Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy

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Summary

Afghanistan is a fragile state that appears to be gradually stabilizing after more than 22 years of warfare, including a U.S.-led war that brought the current government to power. Successful presidential elections held on October 9, 2004 are likely to accelerate stabilization and reconstruction. The report of the 9/11 Commission, as well as legislation passed in December 2004 that implements those recommendations (S. 2845, P.L. 108-458), recommends a long-term commitment to a secure and stable Afghanistan; most of these recommendations already form a major part of the U.S. policy framework for Afghanistan.

Since the defeat of the Taliban, Afghanistan no longer serves as a safe base of operations for Al Qaeda. Afghan citizens are enjoying new personal freedoms that were forbidden under the Taliban, about 3 million Afghan refugees have returned, and women have returned to schools, the workforce, and some participation in politics. Political reconstruction is slowly following the route laid out by major Afghan factions and the international community during the U.S.-led war. A loya jirga (traditional Afghan assembly) adopted a new constitution on January 4, 2004. Presidential and parliamentary elections were to be held by June 2004, but security concerns and factional infighting caused presidential elections to be postponed until October 9, 2004, and parliamentary elections to be put off until the spring of 2005. The presidential elections were held amid high turnout and minimal violence, although some of the challengers to interim president Hamid Karzai alleged widespread fraud. Interim president Karzai was declared first round winner on November 3, 2004, his opponents accepted that result, and he was inaugurated on December 7. A new cabinet, broadly balanced factionally but emphasizing qualifications over political allegiances, was sworn in on December 27, 2004.

Remaining obstacles to stability include the continued local authority of militias controlled by regional leaders and growing narcotics trafficking. U.S. stabilization measures focus on strengthening the central government, which has been widely viewed as weak and unable to control the many regional and factional leaders. The United States and other countries are building an Afghan National Army; deploying a multinational International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to patrol Kabul and other cities; running regional enclaves to create secure conditions for reconstruction (Provincial Reconstruction Teams, PRTs); and disarming militia fighters. U.S.-led forces continue to combat a low level Taliban-led insurgency, and the insurgency appears to have lost traction over the past year. To build security institutions and foster reconstruction, the United States gave Afghanistan a total of about $1.9 billion for FY2004, most of which was provided in a supplemental appropriation (P.L. 108-106). Almost all U.S. and international sanctions imposed on Afghanistan prior to and during Taliban rule have now been removed.

This paper will be updated as warranted by major developments. See also CRS Report RS21922, Afghanistan: Presidential and Parliamentary Elections and CRS Report RL32686, Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy.
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Background to Recent Developments

Afghanistan became unstable in the 1970s as both its Communist Party and its Islamic movement grew in strength and became increasingly bitter opponents of each other. The instability shattered the relative peace and progress that characterized the rule of King Mohammad Zahir Shah, who reigned during 1933 - 1973. Zahir Shah was the last King in Afghanistan’s monarchy, which was founded in 1747 by Ahmad Shah Durrani. Prior to the founding of the monarchy, Afghanistan did not exist as a distinct political entity, but was a territory inhabited by tribes and tribal confederations often linked to neighboring nations. Zahir Shah was the only surviving son of King Mohammad Nadir Shah (1929-1933), whose rule followed that of King Amanullah Khan (1919-1929). King Amanullah Khan launched attacks on British forces in Afghanistan shortly after taking power and won complete independence from Britain as recognized in the Treaty of Rawalpindi (August 8, 1919). He was considered a secular modernizer and who presided over a government in which all ethnic minorities participated.

Zahir Shah is remembered fondly by many Afghans for promulgating a constitution in 1964 that established a national legislature and promoting freedoms for women, including freeing them from covering their face and hair. However, possibly believing that doing so would enable him to limit Soviet support for communist factions in Afghanistan, Zahir Shah also entered into a significant political and arms purchase relationship with the Soviet Union.

While undergoing medical treatment in Italy, Zahir Shah was overthrown by his cousin, Mohammad Daoud, a military leader. Daoud established a dictatorship characterized by strong state control over the economy. After taking power in 1978 by overthrowing Daoud, the communists, first under Nur Mohammad Taraki and then under Hafizullah Amin (leader of a rival communist faction who overthrew Taraki in 1979), attempted to impose radical socialist change on a traditional society, in part by redistributing land and bring more women into government positions. These moves spurred recruitment for Islamic parties and their militias opposed to communist ideology. The Soviet Union sent troops into Afghanistan on December 27, 1979 to prevent a seizure of power by the Islamic militias that became popularly

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1 For more information, see CRS Report RL31759, Reconstruction Assistance in Afghanistan: Goals, Priorities, and Issues for Congress.
known as “mujahedin” (Islamic guerrillas). Upon their invasion, the Soviets ousted Hafizullah Amin and installed a local ally, Babrak Karmal, as Afghan president.

After the Soviets occupied Afghanistan, the U.S.-backed mujahedin fought them effectively, and Soviet occupation forces were never able to pacify all areas of the country. The Soviets held major cities, but the outlying mountainous regions remained largely under mujahedin control. The mujahedin benefitted from U.S. weapons and assistance, provided through the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), working closely with Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence directorate (ISI). That weaponry included man-portable shoulder-fired anti-aircraft systems called “Stingers,” which proved highly effective against Soviet aircraft. The Islamic guerrillas also hid and stored weaponry in a large network of natural and manmade tunnels and caves throughout Afghanistan. The Soviet Union’s losses mounted, and Soviet domestic opinion shifted against the war. In 1986, after the reformist Mikhail Gorbachev became leader of the Soviet Union — and perhaps in an effort to signal some flexibility on a possible political settlement — the Soviets replaced Babrak Karmal with the more pliable director of Afghan intelligence, Najibullah Ahmedzai.

On April 14, 1988, Gorbachev agreed to a U.N.-brokered accord (the Geneva Accords) requiring it to withdraw. The Soviet Union completed the withdrawal on February 15, 1989, leaving in place a weak communist government facing a determined U.S.-backed mujahedin. The United States closed its embassy in Kabul in January 1989, as the Soviet Union was completing its pullout. A warming of superpower relations moved the United States and Soviet Union to try for a political settlement to the Afghan internal conflict. The failed August 1991 coup in the Soviet Union, and its aftermath, reduced Moscow’s capability for supporting communist regimes in the Third World, leading Moscow to agree with Washington on September 13, 1991, to a joint cutoff of military aid to the Afghan combatants.

The State Department has said that a total of about $3 billion in economic and covert military assistance was provided by the U.S. to the Afghan mujahedin from 1980 until the end of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1989. Press reports and independent experts believe the covert aid program grew from about $20 million per year in FY1980 to about $300 million per year during fiscal years 1986 - 1990. Even before the 1991 U.S.-Soviet agreement on Afghanistan, the Soviet withdrawal had decreased the strategic and political value of Afghanistan and made the Administration and Congress less forthcoming with funding. For FY1991, Congress reportedly cut covert aid appropriations to the mujahedin from $300 million the previous year to $250 million, with half the aid withheld until the second half of the fiscal year. Although the intelligence authorization bill was not signed until late 1991, Congress abided by the aid figures contained in the bill.3

2 The term refers to an Islamic guerrilla; literally “one who fights in the cause of Islam.”
## Afghanistan at a Glance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population:</th>
<th>28.5 million (July 2004 est.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic Groups:</td>
<td>Pashtun 42%; Tajik 27%; Uzbek 9%; Hazara 9%; Aimak 4%; Turkmen 3%; Baluch 2%; other 4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religions:</td>
<td>Sunni Muslim 80%; Shiite Muslim 19%; other 1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP:</td>
<td>$20 billion (purchasing power parity)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Debt:</td>
<td>$8 billion bilateral, plus $500 million multilateral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Exports:</td>
<td>fruits, nuts, carpets, semi-precious gems, hides, opium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Imports:</td>
<td>food, petroleum, capital goods, textiles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: CIA World Factbook, 2004.*

With Soviet backing withdrawn, on March 18, 1992, President Najibullah publicly agreed to step down once an interim government was formed. His announcement set off a wave of rebellions primarily by Uzbek and Tajik militia commanders who were nominally his allies, including by Uzbek commander Abdul Rashid Dostam (see below). Joining with the defectors, prominent mujahedin commander Ahmad Shah Masud (of the Islamic Society, a largely Tajik party headed by Burhanuddin Rabbani) sent his fighters into Kabul, paving the way for the installation of a regime led by the mujahedin on April 18, 1992. Masud had earned a reputation as a brilliant strategist by successfully preventing the Soviets from occupying his power base in the Panjshir Valley of northeastern Afghanistan. After failing to flee, Najibullah, his brother, and a few aides remained at a U.N. facility in Kabul until the Taliban movement seized control in 1996 and hanged them.

The fall of Najibullah brought the mujahedin parties to power in Afghanistan but also exposed the serious differences among them. The leader of one of the smaller mujahedin parties, Islamic scholar Sibghatullah Mujadeddi, became president for an initial two months (April - May 1992). Under an agreement among all the major mujahedin parties, Burhanuddin Rabbani became President in June 1992, with the understanding that he would leave office in December 1994. He refused to step down at the end of that time period, maintaining that political authority would disintegrate in the absence of a clear successor, but the other parties accused him of monopolizing power. His government subsequently faced daily shelling from another mujahedin commander, Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, who was nominally prime minister but never formally took office. Hikmatyar headed a fundamentalist faction of Hizb-e-Islami (Islamic Party) and reportedly received a large proportion of the U.S. covert aid during the war against the Soviet Union. Four years (1992-1996) of civil war among the mujahedin destroyed much of Kabul and created popular support for the Taliban as a movement that could deliver Afghanistan from the factional infighting. Hikmatyar was later ousted by the Taliban from his powerbase around Jalalabad despite sharing the Taliban’s ideology and Pashtun ethnicity, and he fled to Iran before returning to Afghanistan in early 2002. He is now allied with Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants.
The Rise of The Taliban 4

The Taliban movement was formed in 1993-1994 by Afghan Islamic clerics and students, many of them former mujahedin who had become disillusioned with continued internal conflict among mujahedin parties and who moved into the western areas of Pakistan to study in Islamic seminaries (“madrassas”). They were mostly practitioners of an orthodox form of Sunni Islam, “Wahhabism,” similar to that practiced in Saudi Arabia. The Taliban was composed overwhelmingly of ethnic Pashtuns (Pathans) from rural areas of Afghanistan. Pashtuns constitute a plurality in Afghanistan, accounting for about 42% of Afghanistan’s population of about 28 million. Taliban members viewed the Rabbani government as corrupt, responsible for continued civil war and the deterioration of security in the major cities, and discriminating against Pashtuns. With the help of defections by sympathetic mujahedin fighters, the Taliban seized control of the southeastern city of Qandahar in November 1994, and by February 1995, it had reached the gates of Kabul, after which an 18-month stalemate around the capital ensued. In September 1995, the Taliban captured Herat province, on the border with Iran, and expelled the governor of the province, Ismail Khan. In September 1996, a string of Taliban victories near Kabul led to the withdrawal of Rabbani and Masud to their Panjshir Valley redoubt north of Kabul with most of their heavy weapons; the Taliban took control of Kabul on September 27, 1996.

The Taliban was led by Mullah (Sunni Muslim cleric) Muhammad Umar, who fought in the anti-Soviet war under the banner of the Hizb-e-Islam (Islamic Party) mujahedin party of Yunis Khalis. He lost an eye in that war. During Taliban rule, Umar held the title of Head of State and Commander of the Faithful, but he remained in his power base of Qandahar, rarely appeared in public, and did not take an active role in day-to-day governance. However, in times of crisis or to discuss pressing issues, he summoned Taliban leaders to meet with him in Qandahar. Considered a hardliner, Umar forged a close personal bond with bin Laden and was adamantly opposed to meeting U.S. demands to hand him over. Born in Uruzgan province, Umar, who is about 57 years old, fled Qandahar city when the Taliban surrendered it on December 9, 2001. He is still at large and reportedly continues to meet with Taliban insurgent commanders, although some of his aides have been captured. (Two top aides were captured by U.S. forces on December 14, 2004.)

After 1997, the Taliban lost international and domestic support as it imposed strict adherence to Islamic customs in areas it controlled and employed harsh punishments, including executions. The Taliban made extensive use of its Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Suppression of Vice, a force of religious police officers that often used physical punishments to enforce Islamic practices, as well as a ban on television, popular music, and dancing. The Taliban prohibited women from attending school or working outside the home, except in health care, and it conducted some public executions of women for various transgressions.

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During the Taliban period, several U.N. Security Council resolutions, including 1193 (August 28, 1998) and 1214 (December 8, 1998), urged the Taliban to end discrimination against women. During a November 1997 visit to Pakistan, then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright attacked Taliban policies as despicable and intolerable. U.S. women’s rights groups, including the Feminist Majority and the National Organization for Women (NOW), mobilized to stop the Clinton Administration from recognizing the Taliban government. On May 5, 1999, the Senate passed S.Res. 68, a resolution calling on the President not to recognize any Afghan government that discriminates against women.

In what most observers considered an extreme action, in March 2001 the Taliban ordered the destruction of two large Buddha statues in the hills above Bamiyan city: the statues dated to the seventh century. Some experts believe the move was a reaction to U.N. sanctions imposed in December 2000 (see below), and it provoked widespread condemnation of the Taliban, even among other Islamic states, including Pakistan.

**Clinton Administration Relations With the Taliban.** The Clinton Administration diplomatically engaged the Taliban movement as it was gathering strength, but U.S. relations with the Taliban deteriorated sharply during the five years that the Taliban were in power in Kabul, to the point where the United States and the Taliban were de-facto adversaries well before the September 11, 2001 attacks. The United States withheld recognition of Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan, formally recognizing no faction as the government. Because of the lack of broad international recognition of Taliban, the United Nations seated representatives of the Rabbani government, not the Taliban. The State Department ordered the Afghan embassy in Washington, D.C., closed in August 1997 because of a power struggle that embassy. Despite the deterioration, Clinton Administration officials met periodically with Taliban officials to stress U.S. concerns.

Well before the September 11, 2001, attacks, the Taliban’s alliance with Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden had become the Clinton Administration’s overriding bilateral agenda item with Afghanistan. After the August 7, 1998, Al Qaeda bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the Clinton Administration placed progressively more pressure on the Taliban to extradite bin Laden, adding sanctions, some military action, reported covert intelligence operations, and the threat of further punishments to ongoing diplomatic efforts. Clinton Administration officials say that they did not take major action to oust the Taliban from power, either through direct U.S. military action or by providing military aid to Taliban opponents in Afghanistan, because domestic U.S. support for those steps was then lacking.

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During an April 1998 visit to Afghanistan, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Bill Richardson asked the Taliban to hand bin Laden over to U.S. authorities, but he was rebuffed.

On August 20, 1998, the United States fired cruise missiles at alleged bin Laden-controlled terrorist training camps in retaliation for the embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.

On July 4, 1999, because of the Taliban’s hosting of bin Laden, President Clinton issued Executive Order 13129, imposing a ban on U.S. trade with Taliban-controlled portions of Afghanistan and blocking Taliban assets in U.S. financial institutions. Afghanistan was not named a state sponsor of terrorism on the grounds that doing so would have implied recognition of the Taliban as the government.

On October 15, 1999, with Russian support, the United States achieved adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1267, which banned flights outside Afghanistan by Ariana airlines, and directed U.N. member states to freeze Taliban assets.

On December 19, 2000, the United States and Russia achieved U.N. Security Council adoption of Resolution 1333, a follow-on to Resolution 1267, that prohibited the provision of arms or military advice to the Taliban (directed against Pakistan); directed a reduction of Taliban diplomatic representation abroad; and banned foreign travel by senior Taliban officials. On July 30, 2001, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1363, providing for the stationing of monitors in Pakistan to ensure that no weapons or military advice was being provided to the Taliban. (In the aftermath of the Taliban’s ouster from power, these provisions were narrowed to focus on Al Qaeda, and not the Taliban, by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1390 of January 17, 2002.)

The Anti-Taliban Opposition

The Taliban’s imposition of puritanical Islamic rule, and its alliance with bin Laden, not only alienated the United States but caused other Afghan power centers to make common cause with the ousted President Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Masud. These groups coalesced into a “Northern Alliance” shortly after Kabul fell to the Taliban. The Tajik core of the Alliance was located not only in the Panjshir Valley of the northeast but also in western Afghanistan near the Iranian border. Those in the west were led by Ismail Khan (who regained the governorship of his former stronghold in and around Herat after the Taliban collapse). Prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Clinton and Bush Administrations did not judge the Northern Alliance sufficiently capable or compatible with U.S. values to merit U.S. military assistance. Various components of the Alliance other than the previously-discussed Islamic Society/Tajik core of the grouping are analyzed below.

General Dostam/Mazar-e-Sharif. One non-Tajik component of the Alliance was the Uzbek militia (the Junbush-Melli, or National Islamic Movement
of Afghanistan) of General Abdul Rashid Dostam. Uzbeks constitute about 9% of the population, compared with 27% that are Tajik. Dostam, best known for his 1992 break with Najibullah that led to Najibullah’s overthrow that year, subsequently fought against Rabbani during 1992-1995 in an effort to persuade him to yield power, but joined the Northern Alliance after the Taliban took power. Dostam once commanded about 25,000 troops, significant amounts of armor and combat aircraft, and even some Scud missiles, but infighting within his faction left him unable to hold off Taliban forces. The Taliban captured Dostam’s region in August 1998, leaving him in control of only small areas near the border with Uzbekistan.

During the 2001 U.S.-led war against the Taliban, Dostam, in concert with a Tajik commander Atta Mohammad and a Shiite Hazara commander Mohammad Mohaqiq, recaptured the key northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif from the Taliban. There were subsequently tensions between Dostam and Atta, often resulting in minor clashes, most recently in October 2003, in which both sides reportedly used heavy weaponry such as tanks. Largely because of the tensions, Dostam is said to be surrendering his heavy weaponry to central government/international forces slowly and grudgingly, reportedly handing in only older, barely functional equipment. Dostam is concerned that he and his Uzbek constituents could be vulnerable if he handed in his best weaponry while rival factions remain armed or able to call in nearby allies. (Both Dostam and Mohaqiq were candidates for president in the October 9, 2004, elections.) To ease factional tensions, in July 2004, President Hamid Karzai appointed Atta governor of Balkh province to curb his role as militia commander.

**Hazara Shiites.** Shiite Muslim parties composed mainly of members of Hazara tribes were generally less active against the Soviet occupation than were the Sunni parties. The Shiites, who are prominent in central Afghanistan, particularly Bamiyan Province, were part of the Northern Alliance as well. The main Shiite Muslim party is Hizb-e-Wahdat (Unity Party, an alliance of eight Hazara tribe Shiite Muslim groups), which joined Rabbani’s 1992-1996 government. Hizb-e-Wahdat has traditionally received some material support from Iran, whose population practices Shiite Islam. Hizb-e-Wahdat forces occasionally retook Bamiyan city from the Taliban, but they did not hold it until the Taliban collapsed in November 2001. The most well known Hazara political leader is Karim Khalili, leader of a large faction of Hizb-e-Wahdat; he was one of President Hamid Karzai’s vice presidential running mates in the presidential election. As discussed above, another prominent Hazara leader is Mohammad Mohaqiq.

**Sayyaf.** Another *mujahedin* party leader, Abd-i-Rab Rasul Sayyaf, heads a Pashtun-dominated faction called the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan. Sayyaf lived many years in and is politically close to Saudi Arabia, which shares his orthodox interpretation of Sunni Islam (“Wahhabism”). During the U.S.-backed war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Sayyaf’s faction of *mujahedin*, along with those of Hikmatyar, were the principal recipients of U.S.-supplied weaponry. Both Sayyaf and Hikmatyar criticized the U.S.-led war against Saddam Hussein after Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait. The Wahhabism of Sayyaf’s movement was shared by the Taliban, which partly explains why many of Sayyaf’s fighters defected to the Taliban movement during its ascendancy. Despite the ideological similarity with the Taliban, Sayyaf joined the Northern Alliance against
the Taliban. Sayyaf is reputed to want to exercise major influence over the judiciary in the post-presidential election government, although many Afghans believe his Islamic orthodoxy would slow modernization of the judiciary and hinder an expansion of Western-style freedoms.

**Bush Administration Policy Pre-September 11, 2001**

Prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks, Bush Administration policy did not much differ from Clinton Administration policy — applying pressure short of military action against the Taliban, while retaining some dialogue with it. The Bush Administration did not arm or fund the Northern Alliance prior to the September 11 attacks, although the Administration did step up engagement with Pakistan in an effort to persuade Pakistan to curtail support for the Taliban. In compliance with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1333, in February 2001 the State Department ordered the closing of a Taliban representative office in New York. The Taliban complied with the directive, but its representative continued to operate informally. In March 2001, Bush Administration officials received a Taliban envoy, foreign ministry aide Rahmatullah Hashemi, to discuss bilateral issues. The contacts did not yield progress on obtaining extradition of bin Laden, and press reports in May 2002 said the Bush Administration was considering, prior to the September 11 attacks, plans to destabilize the Taliban. As did the executive branch, Congress became increasingly critical of the Taliban. A sense of the Senate resolution (S.Res. 275) that resolving the Afghan civil war should be a top U.S. priority passed by unanimous consent on September 24, 1996. A similar resolution, H.Con.Res. 218, passed the House on April 28, 1998.

Fighting without U.S. or major international support, the political rivalries within the Northern Alliance hindered its ability to shake the Taliban’s grip on power. After losing Kabul in 1996, the Northern Alliance steadily lost additional ground, even in areas populated by friendly ethnic minorities. By the time of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Taliban controlled at least 75% of the country and almost all major provincial capitals. The Northern Alliance suffered a major setback on September 9, 2001, two days before the September 11 attacks, when Ahmad Shah Masud was assassinated by suicide bombers posing as journalists, allegedly linked to Al Qaeda. His successor was his intelligence chief, Muhammad Fahim, who is a veteran figure but who lacked Masud’s authority.

**September 11 Attacks and Operation Enduring Freedom**

After the September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration decided to militarily overthrow the Taliban regime when it refused a U.S. demand to extradite bin Laden, who the Administration cited as prime author of the attacks. The Bush Administration decided that a friendly regime in Kabul was needed to create the conditions under which U.S. forces could eliminate Al Qaeda activists from Afghanistan and thereby deny that organization a base of operations. The U.S.-led war in Afghanistan began on October 7, 2001 (Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF).

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OEF consisted primarily of U.S. airstrikes on Taliban and Al Qaeda forces, coupled with targeting by relatively small numbers (about 1,000) of U.S. special operations forces, to facilitate military offensives by the Northern Alliance and Pashtun anti-Taliban forces. Some U.S. ground units (about 1,300 Marines) moved into Afghanistan in December 2001 to pressure the Taliban around Qandahar at the height of the fighting, but there were few pitched battles between U.S. and Taliban soldiers. Most of the ground combat was between Taliban units and Afghan opposition militiamen. Some critics believe that U.S. dependence on the use of local Afghan militia forces to oust the Taliban strengthened the militias’ subsequent assertions of independence from Kabul’s authority.

Legislation supported the decision to oust the Taliban. One bill, H.R. 3088, stated that it should be the policy of the United States to remove the Taliban from power. That bill, as well as another bill (H.R. 2998, introduced October 2, 2001), established a “Radio Free Afghanistan” broadcasting service under RFE/RL. On February 12, 2002, the House passed the Senate version of H.R. 2998 providing $17 million funding for the radio broadcasts for FY2002. President Bush signed it on March 11, 2002 (P.L. 107-148).

Pashtuns Join the Battle. During OEF, Taliban control of the north collapsed first — Mazar-e-Sharif fell to Dostam on November 9, 2001. The Northern Alliance forces commanded by Mohammad Fahim — who had initially promised U.S. officials his forces would not enter the city itself but then abrogated that pledge — captured Kabul three days later. The Taliban collapse in the north was followed by its loss of control of southern and eastern Afghanistan to pro-U.S. Pashtun commanders, such as Hamid Karzai. Karzai had entered Afghanistan just after the September 11 attacks to organize Pashtun resistance to the Taliban, supported in that effort by U.S. special forces. He became central to U.S. efforts to oust the Taliban from Pashtun areas after another Pashtun leader, Abdul Haq, entered Afghanistan in October 2001 without coordination with or support from U.S. forces but was captured and killed by the Taliban. Groups of other Pashtun commanders took control of cities and provinces in the east and south.

Major U.S. combat operations continued after the fall of the Taliban. The United States and its Afghan allies conducted “Operation Anaconda” in the Shah-i-Kot Valley south of Gardez during March 2 - 19, 2002, to eliminate a pocket of as many as 800 Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters. In late March 2003, about 1,000 U.S. troops launched a raid on suspected Taliban or Al Qaeda fighters in villages around Qandahar. On May 1, 2003, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Afghan president Karzai declared major OEF combat operations ended. However, smaller OEF operations against Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants continue (see below).
Post-War Stabilization Efforts

The war against Al Qaeda and the Taliban paved the way for the success of a longstanding U.N. effort to form a broad-based Afghan government. The government of Hamid Karzai has held together at the national level, but tensions exist among factions of the national government and between the central government and some regional leaders. Some argue that, in many respects, “center-periphery” tension has existed throughout Afghan history. An insurgency by Taliban, Al Qaeda, and other Islamic militants persists, although it appears to lack popular support and failed to conduct any major attacks on presidential election day (October 9). However, narcotics trafficking appears to be a growing threat to Afghan stability, as identified by Afghan, U.S., and U.N. officials.

For the eight years prior to the U.S.-led war, the United States worked primarily through the United Nations to end the Afghan civil conflict. The United Nations was viewed as a credible mediator by all sides largely because of its role in ending the Soviet occupation. Some observers criticized U.S. policy as being insufficiently engaged to bring about a settlement. After the fall of Najibullah in 1992, a succession of U.N. mediators — former Tunisian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Mestiri (March 1994-July 1996); German diplomat Norbert Holl (July 1996-December 1997); Algeria’s former Foreign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi (August 1997-October 1999) and Spanish diplomat Fransesc Vendrell (October 1999-September 2001) — sought to form a broad-based government. The proposals incorporated many ideas of former King Zahir Shah, calling for a government to be chosen through a traditional assembly, the loya jirga. The U.N. efforts, at times, appeared to make progress, but ceasefires between the warring factions always broke down. Brahimi suspended his efforts in October 1999.

In coordination with direct U.N. mediation efforts, a “Six Plus Two” contact group began meeting in early 1997; the group consisted of the United States, Russia, and the six states bordering Afghanistan: Iran, China, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. The group was created following informal meetings of some of the key outside parties, in which these countries, including the United States, agreed not to arm the warring factions. (In June 1996, the Administration formally imposed a ban on U.S. sales of arms to all factions in Afghanistan, a policy that had been already in place less formally.) In 2000, a “Geneva group” on Afghanistan began meeting: Italy, Germany, Iran, and the United States. Another mediation effort existed within the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC).

The United States also supported non-governmental initiatives coming from individual Afghans, including Karzai’s clan. One initiative, the Intra Afghan Dialogue, consisted of former mujahedin commanders and clan leaders, and held meetings during 1997 and 1998 in Bonn, Frankfurt, Istanbul, and Ankara. Another

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7 Some of the information in the following sections was gathered during a visit by CRS staff to Afghanistan in January 2004. For an analysis of U.S. reconstruction initiatives in Afghanistan, with a focus primarily on economic reconstruction, see U.S. General Accounting Office, GAO-04-403. Afghanistan Reconstruction. June 2004.

The last loya jirga that was widely recognized as legitimate was held in 1964 to ratify a constitution. Najibullah convened a loya jirga in 1987 to approve pro-Moscow policies; that gathering was widely viewed by Afghans as illegitimate.

Political Reconstruction

The post-Taliban transition is proceeding steadily, although perhaps less consistently and less quickly than had been hoped. The September 11 attacks and the start of U.S. military action against the Taliban injected new urgency into the search for a government that might replace the Taliban. In late September 2001, Brahimi was brought back as the U.N. representative. On November 14, 2001, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1378, calling for a “central” U.N. role in establishing a transitional administration and inviting member states to send peacekeeping forces to promote stability and secure the delivery of aid.

The Bonn Conference. In late November 2001, after Kabul had fallen, delegates of the major Afghan factions — most prominently the Northern Alliance and that of the former King — gathered in Bonn, Germany, at the invitation of the United Nations. The Taliban was not invited. On December 5, 2001, the factions signed an agreement to form a 30-member interim administration to govern until the holding in June 2002 of a loya jirga, to be opened by the former King. The loya jirga would then choose a new government to run Afghanistan until a new constitution is approved and national elections held six months later in June 2004. According to Bonn, the government would operate under the constitution of 1964 until a new constitution was adopted. The Bonn agreement provided for an international peacekeeping force to maintain security, at least in Kabul, and Northern Alliance forces were to withdraw from Kabul. The Bonn agreement was endorsed by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1385 (December 6, 2001), and the international peacekeeping force was authorized by Security Council Resolution 1386, adopted December 20, 2001.

At the Bonn conference, Hamid Karzai was selected chairman of an interim administration, which governed from December 22, 2001 until the June 2002 “emergency” loya jirga. Karzai presided over a cabinet in which a slight majority (17 out of 30) of the positions were held by the Northern Alliance, with this block holding the key posts of Defense (Fahim), Foreign Affairs (Dr. Abdullah Abdullah), and Interior (Yunus Qanooni). The three are ethnic Tajiks, with the exception of Dr. Abdullah (half Tajik and half Pashtun); all are in their late 40s, and were close aides to Ahmad Shah Masud.

Hamid Karzai. Karzai, who is about 50 years old, is leader of the powerful Popolzai tribe of Durrani Pashtuns; he became tribal leader when his father was

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9 The last loya jirga that was widely recognized as legitimate was held in 1964 to ratify a constitution. Najibullah convened a loya jirga in 1987 to approve pro-Moscow policies; that gathering was widely viewed by Afghans as illegitimate.

10 Text of Bonn agreement at [http://www.runiceurope.org/german/frieden/afghanistan/talks/agreement.htm].
assassinated, allegedly by Taliban agents, in Quetta, Pakistan in 1999. Karzai, who had attended university in India, had been deputy foreign minister in Rabbani’s government during 1992-1995. In 1995, he supported the Taliban as a Pashtun alternative to Rabbani, but he broke with the Taliban as its excesses unfolded. During 1997-2001, Karzai and his family, which includes several brothers, some of whom lived in the United States, had been active in intra-Afghan dialogues intended to broker a peaceful transition of power. Prior to the September 11 attacks, he and his clan had reached out to the Northern Alliance in a broad anti-Taliban alliance. He is viewed as a leader who seeks factional compromise rather than by intimidating his opponents with the use of armed force.

The 2002 “Emergency” Loya Jirga. In preparation for the 2002 “emergency” loya jirga, the former King returned to Afghanistan on April 18, 2002. By the time of the meeting, 381 districts of Afghanistan had chosen the 1,550 delegates to it, of which about 200 were women. At the loya jirga, which began June 11, 2002, the former King and Rabbani, withdrew from leadership candidacy and the assembly selected Karzai to continue to lead until planned June 2004 national elections. On its last day (June 19, 2002), the assembly approved a new cabinet, which included three vice presidents and several “presidential advisors,” in an effort to balance the ethnic and factional composition of the government and rein in regional strongmen. Northern Alliance military leader Fahim remained as Defense Minister and acquired the additional title of a vice president. The loya jirga did not establish a parliament.

New Constitution. After the close of the 2002 emergency loya jirga, the Afghan government began drafting a permanent constitution. A 35-member constitutional commission, appointed in October 2002, presented a draft to Karzai in March 2003, but it was not publicly unveiled until November 2003. It was debated by 502 delegates, selected in U.N.-run caucuses, at a “constitutional loya jirga (CLJ)” during December 13, 2003 until January 4, 2004. The CLJ was chaired by Sibghatullah Mojadeddi (see above). The CLJ ended with approval of the constitution with only minor changes from the draft. Most significantly, members of the Northern Alliance factions and their allies did not succeed in measurably limiting the power of the presidency in the final draft.

Karzai’s critics at the CLJ, mainly Northern Alliance members, objected to the draft’s establishment of a governmental structure with a strong elected presidency. An early plan to set up a prime minister-ship had not been included in the draft out of broad concerns that a prime minister might emerge as a rival to the presidency, Northern Alliance supporters had wanted that post as a check on presidential power. As an alternative, the critics sought to strengthen the powers of an elected parliament, and, at the CLJ, some additional powers were given to the parliament,


12 Information on the contents of the draft constitution are derived from a variety of November 3, 2003, wire service reports, including Reuters and Associated Press, which are based on an English translation of the draft provided to journalists by the Afghan (continued...
such as veto power over senior official nominees. However, some experts believe that setting up a strong presidency places undue weight on Karzai’s incumbency and self-restraint. The new constitution:

- sets up a two-chamber parliament, to be elected at the same time, if possible, as presidential elections.

- It gives the president the ability to appoint one-third of the seats for the upper chamber (Meshrano Jirga, House of Elders); another one third are selected by provincial councils, and a final one-third are selected by district councils. Of those appointed by the president, 50% are to be women, meaning that women get at least 16.5% of the total seats in the body (half of the president’s one-third block of appointments).

- The lower house (Wolesi Jirga, House of People), to consist of 249 seats, is to be fully elected. Of those, at least 68 of those elected (2 per province x 34 provinces) “should” be women. That would give women about 25% of the seats in this body. The goal is expected to be met through election rules that mandate that the top two women vote getters in each province win election. The CLJ added a provision to the final constitution that recognizes women as equal citizens.

- The constitution prevents the president from disbanding the parliament and gives parliament the ability to impeach a president. Two vice presidents run on the same election ticket as the president and one succeeds him in the event of the president’s death. They serve a five-year term, and presidents are limited to two terms.

- The document allows political parties to be established as long as their charters “do not contradict the principles of Islam” and they do not have affiliations with other countries. The constitution designates former King Zahir Shah as ceremonial “father of the nation,” a designation that cannot be passed on to his sons.

- The constitution does not impose Sharia (Islamic law), but it does attempt to satisfy Afghanistan’s conservative clerics by stipulating that laws shall not contradict “the beliefs and provisions” of Islam.

- Protections for minorities are also written into the constitution, and Uzbeks and Turkmens received rights for their language to be official languages in their regions, provisions not contained in the draft. This represented an apparent victory for Afghanistan’s minorities; the Pashtun leaders had wanted the final constitution to designate Pashto as the sole official language.

12 (...continued)

government.
Some CLJ delegates, including some female delegates (who were about 20% of the total delegates), said the draft constitution did not provide sufficient protections for human rights and women’s rights and that it placed the freedoms of Afghans in the hands of judges educated in Islamic law, rather than civil law.\textsuperscript{13}

**National Elections.** After the constitution was adopted, the focus of political reconstruction turned to presidential and parliamentary elections. Karzai sought timely national elections to prevent charges that he seeks to monopolize power. His critics wanted simultaneous parliamentary elections so that a parliament can serve as a check on presidential authority, but parliamentary elections are considered more difficult than presidential elections because of the need to establish political parties and election district boundaries, and the more complicated nature of the ballots needed. After a postponement from June 2004, the presidential elections were set for and held on October 9, 2004. For information on the elections, see CRS Report RS21922, *Afghanistan: Presidential and Parliamentary Elections*.

The voting was orderly and turnout heavy (about 8.2 million votes cast out of 10.5 million registered voters. On November 3, 2004, Karzai was declared winner (55.4% of the vote) over his seventeen challengers on the first round, avoiding a runoff. His challengers accepted the result, although some believe there was substantial fraud. He was inaugurated on December 7, 2004, with Vice President Cheney in attendance. Parliamentary elections are to be scheduled in spring 2005, although some believe they might be postponed until September 2005. As of October 2004, the latest date for which official information is available, 70 political parties were registered with the Justice Ministry.

**Post-Election Cabinet.** On December 27, 2004, a new cabinet was sworn in. Broadly, the cabinet appears to retain the factional balance (among Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, Uzbeks, and others) that previously existed, but Pashtuns now hold the security ministries (Defense and Interior) in a cabinet that generally emphasizes technocratic qualifications (nine have Ph.D’s) over factional allegiances:

- The most prominent Northern Alliance minister, Fahim, has been replaced as Defense Minister by his Pashtun deputy, Abdul Rahim Wardak. Wardak lived in exile in the United States during Taliban rule.

- Qanooni was not given a cabinet seat. He has since announced the formation of “New Afghanistan” opposition party that will compete in the parliamentary elections.

- Prominent Northern Alliance figure, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, was retained as Foreign Minister. Eight other Tajiks are in the 27-seat cabinet.

• Interior Minister Ali Jalali, a Pashtun, was retained, although he reportedly will need to relinquish his U.S. citizenship to retain the post.

• Another major move was the dropping of the prominent Finance Minister, Ashraf Ghani (a Pashtun), well liked by international donors, in favor of another Pashtun, Karzai ally and reformist Central Bank governor Anwar ul-Haq Ahady.

• Two women are in the new cabinet, an addition of one from the previous cabinet. Female presidential candidate Masooda Jalal was made Minister of Women’s Affairs, and another woman, Seqida Balkhi, was made Minister for Martyrs and the Disabled.

• To emphasize his stated commitment to end the burgeoning narcotics trafficking problem, Karzai created a new Ministry of Counter-Narcotics, headed by Habibullah Qadari.

Karzai appeared to try, with mixed success, to marginalize regional strongmen. He removed Pashtun regional leader Ghul Agha Sherzai as Minister of Public Works and of Urban Development but then returned him to his prior post as governor of Qandahar. Likewise, Sayyed Hussein Anwari was removed as Agriculture minister but appointed governor of Kabul province. The Tajik regional strongman Ismail Khan was appointed Minister of Water and Energy; he had been removed by Karzai as governor of Herat Province in September 2004 as part of a process of reining in regional leaders.

**Key Obstacles to the Transition**

Although Afghanistan’s political transition has passed several key milestones, the country continues to face substantial hurdles in addition to the ongoing Taliban/Al Qaeda insurgency. They are discussed below.

**Controlling Regionalism and Factionalism.** The Bush Administration says that the Kabul government is slowly expanding its authority and its capabilities, and curbing regional leaders who sometimes act outside government control. In an indication of the scope of the problem, on July 11, 2004, Karzai cited regional and factional militias as the key threat to Afghan stability — greater than that posed by continuing Taliban attacks. In his first post-election speech on November 4, 2004, Karzai said he would work to continue curbing militias. Although Karzai has moved against some regional leaders in the past year and sidelined a few in the appointment of his new cabinet, several continue to exercise substantial power. A number of reports say that the Afghan population greatly resents the arbitrary implementation of justice and corruption in areas controlled by regional leaders. On the other hand, some ethnic minorities look to the regional leaders to defend their interests. Others note that the local militias did not exert a material effect on the October 9 presidential vote.

Some critics attribute the continued strength of the regional leaders to early U.S. policies to work with regional militias to combat Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants,
strengthening these local leaders in the process. Others believe that easily obtained arms and manpower, funded by narcotics trafficking profits, help to sustain the independence of local factions and militias.

Karzai began curbing local leaders in November 2002 when he announced the replacement of some provincial officials with those more loyal to the central government. In August 2003 Karzai replaced Qandahar’s Gul Agha Shirzai with the more pro-Kabul Yusuf Pashtun (a move largely reversed by the new cabinet appointments). As noted above, in July 2004 he removed Atta Mohammad from control of a militia in the Mazar-e-Sharif area and moved two other militia leaders, Hazrat Ali (Jalalabad area) and Khan Mohammad (Qandahar area) into civilian police chief posts. He took advantage of factional fighting in August 2004 in Herat to remove a powerful governor of that province, Ismail Khan, in September 2004 and replace him with a loyalist. Khan subsequently allowed disarmament of his militia there, and Khan has now joined the government in Kabul, taking him away from his power base in Herat.

Several regional leaders remain powerful. Dostam has occasionally seized additional territory in his redoubt in northern Afghanistan, and his strong showing among his Uzbek constituency in the presidential elections might complicate efforts to curb his authority. A related U.S. concern is centered on Defense Minister Fahim, still considered the Northern Alliance’s military chief, who now has no position or stake in the Kabul central government. Over the past two years, U.S. officials have had only mixed success persuading Fahim to pull the forces he controls out of Kabul, as required in the Bonn agreement, with the ultimate goal to incorporate these forces into the Afghan National Army (ANA). However, Fahim has completed the submission of the heavy weapons under his control to U.S.-led cantonment.

As discussed further under “security issues” below, the United States is attempting to strengthen the central government so that it can more easily displace and curb regional leaders. U.S. intelligence is advising the National Security Directorate to help it build its capabilities to monitor threats to the new government, including those posed by regional militias. The State Department (INL) has placed 30 U.S. advisors in the Interior Ministry to help it develop the national police force and counter-narcotics capabilities. Part of the U.S. and Afghan strategy is to build democratic traditions at the local level as a means of curbing the power of local commanders. The Afghan government’s “National Solidarity Program” seeks to create local governing councils and empower these councils to make decisions about local reconstruction priorities. Elections to these local councils have been held in several provinces, and almost 40% of those elected to them have been women.

The United States is providing advice to the new government. Zalmay Khalilzad, an American of Afghan origin who was President Bush’s envoy to Afghanistan, became ambassador in December 2003, and he reportedly has

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significant influence on Afghan government decisions. The U.S. embassy is expanding its facilities to accommodate additional staff going to help accelerate the reconstruction process, and it is improving its physical security capabilities. The conference report on the FY2004 supplemental appropriation (P.L. 108-106) provided $44 million for improvements to the embassy. Afghanistan’s ambassador in Washington is Seyed Jalal Tawwab, formerly a Karzai aide.

As part of the U.S. push to speed reconstruction in advance of the 2004 Afghan elections, the Administration has assigned 14 U.S. officials (fewer than the 20 that were planned) full- or part-time to the U.S. Embassy in Kabul (Afghan Reconstruction Group, ARG) to serve as additional advisors to the Afghan government. On the other hand, a seven page internal Administration memo, written by an unnamed former U.S. official who worked in Afghanistan, is reported to say that the U.S. Embassy remains understaffed, in general, and lacks enough staff with Afghan language ability. The 9/11 Commission report appears to echo some of these criticisms; the report says the State Department presence in Afghanistan is “woefully understaffed.”

**Combating Narcotics Trafficking.** Another major problem facing the Karzai government is the growing influence of narcotics trafficking in Afghanistan’s economy and its politics. The December 5, 2001, Bonn agreement mentions the need for a post-Taliban Afghanistan government to prevent Afghanistan’s re-emergence as a haven for drug cultivation. Karzai highlighted his commitment to tackling this problem in his November 4, 2004 election victory speech, and, at a Kabul conference on the issue two days after his December 7, 2004 inauguration, he called on Afghans to join a “jihad” against the opium trade. On December 12, 2004, he pledged to destroy Afghanistan’s poppy fields within two years. (For a detailed discussion of the narcotics trafficking issue, including U.S. funding to combat this problem in Afghanistan, see CRS Report RL32686, *Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy.* )

U.S. officials in Afghanistan say they are increasingly nervous that Afghanistan could emerge as a “narco-state” and that about $2.3 billion — half of Afghanistan’s GDP — is generated by narcotics trafficking. Several reports and observers say that narcotics trafficking is funding Taliban insurgents and their allies in Afghanistan. There are widespread fears that local leaders might use narcotics profits to fund their campaigns for the parliament in spring 2005 or to bribe government officials or, in any number of ways, undermine democracy. On the other hand, the traffickers do not appear to have formed cartels or strong organizations, and it is not clear that those involved in narcotics in Afghanistan are necessarily adversaries of Karzai or of the government, or have any independent political objectives.

The dimensions of the problem appear to be growing. According to the 2004 Opium Survey conducted by the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Afghan Counternarcotics Directorate, published November 2004, the opium crop was

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close to 4,200 metric tons for 2004, a 17% increase from 2003 and keeping Afghanistan as the leading producer of opium crop.\textsuperscript{18} Cultivation took place on 131,000 hectares of land for 2004, an increase of 64% from the 80,000 hectares of land used for opium production in 2003, according to that report, although some estimates say that as much as 206,000 hectares were under poppy cultivation. The growing problem was also reportedly highlighted in a briefing for senior U.S. officials by the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. David Barno.\textsuperscript{19}

In January 2002, the Karzai government banned poppy cultivation, although it has had difficulty enforcing the ban due to resource limitations and opposition from Afghan farmers who see few alternatives. Afghan government officials say that narcotics cultivation will diminish when there is a vibrant alternate economy that provides other terms of livelihood to Afghans. As of now, Britain has been the lead coalition partner in reducing narcotics production and trafficking; it has raided some drug processing labs and will reportedly send counter-narcotics forces to Qandahar province in coming weeks.

In May 2004, the United States began funding a separate program to work with Afghan government officials to destroy poppy fields themselves, including aerial spraying. The program has been operating in the provinces of Wardak and Nangahar. However, some Bush Administration officials have called on the U.S. military to play a greater role in attacking traffickers and their installations, a mission the U.S. military reportedly has been reluctant to perform on the grounds that it would expand the U.S. military mission in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{20} During his mid-August 2004 visit to Kabul, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said that the U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan is considering new options to combat the drug trade there, possibly involving U.S. military action against narcotics smuggling routes.\textsuperscript{21} In early November, 2004, press reports said the Bush Administration would also take new legal steps against suspected Afghan drug traffickers by indicting them and putting the legal machinery in place to have them extradited from Afghanistan if caught.\textsuperscript{22} On November 17, 2004, the Bush Administration (Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Robert Charles) announced “Plan Afghanistan,” a $780 million (FY2005 funds) program to raise public awareness about the problem, promote alternative livelihoods, and conduct interdiction and crop eradication. However, it is not clear whether the plan will involve counter-narcotics operations by U.S. combat forces in Afghanistan. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) announced on November 17, 2004, that it is a participant in Plan Afghanistan.


In January 2004, as it had in January 2003, the Bush Administration again determined that Afghanistan was a major drug transit or illicit drug producing country. However, the Administration did not include Afghanistan in the list of countries that had “failed demonstrably to make substantial efforts” during the past 12 months to adhere to international counter-narcotics agreements and take certain counter-narcotics measures set forth in U.S. law. Therefore, no sanctions against Afghanistan were triggered.23

Prior to the announcement of Plan Afghanistan, substantial counter-narcotics funds were provided by the FY2004 supplemental appropriation. About $220 million is provided for assistance to Afghanistan’s counter-narcotics effort (and police training) for FY2004 (by State Department’s International Narcotics and Law Enforcement bureau (INL). Of that, $170 million was appropriated in the FY2004 supplemental appropriation (H.Rept. 108-337, P.L. 108-106), and $50 million is being provided from the post-September 11 “Emergency Response Fund.” The supplemental also provided $73 million for Defense Department counter-narcotics activities in Afghanistan, virtually all of which has been spent.

Narcotics trafficking control was perhaps the one issue on which the Taliban satisfied much of the international community. The Taliban, for the most part, enforced a July 2000 ban on poppy cultivation; in February 2001, the U.N. International Drug Control Program (UNDCP) said that surveys showed a dramatic drop in cultivation in the areas surveyed.24 The Northern Alliance did not issue a similar ban in areas it controlled.

Accelerating Reconstruction. An accelerated U.S. economic reconstruction plan has showcased some evidence of success, particularly the Kabul-Qandahar roadway project (Phase I) on December 16, 2003. According to USAID, Phase II paving was completed in November 2004, and several bridges have been completed. Work is also beginning on the Qandahar-Herat roadway, which will be funded by the United States, Japan, and Saudi Arabia. Additional work is being conducted on school and health clinic rebuilding, and agriculture projects such as the setting up of 138 market centers country-wide. Numerous other examples of U.S. economic reconstruction initiatives are analyzed in a General Accounting Office (GAO) report: *Afghanistan Reconstruction*. GAO Report GAO-04-403, June 2004. The report, which studied mainly economic reconstruction, was generally critical of U.S. reconstruction efforts to date, asserting that long term reconstruction efforts had achieved “limited results,” because the U.S. effort “lacked a complete operational strategy.” These findings were disputed by the State Department and USAID in their commenting letters at the end of the report.

Improving Human Rights Practices. Virtually all observers agree that Afghans are freer than they were under the Taliban. The press is relatively free and

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23 This is equivalent to the listing by the United States, as Afghanistan has been listed every year since 1987, as a state that is uncooperative with U.S. efforts to eliminate drug trafficking or has failed to take sufficient steps on its own to curb trafficking.

Afghan political groupings and parties are able to meet and organize freely, according to the State Department report on human rights practices for 2003. However, according to State Department and other reports, there continue to be reports of reprisals and other abuses based on ethnicity or political factionalism in many parts of Afghanistan.

Some observers say that the government is reimposing some Islamic restrictions that characterized Taliban rule, including the code of criminal punishments stipulated in Islamic law. Some have blamed the increased restrictions on chief justice Fazl Hadi Shinwari, a religious conservative who was appointed in late November 2001 by Northern Alliance political leader Rabbani, just after the Taliban fled Kabul but before Karzai took office. On January 21, 2003, Shinwari ordered shut down cable television in Kabul on the grounds it was un-Islamic, and called for an end to co-education. Although U.S. officials are privately critical of Shinwari, the U.S. government has generally refrained from advising the new government on these issues, lest the United States be accused of undue interference in Kabul’s affairs.

U.S. programs — many of which are conducted in partnership with Italy, which is the “lead” coalition country on judicial reform — generally focus on building capacity of the judicial system, including police training and court construction. The United States has provided numerous training programs for judges, prosecutors, and court administrators for the Ministry of Justice, the office of the Attorney General, and the Supreme Court.

An Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHC) also has been formed to monitor government performance; it is headed by former Women’s Affairs minister Sima Samar. The conference report on a FY2004 supplemental appropriation, H.R. 3289 (H.Rept. 108-337, P.L. 108-106), appropriates $5 million to fund the Commission in FY2004. This is the amount authorized, for each FY2003-2006, for that purpose, in the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-327). Another $2 million for the AIHC was appropriated for FY2005 in H.R. 4818 (P.L. 108-447), the omnibus FY2005 appropriation.

**Advancement of Women.** The new government is widely considered to be promoting the advancement of women, although the treatment of women varies considerably by region and remains subject to Afghanistan’s conservative traditions. A July 2003 Human Rights Watch report discussed above observed that women are often subject to physical and psychological harm that has limited their ability to participate in civil society and politics. The most notable development in post-Taliban Afghanistan has been the establishment of a Ministry of Women’s Affairs, now headed by Masooda Jalal, which is dedicated to improving women’s rights. That ministry has tried to get more Afghan women involved in business ventures and it has invited Afghan religious scholars to hear interpretations of the Quran that favor

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26 See also CRS Report RS21865. Assistance to Afghan and Iraqi Women: Issues for Congress.

active participation of women in national and economic affairs. As noted above, two women are in the new cabinet.

Afghan women are playing an active role in political and economic reconstruction. About 3 million women voted on October 9. The presidential candidacy of Masooda Jalal has been discussed previously; she received 1.1% of the vote. The new constitution reserves for women at least 25% of the seats in the upper house of parliament and recognizes men and women as equal citizens.

Women are performing some jobs, such as construction work, that were rarely held by women even before the Taliban came to power in 1996, and some women are joining the new police force. Girls returned to school March 23, 2002, for the first time since the Taliban took power in 1996, and most female teachers have resumed their teaching jobs. Under the new government, the wearing of the full body covering called the *burqa* is no longer obligatory, although many women continue to wear it by tradition.

Although the treatment of Afghan women has improved since the Taliban were removed from power, the Administration and Congress have taken a continued interest in the treatment of women in Afghanistan. After the Karzai government took office, the United States and the new Afghan government set up a U.S.-Afghan Women’s Council to coordinate the allocation of resources to Afghan women. According to the State Department’s May 2004 report on U.S. efforts to promote democracy abroad, the United States was active at the constitutional *loya jirga*, discussed above, to enshrine in the new constitution protections for women and policies to advance women in government.

In recent congressional action, on November 27, 2001, as the Taliban was collapsing, the House unanimously adopted S. 1573, the Afghan Women and Children Relief Act, which had earlier passed the Senate. The law (signed December 12, 2001) calls for the use of unspecified amounts of supplemental funding (appropriated by P.L. 107-38, which gave the Office of the President $40 billion to respond to the September 11, 2001 attacks, and which was subsequently distributed throughout the government to fund various programs) to fund educational and health programs for Afghan women and children. The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-327) authorizes $15 million per year, for FY2003-2006, for the Afghan Ministry of Women’s Affairs. The FY2004 supplemental (P.L. 108-106) appropriated $60 million for programs to assist Afghan women and girls, and expresses the sense of Congress that the United States seek (in Afghanistan and Iraq) to promote high level participation of women in legislative bodies and ministries and ensure their rights in new institutions. The section also calls on the Administration to seek to ensure women’s access to credit, property, and other economic opportunities. In concert with a meeting with President Karzai, on June 15, 2004,

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29 For more information on how the appropriated funds were distributed and used, see CRS Report RL31173, *Combating Terrorism: First Emergency Supplemental Appropriations-Distribution of Funds to Departments and Agencies.*
President Bush announced that the United States would fund a $4 million women’s teacher training institute in Kabul and that it would provide $5 million for small business grants to Afghan women. The FY2005 foreign aid appropriation (H.R. 4818, P.L. 108-447) provides $50 million for Afghan women and girls, of which $7.5 million is to go to small grants to women’s businesses. Another $6 million is appropriated in that law for maternal and child health care in Afghanistan.

Post-War Security Operations and Force Capacity Building

Much of the U.S. program for Afghanistan is intended to improve security throughout Afghanistan, considered a necessary pre-condition for reconstruction and democratic development. The report of the “9/11 Commission” recommends that “...the United States and the international community should make a long-term commitment to a secure and stable Afghanistan ... so that Afghanistan does not again become a sanctuary for international crime and terrorism.”

Despite the Taliban’s overthrow, Taliban, pro-Hikmatyar, and some Al Qaeda militants continue to operate in Afghanistan. The pillars of the security effort are (1) Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) combat operations by U.S. and other coalition forces in Afghanistan; (2) patrols by an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); (3) the formation of “provincial reconstruction teams;” (4) the establishment and training of an Afghan National Army and a police force; and (5) the demobilization of local militias. These programs and policies are discussed in the following sections.

Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). OEF’s primary mission is to combat Taliban insurgents that continue to attack the Afghan government and election and reconstruction workers mainly in the south and east. OEF forces also contributed to security for the October 9 presidential elections; U.S. commanders say that several hundred U.S. troops were deployed to Afghanistan for that mission. OEF forces do not routinely conduct “peacekeeping” missions or patrol Afghan neighborhoods. The United States (U.S. Central Command, CENTCOM) has about 18,000 troops in Afghanistan, and six coalition countries are contributing another 1,600 combat troops to OEF. (Additional foreign troops are dedicated to international peacekeeping, as discussed below). The current commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan is Lt. Gen. David Barno, who is now based at a “Combined Forces Command (CFC)” headquarters near the U.S. Embassy in Kabul, relocating in late 2003 from Bagram air base north of Kabul.

OEF forces, including Afghan troops, are often on the offensive against the militants. The United States and Afghanistan launched “Operation Mountain Viper” on August 25, 2003, followed up by “Operation Avalanche,” (December 8-30, 2003). During March to July 2004, U.S. forces, along with Afghan National Army soldiers, conducted “Operation Mountain Storm” against Taliban remnants in and around Uruzgan province, the home province of Mullah Umar. The 2,400-person Marine unit sent to Afghanistan for the mission has since departed. Other significant operations against militants, particularly in southeastern Afghanistan, have taken place since May 2004 as part of a planned “spring offensive.” A winter offensive, “Operation Lightning Freedom,” began in December 2004 to pre-empt insurgents ahead of planned spring 2005 parliamentary elections.
Several commanders say the combat, coupled with overall reconstruction, has succeeded against the Taliban insurgency. U.S. commanders also attribute the progress to a new military strategy, launched by Lt. Gen. Barno in February 2004, to station some U.S. forces in populated areas to cultivate relations with them and thereby better conduct counter-insurgency missions. In addition, the success of the October 9 presidential elections reportedly caused a rift in the Taliban, with some militants now said to be negotiating with the government (and reportedly with U.S. forces) to join the political process. Others around Mullah Omar are reported to be committed to continuing insurgent activity.

Because U.S. and other OEF forces do not routinely patrol major cities, ending Taliban urban terrorist attacks is considered a more complicated mission. Such attacks have included a September 5, 2002, car bombing in a crowded marketplace in Kabul and a virtually simultaneous assassination attempt against President Karzai. Karzai was unhurt and the assailant, a member of the security detail, was killed by U.S. special forces who serve as Karzai’s protection unit. Other urban terrorist attacks attributed to Taliban activists include the bombing of a marketplace in Qandahar on December 5, 2003, two February 2004 suicide bombings against international peacekeeping troops in Kabul, and an August 29, 2004, bombing of a U.S. security contractor (Dyncorps) facility in Kabul. (Four Americans were killed in that attack.) On October 28, 2004, a Taliban breakaway faction calling itself the “Army of the Muslims” kidnapped three U.N. election workers (one from Northern Ireland, one from Kosovo, and one from the Phillipines). The Karzai government negotiated their release.

**The Hunt for Al Qaeda and Other Militants.** U.S. Special Operations Forces continue to hunt for bin Laden and his close ally, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Bin Laden reportedly escaped the U.S.-Afghan offensive against the Al Qaeda stronghold of Tora Bora in eastern Afghanistan in December 2001. In February 2004, Gen. Barno and other commanders predicted success against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, including their defeat in Afghanistan in 2004. Implied in the prediction of success is that bin Laden would be captured, although he is widely believed to be on the Pakistan side of the border. Pakistan has deployed about 70,000 troops to combat suspected Al Qaeda fighters and their allies on the Pakistan side of the border, although Pakistani officials said in December 2004 that bin Laden’s trail has gone cold.

As noted above, another target of OEF is the Hikmatyar faction (Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, HIG) that is allied with Al Qaeda and Taliban remnants. On February 19, 2003, the U.S. government formally designated Hikmatyar as a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist,” under the authority of Executive Order 13224. That order subjected named terrorists and terrorist-related institutions to financial and other U.S. sanctions. The HIG is analyzed in the section on “other terrorist groups” in the State Department’s report on international terrorism for 2003, released April 29, 2004. The group is not formally designated as a “foreign terrorist organization.”

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**OEF Costs and Casualties.** As of December 2004, about 150 U.S. military personnel have been killed in OEF including from enemy fire, friendly fire, and non-hostile deaths (accidents). About 10 of the U.S. personnel were killed during 2003. Of coalition forces, 4 Canadian and 1 Australian combat (not peacekeeping) personnel were killed in hostile circumstances. In addition, according to CENTCOM, there have been ten U.S. deaths in the Philippines theater of OEF (operations against the Al Qaeda-affiliated Abu Sayyaf organization), all of which resulted from a helicopter crash. No reliable Afghan casualty figures for the war on the Taliban and Al Qaeda have been announced, but estimates by researchers of Afghan civilian deaths generally cite figures of “several hundred” civilian deaths. On July 1, 2002, a U.S. airstrike on suspected Taliban leaders in Uruzgan Province mistakenly killed about 40 civilians.


**International Security Force (ISAF)/NATO.** The Bonn Agreement, discussed above, and U.N. Security Council Resolution 1386 (December 20, 2001) created an international peacekeeping force, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Its mandate is the maintenance of security, and the mandate was initially limited to Kabul. ISAF’s baseline force for Afghanistan is about 6,400 troops from all 26 NATO countries, plus 10 non-NATO countries. However, ISAF force levels increased to about 9,000 to help secure the October 9, 2004, elections. The additional 2,500 troops for the election period were from Spain and Italy; the Italian battalion is currently attached to the “NATO Response Force (NRF),” but the NRF as an entity did not deploy. France had objected to deploying that force on the grounds that election security in Afghanistan was not part of the NRF’s intended mission. In addition to the extra troops for the election period, the Netherlands and Britain each provided six combat aircraft that could have been used to help suppress any election-related violence.

Additional long-term NATO involvement in Afghanistan is a key recommendation of the 9/11 Commission report. NATO’s role in Afghanistan has been expanding since August 2003, when NATO took command of ISAF, putting to rest the difficulty of identifying a lead force or lead country to head ISAF each six-month period. NATO took over from Germany and the Netherlands; earlier leaders were Turkey (June 2002 to February 2003) and Britain (December 2001 to June 2002). NATO’s assumption of command intensified discussions about whether ISAF should deploy to other major cities, a mission the Afghan government and UNAMA

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31 As noted above, six countries (in addition to the United States) are providing forces to OEF, and twelve countries are providing forces to both OEF and ISAF.
The Bush Administration had initially favored reliance on alternative security efforts, but it later agreed to ISAF expansion if enough troops could be contributed. In early October 2003, NATO endorsed a plan to expand its presence to several other cities, contingent on formal U.N. approval. The NATO decision came several weeks after Germany agreed to contribute an additional 450 military personnel to expand ISAF into the city of Konduz. On October 14, 2003, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1510, formally authorizing ISAF to deploy outside Kabul. As discussed further below, NATO is in the process of establishing or taking control of several “provincial reconstruction teams” (PRTs), mainly in western and northern Afghanistan.

The core of ISAF is the Kabul Multinational Brigade (4,400 personnel), which was headed by Canada until August 2004. It is now led by “Eurocorps,” a rapid response force composed of forces from France, Germany, Spain, Belgium, and Luxembourg. But Turkey will be the lead NATO/ISAF force as of February 2005, and Turkey will augment its force to 1,800 (from current levels of 240) when it takes over that lead position. At the headquarters level, there are 600 personnel from 15 contributing nations.

ISAF coordinates with Afghan security forces and OEF forces as well. The United States does not contribute forces to ISAF, but U.S. forces involved in OEF support ISAF. NATO reportedly will issue a report in February 2005 on a U.S. suggestion to combine the ISAF and OEF command structure, presumably under U.S. overall command. Germany and France are said to oppose the idea. Some observers also want NATO/ISAF to assume a role in counter-narcotics missions.

Although NATO nations appear committed to the Afghanistan mission, personnel and equipment shortages plague the organization’s ability to build up its presence in Afghanistan. In an effort to address staffing and equipment shortages, in early December 2003, NATO announced new pledges for ISAF operations: 12 helicopters from Germany, the Netherlands, and Turkey; six aircraft from various nations; an infantry company from Norway’s Telemark battalion, troops from the Czech Republic, intelligence officers from Italy, Romania, and other countries, and airport traffic controllers from Belgium and Iceland. The first military transport plane for ISAF, contributed by Portugal, arrived in late July 2004.

Current NATO contributions in Afghanistan are as follows (with contribution size in parenthesis, if known): Belgium (155); Bulgaria (11); Canada (1,800); Czech Republic; Denmark (49); Estonia (6); France (1,000); Germany (2,300); Greece (123); Hungary (19); Iceland; Italy (270); Latvia (8); Lithuania; Luxembourg; Netherlands (572); Norway (21); Poland; Portugal; Romania (32); Slovak Republic; Slovenia; Spain (400); Turkey (240); United Kingdom (130); and the United States (mostly logistical help). The non-NATO countries in ISAF are Albania (23); Austria (5); Azerbaijan (23); Croatia (47); Finland (46); Georgia (25); Ireland (7); New Zealand (4); Sweden (30); and Switzerland (2). According to the State Department,

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twelve of these nations are also contributed forces to OEF, and seven other nations are contributing to OEF but not ISAF. (For numbers of international troops contributed to OEF, see CRS Report RL31152, *International Support for the U.S.-Led War on Terrorism*, which details each contribution, including types of forces, equipment, and facilities hosting.)

**Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).** The U.S. military has increasingly focused on fostering secure conditions for reconstruction. In mid-December 2002, the Defense Department announced the concept of the provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) to provide safe havens for international aid workers to help with reconstruction and to extend the writ of the Kabul government throughout Afghanistan by attaching to the PRTs Afghan government (Interior Ministry) personnel. PRT activities can range from resolving local disputes to coordinating local reconstruction projects. Each U.S.-run PRT is composed of U.S. forces, Defense Department civil affairs officers, representatives of U.S. aid and other agencies, and allied personnel. Out of the 19 PRTs in operation, 13 are U.S.-run, each with about 50-100 military personnel. The U.S.-run PRTs are in Gardez, Ghazni, Herat, Parwan, Qandahar, Jalalabad, Khost, Qalat, Asadabad, Tarin Kowt, Lashkar Gah, Sharana, and Farah. Some observers say Canada is to soon take over the U.S.-led PRT in Qandahar.

The other six PRTs in operation are run by NATO/ISAF or OEF coalition partners. The ISAF/NATO-run PRTs are in Konduz (Germany is the lead force); Mazar-e-Sharif (Britain is the lead); Faizabad (as a satellite of Germany’s Konduz PRT); Meymaneh (U.K./Norway/Finland-led); and Baghlan (Netherlands-led). New Zealand leads an OEF-run PRT in Bamiyan. In addition, U.K. forces have formed three satellites of the Mazar PRT: in Sari Pol, Samangan, and Sheberghan. Under decisions made by NATO foreign ministers on December 9, 2004, NATO/ISAF is to take over two PRTs in western Afghanistan (Herat and one other) under a “phase two” expansion of the NATO/ISAF involvement in the PRT concept.

U.S. plans are to eventually establish PRTs in most of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, as well as “satellite” PRTs — smaller offshoots of the major PRTs that would operate in nearby population centers. Current plans are for U.S. forces to emphasize the PRTs primarily in the south and east, with a focus on counter-insurgency and anti-Al Qaeda intelligence missions, according to U.S. officers in Afghanistan.

Some aid agencies say they have felt more secure since the PRT program began, fostering reconstruction activity in areas of PRT operations. However, other relief groups do not want to associate with any military force because doing so might taint their perceived neutrality. The FY2004 supplemental request asked that $50 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF) be appropriated for “PRT projects;” that amount is provided in the conference report (H.Rept. 108-337, P.L. 108-106).

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In February 2004, Gen. Barno briefed journalists on an additional concept for “regional development zones”—areas of operations that might group several PRTs—in an effort to promote reconstruction and Afghan governance. According to Barno, a pilot regional development zone (RDZ) has been established in Qandahar, composed of a strongly pro-Kabul governor working with U.S. troops and Afghan national police and Afghan National Army forces. The RDZ’s are expected to provide synergy with PRTs in their areas, and one intention of the concept is to devolve security decision-making to U.S. commanders in the regions, rather than at U.S. headquarters in Kabul.

**Afghan National Army (ANA).** U.S. Special Operations Forces, in partnership with French and British officers, are training the new ANA. U.S. officers in Afghanistan say the ANA is beginning to become a major force in stabilizing the country and a national symbol. As of December 2004, the ANA has about 16,000 troops, according to State Department fact sheets, with training of 3,000 more under way. Most of the force deployed to help maintain security for the October 9 elections. Afghan officials say the desired ultimate size of the army is 70,000, a level that will likely not be reached for several more years, given the current rate of U.S.-led training. However, U.S. commanders say the number of trained ANA soldiers is expected to rise to about 33,500 within the next year as training accelerates.

The United States is also building four bases for the ANA, according to U.S. officials. The bases are in Herat, Gardez, Qandahar, and Mazar-e-Sharif. U.S. officials confirmed the base building in the course of denying allegations in the Afghan and Iranian press that the United States was constructing bases in Afghanistan for exclusive U.S. permanent use.

The ANA began its first deployments in December 2002, on a mission in eastern Afghanistan to fight alongside U.S. forces. The ANA was, by all accounts, welcomed by the local population as a symbol of a unified future for Afghanistan. Coalition officers are conducting heavy weapons training for a heavy brigade as part of a “Kabul Corps,” based in Pol-e-Charki, east of Kabul. The ANA has now established a presence in most of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces, working with the PRTs and assisted by embedded U.S. trainers. The ANA deployed to Herat in March 2004 to help quell factional unrest there, and to Maimana in April 2004 in response to Dostam’s militia movement into that city.

Thus far, weaponry for the ANA has come primarily from Defense Ministry weapons stocks — with the concurrence of former Defense Minister Fahim who controlled those stocks — and from international donors, primarily from the former East bloc. The United States has provided some trucks and other equipment as excess defense articles (EDA), and plans to provide some additional U.S. arms and/or defense services, according to statements by U.S. officials. The FY2004 supplemental appropriation (conference report on H.R. 3289, H.Rept. 108-337, P.L. 108-106) provided $287 million in foreign military financing (FMF) to accelerate

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ANA development. Those funds were allocated as follows: $146 million for infrastructure; $78 million for equipment; $40.7 million for “sustainment” (ANA salaries); $13 million for training; and $9 million for transportation.

There had been reports, at the time the United States first began establishing the ANA, that Northern Alliance figures were weighting recruitment for the national army toward his Tajik ethnic base. Many Pashtuns, in reaction, refused recruitment or left the ANA program. U.S. officials in Afghanistan say this problem has been alleviated with better pay and more involvement by U.S. special forces, as well as the appointment of additional Pashtuns in senior Defense Ministry positions. The naming of a Pashtun, Abdul Rahim Wardak, as Defense Minister in December 2004 could also reduce desertions and absenteeism among Pashtuns. U.S. officers in Afghanistan add that some recruits take long trips to their home towns to remit funds to their families, and often then return to the ANA after a long absence. Fully trained recruits are paid about $70 per month. The FY2005 foreign aid appropriation for Afghanistan (P.L. 108-447) contains a provision requiring that ANA recruits be vetted for past involvement in terrorism, human rights violations, and drug trafficking.

An Afghan Air Force remains, although it has virtually no aircraft to fly. It has about 400 pilots, as well as 28 helicopters and a few cargo aircraft. It is a carryover from the Afghan Air Force that existed prior to the Soviet invasion. Pilots are based at Bagram Airfield. U.S. officers in Afghanistan say they hope to eventually provide some additional equipment to the Afghan Air Force.

**National Guard.** In early 2004, because of the slow pace of expanding the ANA, the Bush Administration reportedly formulated a plan to build up a “national guard” to supplement the ANA. The national guard apparently will consist primarily of regional militia forces; it would report to OEF. This plan might appear to conflict with the Administration’s plan to build up the Kabul government and weaken regional militias, although the Administration reportedly believes this plan could better bring militia forces under central control.

**National Police.** The United States and Germany are training a national police force. About 30,500 national police have been trained thus far, and the entire force of 48,000 (trained and untrained) helped secure the October 9 election. The number of trained police is expected to reach 62,000 within one year, according to U.S. commanders. Germany is focusing on police commander training, and it has trained about 3,700 police commanders thus far, with another 1,500 in training. There are five training centers around Afghanistan, with two more to be established. Some national police have begun to dismantle factional checkpoints in some major cities, according to U.S. officers in Afghanistan. Part of the training consists of courses in human rights principles and democratic policing concepts.

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According to the State Department, the United States has completed training of the first unit of National Interdiction Unit officers under the Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan. U.S. trainers are also building Border Police and Highway Patrol forces.

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR). Japan, the United Nations (UNAMA), the United Kingdom, and Canada, with participation of the United States are leading (funding and implementing) an international effort to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate into society (DDR) fighters from individual militias. The DDR program is intended to undercut the military strength of the regional governors relative to the central government, and it reportedly is gaining momentum. The program got off to a slow start because the Afghan Defense Ministry did not enact mandated reforms (primarily reduction of the number of Tajiks in senior positions) by the targeted July 1, 2003, date. Many (non-Tajik) local militias said they would not disarm as long as the Defense Ministry was monopolized by Tajiks/Northern Alliance personnel. The “reforms” began in September 2003 when Karzai approved the replacement of 22 senior Tajik officials in the Defense Ministry by officials of Pashtuns, Uzbek, and Hazara ethnicity.

The DDR program had initially been expected to demobilize 100,000 fighters. However, lists of fighters submitted by regional leaders in June 2004 now identify about 60,000 total to be demobilized. As of December 2004, about 28,000 have been disarmed (about 50% of the total to be disarmed), with the program now accelerating in Bamiyan, Herat, and Baghlan. Of those, 25,000 have begun exercising their reintegration options: training, starting small businesses, and other options. The program got a boost from the ousting of Ismail Khan as Herat governor in August 2004; he permitted many of his militiamen to enter the DDR program after he was removed. Kabul’s goal is to complete the disarmament process (all 60,000 identified) by parliamentary elections in spring 2005.

A related program is the surrender and cantonment of heavy weapons possessed by major factions. According to UNAMA, at least 20,000 light weapons and 6,000 heavy weapons country-wide have been collected. The cantonment of heavy weapons is considered complete in Kabul. As noted above, the U.K.-led PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif has collected and (along with the ANA) is guarding some heavy weapons (tanks, artillery) from Dostam and rival factions in northern Afghanistan. Along with his other heavy weapons, Fahim has handed in some Scud missiles to U.S./ANA control.

The FY2004 supplemental requests asked $60 million for DDR operations. However, $30 million was provided in the conference report (H.Rept. 108-337, P.L. 108-106) because it is expected that Japan might contribute additional funds.
Regional Context

Even before September 11, several of Afghanistan’s neighbors were becoming alarmed about threats to their own security interests emanating from Afghanistan. Some experts believe that the neighboring governments have been attempting to manipulate Afghanistan’s factions to their advantage, despite the signing on December 23, 2002 of a non-interference pledge (Kabul Declaration) by six of Afghanistan’s neighbors.

Pakistan

Pakistan publicly ended its support for the Taliban in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, although questions persist about Pakistan’s commitment to preventing Taliban remnants from operating there. Pakistan initially saw the Taliban movement as an instrument with which to build an Afghan central government strong enough to prevent fragmentation of Afghanistan while at the same time sufficiently friendly and pliable to provide Pakistan strategic depth against rival India. It had been the most public defender of the Taliban movement and was one of only three countries (Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are the others) to formally recognize it as the legitimate government. Pakistan saw Afghanistan as essential to opening up trade relations and energy routes with the Muslim states of the former Soviet Union.

Prior to the September 11 attacks, General Pervez Musharraf, who took power in an October 1999 coup, resisted U.S. pressure to forcefully intercede with the Taliban leadership to achieve bin Laden’s extradition. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1333, of December 19, 2000, was partly an effort by the United States and Russia to compel Pakistan to cease military advice and aid to the Taliban. Pakistan did not completely cease military assistance, but it abided by some provisions of the resolution, for example by ordering the Taliban to cut the staff at its embassy in Pakistan. Just prior to the September 11 terrorist attacks, Pakistan had said it would cooperate with a follow-on U.N. Security Council Resolution (1363 of July 30, 2001) that provided for U.N. border monitors to ensure that no neighboring state was providing military equipment or advice to the Taliban.

Pakistan’s pre-September 11 steps against the Taliban reflected increasing wariness that the Taliban movement was radicalizing existing Islamic movements inside Pakistan and that its support for the Taliban was propelling the United States into a closer relationship with India. These considerations, coupled with U.S. offers of economic benefit, prompted Pakistan to cooperate with the U.S. response to the

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37 For further information, see CRS Report RS20411, Afghanistan: Connections to Islamic Movements in Central and South Asia and Southern Russia. December 7, 1999, by Kenneth Katzman.


September 11 attacks. Pakistan provided the United States with requested access to Pakistani airspace, ports, airfields. Pakistan also has arrested over 550 Al Qaeda fighters, some of them senior operatives, and turned them over to the United States. Among those captured by Pakistan are: top bin Laden aide Abu Zubaydah (captured April 2002), alleged September 11 plotter Ramzi bin Al Shibh September 11, 2002, and top Al Qaeda planner Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (March 2, 2003). Following failed assassination attempts in December 2003 against Musharraf, Pakistani forces accelerated efforts to find Al Qaeda forces along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, in some cases threatening tribal elements in these areas who are suspected of harboring the militants. In March 2004, about 70,000 Pakistani forces began a major battle with about 300-400 suspected Al Qaeda fighters in the Waziristan area, reportedly with some support from U.S. intelligence and other indirect support. Pakistan said it was winding down the combat in December 2004 and it publicly denied that it had allowed the United States to set up intelligence bases in the Waziristan area as part of the search for bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders.40 (For more information on Pakistan’s efforts against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, see CRS Report RL32259, Terrorism in South Asia.)

At the same time, Pakistan has sought to protect its interests by fashioning a strong Pashtun-based component for a post-Taliban government. Pakistan is wary that a government dominated by the Northern Alliance would be backed by India, which Pakistan says is using its diplomatic facilities in Afghanistan to train and recruit anti-Pakistan insurgents. Some U.S. and Afghan officials continue to accuse Pakistan of allowing Taliban fighters and activists to meet and group in Pakistani cities, and they call on Pakistan to track down and arrest Taliban members as vigorously as it tracks members of Al Qaeda. Pakistan says it is too difficult to distinguish Afghan Taliban from Pakistani nationals, but President Musharraf promised, at a meeting with Karzai on August 23, 2004, to prevent militants in Pakistan from disrupting Afghanistan’s October 9 presidential elections. There are some indications Pakistan implemented that pledge, and Pakistan is expected to try to improve relations further now that Karzai has won a free election. Pakistan wants the government of Afghanistan to pledge to abide by the “Durand Line,” a border agreement reached between Britain (signed by Sir Henry Mortimer Durand) and then Afghan leader Amir Abdul Rahman Khan in 1893, separating Afghanistan from what was then British-controlled India (later Pakistan after the 1947 partition).

As of October 2002, about 1.75 million Afghan refugees have returned from Pakistan since the Taliban fell. About 300,000 Afghan refugees remain in Pakistan.

Iran

Iran perceives its key national interests in Afghanistan as exerting its traditional influence over western Afghanistan, which Iran borders and was once part of the Persian empire, and to protect Afghanistan’s Shiite minority. Iranian firms are also profiting from reconstruction work in western Afghanistan. Iran has long been politically close to the Northern Alliance, and remains so. Iran has confirmed that

it offered search and rescue assistance in Afghanistan during the U.S.-led war, and it also allowed U.S. humanitarian aid to the Afghan people to transit Iran. However, some Iranian leaders were harshly critical of U.S. military action, referring to the action as a U.S. war on Islam.

Iran saw the Taliban as a threat to its interests in Afghanistan, especially after Taliban forces captured Herat (the western province that borders Iran) in September 1995. Iran subsequently drew even closer to the Northern Alliance than previously, providing its groups with fuel, funds, and ammunition, and hosting fighters loyal to Ismail Khan, who was captured by the Taliban in 1998 but escaped and fled to Iran in March 2000. In September 1998, Iranian and Taliban forces nearly came into direct conflict when Iran discovered that nine of its diplomats were killed in the course of Taliban’s offensive in northern Afghanistan. Iran massed forces at the border and threatened military action, but the crisis cooled without a major clash, possibly because Iran lacked confidence in its military capabilities.

Amid reports Iran seeks to exert influence over the new government by arming pro-Iranian Afghan factions, in early January 2002 President Bush warned Iran against meddling in Afghanistan. Since then, the Bush Administration has continued to accuse Iran of trying to build influence over the interim government and of failing to attempt to locate or arrest Al Qaeda fighters who have fled to Iran from Afghanistan. Partly in response to the U.S. criticism, in February 2002 Iran expelled Karzai-opponent Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, although it did not arrest him and allowed him to return to Afghanistan. For his part, Karzai has said that Iran is an important neighbor of Afghanistan and visited Iran in late February 2002, pledging to build ties with the Islamic republic. Iran did not strongly oppose Karzai’s firing of Iran ally Ismail Khan in September 2004, although Iran is said to be nervous about the subsequent U.S. use of the western Afghan air base of Shindand, 20 miles from the Iranian border.

As of October 2002, about 275,000 Afghan refugees have returned from Iran since the Taliban fell. About 1.2 million remain, many of which are integrated into Iranian society.

**Russia**

A number of considerations might explain why Russia supported the U.S. effort against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, including tacitly supporting, or at least not opposing, the use of bases in Central Asia to conduct the war. Russia’s main objective in Afghanistan has been to prevent the further strengthening of Islamic or nationalist movements in the Central Asian states or Islamic enclaves in Russia itself, including Chechnya. Russia’s fear became acute following an August 1999 incursion into Russia’s Dagestan region by Islamic guerrillas from neighboring Chechnya.

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Some reports link at least one faction of the guerrillas to Al Qaeda. This faction was led by a Chechen of Arab origin who is referred to by the name “Hattab” (full name is Ibn al-Khattab), although there are some reports Russia may have killed him in Chechnya in 2002. In January 2000, the Taliban became the only government in the world to recognize Chechnya’s independence, and some Chechen fighters fighting alongside Taliban/Al Qaeda forces have been captured or killed during OEF.

The U.S. and Russian positions on the Taliban became coincident well before the September 11 attacks. Even before the U.S.-led war, Russia was supporting the Northern Alliance with some military equipment and technical assistance. U.S.-Russian cooperation led to the passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1267 and 1233 (see section on “Harboring of Al Qaeda, below”). On the other hand, the United States has not blindly supported Russia’s apparent attempts to place a large share of the blame for the rebellion in Chechnya on the Taliban or Al Qaeda.

India

The interests and activities of India in Afghanistan are almost the exact reverse of those of Pakistan. India’s goal has been to deny Afghanistan from becoming a provider of “strategic depth” to Pakistan. In India’s view, Pakistan is attempting to keep some Taliban elements active because Pakistan believes the United States might some day depart the region, and Pakistan might want to have the option of installing another pro-Pakistan government in Afghanistan. India strongly supported the Northern Alliance in its civil war against the Pakistan-backed Taliban in the mid-1990s. India saw the Taliban’s hosting of Al Qaeda as a major threat to India itself because of Al Qaeda’s association with radical Islamic organizations in Pakistan dedicated to ending Indian control of parts of Jammu and Kashmir. Some of these organizations have committed major acts of terrorism in India. India is currently considering co-financing, along with the Asian Development Bank, several power projects in northern Afghanistan. India denies Pakistan’s allegations that it is recruiting anti-Pakistan insurgents in Afghanistan through its diplomatic facilities or other means.

46 These views were expressed by Indian officials during a visit to India in December 2004.
Central Asian States

During Taliban rule, leaders in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan grew increasingly alarmed that Central Asian radical Islamic movements were receiving safe haven in Afghanistan. In 1996, several of these states banded together with Russia and China into a regional grouping called the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to discuss the threat emanating from Afghanistan’s Taliban regime. The organization groups China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan; Karzai attended its meeting in April 2004 signaling the likely entry of Afghanistan into the grouping. Of the Central Asian states that border Afghanistan, two of them — Uzbekistan and Tajikistan — had seen themselves as particularly vulnerable to militants harbored by the Taliban. Uzbekistan saw its ally, Abdul Rashid Dostam, the Uzbek commander in northern Afghanistan, lose most of his influence in 1998. Prior to the U.S. war on the Taliban and Al Qaeda, Uzbek officials had said that more active support from Uzbekistan would not necessarily have enabled Dostam to overturn Taliban control of the north.

Uzbekistan has long asserted that the group Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), allegedly responsible for four simultaneous February 1999 bombings in Tashkent that nearly killed President Islam Karimov, is linked to Al Qaeda. One of its leaders, Juma Namangani, reportedly was killed while commanding Taliban/Al Qaeda forces in the battle for Mazar-e-Sharif in November 2001. Uzbekistan was highly supportive of the United States in the wake of the September 11 attacks and placed military facilities at U.S. disposal for use in the combat against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. About 1,000 U.S. troops from the 10th Mountain Division, as well as U.S. aircraft, have been based at the Khanabad/Karsi air base there. Following the fall of the Taliban, in December 2001 Uzbekistan reopened the Soviet-built “Friendship Bridge” over the Amu Darya river in order to facilitate the flow of aid into Uzbekistan. Uzbek officials in Tashkent told CRS in May 2002 that the defeat of the Taliban has made them less anxious about the domestic threat from the IMU, and press reports say the IMU has been severely weakened by its war defeats and Namangani’s death.

Tajikistan feared that its buffer with Afghanistan would disappear if the Taliban defeated the Northern Alliance, whose territorial base borders Tajikistan. Some of the IMU members based in Afghanistan, including Namangani, fought alongside the Islamic opposition United Tajik Opposition (UTO) during the 1994-1997 civil war in that country. Tajikistan, heavily influenced by Russia, whose 25,000 troops guards the border with Afghanistan, initially sent mixed signals on the question of whether it would give the United States the use of military facilities in Tajikistan. However, on September 26, 2001, Moscow officially endorsed the use by the United States of three air bases in Tajikistan, paving the way for Tajikistan to open facilities for U.S.

49 The IMU was named a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department in September 2000.
use, which it did formally offer in early November 2001. In July 2003, Afghanistan and Tajikistan agreed that some Russian officers would train some Afghan military officers in Tajikistan.

Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan do not directly border Afghanistan. However, IMU guerrillas have transited Kyrgyzstan during past incursions into Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan had begun to diplomatically engage the Taliban over the year prior to the September 11 attacks, but it publicly supported the U.S. war effort against the Taliban. In early December 2001, Kyrgyzstan offered to host U.S. warplanes, and U.S. and French aircraft, including U.S. Marine F-18 strike aircraft, have been using part of the international airport at Manas (Peter J. Ganci base) as a base for combat flights in Afghanistan. Kyrgyzstan said in March 2002 that there is no time limit on the U.S. use of military facilities there, and about 2,000 U.S. and other OEF personnel remain based at Manas. French aircraft withdrew in September 2002 as the war wound down. Kazakhstan signed an agreement with the United States in July 2002 to allow coalition aircraft to use Kazakhstan’s airports in case of an emergency or short term need related to the ongoing war in Afghanistan.

Of the Central Asian states that border Afghanistan, only Turkmenistan chose to seek close relations with the Taliban leadership when it was in power, possibly viewing engagement as a more effective means of preventing spillover of radical Islamic activity from Afghanistan. Turkmenistan’s leader, Saparmurad Niyazov, saw Taliban control as facilitating construction of a natural gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan, which would help Turkmenistan bring its large gas reserves to world markets. However, the September 11 events stoked Turkmenistan’s fears of the Taliban and its Al Qaeda guests and the country publicly supported the U.S.-led war. No OEF forces were based in Turkmenistan.

China

China has a small border with a sliver of Afghanistan known as the “Wakhan corridor” (see map) and had become increasingly concerned about the potential for Al Qaeda to promote Islamic fundamentalism among Muslims (Uighurs) in northwestern China. A number of Uighurs fought in Taliban and Al Qaeda ranks in the U.S.-led war, according to U.S. military officials. China expressed its concern through active membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, as noted above. In December 2000, sensing China’s increasing concern about Taliban policies, a Chinese official delegation met with Mullah Umar.

Although it has long been concerned about the threat from the Taliban and bin Laden, China did not, at first, enthusiastically support U.S. military action against the Taliban. Many experts believe this is because China, as a result of strategic considerations, was wary of a U.S. military buildup on its doorstep. China is an ally with Pakistan, in part to balance out India, which China sees as a rival. Pakistan’s cooperation with the United States appears to have allayed China’s opposition to U.S.

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50 *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1999*, pp. 14, 92.
51 Some information based on CRS visit to the Manas facility in Kyrgyzstan, May 2002.
military action, and President Bush has praised China’s cooperation with the anti-terrorism effort in his meetings with senior leaders of China.

**Saudi Arabia**

During the Soviet occupation, Saudi Arabia channeled hundreds of millions of dollars to the Afghan resistance, primarily the Islamic fundamentalist militias of Hikmatyar and Sayyaf. Saudi Arabia, which itself practices the strict Wahhabi brand of Islam practiced by the Taliban, was one of three countries to formally recognize the Taliban government. (The others are Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates.) The Taliban initially served Saudi Arabia as a potential counter to Iran, with which Saudi Arabia has been at odds since Iran’s 1979 revolution. However, Iranian-Saudi relations improved dramatically beginning in 1997, and balancing Iranian power ebbed as a factor in Saudi policy toward Afghanistan.

Drawing on its intelligence ties to Afghanistan during the anti-Soviet war, Saudi Arabia worked with Taliban leaders to persuade them to suppress anti-Saudi activities by Al Qaeda. Saudi Arabia apparently believed that Al Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan drew Saudi Islamic radicals away from Saudi Arabia itself and thereby reduced their opportunity to destabilize the Saudi regime. Some press reports indicate that, in late 1998, Saudi and Taliban leaders discussed, but did not agree on, a plan for a panel of Saudi and Afghan Islamic scholars to decide bin Laden’s fate. Other reports, however, say that Saudi Arabia refused an offer from Sudan in 1996 to extradite bin Laden to his homeland on the grounds that he could become a rallying point for opposition to the regime. In March 2000 and again in May 2000, the Saudi-based Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) sponsored indirect peace talks in Saudi Arabia between the warring factions.

According to U.S. officials, Saudi Arabia generally cooperated with the U.S. war effort. Along with the UAE, Saudi Arabia broke diplomatic relations with the Taliban in late September 2001. It quietly permitted the United States to use a Saudi base for command of U.S. air operations over Afghanistan, but it did not permit U.S. aircraft to launch strikes in Afghanistan from Saudi bases. The Saudi position has generally been to allow the United States the use of its facilities as long as doing so is not publicly requested or highly publicized.

**Residual Issues From Afghanistan’s Conflicts**

A few issues remain unresolved from Afghanistan’s many years of conflict. Among them are the “Stinger” anti-aircraft missiles provided to the mujahedin during the Soviet occupation, and the elimination of land mines.

**Stinger Retrieval.** Beginning in late 1985 and following an internal debate, the Reagan Administration provided “hundreds” of man-portable “Stinger” anti-aircraft missiles to the mujahedin for use against Soviet combat helicopters and aircraft. Prior to the U.S.-led war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, common estimates among experts suggested that 200-300 Stingers remained at large in
Afghanistan out of about 1,000 provided during the war against the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{52} The Stinger issue resurfaced in conjunction with the U.S. war effort, when U.S. pilots reported that the Taliban fired some Stinglers at U.S. aircraft during the war, but they recorded no hits. Any Stinglers that survived the anti-Taliban war were controlled by Afghans now allied to the United States and presumably posed less of a threat. However, there are continued concerns that remaining Stinglers could be sold to terrorists for use against civilian airliners and the United States has tried to retrieve those remaining. In February 2002, the Afghan government found and returned to the United States “dozens” of Stinglers.\textsuperscript{53} Estimates in the press say about 50-70 Stinglers remain unaccounted for.

In the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the United States had tried to retrieve the at-large Stinglers.\textsuperscript{54} Iran bought 16 of the missiles in 1987 and fired one against U.S. helicopters; some reportedly were transferred to Lebanese Hizballah, according to press reports in January 2002. India claimed that it was a Stinger, supplied to Islamic rebels in Kashmir probably by sympathizers in Afghanistan, that shot down an Indian helicopter over Kashmir in May 1999.\textsuperscript{55} It was not the Stinger but Soviet-made SA-7 “Strella” man portable launchers that were fired, allegedly by Al Qaeda, against a U.S. military aircraft in Saudi Arabia in June 2002 and against an Israeli passenger aircraft in Kenya on November 30, 2002. Both firings missed their targets. SA-7s have been discovered in Afghanistan by U.S.-led forces, most recently in December 2002.

The practical difficulties of retrieving the weapons had caused this issue to fade from the U.S. agenda for Afghanistan during the 1990s. In 1992, the United States reportedly spent about $10 million to buy the Stinglers back, at a premium, from individual mujahedin commanders. The \textit{New York Times} reported on July 24, 1993, that the buy back effort failed because the United States was competing with other buyers, including Iran and North Korea, and that the CIA would spend about $55 million in FY1994 in a renewed Stinger buy-back effort. On March 7, 1994, the \textit{Washington Post} reported that the CIA had recovered only a fraction of the at-large Stinglers. Many observers speculate that the CIA program retrieved perhaps 50 or 100 of them.

\textbf{Mine Eradication.} Land mines laid during the Soviet occupation constitute one of the principal dangers to the Afghan people. The United Nations estimates that 5-7 million mines remain scattered throughout the country, although some estimates by outside organizations are significantly lower. An estimated 400,000 Afghans have been killed or wounded by land mines. U.N. teams have succeeded in destroying one million mines and are now focusing on de-mining priority-use, residential and commercial property, including land surrounding Kabul. As shown in the U.S. aid

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{54} Gertz, Bill. “Stinger Bite Feared in CIA.” \textit{Washington Times}, October 9, 2000.
\item \textsuperscript{55} “U.S.-Made Stinger Missiles — Mobile and Lethal.” \textit{Reuters}, May 28, 1999.
\end{itemize}
table for FY1999-FY2002, the United States Humanitarian Demining Program was providing about $3 million per year for Afghanistan demining activities, and the amount has escalated to about $7 million in the post-Taliban period. Most of the funds go to the HALO Trust, a British organization, and the U.N. Mine Action Program for Afghanistan.

Providing Resources to the Afghan Government

Since the Soviet invasion, Afghanistan has faced major humanitarian difficulties, some of which deteriorated further under Taliban rule. In addition to 3.6 million Afghan refugees at the start of the U.S.-led war, another 500,000 Afghans were displaced internally even before U.S. military action began, according to Secretary General Annan’s April 19, 2001, report on Afghanistan. Many of the displaced persons had fled the effects of a major drought that affected the 85% of the population that directly depends on agriculture. The conflicts in Afghanistan, including the war against the Soviet Union, left about 2 million dead, 700,000 widows and orphans and about one million Afghan children who were born and raised in refugee camps outside Afghanistan. However, over 3 million Afghan refugees have returned since January 2002. A variety of U.N. agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) serve as the vehicles for international assistance to Afghanistan. The U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) supervises Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan and Afghan repatriation.

U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan

During the 1990s, the United States became the largest single provider of assistance to the Afghan people, even during Taliban rule. No U.S. aid went directly to the Taliban government; monies were provided through recognized NGO’s and relief organizations. During 1985-1994, the United States did have a cross-border aid program for Afghanistan, through which aid was distributed in Afghanistan via U.S. aid workers in Pakistan. However, citing the difficulty of administering a cross-border program, there was no USAID mission for Afghanistan from the end of FY1994 until the reopening of the U.S. Embassy in late 2001. Table 1 breaks down FY1999-FY2002 aid by program. For a history of U.S. aid to Afghanistan prior to 1999 (FY1978-FY1998), see Table 3. (It should be noted that, in some cases, aid figures are subject to variation depending on how that aid is measured. The figures below might not exactly match figures in appropriated legislation; in some funds were added to specified accounts from monies in the September 11-related Emergency Response Fund.)

Post-Taliban/FY2002. On October 4, 2001, in an effort to demonstrate that the United States had an interest in the welfare of the Afghan people and not just the defeat of the Taliban, President Bush announced that humanitarian aid to the Afghan

56 About 1.5 million Afghan refugees were in Iran; 2 million in Pakistan; 20,000 in Russia; 17,000 in India, and 9,000 in the Central Asian states.
people would total about $320 million for FY2002. After the fall of the Taliban, at a donors’ conference in Tokyo during January 20-21, 2002, the United States pledged $296 million in reconstruction aid for Afghanistan for FY2002. The amounts provided for FY2002 are listed in the table below; the figures include both humanitarian and reconstruction aid, totaling over $815 million for FY2002, which includes Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funds devoted to the establishment and training of the Afghan National Army.

**Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002.** An authorization bill, S. 2712, the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002, was passed by the Senate on November 14 and by the House on November 15, and signed on December 4, 2002 (P.L. 107-327). It authorized the following:

- $60 million in total counter-narcotics assistance ($15 million per year for FY2003-FY2006);
- $30 million in assistance for political development, including national, regional, and local elections ($10 million per year for FY2003-FY2005);
- $80 million total to benefit women and for Afghan human rights oversight ($15 million per year for FY2003-FY2006 for the Afghan Ministry of Women’s Affairs, and $5 million per year for FY2003-2006 to the National Human Rights Commission of Afghanistan);
- $1.7 billion in humanitarian and development aid ($425 million per year for FY2003-FY2006);
- $300 million for an Enterprise Fund;
- $300 million in draw-downs of defense articles and services for Afghanistan and regional militaries; and
- $1 billion ($500 million per year for FY2003-FY2004) to expand ISAF if such an expansion takes place.

The total authorization, for all categories for all years, is $3.47 billion. For the most part, the humanitarian, counter-narcotics, and governance assistance targets authorized by the act have been met or exceeded by successive appropriations. However, no Enterprise Funds have been appropriated, and ISAF expansion, to the extent it has occurred, has been funded by ISAF contributing nations, not U.S. appropriations.

**Proposed September 11 Commission-Related Amendments.** Some legislative proposals to implement the recommendations of the September 11 Commission focus on accelerating efforts to stabilize and reconstruct Afghanistan. S. 2845, the version of legislation to implement the Commission recommendations, passed by both chambers in December 2004, contains a subtitle called “The Afghanistan Freedom Support Act Amendments of 2004.” The subtitle mandates the appointment of a U.S. coordinator of policy on Afghanistan and contains provisions requiring additional Administration reports to Congress on progress in reconstruction. The subtitle also contains several “sense of Congress” provisions recommending more rapid DDR activities (see above); expansion of ISAF; and new initiatives to combat narcotics trafficking. The subtitle also eliminates precise dollar authorizations for U.S. aid to Afghanistan for FY2005 and FY2006, authorizing instead “such sums as may be necessary for each of the fiscal years 2005 and 2006.”
FY2003. The Administration provided about $740 million in assistance to Afghanistan in FY2003, close to the pledge announced on March 17, 2003, at a donors forum for Afghanistan, held in Brussels. As part of the FY2003 program, the United States spent $100 million on road reconstruction, as part of an international pledge of $180 million, primarily for the Kabul-Qandahar road. Table 2 covers FY2003 aid as appropriated in the regular FY2003 foreign aid appropriations (P.L. 108-7 omnibus appropriations), which earmarked at least $295 million in aid to Afghanistan, and the FY2003 supplemental appropriations (H.R. 1559, P.L. 108-11).

FY2004. The Administration is providing about $1.9 billion for Afghanistan in FY2004, in both regular (H.R. 2673, P.L. 108-199) and supplemental appropriations (P.L. 108-106). Table 3 below contains a chart of FY2004 assistance to Afghanistan. As noted, most of the FY2004 were provided in a supplemental appropriation, requested to help accelerate reconstruction and expand the capabilities and effectiveness of the Kabul government. The purposes and results of some of the aid provided in that supplemental are discussed under the issue categories analyzed in the previous sections of this paper. The FY2004 supplemental request also asked that the $300 million limit on military drawdowns from DOD stocks enacted in the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-327) be increased to $600 million. The FY2004 supplemental conference report increased the level to $450 million.

FY2005. On February 2, 2004, the Administration sent to Congress its proposed budget for FY2005. The $929 million request for Afghanistan asks for funding in the following categories:

- $150 million in development assistance (DA), including agriculture ($45 million), private sector investment ($31 million), environment ($28 million), primary education ($24 million), child and maternal health ($13 million), reproductive health ($7 million), and democracy building ($20 million);
- $ 225 million in security assistance (ESF), including assistance to Afghanistan’s governing institutions;
- $400 million in FMF for the Afghan National Army;
- $800,00 in International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds to train Afghan officers in democratic values;
- $90 million for police and judicial training and counter-narcotics;
- $17.45 million for non-proliferation, anti-terrorism, de-mining, and related programs, including Karzai protection; and
- $24 million for peacekeeping, including salaries of ANA soldiers in training.

In FY2005 foreign aid legislation, H.R. 4818 (P.L. 108-447) appropriates $980 million in humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan, plus $6 million in child and maternal health. As noted above, the law earmarks $50 million of those funds for programs that benefit Afghan women and girls. From the funds

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57 Much of this section was taken from CRS Report RL31811, Appropriations for FY2004: Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs.
appropriated, the law also earmarks $2 million for reforestation and $2 million for the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission.

**Additional Forms of U.S. Assistance.** In addition to providing U.S. foreign assistance, since 2002 the U.S. Treasury Department (Office of Foreign Assets Control, OFAC) has unblocked over $145 million in assets of Afghan government-owned banking entities that were frozen under U.S. sanctions imposed on the Taliban in 1999 (see below). These funds have been used by the new government for currency stabilization, not for recurring costs of the interim government. Most of the funds consisted of gold that is held in Afghanistan’s name in the United States to back up Afghanistan’s currency. Together with its allies, over $350 million in frozen funds have been released to the new government. In January 2002, the United States agreed to provide $50 million in credit for U.S. investment in Afghanistan, provided by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). On March 7, 2003, OPIC pledged an additional $50 million, bringing the total line of credit to $100 million. The United States also has successfully pressed the International Air Transport Association to pay Afghanistan $20 million in overflight fees that were withheld because of U.N. sanctions on the Taliban. In April 2002, OFAC unblocked $17 million in privately-owned Afghan assets.

**World Bank/Asian Development Bank.** In May 2002, the World Bank reopened its office in Afghanistan after twenty years and, on March 12, 2003, it announced a $108 million loan to Afghanistan, the first since 1979. In August 2003, the World Bank agreed to lend Afghanistan an additional $30 million to rehabilitate the telecommunications system, and $30 million for road and drainage rehabilitation in Kabul.

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has been playing a major role in Afghanistan and has pledged $800 million in loans and grants and $200 million in project insurance for Afghanistan. Since December 2002, the bank has loaned Afghanistan $372 million of road reconstruction, fiscal management and governance, and agricultural development. The Bank has also granted Afghanistan about $90 million for power projects, agriculture reform, roads, and rehabilitation of the energy sector. One of its major projects in Afghanistan was funding the paving of a road from Qandahar to the border with Pakistan. On December 16, 2004, the Bank approved an additional loan of $80 million to restore and improve key sections of the road system.

**International Reconstruction Pledges.** Common estimates of reconstruction needs run up to about $10 billion. At the Tokyo donors’ conference, mentioned above, the following international reconstruction pledges were announced: European Union, $495 million in 2002; Japan, $500 million over the next 30 months; Germany, $362 million over the next four years; Saudi Arabia, $220 million over the next three years; Iran, $560 million over the next five years; Pakistan, $100 million over the next five years; India, a $100 million line of credit; South Korea, $45 million over 30 months; and United Kingdom, $86 million in 2002. Total pledges in Tokyo for reconstruction amounted to $2 billion for 2002 and $4.5 billion over the next five years. Of the amounts pledged for 2002, about $2 billion was spent or received. In March 2003, the EU announced a $410 million donation for 2003-2004. This is in addition to its contribution, noted above, for 2002.
During March 31 - April 1, 2004, international donors met in Berlin and pledged $8.2 billion for Afghanistan for 2004-2006, of which about $4.5 billion is to be provided in 2004. The United States committed about $2.9 for the whole period, which includes the $1.2 billion planned for U.S. FY2005.\textsuperscript{58} Afghan leaders had said before the meeting that Afghanistan needs $27.5 billion for reconstruction over the next seven years, but they said they were satisfied with the Berlin outcome. Other pledges for 2004-2006 included European Union ($2.2 billion); Canada (200 million); Japan ($400 million); World Bank loans ($900 million); Asia Development Bank loans ($560 million); India ($225 million), and Iran ($155 million).

**Domestically Generated Funds.** Obtaining control over revenues has been a key U.S. and Kabul goal. In May 2003, Karzai threatened to resign if the regional governors did not remit some of their privately collected customs revenue to the central government. Twelve regional leaders did so, subsequently remitting nearly $100 million to Kabul. Kabul raised internally about $210 million of its $600 million budget for the fiscal year ending March 2004. Karzai has sought to reassure international donors by establishing a transparent budget and planning process.

**Promoting Long Term Economic Development.** In an effort to find a long-term solution to Afghanistan’s acute humanitarian problems, the United States has, when feasible, tried to promote major development projects as a means of improving Afghan living standards and political stability over the long term. During 1996-98, the Clinton Administration supported proposed natural gas and oil pipelines through western Afghanistan as an incentive for the warring factions to cooperate. One proposal by a consortium led by Los Angeles-based Unocal Corporation\textsuperscript{59} was for a Central Asia Oil Pipeline (CAOP) that would originate at the Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan border and extend through the western region of Afghanistan to Pakistan. A $2.5 billion Central Asia Gas Pipeline (CentGas) would originate in southern Turkmenistan and pass through Afghanistan to Pakistan, with possible extensions into India.

The deterioration in U.S.-Taliban relations after 1998 largely ended hopes for the pipeline projects while the Taliban was in power. Immediately after the August 20, 1998 U.S. strikes on bin Laden’s bases in Afghanistan, Unocal suspended all its Afghan pipeline-related activities, including a U.S.-based training program for Afghans who were expected to work on the project. With few prospects of improved U.S. relations with Taliban, Unocal withdrew from its consortium in December 1998. Saudi Delta Oil was made interim project leader, although Delta lacked the financing and technology to make the consortium viable. The rival consortium led by Bridas of Argentina reportedly continued to try to win approval for its proposal to undertake the project.

\textsuperscript{58} Afghanistan’s Top Donors To Pledge Nine Billion Dollars - Report. 

\textsuperscript{59} Other participants in the Unocal consortium include Delta of Saudi Arabia, Hyundai of South Korea, Crescent Steel of Pakistan, Itochu Corporation and INPEX of Japan, and the government of Turkmenistan. Some accounts say Russia’s Gazprom would probably receive a stake in the project. Moscow Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 30, 1997. Page 3.
Prospects for the project have improved in the post-Taliban period. In a summit meeting in late May 2002 between the leaders of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, the three countries agreed to revive the gas pipeline project. Sponsors of the project held an inaugural meeting on July 9, 2002 in Turkmenistan, signing a series of preliminary agreements. However, financing for the project is unclear.

**Trade and Investment Framework Agreement.** The United States is trying to build on Afghanistan’s post-war economic rebound. The Afghan economy grew 30% in 2002, 25% in 2003, and it is expected to grow 20% in 2004, according to Karzai. Following a meeting with Karzai on June 15, 2004, President Bush announced the United States and Afghanistan would negotiate a bilateral trade and investment framework agreement (TIFA). These agreements are generally seen as a prelude to a broader but more complex bilateral free trade agreement. On December 13, 2004, the 148 countries of the World Trade Organization voted to start membership talks with Afghanistan.

**Lifting of U.S. and International Sanctions.** Shoring up a post-Taliban government of Afghanistan with financial and other assistance has required waivers of restrictions or the permanent modification of U.S. and U.N. sanctions previously imposed on Afghanistan. Most of the sanctions discussed below have now been lifted.

- On May 2, 1980, Afghanistan was deleted from the list of designated beneficiary countries under the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), denying Afghanistan’s exports duty free treatment, by Executive Order 12204 (45 F.R. 20740). This was done under the authority of Section 504 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended [P.L. 93-618; 19 U.S.C. 2464]. On January 10, 2003, the President signed a proclamation making Afghanistan a beneficiary of GSP, eliminating U.S. tariffs on 5,700 Afghan products.

- On June 3, 1980, as part of the sanctions against the Soviet Union for the invasion of Afghanistan, the United States imposed controls on exports to Afghanistan of agricultural products, oil and gas exploration and production equipment, and phosphates. This was implemented at 15 CFR Part 373 et seq (45 F.R. 37415) under the authority of Sections 5 and 6 of the Export Administration Act of 1979 [P.L. 96-72; 50 U.S.C. app. 2404, app. 2405]. On April 24, 1981, these sanctions were modified to terminate controls on U.S. exports to Afghanistan of agricultural products and phosphates.

- In mid-1992, the George H.W. Bush Administration determined that Afghanistan no longer had a “Soviet-controlled government.” This opened Afghanistan to the use of U.S. funds made available for the U.S. share of U.N. organizations that provide assistance to Afghanistan.

- On October 7, 1992, President George H.W. Bush issued Presidential Determination 93-3 that Afghanistan is no longer a Marxist-Leninist country. The designation as such a country had
prohibited Afghanistan from receiving Export-Import Bank guarantees, insurance, or credits for purchases under Sec. 8 of the 1986 Export-Import Bank Act, which amended Section 2(b)(2) of the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 (P.L. 79-173, 12 U.S.C. 635). However, President George H.W. Bush’s determination was not implemented before he left office.

- President George H.W. Bush’s October 7, 1992 determination (93-3) also found that assistance to Afghanistan under Section 620D of the Foreign Assistance Act is in the national interest of the United States because of the change of regime in Afghanistan. The presidential determination, had it been implemented in regulations, would have waived restrictions on assistance to Afghanistan provided for in the act, as amended [P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. 2374]; as added by Section 505 of the International Development Cooperation Act of 1979 [P.L. 96-53]. These provisions prohibit foreign assistance to Afghanistan until it apologizes for the death of U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Adolph Dubs, who was kidnapped in Kabul in 1979 and killed when Afghan police stormed the hideout where he was held, unless the President determines that such assistance is in the national interest because of changed circumstances in Afghanistan. This restriction has consistently been waived since the fall of the Taliban. A provision of S. 2845, passed by both chambers, repeals this restriction outright.

- Section 552 of the Foreign Assistance Appropriations for FY1986 [P.L. 99-190] authorized the President to deny any U.S. credits or most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff status for Afghanistan. Under that law, on February 18, 1986, the height of the Soviet occupation, President Reagan had issued Presidential Proclamation 5437, suspending (MFN) tariff status for Afghanistan (51 F.R. 4287). On May 3, 2002, President Bush restored normal trade treatment to the products of Afghanistan.

- On March 31, 1993, President Clinton, on national interest grounds, waived restrictions provided for in Section 481 (h) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended [P.L. 87-195]; as amended and restated by Section 2005(a) of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 [P.L. 99-570]. The waiver was renewed in 1994. Mandatory sanctions include bilateral aid cuts and suspensions, including denial of Ex-Im Bank credits; the casting of negative U.S. votes for multilateral development bank loans; and a non-allocation of a U.S. sugar quota. Discretionary sanctions included denial of GSP; additional duties on country exports to the United States; and curtailment of air transportation with the United States. On February 25, 2002, President Bush waived restrictions on FY2002 aid to Afghanistan under this Act.

- On June 14, 1996, Afghanistan was formally added to the list of countries prohibited from receiving exports or licenses for exports
of U.S. defense articles and services. This amended the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (22 CFR Part 121 et seq.) under the authority of Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended (P.L. 90-629; 22 U.S.C. 2778) by adding Afghanistan at Section 126.1 of 22 CFR Part 126. **On July 2, 2002, the State Department amended U.S. regulations (22 CFR Part 126) to allow arms sales to the new Afghan government.**

- In a ruling largely redundant with the one above, on May 15, 1997, the State Department designated Afghanistan under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-132), as a state that is not cooperating with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts. The designation, made primarily because of Taliban’s harboring of bin Laden, makes Afghanistan ineligible to receive U.S. exports of items on the U.S. Munitions List. The designation was repeated every year since 1997. **Afghanistan was deleted from the list of non-cooperative states when the list was reissued on May 15, 2002, thereby eliminating this sanction on Afghanistan.**

- On July 4, 1999, the President declared a national emergency with respect to Taliban because of its hosting of bin Laden, and issued Executive Order 13129 that imposed sanctions. The sanctions include the blocking of Taliban assets and property in the United States, and a ban on U.S. trade with Taliban-controlled areas of Afghanistan. On August 10, 1999, the Administration determined that Ariana Afghan Airlines was a Taliban entity. That determination triggered a blocking of Ariana assets (about $500,000) in the United States and a ban on U.S. citizens’ flying on the airline. **On January 29, 2002, the State Department issued a determination that the Taliban controls no territory within Afghanistan, thus essentially ending this trade ban. On July 2, 2002, President Bush formally revoked this executive order.**

- On October 15, 1999, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1267; on December 19, 2000, it adopted U.N. Security Council Resolution 1333, imposed a number of new sanctions against the Taliban. For the provisions of these sanctions, see the section on the harboring of bin Laden. **As noted, these sanctions were narrowed to penalize only Al Qaeda by virtue of the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1390 of January 17, 2002.**
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Program</th>
<th>FY1999</th>
<th>FY2000</th>
<th>FY2001</th>
<th>FY2002 (Final)</th>
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<td>U.S. Department of Agriculture (DOA) and USAID Food For Peace (FFP), via World Food Program (WFP)</td>
<td>$42.0 worth of wheat (100,000 metric tons under “416(b)” program)</td>
<td>$68,875 for 165,000 metric tons. (60,000 tons for May 2000 drought relief)</td>
<td>$131.0 (300,000 metric tons under P.L.480, Title II, and 416(b))</td>
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<td>$16.95 for Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran, and to assist their repatriation</td>
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<td>$22.03 for similar purposes</td>
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<td>$7.0 to various NGO’s to aid Afghans inside Afghanistan</td>
<td>$6.68 for drought relief and health, water, and sanitation programs</td>
<td>$18,934 for similar programs</td>
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<td>Aid to Afghan Refugees in Pakistan (through various NGOs)</td>
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<td>$6.169, of which $3.82 went to similar purposes</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$50.9 (2.4 million rations)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Military Financing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$57.0 (for Afghan national army)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Terrorism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$36.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Support Funds (E.S.F)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$105.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$24.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>$76.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>$113.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>$182.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>$815.9</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan, FY2003
($ in millions, same acronyms as above table)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From the FY2003 Foreign Aid Appropriations (P.L. 108-7)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Development/Health</td>
<td>$90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food Aid</td>
<td>$47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>$10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster Relief</td>
<td>$94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>$50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Proliferation, Demining, Anti-Terrorism (NADR)</td>
<td>$5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee Relief</td>
<td>$55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military aid</td>
<td>$21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total from this law:</td>
<td>$372</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From the FY2003 Supplemental (P.L. 108-11)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ESF</td>
<td>$167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>($100 million for Kabul-Qandahar road; $plus 10 million for provincial reconstruction teams; and $57 million for operational support to Afghan government)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Aid</td>
<td>$170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(to train Afghan national army)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-terrorism/de-mining</td>
<td>$28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total from this law:</td>
<td>$365</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total for FY2003:</strong></td>
<td><strong>$737</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan, FY2004
($ in millions, same acronyms as previous tables)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From the FY2004 Supplemental (P.L. 108-106)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR program)</td>
<td>$30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to Afghan government</td>
<td>$70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elections/governance</td>
<td>$69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads</td>
<td>$181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools/Education</td>
<td>$95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health Services/Clinics</td>
<td>$49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)</td>
<td>$58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private Sector/Power Generation</td>
<td>$95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Projects</td>
<td>$23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counter-narcotics/police training</td>
<td>$220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan National Army (training/equipment)</td>
<td>$364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Terrorism/Afghan Leadership Protection</td>
<td>$64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>$150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total from this law:</strong></td>
<td><strong>$1,47</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>From the FY2004 Regular Appropriation (P.L. 108-199)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Development/Health</td>
<td>$171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster Relief</td>
<td>$35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugee Relief</td>
<td>$72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Aid/ESF</td>
<td>$75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(includes earmarks of $2 million for reforestation; $2 million for the Afghan Judicial Reform Commission; $5 million for Afghan women; and $2 million for aid to communities and victims of U.S. military operations)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Assistance</td>
<td>$50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total from this law:</strong></td>
<td><strong>$403</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total for FY2004</strong></td>
<td><strong>$1,87</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>Devel. Assist.</th>
<th>Econ. Supp. (ESF)</th>
<th>P.L. 480 (Title I and II)</th>
<th>Military</th>
<th>Other (Incl. Regional Refugee Aid)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>4.989</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>5.742</td>
<td>0.269</td>
<td>0.789</td>
<td>11.789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>3.074</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>7.195</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0.347</td>
<td>10.616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>(Soviet invasion - December 1979)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>3.369</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3.369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>29.9</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>74.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>77.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>88.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>80.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>81.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>68.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>42.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>45.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>26.4</td>
<td>42.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>31.9*</td>
<td>49.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>49.14**</td>
<td>52.74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: U.S. Department of State.
* Includes $3 million for demining and $1.2 million for counternarcotics.
** Includes $3.3 million in projects targeted for Afghan women and girls, $7 million in earthquake relief aid, 100,000 tons of 416B wheat worth about $15 million, $2 million for demining, and $1.54 for counternarcotics.
Table 5. Major Factions in Afghanistan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party/Commander</th>
<th>Leader</th>
<th>Ideology/Ethnicity</th>
<th>Power Base</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taliban</td>
<td>Mullah (Islamic cleric) Muhammad Umar</td>
<td>ultra-orthodox Islamic, Pashtun</td>
<td>Small opposition groups, mostly in the south and east. No official presence in government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Society (dominant party in the “Northern Alliance”)</td>
<td>Burhannudin Rabbani (political leader), Muhammad Fahim (military leaders)</td>
<td>moderate Islamic, mostly Tajik</td>
<td>Much of northern and western Afghanistan, including Kabul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ismail Khan (part of Islamic Society/Northern Alliance)</td>
<td>Ismail Khan</td>
<td>Tajik</td>
<td>Herat Province and environs; Khan removed as Herat governor in September 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Shura (Council)</td>
<td>No clear leader, after death of Abdul Qadir; son succeeded him as Jalalabad governor</td>
<td>moderate Islamic, Pashtun</td>
<td>Jalalabad and environs; Qadir was vice president.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hizb-e-Wahdat</td>
<td>Karim Khalili (Vice President)</td>
<td>Shiite, Hazara tribes</td>
<td>Bamiyan province.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pashtun Leaders</td>
<td>Various leaders; government led by Karzai. Gul Agha Shirzai reappointed Qandahar governor (Dec. 04)</td>
<td>mostly conservative Islamic, Pashtun</td>
<td>Southern, eastern Afghanistan, including Qandahar, Gardez, Ghazni, Khost, Tarin Kowt, Spin Buldak.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hizb-e-Islam Gulbuddin (HIG)</td>
<td>Mujahedin party leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar</td>
<td>orthodox Islamic, Pashtun</td>
<td>Small groups around Jalalabad and in the southeast. Allied with Taliban.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic Union</td>
<td>Abd-i-Rab Rasul Sayyaf</td>
<td>orthodox Islamic, Pashtun</td>
<td>No clear regional base</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1. Map of Afghanistan

Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS. (1/03 M.Chin)