Order Code RL32711
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Homeland Security:
Compendium of Recommendations
Relevant to House Committee Organization and
Analysis of Considerations for the House
December 29, 2004
Michael L. Koempel
Senior Specialist in American National Government
Government and Finance Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Homeland Security:
Compendium of Recommendations
Relevant to House Committee Organization and
Analysis of Considerations for the House
Summary
Commissions and think tanks studying homeland security have recommended
congressional committee reorganization to increase Congress’s policy and oversight
coordination. This report analyzes selected recommendations.
In the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Congress included a sense of the
Congress resolution that each chamber should review its committee structure. This
report identifies the definitions of homeland security included in the act.
In the 108th Congress, the House created a Select Committee on Homeland
Security, and charged it with studying the rules of the House with respect to the issue
of homeland security. The select committee recommended a standing Committee on
Homeland Security. This report digests the select committee’s recommendations.
Before the select committee made its recommendations, one of its
subcommittees held four hearings on Perspectives on House Reform. To analyze the
content of these hearings, this report organizes the testimony into 10 categories.
The House has tended not to change its committee structure after executive
branch reorganizations. This report contains a brief history of House committees.
One consideration in creating a homeland security committee relates to the
concentration or dispersal of homeland security jurisdiction. The House at different
times has made different decisions about concentrating or dispersing jurisdiction.
A second consideration in creating a homeland security committee relates to
implications of jurisdictional changes. Proponents of a new committee point to the
fragmentation of jurisdiction over homeland security. Others point to the record of
Congress as a strong indication that existing committees are capable of action.
A third consideration in creating a homeland security committee is whether such
a committee is sufficient for policymaking. Even if a new committee is created, other
committees will still have jurisdiction over components of homeland security.
Related CRS reports are: CRS Report RL32661, House Committees: A
Framework for Considering Jurisdictional Realignment, by Michael L. Koempel;
CRS Report RS21901, House Select Committee on Homeland Security: Possible
Questions Raised If the Panel Were to Be Reconstituted as a Standing Committee,
by Judy Schneider; CRS Report RL31835, Reorganization of the House of
Representatives: Modern Reform Efforts, by Judy Schneider, Christopher M. Davis,
and Betsy Palmer; and CRS Report RL31572, Appropriations Subcommittee
Structure: History of Changes, 1920-2003, by James V. Saturno. This report will not
be updated.

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Contents
Homeland Security and House Committees in the 107th and 108th Congresses . . . 3
107th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
108th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
108th Congress Hearings on Homeland Security and Committee Organization . . 7
Importance of Homeland Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Future Development of the Department of Homeland Security . . 9
Conduct of Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Department’s Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Executive-Legislative Balance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Committee Overlap vs. Committee Expertise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Competing Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
The Committees’ Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
What Is Homeland Security? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Options Suggested . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Homeland Security Committee Built Incrementally . . . . . . 18
No Homeland Security Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Transfer Jurisdiction over DHS to Homeland
Security Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Split Transportation and Infrastructure Committee . . . . . . . 21
Assign Homeland Security to the Government
Reform Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Select Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Ad Hoc Committees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Budget Subcommittee on Homeland Security . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Homeland Security Subcommittees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Select Committee’s Recommendations for a Homeland Security Committee . . 24
Subsequent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
What Is Homeland Security? The Homeland Security Act of 2002 . . . . . . . . . . 29
What Is Homeland Security? Commission and Think Tank Recommendations 31
9/11 Commission Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Bremer Commission
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Gilmore Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Hart-Rudman Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Brookings Institution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

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Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Center for Strategic and International Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Recommendation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
A Brief History of House Committees and Department Creation . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Analysis of Considerations Relevant to the
Creation of a Homeland Security Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Concentration or Dispersal of Homeland Security Jurisdiction . . . . . . 47
Implications of Jurisdictional Gains and Losses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Would a Homeland Security Committee Be Enough? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Appendix A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Recommendations of the Select Committee on Homeland Security on
Changes to the Rules of the House of Representatives with
Respect to Homeland Security Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Appendix B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Recommendations on Congressional Organization
Made by the 9/11 Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Appendix C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Recommendations on Congressional Organization
Made by the Bremer Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Appendix D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Recommendations on Congressional Organization
Made by the Gilmore Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Appendix E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Recommendations on Congressional Organization
Made by the Hart-Rudman Commission . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Appendix F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Recommendations on Congressional Organization
Made by The Brookings Institution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Appendix G . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Recommendations on Congressional Organization Made By the
Center for Strategic and International Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

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Homeland Security:
Compendium of Recommendations
Relevant to House Committee Organization
and
Analysis of Considerations for the House
As directed by the House,1 the Select Committee on Homeland Security reported
to the House Rules Committee September 30, 2004, its recommendations on “the
operation and implementation of the rules of the House, including rule X, with
respect to the issue of homeland security.” The select committee recommended the
creation of a permanent standing Committee on Homeland Security, with specified
jurisdiction.
A number of House committees currently have important roles in homeland
security policymaking. The Appropriations Committee’s role related to discretionary
spending is clear cut, and the committee reorganized its subcommittees at the start
of the 108th Congress to create a Homeland Security Subcommittee aligned with the
component parts of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Legislative authority over policy areas and federal agencies included in DHS are
principally within the jurisdiction of several standing House committees: Agriculture,
Armed Services, Energy and Commerce, Financial Services, Government Reform,
International Relations, Judiciary, Science, Transportation and Infrastructure, and
Ways and Means, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Some of
these committees also have jurisdiction over federal agencies and components of
federal programs included in the department that have non-homeland-security-related
purposes. In the 108th Congress, the Select Committee on Homeland Security also
had jurisdiction over legislation affecting DHS.
In addition, some committees have key roles to play in overseeing homeland-
security-related policy areas and federal agencies not incorporated in the department.
These committees are Armed Services, Energy and Commerce, Financial Services,
International Relations, and Judiciary Committees, and the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence.
1 H.Res. 5, §4(b)(3). H.Res. 5 was agreed to in the House Jan. 7, 2003.

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CRS-2
On July 22, 2004, the 9/11 Commission2 became the latest of a number of
commissions, think tanks, and other entities to weigh in on congressional oversight
of the issue of homeland security. Some of these entities issued reports before the
creation of DHS, some before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and some
more recently. In addition, witnesses at House committee hearings in the 108th
Congress held by subcommittees of the Select Committee on Homeland Security and
the Committee on Rules provided additional ideas related to House oversight of
homeland security. These entities’ and witnesses’ recommendations varied, but their
variety offers the House a wealth of perspectives to draw on related to congressional-
executive relations, building knowledge of homeland security policy issues among
Members, and other aspects of congressional handling of the issue of homeland
security.
A specific recommendation of the 9/11 Commission and other entities was
creation of a homeland security committee in each chamber. In addition, a number
of witnesses at the House subcommittee hearings recommended a homeland security
committee in the House, and made recommendations related to jurisdiction,
membership, and other factors.
It is a complex question, however, to take the recommendations of the 9/11
Commission and other entities and of witnesses at the House subcommittee hearings
and determine the potential meaning and scope of homeland security in considering
committee jurisdictions. One difficulty lies in trying to narrow the term to focus
solely on the homeland — within the United States — as reflected in this statement
from the 9/11 Commission report:
America [in the post-Cold War world] stood out as an object for admiration,
envy, and blame. This created a kind of cultural asymmetry. To us Afghanistan
seemed very far away. To members of al Qaeda, America seemed very close.
In a sense, they were more globalized than we were.3
Homeland security begins with counterterrorism and other initiatives overseas, and
it includes intelligence activities at home and abroad that can help prevent terrorist
attacks. In the 9/11 Commission recommendations, those of other entities, and those
of some hearings witnesses, homeland security is a continuum of international and
domestic initiatives and activities, all of which are essential to reducing the
likelihood and potential impact of terrorist attacks against the United States.
Another difficulty lies is the connectedness of homeland security to other policy
areas. For transportation policy, agricultural policy, public health policy, trade
policy, and so on, homeland security is one component of the policy area. Even if
2 Among the purposes spelled out in the law creating the commission, the commission was
to “make a full and complete accounting of the circumstances surrounding the attacks of
September 11, 2001,” the source of the commission’s popular name. The commission’s
official name was the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.
3 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Report: Final
Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
(Washington: GPO, July 22, 2004), p. 340. (Available online at
[http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/index.html], visited Dec. 10, 2004.)

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CRS-3
homeland security is now recognized as a critical component, some policymakers see
the need for homeland security policy to mesh with the specific policy area and to
be made within the context of the specific policy area.
This report presents and discusses the recommendations of the Select
Committee on Homeland Security, the 9/11 Commission, and five other entities
relevant to House committee organization and the issue of homeland security.
(Related text from the select committee’s, the 9/11 Commission’s, and other entities’
reports appear in the appendices.) The report also synthesizes hearings testimony on
House committee organization related to homeland security before the select
committee and a subcommittee of the House Rules Committee. Finally, it analyzes
the options and implications of this body of recommendations for House committee
organization. The report is intended to support the House in evaluating potential
changes to its oversight of homeland security as it makes and implements decisions
on committee organization in the 109th Congress.

Homeland Security and House Committees in the
107th and 108th Congresses
107th Congress
Shortly after the convening of the 107th Congress, Speaker Hastert initiated a
Working Group on Terrorism and Homeland Security as a unit of the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.4 Following the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, the Speaker and Minority Leader Gephardt announced the
elevation of the working group to a subcommittee.5 The subcommittee was to
“coordinate the efforts of various [House] committees” with a claim to jurisdiction
over various aspects of terrorism and to “provide a clearinghouse for legislative
proposals.”6
Subsequently, the jurisdictional complexity of the subject matter of homeland
security was demonstrated by the referral of the House measure to create DHS. That
bill, H.R. 5005, was referred to 12 committees. A thirteenth committee, the Select
Committee on Homeland Security, was created for the 107th Congress to receive
4 Rep. Porter Goss, remarks in the House, “Publication of the Rules of the Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, 107th Congress,” Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 147,
Mar. 20, 2001, pp. H990-H994; and Niels C. Sorrells, “Chambliss Claims Intelligence Seat
Surrendered by Bass,” CQ Daily Monitor, vol. 37, Feb. 16, 2001, p. 9.
5 “Terrorism Working Group Now An Intelligence Subcommittee,” CQ Daily Monitor, vol.
37, Sep. 21, 2001, p. 11.
6 House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Terrorism and
H o m e l a n d S e c u r i t y , a r c h i v e d h o m e p a g e ( a v a i l a b l e o n l i n e a t
[http://web.archive.org/web/20011011082741/intelligence.house.gov/terrorism.htm], visited
Dec. 10, 2004).

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CRS-4
these committees’ recommendations and to mark up and report a bill.7 Additional
committees had narrower jurisdictional claims to H.R. 5005, but the bill was not
referred to them.8
Congress also included the following provision related to House and Senate
committee organization in the Homeland Security Act:
It is the sense of Congress that each House of Congress should review its
committee structure in light of the reorganization of responsibilities within the
executive branch by the establishment of the Department.9
108th Congress
The sense-of-the-Congress provision on review of committee structure included
in the Homeland Security Act did not require either chamber to take action related
to committee organization. The House, however, responded in adopting its rules for
the 108th Congress by creating a Select Committee on Homeland Security for the
duration of the 108th Congress.10 The House vested the select committee with the
following jurisdiction:
(1) LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTION — The select committee may develop
recommendations and report to the House by bill or otherwise on such matters
that relate to the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) as may
be referred to it by the Speaker.
(2) OVERSIGHT FUNCTION — The select committee shall review and study
on a continuing basis laws, programs, and Government activities relating to
homeland security.11
Speaker Hastert explained the purpose of the select committee in remarks to the
House following his reelection as Speaker:
7 H.Res. 449 was agreed to in the House June 19, 2002.
8 See CRS Report RL31449, House and Senate Committee Organization and Jurisdiction:
Considerations Related to Proposed Department of Homeland Security, by Judy Schneider.
9 P.L. 107-296, §1503; 116 Stat. 2135, 2309.
10 In the Senate for the 108th Congress, jurisdiction over DHS resided in the Governmental
Affairs Committee, which had marked up and reported legislation in the 107th Congress to
create the department. Jurisdiction over various agencies and programs incorporated into
the department was to be shared with other committees based on their jurisdictions. See
Sen. Bill Frist, remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 149, Jan.
7, 2003, p. S26; and Mary Dalrymple, “Homeland Security Oversight Lands at
Governmental Affairs,” CQ Daily Monitor, vol. 39, Jan. 8, 2003, p. 5.
Subsequently, on Oct. 9, 2004, the Senate agreed to S.Res. 445, which renamed the
Governmental Affairs Committee as the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
Committee and made jurisdictional changes in this and other Senate committees, effective
in the 109th Congress. See Andrew Taylor, “Senators Fight over Turf in Revamp of
Homeland Security Oversight,” CQ Weekly, vol. 62, no. 40, Oct. 16, 2004, p. 2460.
11 H.Res. 5, §4(b)(1) and (2); H.Res. 5 was agreed to in the House Jan. 7, 2003.

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CRS-5
Later on today, we will vote to create a Select Committee on Homeland Security.
Members of this select committee will oversee the creation of the Department of
Homeland Security to make certain that the executive branch is carrying out the
will of the Congress. This select committee will be our eyes and our ears as this
critical department is organized. The standing committees of the House will
maintain their jurisdictions and will still have authorization and oversight
responsibilities. This House needs to adapt to the largest reorganization of our
executive branch in 50 years, and this select committee will help us make this
transition.12
In its 108th Congress rules changes, the House also amended Rule XII, cl. 2(c)(1)
to add the phrase shown here in italic:
(c) In carrying out paragraphs (a) and (b) with respect to the referral of a matter,
the Speaker —
(1) shall designate a committee of primary jurisdiction (except where he
determines that extraordinary circumstances justify review by more than one
committee as though primary);13
The jurisdiction of the select committee provided the House with a focus for
homeland security legislation and oversight, without immediately changing the
jurisdictions of the standing committees that held jurisdiction over aspects of
homeland security.14 The addition to the Speaker’s referral authority provided him
with increased flexibility in referring homeland security legislation in this context,
if needed, and with increased flexibility in referring other legislation where he
deemed it an appropriate form of referral.15

12 Speaker Hastert, remarks in the House, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 149, Jan.
7, 2003, p. H5.
13 H.Res. 5, §2(i).
14 During debate on the rules changes proposed to the House, Rep. Oberstar, the ranking
member of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, observed: “Mr. Speaker,
the proposal to create a new Select Committee on Homeland Security interestingly does not
make any changes in the legislative jurisdiction of the committees outlined in rule 10 of the
rules of the House.” He ended his remarks by asking a question of House Rules Committee
Chairman Dreier about referral in the 108th Congress of a bill covering subject matter that,
in the 107th Congress, had been reported by the Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee. Chairman Dreier responded: “Mr. Speaker, let me just say that it is very clear
that the Speaker does have authority to refer legislation, and it is his intent to ensure that we
maintain the jurisdiction of those committees.” Rep. James L. Oberstar and Rep. David
Dreier, remarks in the House, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol. 149, Jan. 7, 2003,
p. H15.
15 In explaining the package of rules changes proposed to the House, Rules Committee
Chairman Dreier said about this change: “Section 2(1) permits the joint referral of measures
without designation of primary jurisdiction. This change is meant only as a minor deviation
from the normal requirement under the rules for the designation of one committee of
primary jurisdiction and should be exercised only in extraordinary jurisdictionally deserving
instances.” Rep. David Dreier, remarks in House, Congressional Record, daily edition, vol.
149, Jan. 7, 2003, p. H11.

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CRS-6
In the 108th Congress, measures related to homeland security were referred to
the Select Committee on Homeland Security and in addition to other committees,
with the select committee designated by the Speaker as the primary committee.
Other measures related to homeland security were referred in addition to the select
committee and other committees, with a committee other than the select committee
designated by the Speaker as the primary committee. Some measures related to
homeland security were not referred to the select committee.16
The House Appropriations Committee responded to the creation of DHS with
a reorganization of its subcommittees. On January 29, 2003, House Appropriations
Committee Chairman Bill Young announced the creation of the Homeland Security
Subcommittee to correspond to the agencies and programs incorporated in the new
Department of Homeland Security. The jurisdictions of the other subcommittees were
realigned in order to retain 13 appropriations subcommittees, including the new
subcommittee.17
In addition, five House authorizing committees renamed or reorganized
subcommittees to create homeland security or terrorism subcommittees:
! Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and
Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services;
! Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and
International Relations, Committee on Government Reform;
16 See, for example, Homeland Security: Bill Referrals in the House, 108th Congress, by
Judy Schneider, CRS congressional distribution memorandum, April 9, 2003.
17 House Committee on Appropriations, “Chairman Young Announces Homeland Security
Reorganization,” news release, Jan. 29, 2003. (Available online at
[http://appropriations.house.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressRele
ase_id=210&Month=1&Year=2003], visited Dec. 10, 2004.) Jurisdictions of the
Appropriations Committee’s subcommittees are available on the committee’s website; see,
for example, that of the Subcommittee on Homeland Security,
[http://appropriations.house.gov/index.cfm?FuseAction=AboutTheCommittee.Jurisdictio
n&SubcommitteeId=14], visited Dec. 10, 2004. See also CRS Report RL31572,
Appropriations Subcommittee Structure: History of Changes, 1920-2003, by James V.
Saturno.
On March 4, 2003, Senate Appropriations Committee Chairman Stevens and Ranking
Member Byrd announced the committee’s reorganization, which mirrored the House
committee’s changes. Senate Committee on Appropriations, “Appropriations Committee
Sets Subcommittee Assignments,” news release, March 4, 2003. (Available online at
[http://appropriations.senate.gov/releases/record.cfm?id=190975], visited Dec. 10, 2004.)
A crosswalk of federal agencies and programs to the Senate Appropriations subcommittee
with jurisdiction is available at [http://appropriations.senate.gov/jurisdiction/
juristiction.pdf], visited Dec. 10, 2004.
In addition, the Senate approved S.Res. 445 on Oct. 9, 2004, which in sec. 402 created
an intelligence appropriations subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee, but allowed
the committee to determine the changes to be made in other appropriations subcommittees
in order to retain 13 subcommittees. See “Amendment No. 4015 to Amendment No. 3981”
and “Amendment No. 4042 to Amendment No. 4015,” Congressional Record, daily edition,
vol. 150, Oct. 9, 2004, pp. S10908-S10909, S10917-S10918.

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CRS-7
! Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and
Human Rights, Committee on International Relations;
! Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security,
Committee on the Judiciary (created in 107th Congress);18 and
! as mentioned above concerning the 107th Congress, Subcommittee
on Terrorism and Homeland Security, Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence.
Finally, the Select Committee on Homeland Security was given another function
in the House rules resolution — to assist the House in determining how it might
organize itself in the future vis-à-vis the issue of homeland security:
(3) RULES STUDY — The select committee is authorized and directed to
conduct a thorough and complete study of the operation and implementation of
the rules of the House, including rule X, with respect to the issue of homeland
security. The select committee shall submit its recommendations regarding any
changes in the rules of the House to the Committee on Rules not later than
September 30, 2004.19
The next section synthesizes testimony received at hearings conducted by a
subcommittee of the select committee on the operation and implementation of the
rules of the House, including Rule X. The section following it explains the
recommendation of the select committee to the Rules Committee, and lists
developments in the 108th Congress after the release of the select committee’s
recommendations.
108th Congress Hearings on Homeland Security and
Committee Organization
When the Select Committee on Homeland Security organized, it created a
Subcommittee on Rules under the chairmanship of Representative Lincoln Diaz-
Balart to carry out the study of House rules. The subcommittee conducted four
hearings to support the select committee in fulfilling the House’s mandate.20
Witnesses at three of the Rules Subcommittee hearings in 2003 unanimously
endorsed the existence of a House committee with legislative and oversight
18 Pamela Barnett, “Subcommittee Name Change Reflects Homeland Security Issues,”
CongressDaily AM, Mar. 21, 2002, p. 12.
19 H.Res. 5, §4(b)(3).
20 House Select Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Rules, Perspectives
on House Reform: Lessons from the Past, hearings, 108th Cong., 1st sess., May 19, 2003
(Washington: GPO, 2004); Perspectives on House Reform: Committees and the Executive
Branch, hearings, 108th Cong., 1st sess., July 10, 2003 (Washington: GPO, 2004);
Perspectives on House Reform: Former House Leaders, hearings, 108th Cong., 1st sess.,
Sept. 9, 2003 (Washington: GPO, 2004); and Homeland Security Jurisdiction: The
Perspective of Committee Leaders, hearings, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., March 24, 2004
(Washington: GPO, 2004).

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jurisdiction over DHS and the policy area of homeland security, although there were
variations in specific recommendations in these witnesses’ testimony and responses
to subcommittee members’ questions. These public witnesses — academic experts
on Congress, former Speakers Foley and Gingrich, former Members Robert Walker
and Lee Hamilton, and former Departments of Defense and Energy Secretary James
Schlesinger — testified on the importance and uniqueness of homeland security in
explaining their support for a separate legislative committee. The then-House
parliamentarian also testified on May 19, 2003, providing a context for previous
House committee reorganizations and attempted reorganizations.
Witnesses at the Rules Subcommittee’s fourth hearing on March 24, 2004, and
at a hearing held by another subcommittee, the Subcommittee on Technology and the
House, on June 16-17, 2004,21 comprised almost exclusively chairs and ranking
members of House committees. The Members made a variety of suggestions
regarding creation of a House committee on homeland security with legislative and
oversight jurisdiction, and raised a number of issues to be considered by the House
in deciding whether to create a committee and what kind of committee to create,
including the impact on existing committees.
The remainder of this section categorizes key considerations developed in the
four Rules Subcommittee hearings, and synthesizes the testimony from witnesses at
those hearings. Committee chairs and ranking members who testified at the hearing
held by the Subcommittee on Technology and the House presented similar
considerations. Cross references to the hearing of the Subcommittee on Technology
and the House are provided in the footnotes in the balance of this section.22
Most quotations in this section are from oral testimony at the Rules
Subcommittee hearings. In those instances where an excerpt from a prepared
statement is used, that is noted.
Importance of Homeland Security. In his oral and written statements,
former Speaker Gingrich explained the depth and breadth of the terrorist threat and
the potential loss of life that could result from some forms of terrorist attack.23 In his
prepared statement, Speaker Gingrich introduced this explanation by stating:
The risk of potentially losing millions of Americans and even having the very
fabric of our society torn apart is why there is no issue or problem for which
21 A subcommittee of the House Rules Committee. House Rules Committee, Subcommittee
on Technology and the House, Rule X, The Organization of Committees, hearings, 108th
Cong., 2nd sess., June 16-17, 2004 (unprinted) (available online at
[http://www.house.gov/rules/108_hear_ruleX.htm], visited Dec. 10, 2004).
22 For a range of information on committee organization (e.g., options for House committee
organization and testimony by Members), see U.S. Senate, Joint Committee on the
Organization of Congress, Background Materials: Supplemental Information Provided to
Members of the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress, Senate print 103-55,
103rd Cong., 1st sess. (Washington: GPO, 1993).
23 Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Former House Leaders, Sept. 9, 2003, pp. 9-
16.

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Congress must organize and allocate time and resources which is more important
than creating an effective system of Homeland Security.24
Former Secretary Schlesinger also addressed the threat of terrorist attacks to
American democracy and society.25 Witnesses such as Donald Wolfensberger26
testified on the duration and seriousness of the terrorist threat as reasons for a
“concentrated effort by both the executive and Congress.”27
Aviation Subcommittee28 Chairman Mica explained the congressional
environment:
The problem has never been a lack of focus or interest by the standing
committees. Rather, the missing ingredient was a national consensus that
terrorism should be a top priority. Congress as a whole reflected the national
will and has been unable to make the tough choices terrorism required. And that,
we know, is a part of our history, unfortunately, today.
9/11 changed that, and within days or a few weeks the standing committees had
legislation ready.29
Future Development of the Department of Homeland Security.
Witnesses testified on the importance of the new Department of Homeland Security
developing organizationally so that it could successfully carry out its mission. This
point was often coupled with a witness’s perspective on whether a single House
homeland security committee was needed. For example, at the Rules
Subcommittee’s July 10 hearing, former Secretary Schlesinger was asked to
summarize the points he had made on why it was important for the House to have a
permanent committee on homeland security:
24 Ibid., p. 13.
25 Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Committees and the Executive Branch, July
10, 2003, pp. 21, 23. For additional perspectives on the importance of homeland security,
see Select Committee on Homeland Security, Freedom Defended: Implementing America’s
Strategy for Homeland Security, committee white paper, 108th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington:
Select Committee on Homeland Security, Oct. 5, 2004), available online at
[http://hsc.house.gov/files/freedom_defended.pdf], visited Dec. 10, 2004; and Rep. Jim
Turner, Winning the War on Terror (Washington: Select Committee on Homeland
Security/Democratic Office, April 27, 2004), available online at
[http://www.house.gov/hsc/democrats/issues_winning_war_terror.shtml], visited Dec. 10,
2004).
26 Mr. Wolfensberger was formerly chief of staff of the House Committee on Rules. He
serves as director of the Congress Project at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International
Scholars.
27 Ibid., pp. 32-33, 35.
28 A subcommittee of the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee.
29 Homeland Security Jurisdiction: The Perspectives of Committee Leaders, March 24, 2004,
p. 77.

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It is quite simple: It means that you will not be helping this new department to
become more unified on the mission of homeland security, that the agencies that
go into that department will continue more than is necessary to focus on their
historic function, and it will tend to preserve the existing cultures of those
agencies.
And on the other hand, all of us have a responsibility for homeland security. Any
failure on the part of the United States to bring these agencies into an effective
whole [is] going to be noticed and exploited by those who wish the country
harm.30
Secretary Schlesinger31 and congressional scholar Norman Ornstein testified that
fragmentation of committee jurisdiction over homeland security harmed development
of the department. Dr. Ornstein suggested a cause and effect relationship:
The problem with fragmentation otherwise is, once again, just exactly what we
had before we ended up with a Department of Homeland Security, which is all
these other committees have a longtime interest in their own cultures built around
the old functions of these agencies, and they are going to use their resources and
their pressure to push those functions, which are appropriate functions. But if
we don’t have a counterweight to make sure that the Homeland Security culture
takes over, then they are going to have even greater problems inside the
Department making things work.32
Government Reform Committee Chairman Tom Davis testified on the
importance of Congress’s work related to DHS:
Because the success of the Department is vital to the continuing economic
recovery and winning the war on terrorism, we all want it to succeed. Congress
must provide the Department with the proper resources while at the same time
maintaining aggressive oversight to ensure that this massive reorganization and
commitment of resources succeeds.33
Conduct of Oversight. Public witnesses regularly mentioned the number of
committees and subcommittees with legislative and oversight jurisdiction over DHS
and the policy area of homeland security as a challenge to the development of a
coherent homeland security policy. The chairs and ranking members drew on their
experience in Congress to speak favorably about the work that had been done on
homeland security by the existing committees.
Former Secretary Schlesinger, drawing on his time as the secretary of the then-
new Department of Energy as well as his time as the top official in other government
agencies, pointed out the problems of duplication by House committees while
30 Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Committees and the Executive Branch, July
10, 2003, p. 18.
31 Ibid., p. 24.
32 Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Lessons from the Past, May 19, 2003, p. 40.
33 Homeland Security Jurisdiction: The Perspectives of Committee Leaders, March 24, 2004,
p. 64.

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acknowledging the proper role of oversight.34 Former Speaker Foley pointed out the
inclination of committees and subcommittees to use the dispersed jurisdiction they
have when focused oversight is what the new department needs.35 Former
Representative Lee Hamilton addressed the blurring of priorities that occurs with
many committees engaged in oversight.36 Former Representative Robert Walker
discussed one committee’s priorities pushing aside another committee’s.37
A number of committee chairs and ranking members addressed the effectiveness
of oversight under the current House committee system. Ranking Member Dingell
of the Energy and Commerce Committee indicated that his experience with
committees sharing oversight from their individual perspectives was positive and that
agreements were able to be worked out when several committees had jurisdiction
over a piece of legislation. He also expressed his concern over having a single
committee conduct oversight over DHS, where the relationship might become
comfortable rather than disinterested.38
Judiciary Committee Chairman Sensenbrenner testified that agencies report to
more than one committee and function effectively.39 Like Representative Dingell,
Ranking Member Waxman of the Government Reform Committee expressed the
view that oversight by multiple committees with different perspectives is effective.40
Department’s Time. Public witnesses also expressed their concern with the
amount of time that DHS officials might spend in responding to hearings and
requests from the numerous committees and subcommittees with jurisdiction over
the department and the policy area of homeland security. Some committee chairs and
ranking members addressed this concern in different ways.
Former Secretary Schlesinger reported spending half of his time as secretary of
energy on Capitol Hill, “dealing with one problem or another.” He indicated the
number of committees and subcommittees with jurisdiction over DHS would be a
burden to a new department, and that staffs of those committees would add to the
department’s workload by requesting individual briefings.41 Congressional scholar
34 Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Committees and the Executive Branch, July
10, 2003, p. 13, 14, 24.
35 Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Former House Leaders, Sept. 9, 2003, pp.7-8,
17. Mr. Foley’s Speakership included the 102nd and 103rd Congresses, during which the
Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress was created and worked.
36 Ibid., pp. 41, 43. Mr. Hamilton was co-chair of the Joint Committee on the Organization
of Congress in the 102nd and 103rd Congresses.
37 Ibid., p. 45.
38 Homeland Security Jurisdiction: The Perspectives of Committee Leaders, March 24, 2004,
pp. 49-50, 53-54.
39 Ibid., pp. 95, 110.
40 Ibid., p. 73.
41 Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Committees and the Executive Branch, July
(continued...)

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James Thurber commented on the lack of effectiveness for both Members and
departmental officials in having multiple hearings scheduled at the same time.42
Former Representative Hamilton noted: “Congress can make a significant
contribution to the implementation of the Department of Homeland Security simply
by simplifying these overlapping committee structures.”43
Representative Dingell drew on his experience as a Member during the energy
shortages of the 1970s to present another perspective:
I went through the energy crisis, in the 1970s, and I have gone through a number
of other problems of similar character, and I never found that there was anything
other than benefit to be achieved by having a large number of committees
viewing these questions from the standpoint of their own experience and
expertise. And I would say that this happened very much during the time of the
1970s when the Energy Administrator or the chairmen of the regulatory bodies
or later the head of the Department of Energy would come up to report to
different committees about how they were conducting their business.44
Executive-Legislative Balance. Several public witnesses discussed a
standing homeland security committee in terms of Congress being able to perform
its legislative and oversight role effectively following the reorganization of the
executive branch to create DHS. For example, congressional scholar David King
testified:
[N]ow it is a fact that we have [DHS], and it is a fact that there is now a
tremendous imbalance between the executive branch and the legislative branch.
And the Congress must catch up.
I am afraid that some of the people who will oppose the single standing
committee of jurisdiction here are still in their minds back in the days before
there was a Department of Homeland Security, trying to keep those clientalistic
relationships that existed before. The fragmentation is tremendously debilitating.
And Congress, as an institution must step up to the plate....
And far too many [M]embers of Congress, and certainly people in the executive
branch, forget that Article I is about Congress, the most important branch as far
as I am concerned, in the government. And it needs to be on equal footing with
the Department of Homeland Security through a single permanent committee.45
41 (...continued)
10, 2003, pp. 9, 11, 12.
42 Ibid., p. 45.
43 Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Former House Leaders, Sept. 9, 2003, pp. 41,
43.
44 Homeland Security Jurisdiction: The Perspectives of Committee Leaders, March 24, 2004,
p. 49.
45 Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Committees and the Executive Branch, July
10, 2003, p. 45.

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Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman Barton explained a different
perspective on committee organization that was also expressed by several other
committee chairs and ranking members:
Health and Human Services, whose Cabinet Secretary has already testified before
my committee on budget priorities and policy issues, also is subject to the Budget
Committee, the Ways and Means Committee, obviously the Appropriations
Committee, the Government Reform Committee. So they are going to multiple
committees. The Environmental Protection Agency, which is one of the major
agencies that we have jurisdiction over, they also have to report to the
Transportation Committee, again the Appropriations Committee, [Agriculture]
Committee, the Government Reform Committee, and the Science Committee.
[The] Department of Energy, in addition to being responsible to the Energy and
Commerce Committee[,] has issues for Armed Services, Government Reform,
Science, [Appropriations], Resources. So most of the Cabinet agencies do report
to multiple congressional committees, and I don’t see why Homeland Security
should be any different, especially if we are doing our job.46
Committee Overlap vs. Committee Expertise. In indicating his support
for a new homeland security committee, former Speaker Foley expressed a view that
was made by the public witnesses:
I think there is the problem that otherwise [than having a new committee], with
this diverse universe of subcommittees and committees, 13 committees, 88
subcommittees, a majority of the committees of the House, a majority of the
subcommittees of the House, I am told almost rather clear the majority of the
Members of the House have some connection with one of these subcommittees
or committees that would otherwise have jurisdiction. So there is not only a
need to bring some focus and scope to the oversight function, but there is a
critical need to avoid the [distraction] of members of this new Department from
having to respond day by day to dozens and dozens of different requests for
testimony, and that is predictable.47
Former Representative Walker provided an example from his experience as a
member and chair of the Science Committee, where jurisdiction over the energy
policy area was shared with the Energy and Commerce Committee. He stated:
“Those jurisdictional arguments often ended up with a nonaction in that area....”48
Former Secretary Schlesinger commented: “My problem is that there is so much
duplication when a senior official comes to Capitol Hill and has to deal with five, six
46 Homeland Security Jurisdiction: The Perspectives of Committee Leaders, March 24, 2004,
p. 54.
47 Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Former House Leaders, Sept. 9, 2003, p. 7.
See also the testimony of Select Committee on Homeland Security Committee Chairman
Cox, Subcommittee on Technology and the House, Rule X, The Organization of Committees,
June 16, 2004.
48 Ibid., p. 45.

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CRS-14
or eight committees. That does not help the House. That does not help the
process.”49
In contrast, Agriculture Chairman Goodlatte and Ranking Member Stenholm
asked how such a large department as Homeland Security, with such a diverse
portfolio in support of its mission, could be overseen by one committee. They stated
that the Agriculture Committee was concerned with “both intentional and
unintentional threats” to U.S. agriculture, and provided an example of oversight in
working with DHS to overturn a decision to eliminate agricultural inspectors and
assign their duties to Customs and Border Protection officers, who would lack
needed expertise to protect against agricultural threats.50 Aviation Subcommittee
Chairman Mica and Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Ranking Member
Oberstar discussed the importance of the expertise resident in their committee in
policymaking. For example, Representative Mica stated:
It should be no surprise that a thorough understanding of the aviation system is
required to produce effective aviation security legislation. The aviation system
is based on a careful balance of highly complex regulations, procedures,
infrastructure, engineering. And this system in fact has produced the world’s
safest aviation industry. Preserving that balance is impossible without the
expertise that comes from working on these issues for years.51
Competing Interests. Congressional scholar Norman Ornstein52 and former
Representative Hamilton supported their recommendations for a homeland security
committee by pointing out the need for congressional leadership in helping a culture
of homeland security to take root in the new department. Representative Hamilton’s
prepared statement explained:
DHS was created so that 22 agencies of the Federal Government would reorient
their purpose and organization towards the mission of protecting the homeland.
DHS is intended to embody a common mission and culture — indeed, the vital
goal of implementation is to overcome bureaucratic resistance to forging that
common culture.53
49 Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Committees and the Executive Branch, July
10, 2003, p. 13. Select Committee Chairman Cox noted during the hearings a coordination
role for DHS testimony played by the select committee: Hearing on Perspectives on House
Reform: Lessons from the Past, May 19, 2003, p. 48; and Hearing on Perspectives on House
Reform: Former House Leaders, Sept. 9, 2003, p. 30.
50 Homeland Security Jurisdiction: The Perspectives of Committee Leaders, March 24, 2004,
pp. 30, 32, 35, 36-37, 38, 41. See also the testimony of Chairman Goodlatte and Ranking
Member Stenholm, Subcommittee on Technology and the House, Rule X, The Organization
of Committees, June 17, 2004.
51 Ibid., pp. 76, 80-81, 82-83. See also the testimony of Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee Ranking Member Oberstar, Subcommittee on Technology and the House, Rule
X, The Organization of Committees, June 17, 2004.
52 Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Lessons from the Past, May 19, 2003, p. 40.
53 Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Former House Leaders, Sept. 9, 2003, p. 43.
(continued...)

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Former Secretary Schlesinger also discussed cultural change inside the department
in stating his support for a homeland security committee:
We talk about the cultural problems of bringing together agencies that have had
a disparate past and integrating them into a new department. There are the
cultural problems up here on the Hill of these different standing committees that
have their traditions and their powers. And unless we effectively deal with that,
the components of the department will not be able to focus on the newer
problems of homeland security[;] those components will continue to respond to
the older standing committees and their interests.54
In their testimony, committee chairs and ranking members identified their
concerns with changes to the committee system that might sever components of
existing jurisdiction. For example, Judiciary Committee Chairman Sensenbrenner
discussed law enforcement and civil liberties as related policy concerns in his
committee:
There is more to law enforcement and training than just security. There is an
important balancing to be done between security and civil liberties. It is
dangerous to put that balancing task in a committee, the primary focus of which
is security. I fear that civil liberties interest will be sacrificed.55
With regard to the committee’s jurisdiction over immigration, Chairman
Sensenbrenner pointed out that immigration is within the jurisdiction of four
departments, and stated:
Although countering the terrorist threat is of significant importance in
implementing our immigration laws, it is certainly not the only issue. Rather,
immigration involves much more than homeland security[:] reuniting families,
providing needed workers for American businesses, offering havens to refugees,
and deporting those aliens who have broken our laws.56
Ways and Means Committee Chairman Bill Thomas discussed the conflict
between security and commerce:
What has occurred in terms of the coordination of activities at the border I think
was overdue, and it probably took a crisis such as this to require the rethinking
and the integration of those border duties.
53 (...continued)
See also the testimony of Select Committee on Homeland Security Ranking Member Jim
Turner, Subcommittee on Technology and the House, Rule X, The Organization of
Committees, June 16, 2004.
54 Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Committees and the Executive Branch, July
10, 2003, p. 17.
55 Homeland Security Jurisdiction: The Perspectives of Committee Leaders, March 24, 2004,
p. 94, 108.
56 Ibid., p. 94, 103. See also the testimony of Chairman Sensenbrenner, Subcommittee on
Technology and the House, Rule X, The Organization of Committees, June 17, 2004.

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I just have to tell you that the period in which we have negotiated with the
homeland security structure has been one that I fully anticipated. That is, when
your primary title is security, you make decisions differently than beings who are
in the process of attempting to facilitate commercial intercourse and have been
doing it for several hundred years. The question of whether or not a potential
threat to, say, a port or an airport would require it to be shut down oftentimes is
on the teeter-totter between public security and freedom. Those people who have
security in their title hastily move to make sure that the place is secure.57
The Committees’ Records. Several committee chairs and ranking members
discussed the records of their committees in holding hearings and reporting
legislation related to homeland security. For example, Energy and Commerce
Committee Chairman Barton submitted a list of “homeland security
accomplishments” with his prepared statement. In oral testimony, he gave examples
of the committee’s work, for example:
The Energy and Commerce Committee has jurisdiction for security at
commercial nuclear power plants. Everybody, regardless of where your
committee is, agrees that securing these facilities from a terrorist attack or any
kind of attack is a very good idea. The conference report on H.R. 6, the
comprehensive energy bill, contains very strong new requirements in that respect.
These requirements were developed in our committee on a bipartisan basis.58
Representative Mica, chairman of the Aviation Subcommittee, provided the
Rules Subcommittee with a statement by Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee Chairman Young, which listed that committee’s counterterrorism and
homeland security legislation beginning in 1989. Representative Mica testified:
Back in 1990, we mandated background checks for aviation personnel, began
deploying bomb detection devices at our [airports]; we built FEMA, which
helped New York and Washington respond to 9/11 and much of the rest of the
country. We created TSA, fortified cockpit doors, armed pilots, put marshals
back in the sky, developed a whole host of comprehensive approaches not only
to aviation, but also to transportation security. We established the aviation
industry, passed the Maritime Security Act, and created port security grants.59
Government Reform Committee Chairman Davis stated his committee
“maintain[ed] an aggressive posture when it comes to overseeing DHS.” He
testified:
For example, the committee held oversight hearings on topics related to FEMA,
TSA, first responders, critical infrastructure, visa policy, preparedness standards,
DHS financial accountability, border management, port security and product
litigation management, to name just a few. We held markups on Project
57 Ibid., p. 114. See also the testimony of Chairman Thomas, Subcommittee on Technology
and the House, Rule X, The Organization of Committees, June 16, 2004, and the testimony
of Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Chairman Don Young, Subcommittee on
Technology and the House, Rule X, The Organization of Committees, June 17, 2004.
58 Ibid., p. 45, 46-47.
59 Ibid., p. 77, 79.

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BioShield, the Presidential Vacancy Act and the DHS Financial Accountability
Act.60
In his opening remarks at the same hearing, Rules Subcommittee member
Representative Curt Weldon listed three examples of homeland security legislation
that seemed to be stalled at the committee stage after being referred to several
committees.61 Later in the hearing, select committee Chairman Cox, sitting as a
member of the subcommittee, observed that there was little overlap in the work of
the select committee and that of Energy and Commerce Committee, on which he also
served.62
What Is Homeland Security? Several witnesses made statements that
suggested definitions of homeland security, speaking either specifically of DHS or
broadly of the policy area.
Former Secretary Schlesinger responded as follows to a question about a
mission for the department that might be selected from a continuum of possibilities:
Well, I think the department has, in the President’s message [on a national
strategy], indicated that what we must do is to anticipate through intelligence
possible attacks on the United States, to respond to such attacks as quickly as we
can and to mitigate the consequences of those attacks. And that is why we have
responded. It is at the one pole [of the continuum] that you mentioned at the
outset, which was, you know, to inform local governments.
Those local governments will need help, and only the United States, the Federal
Government, can provide that help.
If we have nuclear detonation in some place in the United States, the local
authorities will be overwhelmed, and we must have an entity that has thought
through that problem and will bring to bear the resources of the Federal
Government to help those local governments. It is not just warning.63
In a later hearing, former Speaker Gingrich responded to a question about the
role of the department:
It is, first, intelligence and prevention. I think you put your finger on the key
part: Can we block something bad from happening defensively inside our own
country? Second, ensuring that the capability exists for response, recovery, and
rehabilitation; setting the standards and monitoring to make sure that those
capabilities exist. But it is, third, whenever possible, contracting out and
coordinating those capabilities. For example, the Northern Command in the
Department of Defense is a significant piece of this. The National Guard
component of that is a significant piece. Health and Human Services and the
60 Ibid., p. 64-65.
61 Ibid., p. 8.
62 Ibid., p. 62.
63 Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Committees and the Executive Branch, July
10, 2003, p. 19.

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Centers for Disease Control and the Public Health Service have a significant
piece of this. The U.S. Department of Agriculture in terms of its food
inspection.... And then, finally, the cities and States who are going to have an
ongoing everyday first responder....64
Later in the same hearing, Speaker Gingrich responded to a question on
committee organization:
...I think the jurisdiction issue is actually fairly easy in principle. The principle
ought to be that this is a mission-driven jurisdiction; that is, when there are
questions of activities that are uniquely homeland security, protection, response,
recovery, rehabilitation, this committee ought to have either sole or lead
jurisdiction. But it ought to have the right to claim concurrent jurisdiction over
problems as they impinge on homeland security. And the reason I say that is, this
year the problem may be an issue of how do you change spectrum, the next year
the issue may be one dealing with agriculture. We can’t tell in advance where
the intelligence trail and where the threat is going to take us.65
Sitting as an ex officio member of the Rules Subcommittee, Select Committee
on Homeland Security Chairman Cox expressed his concern over keeping DHS
focused on its mission, which he summarized as follows: “First, to protect; second,
to prevent; and third, to respond. Those three must, it seems to me, define the
Department and thus the jurisdiction of any committee that oversees it to the
exclusion of all else.”66
Options Suggested. Witnesses suggested a number of options for a new
committee on homeland security. Some witnesses opposed some possible
jurisdictional arrangements for such a committee.
Homeland Security Committee Built Incrementally.
C o n gr e s s i o n a l
scholars Ornstein and Thomas Mann testified jointly. They suggested moving
“gradually,” or “incrementally,” and “strategically” in creating a permanent standing
committee with “several areas of jurisdiction.” They warned that a new committee
“with substantial jurisdiction that takes away from other committees at once” would
“fail.” In addition, there would need to be coordination and shared jurisdiction since
there were non-homeland security functions included in DHS and functions that were
closely related to homeland security outside of the department. They suggested
“creative use of the referral process,” including in the designation of “lead actors” for
64 Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Former House Leaders, Sept. 9, 2003, p. 21.
65 Ibid., p. 29.
66 Homeland Security Jurisdiction: The Perspectives of Committee Leaders, March 24, 2004,
p. 23.

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important legislation, and the Speaker’s involvement in creating a “process of
prioritizing” requests for the testimony of executive officials.67
Dr. Ornstein added that Members would want to retain assignments in addition
to service on a new committee “and we will end up with bigger institutional
problems.”68
Former Secretary Schlesinger recommended consolidating committee
jurisdiction over DHS as helpful to the new department, commenting favorably on
creating a standing committee.69 He also called it “useful” to give the committee
both oversight and legislative authority.70
No Homeland Security Committee. In response to a question regarding
possible “benefits” to not having a homeland security committee, Dr. Mann
responded:
I think there are arguments. One of them is that the House since 1974 has
figured out a way to live with and cope with jurisdictional sprawl, that the
leadership working through the Parliamentarian’s office has developed strategies
of joint and sequential referral, of special rules, of scheduling, in ways that allow
them, the leadership, to pull the expertise from various committees and
subcommittees together in coherent pieces of legislation. In doing so, you don’t
disrupt existing patterns of expertise, of historical memory, of staffing, that you
retain some capacity for alternative perspectives on similar problems, that you
set up some competition between teams of members who might see things
differently. All those are advantages in letting the current system go forward as
it is.71
Transfer Jurisdiction over DHS to Homeland Security Committee. Dr.
Thurber was specific in his recommendation to create a permanent standing
committee on homeland security in House Rule X, with “jurisdiction directly related
to the agencies of DHS and generally to the mission of reducing the threat [to]
homeland security.” He noted that there are agencies outside of DHS that deal with
homeland security, that the new committee needed an “oversight and coordination
relationship” with those activities, and that coordination would be needed with other
committees in order to develop a “comprehensive policy making approach to
homeland security.” Dr. Thurber favored “shared [committee] jurisdiction with
primary and secondary responsibilities for the functions of the entities in DHS” that
are not related to homeland security. He recommended the jurisdictions of other
67 Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Lessons from the Past, May 19, 2003, pp. 29,
33, 36-37. In a later hearing, former Speaker Foley began his testimony by endorsing Dr.
Mann’s and Dr. Ornstein’s testimony, Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Former
House Leaders, Sept. 9, 2003, p. 7.
68 Ibid., p. 42.
69 Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Committees and the Executive Branch, July
10, 2003, p. 13.
70 Ibid., p. 24.
71 Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Lessons from the Past, May 19, 2003, p. 42.

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committees over DHS agencies be transferred to the new committee. Finally, Dr.
Thurber recommended that the membership of the new committee include members
from committees losing jurisdiction in order to bring to the new committee
“knowledge, expertise, institutional history,” and that there be “transition rules” to
facilitate this service.72
Mr. Wolfensberger also favored creation of a permanent standing committee on
homeland security similar to that described by Dr. Thurber. Mr. Wolfensberger
added that the committee should be a “major committee for assignment purposes, if
not an exclusive committee.” He stated that the new committee should work closely
with the leadership in “coordinating its oversight activities with that of other
committees,” with oversight agendas “superintended by the bipartisan leadership.”73
Finally, he suggested coupling the creation of a new homeland security committee
with an increase in committee chairs’ term limits to four consecutive terms from
three consecutive terms. The increase would serve as an incentive to support change
as well as allow more time for a chair to build expertise.74
Both former Representative Walker and former Representative Hamilton also
favored creation of a permanent standing committee on homeland security. Mr.
Walker addressed the need to get rid of “silos” in order to make policy decisions on
homeland security issues in support of a “common goal.” Mr. Hamilton spoke of the
value of informed congressional oversight based on “acquired expertise.”75
A number of committee leaders expressed reservations about or opposition to
the transfer of jurisdiction from committees with long expertise and with perspectives
in addition to that of counter-terrorism security. Agriculture Committee Chairman
Goodlatte urged the Rules Subcommittee to be “cautious in considering
[jurisdictional] changes,” citing his committee’s expertise in agriculture compared
to the breadth of expertise that a single committee would need to cumulate to oversee
DHS’s wide and varied scope of responsibilities.76 Energy and Commerce
Committee Chairman Barton pointed out the difficulty of distinguishing the
relationship of his committee’s jurisdiction to homeland security from the homeland
security jurisdiction of a new committee, explaining that the “consequences” of
terrorist attacks or of other actions or events may be the same.77 Aviation
Subcommittee Chairman Mica and Transportation and Infrastructure Committee
Ranking Member Oberstar explained the expertise that existed in standing
72 Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Committees and the Executive Branch, July
10, 2003, pp. 26-28, 29-30.
73 Ibid., pp. 33, 35-36.
74 Ibid., p. 42.
75 Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Former House Leaders, Sept. 9, 2003, pp. 37,
39, 40-41, 42-44.
76 Homeland Security Jurisdiction: The Perspectives of Committee Leaders, March 24, 2004,
p. 32.
77 Ibid., p. 45.

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committees and that was needed to legislate on homeland security within complex
systems such as aviation or emergency management.78
Judiciary Committee Chairman Sensenbrenner, as mentioned above, explained
the balance within law enforcement and immigration between security and civil
liberties in the case of law enforcement and between security and the several
purposes of immigration in the case of legal immigration. He stated the Judiciary
Committee should retain its jurisdiction, should the House create a homeland security
committee, since the Judiciary Committee had “experience and expertise” and had
demonstrated a “unified, balanced approach” to the work within its jurisdiction.79
Ways and Means Committee Chairman Thomas explained that his committee’s
jurisdiction over customs functions is essential to U.S. international trade: “The point
at which those [export and import] activities occur have to be allowed to go forward
in a very smooth and efficient manner, with the full understanding of the concerns
of security today different than previously....”80
Split Transportation and Infrastructure Committee.
Mr. Wolfensberger
suggested creating the new committee by splitting the existing Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee, assigning about a third of its members to the new
committee and adding members from the other committees that currently have
jurisdiction over homeland security. The other members of the existing
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee would be assigned to a new
transportation committee. Mr. Wolfensberger made an analogy to the reorganization
of the Appropriations Committees.81
Assign Homeland Security to the Government Reform Committee.
Stating that a new homeland security committee would cause “new jurisdictional
overlaps and conflicts,” Government Reform Committee Chairman Tom Davis and
Ranking Member Waxman proposed that the Government Reform Committee would
“oversee the administration of the Department’s headquarters and departmentwide
policies as well as White House efforts to coordinate homeland security policy” and
“current committees would continue to oversee their legacy agencies” that had been
transferred to DHS. They made an analogy to the Senate Governmental Affairs
Committee as it exercised jurisdiction over DHS in the 108th Congress.82
Chairman Davis noted that the Government Reform Committee has jurisdiction
over “agency reorganization, human capital, IT security, Federal-State relations,
78 Ibid., pp. 77, 81, 82-83. See also the statement of Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee Chairman Don Young, pp. 77-79.
79 Ibid., pp. 92-95, 103-104, 108..
80 Ibid., p. 117.
81 Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Committees and the Executive Branch, July
10, 2003, p. 42.
82 Homeland Security Jurisdiction: The Perspectives of Committee Leaders, March 24, 2004,
pp. 65, 67, 68. See also the testimony of Chairman Tom Davis and Ranking Member
Waxman, Subcommittee on Technology and the House, Rule X, The Organization of
Committees, June 16, 2004.

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procurement, and the management and efficiency of government organizations.” He
also noted that the committee had experience in working on legislation with other
committees, that the proposal “strengthens the parallel structures of House-Senate
relations,” and that the arrangement ensured coordination among committees “when
no other committee could naturally receive the primary referral” of “cross-agency
proposals.”83
In a statement submitted for the hearing record, Science Committee Chairman
Boehlert suggested:
...giving primary legislative jurisdiction over each directorate of DHS to the
appropriate standing Committee and having the Committee on Government
Reform exercise its traditional jurisdiction across the agency.84
Select Committee. Congressional scholar David King recommended a
permanent select committee on homeland security, with primary jurisdiction over
homeland security generally and over DHS, and with jurisdiction over DHS agencies
transferred from existing committees. In a departure from this recommendation of
consolidation, he suggested transferring jurisdiction over the Coast Guard to the
Armed Services Committee. Dr. King recommended that the Speaker direct the
parliamentarian to draft a memorandum of understanding to govern “multiple
referrals for homeland security issues,” and that, on referrals, the Speaker give
“primary jurisdiction over homeland security” to the new committee and “secondary
time-limited referrals” to other committees. Dr. King recommended that the new
committee’s members be drawn from committees losing jurisdiction, with the
distribution of committee seats specified; he added that seniority on the new
committee should be “based on time served on the committees contributing their
members.” Dr. King also recommended limiting the committee’s size.85
Intelligence Committee Chairman Goss pointed out the advantages of a
permanent select committee on homeland security, specifically identifying the
advantages of leadership selection of committee members.86
Ways and Means Committee Chairman Thomas made an analogy to the former
Select Committee on Aging as a potential model, with a distinct focus, for an
oversight committee on homeland security. He said such a homeland security
committee would have the function “of coordination, of concern, of observation, of
assistance.” He stated that a homeland security committee should not be vested with
83 Ibid., pp. 65-66, 67.
84 Ibid., p. 119.
85 Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Committees and the Executive Branch, July
10, 2003, pp. 38-39, 40-41, 43.
86 Homeland Security Jurisdiction: The Perspectives of Committee Leaders, March 24, 2004,
pp. 19, 21. See also the testimony of Chairman Goss, Subcommittee on Technology and the
House, Rule X, The Organization of Committees, June 17, 2004.

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jurisdiction in a manner that would “interfere with a [committee] structure that has
been successful through a number of other threats to our security....”87
Ad Hoc Committees.
Several witnesses commented on the past use of ad hoc
committees, including creation of the Select Committee on Homeland Security in the
107th Congress to report legislation establishing DHS.88 Agriculture Committee
Ranking Member Stenholm urged the Rules Subcommittee to “give more life” to the
Speaker’s authority under House Rule XII to refer matters to ad hoc committees. He
also suggested that the House work toward achievement of its rule of limiting each
Member to two committee assignments.89
Coordination. A number of public witnesses and committee leaders addressed
the need or the perceived need for coordination of legislation affecting DHS or of
requests for hearings testimony by DHS officials. As mentioned above, former
Secretary Schlesinger indicated the number of committees and subcommittees with
jurisdiction over DHS would be a burden to the new department.90 Congressional
scholar James Thurber commented on the lack of effectiveness for both Members and
departmental officials in having multiple hearings scheduled at the same time.91
Former Representative Hamilton noted the contribution Congress could make to
DHS’s implementation by simplifying its committee structures.92
Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman Barton observed that a response
to the concern over numerous committees and subcommittees with jurisdiction over
DHS would be coordination rather than the creation of a new committee. He
suggested a liaison staff member in the Speaker’s office as an option. He also
suggested the possibility of extending the life of the Select Committee on Homeland
Security for one more Congress.93 Energy and Commerce Committee Ranking
Member Dingell stated that the existing committees of jurisdiction could coordinate,
as they have in the past, with the “assistance” of the House leadership. He also noted
that House rules could be amended to assign specified homeland-security functions
to the standing committees.94
Intelligence Ranking Member Harman explained the value of a permanent
standing committee on homeland security as a “mechanism for coordinated review
87 Ibid., pp. 115, 116.
88 See, for example, the prepared statement of Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein, Hearing
on Perspectives on House Reform: Lessons from the Past, May 19, 2003, pp. 35-36.
89 Homeland Security Jurisdiction: The Perspectives of Committee Leaders, March 24, 2004,
pp. 35-36.
90 Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Committees and the Executive Branch, July
10, 2003, pp. 9, 11, 12.
91 Ibid., p. 45.
92 Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Former House Leaders, Sept. 9, 2003, p. 41.
93 Homeland Security Jurisdiction: The Perspectives of Committee Leaders, March 24, 2004,
pp. 45-46, 53.
94 Ibid., p. 52, 60.

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of terrorism” and as a means for effective oversight of DHS.95 Aviation
Subcommittee Chairman Mica noted that a homeland security committee could have
a role in coordination over homeland-security activities of executive entities that
were included in DHS and those outside DHS and in marshaling expertise in the
House from among the committees of jurisdiction.96
Budget Subcommittee on Homeland Security.
S p e a k e r G i n g r i c h
recommended the creation of a homeland security subcommittee of the Budget
Committee to ensure “adequate resources for Homeland Security before considering
any other budgetary matters.” He endorsed the creation of a permanent standing
committee on homeland security, “with the right to claim concurrent jurisdiction over
problems as they impinge on homeland security.” Speaker Gingrich also
recommended adoption of a resolution at the beginning of each Congress that
“instructs the executive branch on who has to report where,” and monitoring
interactions by the House with DHS to prevent “diversions.”97
Homeland Security Subcommittees. As mentioned earlier, six standing
committees reorganized to create subcommittees with jurisdiction over homeland
security. In his testimony, Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman Barton
suggested that House rules might be changed to allow standing committees to create
an additional subcommittee, to which a committee could assign jurisdiction over
homeland security.98
Select Committee’s Recommendations for a
Homeland Security Committee
On September 30, 2004, the Select Committee on Homeland Security
transmitted its recommendations to the Rules Committee.99 It recommended that a
standing and therefore permanent Committee on Homeland Security be established,
95 Ibid., pp. 16, 17-18.
96 Ibid., p. 91.
97 Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Former House Leaders, Sept. 9, 2003, pp. 12,
16, 29.
98 Homeland Security Jurisdiction: The Perspectives of Committee Leaders, March 24, 2004,
pp. 56, 63. See also the testimony of Chairman Barton, Subcommittee on Technology and
the House, Rule X, The Organization of Committees, June 17, 2004.
99 A majority of members of the select committee signed a letter from Chairman Cox and
Ranking Member Jim Turner transmitting the recommendations to the Rules Committee; the
letter is available online at [http://hsc.house.gov/files/mini_report_sigs.pdf], visited Dec. 10,
2004. There was not a committee meeting to consider the recommendations.

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with the addition of a new clause 12 to House Rule X.100 Key aspects of the select
committee’s recommendations included:
! a standing committee is to be created, composed of not more than 29
members and not more than 16 from one party;
! the Speaker and minority leader to serve ex officio, without voting
privileges;
! jurisdiction is to be granted over “homeland security generally” and
over DHS, except, generally, for non-homeland security matters
within the authority of the department;
! “exclusive authorizing and primary oversight jurisdiction” is to be
granted with respect to the department’s authorities related to the
“prevention of, preparation for, and response to acts of terrorism
within the United States”;
! authorizations for the department to prevent, prepare for, or respond
to acts of terrorism must precede appropriations; and
! referrals of legislation and other matters to the Select Committee on
Homeland Security in the 108th Congress would not be considered
precedent for referrals to the new committee.101
In addition to jurisdiction over homeland security generally and the department
(numbered (1) and (2) in the proposed standing committee’s jurisdiction), the select
committee’s recommendations enumerated eight other specific components of the
proposed committee’s jurisdiction:
(3) The integration, analysis, and sharing of homeland security information
related to the risk of terrorism within the United States.
(4) The dissemination of terrorism threat warnings, advisories, and other
homeland security-related communications to State and local governments, the
private sector, and the public.
(5) Department of Homeland Security responsibility for research and
development in support of homeland security, including technological
applications of such research.
(6) Department of Homeland Security responsibility for security of United States
borders and ports of entry, including the Department’s responsibilities related to
visas and other forms of permission to enter the United States.
100 House Select Committee on Homeland Security, Recommendations of the Select
Committee on Homeland Security on Changes to the Rules of the House of Representatives
with Respect to Homeland Security Issues, 108th Cong., 2nd sess., Sep. 30, 2004. The select
committee also issued Supplementary Materials and Summary of Activities of the Select
C o m m i t t e e o n H o m e l a n d S e c u r i t y . ( A v a i l a b l e o n l i n e a t
[http://hsc.house.gov/files/mini_report_sigs.pdf], visited Dec. 10, 2004.) See also Appendix
A for the text of select committee’s recommendations.
101 Ibid., pp. 7-8.

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(7) Enforcement of Federal immigration laws (except for responsibilities of the
Department of Justice).
(8) Security of United States air, land, and maritime transportation systems.
(9) Non-revenue aspects of customs enforcement.
(10) Department of Homeland Security responsibility for Federal, state, and local
level preparation to respond to acts of terrorism.102
These statements provided specificity to discussion in the House of what might
constitute homeland security jurisdiction. The select committee observed in its
report: “The Homeland Security Act of 2002 offers a congressionally-created road
map to jurisdictional reform that focuses on the structure, organization, capabilities,
and mission of the Department itself.”103
In addition, the recommendations included proposed changes to the Rule X
jurisdictional statements of other committees to reduce or eliminate overlap of
homeland security jurisdiction with the new committee. The committees that would
be affected by the proposed changes were:
! Committee on Energy and Commerce, where there was an addition
at the end of its jurisdictional statement: “In the case of each of the
foregoing, the committee’s jurisdiction shall not include
responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security.”;
! Committee on Financial Services, where there was an addition at the
end of its jurisdictional statement: “In the case of each of the
foregoing, the committee’s jurisdiction shall not include
responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security.”;
! Committee on International Relations, where there was an addition
at the end of its jurisdictional statement: “In the case of each of the
foregoing, the committee’s jurisdiction shall not include
responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security.”;
! Committee on the Judiciary, where its jurisdiction over immigration
and naturalization was amended to contain an exception — “(except
for Department of Homeland Security responsibility for security of
United States borders and ports of entry, including the Department’s
responsibilities for visas and other forms of permission to enter the
United States, and immigration enforcement)” — and its jurisdiction
over subversive activities was also amended to contain an exception
— “(except for responsibilities of the Department of Homeland
Security)”;
! Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, where its
jurisdiction was amended at five points —
102 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
103 Ibid., p. 2.

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! the non-homeland security-related missions of the Coast
Guard remained within the jurisdiction of the committee,
! federal management of natural disasters remained within the
committee’s jurisdiction, although federal management of
“emergencies” was not listed,
! jurisdiction over related transportation regulatory agencies was
amended to contain an exception — “(except for
responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security),”
! jurisdiction over various forms of transportation and related
matters was amended to contain an exception — “in each case
exclusive of the responsibilities of the Department of
Homeland Security,” and
! jurisdiction over civil aviation was removed from the list of
various forms of transportation, listed separately in a new
subparagraph, and stated as follows — “Civil aviation,
including safety and commercial impact of security
measures.”; and
! Committee on Ways and Means, where the phrase “Revenue from”
was added at the beginning of the jurisdictional statement “Customs,
collection districts, and ports of entry and delivery.”.
Finally, the membership of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence was
proposed to include at least one member of the new Committee on Homeland
Security; the membership of the Intelligence Committee already includes members
of other committees.
In a news release announcing the issuance of the select committee’s
recommendations, Chairman Cox stated:
We must give the new committee meaningful jurisdiction to legislate and to
conduct congressional oversight of the Department of Homeland Security and
related homeland security programs and activities. I think all of us would agree
that it would be better to have no committee than a committee with
jurisdictionally clipped wings, condemned never to take flight.
In the same news release, the ranking member of the select committee’s Rules
Subcommittee, Representative Slaughter, stated:
Congress ordered the largest reorganization of government when it created the
Department of Homeland Security. Now, Congress must act decisively and
create a permanent standing committee to ensure that DHS becomes the agency
that Congress envisioned. Anything less than that, and Congress will not be
fulfilling its duty to the American people.104
These comments echoed the explanation the select committee gave for its
recommendation:
104 House Select Committee on Homeland Security, “House Homeland Security Committee
Recommends Reform of DHS Oversight,” news release, Sep. 30, 2004. (Available online
at [http://hsc.house.gov/release.cfm?id=257], visited Dec. 1, 2004.)

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The current diffused and unfocused congressional jurisdiction over the
Department of Homeland Security, and homeland security in general, not only
imposes extraordinary burdens on the Department, but makes it far more difficult
for the Congress to guide the Department’s activities in a consistent and focused
way that promotes integration and eliminates programmatic redundancies, and
advances implementation of a coherent national homeland security strategy.105
Subsequent Developments. Following the release of the
select
committee’s recommendations, Chairman Linder of the Rules Committee’s
Subcommittee on Technology and the House issued a “Dear Colleague” letter
soliciting Members’ “opinions on matters relating to homeland security and Rule X,
including the formal recommendations of the Select Committee on Homeland
Security.”106 In addition, following past practice near the end of a Congress, the
Rules Committee solicited Members’ proposals for House rules changes for the 109th
Congress.107
The House also passed H.R. 10, the 9/11 Recommendations Implementation
Act, containing a sense of the House provision:
It is the sense of the House of Representatives that the Committee on Rules
should act upon the recommendations provided by the Select Committee on
Homeland Security, and other committees of existing jurisdiction, regarding the
jurisdiction over proposed legislation, messages, petitions, memorials and other
matters relating to homeland security prior to or at the start of the 109th
Congress.108
And, on November 16, 2004, following his renomination to the Speakership by
the House Republican Conference, Speaker Hastert addressed the conference and
said this about a House homeland security committee:
105 Recommendations of the Select Committee on Homeland Security on Changes to the
Rules of the House of Representatives with Respect to Homeland Security Issues, pp. 1-2.
106 Rep. Linder, Chair, Subcommittee on Technology and the House, Committee on Rules,
Dear Colleague letter, Oct. 4, 2004. See, for example, Judiciary Committee Chairman
Sensenbrenner, letter to Chairman Linder, Oct. 18, 2004; and “Hill Briefs: Homeland
Security,” CongressDaily PM, Oct. 22, 2004.
107 Rules Committee, “Proposed Rules Changes for the 109th Congress,” special
announcement, Oct. 18, 2004 (available online at [http://www.house.gov/
rules/108announce_109rulechngs.htm], visited Dec. 10, 2004).
108 Sec. 5027(b) of H.R. 10, passed by the House Oct. 8, 2004. Subsequently, Congress
passed and the President on Dec. 17, 2004, signed into law S. 2845, P.L. 108-458, the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. In addition, on Oct. 7, 2004,
Rep. Maloney introduced H.Res. 837, with five cosponsors, to create a standing Committee
on Homeland Security, among other purposes; the measure was referred to the Committee
on Rules.

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In the last Congress, we created a Select Committee on Homeland Security to
help us coordinate our legislative response to the new Department of Homeland
Security. This year, it is my intention that we make that Committee permanent.109
Conclusion. To this point, this report has recounted and synthesized actions
in the 107th and 108th Congresses related to committee organization and the issue of
homeland security. Key actions on committee organization in the 107th Congress
were the creation of the Working Group on Terrorism and Homeland Security within
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and its elevation to a subcommittee,
and the creation of the Select Committee on Homeland Security to mark up and
report the bill establishing the Department of Homeland Security.
Key actions on committee organization in the 108th Congress were the creation
of the Select Committee on Homeland Security, with jurisdiction over the Homeland
Security Act and responsibility for a study of House rules, including Rule X, with
respect to the issue of homeland security; hearings on committee organization held
by a subcommittee of the select committee and, separately, by a subcommittee of the
Rules Committee; recommendations from the select committee for a standing
committee of the House on homeland security; and support voiced by the Speaker for
a permanent homeland security committee in the 109th Congress.
The next two sections of this report distill the provisions of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002 and the recommendations of four national commissions and two
think tanks relevant to House committee organization and the issue of homeland
security. The section on the Homeland Security Act focuses on the definitions of
homeland security contained in the act. The section on commission and think tank
recommendations captures the specific recommendations related to committee
organization and the context in which the recommendations were made.
These two sections are followed by a brief history of committee reorganization
related to departmental creation, bringing together this record in one place.
What Is Homeland Security? The Homeland
Security Act of 2002
As noted above, the Select Committee on Homeland Security stated in the report
on its recommendations to the House: “The Homeland Security Act of 2002 offers
a congressionally-created road map to jurisdictional reform that focuses on the
structure, organization, capabilities, and mission of the Department itself.” Some of
these directions are reflected in definitions of homeland security that appear in the
109 Speaker Hastert, “Speaker Hastert Wins Renomination to Fourth Consecutive Term,”
news release, Nov. 16, 2004. (Available online at [http://speaker.house.gov/
library/misc/041116term.shtml], visited Dec. 10, 2004). See also Select Committee on
Homeland Security, “Speaker Hastert Endorses Homeland Security Committee,” news
release, Nov. 16, 2004. (Available online at [http://hsc.house.gov/release.cfm?id=270],
visited Dec. 10, 2004).

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Homeland Security Act as well as in the President’s national strategy, which served
as a basis for the Homeland Security Act.
In the National Strategy for Homeland Security that President Bush issued in
June 2002, the strategy contained the following:
Definition: Homeland security is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist
attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and
minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.110
The Homeland Security Act of 2002, as enacted, contained three definitions of
homeland security for three different purposes under the law. First, in the mission
of DHS, Congress restated the definition from the President’s national strategy:
In general. — The primary mission of the Department is to — (A) prevent
terrorist attacks within the United States; (B) reduce the vulnerability of the
United States to terrorism; (C) minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery,
from terrorist attacks that do occur within the United States....111
Second, in establishing the Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency,
Congress defined homeland security research to explain the purpose of such
research:
Homeland security research. — The term “homeland security research” means
research relevant to the detection of, prevention of, protection against, response
to, attribution of, and recovery from homeland security threats, particularly acts
of terrorism.112
Third, in directing the President to include in his annual budget submission an
analysis of homeland security spending, Congress provided the following definition
for determining what activities and accounts to include in the analysis:
In this paragraph, consistent with the Office of Management and Budget’s June
2002 ‘Annual Report to Congress on Combatting Terrorism’, the term ‘homeland
110 Office of Homeland Security, Executive Office of the President, National Strategy for
Homeland Security, June 2002. (Available online at, [http://www.whitehouse.gov/
homeland/book/index.html], visited Sept. 21, 2004.) For a discussion of the evolution of
the term homeland security, its relationship to the earlier term civil defense, and its contrast
with the terms national security and internal security, see Harold C. Relyea, “Homeland
Security and Information,” Government Information Quarterly, vol. 19, 2002, pp. 213-223.
111 P.L. 107-296, §101; 116 Stat. 2135, 2142. In marking up H.R. 5005, the 107th Congress
bill to create DHS, the House Government Reform Committee approved an amendment in
the nature of a substitute to H.R. 5005 that contained the following definition of homeland
security: “The term ‘homeland security’ means the deterrence, detection, preemption,
prevention, and defense against terrorism targeted at the territory, sovereignty, population,
or infrastructure of the United States, including the management of the programs and
policies necessary to respond to and recover from terrorist attacks within the United States.”
Amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 5005 offered by Chairman Burton, and
approved by the House Committee on Government Reform June 12, 2002.
112 P.L. 107-296, §307; 116 Stat. 2135, 2169.

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security’ refers to those activities that detect, deter, protect against, and respond
to terrorist attacks occurring within the United States and its territories.113
These definitions are explicit in stating that homeland refers to “within the
United States.” A substantial part of homeland security — American military,
intelligence, and diplomatic activities — relate to actions that occur outside of the
United States.
113 P.L. 107-296, §889; 116 Stat. 2135, 2251. The OMB report is available online at
[http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/combating_terrorism06-2002.pdf], visited Dec.
10, 2004.

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What Is Homeland Security? Commission and
Think Tank Recommendations
As noted at the beginning of this report, the 9/11 commission and other
commissions and think tanks recommended a reorganization of congressional
committees, specifically recommending the creation of a homeland security
committee in each chamber. These recommendations were not specific about key
aspects of such committees, such as jurisdiction. However, each entity set out one
or more principles that might guide House and Senate reorganization of its
committees vis-à-vis the policy area of homeland security.
The commissions and think tanks made their recommendations on committee
reorganization in the context of a larger set of recommendations for combating
terrorism and securing the homeland. This context is helpful in understanding how
these entities defined homeland security and how they arrived at a recommendation
for committee reorganization.
This section examines the reports of four commissions and two think tanks. It
analyzes the context for each entity’s recommendations for committee reorganization
and provides the specific recommendation. Citations to additional studies related to
committee reorganization are provided in the footnotes of this section.114
114 Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and other commissions and think tanks
related to changes in Congress’s oversight of intelligence are not discussed in this report,
nor are recommendations related to policy options requiring congressional action. However,
the excerpts from the reports provided in the appendices contain all analyses and
recommendations related to congressional organization.
In addition, the commission and think tank reports summarized in this CRS report are
representative of a large number of studies by various private, governmental, and
congressional entities.
For example, see also recommendations by the Heritage Foundation on congressional
committee reorganization: Michael Scardaville, “The New Congress Must Reform Its
Committee Structure to Meet Homeland Security Needs,” Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder, Nov. 12, 2002 (available online at [http://www.heritage.org/Research/
HomelandDefense/bg1612.cfm], visited Dec. 10, 2004); James Jay Carafano and Paul
Rosenzweig, “What the 9/11 Commission’s Report Should Contain: Four Recommendations
for Making America Safer,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, July 13, 2004 (available
online at [http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/bg1778.cfm], visited Dec.
10, 2004); James Jay Carafano, “Lack of Congressional Reform Leaves America Less Safe,”
Heritage Foundation Web Memo #579, Sept. 30, 2004 (available online at
[http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/wm579.cfm], visited Dec. 10, 2004);
and James Jay Carafano, “Homework: Congress Needs To Return with a Better Plan to
Reform Homeland Security Oversight” Heritage Foundation, Web Memo #587, Oct. 14,
2004 (available online at [http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/
wm587.cfm?renderforprint=1], visited Dec. 10, 2004).
For additional recommendations on policies and organization of the federal
government, see also, for example, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition
and Technology, The Defense Science Board 1997 Summer Study Task Force on DOD
Responses to Transnational Threats, vol. I (Washington, Oct. 1997) (available online at
[http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/trans.pdf], visited Dec. 10, 2004); and Senate Select
(continued...)

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9/11 Commission Recommendations
Former New Jersey Governor Thomas Kean (R) chaired the 9/11 Commission;
former Representative Lee Hamilton (D-IN) served as vice chair. The commission’s
official name was the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.
The 9/11 Commission reported to the President and Congress on July 22, 2004.115
Context. In explaining the potential meaning and scope of homeland security,
the 9/11 Commission summarized its proposed strategy as follows:
The present transnational danger is Islamist terrorism. What is needed is a broad
political-military strategy that rests on a firm tripod of policies to
! attack terrorists and their organizations;
! prevent the continued growth of Islamist terrorism; and
! protect against and prepare for terrorist attacks.116
The commission made numerous recommendations in the final two chapters of
its report. It stated the purpose of these two chapters as follows:
The United States should consider what to do — the shape and objectives of a
strategy. Americans should also consider how to do it — organizing their
government in a different way.117 (Emphasis in original.)
The commission’s recommendations related to congressional organization were
made in the context of its recommendations for governmentwide organization. In
introducing the chapter on “how to do it,” the commission summarized its
recommendations for government organization:
The United States has the resources and the people. The government should
combine them more effectively, achieving unity of effort. We offer five major
recommendations to do that:
! unifying strategic intelligence and operational planning against
Islamist terrorists across the foreign-domestic divide with a
National Counterterrorism Center;
114 (...continued)
Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Joint
Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of
September 11, 2001, report, 107th Cong., 2nd sess., H.Rept. 107-792 (Washington: GPO, Dec.
2002) (available online at [http://www.gpoaccess.gov/serialset/creports/911.html], visited
Dec. 10, 2004).
115 Among the purposes spelled out in the law creating the commission, the commission was
to “make a full and complete accounting of the circumstances surrounding the attacks of
September 11, 2001,” the source of the commission’s popular name. See Appendix B for
the citation in law to the commission’s creation and for the full text of its analysis and
recommendations related to congressional organization.
116 The 9/11 Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States, p. 363.
117 Ibid., p. 361.

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! unifying the intelligence community with a new National Intelligence
Director;
! unifying the many participants in the counterterrorism effort and their
knowledge in a network-based information-sharing system that transcends
traditional governmental boundaries;
! unifying and strengthening congressional oversight to improve quality and
accountability;
! strengthening the FBI and homeland defenders.118
Recommendation. With regard to intelligence, counterterrorism, and
homeland security, the 9/11 Commission stated in its report to the President and
Congress that congressional committee reorganization was critical to a “unity of
effort” across the federal government. For intelligence oversight, it recommended
a joint committee of the two houses of Congress, or a single committee in each
chamber with authorizing and appropriating authority. With regard to homeland
security, the commission stated:
The leaders of the Department of Homeland Security now appear before 88
committees and subcommittees of Congress.119 One expert witness (not a
member of the administration) told us that this is perhaps the single largest
obstacle impeding the department’s successful development. The one attempt
to consolidate such committee authority, the House Select Committee on
Homeland Security, may be eliminated. The Senate does not have even this.
Congress needs to establish for the Department of Homeland Security the kind
of clear authority and responsibility that exist to enable the Justice Department
to deal with crime and the Defense Department to deal with threats to national
security. Through not more than one authorizing committee and one
appropriating subcommittee in each house, Congress should be able to ask the
secretary of homeland security whether he or she has the resources to provide
reasonable security against major terrorist acts within the United States and to
hold the secretary accountable for the department’s performance.
Recommendation: Congress should create a single, principal point of oversight
and review for homeland security. Congressional leaders are best able to judge
what committee should have jurisdiction over this department and its duties. But
we believe that Congress does have the obligation to choose one in the House
and one in the Senate, and that this committee should be a permanent standing
committee with a nonpartisan staff.120
118 Ibid., pp. 399-400.
119 For a discussion of the number of committees and subcommittees that could purportedly
claim jurisdiction over homeland security, see House Committee Jurisdiction over Entities
and Functions Transferred to the Department of Homeland Security, by Judy Schneider and
Christopher M. Davis, CRS congressional distribution memorandum, April 7, 2003, p. 2.
120 The 9/11 Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States, p. 421.

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Bremer Commission
The Bremer Commission took its name from its chair, then-managing director
of Kissinger Associates and former U.S. ambassador-at-large for counterterrorism L.
Paul Bremer III. Its official name was the National Commission on Terrorism. The
commission reported to the President and Congress on June 7, 2000.121
Context. The commission’s recommendation on congressional organization
was part of a report that warned of an increasing and changing terrorist threat. The
Bremer Commission focused its attention particularly on the intelligence and
international components of counterterrorism and protection of the homeland, stating:
! International terrorism poses an increasingly dangerous and
difficult threat to America.
! Countering the growing danger of the terrorist threat requires
significantly stepping up U.S. efforts.
! Priority one is to prevent terrorist attacks. U.S. intelligence and law
enforcement communities must use the full scope of their authority
to collect intelligence regarding terrorist plans and methods.
! U.S. policies must firmly target all states that support terrorists.
! Private sources of financial and logistical support for terrorists must
be subjected to the full force and sweep of U.S. and international
laws.
! A terrorist attack involving a biological agent, deadly chemicals, or
nuclear or radiological material, even if it succeeds only partially,
could profoundly affect the entire nation. The government must do
more to prepare for such an event.
! The President and Congress should reform the system for reviewing
and funding departmental counterterrorism programs to ensure that
the activities and programs of various agencies are part of a
comprehensive plan.122
The report contained a series of recommendations related to laws, an unratified
treaty, policies, and guidelines. In some instances the commission recommended
ratification or implementation; in others it recommended change or repeal. These
recommendations outlined specific actions that could help the U.S. government
prevent terrorist acts, reduce their likelihood, and prepare for their possibility.
Recommendation.
In its report to the President and Congress, the Bremer
Commission recommended that Congress “should develop mechanisms for
coordinated review of the President’s counterterrorism policy and budget, rather than
121 See Appendix C for the citation in law to its creation and for the full text of its analysis
and recommendations related to congressional organization.
122 National Commission on Terrorism, Countering the Changing Threat of International
Terrorism, transmitted to the President and Congress June 7, 2000, pp. iv-v. (Available
online at [http://www.gpo.gov/nct], visited Dec. 10, 2004.)

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having each of the many relevant committees moving in different directions without
regard to the overall strategy.”123
Gilmore Commission
The Gilmore Commission took its name from its chair, then-Virginia Governor
James S. Gilmore III (R). Its official name was the Advisory Panel to Assess
Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass
Destruction. The Gilmore Commission made five reports annually in December to
the President and Congress, from December 1999 through December 2003.124
Context. The Gilmore Commission’s principal recommendation, which it
examined in each of its five annual reports, was the promulgation of a national
strategy to combat terrorism, “impelled by a stark realization that a terrorist attack on
some level inside our borders is inevitable and the United States must be ready.”125
In the commission’s view, a federal strategy would be a component of the national
strategy.126 And, by addressing its own organization, Congress would be able to
address the national strategy for counterterrorism and homeland security in a
“cohesive way.”127 The Gilmore Commission made numerous other
recommendations.
The Gilmore Commission chose to establish a strategic vision that in five years
— by 2009 — would describe “in both appearance and reality an acceptable level of
awareness, prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery capabilities to cope with
the uncertain and ambiguous threat of terrorism as part of dealing with all
hazards.”128 The commission called its strategic vision “America’s New Normalcy,”
and stated that it presented a “carefully balanced approach to the difficult question
of whether to place more or less emphasis on reducing the terrorist threat versus
lessening American vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks.” (Emphasis in original.) The
commission said the following about the strategic vision:
123 Ibid., p. 35.
124 See Appendix D for the citation in law to its creation and for the full text of its analysis
and recommendations related to congressional organization.
125 Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving
Weapons of Mass Destruction, II. Toward a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,
Second Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Dec. 15, 2000, letter from the
chairman. (Available online at [http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel], visited Dec. 10, 2004.)
126 Ibid. pp.3-5.
127 Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving
Weapons of Mass Destruction, IV. Implementing the National Strategy, Fourth Annual
Report to the President and the Congress, Dec. 15, 2002, p. 50. (Available online at
[http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel], visited Dec. 10, 2004.)
128 Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving
Weapons of Mass Destruction, V. Forging America’s New Normalcy: Securing Our
Homeland, Preserving Our Liberty, Fifth Annual Report to the President and the Congress,
Dec. 15, 2003, p. i. (Available online at [http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel], visited Dec.
10, 2004.)

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America’s New Normalcy in January of 2009 should reflect:
! Both the sustainment and further empowerment of individual freedoms
in the context of measurable advances that secure the homeland.
! Consistent commitment of resources that improve the ability of all levels
of government, the private sector, and our citizens to prevent terrorist
attacks and, if warranted, to respond and recover effectively to the full
range of threats faced by the nation.
! A standardized and effective process for sharing information and
intelligence among all stakeholders — one built on moving actionable
information to the broadest possible audience rapidly, and allowing for
heightened security with minimal undesirable economic and societal
consequences.
! Strong preparedness and readiness across State and local government
and the private sector with corresponding processes that provide an
enterprise-wide national capacity to plan, equip, train, and exercise against
measurable standards.
! Clear definition about the roles, responsibilities, and acceptable uses of
the military domestically — that strengthens the role of the National
Guard and Federal Reserve Components for any domestic mission and
ensures that America’s leaders will never be confronted with competing
choices of using the military to respond to a domestic emergency versus
the need to project our strength globally to defeat those who would seek
to do us harm.
! Clear processes for engaging academia, business, all levels of government,
and others in rapidly developing and implementing research,
development, and standards across technology, public policy, and other
areas needed to secure the homeland — a process that focuses efforts on
real versus perceived needs.
! Well-understood and shared process, plans, and incentives for protecting
the nation’s critical infrastructures of government and in the private
sector — a unified approach to managing our risks.129 (Emphasis in
original.)
The Gilmore Commission put its strategic vision in a context somewhat
different from that of other commissions, perhaps reflecting the significant
representation of state and local officials, including officials with first-responder
duties. The commission emphasized that the strategic vision was “fully consistent
with an all-hazards approach,” stating:
As our experience with SARS, West Nile Virus, monkeypox, the recent fires in
California, and the current influenza epidemic have demonstrated vividly, we
must be able to handle a wide variety of threats.130
In each of its reports the Gilmore Commission, among several commissions and
other entities, addressed two additional major topics enmeshed in homeland security.
The topics were “protecting civil liberties” and “empowering state and local
government.” With regard to civil liberties, the commission’s report stated:
129 Ibid., p. iv.
130 Ibid., p. 3.

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Rather than the traditional portrayal of security and civil liberties as competing
values that must be weighed on opposite ends of a balance, these values should
be recognized as mutually reinforcing. Under this framework, counterterrorism
initiatives would be evaluated in terms of how well they preserve all of the
unalienable rights that are essential to the strength and security of our nation:
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. While these fundamental rights are
cited in our Declaration of Independence and imbedded in our Constitution, they
should not be confused with privileges, which may be imposed upon to protect
national security. However, even privileges should not be imposed upon lightly;
they are fundamental to our quality of life. For example, the opportunity to fly
may be viewed as a privilege rather than a right, but overly stringent and
arbitrary security measures not only have an economic impact but could also
increase public skepticism about security measures generally.131
Regarding the states and localities, the commission stated:
To achieve a truly national strategy, the Federal government must empower
States and local governments by providing a clear definition of preparedness and
a strategic plan and process to implement the objectives of a longer-term vision
across the entire spectrum from awareness through recovery.... Officials at the
Federal level should lead the development of an enterprise architecture to
institutionalize intelligence and information sharing, risk assessments, better
integrated planning and training, and effective requirements generation in close
coordination with State and local governments and the private sector. Only
through true cooperation will we achieve some sustainable measure of
preparedness for the uncertain threat of terrorism.132 (Emphasis in original.)
Recommendation.
In the first two of its five annual reports, the Gilmore
Commission recommended creating a committee in each chamber or a joint
committee of the House and Senate that would have jurisdiction over
counterterrorism and homeland security. It recommended that these committees
comprise representatives of the principal authorizing committees and the
Appropriations Committees, but that the new committees have their own expert staff.
The commission explained the purpose of these committees:
First, it would constitute a forum for reviewing all aspects of a national strategy
and supporting implementation plans for combating terrorism, developed and
submitted by the National Office for Combating Terrorism. [The office was
131 Ibid., p. 4. Yet another entity that has recommended congressional committee
reorganization, the Markle Foundation, put its recommendation in the context of
“Oversight: Protecting Civil Liberties and Sustaining an Effective Homeland Security
Mission,” in Protecting America’s Freedom in the Information Age (New York: The Markle
F o u n d a t i o n , O c t . 2 0 0 2 ) , p p . 7 5 - 7 7 . ( A v a i l a b l e o n l i n e a t
[http://swandive.securesites.net/resources/reports_and_publications/national_security/in
dex.php], visited Dec. 10, 2004.)
132 Ibid., p. 7. In a followup report to the Hart-Rudman Commission (see next section), a
task force of the Council on Foreign Relations recommended congressional committee
reorganization in order to have one place in the House and Senate where emergency
responder programs are authorized. Emergency Responders: Drastically Underfunded,
Dangerously Unprepared (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2003), p. 19.
(Available online at [http://www.cfr.org/pdf/Responders_TF.pdf], visited Dec. 10, 2004.)

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proposed earlier in the commission’s second annual report.] As part of that
process, the joint or each separate committee should develop a consolidated
legislative plan, including authorizing language and corresponding budget and
appropriations ‘benchmarks’ in response to the national strategy to combat
terrorism and accompanying program and budget proposals.
Second, it would serve as the ‘clearinghouse’ for all legislative proposals for
combating terrorism. For separate bills (unrelated to the omnibus package
related to the strategy), the committee should have first referral of such
legislation, prior to the referral to the appropriate standing committee.133
In its fourth report, the Gilmore Commission’s recommendation evolved further:
Recommendation: That each House of the Congress establish a separate
authorizing committee and related appropriation subcommittee with jurisdiction
over Federal programs and authority for Combating Terrorism/Homeland
Security.134
Hart-Rudman Commission
The Hart-Rudman Commission took its name from its co-chairs, former
Senators Gary Hart (D-CO) and Warren B. Rudman (R-NH). Its official name was
the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century. The Hart-Rudman
Commission issued three reports, in September 1999, April 2000, and February
2001.135
Context. Over the course of two years, the Hart-Rudman Commission
published three reports: one assessing the global security environment over the next
25 years, one detailing a strategy of national security/homeland security in that time
frame, and a final report on institutional change to support the recommended strategy.
The commission envisioned an era of rapid, profound change driven by scientific and
technological development and other change.136 It proposed a strategy wherein the
United States would “lead in the construction of a world balanced between the
133 Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving
Weapons of Mass Destruction, II. Toward a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,
Second Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Dec. 15, 2000, p. 18. (Available
online at [http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel], visited Dec. 10, 2004.)
134 IV. Implementing the National Strategy, Fourth Annual Report to the President and the
Congress, p. 50.
135 See Appendix E for the citation to the Secretary of Defense charter creating the
commission and for the full text of its analysis and recommendations related to
congressional organization.
136 United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, New World Coming:
American Security in the 21st Century, Major Themes and Implications, The Phase I Report
of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, Sep. 15, 1999. (Available online
at [http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nssg/nwc.pdf], visited Dec. 10, 2004.)

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expansion of freedom, and the maintenance of underlying stability.”137 Finally, the
commission recommended extensive changes in institutional arrangements and
policies in the executive and legislative branches. It found: “The problem is that the
current structures and processes of U.S. national security policymaking are incapable
of such management [of the opportunities and dangers in implementing the
recommended strategy].”138
The Hart-Rudman Commission summarized its proposal for U.S. national
security strategy as follows:
We believe that American strategy must compose a balance between two key
aims. The first is to reap the benefits of a more integrated world in order to
expand freedom, security, and prosperity for Americans and for others. But
second, American strategy must also strive to dampen the forces of global
instability so that those benefits can endure and spread.139
The commission stated six objectives that underlie this strategy:
! First, to defend the United States and ensure that it is safe from the
dangers of a new era.
! Second, to maintain America’s social cohesion, economic
competitiveness, technological ingenuity, and military strength.
! Third, to assist the integration of key major powers, especially China,
Russia, and India, into the mainstream of the emerging international
system.
! Fourth, to promote, with others, the dynamism of the new global economy
and improve the effectiveness of international institutions and
international law.
! Fifth, to adapt U.S. alliances and other regional mechanisms to a new era
in which America’s partners seek greater autonomy and responsibility.
! Sixth, to help the international community tame the disintegrative forces
spawned by an era of change.140
The commission summarized the reasoning behind its objectives and the strategy the
objectives support:
These six objectives, and the Commission’s strategy itself, rest on a premise so
basic that it often goes unstated: democracy conduces generally to domestic and
international peace, and peace conduces to, or at least allows, democratic
137 United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, Seeking a National
Strategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom, The Phase II Report
of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, April 15, 2000, p. 15. (Available
online at [http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nssg/phaseII.pdf ], visited Dec. 10, 2004.)
138 United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, Road Map for National
Security: Imperative for Change, The Phase III Report of the U.S. Commission on National
Security/21st Century, Feb. 15, 2001, p. 7. (Available online at
[http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nssg/index.html], visited Dec. 10, 2004.)
139 Ibid., p. 5.
140 Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom,
The Phase II Report on a U.S. National Security Strategy for the 21st Century, pp. 8-13.

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politics. While this premise is not a ‘law,’ and while scholars continue to study
and debate these matters, we believe they are strong tendencies, and that they can
be strengthened further by a consistent and determined national policy.141
Finally, the Hart-Rudman Commission encapsulated its recommendations for
organizational change into five components, which it listed as:
! ensuring the security of the American homeland;
! recapitalizing America’s strengths in science and education;
! redesigning key institutions of the Executive Branch;
! overhauling the U.S. government’s military and civilian personnel
systems; and
! reorganizing Congress’s role in national security affairs.142
Recommendation. The Hart-Rudman Commission detailed several
recommendations regarding congressional organization, including:
! The President should ask Congress to appropriate funds to the State
Department in a single integrated Foreign Operations budget, which would
include all foreign assistance programs and activities as well as all
expenses for personnel and operations.143
! Congress should rationalize its current committee structure so that it best
serves U.S. national security objectives; specifically, it should merge the
current authorizing committees with the relevant appropriations
subcommittees.144
! The Executive Branch must ensure a sustained focus on foreign policy and
national security consultation with Congress and devote resources to it.
For its part, Congress must make consultation a higher priority and form
a permanent consultative groups of Congressional leaders as part of this
effort.145
! The Congressional leadership should conduct a thorough bicameral,
bipartisan review of the Legislative Branch relationship to national
security and foreign policy.146
141 Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, The Phase III Report of the U.S.
Commission on National Security/21st Century, p. 6.
142 Ibid., p. viii. The Council on Foreign Relations created a task force headed by former
Senators Hart and Rudman to do a followup report: America — Still Unprepared, Still in
Danger (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002). (Available online at
[http://www.cfr.org/pub5099/gary_hart_warren_b_rudman_stephen_e_flynn/americastill
_unprepared_still_in_danger.php], visited Dec. 10, 2004.)
143 Ibid., p. 58.
144 Ibid., p. 112.
145 Ibid., p. 113.
146 Ibid., p. 110.

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Brookings Institution
Brookings Institution scholars prepared a report in 2002 and, in 2003, updated
it with a lengthy preface.147
Context. The 2003 preface added to the report summarized the
accomplishments in homeland security in the intervening year and laid out an “unmet
agenda.” The Brookings recommendations were made within the context of a
homeland security strategy involving “border protection, domestic prevention,
domestic protection, and consequence management.” The update focused on an
“unmet agenda” broader than the creation of DHS and the other steps taken after the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.148 The 2003 preface concluded with a
summary of the unmet homeland security needs that suggested the scope of homeland
security as the Brookings scholars perceived it:
The first priority relates to resources. Congress and the president enacted an
inadequate level of funding in 2003 for homeland security. In addition to
rectifying that problem, they need to turn promptly to the 2004 budget and
redress vulnerabilities not yet given sufficient priority. These include the use of
information technology, where federal funding to date has been a pittance of
what is required. They also include public-private cooperation on protecting
assets such as chemical facilities, hazardous materials trucking, and the air
intakes of skyscrapers. Finally, a number of existing capabilities and capacities
need dramatic and rapid augmentation. Such strengthening has already occurred
in areas such as airport security and airplane marshals; it now is needed for the
Coast Guard, the Customs Service, train travel, airliner protection against
surface-to-air missiles, and many state and local capacities (such as first
responder teams and hospitals) as well.
Another major part of the challenge is making real what Congress and President
Bush have created on paper, but not yet in reality — a new and huge federal
Department of Homeland Security. Tom Ridge and his management team face
a mammoth reorganization task — larger in many ways than anything ever
attempted in government. And they must undertake that task without in any way
reducing their attention to the demanding effort of securing America against a
future terrorist attack. It is therefore crucial that Ridge sets clear reorganization
priorities — focusing on those areas that need the most immediate attention such
border security and information analysis (and leaving others, such as federal
emergency response, until later). Ridge’s undersecretary candidates will need
to display strong organizational and managerial abilities, particularly in areas
such as infrastructure protection, where whole new capacities need to be created
147 See Appendix F for the full text of the Brookings analysis and recommendations related
to congressional organization.
148 Michael E. O’Hanlon, Ivo H. Daalder, David L. Gunter, Robert E. Litan, Peter R. Orszag,
I.M. Destler, James M. Lindsay, and James B. Steinberg, Protecting the American
Homeland: One Year On (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2002), pp. x, xii.
(Available online at
[http://brookings.edu/dybdocroot/fp/projects/homeland/newhomeland.pdf], visited Dec. 10,
2004.)

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and where little has been accomplished to date, despite the heightened attention
given to homeland security since 9/11.
Finally, the government needs to organize itself much more effectively to
monitor terrorists and try to determine where their next attacks may come. A
stronger domestic counterterrorism entity is needed, including a new agency
independent from the FBI. At present, we are hoping to get lucky by identifying
and apprehending individual terrorists before they can strike. We also need to
develop an alternative approach that allows us to address the “unknown
unknowns,” using “red teams” to prepare for what terrorists might do next even
if they have shown no proclivity for such attacks to date.149
Recommendation.
In 2002, the Brookings scholars recommended that
Congress create homeland-security appropriations subcommittees in each chamber
and, as a interim step until homeland-security authorizing committees were
established, a joint study and oversight committee for homeland security policy.150
In updating their report a year later, after the creation of DHS, these scholars
specifically recommended that Congress create homeland security authorizing
committees in each chamber to “maximize the efficacy of congressional oversight.”
They explained the recommendation:
Much of the benefit of consolidating the homeland security mission within the
executive branch will be lost if our national legislature fails to reflect that
reorganization in its own structure.151
Center for Strategic and International Studies152
Scholars at the Center for Strategic and International Studies issued a white
paper in 2002. A task force organized by CSIS issued a subsequent white paper in
December 2004.
Context. The CSIS scholars’ recommendations were part of an agenda of
recommendations that included the need to state a “national strategy for homeland
security that defines the mission as well as the capabilities and processes necessary
to perform that mission”153 as well as numerous specific actions. Scholars at CSIS
sounded a theme similar to that contained in the Brookings report:
Although creating a Department of Homeland Security is an important step, it
must be viewed as only one part of the answer to the management challenges of
149 Ibid., pp. xxxvi-xxxvii.
150 Ibid., p. 123.
151 Ibid., pp. xxviii, xxx.
152 See Appendix G for the full text of the CSIS analysis and recommendations related to
congressional organization.
153 Center for Strategic and International Studies, Meeting the Challenges of Establishing
a New Department of Homeland Security: A CSIS White Paper, 2002, p. 6. (Available
online at [http://www.csis.org/features/hamrefinalpaper.pdf], visited Dec. 10, 2004.)

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the homeland security mission. No single structural fix can resolve what is a
massive, long-term strategic problem.
Six broad considerations should inform the efforts of homeland security decision
makers:
! Articulate a Homeland Security Strategy...
! Conduct a Comprehensive Threat and Vulnerability Assessment...
! Strengthen White House Coordination...
! Craft an Effective Implementation Strategy...
! Balance Other Critical Concerns...
! Seize an Historic Opportunity to Reform Government....154
Recommendation. Scholars at CSIS recommended Congress create select
committees on homeland security in each chamber comprising the chairs and ranking
members of committees and subcommittees that exercised jurisdiction over agencies
included in DHS. They also recommended new “subcommittees of oversight” in
each chamber’s Appropriations Committee.155
In a subsequent white paper issued in December 2004, a CSIS task force
observed:
We believe that partial reform or piecemeal efforts will be ineffective. The
Department of Homeland Security will be insufficiently accountable unless true
reforms are made to place the majority of oversight responsibility in one
committee in each chamber of Congress. The current situation poses a clear and
demonstrable risk to our national security.156
The task force followed this observation with a recommendation:
We recommend that both the House and the Senate create strong standing
committees for homeland security, with jurisdiction over all components of the
Department of Homeland Security. We recommend that these committees have
a subcommittee structure that maps closely to the core mission areas outlined in
the National Strategy for Homeland Security, not simply to the individual
directorates of DHS. Further, we recommend that these committees be
established pursuant to developing a small, expert cadre of members who can
exercise oversight and craft legislation taking into account the full spectrum of
homeland security requirements — not simply one narrow element of the
domestic war against terrorism. [The core mission areas were listed as
‘Intelligence and Warning, Border and Transportation Security, Domestic
154 Ibid., pp. 6-10.
155 Ibid., pp. 19-21.
156 Center for Strategic and International Studies and Business Executives for National
Security, Untangling the Web: Congressional Oversight and the Department of Homeland
Security: A White Paper of the CSIS-BENS Task Force on Congressional Oversight of the
Department of Homeland Security, Dec. 10, 2004, pp. 3-4. (Available online at
[http://www.csis.org/hs/041210_DHS_TF_WhitePaper.pdf], visited Dec. 10, 2004.)

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Counterterrorism, Protecting Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets, Defending
Against Catastrophic Threats, Emergency Preparedness and Response.’]157
A Brief History of House Committees and
Department Creation
Since World War II, when confronted with an opportunity to create or
reorganize its committees to correspond to new Cabinet departments, the House has
responded differently to the creation of various departments. This section of this
report chronicles the response of the House in its committee organization following
creation of new departments, collecting this information in one place.158
The House’s creation of the Armed Services Committee occurred by merger of
the separate Military Affairs and Naval Affairs Committees, pursuant to the
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946,159 and preceded by one Congress the creation
of the National Military Establishment, later redesignated the Department of
Defense.160 The Armed Services Committee’s jurisdiction was updated in 1953 to
reflect the existence of the department.161
When Congress in 1953 approved President Eisenhower’s reorganization plan
creating the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,162 the House did not
make changes in its committee organization to parallel the department.163
The then-House Committees on Banking, Public Works, Education and Labor,
and Veterans’ Affairs were created or reorganized long before the creation of the
Departments of Housing and Urban Development, Transportation, Education, and
Veterans Affairs, respectively.164
157 Ibid., p. 4.
158 See also CRS Report RL32661, House Committees: A Framework for Considering
Jurisdictional Realignment, by Michael L. Koempel. For a history of Appropriations
Committee subcommittee changes, see CRS Report RL31572, Appropriations Subcommittee
Structure: History of Changes, 1920-2003, by James V. Saturno.
159 60 Stat. 812.
160 63 Stat. 578.
161 H.Res. 5, which was agreed to in the House Jan. 3, 1953.
162 67 Stat. 18.
163 Following the creation of major new agencies by executive action, such as the
Environmental Protection Agency (Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970) and the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (Executive Order 12127 of March 31, 1979, implementing
Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978), Congress did not act to realign committee jurisdictions.
164 79 Stat. 667; 80 Stat. 931; 93 Stat. 668; and 102 Stat. 2635, respectively. In his prepared
statement for the hearing of the Select Committee on Homeland Security’s Subcommittee
on Rules, then-House Parliamentarian Charles Johnson explained the subsequent evolution
of the Public Works Committee, now the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, after
(continued...)

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The reorganization of House committee jurisdictions to reflect the 1977 creation
of the Department of Energy165 followed the department’s organization by three
years. On March 25, 1980, the House agreed to H.Res. 549, to be effective with the
next Congress, redesignating the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee as the
Energy and Commerce Committee and giving it jurisdiction over national energy
policy generally and over many components of energy policy.
Still, the jurisdiction of the now-Science Committee over such related matters
as energy research and development was expanded by H.Res. 549. The Ways and
Means Committee continued to have jurisdiction over tax and trade laws, even as
they affected energy policy. The now-Transportation Committee had jurisdiction
over oil and other pollution of navigable waters, and the now-Resources Committee
had jurisdiction over mineral resources on public lands. Appropriations for the
Energy Department were generally contained in an energy and water appropriations
bill, which through 1978 had been called a public works appropriations bill, and in
an interior appropriations bill. Other committees retained other energy-related
jurisdiction.166 This arrangement was in part due to the retention of energy programs
in other departments after the creation of the Department of Energy.
Conclusion. The House has tended to continue its committee organization
following congressional creation of a new department or a major reorganization in
the executive branch. In action after creation of the Department of Energy, the House
established the Energy and Commerce Committee as the lead energy policy
committee, but it also continued a jurisdictional structure that gave other committees
a role in energy policymaking. The merger of the Military Affairs Committee and
the Naval Affairs Committee into the Armed Services Committee was the exception
to the House’s pattern, but it took place within a wholesale and fundamental
consolidation of House and Senate committees.
164 (...continued)
the formation of the Department of Transportation: “I recall the creation of the Department
of Transportation in the late 1960s. Incrementally thereafter, the House in adoption of its
rules from the majority caucus on opening day accomplished a consolidation of committee
jurisdiction. Whereas at the time of creation of the Department, Public Works had
jurisdiction over highways and civil aviation, Banking had jurisdiction over urban mass
transit, Commerce had jurisdiction over railroads and Merchant Marine and Fisheries had
jurisdiction over maritime transportation, those various aspects have been gradually
consolidated under the umbrella of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
following the demise of certain transportation regulatory independent agencies that
remained in place after the creation of DOT.” Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform:
Lessons from the Past, May 19, 2003, p. 11.
165 91 Stat. 565.
166 For a legislative history of the creation of executive departments after World War II, see
CRS Report RL31497, Creation of Executive Departments: Highlights from the Legislative
History of Modern Precedents, by Thomas P. Carr.

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Analysis of Considerations Relevant to the
Creation of a Homeland Security Committee
The 9/11 Commission and other commissions and think tanks define homeland
security to be a continuum of international and domestic initiatives and activities, all
of which have a role reducing the likelihood and potential impact of a terrorist attack
against the United States. The themes behind these initiatives and activities include:
! disabling terrorists overseas,
! winning friends in Islamic and other countries,
! counterterrorism and homeland security as the principle and purpose
of American diplomatic and military strategy,
! good intelligence abroad and at home, shared appropriately within
the federal government and between the federal government and
state and local governments and the private sector,
! commitment abroad and at home to freedom and civil liberties,
! maintaining a national strategy for homeland security,
! organizing the federal executive to carry out the strategy,
! defining the military’s domestic role in homeland security,
! organizing Congress to contribute to and oversee the strategy and its
implementation, particularly the ongoing development of DHS to
prevent attacks, reduce vulnerability, and respond to and recover
from attacks,
! including state and local governments and the private sector in
carrying out the strategy,
! federal funding of components of the strategy, and
! preparing the American citizenry for possible additional terrorist
attacks.167
The Select Committee on Homeland Security recommended the creation of a
permanent Homeland Security Committee that would have jurisdiction over domestic
components of homeland security, reporting to the House Rules Committee on
September 30, 2004, as required by H.Res 5.168 That jurisdiction in itself is wide
ranging and requires expertise in a large number of policy areas, including
intelligence analysis, public health, border control, transportation security, first
responders, information technology, protection of critical infrastructure, and
homeland security-related research, among other policy areas. The recommended
jurisdiction includes DHS and, presumably, the national strategy issued by the
President in 2002 and any changes to that strategy.
Among many policy areas, the select committee’s recommendation would leave
jurisdiction over the intelligence community principally in the jurisdiction of the
167 For a comparison of the commissions’ specific policy recommendations, see CRS Report
RL32519, Terrorism: Key Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and Recent Major
Commissions and Inquiries, by Richard F. Grimmett.
168 Recommendations of the Select Committee on Homeland Security on Changes to the
Rules of the House of Representatives with Respect to Homeland Security Issues, p. 7.

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Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) in the jurisdiction of the Judiciary Committee, the armed forces in the
jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committee, relations with foreign nations in the
jurisdiction of the International Relations Committee, and money laundering and
other financial arrangements in the jurisdiction of the Financial Services Committee.
In addition, the policy-area jurisdiction of the proposed committee could overlap
with the policy-area jurisdictions of other committees; so, for example, legislation
dealing with information technology or public health might be within the jurisdiction
of the Homeland Security Committee, the Energy and Commerce Committee, and
possibly other committees. Overlaps in some areas, such as with the Agriculture
Committee on border issues and with the Science Committee on research and
development, were not addressed in the select committee’s recommendations.
Under the select committee’s recommendations, activities within DHS that are
not homeland-security-related would remain within the jurisdiction of standing
committees already having jurisdiction. For example, the non-homeland-security
missions of the Coast Guard and natural disaster preparedness and response would
remain under the jurisdiction of the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee; the
revenue functions of the Customs Service would remain under the jurisdiction of the
Ways and Means Committee; and immigration and naturalization policy that is not
related to homeland security would remain under the jurisdiction of the Judiciary
Committee.
The select committee’s recommendations would also leave jurisdiction over
appropriations in the Appropriations Committee. As mentioned above, the
Appropriations Committees in each chamber realigned their subcommittees to create
one subcommittee that parallels the programs and entities of DHS, which leaves
funding decisions for other homeland security-related programs and agencies in the
jurisdiction of other appropriations subcommittees. (However, discussion of
subcommittee jurisdiction over intelligence appropriations could lead to further
realignment.)
Concentration or Dispersal of Homeland Security Jurisdiction. The
9/11 Commission and the other commissions and think tanks recommended
alternative committee arrangements: a joint committee, an authorizing committee in
each chamber of Congress, or a combined authorization-appropriation committee in
each chamber that would have jurisdiction over homeland security, as the 9/11
Commission explained its recommendation, in order to achieve a “unity of effort.”
The recommendations for a consolidation of jurisdiction in Congress were based on
a desire for coherent congressional policymaking vis-à-vis the new Department of
Homeland Security or a national homeland-security strategy or both.
The commissions and think tanks that made recommendations after the
President proposed the creation of DHS, including the select committee, argued that
the department would have the best chance of developing with clear lines of authority
in Congress. As the 9/11 Commission stated:
Through not more than one authorizing committee and one appropriating
subcommittee in each house, Congress should be able to ask the secretary of

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homeland security whether he or she has the resources to provide reasonable
security against major terrorist acts within the United States and to hold the
secretary accountable for the department’s performance.169
Or, as the select committee stated in its recommendations:
The current diffused and unfocused congressional jurisdiction over the
Department of Homeland Security, and homeland security in general, not only
imposes extraordinary burdens on the Department, but makes it far more difficult
for the Congress to guide the Department’s activities in a consistent and focused
way that promotes integration and eliminates programmatic redundancies, and
advances implementation of a coherent national homeland security strategy.170
The commissions that made recommendations prior to the President’s proposal to
create DHS recommended a consolidation of committee jurisdictions so that the
House and Senate could oversee a national strategy, rather than have separate
committees pursue separate interests.
Some of the commissions and think tanks were explicit in their desire to ensure
that the executive was accountable to Congress for its management of homeland
security. As the Hart-Rudman Commission stated:
Solving the homeland security challenge is not just an Executive Branch
problem. Congress should be an active participant in the development of
homeland security programs as well. Its hearings can help develop the best ideas
and solutions. Individual members should develop expertise in homeland
security policy and its implementation so that they can fill in policy gaps and
provide needed oversight and advice in times of crisis. Most important, using its
power of the purse, Congress should ensure that government agencies have
sufficient resources and that their programs are coordinated, efficient, and
effective.171
The select committee took this perspective a step further in arguing that it was
essential for Congress to reorganize its committees in order to exercise its role in
homeland security policymaking, stating:
Terrorism is now a first-order priority in Congress, the Executive branch, and
among the American people. Global terrorism is recognized as a fundamental
threat to our people, territory, and way of life for the foreseeable future. The
Executive branch has been reconfigured in light of that reality. Congress,
however, has not. The result has been uncoordinated oversight and conflicting
legislative guidance — effecting a tacit enhancement of Executive branch
authority over homeland security policy, programs, and activities. Congress
169 The 9/11 Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States, p. 421.
170 Recommendations of the Select Committee on Homeland Security on Changes to the
Rules of the House of Representatives with Respect to Homeland Security Issues, pp. 1-2.
171 Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, The Phase III Report of the
United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, p. 26.

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must, in short, fundamentally reform itself or become largely irrelevant where
homeland security matters are concerned.172
In testimony before the select committee’s Rules Subcommittee, several
witnesses explained in concrete terms what they believed Congress would gain from
committee reorganization, enabling it in turn to better exercise its policymaking role.
For example, for Representative Hamilton testified:
[R]eal congressional expertise on homeland security will come about better I
think if you have a permanent committee. My guess is that everybody on [the
select] committee has learned an awful lot about homeland security in the last
few months, a lot more than they knew when they began work on that committee.
That is the strength of the Congress, developing expertise on a difficult subject,
and this is one of the key reasons why you should have a permanent committee.
There is no substitute for expertise focused on the task at hand; and I think then
expertise has to be cultivated, it has to be developed. You have got so many
other things that demand your attention, and serving on the committee will make
you focus on it and make you do the job of oversight and will develop expertise
that the Congress badly needs. But, more important, it will develop the expertise
that is critical for the operation of the department itself, the executive branch.173
On this same point, congressional scholar Wolfensberger testified about an obstacle
to developing new expertise in the current committee alignment:
Both branches are still wedded to traditional, pre-9/11 arrangements and
relationships internally, and with their counterparts in the other branch, what
some have referred to in the past as the iron triangle of subcommittees, agencies
and their private and public sector clienteles.
You need a separate committee that is willing to set a new course and way of
doing things; exercise tough oversight, employ innovative thinking and exert
constant pressure on the new department to set the right priorities and pursue
them rigorously.174
However, the House has made different decisions in different situations
regarding the organization of its committees to oversee a policy area or even a
Cabinet department. If the House were to organize a permanent homeland security
committee, it could do so in a way that allowed more committee and Member
participation in the formulation of homeland security policy, or that allowed
integration of homeland-security-related and non-homeland-security-related
components of a policy area. The House might choose an alternative to the
recommendations of the various commissions and think tanks and its own select
committee. Such a choice would be consistent with a number of past decisions on
172 Supplementary Materials [of the Select Committee on Homeland Security], p. 16.
173 Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Former House Leaders, Sept. 9, 2003, pp.
40-41.
174 Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Committees and the Executive Branch, July
10, 2003, p. 33.

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committee jurisdiction over a department or agency or policy area or components of
a policy area.175
As described in a previous section, the House has tended not to follow
reorganization in the executive branch with reorganization of House committees.
Creation of the Armed Services Committee occurred from merger of two committees
and preceded reorganization of what became the Department of Defense by one
Congress. While the Armed Services Committee seems to represent the kind of
“unity of effort” in committee organization sought by the 9/11 Commission, the
committee’s creation occurred within the context of the Legislative Reorganization
Act of 1946, under which virtually the whole House and Senate committee structure
was reorganized. The new committee’s jurisdiction was also distinct from the
jurisdictions of the other committees organized under the act.
The House’s renaming of the Interstate and Foreign Committee as the Energy
and Commerce Committee and the designation of that committee as the House’s lead
committee on energy occurred three years after the creation of the Department of
Energy, following a review of committee jurisdiction. (This review is described
further below.) The designation was accomplished in the same House resolution that
enhanced the energy research jurisdiction of what is now the Science Committee.
And, the jurisdiction of what is now the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee
evolved only incrementally over a number of years after the creation of the
Department of Transportation.
The House has also chosen not to concentrate all aspects of a policy area in a
single committee, choosing instead openness and differing policy perspectives. For
example, the Education and the Workforce Committee has jurisdiction over
“education or labor generally,”176 but jurisdiction over the education of veterans is
vested in the Veterans’ Affairs Committee, over mining schools in the Resources
Committee, over international education in the International Relations Committee,
and over agricultural colleges in the Agriculture Committee.177 Jurisdiction over the
federal civil service is vested in the Government Reform Committee, and over
transportation labor in the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee.178 Although
the Government Reform Committee has jurisdiction over the federal civil service, the
Armed Services Committee has jurisdiction over “pay, promotion, retirement, and
other benefits and privileges of members of the armed forces,” and the House
Administration Committee has jurisdiction over “Employment of persons by the
House, including staff for Members, Delegates, the Resident Commissioner, and
committees; and reporters of debates....”179
175 For an analysis of House decisions on jurisdiction realignment, see CRS Report
RL32661, House Committees: A Framework for Considering Jurisdictional Realignment,
by Michael L. Koempel.
176 House Rule X, cl. 1(e)(6).
177 House Rule X, cl. 1(r)(3), cl. 1(l)(14), cl. 1(j)(8), and cl. 1(a)(4), respectively.
178 House Rule X, cl. 1(h)(1) and cl. 1(q)(20), respectively.
179 House Rule X, cl. 1(c)(10) and cl. 1(i)(3), respectively.

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The House has also tended to choose dispersal of at least components of a policy
area rather than a concentration in one committee, with very large exceptions such
as Appropriations and, with regard to taxation, Ways and Means. The House might
choose such an arrangement to overcome a committee’s bias in favor of a department
or agency and too much deference to it; too close an alignment of a committee, a
department or agency, and interest groups; or too concentrated power over a policy
area. Due in part to dissatisfaction in the 1970s with the Armed Services
Committee’s and other committees’ conduct of intelligence oversight, the House
created what ultimately became the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.180
The House abolished the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in 1977, dispersing its
jurisdiction to several committees. By the 1970s, public health and environmental
concerns were part of the policy debate over nuclear energy’s future, and the joint
committee was criticized for its closeness to the nuclear power industry.181
The House has also chosen to redistribute a committee’s jurisdiction when it
has perceived that the jurisdiction is too broad, that components of the jurisdiction
are closely related to the jurisdiction of another committee, or that a redistribution of
jurisdiction would better distribute House committees’ workload. For example, in
adopting rules for the 104th Congress, the House redistributed specific parts of the
Energy and Commerce Committee’s jurisdiction to three other standing
committees.182

Nonetheless, the House cleared up what might have been perceived as
duplication of the work of the standing committees by abolishing four select
committees in the 103rd Congress and what might have been perceived as committees
with redundant or too narrow jurisdiction by abolishing three standing committees
in the 104th Congress.183 It also over the course of four Congresses transferred
jurisdiction over several financial services policy areas to what is now the Financial
Services Committee from the Energy and Commerce Committee, in recognition of
changes in the financial services sector of the domestic and global economy.184 Since
World War II, however, the House has not done what the select committee has
recommended with regard to homeland security jurisdiction: create a new committee
and curtail the jurisdiction of existing standing committees.
180 The select committee was created pursuant to H.Res. 658, agreed to in the House July 14,
1977. For background, see “U.S. Intelligence Agencies Probed in 1975,” Congressional
Quarterly Almanac 1975, vol. XXXI (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1976), pp.
387-408; and “Intelligence Committee,” Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1977, vol.
XXXIII (Washington: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1977), pp. 376-377.
181 See CRS Report RL32538, 9/11 Commission Recommendations: Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy — A Model for Congressional Oversight?, by Christopher M. Davis; and
“Atomic Energy Committee,” Congressional Quarterly Almanac 1977, vol. XXXIII
(Washington: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1977), pp. 660-661.
182 CRS Report RL32661, House Committees: A Framework for Considering Jurisdictional
Realignment, p. 7.
183 Ibid., p. 7.
184 Ibid. p. 3.

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If the House were to create a permanent homeland security committee,
considerations in addition to the importance of homeland security might affect the
design of the committee in its creation or in implementation of the House’s decision.
If selected jurisdictions of existing standing committee were to be curtailed or taken
away, the House could lose the expertise of Members and staff serving or working
on those committees, and the House might value shared jurisdiction allowing a
broader range of expertise among its committees rather than expertise largely
residing in one committee. Shared jurisdiction could arguably enhance the
integration of homeland-security-related initiatives into the broader policy areas of
which they are a part, such as immigration, transportation modes and systems,
federally supported R&D, or international commerce.
While possibly creating a lead committee on homeland security, the House
might desire having more than one committee serve as a watchdog of the new
department and bring different perspectives of committees and the Members who
serve on them to bear on homeland security policymaking. For example, even in
designating the Energy and Commerce Committee as the House’s lead committee on
energy policy, important components of energy policy were left or placed in the
jurisdiction of other committees. While such an arrangement might arguably make
it more difficult to legislate in a policy area at the committee level, the arrangement
can provide an incentive for a larger number of Members to become knowledgeable
about policymaking related to that area. Indeed, one consequence of a number of
Members having waivers from the House rule limiting Members to service on two
standing committees is to give many Members a broader role in policymaking at the
committee level.
A more dispersed jurisdiction could also provide additional access to Congress
for whistleblowers, alternative forums that might be more receptive to critical
reviews or the conduct of oversight, or alternative forums for competing views
contributing to more robust policymaking.
Implications of Jurisdictional Gains and Losses. Despite the House’s
predilection for multiple perspectives being brought to bear on policy problems and
the desire it manifested in the 103rd and 104th Congresses to reduce the number of
House committees, the policy area of homeland security seems to be something new.
Remarkably, the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, perhaps due to the
broadness and flexibility of the subject terms employed, anticipated many policy
problems and the role the federal government would come to play in policy setting
and funding through congressional authorization. Cabinet departments could be
created and policy problems acted on, and the House could make incremental
adjustments over the years to committee jurisdiction and the referral of legislation to
accommodate change.
Possibly the closest analogy to the perception of homeland security as a new
policy problem is the energy crises of the 1970s. Some Members then perceived a
need for jurisdictional changes in House committees following the creation of the
Department of Energy, and the House eventually created a select committee to study
committee jurisdiction and other matters, including jurisdiction over energy policy,
and to develop recommendations. In addition, subcommittees had proliferated in the
1970s, and some 83 House committees and subcommittees were believed to have a

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jurisdictional claim over energy policy. The select committee recommended the
creation of an energy committee. However, the House instead by vote affirmed the
Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee’s lead role in energy policy and then
agreed to the changes that were described above.185
Are the energy crises analogous to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 that brought
homeland security into focus? Some have at least tacitly said no. In distinguishing
the House’s decision to reduce the number of standing committees in 1994 from his
favoring a new permanent homeland security committee, former Speaker Gingrich
testified as follows:
[T]his is the only potential standing committee which really has the defensive
obligation that could involve millions of lives. And for the House to have not
some centralized authority monitoring the Department of Homeland Security and
creating an effective, secure relationship[,] I think would be an enormous mistake
and one which literally could over the next decade result in us having a tragic
loss dramatically greater than September 11. This is an unusual case. I don’t
think you are going to see me come up here and testify about new standing
committees, but this is a very unusual moment in our history.186
In distinguishing the long-term problem of terrorism from previous challenges
the United States has faced, former Secretary Schlesinger testified as follows:
We now face a different kind of crisis. It is not a question of responding to Pearl
Harbor, and four years later accepting the surrender of Japan in Tokyo Bay.
Terrorism is the tool of the weak and the terrorists are likely always to be with
us. We must lower their capacity to inflict damage. If we fail to lower that
capacity to inflict damage, this society will begin to change. It is a democracy,
but if you begin to contemplate the psychological reaction of the public seeing
a biological attack in Cincinnati, followed by a nuclear attack in Houston, what
have you, you are going to see this society change.
If we value what has been the wellspring of this constitutional democracy, which
continues to be a dispersion of power, then we must as effectively as we can
lower the capacity of those hostile to the United States to commit terrorist acts.
And that is what the Department of Homeland Security is about. That is the
legislation that you passed, and now you are called upon to make it effective.187
The commissions and think tanks also described the gravity of the terrorist
threat and its long-term nature, and the critical importance of a national strategy in
response and its implementation.
185 For a history of congressional reform since World War II, see CRS Report RL31835,
Reorganization of the House of Representatives: Modern Reform Efforts, by Judy Schneider,
Christopher M. Davis, and Betsy Palmer. See pp. 43-45 for a history of the Select
Committee on Committees.
186 Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Former House Leaders, Sept. 9, 2003, pp.
24-25.
187 Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Committees and the Executive Branch, July
10, 2003, p. 21.

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Former Secretary Schlesinger also contrasted the Department of Energy with the
Department of Homeland Security and the needs of a diverse new department,
stating:
[C]reating the Department of Energy was child’s play compared to creating this
new department simply because the bulk of the resources came from one
previously existing agency. Some of the responsibilities, particularly in [the]
area of price controls, were shed over the course of the next three years. And as
a result, we have a compact, relatively compact, department.
What we have here is [a] set of agencies brought together that have a long
tradition, Customs Service, the Coast Guard, and newly formed agencies that
have not completely jelled, like the Transportation Security [Administration].
These must be helped along so that the disparate cultures of these agencies can
be brought together.188
Later, Secretary Schlesinger stated his concerns about the impact on DHS’s future
of “fragmentation” among congressional committees:
[Y]ou [a subcommittee member] talked about what essentially was
fragmentation. If the 88 committees of some jurisdiction in the Congress are
dealing with the Department of Homeland Security, they cannot successfully
achieve that common mission of protecting the homeland. Thus, it will wind up
that some committees, some committee members, some staffs will say to that
Department of Homeland Security, unless you do X, unless you give us this
response, we are going to take it out on the department. And you will have
fragmentation that will be pulling the department apart. It will be responding to
the fragmentation that would continue to exist on Capitol Hill.
And as a consequence, I think that if you are going to achieve the results that
everybody wants, they may disagree in retrospect about what should have been
put in the department, but the result that everybody wants, that this department
be successful because it is the umbrella that protects the society, then we must
have a greater degree of unity on the Hill, as well as in the executive branch.
The executive branch will continue to fragment if the Hill remains fragmented.189
Congressional scholar King made a similar point: “The fragmentation is
tremendously debilitating [to DHS].”190
The question for many committee leaders and presumably some number of
House Members is how to reconcile the new and perhaps overriding national security
purpose of homeland security with existing programs and policies. Can the House
disambiguate the homeland security components of threats to agriculture, nuclear
plants, transportation modes, ports, information technology, or public health, or of
management of immigration, emergency response, or the Coast Guard, from the
individual policy systems governing animal and plant health, nuclear plant safety and
security, transportation regulation, and so on?
188 Ibid., p. 11.
189 Ibid., p. 24.
190 Ibid., p. 45.

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Ways and Means Committee Chairman Bill Thomas explained this concern in
relation to traditional Customs functions and international trade, stating:
I am very concerned about losing the knowledge and the ability in a continually
growing, complicated area of intercourse. It is not bright-lighted. It is not a big
area, but, boy, is it necessary to function smoothly as the world’s largest importer
and the world’s largest exporter. The point at which those activities occur have
to be allowed to go forward in a very smooth and efficient manner, with the full
understanding of the concerns of security today different than previously, that we
are more than willing to take into consideration on a negotiated basis[,] with
Treasury retraining the structure that it has, with the ability to consult and make
adjustments. That is where we are today. That arrangement seems reasonable
to me.
But if the option of a permanent committee on homeland security is to take
jurisdiction from other committees and put it together under the rubric of security
and expect, for example, the Customs fees and duty collection function to
continue[,] would be rather naive. They would be submitted to security
restrictions which I think would make it virtually impossible for them to do their
historic job.191
As noted in the section above related to the select committee’s Rules
Subcommittee’s hearings, other committee leaders also discussed this problem. For
example, Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman Barton mentioned the nuclear
plant safety provisions in the energy bill and asked in his testimony: “How do you
distinguish the need to keep our nuclear plants secure from terrorism versus the need
to secure them against sabotage or something done by a former disgruntled
employee?”192
A number of committee leaders also pointed to the legislative and oversight
accomplishments of their committees related to homeland security, some pre-dating
9/11 and many in response to the terrorist attacks. Aviation Subcommittee Chairman
Mica and Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Ranking Member Oberstar
discussed aviation security; a list was included in the statement submitted by
committee Chairman Don Young. Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman
Barton listed the committee’s accomplishments in both his oral and written
testimony. Judiciary Committee Chairman Sensenbrenner and Government Reform
Committee Chairman Tom Davis and Ranking Member Waxman also detailed the
work of their committees. Energy and Commerce Committee Ranking Member
Dingell explained this perspective:
I would note that the standing committees have taken their responsibilities as
seriously as have you ladies and gentlemen here [members of the select
committee], and we have moved cooperatively with you and with the others who
191 Homeland Security Jurisdiction: The Perspectives of Committee Leaders, March 24,
2004, p. 117.
192 Ibid., p. 45.

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are concerned with these matters [of homeland security] and with each other to
see to it that we have accomplished the legislative purposes that were needed.193
The committee leaders also noted the expertise of their committee members and
staff, and expressed the value of different perspectives being brought to bear on
policy problems. Agriculture Committee Chairman Goodlatte and Ranking Member
Stenholm asked how one committee could gain the expertise to oversee an enterprise
as large and diverse as DHS. Chairman Goodlatte stated:
Mr. Chairman, with nearly 170,000 employees and countless missions and
responsibilities, the function of the Department of Homeland Security lends itself
to a functionally diverse oversight mechanism. I cannot see how a single standing
committee with a normal staff can ever amass the expertise necessary to
completely[,] properly oversee this new Department. The Congress has a
constitutional responsibility to ensure that sufficient resources are provided to
review and analyze each of our Federal programs. A single standing [C]ommittee
on Homeland Security would have great difficulty in fulfilling this
responsibility....194
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Ranking Member Oberstar spoke about
his committee’s expertise in aviation and asked that that expertise be used to deal
with policy problems and their oversight:
Secretary Mineta has said he wants world class security with world class service.
How to get there? I think our committee understands how to do that. We have
contributed a great deal fo time to the deliberation [of] these issues. And while
we might start out with differing viewpoints, we generally come to a consensus
position on the underlying legislation and then work to ensure that it is well
carried out.
So I urge this committee (the select committee’s Rules Subcommittee) to keep
in mind this body of expertise, that not only ours but other authorizing
committees, standing committees[,] have in matters such as the one you are
considering and, more importantly, the interrelationship with other functions of
these departments and agencies that are not security but may have [a]
relationship to security, and let us continue to attend to the needs and craft the
legislation and shape the future missions of these agencies in a way that will be
supportive of security but also respectful of the historic functions of say, Coast
Guard, aviation, FEMA, and our maritime system.195
At several points during the hearings, select committee Chairman Cox, sitting
as a member of the Rules Subcommittee, provided a perspective on the mission of
DHS and a homeland security committee overseeing it that distinguished the
department’s homeland security mission and the committee’s potential jurisdiction
from the work and jurisdiction of other standing committees. His perspective
reflected the definitions of homeland security contained in the Homeland Security
193 Ibid., p. 48.
194 Ibid., p. 32.
195 Ibid., p. 81.

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Act. In an exchange involving jurisdiction over aviation security, Chairman Cox
explained:

[Y]ou have got a Department of Homeland Security that is focused on
prevention, protection, and response, and is not going to become the regulator of
every aspect of American life; it is not going to become the regulator of every
aspect of American commerce. But, as I have said, before other panels have
testified today, I think there is a risk the Department could morph into those
things.
And that is one of the reasons that we want very, very strenuous oversight from
the Congress that created it so recently, because if the department, which surely
is going to exist indefinitely, the new cabinet department[,] history suggests they
don’t go away, is going to grow. And if it is going to grow and last indefinitely,
then it needs to stay focused, and it needs to stay focused on protecting
Americans and our security and not get into all these other areas. And we will
lost our competitiveness in all these industries if we regulate them not with a
view to the big picture, which includes competition of global commerce, job
creation, investment, in the case of transportation safety and all these other
things.
If we have on the blinders of security and that is all, and then we become — we,
the Department of Homeland Security in this case, become the regulators of all
these industries, then the regulation will suffer, the industries will suffer, the
country will suffer, and it won’t work. So I think that dichotomy [between the
traditional functional responsibilities of the standing committees and the role of
DHS in prevention, protection, and response] makes a great deal of sense. And
its is just as important that we circumscribe the mission of the Department of
Homeland Security as it is that we respect the traditional jurisdictions of the
committees.196
Former Speaker Gingrich, as cited earlier, responded similarly when asked a
question about committee organization:
...I think the jurisdiction issue is actually fairly easy in principle. The principle
ought to be that this is a mission-driven jurisdiction; that is, when there are
questions of activities that are uniquely homeland security, protection, response,
recovery, rehabilitation, this committee ought to have either sole or lead
jurisdiction.197
And, a statement of the Gilmore Commission, cited previously, could be read
as consistent with Chairman Cox’s explanation. The commission emphasized that
its strategic vision for homeland security was “fully consistent with an all-hazards
approach,” in other words a component of the larger and prevailing emergency
management system. The commission noted:
196 Ibid., pp. 89-91.
197 Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Former House Leaders, Sept. 9, 2003, p. 29.

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As our experience with SARS, West Nile Virus, monkeypox, the recent fires in
California, and the current influenza epidemic have demonstrated vividly, we
must be able to handle a wide variety of threats.198
A former senior analyst at the Congressional Research Service, Walter Kravitz,
described the legislative process in Congress as a “procedural obstacle course.”
Under the Constitution, both houses of Congress and the President must agree to the
same legislation. Under the rules and practices of each chamber, leaders’ support
must be garnered and majorities assembled at each stage of the legislative process —
subcommittee, committee, floor — to advance legislation or prevent its derailment.
Referral of a measure in the House to one committee or to more than one committee,
based on jurisdiction, can be looked at from different perspectives. If a measure is
referred to just one committee, a majority on that committee can control the
committee phase. If a measure is referred to more than one committee, the control of
a single committee is lost, but the support of members from multiple committees is
gained if each committee reports the legislation. Whether one committee or several
committees report a measure, a majority must still be assembled on the floor. The
rules and practices of the House and Senate and the requirements of the Constitution
make it difficult to pass a measure and enact it into law.
If the House were to organize a permanent homeland security committee, would
a homeland security committee created in a way that curtails or takes away
jurisdiction from existing standing committees shift inter-committee negotiations
from the committee phase to the post-reporting/pre-floor phase? Might the
leadership or the House Rules Committee or party entities, or a combination of these
groups, be called on to negotiate base text or substitute amendments or other changes
to any measure reported from the new committee? The existing standing committees
have expertise and decades of experience with the policy problems of which security
is now a component, and their continued involvement in the development of
legislation that affects their traditional jurisdiction is a possibility. Their leverage lies
in the legislative process.
Witnesses at the select committee’s subcommittee hearings offered a variety of
options that the House could consider at the time of the creation of a homeland
security committee or over the course of one or more Congresses after its creation.
For example, several witnesses mentioned the tools at the Speaker’s disposal to
facilitate committee processing of homeland security legislation — making referrals,
designating a primary committee, not designating a primary committee, making
sequential referrals, and setting time limits for action under a referral are some of
these tools. These tools can be particularly effective where there is shared jurisdiction
or a measure’s provisions trigger the jurisdiction of more than one committee.
Congressional scholars Ornstein and Mann suggested going slowly in building
a new committee’s jurisdiction, adding to it over time. They, as well as others, also
commented on the use of committee assignments, including members from existing
standing committees of jurisdiction, as a way to build support for a new committee.
198 V. Forging America’s New Normalcy: Securing Our Homeland, Preserving Our Liberty,
Fifth Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Dec. 15, 2003, p. 3.

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Congressional scholar King noted that committees build jurisdiction through such
actions as “bill referrals over jurisdictionally ambiguous issues,” and that that
jurisdiction is later validated in rules changes.199 Former Speaker Gingrich discussed
the concept of “concurrent jurisdiction” to allow the new committee to assert
jurisdiction when future problems “impinge on homeland security.”200 Some
witnesses discussed oversight jurisdiction, by which a committee can be granted
under House rules a broader or different jurisdiction from the committee’s legislative
jurisdiction. Even in a system of shared jurisdiction, jurisdictional changes could be
effected that limit the number of committees with jurisdiction over a function or
directorate of DHS.201
Would a Homeland Security Committee Be Enough? The select
committee’s recommendations related to jurisdiction cover many domestic
components of homeland security, those specifically a part of DHS. Other domestic
components and international components, such as combating terrorism overseas, are
not specifically listed. This fact was summarized at the beginning of this section. In
recognition of the importance of counterterrorism and homeland security, a number
of witnesses at the select committee’s subcommittee hearings made suggestions for
coordination among congressional committees. In addition, a common element
among all commission and think tank reports was the need for coordination among
congressional committees.
One matter cited in the hearings, in the 9/11 Commission report, and in the
select committee’s recommendations is a perceived need for coordinating or reducing
hearings appearances by DHS officials and perhaps other requests to DHS. While
some witnesses de-emphasized this concern, many witnesses deplored the number
of requests from congressional committees for DHS hearings witnesses and other
responses. Former Speaker Gingrich suggested that the House agree to a resolution
at the beginning of a Congress “which instructs the executive branch on who has to
report where.”202 He also suggested that the leadership monitor DHS “interactions
with the House” to prevent diversion of DHS’s leadership.203 Some witnesses called
for coordination of requests to DHS by the leadership or by a successor to the select
committee. Congressional scholar Wolfensberger suggested that, with regard to
homeland security, the “oversight agendas adopted by the committees at the
beginning of a Congress should be superintended by the bipartisan leadership.”204
199 Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Committees and the Executive Branch, July
10, 2003, p. 38.
200 Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Former House Leaders, Sept. 9, 2003, p. 29.
201 See, for example, the statement of Science Committee Chairman Boehlert, Homeland
Security Jurisdiction: The Perspectives of Committee Leaders, March 24, 2004, pp. 118-
119.
202 Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Former House Leaders, Sept. 9, 2003, p. 12.
203 Ibid., p. 17-18.
204 Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Committees and the Executive Branch, July
10, 2003, p. 33.

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Another matter cited in several of the commission and think tank reports and by
former Speaker Gingrich that would benefit from coordination is review of the
budget for counterterrorism and homeland security. The reorganization of the
Appropriations Committees’ subcommittees seemed to answer at least some of the
concerns raised by the commissions and think tanks. However, Speaker Gingrich,
as noted earlier, suggested the creation of a homeland security subcommittee of the
Budget Committee to ensure “adequate resources for Homeland Security before
considering any other budgetary matters.”205
Finally, creation of a permanent homeland security committee with jurisdiction
over DHS, homeland security generally, and related, enumerated policy areas, as the
select committee recommended, might not alone guarantee the policy coordination
in Congress over counterterrorism and homeland security that the various
commissions, think tanks, and witnesses recommended. The Brookings Institution
scholars explained this concern as follows:
Congress would be wise then to take to heart its message in the Department of
Homeland Security Act and reorganize its jurisdictions to create authorizing
committees for homeland security. Such a reorganization would not produce a
unified decisionmaking process. Some fragmentation would remain as a result
of bicameralism and the twin-track authorization and appropriations process.
The task of coordinating the authorizers and appropriators on homeland security
with those responsible for related activities by the intelligence agencies, the FBI,
and the Pentagon (to name just a few) would also remain. But establishing
dedicated homeland security committees to complement the homeland security
appropriations subcommittees would likely maximize the efficacy of
congressional oversight.206 (Emphasis added.)
Congressional scholar Thurber addressed this concern in a concrete manner in
his testimony before the select committee’s subcommittee, explaining:
The jurisdiction of the new committee should also, though, take into account that
most agencies dealing with homeland security are outside the DHS. These
agencies include the Northern Command. And I am not recommending that they
be in your committee [a homeland security committee that the select committee
might ultimately recommend creating], but I just want to point out that there
should be some relationship with these things. The Northern Command, the
National Guard, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence
Agency, the NSA [National Security Agency], the National Imagery and
Mapping Agency, the Centers for Disease Control.
We talked about the NRC [Nuclear Regulatory Commission] before. I have done
a lot of work with NRC. And there is a division there that deals with security.
There should be some relationship to that. And the elements of the Drug
Enforcement [Administration] that deal with borders, and many parts of the
Department of Energy. There should be some kind of oversight and coordination
relationship with those activities, in my opinion.
205 Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Former House Leaders, Sept. 9, 2003, p. 16.
206 Protecting the American Homeland: One Year On, pp. xxix-xxx.

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The new committee will need to strengthen coordination with other committees,
such as Armed Services, Judiciary and the Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, in order to develop, in my opinion, a comprehensive policy making
approach to homeland security.207
One indication of the need for coordination arises from various assessments of
what is important or critical to homeland security. For example, the Hart-Rudman
Commission stated: “Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is of the
highest priority in U.S. national security policy in the next quarter century.”208 The
Armed Services and International Relations Committees would be the forums for
work on such an issue, but a homeland security committee would have a policy
interest in the issue.
If the House desired to increase coordination over homeland security within the
United States, or over homeland security and combating terrorism overseas, the
commissions, thinks tanks, and hearings witnesses suggested options. An option
related to the design of permanent homeland security committee is assignment to the
committee of members from other committees with related jurisdiction. This option
is a variation on the assignments to the select committee in the 108th Congress. Or,
the new committee itself could be assigned a coordinating role. The Select
Committee on Homeland Security in the 107th Congress had, and the Budget
Committee has, a coordinating role; these and other coordinating roles could be
examined. Several of the commissions suggested ad hoc committees of chairs and
ranking members or other arrangements to bring together the principal Members
whose committees would have jurisdiction over components of homeland security
policy. Such an arrangement could be organized or led by the leadership, and be
formally or informally instituted, including being formally constituted under the
Speaker’s authority in Rule XII. And, as mentioned above, congressional scholar
Wolfensberger suggested a new use and increased management of committee
oversight plans. Relatedly, the role of the Government Reform Committee, to which
committees submit their oversight plans, could be enhanced with regard to plans
related to homeland security.
Conclusion
If the House were to create a permanent homeland security committee in the
109th Congress, the time after creation of the committee, in the 109th Congress and
beyond, would provide an opportunity for adjustments within the House’s committee
structure. Would a homeland security committee better be able to guide development
of the Department of Homeland Security, hold its officials accountable, and keep it
focused on its mission? What could other committees contribute to the department’s
development, and how could they contribute? Would a new committee help make
Congress a stronger institutional player in setting homeland security policy?
207 Hearing on Perspectives on House Reform: Committees and the Executive Branch, July
10, 2003, pp. 27-28.
208 Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom,
The Phase II Report of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, p. 8.

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Experience will help generate answers to these questions and better inform the House
whether a concentration of jurisdiction over the issue of homeland security is
preferable to a more dispersed jurisdictional structure.
A particular challenge for a new committee, the existing standing committees,
and the House leadership is the relationship of homeland security policy to non-
homeland-security policy. Can homeland security concerns be addressed separately
from the existing policies and programs related to sectors of the economy like air
transportation, types of activities like trade, or agencies with large non-homeland-
security responsibilities like the Coast Guard or FEMA? Would the existing standing
committees work with a new committee, in parallel to it, or separately from it?
Again, experience could help answer questions raised about what a homeland
security committee could contribute to policymaking and how best to ensure that
both homeland security and non-homeland-security missions and purposes are
achieved.
Finally, a homeland security committee has not been envisioned or proposed
that would displace committees with jurisdiction over the intelligence community,
foreign relations, the armed forces, or other activities and entities that are important
to realizing homeland security. How could the legislative committees reduce further
the “fragmentation” that is expected to be reduced with the creation of a homeland
security committee? The period following the creation of a homeland security
committee would provide an opportunity to try different coordinating mechanisms.

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Appendix A
Recommendations of the Select Committee on Homeland
Security on Changes to the Rules of the House of
Representatives with Respect to Homeland Security Issues
In this appendix, the reader will find the text of the report of the Select
Committee on Homeland Security, which was directed by the House, as explained
above, to “conduct a thorough and complete study of the operation and
implementation of the rules of the House, including rule X, with respect to the issue
of homeland security. The select committee shall submit its recommendations
regarding any changes in the rules of the House to the Committee on Rules not later
than September 30, 2004.”209 Different type styles and formats reflect those used in
the original text.
House Select Committee on Homeland Security, Recommendations of the Select
Committee on Homeland Security on Changes to the Rules of the House of
Representatives with Respect to Homeland Security Issues, 108th Cong., 2nd sess.,
September 30, 2004. (Available online at [http://hsc.house.gov/files/
mini_report_sigs.pdf], visited Dec. 10, 2004.210)
“THE NEED FOR A PERMANENT STANDING COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
“The 9/11 terrorists exploited longstanding policy, structural, and programmatic gaps
in America’s homeland security caused by the separation of foreign from domestic
intelligence, the division of ‘national security’ and ‘law enforcement’ information
and activities, and the stove-piped and uncoordinated nature of our multi-agency
border and transportation security systems. Since then, Congress and the President
have collaborated in a fundamental re-focusing of executive branch agencies to close
those gaps, particularly by creating the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), but
also through a wide variety of other initiatives, such as the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center (TTIC), the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), and the proposed
National Intelligence Director (NID) and National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).
“Despite this significant Executive Branch reorganization, Congressional structures
remain almost the same as they were before the 9/11 attacks. Scores of committees
and subcommittees of the Congress have some claim to jurisdiction over various
elements of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), with six standing
committees claiming some jurisdiction over critical border security functions of the
Department. This creates chaos for the Department. Since January 2004, senior
officials from the Department have had to testify at more than 160 Congressional
hearings — an average of 20 each month.
209 H.Res. 5, §4(b)(3). H. Res 5 was agreed to in the House Jan. 7, 2003.
210 A facsimile of the letter transmitting the report to the House Rules Committee and two
additional documents, “Supplementary Materials” and “Summary of Activities of the Select
Committee on Homeland Security,” are also available online at this location.

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“Creating a permanent standing Committee on Homeland Security, commencing in
the 109th Congress, is necessary if the House of Representatives is effectively to
meet its legislative and oversight responsibilities with respect to homeland security
programs and activities, particularly those of DHS. The current diffused and
unfocused congressional jurisdiction over the Department of Homeland Security, and
homeland security in general, not only imposes extraordinary burdens on the
Department, but makes it far more difficult for the Congress to guide the
Department’s activities in a consistent and focused way that promotes integration and
eliminates programmatic redundancies, and advances implementation of a coherent
national homeland security strategy. Current legislative “silos” foster — and, if left
unchanged, will continue to foster — fragmentation within DHS as it struggles to
build a new common culture focused squarely on the homeland security mission.
“For these reasons, not only the 9/11 Commission, but virtually every other
commission and outside expert has recognized that effective and efficient legislation
and oversight with respect to homeland security requires congressional
reorganization that vests in a single standing committee in each chamber jurisdiction
that parallels the homeland security mission of preventing, preparing for, and
responding to acts of terrorism in the United States. A select committee, while
appropriate in certain situations, would not be conducive to fostering the clear lines
of accountability and responsibility that are necessary when dealing with the variety
and cross-cutting nature of homeland security programs and activities situated largely
in a single Department.
“The success of this endeavor requires that the new standing committee have
legislative and oversight jurisdiction broad enough to ensure that it can take a holistic
approach toward homeland security issues, and that the unnecessarily heavy burden
the Department of Homeland Security now bears in interacting with a vast array of
committees and subcommittees in both houses of the Congress is drastically reduced.
“In carrying out this consolidation, it is important to craft the right balance between
the jurisdiction of the new standing Committee on Homeland Security and that of
existing committees. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 offers a congressionally-
created road map to jurisdictional reform that focuses on the structure, organization,
capabilities, and mission of the Department itself. The House must reorganize the
committee structure so that the new homeland security mission is provided sustained
and consistent attention.
“RECOMMENDATIONS ON CHANGES TO RULE X WITH RESPECT TO HOMELAND
SECURITY
“Pursuant to House Resolution 5, the Select Committee on Homeland Security makes
the following recommendations for changes to Rule X regarding the reorganization
of jurisdiction within the House with respect to homeland security matters:

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“RULE X
“Organization of Committees
“COMMITTEES AND THEIR LEGISLATIVE JURISDICTIONS
“I. There shall be in the House the following standing committees, each of which
shall have the jurisdiction and related functions assigned by this clause and clauses
2, 3, and 4. All bills, resolutions, and other matters relating to subjects within the
jurisdiction of the standing committees listed in this clause shall be referred to those
committees, in accordance with clause 2 of rule XII, as follows:
“(a) Committee on Agriculture. ...
[no changes]
“(b) Committee on Appropriations. ...
[no changes]
“(c) Committee on Armed Services. ...
[no changes]
“(d) Committee on the Budget. ...
[no changes]
“(e) Committee on Education and the Workforce. ...
[no changes]
“(f) Committee on Energy and Commerce. ...
Add at end: “In the case of each of the foregoing, the committee’s jurisdiction shall
not include responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security.”
“(g) Committee on Financial Services. ...
Add at end: “In the case of each of the foregoing, the committee’s jurisdiction shall
not include responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security.”
“(h) Committee on Government Reform. ...
[no changes]
“(i) Committee on House Administration. ...
[no changes]
“(j) Committee on International Relations. ...

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Add at end: “In the case of each of the foregoing, the committee’s jurisdiction shall
not include responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security.”
“(k) Committee on the Judiciary. ...
“(8) Immigration and naturalization (except for Department of Homeland Security
responsibility for security of United States borders and ports of entry, including the
Department’s responsibilities for visas and other forms of permission to enter the
United States, and immigration enforcement) .
“(18) Subversive activities affecting the internal security of the United States (except
for responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security) .
“(l) Committee on Resources. ...
[no changes]
“(m) Committee on Rules. ...
[no changes]
“(n) Committee on Science. ...
[no changes]
“(o) Committee on Small Business. ...
[no changes]
“(p) Committee on Standards of Official Conduct. ...
[no changes]
“(q) Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.
“(I) Non-homeland security missions of the Coast Guard, including lifesaving
service, lighthouses, lightships, ocean derelicts, and the Coast Guard Academy.
“(2) Federal management of natural disasters.
“(18) Related transportation regulatory agencies (except for responsibilities of the
Department of Homeland Security).
“(20) Transportation, including railroads, water transportation, transportation safety
(except automobile safety), transportation infrastructure, transportation labor, and
railroad retirement and unemployment (except revenue measures related thereto); in
each case exclusive of the responsibilities of the Department of Homeland Security.
“(22) Civil aviation, including safety and commercial impact of security measures.
“(r) Committee on Veterans’ Affairs. ...

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[no changes]
“(s) Committee on Ways and Means. ...
“(I) Revenue from customs, collection districts and ports of entry and delivery. ...
“GENERAL OVERSIGHT RESPONSIBILITIES
“[no changes]
“SPECIAL OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONS...
“[no changes]
* * * * *
“PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
“...
“ I I. (a)(I) There is established a Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
(hereafter in this clause referred to as the “select committee”). The select
committee shall be composed of not more than 18 Members, Delegates, or the
Resident Commissioner, of whom not more than 10 may be from the same
party. The select committee shall include at least one Member, Delegate, or the
Resident Commissioner from each of the following committees:
“(A) the Committee on Appropriations;
“(B) the Committee on Armed Services;
“(C) the Committee on Homeland Security;
“(D) the Committee on International Relations; and
“(E) the Committee on the Judiciary. ...
* * * * *
“COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
“12. (a)(I) There is is here by established a permanent standing Committee on
Homeland Security (hereafter in this clause referred to as the “committee”’),
which shall be composed of not more than 29 Members, Delegates, or the
Resident Commissioner, of whom not more than 16 may be from the same
party.

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“(2) The Speaker and the Minority Leader shall be ex officio members of the
committee but shall have no vote in the committee and may not be counted for
purposes of determining a quorum thereof.
“(3) The Speaker and Minority Leader each may designate a member of his
leadership staff to assist him in his capacity as ex officio member, with the same
access to committee meetings, hearings, briefings, and materials as employees
of the committee and subject to the same security clearance and confidentiality
requirements as employees of the committee under applicable rules of the
House.
“(b) There shall be referred to the committee proposed legislation, messages,
petitions, memorials, and other matters related to —
“(I) Homeland security generally.
“(2) The Department of Homeland Security (except with respect to Federal
management of natural disasters, the non-homeland security missions of
the Coast Guard, and immigration and naturalization matters unrelated
to homeland security) .
“(3) The integration, analysis, and sharing of homeland security information
related to the risk of terrorism within the United States.
“(4) The dissemination of terrorism threat warnings, advisories, and other
homeland security related communications to State and local governments,
the private sector, and the public.
“(5) Department of Homeland Security responsibility for research and
development in support of homeland security, including technological
applications of such research.
“(6) Department of Homeland Security responsibility for security of United
States borders and ports of entry (unrelated to customs revenue functions),
including the Department’s responsibilities related to visas and other forms
of permission to enter the United States.
“(7) Enforcement of Federal immigration laws (except for responsibilities of the
Department of Justice).
“(8) Security of United States air, land, and maritime transportation systems.
“(9) Customs functions, other than customs revenue functions.
“(10) Department of Homeland Security responsibility for Federal, state, and
local level preparation to respond to acts of terrorism.
“(c) In addition to the general oversight responsibilities described in clause 2, the
committee shall review, study, and coordinate on a continuing basis laws,
programs, and Government activities related to all aspects of homeland

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security.
“(d) The committee shall have exclusive authorizing and primary oversight
jurisdiction with respect to the Department of Homeland Security’s
responsibilities and activities related to the prevention of, preparation for, and
response to acts of terrorism within the United States. The committee also shall
have jurisdiction over the other responsibilities and activities of the Department
of Homeland Security, except as specified in subsection (b) (2).
“(e) Subject to the Rules of the House, funds may not be appropriated for a fiscal
year, with the exception of a bill or joint resolution continuing appropriations,
or an amendment thereto, or a conference report thereon, to, or for use of, the
Department of Homeland Security to prevent, prepare for, or respond to acts of
terrorism in the United States, unless the funds shall previously have been
authorized by a bill or joint resolution passed by the House during the same or
preceding fiscal year to carry out such activity for such fiscal year.
“(f) No referrals of legislation, executive communication, or any other action taken
in the 108th Congress with regard to the Select Committee on Homeland
Security or any other committee of the House shall be considered to be a
precedent for referrals of any homeland security-related measures in the current
Congress.”

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Appendix B
Recommendations on Congressional Organization
Made by the 9/11 Commission211
In this appendix, the reader will find excerpts from the report of the 9/11
Commission. The excerpts are the verbatim recommendations related to
congressional organization that are contained in this report. Different type styles and
formats reflect those used in the original text.
1) National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11
Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the
United States (Washington: GPO, July 22, 2004), p. 416. (Available online at
[http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/index.html], visited Dec. 10, 2004.)
“Recommendation: Finally, to combat the secrecy and complexity we have
described [in accomplishing unity of effort in the intelligence community], the
overall amounts of money being appropriated for national intelligence and to
its component agencies should no longer be kept secret. Congress should pass
a separate appropriations act for intelligence, defending the broad allocation of
how these tens of billions of dollars have been assigned among the varieties of
intelligence work.
“The specifics of the intelligence appropriation would remain classified, as they are
today. Opponents of declassification argue that America’s enemies could learn about
intelligence capabilities by tracking the top-line appropriations figure. Yet the top-
line figure by itself provides little insight into U.S. intelligence sources and methods.
The U.S. government readily provides copious information about spending on its
military forces, including military intelligence The intelligence community should
not be subject to that much disclosure. But when even aggregate categorical numbers
remain hidden, it is hard to judge priorities and foster accountability.”
øøø
2) The 9/11 Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States, pp. 419-423.212
211 Created in PL 107-306, §§601-611; 116 Stat. 2383, 2408-2413. The original 18-month
existence of the commission was extended to 20 months in PL 108-207; 118 Stat. 556.
Among the purposes spelled out in sec. 603 of PL 197-306, the commission’s mandate was
to “make a full and complete accounting of the circumstances surrounding the attacks of
September 11, 2001,” the source of the commission’s popular name. The commission’s
official name was the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States.
212 See also Chapter 3, “Counterterrorism Evolves,” of the 9/11 Commission report, where
the commission analyzed the “evolution of government efforts to counterterrorism by
Islamic extremists against the United States.” Section 3.7 addressed the evolution in
Congress, focusing on the post-Cold War period. The 9/11 Report: Final Report of the
(continued...)

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“13.4 UNITY OF EFFORT IN THE CONGRESS
“Strengthen Congressional Oversight of Intelligence and Homeland Security
“Of all our recommendations, strengthening congressional oversight may be among
the most difficult and important. So long as oversight is governed by current
congressional rules and resolutions, we believe the American people will not get the
security they want and need. The United States needs a strong, stable, and capable
congressional committee structure to give America’s national intelligence agencies
oversight, support, and leadership.
“Few things are more difficult to change in Washington than congressional
committee jurisdiction and prerogatives. To a member, these assignments are almost
as important as the map of his or her congressional district. The American people
may have to insist that these changes occur, or they may well not happen. Having
interviewed numerous members of Congress from both parties, as well as
congressional staff members, we found that dissatisfaction with congressional
oversight remains widespread.
“The future challenges of America’s intelligence agencies are daunting. They include
the need to develop leading-edge technologies that give our policy-makers and
warfighters a decisive edge in any conflict where the interests of the United States are
vital. Not only does good intelligence win wars, but the best intelligence enables us
to prevent them from happening altogether.
“Under the terms of existing rules and resolutions the House and Senate intelligence
committees lack the power, influence, and sustained capability to meet this challenge.
While few members of Congress have the broad knowledge of intelligence activities
or the know-how about the technologies employed, all members need to feel assured
that good oversight is happenings. When their unfamiliarity with the subject is
combined with the need to preserve security, a mandate emerges for substantial
change.
“Tinkering with the existing structure is not sufficient. Either Congress should create
a joint committee for intelligence, using the Joint Atomic Energy Committee as its
model, or it should create House and Senate committees with combined authorizing
and appropriations powers.
“Whichever of these two forms are chosen, the goal should be a structure — codified
by resolution with powers expressly granted and carefully limited — allowing a
relatively small group of members of Congress, given time and reason to master the
subject and the agencies, to conduct oversight of the intelligence establishment and
be clearly accountable for their work. The staff of this committee should be
nonpartisan and work for the entire committee and not for individual members.
212 (...continued)
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, pp. 102-107.

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CRS-73
“The other reforms we have suggested — for a National Counterterrorism Center and
a National Intelligence Director — will not work if congressional oversight does not
change too. Unity of effort in executive management can be lost if it is fractured by
divided congressional oversight.
“Recommendation: Congressional oversight for intelligence — and
counterterrorism — is now dysfunctional. Congress should address this
problem. We have considered various alternatives: A joint committee on the old
model of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is one. A single committee in
each house of Congress, combining authorizing and appropriating authorities,
is another.
“!The new committee or committees should conduct continuing studies
of the activities of the intelligence agencies and report problems relating
to the development and use of intelligence to all members of the House
and Senate.
“!We have already recommended that the total level of funding for
intelligence be made public, and that the national intelligence program be
appropriated to the National Intelligence Director, not to the secretary of
defense.
“!We also recommend that the intelligence committee should have a
subcommittee specifically dedicated to oversight, freed from the
consuming responsibility of working on the budget.
“!The resolution creating the new intelligence committee structure should
grant subpoena authority to the committee or committees. The majority
party’s representation on this committee should never exceed the
minority’s representation by more than one.
“!Four of the members appointed to this committee or committees should
be a member who also serves on each of the following additional
committees: Armed Services, Judiciary, Foreign Affairs, and the Defense
Appropriations subcommittee. In this way the other major congressional
interests can be brought together in the new committee’s work.
“!Members should serve indefinitely on the intelligence committees,
without set terms, thereby letting them accumulate expertise.
“!The committees should be smaller — perhaps seven or nine members
in each house — so that each member feels a greater sense of
responsibility, and accountability, for the quality of the committee’s work.
“The leaders of the Department of Homeland Security now appear before 88
committees and subcommittees of Congress. One expert witness (not a member of
the administration) told us that this is perhaps the single largest obstacle impeding
the department’s successful development. The one attempt to consolidate such
committee authority, the House Select Committee on Homeland Security, may be
eliminated. The Senate does not have even this.

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CRS-74
“Congress needs to establish for the Department of Homeland Security the kind of
clear authority and responsibility that exist to enable the Justice Department to deal
with crime and the Defense Department to deal with threats to national security.
Through not more than one authorizing committee and one appropriating
subcommittee in each house, Congress should be able to ask the secretary of
homeland security whether he or she has the resources to provide reasonable security
against major terrorists acts within the United States and to hold the secretary
accountable for the department’s performance.
“Recommendation: Congress should create a single, principal point of oversight
and review for homeland security. Congressional leaders are best able to judge
what committee should have jurisdiction over this department and its duties.
But we believe that Congress does not have the obligation to choose one in the
House and one in the Senate, and that this committee should be a permanent
standing committee with a nonpartisan staff.
“Improve the Transitions between Administrations
“In chapter 6, we described the transition of 2000-2001. Beyond the policy issues we
described, the new administration did not have deputy cabinet officers in place until
the spring of 2001, and the critical subcabinet officials were not confirmed until the
summer — if then. In other words, the new administration — like others before it
— did not have its team on the job until at least six months after it took office.
“Recommendation: Since a catastrophic attack could occur with little or no
notice, we should minimize as much as possible the disruption of national
security policymaking during the change of administrations by accelerating the
process for national security appointments. We think the process could be
improved significantly so transitions can work more effectively and allow new
officials to assume their new responsibilities as quickly as possible.213
“!Before the election, candidates should submit the names of selected
members of their prospective transition teams to the FBI so that, if
necessary, those team members can obtain security clearances immediately
after the election is over.
“!A president-elect should submit lists of possible candidates for national
security positions to begin obtaining security clearances immediately after
the election, so that their background investigations can be complete before
January 20.
“!A single federal agency should be responsible for providing and
maintaining security clearances, ensuring uniform standards — including
213 For an analysis of this recommendation’s implications for Senate procedures, see CRS
Report RL32551, 9/11 Commission Recommendations: The Senate Confirmation Process
for Presidential Nominees, by Betsy Palmer; and CRS Report RL32588, 9/11 Commission
Recommendations: Changes to the Presidential Appointment and Presidential Transition
Processes, by Henry B. Hogue.

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CRS-75
uniform security questionnaires and financial report requirements, and
maintaining a single database. This agency can also be responsible for
administering polygraph tests on behalf of organizations that require them.
“!A president-elect should submit the nominations of the entire new
national security team, through the level of under secretary of cabinet
departments, not later than January 20. The Senate, in return, should adopt
special rules requiring hearings and votes to confirm or reject national
security nominees within 30 days of their submission. The Senate should
not require confirmation of such executive appointees below Executive
Level 3.
“!The outgoing administration should provide the president-elect, as soon
as possible after election day, with a classified, compartmented list that
catalogues specific, operational threats to national security; major military
or covert operations; and pending decisions on the possible use of force.
Such a document could provide both notice and a checklist, inviting a
president-elect to inquire and learn more.”

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CRS-76
Appendix C
Recommendations on Congressional Organization
Made by the Bremer Commission214
In this appendix, the reader will find excerpts from the report of the Bremer
Commission. The excerpts are the verbatim recommendations related to
congressional organization that are contained in this report. Different type styles and
formats reflect those used in the original text.
National Commission on Terrorism, Countering the Changing Threat of
International Terrorism, transmitted to the President and Congress June 7, 2000, pp.
33, 35-36. (Available online at [http://www.gpo.gov/nct], visited Dec. 10, 2004.)
“Improve Executive and Legislative Branch Review of Counterterrorism
Activities
“Congressional responsibility for reviewing the President’s counterterrorism
budget is divided among several committees and sub-committees, making
coordinated review more difficult.
“One of the essential tasks for the national counterterrorism coordinator [on the
President’s staff] is to prepare a comprehensive counterterrorism plan and budget.
Similarly, Congress should develop mechanisms for coordinated review of the
President’s counterterrorism policy and budget, rather than having each of the many
relevant committees moving in different directions without regard to the overall
strategy.
“As a first step, the Commission urges Congress to consider holding joint hearings
of two or more committees on counterterrorism matters. In addition, to facilitate
executive-legislative discussion of terrorism budget issues, the House and Senate
Appropriations committees should each assign to senior staff responsibility for cross-
appropriations review of counterterrorism programs.
“Finally, the Commission notes the importance of bipartisanship both in Congress
and in the executive branch when considering counterterrorism policy and funding
issues.
214 Created in P.L. 105-277 (within this law, the Omnibus Appropriations Act for FY1999,
the commission was created in the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for FY1999,
§591); 112 Stat. 2681-1, 2681-210 - 2681-213. The Bremer Commission took its popular
name from its chair, L. Paul Bremer III, then-managing director of Kissinger Associates and
former U.S. ambassador-at-large for counter-terrorism.

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CRS-77
“KEY CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES WITH OVERSIGHT
RESPONSIBILITY FOR COUNTERTERRORISM
“SENATE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Appropriations
Appropriations
Armed Services
Armed Services
Foreign Relations
Government Reform
Governmental Affairs
International Relations
Judiciary
Judiciary
Intelligence
Intelligence
“Recommendations:
“• Congress should develop a mechanism for reviewing the President’s
counterterrorism policy and budget as a whole. The executive branch should commit
to full consultation with Congress on counterterrorism issues.
“• House and Senate Appropriations Committees should immediately direct full-
committee staff to conduct a cross-subcommittee review of counterterrorism
budgets.”

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CRS-78
Appendix D
Recommendations on Congressional Organization
Made by the Gilmore Commission215
In this appendix, the reader will find excerpts from the report of the Gilmore
Commission. The excerpts are the verbatim recommendations related to
congressional organization that are contained in this report. Different type styles and
formats reflect those used in the original text.
1) Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving
Weapons of Mass Destruction, I. Assessing the Threat, First Annual Report to the
President and the Congress, Dec. 15, 1999, p. 57. (Available online at
[http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel], visited Dec. 10, 2004.)
“Congressional Responsibilities
“In much the same way that the complexity of the Federal bureaucratic structure is
an obstacle — from a state and local perspective — to the provision of effective and
efficient Federal assistance, it appears that the Congress has made most of its
decisions for authority and funding to address domestic preparedness and response
issues with little or no coordination. The various committees of the Congress
continue to provide authority and money within the confines of each committee’s
jurisdiction over one or a limited number of Federal agencies and programs. The
Panel recommends, therefore, that the Congress consider forming an ad hoc Joint
Special or Select Committee, composed of representatives of the various committees
with oversight and funding responsibilities for these issues, and give such an entity
the authority to make determinations that will result in more coherent efforts at the
Federal level.”
øøø
2) Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving
Weapons of Mass Destruction, II. Toward a National Strategy for Combating
Terrorism, Second Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Dec. 15, 2000,
pp. 16-18. (Available online at [http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel], visited Dec. 10,
2004.)
215 Created in P.L. 105-661, §1405; 112 Stat. 1920, 2169-2170. The original three-year
existence of the commission was extended to five years, through 2003, in P.L. 107-107,
§1514; 115 Stat. 1012, 1273-1274. The Gilmore Commission took its popular name from
its chair, former Virginia Gov. James S. Gilmore III. Its official name was the Advisory
Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass
Destruction.

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CRS-79
“IMPROVING COORDINATION IN THE CONGRESS
“In our first report, we were critical of the Congress for its propensity to make
‘decisions for authority and funding to address domestic preparedness and response
issues with little or no coordination.’ We noted that the ‘various committees of the
Congress continue to provide authority and money within the confines of each
committee’s jurisdiction over one or a limited number of Federal agencies and
programs.’ Those observations still pertain.
“The Congress has been active in proposing legislative “fixes” to the problem of
Interagency coordination. Two recent examples are the unanimous passage by the
House of Representatives of a bill to create the ‘Office of Terrorism Preparedness”
in the Executive Office of the President, and of a provision to create a new ‘Deputy
Attorney General for Combating Domestic Terrorism.’ Numerous Congressional
panels on both sides of Capitol Hill have held hearings on the subject of terrorism.
The Congress has also commissioned various studies and reports on combating
terrorism by the General Accounting Office (GAO). One Act noted that Members
‘continue to be concerned about the threat of domestic terrorism, particularly
involving the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the ability of the
Federal Government to counter this threat.’ As a consequence the Congress directed
a comprehensive report from the GAO:
“‘The conferees agree to a provision that would require the Comptroller General
to provide an updated report to Congress, not later than 180 days after the
enactment of this Act, on federal strategy, policy and programs to combat
domestic terrorism. The conferees direct the Comptroller General to include in
the report on combating domestic terrorism a discussion of the following issues:
lead agency responsibility for crisis and consequence management; adequacy of
exiting plans formulated by the various federal agencies; threat and risk
assessments; command and control structures; exercises, including a thorough
assessment of the recent Top Official Exercise 2000; cyberterrorism; and
research and development efforts of new technologies.’
“The Congress continues to direct the creation and funding of specific programs with
little coordination among the various committees. Some programs are funded with
little apparent consideration for the impact of those decisions on a comprehensive
national effort.
“Moreover, appropriations committees, through their various agency appropriations
bills, occasionally create and fund programs that were not subject to the normal
authorization processes. The result of such action is often lack of detail and clarity
in the structure and execution of programs, as well as a lack of continuity and
sustainability, as most such programs are only funded year by year. Examples of
major programs created and funded in appropriations bills, which have no parallel
authorizing language, include most of the programs for combating terrorism
administered by the Office of State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support in the
Department of Justice: equipment grant programs totaling $75 million; and training
programs, including grants to the national training consortium and the Center for
Domestic Preparedness totaling $37 million; and earmarks to two institutes totaling
$30 million.

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CRS-80
“The Congress may, however, be foundering on the issue in large measure because
of the absence of a comprehensive ‘national strategy’ for combating terrorism. We
do not suggest that Congress has or should have the responsibility for creating such
a national strategy. That is, in our view, clearly the responsibility fo the Executive
Branch. (Footnote citations to previous commission report, congressional bills and
reports, GAO, and programs are not included.)
“Special Committee for Combating Terrorism
“We recommend the establishment of a Special Committee for Combating
Terrorism — either a joint committee between the Houses or separate
committees in each House27 — to address authority and funding, and to provide
Congressional oversight, for Federal programs and authority for combating
terrorism.
“We do not make this proposal lightly, and do so with the full recognition that such
change may be difficult but is no less meritorious.
“Committee Functions and Structure
“The joint or separate committee of each House should consist of bipartisan
representation from Members of all relevant authorization, oversight, budget, and
appropriations committees and subcommittees that currently have cognizance over
Federal programs and activities to combat terrorism. It should have a full-time staff
either detailed from those relevant committees and subcommittees or new employees
who have the requisite experience and expertise.28
“The joint or separate panel should perform several critical functions. First, it would
constitute a forum for reviewing all aspects of a national strategy and supporting
implementation plans for combating terrorism, developed and submitted by the
National Office for Combating Terrorism. [The office is proposed earlier in the
second annual report.] As part of that process, the joint or each separate committee
should develop a consolidated legislative plan, including authorizing language and
corresponding budget and appropriations ‘benchmarks’ in response to the national
strategy to combat terrorism and accompanying program and budget proposals.
“Second, it would serve as the ‘clearinghouse’ for all legislative proposals for
combating terrorism. For separate bills (unrelated to the omnibus package related to
the strategy), the committee should have first referral of such legislation, prior to the
referral to the appropriate standing committee.
“Such a structure, with the direct testimony from Executive Branch representatives,
State and local officials, private industry, and terrorism experts, could help to
eliminate duplication in programs and funding, and to promote an effective national
program.
“27Similar to the processes of permanent select committees on intelligence — the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
“28The ‘relevant committees and subcommittees; would include as a minimum:

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CRS-81
“Agriculture Committee (House and Senate)
“Appropriations Committee (House and Senate)
“Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and the Judiciary
“Subcommittee on Defense
“Subcommittee on Transportation
“Subcommittee on Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government
“Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education
“Subcommittee on Foreign Operations
“Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development
“Subcommittee on Agriculture and Rural Development
“Armed Services Committee (House and Senate)
“Budget Committee (House and Senate)
“Commerce Committee (House and Senate)
“Energy and Natural Resources Committee (Senate)
“Resources Committee (House)
“Foreign Relations Committee (Senate)
“International Relations Committee (House)
“Governmental Affairs Committee (Senate)
“Government Reform Committee (House)
“Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee (Senate)
“Science Committee (House)
“Judiciary Committee (House and Senate)
“Transportation and Infrastructure Committee (House)
“Ways and Means Committee (House)
“Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
“House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence”
øøø
3) Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving
Weapons of Mass Destruction, IV. Implementing the National Strategy, Fourth
Annual Report to the President and the Congress, December 15, 2002, pp. 44-45.
(Available online at [http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel], visited Dec. 10, 2004.)216
“In addition [to the proposed creation of a National Counter Terrorism Center
(NCTC) that would replace the FBI in collecting intelligence and other information
on international terrorist activities inside the United States], there could be more
focused and effective Congressional oversight of the domestic collection and analysis
functions. Currently, the oversight of the FBI’s FISA [Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act] and other domestic intelligence activities is split between the
Judiciary and Intelligence committees of each House of Congress. Creation of the
NCTC would clearly place the primary responsibility for oversight of that agency
under the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence. Such a structure and improved oversight would likely
provide an even better mechanism for protecting civil liberties than do current
structure and processes. For that reasons, the panel makes the following, related
216 The third annual report focused on “functional challenges to protecting the United States
against terrorism,” and did not contain additional recommendations related to congressional
organization. Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism
Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, III. For Ray Downey, Third Annual Report to the
President and the Congress, Dec. 15, 2001. (Available online at
[http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel], visited Dec. 10, 2004.)

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CRS-82
“Recommendation: That the Congress ensure that oversight of the NCTC be
concentrated in the intelligence committees of each House.”
øøø
4) IV. Implementing the National Strategy, Fourth Annual Report to the President
and the Congress, p. 50.
“The Congress
“The Congress is still not well organized to address issues involving homeland
security in a cohesive way. The House recently took the bold, necessary, but
unfortunately only temporary step of creating a special committee just to consider the
proposal to create the Department of Homeland Security. Structures of that nature
are required on a longer-term basis. Jurisdiction for various aspects of this issue
continues to be scattered over dozens of committees and subcommittees. We
therefore restate our prior recommendation with a modification.
“Recommendation: That each House of the Congress establish a separate
authorizing committee and related appropriation subcommittee with
jurisdiction over Federal programs and authority for Combating
Terrorism/Homeland Security.”
øøø
5) Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving
Weapons of Mass Destruction, V. Forging America’s New Normalcy: Securing Our
Homeland, Preserving Our Liberty, Fifth Annual Report to the President and the
Congress, December 15, 2003, p. 16. (Available online at [http://www.rand.org/
nsrd/terrpanel], visited December 10, 2004.)
[As an achievement of the strategic vision — ] “Executive Branch and Congressional
oversight mechanisms have proven highly effective in preventing any abuses [by the
Terrorist Threat Integration Center that the commission recommended be created and
charged with certain domestic intelligence collection responsibilities].”
øøø
6) In Appendix K , “Status of Previous Advisory Panel Recommendations,”217 of the
fifth annual report, the following information, in a similar format, is provided on
recommendations related to congressional organization:
217 Available online at [http://www.rand.org/nsrd/terrpanel], visited Dec. 10, 2004.

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CRS-83
Page
“Category
Recommendation
1999
2000
2001
2002
Outcome
K-10
“Intelligence
That the Congress ensure that
X
The TTIC will presumably be principally
oversight of the NCTC be
within the oversight of the intelligence
concentrated in the intelligence
committees
committee in each House
K-15
“Strategy and
That the Congress consider forming an
X
Three new committees have been
Structure
ad hoc Joint Special or Select
established in the Congress for oversight
Committee, composed of
and appropriations: the House Select
representatives of the various
Committee on Homeland Security, the
committees with oversight and funding
House Appropriations Committee,
responsibilities for domestic
subcommittee on Homeland Security, and
preparedness and response, and give
the Senate Committee on Appropriations,
such an entity the authority to make
Subcommittee on Homeland Security.
determinations that will result in more
These committees commenced operation
coherent efforts at the Federal level
in 2003.
K-15
“Strategy and
The establishment of a Special
X
Three new committees have been
Structure
Committee for Combating Terrorism
established in the Congress for oversight
— either a joint committee between
an appropriations: the House Select
the Houses or separate committees in
Committee on Homeland Security, the
each House — to address authority and
House Appropriations Committee,
funding, and to provide Congressional
subcommittee on Homeland Security, and
oversight, for Federal programs and
the Senate Committee on Appropriations,
authority for combating terrorism
Subcommittee on Homeland Security.
These committees commenced operation
in 2003. In addition, the House Armed
Services Committee created a special
oversight panel on terrorism and the
House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence created a subcommittee on

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CRS-84
Page
“Category
Recommendation
1999
2000
2001
2002
Outcome
Terrorism and Homeland Security.
K-18
“Strategy and
That each House of Congress establish
X
Three new committees have been
Structure
a separate authorizing committee and
established in the Congress for oversight
related appropriation subcommittee
an appropriations: the House Select
with jurisdiction over Federal
Committee on Homeland Security, the
programs and authority for Combating
House Appropriations Committee,
Terrorism/
subcommittee on Homeland Security, and
Homeland Security
the Senate Committee on Appropriations,
Subcommittee on Homeland Security.
These committees commenced operation
in 2003. In addition, the House Armed
Services Committee created a special
oversight panel on terrorism and the
House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence created a subcommittee on
Terrorism and Homeland Security.”

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CRS-85
Appendix E
Recommendations on Congressional Organization
Made by the Hart-Rudman Commission218
In this appendix, the reader will find excerpts from the report of the Hart-
Rudman Commission. The excerpts are the verbatim recommendations related to
congressional organization that are contained in this report. Different type styles and
formats reflect those used in the original text.
1) United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, Road Map for
National Security: Imperative for Change, The Phase III Report of the United States
Commission on National Security/21st Century, Feb. 15, 2001, pp. 26-28. (Available
online at [http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nssg/index.html], visited December 10,
2004.)219
218 Created by a charter from Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Sept. 2, 1999. For text
of charter, see United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, Road Map for
National Security: Imperative for Change, The Phase III Report of the United States
Commission on National Security/21st Century, Feb. 15, 2001, Appendix 2. (Available
online at [http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nssg/index.html], visited Dec. 10, 2004.) The Hart-
Rudman Commission took its name from its co-chairs, former Senators Gary Hart (D-CO)
and Warren B. Rudman (R-NH). Its official name was the United States Commission on
National Security/21st Century.
For the Hart-Rudman Commission’s first two reports, see United States Commission
on National Security/21st Century, New World Coming: American Security in the 21st
Century: Major Themes and Implications, The Phase I Report on the Emerging Global
Security Environment for the First Quarter of the 21st Century, Sept. 15, 1999 (available
online at [http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nssg/nwc.pdf], visited Dec. 10, 2004), and
Seeking a National Strategy: A Concert for Preserving Security and Promoting Freedom,
The Phase II Report on a U.S. National Security Strategy for the 21st Century, April 15,
2000 (available online at [http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nssg/phaseII.pdf], visited
Dec. 10, 2004).
219 As a supplement to the third report, the Hart-Rudman Commission published an extensive
addendum, one part of which contained profiles of six House and five Senate committees.
Each profile contained eight parts plus an appendix with a “key process” flowchart. The
eight parts were: (1) legal specifications, authorization, and responsibilities; (2)
missions/functions/purposes; (3) vision and core competencies; (4) organizational culture,
which included committee and subcommittee rosters and subcommittee jurisdictions; (5)
formal national security process involvement; (6) informal national security process
involvement; (7) funding and personnel; and (8) observations. The committees profiled
were the House Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, International Relations,
Budget, Science, and Transportation and Infrastructure, and the Senate Committees on
Appropriations, Armed Services, Foreign Relations, Budget, and Commerce, Science, and
Transportation. United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, Road Map
(continued...)

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CRS-86
“C. EXECUTIVE-LEGISLATIVE COOPERATION
“Solving the homeland security challenge is not just an Executive Branch problem.
Congress should be an active participant in the development of homeland security
programs as well. Its hearings can help develop the best ideas and solutions.
Individual members should develop expertise in homeland security policy and its
implementation so that they can fill in policy gaps and provide needed oversight and
advice in times of crisis. Most important, using its power of the purse, Congress
should ensure that government agencies have sufficient resources and that their
programs are coordinated, efficient, and effective.
“Congress has already taken important steps. A bipartisan Congressional initiative
produced the U.S. effort to deal with the possibility that weapons of mass destruction
could ‘leak’ out of a disintegration Soviet Union. It was also a Congressional
initiative that established the Domestic Preparedness Program and launched a 120-
city program to enhance the capability of federal, state, and local first responders to
react effectively in a WMD emergency. Members of Congress from both parties
have pushed the Executive Branch to identify and manage the problem more
effectively. Congress has also proposed and funded studies and commissions on
various aspects of the homeland security problem. But it must do more.
“A sound homeland security strategy requires the overhaul of much of the legislative
framework for preparedness, response, and national defense programs. Congress
designed many of the authorities that support national security and emergency
preparedness programs principally for a Cold War environment. The new threat
environment — from biological and terrorist attacks to cyber attacks on critical
systems — poses vastly different challenges. We therefore recommend that
Congress refurbish the legal foundation for homeland security in response to the
new threat environment.
“In particular, Congress should amend, as necessary, key legislative authorities such
as the Defense Production Act of 1950 and the Communications Act of 1934, which
facilitate homeland security functions and activities. Congress should also encourage
the sharing of threat, vulnerability, and incident data between the public and private
sectors — including federal agencies, state governments, first responders, and
industry. In addition, Congress should monitor and support current efforts to update
the international legal framework for communications security issues. (Footnote
citations to laws and other reports are not included.)
“Beyond that, Congress has some organizational work of its own to do. As things
stand today, so many federal agencies are involved with homeland security that it is
exceedingly difficult to present federal programs and their resource requirements to
219 (...continued)
for National Security: Imperative for Change, The Phase III Report of the United States
Commission on National Security/21st Century, Feb. 15, 2001, Addendum on Structure and
P r o c e s s A n a l ys e s , V o l . III — C o n g r e s s . ( A va i l a b l e o n l i n e a t
[http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nssg/addedumpage.htm], visited Dec. 10, 2004.)

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the Congress in a coherent way. It is largely because the budget is broken up into so
many pieces, for example, that counterterrorism and information security issues
involve nearly two dozen Congressional committees and subcommittees. The
creation of the National Security Homeland Agency will redress this problem to some
extent, but because of its growing urgency and complexity, homeland security will
still require a stronger working relationship between the Executive and Legislative
Branches. Congress should therefore find ways to address homeland security issues
that bridge current jurisdictional boundaries and that create more innovative
oversight mechanisms.
“There are several ways of achieving this. The Senate’s Arms Control Observer
Group and its more recent NATO Enlargement Group were two successful examples
of more informal Executive-Legislative cooperation on key multi-dimensional issues.
Specifically, in the near term, this Commission recommends the following:
“•7. Congress should establish a special body to deal with homeland security
issues, as has been done effectively with intelligence oversight. Members
should be chosen for their expertise in foreign policy, defense,
intelligence, law enforcement, and appropriations. This body should
also include members of all relevant Congressional committees as well
as ex-officio members from the leadership of the Houses of Congress.
“This body should develop a comprehensive understanding of the problem of
homeland security, exchange information and viewpoints with the Executive Branch
on effective policies and plans, and work with standing committees to develop
integrated legislative responses and guidance. Meetings would often be held in
closed session so that Members could have access to interagency deliberations and
diverging viewpoints, as well as to classified assessments. Such a body would have
neither a legislative nor an oversight mandate, and it would not eclipse the authority
of any standing committee.
“At the same time, Congress needs to systematically review and restructure its
committee system, as will be proposed in recommendation 48. A single, select
committee in each house of Congress should be given authorization, appropriations,
and oversight responsibility for all homeland security activities. When established,
these committees would replace the function of the oversight body described in
recommendation 7.”
øøø
2) Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, The Phase III Report of
the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, pp. 58-59.
“It follows from a reform that integrates many of the nation’s foreign policy activities
under the Secretary of State that a similar logic should be applied to the State
Department budget. We therefore recommend the following:

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“• 22:
The President should ask Congress to appropriate funds to the
State Department in a single integrated Foreign Operations budget,
which would include all foreign assistance programs and activities
as well as all expenses for personnel and operations.
“The State Department’s International Affairs (Function 150) Budget Request would
no longer be divided into separate appropriations by the Foreign Operations
subcommittee on the one hand, and by a subcommittee on the Commerce, State, and
Justice Departments on the other. The Congressional leadership would need to alter
the current jurisdictional lines of the Appropriation subcommittees so that the
Foreign Operations subcommittee would handle the entire State Department budget.
Such a reform would give the administration the opportunity to:
“ — Allocate all the State Department’s resources in a way to carry out the
President’s overall strategic goals;
“ — Ensure that the various assistance programs are integrated, rather than
simply a collection of administrations’ political commitments and Congressional
earmarks; and
“ — Replace the existing budget categories with purposeful goals.” (Footnote
citation to Function 150 budget categories is not included.)
øøø
3) Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, The Phase III Report of
the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, pp. 72-73.
“Program turbulence, often stemming from lack of funds or from budgetary
instability, is the primary cause of inefficiencies and cost overruns in DoD programs.
This budgetary instability has several sources. One is the current reality of the
resource allocation process itself within DoD, which unfortunately often takes all
resources into account during budget reductions — including acquisition programs.
This normally results in a known and deliberate underfunding of previously approved
programs. Another problem is the acquisition system itself, which suffers from cost
overruns and program extensions. Lastly, the Congress often uses small “takes” from
large programs to reallocate funds to other priorities without realizing or
understanding the problems this creates in having to reprogram funds, write new
contracts, and establish new schedules.
“We realize that many commissions, and ever more studies, over the past several
years have recommended two-year budgeting and multiyear procurement as a way
of limiting program turbulence. If these forms of budgeting were introduced, the
disincentive to disrupt acquisition programs would appropriately be very high. We
also know that Congress had doggedly refused to take such proposals seriously.
Congress lacks confidence in DoD’s ability to execute such a budget given past
weapons cost overruns. Furthermore, appropriating funds on a yearly basis gives
Congress a greater ability to influence the Defense Department’s policies and
programs.

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“Therefore, rather than propose two-year budgeting across the entire Department of
Defense, we focus on the single area where two-year budgeting makes the most sense
and stands to do the most good. We recommend the following:
“•31.
Congress should implement two-year defense budgeting solely for
the modernization element of the DoD budget (R&D/procurement)
because of its long-term character, and it should expand the use of
multiyear procurement.
“Such steps would markedly increase the stability of weapons development programs
and result in budgetary savings in the billions of dollars. For this to happen,
however, the Secretary of Defense must impose discipline in the decision-making
process. It is already difficult to start new engineering development programs. It
should be made even more demanding, ensuring that the military requirements are
understood and enduring, and that the technology, concepts, and funding are all well
in hand. Once a program is approved, it should be equally difficult to change it. The
Commission also notes that it is sometimes better to eliminate some programs early
than to absorb the costs of constantly extending programs and procuring limited
numbers of weapons at high costs. To accomplish this, Congress will need to let
decisions to kill programs stand as well as support DoD budgeting and procurement
reforms.
“If the government will not take the measures to improve program stability by
introducing two-year budgeting in modernization and R&D accounts, and more
broadly adopt multiyear funding, it cannot expect private industry to obligate itself
to suppliers, or to assume risks on its own investments with little prospect of long-
term returns.”
øøø
4) Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, The Phase III Report of
the United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, pp. 110-115.
“V. The Role of Congress
“This Commission has recommended substantial change in Executive Branch
institutions, change that is needed if America is to retain its ability to lead the world
and to assure the nation’s safety. A number of prominent leaders have exhausted
themselves and frustrated their careers by too aggressively seeking to reform the
House and Senate. The Legislative Branch, however, must change as well.
“It is one thing to appeal to Congress to reform the State Department or the Defense
Department, quite another to call on Congress to reform itself. Over the years since
World War II, the Legislative Branch has been reformed and modernized much less
than the Executive Branch. Indeed, the very nature of power in Congress makes it
difficult for legislators to reform their collective institution. Yet American national
security in the 21st century, and the prominent role of daily global involvement that
is the nature of American life in our generation, mandates a serious reappraisal of
both the individual and collective efforts of Congress and its members.

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“Such a reappraisal must begin with a shared understanding of the Legislative
Branch’s role in the development and assessment of post-Cold War foreign policy.
Divided Constitutional responsibilities require the Executive and Legislature to work
together in order for U.S. foreign policy to have coherence. Yet the Executive
Branch has at times informed rather than consulted Congress. It has often treated
Congress as an obstacle rather than as a partner, seeking Congressional input mostly
in times of crisis rather than in an ongoing way that would yield support when crises
occur. For its part, Congress has not always taken full responsibility for educating
its members on foreign policy issues. It is not often receptive to consultation with
the Executive Branch, as well, and has sustained a structure that undermines rather
than strengthens its ability to fulfill its Constitutional obligations in the foreign policy
arena.
“Several measures are needed to address these shortcomings and they are described
below. But as an immediate first step we recommend that:
“•46.
The Congressional leadership should conduct a thorough
bicameral, bipartian review of the Legislative Branch relationship
to national security and foreign policy.
“The Speaker of the House, the Majority and Minority leaders of the House, and the
Majority and Minority leaders of the Senate should form a bipartisan, bicameral
working group with select staff and outside advisory panels to review the totality of
Executive-legislative relations in the real-time global information age we are
entering. Only by having the five most powerful members of the Congress directly
involved is there any hope of real reform. They should work methodically for one
year and, by the beginning of the second session of the Congress, they should report
on proposed reforms to be implemented by the next Congress. The President, the
Vice President, the National Security Advisor, and senior cabinet officers should
work directly with this unique panel to rethink the structure of Executive-Legislative
relations in the national security and foreign policy domains.
“With that as a basis, reforms can and must be undertaken in three crucial areas:
improving the foreign policy and national security expertise of individual members
of Congress; undertaking organizational and process changes within the Legislative
Branch; and achieving a sustained and effective Executive-Legislative dialogue on
national security issues.
“Despite the range of foreign policy challenges facing the United States, many
current members of Congress are poorly informed in this area. Their main electoral
priorities are generally within domestic policy; foreign policy concerns are often
limited to issues of concern to special interests or to prominent ethnic groups in their
districts. Once in office, attention to foreign policy issues generally focuses on
pending votes and looming crisis. To build a broad base of informed and involved
members on foreign policy issues, we recommend the following:

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“•47.
Congressional and Executive Branch leaders must build programs
to encourage individual members to acquire knowledge and
experience in both national security and foreign policy.
“In particular, this means that:
“!The Congressional leadership should educate its members on foreign policy
and national security matters beyond the freshman orientation provided for new
members. Such education should emphasize Congress’ foreign policy roles and
responsibilities. We must reinforce the principal of minimal partisanship on
foreign policy issues: that politics stops at the water’s edge. Effective education
of members will ensure a more knowledgeable debate and better partnership
with the Executive Branch on foreign policy issues. It also will allow members
to become more effective educators of their constituencies about the importance
of national security concerns.
“!Members should be encouraged to travel overseas for serious purposes and
each member should get letters from the President or from the head of their
body formally asking them to undertake trips in the national interest. A
concerted effort should be made to distinguish between junkets (pleasure trips
at taxpayer expenses) and the serious work that members need to undertake to
learn about the world. A major effort should be made to ensure that every new
member of Congress undertakes at least one serious trip in his or her first term,
and is involved in one or more trips each year from the second term on.
“!Legislature-to-legislature exchanges and visits should be encouraged and
expanded. More funding and staffing should be provided to both accommodate
foreign legislators visiting the United States and to encourage American
legislators and their spouses to visit foreign legislatures. Much is to be gained
by strengthening the institutions of democracy and by improving understanding
among elected officials. This should get a much greater emphasis and much
more institutional support than it currently does.
“!The wargaming center at the National Defense University should be
expanded so that virtually every member of Congress can participate in one or
more war games per two-year cycle. By role-modeling key decision-makers
(American and foreign), members of Congress will acquire a better
understanding of the limits of American power, and of the reality that any action
the United States taken invariably has multiple permutations abroad. Giving
members of Congress a reason to learn about a region, about the procedures
and systems of Executive Branch decision-making, and about crisis interactions
will lead eventually to a more sophisticated Legislative Branch. On occasion,
particularly useful or insightful games should lead to a meeting between the
participating Congressmen and Senators and key Executive Branch officials.
“Member’s increased fluency in national security issues is a positive steps but one
that must be accompanied by structural reforms that address how Congress organizes
itself and conducts its business. Several recommendations concerning Congressional
structure have already been made in this report: to create a special Congressional

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body to deal with homeland security issues (recommendation 7); to consider all of
the State Department’s appropriations within the Foreign Operations subcommittee
(recommendation 22); and to move to a two-year budget cycle for defense
modernization programs (recommendation 31). To meet the challenges of the next
quarter century, we recommend Congress take additional steps.
“•48.
Congress should rationalize its current committee structure so that
it best serves U.S. national security objectives; specifically, it should
merge the current authorizing committees with the relevant
appropriations subcommittees.
“Our discussion of homeland security highlights the complexity and overlaps of the
current committee structure. The Congressional leadership must review its structure
systematically in light of likely 21st century security challenges and of U.S. national
security priorities. This is to ensure both that important issues receive sufficient
attention and oversight and the unnecessary duplication of effort by multiple
committees is minimized.
“Such an effort would benefit the Executive Branch, as well, which currently bears
a significant burden in terms of testimony. The number of times that key Executive
Branch officials are required to appear on the same topics in front of different panels
is a minor disgrace. At a minimum, we recommend that a public record should be
kept of these briefings and published annually. If that were done, it would become
obvious to all observers that a great deal of testimony could be given in front of joint
panels and, in some cases, bicameral joint panels. While we emphasize the need for
strong consultation with the Legislative Branch, we need a better sense of what
constitutes a reasonable amount of time that any senior Executive Branch official
should spend publicly educating Congress.
“Specifically, in terms of committee structure, we believe action must be taken to
streamline the budgeting and appropriations processes. In 1974, Congress developed
its present budget process as a way of establishing overall priorities for the various
authorizations and appropriations committees. Over time, however, the budget
process has become a huge bureaucratic undertaking and the authorization process
has expanded to cover all spending areas. In light of this, there is no longer a
compelling rationale for separate authorization and appropriations bills.
“This is why we believe that the appropriations subcommittees should be merged
with their respective authorizing committees. The aggregate committee (for
example, the Senate Armed Services Committee) should both authorize and
appropriate within the same bill. This will require realigning appropriations
subcommittees. For example, appropriations relating to defense are currently dealt
with in three subcommittees (defense, military construction, and energy and water);
under this proposal, all appropriations would be made within the Senate Armed
Services Committee.
“This approach has at least two important merits. First, it furthers the aim of
rationalizing committee jurisdiction because all appropriating and authorizing
elements relating to a specific topic are brought within one committee. Second, it

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brings greater authority to those charged with oversight as well as appropriations. In
the current system, power has shifted from the authorizing committees to the
appropriating committees with a much-narrower budgetary focus. By combining the
two functions, more effort may be paid to examining how foreign policy laws have
been implemented, what their results have been, and how policy objectives can be
better achieved. Finally, this new structure may facilitate adoption of two-year
budgeting if efforts such as those proposed for defense modernization programs
prove successful. The merged committee could authorize, in less detail, for the two-
fiscal-year period while appropriating, in greater detail, for the first fiscal year.
“If this important reform were undertaken, then the budget committees in each house
of Congress would consist of the Chairman and ranking member of each new
combined committee. As part of the budget function, these two committees would
distribute the macro-allocations contained in the budget resolution.
“Once Congress has gotten its own house in order, it still remains to ensure that there
is ongoing Executive-Legislative consultation and coordination. Efforts to do so are
beneficial not only so that both branches can fulfill their Constitutional obligations
but also because effective consultation can improve the quality of U.S. policy. We
have acknowledged this, for example, in our Defense Department planning
recommendation, which defers detailed program and budget decisions until Congress
has marked up the previous year’s submission. Because Congress is the most
representative branch of government, Executive Branch policy that considers a range
of Congressional views is more likely to gain public support. The objections raised
by differing Congressional opinions can refine policy by forcing the administration
to respond to previously unconsidered concerns. Finally, Congress can force the
President and his top aides to articulate and explain administration policy — so the
American people and the world can better understand it.
“Given these benefits, efforts must be undertaken to improve the consultative
process. Indeed, a coherent and effective foreign policy requires easy and honest
consultation between the branches. The bicameral, bipartisan panel put forward in
recommendation 46 is a good first step in this process, but additional processes must
be established to ensure that such efforts are ongoing. Therefore, we recommend the
following:
“•49.
The Executive Branch must ensure a sustained focus on foreign
policy and national security consultation with Congress and devote
resources to it. For its part, Congress must make consultation a
higher priority and form a permanent consultative group of
Congressional leaders as part of this effort.
“A sustained effort at consultation must be based on mutual trust, respect, and
partnership and on a shared understanding of each branch’s role. The Executive
Branch must recognize Congress’ role in policy formulation and Congress must grant
the Executive Branch flexibility in the day-to-day implementation of that policy.
Congress must also ensure that if it is consulted and its criticisms are taken seriously,
it will act with restraint and allow the Executive Branch to lead. For his part, the
President must convey to administration officials the importance of ongoing,

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bipartisan consultation and dialogue. Efforts must not be limited to periods of crisis.
Further, administration officials should take into consideration the differences in
knowledge and perspective among members.
“Beyond these general principles, specific mechanisms can facilitate better
consultation:
“!Congress should create a permanent consultative group composed of the
Congressional leadership and the Chairmen and ranking member of the main
Congressional committees involved in foreign policy. Other members with
special interest or expertise could join the group’s work on certain issues. The
group would meet regularly — in informal and private sessions — with
representatives of the Executive Branch. While these may regularly be Cabinet
officials, they may often be at the Under Secretary level. This will make
possible a regular dialogue with knowledgeable administration officials,
allowing the Congressional group not only to respond to crises but to be part of
the development of preventive strategies. The agenda for these meetings would
not be strictly limited, allowing members to raise issues they are concerned
about. The group would also meet on any emergency basis whenever the
President considers military action abroad or deals with a foreign policy crisis.
“!Beyond this interaction between the leadership of both branches, the
administration must reach out to consult with a broader Congressional group.
This will involve increasing the number of administration representatives
working to consult with Congress and assigning high-quality people to that task.
The Executive must send mid-level, as well as high-level, officials to Capitol
Hill and keep closer track of the foreign policy views and concerns of every
member of Congress. Only through such concerted efforts, combined with the
aforementioned education initiatives, will there be a critical mass of members
knowledgeable of and engaged in foreign policy issues.
“!Finally, in order for Congress to be most effective in partnering with the
Executive Branch, it must undertake its own consultation with a broad group of
leaders in science, international economics, defense, intelligence, and in the
high-technology, venture-capital arena. Congress is fare more accessible to this
expertise than the Executive Branch and should work to bring these insights into
consultations. To do this, however, Members of Congress need regular and
direct dialogue with experts without the screen of their staffs. The best experts
in these fields are vastly more knowledgeable than any Congressional staff
member, and there needs to be a routine system for bringing members of
Congress in touch with experts in the areas in which they will be making
decisions. All four parts of the National Academies of Science should play key
roles in bringing the most knowledgeable scientists and engineers in contact
with members of the Legislative Branch. Policy institutions with deep
reservoirs of expertise on defense and foreign policy, too, can help build
Congressional fluency with these issues with a measure of detachment and
independent perspective. Similar institutions need to be engaged in other areas.
(Footnote citations other parts of the report and to additional reading are not
included.)

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“An effective national security policy for the 21st century will require the combined
resources of the Executive and Legislative Branches. While much of this report has
rightly focused on the needs for reform within Executive Branch structures and
processes, corresponding efforts must be undertaken for Congress. We believe that
a tripartite effort focused on the foreign policy education of members, the
restructuring of the Congressional committee system, and stronger Executive-
Legislative consultative efforts will go a long way to ensuring that the United States
can meet any future challenges.”

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Appendix F
Recommendations on Congressional Organization
Made by The Brookings Institution
In this appendix, the reader will find excerpts from the report of The Brookings
Institution. The excerpts are the verbatim recommendations related to congressional
organization that are contained in this report. Different type styles and formats
reflect those used in the original text.
1) Michael E. O’Hanlon, Ivo H. Daalder, David L. Gunter, Robert E. Litan, Peter R.
Orszag, I.M. Destler, James M. Lindsay, and James B. Steinberg, Protecting the
American Homeland: One Year On (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2002),
p. xxviii-xxx. (Available online at [http://brookings.edu/dybdocroot/fp/projects/
homeland/newhomeland.pdf], visited December 10, 2004.)
“Reforming Congress’s Role
“Much of the benefit of consolidating the homeland security mission within the
executive branch will be lost if our national legislature fails to reflect that
reorganization in its own structure. Congressional oversight of homeland security
activities has traditionally been scattered across Capitol Hill. By the administration’s
count, thirteen full committees in each house, and a total of 88 committees and
subcommittees overall, shared responsibility for overseeing the homeland security
mission in 2002. The House Appropriations Committee alone had eight
subcommittees overseeing the agencies and programs merged into DHS. With
authority so badly fragmented, coordination problems were rife, and no one was
responsible for trying to bring coherence to the decisions made by individual
committees.
“The Department of Homeland Security Act expresses “the sense of Congress that
each House of Congress should review its committee structure in light of the
reorganization of responsibilities within the executive branch.” To its credit,
Congress has taken some important steps to meet this call. The House and Senate
Appropriations Committees agreed at the start of 2003 to realign their subcommittee
jurisdictions to create new homeland security subcommittees. This restructuring both
institutionalizes the responsibility for appropriations oversight of the executive
branch — increasing the changes that budgetary supervision will occur even if events
shift political appeal to other topics — and reduce fragmentation — increasing the
chances that Congress can identify major gaps and sensible tradeoffs in homeland
security spending.
“Congress has not moved as aggressively to consolidate the badly fragmented
authorization process. The Senate plans no changes to its committee structure. The
Government Affairs Committee had responsibility for overseeing the creation of
DHS, while other authorizing committees have responsibility for overseeing
individual programs and agencies within DHS. The House has gone somewhat
further. It has created a Select Homeland Security Committee, composed on the

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Republican side largely of the chairmen of the committees with a stake in homeland
security. The goal is to establish a permanent Homeland Security Committee at the
start of the 109th Congress (2005-07). The question of what jurisdictions a permanent
committee would take from other panels has yet to be answered. In the interim, the
leadership of the select committee sees its task as coordinating the homeland security
actions of other committees and reconciling any disagreements rather than
establishing a claim to primary authorization oversight of homeland security.
“Although the House’s approach is preferable to the Senate’s, neither is sufficient to
ensure effective congressional oversight. Maintaining a fragmented authorization
process increases the odds that Congress will drag its feet in considering executive
branch proposals, bicker internally over the direction of homeland security, and issue
conflicting directives to DHS. A streamlined appropriations process cannot eliminate
these problems, even though appropriators normally follow the authorizers in the
legislative process and can in theory reconcile any conflicting authorization
mandates. Appropriators approach oversight largely through budgetary and
management lenses. Their instinct is to ask how much is being spend and whether
it can be spent efficiently. They devote less time to the related but distinct policy
issues that the authorization committees specialize in. As a result, the chances
remain that broader policy issues either will be the object of turf wars or fall through
the cracks of the authorization process. Bringing committee heads together as the
House proposes can mitigate these problems in the short term. It is debatable,
however, that a select committee will provide adequate oversight in the long term.
Committee chairs have numerous competing demands on their time, many of which
are more politically salient than homeland security. Moreover, the select committee
approach by its nature focuses oversight attention on where committees disagree
rather than on the equally pressing question of whether the sum total of committee
decisions makes sense.
“Congress would be wise then to take to heart its message in the Department of
Homeland Security Act and reorganize its jurisdictions to create authorizing
committees for homeland security. Such a reorganization would not produce a
unified decisionmaking process. Some fragmentation would remain as a result of
bicameralism and the twin-track authorization and appropriations process. The task
of coordinating the authorizers and appropriators on homeland security with those
responsible for related activities by the intelligence agencies, the FBI, and the
Pentagon (to name just a few) would also remain. But establishing dedicated
homeland security committees to complement the homeland security appropriations
subcommittees would likely maximize the efficacy of congressional oversight.”
øøø
2) Protecting the American Homeland: One Year On, 2002, pp. 122-123.
“Congress
“However the executive branch conducts its work, many issues will inevitably
engage the legislative branch. The president’s ability to make homeland security his
top priority will be helped, or hindered, according to whether and how much
Congress can revamp its structure and process to the same end. Two reforms would

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be especially useful: establishment of House and Senate appropriations
subcommittees for homeland security, and creation of a joint committee to oversee
the national effort. The congressional role and focus would be further strengthened,
moreover, if the Homeland Security Council were made a statutory entity, and its
director subject to Senate confirmation — as recommended above.
“One of Tom Ridge’s signal achievements has been the submission of a unified
homeland security budget. But once on Capital Hill, it now must be disaggregated
and its components distributed among multiple appropriations subcommittees. There
they will be weighed not in relation to overall homeland security needs, but within
such jurisdictions as Commerce, Justice, and State; Defense; and Labor, Health and
Human Services, and Education. What the executive branch has laboriously pulled
together, Congress must quickly pull apart. The obvious remedy, difficult though it
may be to implement, is to establish new appropriations subcommittees on homeland
security in both branches. If that proves too large a reform to swallow, a second-best
alternative would be for the appropriations committees as a whole to take up and pass
the homeland security budget.
“Ideally, there would also be established authorizing committees with the same
jurisdiction. In the near term, however, this would likely prove even harder to
accomplish than appropriations reform. A useful “second-best” option, therefore,
would be to enhance congressional capacity for analysis and oversight by creating
a new body on the model of the Joint Economic Committee. This would limit the
threat to existing jurisdictions, as a joint committee for homeland security would
have no legislative authority. This would also limit its impact, of course, but such
a committee could be a useful focal point, holding hearings, issuing reports, calling
executive officials to task.”

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Appendix G
Recommendations on Congressional Organization Made By
the Center for Strategic and International Studies
In this appendix, the reader will find excerpts from the report of the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). The excerpts are the verbatim
recommendations related to congressional organization that are contained in this
report. Different type styles and formats reflect those used in the original text.
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Meeting the Challenges of
Establishing a New Department of Homeland Security: A CSIS White Paper, 2002,
pp. 19-21. (Available online at [http://www.csis.org/features/hamrefinalpaper.pdf],
visited December 10, 2004.)
“Revamp Congressional Oversight of Homeland Security
“!Create a Select Committee of oversight in the House, and a similar
committee in the Senate.
“Congressional leadership should create new select committees in order to streamline
the report process, eliminate fragmentation of authority, and ensure efficient and
effective oversight of the new Homeland Security Department.
“!Relinquish responsibility in committees that exercise overly broad and,
in most cases, duplicative oversight of the agencies that will be folded into
the Department of Homeland Defense.
“Today, far too many Congressional committees and subcommittees have been given,
or have taken, oversight responsibility for various aspects of homeland security. To
ensure effective oversight of homeland security, Congress must rein in the number
of committees and subcommittees that exercise authority over the new department.
“Specifically, the scope of jurisdiction of the House Government Reform Committee
should be narrowed and its functions redefined to eliminate duplicate oversight over
the many defense and homeland security functions already under the jurisdiction of
other committees.
“The Senate Government Affairs Committee should revise its charter and divest itself
of the International Security and Proliferation function of the Subcommittee on
International Security, Proliferation and Federal Services. This oversight role is
adequately exercised in other standing Senate committees.
“!Membership of each respective Select Committee should be made up of
chairpersons and ranking members from the committees (House and
Senate) and subcommittees (House) that now exercise oversight over the
various agencies that will be consolidated in the new Department of
Homeland Security. This criteria for membership will ensure cross-

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jurisdictional involvement by members, further providing comprehensive
oversight.
“The relevant Senate committees include: Agriculture; Appropriations; Armed
Services; Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs; Commerce, Science and
Transportation; Energy and Natural Resources; Judiciary; and Intelligence.
“The relevant House committees (and attendant subcommittees) include: Agriculture
(Specialty Crops and Foreign Agriculture); Appropriations (Agriculture; Commerce,
Justice, State; Defense; Energy and Water; Transportation; Treasury, Postal Service
and General Government); Armed Services (Military Readiness; Military Research
and Development); Energy and Commerce (Environment and Hazardous Materials;
Health; Telecommunications and the Internet); Financial Services (Financial
Institutions and Consumer Credit); Judiciary (Courts, the Internet ad Intellectual
Property; Crime; Immigration and Claims); Science (Energy; Research);
Transportation (Aviation; Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation; Highways;
Railroads); and Intelligence (Human Intelligence, Analysis and Counterintelligence;
Intelligence Policy and National Security; Terrorism and Homeland Security).
“!Terms of membership on each Select Committee should be governed by
the same criteria that govern chairmanship or ranking member status on
other committees.
“Term limits on membership ensure fresh perspectives, while maintaining more than
adequate understanding of the issue because of members’ other committee
assignments.
“!Each new Select Committee should have its own separate staff, not
affiliated with any other committee or subcommittee.
“Separate staff will ensure independence and limit cross-jurisdictional turf battles.
Further, a separate staff provides focused and expert insight to members of each
Select Committee.
“!Within each Appropriations Committee, create new subcommittees of
oversight. In conjunction with those new subcommittees, dissolve oversight
responsibilities now resident in standing subcommittees.
“Unless separate new subcommittees are created, and oversight within current
subcommittees is dissolved, the new Department will be whipsawed by competing
demands and lines of authority within the Appropriations Committees.”

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