Administration was credited with carrying out
major efforts to eradicate and seize illicit drugs, with achieving tangible results
against drug trafficking organizations, and with providing unprecedented cooperation
with the United States. The State Department reported in April 2004, however, that
marijuana cultivation increased 70% and opium poppy cultivation increased 78% in
Mexico in 2003, in part because of unusually favorable growing conditions.18
In recent law enforcement actions with U.S.-Mexico cooperation, alleged
Central American drug trafficker Otto Herrera-Garcia was arrested in Mexico on
April 21, 2004, on drug trafficking charges, and Mexican national Jaime Ross-
Castillo was arrested in Mexico on the same day on money-laundering charges.
Later, Efrain Perez and Jorge Arellano Felix, two alleged lieutenants of the Arellano-
Felix Organization (AFO) drug cartel, were arrested in Mexico on June 3, 2004. Still
later, Ramiro Hernández, an alleged leader of the Gulf drug cartel, was arrested on
August 10, 2004, and Gilberto Higuera Guerrero, an alleged leader of the Sinaloa
drug cartel, was arrested on August 22, 2004. On October 19, 2004, DEA officials
announced the dismantling of a major Mexican money-laundering and drug
trafficking organization operating in the United States. On November 24, 2004, the
U.S. Treasury added the names of six leaders of the Arellano Feliz Organization, a
Mexican narcotics cartel, to the list of persons subject to economic sanctions and
restrictions under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act.
Political and Human Rights Issues
Concerns over Elections and Political Rights. Over the years, major
attention has focused on the fairness of elections in Mexico because the Institutional
Revolutionary Party or PRI controlled the presidency until 2000, all gubernatorial
posts until the 1990s, and had solid control of the two chambers of the Mexican
Congress until 1997, although the PAN had made progress in capturing control of
major cities for several decades. Following the controversial July 1988 presidential
election, however, major electoral reforms were enacted in the early 1990s and the
mid-1990s, and subsequent elections produced a number of opposition victories and
increasingly pluralistic legislatures.
In the period leading to the July 2000 presidential and congressional elections,
former Government Minister Francisco Labastida was selected as the candidate of
the PRI in an open nation-wide primary. Efforts by the PAN and the PRD to agree
on a common candidate for the opposition came to an impasse, and former Governor
of Guanajuato Vicente Fox was designated as the presidential candidate for the PAN,
and former mayor of the Mexico City Federal District Cuauhtemoc Cardenas was
designated as the presidential candidate for the PRD. On July 2, 2000, Vicente Fox
18 For more detail, see CRS Report RL32669, Mexico’s Counter-Narcotics Efforts under
Fox, December 2000 to October 2004, by K. Larry Storrs.

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CRS-15
of the Alliance for Change (PAN/PVEM) was elected President with 42.52% of the
vote, marking the first election of a president from an opposition party in 71 years
and erasing many doubts about the fairness of elections.19
On July 6, 2003, Mexico held nation-wide elections to renew the membership
of the 500-seat Chamber of Deputies, and to elect local officials in ten states.
Official results indicated that President Fox’s conservative National Action Party
(PAN) fared poorly, winning only 31% of the seats in the Chamber and two of the
six governorships in contention. The previously long-ruling centrist Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI) secured a dominant position in the Chamber with 45% of
the seats, and it won four of the six gubernatorial races, while the leftist Party of the
Democratic Revolution (PRD) increased representation in the Chamber to 19% of the
seats, and consolidated local control in the Mexico City Federal District.20
In 2003, the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) assessed steep fines against the two
largest parties in the country for irregularities in campaign financing during the 2000
presidential election. In February 2003, the IFE assessed a fine against the PRI for
illegally receiving funds for the 2000 campaign from the union of the Mexican
petroleum monopoly (Pemex). In October 2003, the IFE assessed fines against the
PAN and the PVEM for illegally receiving foreign contributions from the Amigos
de Fox (Friends of Fox) organization in the 2000 campaign. In April 2004, the IFE
imposed major fines upon all of Mexico’s political parties for irregularities during
the July 2003 Chamber of Deputies election, including five whose registry expired
because of inadequate voting support, for exceeding campaign spending limits and
other violations of law.
In 2004, considerable attention focused on the state and municipal elections in
a number of states. In local elections in the state of Yucatan on May 16, 2004, the
PAN won in 50 municipalities, including the capital city of Mérida, while the PRI
won 50 and the PRD won 5 municipalities. In the state assembly, the PAN will have
13 deputies, the PRI will have 10, and the PRD will have 2. In state elections in
Chihuahua, Durango, and Zacatecas on July 4, 2004, the PRI in alliance with the
PVEM and the PT retained the governorships in Chihuahua and Durango, while the
PRD in alliance with PAN retained control in Zacatecas. In state elections on August
1, 2004, the PRI won the mayoral race in the northern border city of Tijuana and
claimed victory in the gubernatorial race in southern Oaxaca state where the result
was contested, while the PAN won the gubernatorial election in Aguascalientes. On
September 5, 2004, the PRI won the governorship in Veracruz in disputed elections,
and on October 3, 2004, the PRI generally won in municipal elections in Oaxaca and
Chiapas, winning control of several major cities previously controlled by the PAN.
Allegations of Human Rights Abuses. Charges of human rights abuse in
Mexico, cited by human rights groups and the State Department’s annual reports,
include allegations of torture, harassment, and extra-judicial killings by law
19 For more detail, see CRS Report RS20611, Mexico’s Presidential, Legislative, and Local
Elections of July 2, 2000, by K. Larry Storrs.
20 For more detail, see CRS Report RS21561, Mexico’s Congress and July 2003 Elections,
by K. Larry Storrs.

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CRS-16
enforcement agents, and threats against journalists and human rights monitors. Other
abuses include prison deficiencies, discrimination against women and indigenous
peoples, and extensive child labor in the informal sector. The State Department’s
March 2004 report on human rights conditions in Mexico notes that the
government’s efforts to improve the human rights situation have appeared to stall,
with a few exceptions.
President Fox, even before taking office, appointed well known human rights
activist Mariclaire Acosta as a Special Ambassador for Human Rights, and Mexican
spokesmen have asserted that Mexico will be open to visits by human rights
organizations and foreign visitors and will take strong human rights positions.
Immediately after his inauguration, President Fox signed an agreement with the
United Nations to provide technical assistance on human rights. The killing of
human rights lawyer Digna Ochoa y Placido on October 19, 2001, raised questions
about the government’s human rights policies, and prompted calls for prompt action
by the government from domestic and foreign human rights organizations. Criticism
has also been expressed over the government’s allegations in May and June 2002
and again in July 2003 that her death may have been a suicide. President Fox freed
two well known Mexican environmentalists that Digna Ochoa had represented and
defended, namely Rodolfo Montiel and Teodoro Cabrera, on November 8, 2001.
The National Commission on Human Rights presented a report to President
Fox, on November 27, 2001, that documented human rights abuses and
disappearances of persons in the 1970s and early 1980s, and President Fox named
legal scholar Ignacio Carrillo as a Special Prosecutor to investigate these and other
cases on January 4, 2002. President Fox ordered the release from prison of General
Jose Francisco Gallardo on February 9, 2002, but did not pardon him, despite the fact
that human rights groups argue that his conviction in military courts for theft and
corruption was fabricated because of his advocacy of a human rights ombudsman for
the Mexican military. On May 31, 2002, 26 indigenous peasants were killed in an
incident in southern Oaxaca, and 15 men and one woman were arrested in early June
2002 for the killings that were purportedly motivated by longstanding land disputes
in the area. In June 2002, President Fox signed a new Freedom of Information Act
for Mexico, and released secret government archives. In late September 2002,
Mexican army officers General Mario Arturo Acosta and Francisco Quiros, both
already in prison on drug trafficking charges, were charged, along with retired Major
Francisco Javier Barquin, with homicide for the killings of 143 anti-government
activists in the 1970s.
On March 24, 2003, authorities charged Luis de la Barreda Moreno, the former
head of the now disbanded secret police, with torture and murder of alleged guerrilla
leader Jesus Piedra Ibarra in the mid-1970s. Although the Mexican government has
arrested a number of suspects for involvement in the past abuses, Human Rights
Watch issued a report in late July 2003 arguing that the special prosecutor has failed
to produce significant results, and that the office has received inadequate support
from the government. Critics argue that the government has been reluctant to press
human rights issues while courting support from the long-ruling PRI, and they point
to the elimination, in early August 2003, of the position of Special Ambassador for
Human Rights as evidence.

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CRS-17
In late January 2004, President Fox named a special prosecutor to coordinate the
federal and state efforts to find and punish those responsible for a decade of slayings
of over 300 women in Ciudad Juarez, across the border from El Paso, Texas. On
February 18, 2004, the former chief of Mexico’s secret police, Miguel Nazar Haro,
was arrested and charged with the torture and murder of alleged guerrilla leader Jesus
Piedra Ibarra in the mid-1970s. On July 24, 2004, a Mexican judge refused the
special prosecutor’s request for an arrest warrant against former President Luis
Echeverria for involvement in a 1971 massacre, on grounds that the statute of
limitations had expired. On December 10, 2004, President Fox, responding to an
analysis by the UN High Commission for Human Rights, presented a series of
proposed human rights reforms that would discourage torture and strengthen the
rights of defendants in Mexico.
For Additional Reading
CRS Products
CRS Report RL32616. 9/11 Commission: Implications for U.S. Immigration Law
and Policy, by Michael John Garcia and Ruth Ellen Wasem.
CRS Report RL32094. Consular Identification Cards: Domestic and Foreign Policy
Implications, the Mexican Case, and Related Legislation, by Andorra Bruno and
K. Larry Storrs.
CRS Report RL32038. Drug Certification/Designation Procedures for Illicit
Narcotics Producing and Transit Countries, by K. Larry Storrs.
CRS Report RL30892. Drug Certification Requirements and Congressional
Modifications in 2001-2002, by K. Larry Storrs.
CRS Issue Brief IB88093. Drug Control: International Policy and Options, by
Raphael Perl.
CRS Report RL32169. Immigration Legislation and Issues in the 108th Congress,
by Andorra Bruno, Coordinator.
CRS Report RL32044. Immigration: Policy Considerations Related to Guest
Worker Programs, by Andorra Bruno.
CRS Report RL31386. Industry Trade Effects Related to NAFTA, by M. Angeles
Villarreal.
CRS Report 98-174. Mexican Drug Certification Issues: U.S. Congressional Action,
1986-2002, by K. Larry Storrs.
CRS Report RL32669. Mexico’s Counter-Narcotics Efforts Under Fox, December
2000 to October 2004, by K. Larry Storrs.

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CRS-18
CRS Report RL31412. Mexico’s Congress and July 2003 Elections, by K. Larry
Storrs.
CRS Report RS20611. Mexico’s Presidential, Legislative, and Local Elections of
July 2, 2000, by K. Larry Storrs.
CRS Report 97-861. NAFTA Labor Side Agreement: Lessons for the Worker Rights
and Fast-Track Debate, by Mary Jane Bolle.
CRS Report RS21737. NAFTA at Ten: Lessons from Recent Studies, by J.F.
Hornbeck.
CRS Report 97-291. NAFTA: Related Environmental Issues and Initiatives, by Mary
Tiemann.
CRS Report RL32004. Social Security Benefits for Noncitizens: Current Policy and
Legislation, by Dawn Nuschler and Alison Siskin.

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